THE POST–RAWLSIAN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
A CRITIQUE OF THE REALIST STANDPOINT

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Abstract: This article presents a critique of the contemporary realist political theory developed as an anti–thesis to the Rawlsian normative political philosophy. John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* (1971) fosters a colossal influence on the current Anglo–American political thought which defends that political philosophy ought to be an applied moral philosophy. It offers a normative standpoint. Political realists, on the other hand, argue that political philosophy should be independent of moral philosophy. It offers a realist standpoint. The core contention between these two standpoints is that whether political philosophy is (in)dependent to moral philosophy. The normative standpoint places ethics at the centre of politics while the realist standpoint places sociology and history at the centre of politics. In this paper, I examine the central contours of political realism to understand whether it can be consistent with political moralism. I conclude that reverence as a moral and political ideal could be a common foundation for political realism and moralism.

Key Words: Political moralism, political realism, John Rawls, Raymond Geuss, Bernard Williams, reverence as a moral and political ideal.
Introduction

John Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* (1971) had a seismic impact on Anglo–American political philosophy. This impact eventually established an academic industry, the Rawlsian industry, in the contemporary social and political thought. Robert Nozick, Ronald Dworkin, David Gauthier and Jeremy Waldron are considered to be significant and ardent intellectual workers of the industry. However, the central thesis of the Rawlsian political theory maintains that ‘politics is an applied ethics.’ This position has been labelled as ‘political moralism’ by Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss. Political moralism gives credence of ethics to politics in the sense that normative moral values ought to direct political conduct. Notably, political realism is one of the numerous standpoints that stand in contrast to political moralism. Political realists argue that political judgements should not be derived from moral values, but from political values, and these political values should direct political decision-making. According to political realism, legitimacy, order, stability, freedom, equality and toleration are political values. In this paper, I will evaluate the central arguments of political realism to understand whether these political values are promising for bringing about the common good in society.

Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice,* certainly, has been successful enough to produce numerous offshoots in socio–political theory. Besides communitarianism and the common mind theory, political realism is one of the central theories in political philosophy that appeared in reaction to the Rawlsian philosophy. Although, Rawls has been generally recognized with the assumption that he revitalizes political philosophy in the contemporary epoch, political realists debunk the assumption and they accuse Rawls that he turned the political philosophy in a wrong direction which is actually an escape from reality. It means that the Rawlsian philosophy is normative and ideal, and has no relation with reality. Instead, political realists argue that political philosophy should deal with real problems in political life. They draw their arguments on the classical canonical works of political philosophy, such as Thucydides, Niccolo Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, J. G. Herder and Friedrich Nietzsche. Accordingly, political realists claim that politics is not an applied ethics. Considering the central premise of political realism, I argue that although political realist argument, which locates politics in society and history, is a promising standpoint, it does not mean that a political conduct should not be moral. It is reasonable to exercise political values, such as political legitimacy, political authority
and political power, but these political values should be underpinned with a sense of reverence for the common good.

This paper will primarily discuss the main contours of the Rawlsian political philosophy to make sense of how it could impact the post-Rawlsian approaches in political thought. Subsequently, I will briefly explicate those divergent strands in political theory that emerge directly or indirectly in response to the Rawlsian project. Furthermore, I will evaluate the arguments of two leading political realists, Raymond Geuss and Bernard Williams, to examine the validity of their arguments. In the last section, I will conclude the argument.

**The Rawlsian Political Thought**

The question of whether political philosophy was dead had been widely deliberated by academia in the 1960s. Brian Barry and Isaiah Berlin have adequately demonstrated the declining conditions of political philosophy. In his article, *The Strange Death of Political Philosophy*, Barry concluded that political philosophy was almost lifeless. He records the actual existential conditions of political philosophy in 1961 stating “You really could turn over whole volumes of the political journals and find nothing about political philosophy—indeed very little substantive moral philosophy except for an occasional piece of utilitarian casuistry”. Like Barry, Berlin’s paper *Does Political Theory Still Exist?* (1962) sustains that same view. He asserts that ‘political philosophy, whatever, it may have been in the past, is today dead or dying. The principal symptom which seems to support this belief is that no commanding work of political philosophy has appeared in the twentieth century”. Hence, it can be safely concluded that in 1960s political philosophy had completely flat lined.

A decade later in 1971, Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, gave life to the breathless carcass of political philosophy. In spite of numerous shortcomings, Rawls’s theory unexpectedly became ubiquitous in academic and non-academic arenas. The book which is colossally long, badly structured, and stylistically ordinary, has become vastly popular all over. It posits massive, but ambitious claims to draw principles of justice from a hypothetical situation, ‘original position’, which represents the contemporary liberal mind. It has emerged as a phenomenon, ‘the Rawls phenomenon’ that not only influences scholars in the subject of philosophy, but also in other subjects including
economics, political science, law and sociology. The expression, ‘Rawls phenomena’, has been used in different contexts: the Rawls industry, Rawlsianism or Rawlsian project.

Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* primarily defends the thesis that a political action should be executed under certain moral conditions for fostering egalitarian social justice. This philosophical position is ultimately drawn to suggest that politics is an applied ethics. Drawing on Hobbesian notion of ‘state of nature’, and Kantian notion of ‘categorical imperative’, Rawls coins two metaphors, ‘the original position’ and ‘the veil of ignorance’, for a hypothetical situation in which individuals coordinate with each other with a sense of fairness for acquiring a social justice. For Rawls, the notion of the original position provides “an initial choice situation” for a theory of justice. The purpose for creating an initial situation (the original position) is to consider “commonly shared assumptions” under reasonable restrictions so that people should not be unduly advantaged or deprived because of social conditions or natural fate. Rawls juxtaposes the expression ‘original position’ with the expression ‘veil of ignorance’ to maintain impartiality. Like the hypothetical situation of the original position, veil of ignorance separates a human mind from all kinds of identities: the agents become oblivious of their culture, religion, language, race and colour or any other kinds of identities.

It presents a thought experiment in which people imagine that anonymous individuals attempt to reach decisions under several different artificial state of affairs, while being oblivious of certain facts about the world. Thus, Rawls’s political theory maintains that under normative conditions, an agreement on egalitarian grounds can be possible among individuals for social justice with a sense of fairness. The opponents of the Rawlsian philosophy, the political realists, allege that ‘political philosophy is an applied moral philosophy’. Countering the allegation of political realists, Jeremy Waldron has recently published an interesting book titled *Political Political Theory* (2016). Waldron argues that political theory should be based on normative aims and ideals because politics is not a science but a system of norms. He identifies and enumerates the ideals with "justice, equality, human rights, toleration, liberty, community, prosperity, wealth maximisation and the common good". Besides numerous defenders of the Rawlsian normative project, Waldron’s recent defense is promising.
The Post-Rawlsian Political Philosophy: Divergent Strands

Indeed, Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* acted as a catalyst for the emergence of divergent strands in political thought. Rawls’s theory is principally characterised with two striking features: the individualist stance and the normativist stance. These two stances generate two strands of theories. In response to the individualist stance two main social holist theories have emerged: the common mind theory and communitarianism. While in reaction to the normative stance, political realism made an appearance.

The common mind theory, posited by Philip Pettit, proclaims that social metaphysics is essential for explaining social and political conduct\(^\text{19}\). The central argument of the common mind theory supports that social metaphysics comprising ‘commonable contents’ which are intelligible to people, escort them to “think in a commonable way”\(^\text{20}\). This ‘thinking in a commonable way’ underpins collective action in social and political life. Accordingly, a political theorist must identify a common mind by considering ‘what is there in social arena’\(^\text{21}\) to create a social and political theory. So, the common mind theory is a post-Rawlsian approach in political philosophy which is novel in the sense that it diverts from the tradition of justice. Since 1971, it seems that theorising justice is perhaps the only way to theorise political philosophy.

Besides the common mind theory, communitarianism is a social holist theory that also contradicts with Rawls’s political philosophy of justice. Communitarianism argues that the community is prior to the individual. Some of the significant communitarian theorists are Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer. Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* is regarded as the handbook of the contemporary liberal political theory. The problem of how the individual relates to the community is one of the central disputes between the communitarian theorists and the liberal theorists. However, the communitarian theorists criticise that the Rawlsian political theory, which takes individual’s ends independent or prior to society in a quixotic original position with its veil of ignorance, is mistaken, because people’s ends as values or conceptions of the good emerge as a result of their social interactions in real community\(^\text{22}\). Consequently, communitarianism declares that asocial individualism that quarantines individuals from their communities is wrong, because people make their selves in a social matrix.
As an antithesis to the normativist stance of the Rawlsian political theory, political realism has appeared. Political realists criticise the Rawlsian political theory that it brings about the ‘normative turn’ in political philosophy. Instead, they argue for the ‘realist turn’ in political philosophy. In a crude sense, the central problem between political realists and political moralists is to identify which comes first, ethics or politics. Raymond Geuss and Bernard Williams are the ardent stalwarts of political realism.

**Political Realism: Central Theses**

Diverging from the normative political philosophy based on Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice*, political realists make two theses: first, politics should be understood in the context of sociology and history, and second that politics should be independent from ethics. To support these theses, political realists make the assumption that it is power that directs political behaviour. From the power-oriented politics, they infer two conclusions: first, politics is not a game played in a vacuum, but actually evolves in history and society. Therefore, politics cannot be understood without realising the anthropological (or sociological) and historical ethos of a political action. Second, politics is independent from ethics, because it deals with the actual situations that govern political action. Moreover, political realism argues that political judgement or conduct should directly deal with real problems rather than hypothetical problems. Thus, the key objection to the normative politics is that it has no relation to real life problems. The title of Ian Shapiro’s book, *Flight from Reality* portrays perfectly the character of normative politics.

**Geuss’s Realist Standpoint**

Although the term, ‘realism’ can be considered in many ways, Raymond Geuss does not use it as a foil to political utopianism, but to political moralism. In a crude sense, ‘moralism’ is a type of “moralised preaching” that leads to the creation of moral judgements. However, it is reasonably possible that a moral judgement can be inferred by not being committed to ‘moralism’. Geuss claims that moral judgements should not be created out of moralism, but by considering the real experiences in politics. Drawing on Max Weber’s ideal types, Geuss upholds that ‘moralism’ creates an artificial construction to explain the internal consistency of the elements. Contrary to moralism, ‘realism’ asserts that one should devote oneself to a specific strand of an open-minded, indeterminate attitude and context-dependence of judgement.
Geuss argues that the ‘normative turn’ in the English-speaking world evaluates political action abstractly without studying human societies and their problems properly; it studies the society in isolation from the history and sociology. Accordingly, by disapproving political moralism while supporting political realism, Geuss intends to “see how the world would look if one were to undo the normativist counterrevolution.” Indeed, Geuss’s desire to look the world beyond the normative constructs is plausible.

Geuss assumes that Kant’s Copernican epistemological revolution can be considered as a counterrevolution because Ptolemy placed human beings in the centre of the universe while all the heavenly bodies oscillate around the centre. It was Copernicus who dislocated the human being from the centre. Kant brought the human being as the finite rational agent to the centre, once again becoming a significant subject-matter of philosophical scrutiny. In this context, the Rawlsian ‘normative turn’ can be comprehended as a “counterrevolution against historically and sociologically sophisticated views about ethics, and politics developed in the period of Herder and Marx continued to represent an important strand of thinking until the normative deluge of the late 1970s and early 1980s.”

Geuss uses Herder’s thesis that political concepts do not originate in a vacuum, while their origins in historically constituted societies were not always politically and ethically irrelevant. Accordingly, the insurgent ‘normative turn’ is an all-inclusive disaster for politics. In this way, Geuss concludes that normative bases of political philosophy are contingent because it does not approach society adequately. Geuss develops the realist standpoint of politics in several of his works including *History and Illusion in Politics* (2001), *Philosophy and Real Politics* (2008), *Politics and the Real Imagination* (2010), and *Reality and Its Dreams* (2016).

In his *Reality and Its Dreams* (2016), Geuss reiterates the central contours of his philosophical position on politics. He sketches a triadic argument: first, he contests the Rawlsian normative politics; second, he challenges logical positivists’ analytical and scientific politics. Third, he supports that real politics is based on anthropological and historical perspectives. Although Geuss’s political realist standpoint is tripartite, it mainly reacts to the normative programme of the Rawlsian industry that
holds that politics should begin with normative human values, which may be abstract and independent from the real world. In a general sense, it is ethics that underpin politics because “Politics is an applied ethics”\textsuperscript{33}. Instead, Geuss supports a realist political theory that provides independent bases to ethics and politics, politics is not an applied ethics, but it commences with recognising the power relations within socio-historical milieu\textsuperscript{34}.

To understand Geuss’s political realist standpoint, it is pertinent to state his four theses posited in \textit{Philosophy and Real Politics} (2008). For addressing the question which comes first: ethics or politics; Geuss supports the ‘politics first view’ rather than the ‘ethics first view’. Geuss develops his four theses: The first thesis claims that political philosophy must neither be normative nor positive, but rather be realist\textsuperscript{35}. The main argument maintains that political philosophy should not begin with the questions regarding how people ought to act, desire or value on ‘imaginative’ grounds, but commence by considering the ways the social, economic and political institutions direct society at a specific time, and what motivates people to act in a given state of affairs\textsuperscript{36}. Politics does not deal with the potential, but the real state of affairs in the social world.

The second thesis asserts that political philosophy must admit that politics is an action-oriented activity, and not merely beliefs and judgements\textsuperscript{37}. Although beliefs may be significant in numerous contexts to understand how others are likely to act, but sometimes, actors do not follow their beliefs in their actions. Accordingly, politics primarily concerns with actions and secondarily concerns with beliefs. What is an action? Theorising a theory, explaining a concept, sharing a piece of information, and so on are the different forms of actions\textsuperscript{38}. This thesis asserts that politics extols the action-oriented approach to life.

The third thesis claims that a political conduct is historically structured\textsuperscript{39}. Political philosophy studies human interactions in institutional settings that do not remain the same over time. For understanding how a political action takes place, it is necessary to consider the cultural and historical deliberations\textsuperscript{40}. Contrary to the Rawlsian political philosophy, Geuss emphasises that politics cannot be understood without proper understanding of history. In other words, history helps to make sense of political behaviour in the social world. In classical European thought, J. G. Herder, and in modern European
thought, Michael Oakeshott, support the thesis that politics is historically structured.

The fourth thesis assumes that politics is a craft or art that needs the exercise of skills to resolve the political conflicts. In this context, a skill can be understood as an ability to act in accordance with the environment. The central point is that one is flexible enough to adjust oneself considering the requirements. This thesis claims that politics is not a set of prescriptions, but it is an art that is used to settle political problems. Contrary to Geuss, Waldron contends that politics is not a science, but a system of norms.

In addition, Geuss upholds two further theses: a negative one and a positive one. The negative thesis denies any pure and philosophical ethics in the traditional sense. He states that there are different forms of normativity that one “ought” to do. For instance, we ought to be obliged to our well-wishers, we ought to keep our promises, we ought to find correct information by Google, and many others. These are just imperatives that occur in numerous ways. The point is these several “oughts” do not constitute a single moral system of the traditional type from which substantive conclusion about human action could be taken. In a crude sense, it is not possible to draw a doctrine that guides us on how we ought to act in all state of affairs in life. In short, a “normative dimension” encompasses entire human life, but it does not provide a coherent, holistic and separate rational system. Accordingly, the “normative turn” in political philosophy that emerged with John Rawls was a mistake, because there is nothing in existence which is simply normative and not real.

The positive thesis holds that the absence of a unitary and separate “normative ethics” does not matter because political philosophy is praxis-orienting and cause intervention. Like Bernard Williams, Geuss also draws his realist standpoint of political philosophy on Hobbesian political cannons that consider historically-based structures of collective action in which individuals determine order or disorder pursuing their own interests with different reasons. Geuss upholds that a realist standpoint considers the existing motivations in politics and social institutions. The enlightening and full explanation of the institutions will need of an evaluative jargon with a particular history. Yet, Politics ought to be concrete, action-orientated, and free from prejudice.
Williams’s Realist Standpoint
In the *Beginning was the Deed* (2005), Bernard Williams juxtaposes the philosophical positions of realism and moralism in political philosophy. For addressing the question of how ethics relates to politics, Williams makes a distinction between two models, which he terms, enactment model and structural model. ‘Enactment’ model of political theory posits that moral principles, concepts, values and ideals direct political action. Utilitarianism, according to Williams, is a form of the enactment model. While the structural model justifies the exercise of power justly under “moral conditions of co-existence”. Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* (1971) is an example of the structural model of political theory. Williams establishes a position that Rawls’s *A Theory of Justice* presents neither independently a moral conception nor a political conception, but an amalgamation of both conceptions.

Embarking on the convergences rather than the divergences of the models, Williams argues that both models assume “the priority of the moral over the political”. According to the enactment model, politics is determined by morals. While in the structural model morality imposes constraints to determine what politics can rightfully do. However, both models show that political philosophy is an applied morality. Williams criticises Rawls’s thesis that a democratic pluralistic society is or should be underpinned by “moral psychology of agents living within an overlapping consensus”. According to Rawls, the foundation of co-existence under moral conditions, and higher moral power is the sense of fairness. This sense of fairness is contrasted to the Hobbesian sense of fear for the mutual advantage.

Williams terms the position, “political moralism” that gives priority of moral to political. Political moralism does not direct actor to cogitate politically but it directs them to act in moral terms that relate to political theory. In the contemporary philosophy, political moralism provides the foundation to liberalism. In contrast to political moralism, Williams posits a position which he calls “political realism” that provides autonomy to political thought distinctive from moral thought. Political realism does not converge to political liberalism. Williams attempts to change the political argument from justice to legitimacy. Embarking on Thomas Hobbes’s first political question of how to maintain social order, protection, safety, trust and the conditions of cooperation, Williams makes ‘basic legitimation demand’ to resolve the political
problems on grounds of political conducts which are ‘acceptable’ and ‘legitimate’. This political conduct, according to Williams, should be context-dependent or practice-dependent.

Williams’s two models explain that Benthamite utilitarianism and Rawls’s theory of justice give priority of moral values to political conduct. For instance, the first model supports pre-political moral values containing happiness, equality or autonomy. In the similar vein, the second model tends to direct a political action under pre-political moral conditions, which can be identified with a Kantian notion of autonomy or certain moral rights. Consequently, in both cases, these moral ideals are not compatible with politics in two ways. First, these moral ideals are independent of the political conduct in the sense that the morals are prior to politics. Second, the politics is not independent, because these moral ideals provide the foundation to politics. Hence, ethics act as an antecedent authority over the political which directs the goals of politics. Instead, legitimacy and authority should be exercised by politics independent of ethics because legitimacy and authority are political values that should not be derived from moral values.

**Political Realism: A Critique**

The crux argument of political realism affirms that politics is independent of ethics because politics embodies political values which are distinct from moral values. So, political values ought not to be derived from moral values. Instead, liberalism and utilitarianism assume that moral ideals are prior to political state of affairs. Thus, neither liberalism nor utilitarianism considers society and history for positing political theories. In addition, many liberal philosophers concentrate on justice while utilitarian theorists converge on utility, which most of the time is happiness. Both liberal and utilitarian theorists do not consider political values, such as political legitimacy, political authority and political power, into account. In a way, the argument of political realism refurbishes the priority of politics to ethics, drawing on classical political philosophers. Identifying political action in the anthropological and historical contexts, according to political realists, is compatible with real politics.

I hold that political realism is justified for declaring that real politics requires anthropological and historical contexts for doing political conduct because political decision-making goes beyond just theoretical
deliberations. Political problems arise in societies that require empirical underpinnings. Political power uses political authority for resolving political problems. However, the problem is how a political authority or power can be legitimised. Certainly, without a moral ideal, a political authority can be detrimental to society. I maintain that the contention between political realism and political moralism can be resolved by embarking neither on political values nor moral values alone but finding out the common moral and political values. Reverence is such a moral and political value. Modern moral and political theorists have not realised the significance of ‘reverence’ as a moral and political ideal in real sense. Bertrand Russell had discerned the reality of reverence in moral and political life nearly a hundred years ago. In Political Ideals, Russell mentions that “all their dealings with others will be inspired by a deep impulse of reverence” [italics added]. While in Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916), Russell defines the principle of reverence as: “the life of another has the same importance which we feel in our own life”. Consequently, I suggest that political realists should revisit their arguments and recognise the political values which are consistent with moral values.

Conclusion
To sum up, the preceding discussion juxtaposes the arguments of political moralism and political realism together to understand their relevancy to actual moral and political life. The argument advances with the development of political philosophy since the second half of the twentieth century. At the advent of the second half of the previous century, it was a general impression that the subject of political philosophy had been dead in the academic institutions for a long time. John Rawls attempted to bring about the revival of political philosophy in academic circles with his magnum opus, A Theory of Justice (1971) which played a constructive role for bolstering political discourse in academic and non-academic spheres. However, Rawls’s theory antagonises several scholars who have gone on developed their own anti-Rawlsian approaches in political thought. Communitarianism, the common mind theory, political realism are prominent theories which may be branded as post-Rawlsian political theories.

The paper briefly examined the salient features of the Rawlsian political thought to understand its counter theories. It then mainly focused on political realism. Political realists call Rawlsian political theory, ‘political moralism’. Political moralists defend that ethics is prior to
politics while political realists defend that politics is prior to ethics. The Rawlsian political theory gives priority to justice over other political ideals, whereas political realists foster political legitimacy, political authority and political power.

I argued that although political realism embraces certain promising features that give rise to the ethnological and historical orientations in politics, it requires a bedrock for its political ideals. This bedrock is a sense of reverence as a moral and political ideal. If the sense of fairness is the heart of the Rawlsian liberal political thinking, then the sense of reverence should be the heart of real politics for the common good.
End Notes

9. Geuss states that he completed his PhD in 1971, his doctoral supervisor at Columbia University, New York, remarked that John Rawls published his book entitled, *A Theory of Justice*, but “no one would need to read it because it was of merely academic interest, an exercise in trying to mobilize some half-understood fragments of Kant to give a better foundation to American ideology than utilitarianism had been able to provide” (Geuss 2016, 82).
48. Bernard Williams, *In the Beginning was the Deed*, 2005, 2.
49. Bernard Williams, *In the Beginning was the Deed*, 2005, 2.
50. Bernard Williams, *In the Beginning was the Deed*, 2005, 2.
52. Williams, *In the Beginning was the Deed*, 2.
53. Williams, *In the Beginning was the Deed*, 2.
54. Williams, *In the Beginning was the Deed*, 3.
55. Williams, *In the Beginning was the Deed*, 3.
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