the absence of ψ due to unusual physical circumstances (involving hallucinogens, optical illusions, or whatever)' (p. 101), but Pelczar disarms this through an analysis of the truth conditions for counterfactuals about possibilities, analogous to a standard account of counterfactuals given by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker.

So much for the objections, but what are the positive arguments in favour of phenomenalism? Pelczar offers two of them, both variants of influential arguments for materialism: the Regularity Argument, that the physical world is what best explains the reality of experience; what explains the reality of experience is also the propensity of experience to occur in certain ways; and therefore, the physical world is the propensity of experience to occur in certain ways. (The Regularity Argument is supplemented by the 'Shifting Basis Argument'[pp. 69–70] that if there is a categorical basis for experience, we have no reason to think this basis would be stable over time.) The other variant of an argument for materialism is the Correspondence Argument, that the 'perfect correspondence or correlation between physical things and possibilities of sensation: a physical thing for each possibility and vice versa,'(p. 112) is best explained by their identity.

I have mentioned that accepting objective probabilities is a key premise of Pelczar's case for phenomenalism, and I shall close by calling attention to another key premise. This is that 'anything can cause anything,' a comment he makes several times in the book. For example, in responding to objections that possibilities don't have the requisite nature to account for the physical world, he says, 'The first response to this, paraphrasing Hume, is that anything can cause anything; at least, anything that isn't a mere abstraction. There's nothing in the concept of causation to prevent any non-abstract state of affairs from bringing about any other non-abstract state of affairs.' (p. 129) This premise is perhaps more controversial than Pelczar allows.

Phenomenalism is a major contribution to contemporary metaphysics, and I think Mill would have esteemed it greatly.

David Gordon
Ludwig von Mises Institute, USA

Advance Access Publication 27th January 2024
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae008

Educating Character through the Arts. Edited By Laura D'olimpio, Panos Paris, and Aidan P. Thompson. (London: Routledge, 2023. Pp. 192. Price £90.00)

By bringing together the perspectives of both philosophers and educationalists, the essays in this volume aim to examine whether or not, and in what

ways, artistic engagement contributes to moral education. One will find some comfort in knowing that the answer is broadly optimistic, especially in times of moral chaos. But how exactly can artistic engagement help us become better people? Is it related to the different artistic techniques employed by artists? Or does it have to do with a shared set of skills that we are required to exercise both as art appreciators and moral agents? Furthermore, can non-traditional art forms contribute to character formation? And, how transformative and lasting are the effects of art on one's character? These are the main questions organizing the different contributions.

Art has the power to inspire meaningful change within us. Artworks invite us to adopt perspectives that are different, sometimes radically different, from the ones we are familiar with. Art encourages us to be open, to reflect on complex issues challenging our existing values, and even motivates us to take specific actions. For the authors of this volume, these facts signal a connection between artistic and moral value, making art a fertile ground for the cultivation of character. While the connection between character and contemporary aesthetics remains relatively unexplored, the claim that the arts can influence one's moral outlook (for better or worse) has deep philosophical roots. As various of the essays remind us, Plato's famous exclusion of poets from his ideal state is a radical example of the belief that art can be morally corruptive. A more positive perspective is found in Aristotle's *Poetics*, where artistic creation is not viewed with suspicion; tragedy is recognized for its ability to clarify feelings of pity and fear.

Similar ideas, emphasizing the connection between moral and aesthetic cultivation, are present in the modern theories of Hume, Kant, and Schiller. They also extend into non-western traditions, as Ian James Kidd explains through an engaging analysis of the aesthetic appreciation of gardens in Confucianism and Daoism. John Haldane's *Afterword* offers an illuminating historical overview of the ways in which aesthetics, ethics, and education overlap. I would recommend beginning with Haldane's piece before approaching the different chapters in the volume for readers who are not already familiar with this debate.

The concept of moral character is employed by most contributors. It encompasses a broad range of things: the capacity to empathize with others, a reconfiguration of one's understanding of a subject matter, an improvement in ethical judgement, and emotional clarification or refinement. For several of the authors, it is this last skill that is most relevant in an artistic context. This is because, as noted by the editors in the *Introduction*, most contributions of this volume have a neo-Aristotelian or virtue-theoretic flavour to them. On a neo-Aristotelian approach, the moral value of art resides in its capacity to educate feelings. It is by engaging our emotions that artworks provide us with experiential knowledge and help us improve our moral judgements.

Discussions about the role of the arts in the 'education of the heart' are part of the essays by James O. Young, Noël Carroll, David Carr, and Karen E. Bohlin.

It is also worth mentioning that this Aristotelian approach is expanded to include a variety of artforms that go beyond the traditional narrative arts. Each contribution concentrates on a specific art form, ranging from music, literary classics, videogames, tv series, and even gardening. This approach encourages us to attend to the importance of medium and genre-specificity when attempting to answer the question of how exactly art can make us better. This approach also helps to demystify certain pessimistic views of particular genres (Amanda Cawston and Nathan Wildman have a very interesting chapter on the agential value of interactive fictions such as video games, for example). Care is taken in discussing the particularities of the artworks used as examples throughout the collection, which is not always the case in adjacent fields like mainstream philosophical aesthetics. Particularly illuminating is Panos Paris' discussion of how 'rough-hero' television series contribute to moral enhancement by constantly questioning our affective relation to heroic characters as well as our moral evaluation of them (what Paris calls an 'elenctic pattern'). Another rich analysis is found in Laura D'Olimpio's contribution, focused on the depiction of female protagonists in some influential teen novels and films, and how their evaluation offers a younger audience an opportunity to debate and question traditional stereotypes associated with the concept of a 'heroine'.

A consequence of adopting a virtue-based approach to the question of arts role in character education is the risk that art is instrumentalized. Must art contribute to moral enhancement in order to be valuable? Typically, we do not tend to view our experience with art as valuable insofar as they contribute to the perfection of any particular skill or aspect of our character, be this emotional or cognitive. We expect more from our artistic engagements. In this context, Noël Carroll argues that art does not merely connect with the 'cultural sentiments of a culture' (as Scruton claims) but also has the function of precisely challenging such sentiments. Art can thus recalibrate our sentiments through 'criterial pre-focusing', a technical term introduced by Carroll. Criterial pre-focusing is the process whereby artists elicit specific affective responses from us by directing our attention to particular objects, and particular properties of these objects that are appropriate to the given emotion/the affective response elicited. Laura D'Olimpio also makes interesting use of the concept of criterial pre-focusing in her contribution.

In a somewhat similar vein, Jeremy Page shows how artworks can reconfigure our understanding of certain subject matters. For Page, this cognitive gain is more substantive and radical than a mere clarification or piecemeal addition to what one already knows. 'Such reconfiguration is relevant for the education of character as it affects an agent's epistemic orientation in a way that ultimately contributes to the consistency and virtuosity of their interpretation and navigation of the relevant subject matter and of how they act in

states of affairs relating to it' (p. 52). Page argues that this kind of view is different in kind from 'accretionary' accounts of the cognitive gains art offers like those defended in other chapters of this volume. Though, as he admits, it is difficult to pin down exactly what counts as a clarification or accretionary improvement of possessed knowledge and what counts as a reconfiguration of one's understanding.

The different contributions of this volume offer an opportunity to reconsider the moral value of art and the relationship between our aesthetic and moral sensibility. They achieve this by opening up new lines of inquiry that transcend traditional disciplinary boundaries, engaging in lively discussion across a variety of art forms, and providing pedagogical tools for implementing their findings in the classroom. This book will be of great interest to students and academics in the fields of philosophy of education, ethics, and aesthetics, as well as to teachers of the arts.

Irene Martínez Marín
Uppsala University, Sweden

Advance Access Publication 22nd January 2024
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae006

The Mind Body Problem and Metaphysics: An Argument from Consciousness to Mental Substance. By Ralph Stefan Weir. (London: Routledge, 2024, 157 pages, Hardback.)

The contemporary mind-body debate concerns the nature of mental (or phenomenal) properties. Physicalists maintain that mental properties are properly among the class of physical properties. Dualists, meanwhile, deny this, holding that mental properties are non-physical properties of a fundamentally different kind.

This way of framing the debate, however, leaves out an historically important, though currently neglected form of dualism, which opposes physicalism not only with the claim that mental properties are non-physical, but also by recognising non-physical substances. Contemporary dualism is also known as *property* dualism, on which mental and physical properties are instantiated by the self-same physical object. The classical dualism of Plato, Augustine, and Descartes, however, was a form of *substance dualism*, on which mental properties are not only non-physical features, but also properties instantiated by non-physical substances.

The consensus in the contemporary literature is that while property dualism is a serious option in the mind-body debate, substance dualism is not. It is with this contemporary dogma that Ralph Stefan Weir, in his excellent