Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentionality as a Relational Theory

Andrea Marchesi†
University of Salzburg
Department of Philosophy (KGW)
andrea.marchesi@sbg.ac.at

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Abstract
This paper examines Husserl’s theory of intentionality as it is developed in Logical Investigations and other early writings. In section 1, I attempt to capture the core of Husserl’s concept of intentionality. Section 2 is devoted to a detailed analysis of the account of intentional relation developed in the fifth Investigation. In section 3, I try to flesh out what is meant by the claim in the sixth Investigation that the designation ‘object’ is a relative one. In section 4, I discuss Husserl’s conception of intentionality in light of the mereology outlined in the third Investigation. In section 5, I explain how Husserl criticizes the so-called theory of immanent objects and how he addresses the problem of non-existents. In section 6, I argue that a phenomenological theory of intentionality grounded in Husserl’s insights cannot be a non-relational one.

Keywords
Husserl · Intentionality · Relations · Properties · Existence · Mereology

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What prompted Husserl’s inquiry into the nature of intentionality is well known: from Brentano he inherits the idea that a crucial task of philosophy is to focus on experiences, which according to the Brentanian view are necessarily intentional; from Bolzano he inherits the burden of dealing with the issue of ‘objectless presentations’—an issue that by focusing on non-existent objects presents a problem for intentionality in general. Brentano’s teaching and Bolzano’s problem drove him to clarify the relationship among experience, intentionality, and existence. The principal goal of this paper is to discuss Husserl’s theory of intentionality as it appears in *Logical Investigations* and in other early writings. My contribution aims at being both exegetical and systematic. My main exegetical thesis is that Husserl’s early theory of intentionality cannot be read as a non-relational theory of intentionality; in particular, it cannot be read as a sort of adverbialism. The interpretation I will defend is a minority one, for Husserl’s theory of intentionality is mostly taken as a non-relational theory (see Süßbauer 1995; Crane 2006; Erhard 2009; Künne 2011), and more specifically as a case of adverbial theory (see Erhard 2009; Chrudzimski 2015). My main systematic thesis is that a phenomenological theory of intentionality grounded in Husserl’s insights cannot be a non-relational theory of intentionality.

Before beginning I should make two philological remarks. First, I will not take into account Husserl’s 1894 essay *Intentionale Gegenstände*, in which a solution to Bolzano’s issue is developed which is peculiar and quite different to the one presented in *Logical Investigations* (see Fréchette 2009; Erhard 2014, pp. 213–257). Nevertheless, I will quote from this essay, for two reasons: because I think it contains insights which turn out to be important for the theory of intentionality presented in *Investigations*; and because some interpreters argue that the two works permit the same reading—which is precisely the position I will argue against.

Secondly, the edition of *Logical Investigations* I will be examining is the second one, which is subsequent to *Ideas I*. However, even though I will consider texts which were written after *Ideas I*, I will not discuss the notion of ‘noema’; this notion is so complex and controversial that it deserves a separate paper. All that I will do is to point to those passages from Husserl’s early writings that in my view contain Husserl’s conception of noema in nuce.

The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section, I will present Husserl’s early concept of intentionality in its main features. I will attempt to capture its core by identifying three basic theses (which will become more and more clear along the way) about intentionality: that it is a property; that it entails a relation; and that it does not
depend upon veridicality. The second section is devoted to a detailed analysis of the account of the intentional relation developed in the 5th Logical Investigation (henceforth: ‘5th LI’, and likewise for the other Investigations). First, I will argue that in Husserlian ontology a proposition such as ‘Every intentional experience has an object’ should be considered analytic; and second, I will address the issue using contemporary notions of property. In the third section, I will try to flesh out what is meant by the claim in the 6th LI that the designation ‘object’ is a relative one. In the fourth section, I will examine Husserl’s conception of intentionality in light of the mereology outlined in the 3rd LI. In the fifth section, I will explain how Husserl criticizes the so-called theory of immanent objects (mainly developed by Twardowski) and how he addresses the problem of non-existents (a reformulation of the above-mentioned issue). I will there challenge the reading defended by Alfons Süßbauer (1995) and Wolfgang Künne (2011) and clarify Husserl’s concept of existence. In the final section, I will argue that a phenomenological theory of intentionality grounded on Husserl’s insights cannot be a non-relational one. In this regard, I will also compare Husserl’s account with the adverbial account and the parametric account.

1 The concept of intentionality

It is widely accepted that it is in Logical Investigations that Husserl developed his most sophisticated theory of intentionality. Nevertheless, some disagree. Süßbauer (1995, p. 96) for example has claimed that in that work Husserl tried to clarify the concept of intentionality by using metaphorical (hence improper) language. Heffernan (2015, p. 82) by contrast holds that Husserl’s discussion of the concept at issue is a scientific one, that is, a discussion conducted in proper language. In the following, I aim at showing that Süßbauer is wrong and that Heffernan is right. In my view, the core of the theory of intentionality developed in Logical Investigations and other early writings can be summarized in three basic theses:

[H_1] Intentionality is a property.

[H_2] Intentionality entails a relation.

[H_3] Intentionality does not depend upon veridicality.

Let me briefly introduce them one by one.

[H_1]. In the 5th LI, Husserl states that the qualifying adjective ‘intentional’ designates the property (Eigenheit) of intentionality, which does not belong to all experiences and
which is defined as something that entails a reference to something else in the mode of presentation (Vorstellung) or in an analogous way.\textsuperscript{2} This allows us to formulate the following definition: an \textit{intentional experience} (or \textit{act}) is nothing other than an experience through which we \textit{present} something. More formally, we can say that an experience E is intentional if and only if through E we present something. For example, if through an experience E we present a laptop, then E is intentional.

[H\textsubscript{2}]: Husserl stresses the point that in developing a theory of intentionality the concept of relation (Beziehung) turns out to be unavoidable: if an experience is intentional, then through that experience we \textit{refer} to (sich beziehen) or \textit{direct} ourselves to (sich richten) something.\textsuperscript{3} Even though in Husserl’s texts there are no such fine-grained distinctions, it can be stated that the categories of relation and direction are not equivalent: every direction is a relation, but not every relation is a direction. Thus, it can be said that intentionality is a property which entails a \textit{directional} relation. Following Paśniczek (1996), I would like to describe intentionality using some notions of basic geometry. Here a direction is determined by any two points a and b. Point a stands for the intending subject, point b for the object. However, intentionality entails a direction with a certain \textit{orientation}; this is why we represent it with an arrow. Indeed, intentionality has a definite orientation: from the intending subject to the object, but \textit{not} vice versa.

Such a description permits a preliminary demarcation of the notion of \textit{object}. As Husserl writes in his lecture course from 1902, \textit{Allgemeine Erkenntnistheorie}, what we term ‘object’ is the target (Zielpunkt) of the experience (see Husserl 1902, p. 136). Thus, in our drawing, what indicates the object cannot be \textit{any} point between a and b, for what we term ‘object’ is what the intending subject \textit{aims at}; in other words, the object is by definition the \textit{final} point. Such a description is mirrored on the etymological level: as Husserl himself points out in his 1898 treatise \textit{Abhandlung über Wahrnehmung}, the German word Gegenstand means ‘something which stands in front of (something else)’.\textsuperscript{4}

[H\textsubscript{3}]: In the lecture course from 1908, \textit{Vorlesungen über Bedeutungslehre}, Husserl writes that every presentation must have an object, and it does not matter if the conviction (Überzeugung) is right (richtig) or not.\textsuperscript{5} ‘Conviction’ can be read as what in the 5th LI is more technically called \textit{positional quality}. The nexus between positionality and veridicality is quite clear: if an intentional experience E is veridical, then the positional quality which belongs to E is right. More precisely, if a perception P is veridical, then the belief which belongs to P is right. That a perception P is veridical entails that the object of P is real; for example, if my perception of the laptop is veridical, then the laptop is real.
2 The intentional relation

In the 5th LI a seemingly simple question is posed: what does it mean to say that something is intended? According to Husserl, it means just that an intentional experience is present (präsent). Husserl expands on his answer as follows: if (i) “an intentional experience is present (präsent),” then (ii) “an intentional relation is eo ipso carried out,” and (iii) “an object is eo ipso ‘intentionally gegenwärtig’.” Since Husserl states that (i), (ii), and (iii) say the same thing, it is tempting to conceive of präsent and gegenwärtig as equivalent. However, this is not the case: as Husserl himself emphasizes, the fact that we present something (or that something is presented) does not imply that an object is präsent, but only that an experience is präsent. By contrast, if we present something (or if something is presented), then, necessarily, an object is gegenwärtig. As I will show, all this is perfectly consistent with the view about existence we will find in the appendix to the 5th LI—a view which is already fully developed in the 1898 treatise (see section 5) and which substantiates [Hs]. For all these exegetical reasons, I conclude that in this context, präsent can be replaced by ‘existent’, whereas gegenwärtig cannot. Thus, (i), (ii), and (iii) can be rephrased as follows:

(i*) An intentional experience exists.
(ii*) An intentional relation exists.
(iii*) Something is an object.

Note that both of the following would be incorrect (or at least misleading) rewordings of (iii):

(iii~) An object exists.
(iii~) There is an object.

This is because the early Husserl uses ‘There is […]’ and ‘[…] exists’ as stylistic variants. This is what we read in the essay from 1894, Intentionale Gegenstände, where he declares that the propositions ‘there is an A’ and ‘A exists’ have the same domain. Asserting that (i*), (ii*), and (iii*) say the same thing is tantamount to asserting that (i*), (ii*), and (iii*) are extensionally equivalent. This means, for example, that if we state (i*), then we state (iii*) implicitly. All this complies with Husserl’s way of speaking in the key passages of the 5th LI, where he frequently writes: ‘If I present X, then X is an object’ (see Husserl 1901, pp. 386 and 439).
Interestingly, if we look at the account of the analytic–synthetic dichotomy that Husserl develops in §11 of the 3rd LI (which is quite different from the one developed in §12 of the same Investigation), a proposition such as (a) ‘Every intentional experience has an object’ turns out to be analytic (provided that there is no third way between the analytic and the synthetic). In fact, in the passage quoted above, the Latin locution eo ipso is paraphrased as ‘according to its own essence’ (an seinem eigenen Wesen), which is the same expression Husserl uses to describe the relation between pleasure and what is pleasant: the essence (or concept) of pleasure demands a relation to the essence (or concept) of what is pleasant. To make this clearer, compare (a) with the paradigmatic case of a synthetic (a priori) proposition we find in the 3rd LI: (b) ‘Every colour is extended.’ In this case, Husserl says that the essence (or concept) of colour does not demand a relation to the essence (or concept) of extension; hence this proposition is not analytic.\(^8\) Even though it seems that Husserl denies that pleasure and what is pleasant are correlatives (Korrelativa), I maintain that the intending subject and the object should be considered correlatives. If this were not the case, it would be difficult to explain why Husserl speaks of an ‘intentional correlation’. But note that the claim ‘An intending subject is unthinkable without an object (and vice versa)’ should not be rephrased as ‘A subject intends X if and only if there is an X’ or ‘A subject intends X if and only if X exists,’ but rather as ‘A subject intends X if and only if X is an object.’\(^9\)

3 ‘Object’ as a relative designation

There are two properties that we usually associate with a dyadic relation (see Casari 2009, pp. 53–54). Take for example the following proposition: (A) ‘A love relation obtains between Paris and Helen,’ where ‘to obtain’ must be considered a synonym of ‘to exist’ (here and henceforth). Now, (A) entails both (B) ‘Paris has the property of loving Helen’ and (C) ‘Helen has the property of being loved by Paris.’ These properties are called relational properties. Let us apply this schema to Husserl’s account of intentionality. Consider another proposition which expresses a dyadic relation: (A’) ‘An intentional relation obtains between Paris and a leaf.’ Again, (A’) entails both (B’) ‘Paris has the property of intending a leaf’ and (C’) ‘A leaf has the property of being intended by Paris.’ As I said, the properties expressed in (B’) and (C’) are relational, but both (B’) and (C’) imply that there exists an experience which has the property of intentionality. It is not easy to categorize this property: does ‘intentional’ also express a relational property? Or does it rather express a mereological property? By this I mean simply a
part. Thus, it can be stated: \( x \) is a mereological property of \( y \) if and only if \( x \) is a part of \( y \). A Husserlian instance of a mereological property is green: if \( x \) is said to be green, then green is a part of \( x \). I shall leave my question open; I will state only that if ‘intentional’ expresses a mereological property, then, by definition, ‘intentional’ will designate a part of an experience. I shall call relational properties ‘R-properties’ and mereological properties ‘M-properties’. Thus, both ‘intending something’ and ‘being intended by someone’ express R-properties.

Such a schema conforms with Husserl’s notion of ‘object’. In the 6th LI we read that the designation ‘object’ is a relative one, namely, a designation which expresses a relation. This means that it does not designate a ‘mark’ (Merkmal)—an expression which in the 3rd LI is a synonym of ‘part’ (see Husserl 1901, pp. 31, 198, 666 and 680).\(^{10}\) Husserl’s definition of ‘part’ is quite simple. In the 3rd LI two versions of it are provided: according to the first, \( x \) is a part of \( y \) if and only if \( x \) is really in \( y \); according to the second, \( x \) is a part of \( y \) if and only if \( y \) really has \( x \). It is clear that the second definition is simply a rewording of the first. Using my example, I can say that ‘object’ does not designate something that is really in the leaf or that the leaf really has. That \( X \) is an object means rather that \( X \) is the intentional correlate of an experience (or alternatively, that \( X \) is presented). Hence, in Husserl’s view, ‘object’ is a designation which expresses an R-property. This point can be clarified using the comparison Husserl makes: ‘representative’ does not express an M-property of the sensation, for the existence of the mere sensation is not sufficient for the sensation to be designated ‘representative’; the existence of an apprehension is also necessary. Analogously, ‘object’ does not express an M-property of the leaf, for the existence of the leaf is not sufficient for the leaf to be designated an ‘object’; the existence of an intentional experience is also necessary. In other words, just as it is not an M-property of the sensation of green to be a representative of a green thing, because the sensation of green is not representative just by virtue of itself, so it is not an M-property of the leaf to be the object of an intentional experience, because the leaf is not an object just by virtue of itself. To be sure, just as ‘being an object’ does not designate a part of the leaf, so ‘being green’ does not designate a part of the leaf (see Husserl 1901, p. 666). Nevertheless, while ‘object’ does not designate a part of the leaf (i.e. it does not express an M-property of the leaf), ‘green’ does designate a part of the leaf (i.e. it expresses an M-property of the leaf): I can say that the green is really in the leaf or that the leaf really has the green.

This is also descriptively (that is, phenomenologically) grounded. Let us assume that ‘object’ designates a part of the leaf (i.e. ‘object’ expresses an M-property); as a part, it
should be, for example, perceivable—implicitly through a partial intention (Partialintention) and explicitly through a particular perception (Sonderwahrnehmung). We could intend it as we do in the case of colours. But Husserl would hold that this is unsound. Consequently, the sentence ‘We intend an object’ is also imprecise, for we intend something (e.g., a leaf), which therefore is an object.

4 Mereology and intentionality

Recall the answer Husserl gives in the 5th LI: that something is intended means just that an intentional experience is present (präsent). As I said, we can paraphrase the second part of the answer as follows: ‘An intentional experience exists.’ Husserl urges us not to misunderstand his answer. According to him, two wrong readings are likely:

1. For every intentional experience E: we live through (erleben) E and the object of E.
2. For every intentional experience E: E is to its object either as a whole is to one of its parts or as a part is to its whole.

By rejecting (1) Husserl denies that the level of experience coincides with the level of objects: indeed, (1) is untenable because it is true only in case of reflection, often called by Husserl ‘immanent perception’. In the case of intentional experiences such as transcendent perceptions or their intentional modifications (remembering and phantasy), it is not: if we perceive a laptop, we do live through the perception of the laptop, but we do not live through the laptop itself. Analogously, if we remember the laptop, we do live through the remembering of the laptop, but we do not live through the laptop itself.

By evoking (2), Husserl implicitly asserts that in the discussion of intentionality, mereology must be taken into account. In this regard two relationships must be considered: the relationship between the intentional experience and intentionality, and the relationship between the intentional experience and the object. Concerning the first, I left the issue open: if intentionality were an M-property of an experience, then, by definition, intentionality would be a part of that experience. What is certain is that intentionality is a peculiar property, since it can entail a relationship between a whole W (the experience) and something which is not a part of W. Thus, while the first relationship would subsist necessarily between a whole W and a part of W, the second one does not subsist necessarily between a whole W and a part of W. As I said, this is true only
for an immanent intentional experience; it is not true for a transcendent one. The example of a transcendent act we find in the 5th LI is the presentation of the god Jupiter (see Husserl 1901, p. 386), but it can be said that the paradigmatic case of a transcendent act in Husserl’s investigations is outer perception.

In the lecture course from 1904, Über Wahrnehmung, Husserl develops the following two arguments in order to justify the transcendence of the object of outer perception:12

[Arg1] If the object of outer perception were to the perception as a part is to its whole, then the real existence of outer perception would entail the real existence of its object. But its object can be unreal; thus, the object of outer perception cannot be a part of it.

[Arg2] If the object of outer perception were to the perception as a part is to its whole, then different outer perceptions would have different objects. But different outer perceptions can have the same object; thus, the object of outer perception cannot be a part of it.

So even if we are allowed to say that an outer perception P has an object—meaning by this simply that through P we refer to something—we cannot say that P really has an object; analogously, even if we are allowed to say that the object of P is in P—meaning by this simply that the object is the intentional correlate of P—we cannot say that the object of P is really in P. For if it were the case the object of P is a content (Inhalt) of P in the proper sense, it would be a part of it.

Note that in both [Arg1] and [Arg2] there is an implicit premise, which in both cases is an analytic law. [Arg1] follows from the law according to which the existence of the whole entails the existence of (all of) its parts (see Husserl 1901, 260). [Arg2] follows from the law according to which different wholes are distinct wholes, and parts of distinct wholes are distinct entities (and hence numerically distinguishable entities). [Arg1] is based on the case of hallucination: if we hallucinate a laptop, then our hallucination is real, whereas the laptop is unreal. [Arg2] is based on the case of the manifold: if we turn the laptop around and see it from various sides, we live through different visual perceptions which have the same object.

At this point I can state that Husserl rejects two theses, which are exactly the two disjuncts that appear in (2):

[M1] For every intentional experience E: E is to its object as a whole is to one of its parts.
[M2] For every intentional experience E: E is to its object as a part is to its whole.
I have already explained why, according to Husserl, \([M_1]\) is untenable. \([M_2]\) is patently counterintuitive. However, a third conception is still available:

\([M_3]\) For every intentional experience \(E\): \(E\) is to its object as a part \(x\) of a whole \(W\) is to a part \(y\) of \(W\).

One could hold that \([M_3]\) is a correct description of intentionality; more specifically, one could hold that for every intentional experience \(E\), \(E\) is to its object as a moment \(x\) of a whole \(W\) is to a moment \(y\) of \(W\).\(^{13}\) The likely hidden premise in this train of thought is the following: since something is an object if and only if an intentional experience exists, then the intentional experience and the object are moments of a whole \(W\). But such an inference is simply wrong. In this regard, it is important not to treat as equivalent a correlation with a relationship between parts: the intending subject and the object are correlatives (the one is not thinkable without the other), but what is designated by ‘intending subject’ is not related to what is designated by ‘object’ as a part \(x\) of a whole \(W\) is to a part \(y\) of \(W\). Father and son are correlatives, but hardly anyone would say that the first is to the second as a part \(x\) of a whole \(W\) is to a part \(y\) of \(W\). It is no accident that Husserl explicitly denies \([M_3]\): as he writes in his lecture course from 1915, *Ausgewählte phänomenologische Probleme*, the intentional experience and the object are without any connection (Zusammenhang); consequently, they do not together form a whole.\(^{14}\) Since \([M_3]\) says something general—that is, something which concerns the notion of ‘part’ as such—and since Husserl denies \([M_3]\), it follows that the concept of ‘foundation’ cannot be applied to the case of intentional relation. In other words, between intentional experience and object there subsists neither a bilateral foundation (\(x\) is founded on \(y\) and \(y\) is founded on \(x\)) nor a unilateral foundation (\(x\) is founded on \(x\) even if \(y\) is not founded on \(x\)). All this means that truths such as ‘Every intentional experience has an object’ or ‘Something is an object if and only if an intentional experience exists’ do not imply \([M_3]\).

5 The problem of non-existents

By focusing on the relationship between intentionality and existence, Bolzano’s issue makes intricate intentionality itself: indeed, the fact that we can intend something which does not exist—in Bolzanian terms, the fact that some presentations are objectless—leads some scholars to deny that intentionality entails a relation. According to
Süßbauer (1995) and Künne (2011) this is also Husserl’s view. They ground their reading on *Intentionale Gegenstände*, the above-mentioned essay written in 1894. In support of their exegesis they cite the following statement: “The being of a relation (*Relation*) entails the being of the members of the relation.” However, both Süßbauer (1995, *passim*) and Künne (2011, p. 89) contend that their reading is valid with regard to *Logical Investigations* as well. It is clear therefore that they assume that the German terms *Relation* and *Beziehung* are equivalent. In this regard one could object that the term *Relation* is much more loaded than *Beziehung*, and so they are not fully interchangeable. This is not the objection I am going to raise: indeed, from some passages of *Investigations* it emerges clearly that *Relation* is just the Latin loanword which in scientific contexts replaces *Beziehung*. For example, when Husserl states that the expression ‘colour’ is not a relative (*relativer*) term, he clarifies this point by claiming that the expression at issue does not involve the presentation of a relation (*Beziehung*) to something else. The notion of ‘object’ itself is defined as a relative (*relative*) one exactly because ‘being an object’ means that an intentional relation (*Beziehung*) exists, since the object is one of the members of the intentional correlation (*Korrelation*). Thus, although Husserl never uses the term *Relation* in the context of intentionality—in which we find only the above-mentioned terms—it can be stated that in *Logical Investigations, Relation* and *Beziehung* relate to each other in a way analogous to *Intuition* and *Anschauung*.

However, I believe that the statement which appears in the 1894 essay does not reflect Husserl’s more mature account. Specifically, I believe that in the 5th LI, especially in the context of the discussion of intentionality, such a claim is not at work. In this regard, it is not by chance that Husserl himself in the following years expressed several reservations about his own essay (see Heffernan 2015, p. 82 fn 32 and p. 83 fn 35). Thus, contrary to what I will call the Süßbauer-Künne reading, I argue that the account developed in *Logical Investigations* and in other early writings implies not only [H1], but also [H2] and [H3]. In other words, I will argue that these three theses capture the core of Husserl’s early theory of intentionality.

Süßbauer’s argument can be reconstructed as a *reductio ad absurdum*. Let A be an act which has a non-existent object:

(P1) If A is intentional, then a relation between A and its object O exists.
(P2) Necessarily, A is intentional.
(P3) If a relation between A and O exists, then A exists and O exists.
(P4) O does not exist.
(C1) A relation between A and O does not exist. [from P3 and P4]
(C₂) A is not intentional. [from P₁, P₃, P₄ and C₁]
(C₃) Not necessarily, A is intentional. [from C₃]

Here (P₃) is an application of the (alleged) law according to which the existence of a relation entails the existence of the relata, and the modal ‘necessarily’ in (P₂) can be replaced by a more Husserlian ‘essentially’. As we can see, a contradiction arises between (P₂) and (C₃), and thus (P₁) is false by reductio. Süßbauer (1995, p. 123) argues that the way round proposed by Husserl is to reject (P₁) and to distinguish between ‘intentionality’ and ‘relation to an object’ (gegenständliche Beziehung): intentionality will then be a property of some experiences, whereas the relation to an object will be a relation between an act and an object. According to Süßbauer, Husserl does not claim \([H₂]\), but only \([H₁]\): it is contingent that a relation between an act and an object obtains, that is, it obtains only in those possible worlds in which the object exists. Besides pointing out the fact that saying that the intentional relation obtains between an act and an object would be imprecise (for it obtains rather between a subject and an object; see (A’)), I contend that Süßbauer’s argument collapses under Husserl’s scrutiny: for as I will show, Husserl would refuse to subscribe to one of the premises.

Künne in his turn raises the following (clearly rhetorical) question: is every presentation an intentional experience? Alternatively: do we direct ourselves to something through every presentation? Künne’s answer is no: only those presentations which are not objectless (i.e. which have objects that do exist) are intentional experiences. More precisely, according to Künne’s hypothesis we will have the following: if A is an objectless presentation, then A is not an intentional experience. Husserl would deny Künne’s view: for according to him, every presentation is an intentional experience (by definition), and hence the so-called ‘objectless’ presentations are also intentional experiences. As I will show, an objectless presentation is just an intentional experience which does have an object (see also (iii’)), but one that does not exist.

Let us now look at Husserl’s texts. Recall that I want to argue that both \([H₂]\) (intentionality entails a relation) and \([H₃]\) (intentionality does not depend upon veridicality) express something Husserlian. In the 1898 treatise and in the appendix to the 5th LI, Husserl criticizes the so-called theory of immanent objects. Such a theory was developed by Kazimierz Twardowski in Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellung (1894). Husserl’s critique of the notion of ‘immanent object’ is basically the same as what we find in §90 of Ideas I (see Husserl 1913, pp. 206–209: Der ‘noematische Sinn’ und die Unterscheidung von ‘immanenten’ und ‘wirklichen Objekten’) and can be summed up in the following three conditionals:
If we intend something which is transcendent (say, T), then T—and not an alleged immanent “copy” of T which as such is distinct from T—is the object of our experience.

If we intend something which exists (say, X), then X—and not an alleged immanent “copy” of X which as such is distinct from X—is the object of our experience.

If we intend something which does not exist (say, Y), then Y—and not an alleged immanent “copy” of Y which as such is distinct from Y—is the object of our experience.

Here ‘distinct’ entails numerical distinguishability. Using my example, if we perceive a laptop (T), then the laptop—and not an alleged immanent “copy” of the laptop which as such is distinct from the laptop—is the object of our experience. The alleged immanent “copy” of the laptop is what the immanentist terms ‘the perceived laptop’ or ‘the laptop as perceived’ (which Twardowski conceived of as a sort of picture). Husserl is willing to distinguish between the perceived laptop (or the laptop as perceived) and the laptop itself only on the conceptual (begrifflich) level (and hence not on the ontological level). By the first expression he means the laptop as it is given in outer perception: this implies among other things that some of its profiles are hidden. By the second expression he means the laptop as it is, regardless of how it is given in outer perception; for example, even though the laptop can appear to us visually as grey (because of the sunlight, say), it is actually black. What is worth noting is that in both cases we are speaking of the same thing (T), just from different conceptual perspectives. This is why Husserl can say that the perceived laptop is real if and only if the laptop itself is real. Nor does speaking of an immanent “copy” make sense in the case contemplated in the last conditional: it is true not only that there is not a round square (which as we know is a stylistic variant of ‘A round square does not exist’), but also that, if we intend a round square, there is no round square (hence, there is not even an immanent round square). All that we can say is that a round square (which is something transcendent) is presented, that is, it is an object. This is why with regard to non-veridical intentional experiences Husserl refuses to speak of ‘merely intentional objects’.

Besides Husserl’s remarks, I think that the immanentist approach encounters two other problems. The first is closely connected with the notion of ‘object’: if ‘object’ designates the target of our experience, then speaking of an immanent object distinct from a transcendent one will imply either that one and the same intentional experience can
have two targets, or that we are able to have two intentional experiences at the same time. Both theses seem to me to be highly disputable. The first one is simply false: if through an intentional experience E we direct ourselves to the laptop itself, say T, and T is distinct from the immanent laptop, say T', then through E we cannot direct ourselves to T'. After all, an intentional experience is defined by its object (an experience E is what it is because it is an experience of x). The second solution is less easily refuted. Nothing seems to lead us to state that if at instant t we have an intentional experience E, then at t we cannot have an intentional experience E': indeed, we can have an intentional experience against a background of other contemporaneous intentional experiences. This is exactly what happens in outer perception: for example, when we see (explicitly) the laptop (intentional experience E at t), we see (implicitly) the table on which it is (intentional experience E' at t). So the immanentist could apply this schema to the immanent object. Still, it seems to me that this sort of solution would be descriptively unsound in the case at hand.

However, the immanentist could deny such an interpretation; he could reply that the only target of our experience is what he calls the ‘immanent object’—in my example, the immanent laptop. But then the second problem arises: if the immanent laptop is the only object of our experience, then how can we clarify our access (namely, our relation) to the transcendent laptop? More generally, what allows us to talk about transcendent laptops, if our experience does in fact not reach them?

Let us now return to Husserl’s conception. It can be observed that the last two conditionals entail two analytic propositions:

- If X exists and X is intended through an experience E, then the object of E exists.
- If Y does not exist and Y is intended through an experience E, then the object of E does not exist.

The first conclusion that can be derived is that Husserl’s notion of ‘object’ is existentially neutral (see Heffernan 2015, p. 80): not all that is intended exists, that is, not every object is existent.

The second text I would like to look at is the lecture course from 1906, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Husserl writes:

We have countless intuitive and conceptual thought acts that are objectless. Objectless, insofar as the objects that are presented and thought do not exist at all. And yet not objectless, insofar as there is the consciousness of an object in all of them:
in hallucination an object stands “before our eyes”. Acts refer to things (Sachen) […] in any case. (my emphasis)

Here Husserl is referring to two notorious cases which are also cited in the appendix to the 5th LI: the presentation of a round square (something that necessarily does not exist, that is, which necessarily is neither real nor possible) and the hallucination of a physical thing (something that is contingently real but necessarily possible). What is interesting in the quoted passage is not that Husserl concedes that there is a sense in which a presentation can be said to be ‘objectless’ (after all, the term is ambiguous and it is not originally Husserlian, but rather Bolzanian), but that Husserl stresses the point that a presentation cannot be said to be ‘objectless’ precisely because intentionality entails a relation between an act and an object. In this context it is worth noting that according to Husserl ‘to perceive’ is not a factive verb: ‘S perceives X’ does not entail that S’s perception is veridical (which in turn would entail that X is real); rather, it means just ‘X is given to S in the flesh (leibhaftig)’ (see Husserl 1907, p. 15); hence, in Husserl’s framework a hallucination of X is a non-veridical perception of X.

Related considerations lie behind what we read in the second book of Ideas, where it is stated that an intentional relation exists even if the object does not exist. More precisely, with regard to transcendent perception Husserl distinguishes between the intentionale Beziehung and the reale Beziehung. For the first to obtain, it is sufficient that something be perceived; for the second to obtain, it is necessary that what is perceived be real. We should bear in mind that Husserl uses the adjective real, which in his framework is not the same as wirklich. By calling the second relation real he does not want to say that the first one is unreal (unwirklich). Rather, he means just what follows: when we perceive a real laptop, this latter propagates through space in waves that strike our sense organs (e.g., our optic nerves, if the perception is a visual one). Husserl points out that all this is a psychophysical fact, and this is why he calls the real relation also the real-causal relation: this latter “runs ‘parallel’” to the intentional relation, which obtains even when we perceive an unreal laptop (i.e. when we hallucinate a laptop).

The second conclusion that can be derived is that with regard to Husserl’s account we can speak of the existence-independence of the intentional relation (see Smith and McIntyre 1982, p. 11). That is, that an intentional relation between x and y obtains does not entail that x exists and y exists. So as for Süßbauer’s argument, I can conclude that Husserl would not deny (P₁), but rather (P₃): he would agree that the existence of a relation entails the relata (or arguments), but he would not agree that the existence of a relation entails the existence of the relata.
At this stage, some explanation of the Husserlian notion of ‘existence’ is required. An account that allows us (as Husserl’s does) to speak of ‘existent objects’ and ‘non-existent objects’ does not imply that existence is an mereological property. Here the grammatical form might be misleading; since in English both ‘existent’ and ‘green’ are adjectives, one might put an expression like ‘existent object’ on the same level as expressions like ‘green leaf’. Yet as is noted in *Intentionale Gegenstände*, though ‘existence’ seems to express a predicate among others, in fact it does not, for it expresses rather what may be called a condition—the one of ‘validity’, Husserl there specifies. This is also why we should be more careful in translating; Husserl uses *existierend*, which in German is primarily a form of a verb (a present participle to be precise), though it is also an adjective; accordingly, we should rather speak of ‘existing’ (and ‘non-existing’) objects. This way of speaking prevents us from conceiving of existence as an M-property: indeed, as Husserl clearly states in the 3rd LI, ‘existent’, unlike ‘red’ and ‘round’, does not designate a part of the object (hence, according to the given definitions, I cannot say that existence is really in the object, nor can I say that the object really has existence). If existence were a part of the object, we could intend existence, or more specifically, we could perceive existence (implicitly in a partial intention and explicitly in a particular perception)—but this is phenomenologically unsound; for example, we can see the leaf (or its colour), but we cannot see its reality. Difficulties would arise on the ontological side as well: if it were true that the existence of the whole entails the existence of (all of) its parts, then the existence of the leaf would entail the existence of the existence of the leaf—and this is counterintuitive.

Furthermore, in such a framework the classical logical principle of existential introduction (\(Fa \rightarrow \exists x(Fx)\)) fails. Consider a round square, that is, a square which instantiates the property ‘round’ (just as a green square is a square which instantiates the property ‘green’). In first-order predicate calculus we could write it as \(Fa \land Ga\), and so derive \(\exists x(Fx \land Gx)\). Now, Husserl would say that a round square is an impossible whole (‘round’ and ‘square’ being incompatible (unverträglich)), that is, something which does not exist (possibility being the minimal sense in which something can exist).

In conclusion, Bolzano’s issue—as Husserl himself formulates it in *Intentionale Gegenstände* (see Husserl 1894, p. 303)—can be solved by the Husserl of the *Investigations* by means of the conjunction of two statements which do not contradict each other: ‘Every presentation has an object’ and ‘Not every presentation has an existent object.’
6 Non-relational accounts

I have shown that the Süßbauer-Künne (henceforth SK) reading is exegetically untenable. In this section I will show that it is flawed as a phenomenological account of intentionality. In other words, I will argue that Husserl’s account is better in terms of what has been called ‘phenomenal adequacy’ (Meixner 2006).

It is tempting to say that every non-relational account faces what might be called the access problem: if intentionality does not entail a relation (negation of [H2]), and if what we term ‘act’ or ‘intentional experience’ cannot be reduced to what we term (for example) ‘green leaf’ (that is, if act and object are not identical), then how can we clarify our access (namely, our relation) to what we term ‘green leaf’? I believe that SK can avoid the access problem in the following way. Consider the case of perception; SK might formulate the following thesis:

(SK+) If a perception P is veridical, then a relation between P and its object exists.

Where the antecedent of (SK+) entails ‘The object of the perception P is real.’ To put it differently, SK might make relationality dependent upon veridicality (this is in fact the solution adopted by Kriegel (2008)):

(SK+) If a perception P is veridical, then a relation between P and its object exists.
(SK-) If a perception P is non-veridical, then a relation between P and its object does not exist.

As I have shown, Husserl’s account is quite different:

(H+) If a perception P is veridical, then the object of P is real.
(H-) If a perception P is non-veridical, then the object of P is not real.

Where both the antecedent in (H+) and the antecedent in (H-) entail ‘A(n intentional) relation exists.’

Before going back to SK, I would like to compare Husserl’s theory with three alternative theories of intentionality: the relational account, the adverbial account, and the parametric account.24
RELATIONAL ACCOUNT. In my previous schema I conceived of ‘Paris intends a leaf’ as a (dyadic) relation I which obtains between Paris and the leaf, in that order. Let the intending subject be denoted by \( p \) (Paris) and let the object be denoted by \( l \) (the leaf). Thus, we have a binary predication which can be written either as \( I(p,l) \) (if we opt for the notation \( R(x,y) \)) or as \( pll \) (if we opt for the (Russellian) notation \( xRy \)). This is the logical description which corresponds to a relational account of intentionality. I believe that such an account is the one that best captures Husserl’s theory.

ADVERBIAL ACCOUNT. An adverbialist attempts to capture the nature of intentionality by rephrasing the proposition ‘S intends X’ as ‘S intends X-ly.’ Using my example, ‘Paris intends a leaf’ becomes ‘Paris intends leafly.’ The proposition thus acquires the form of a monadic predication, where the unary predicate is obtained from an adverbial modification of the derelativization \( I^* \) of I. Hence the logical form is \( ([l][I])p \). A phenomenological objection to this account can be formulated as follows: a thing as such cannot be described as a way, and the same must be said with respect to ideal objects like numbers, concepts, etc. Perhaps Husserl would say that an adverb generated by adding the suffix ‘-ly’ can express what he terms ‘apprehensional form’ or ‘apprehensional way’ (Auffassungsform/Auffassungsweise; see Husserl 1901, p. 624), which determines, for example, whether an intentional experience is perceptual or imaginative. So we may say, for example, ‘S intends X perceptually’ or ‘S intends X imaginatively.’ Husserl would probably consider a phrase like ‘leaf-ly’ as a mere façon de parler.

PARAMETRIC ACCOUNT. The parametric account follows a similar path: here ‘S intends X’ is rephrased as ‘S has the property of X-intending.’ Again, using my example, ‘Paris intends a leaf’ becomes ‘Paris has the property of leaf-intending.’ In this case too, the proposition acquires the form of a monadic predication, where the unary predicate is obtained from the parametrization of the dyadic relation I by the noun \( l \); the logical form is thus \( I_l(p) \). The phenomenological objection this account results in can be formulated as follows: trivially, since the parametric account is not a relational account, it cannot be said that ‘leaf-intending’ expresses an \( R \)-property, and so it must express another sort of property. I contend only that ‘leaf-intending’ cannot express an \( M \)-property. In this sense, Paris can have, for example, the property white, but not the alleged property leaf-intending. I have not decided whether intentionality is an \( M \)-property of an experience (it is not germane to my argument to determine this), but I do not want
to leave open the question whether intentionality is an M-property of a subject, since I believe it is surely not.

However, both an adverbialist and a parametrist can hold SK; in other words, both can make relationality dependent upon veridicality. But an account that adopts this position would not be a phenomenological account: *phenomenally* speaking, the intentional relation is not something that depends upon the existence of the object (hence, it is not *contingent* that an intentional relation exists if an intentional experience exists), for ‘relation’ captures only our *stance*, which is a stance *towards something*. This is what reflection shows us: the stance at issue is the *same* in both *veridical* and *non-veridical* intentional experiences. The case of hallucination is instructive: we must describe non-veridical perceptions as a relation to something (“In hallucination an object stands ‘before our eyes’.”). In the words of Aristotle (*Met. Δ.15, 1020b26–1021b11*), intentionality *as such* entails a πρὸς τί.

7 Conclusion

Let me briefly summarize my results. From the *exegetical* point of view, I believe I have shown that there is no reason to read Husserl’s early theory of intentionality as a *non-relational* one; indeed, from the texts I have examined, it emerges clearly that according to Husserl, in describing intentionality the concept of relation turns out to be unavoidable. From the *systematic* point of view, I believe I have presented a *consistent* theory of intentionality. I believe that this is due in particular to Husserl’s notions of object and existence, which are more sophisticated than many contemporary ones. I also believe that Husserl’s early theory of intentionality is the best candidate for a *unified* theory of intentionality, that is, a theory that provides a clarification of *all* cases in which we refer to something through presentation.

Notes

1 I translate *Erlebnis* as ‘experience’, though what this English word properly fits is *Erfahrung*, which in Husserl’s framework is not coterminous with *Erlebnis*: indeed, some *Erlebnisse* are not *Erfahrungen* (e.g., phantasies).

2 See Husserl (1901, p. 392): “Das determinierende Beiwort *intentional* nennt den gemeinsamen Wesenscharakter der abzugrenzenden Erlebnisklasse, die Eigenheit der Intention, das sich in der Weise der Vorstellung oder in einer irgend analogen Weise auf ein Gegenständliches Beziehen.”

4 See Husserl (1898, p. 130): “In dem Letzteren ist Inhalt ein wenig passendes Wort für Gegenstand, denn es betrifft das mir in der Wahrnehmung Gegenüberstehende, das von mir wahrnehmend, d. h. als daseiend Gemeinte (Intendierte).”

5 See Husserl (1908, p. 39): “Jede Vorstellung soll einen Gegenstand haben, sich auf einen Gegenstand beziehen, gleichgültig, ob Überzeugung mitbesteht oder nicht besteht, und gleichgültig, ob die Überzeugung richtig ist oder nicht.”


7 See Husserl (1894, p. 326): “So weit der Ausdruck ‘Es gibt ein A’ Sinn und Wahrheit beanspruchen kann, so weit reicht auch die Domäne des Existenzbegriffs.”


9 I should point out that the examples of correlatives given in the 3rd LI contain instances of ‘there is’ and ‘exist(s)’; e. g., “A father cannot be if there is not a son” (see Husserl 1901, p. 257). I believe that these
formulations are imprecise, or at least do not do justice to the account of intentionality developed in the subsequent *Investigations*.

10 See Husserl (1901, p. 616): “Die Bezeichnung *dieser* Bestandstücke als Füllen ist eben eine relative, funktionelle, sie drückt eine Charakteristik aus, die dem Inhalt durch den Akt und durch die Rolle dieses Aktes in möglichen Erfüllungssynthesen zuwächst. Es verhält sich hier ähnlich wie bei der Bezeichnung ‘Gegenstand’. Gegenstand zu sein ist kein positives Merkmal, keine positive Art eines Inhalts, es bezeichnet den Inhalt nur als intentionales Korrelat einer Vorstellung.” Note that this account of the designation ‘object’ supports my reading of the proposition ‘Every intentional experience has an object’ as an analytic one; what Husserl denies is that the expression ‘colour’ is a *relative* one.

11 With regard to reflection, the early Husserl holds true two theses; first, if we reflect on something, say X, we live through *both* the reflection on X and X itself (see, e.g., Husserl 1904, p. 19); and secondly, the object of a reflection is to this latter as a *part* is to its *whole* (see, e.g., Husserl 1909, p. 115). I believe that both theses are highly problematic, but this would be the topic of another paper.


13 Heffernan puts forward this view. I would like to emphasize that apart from this point, my reading of Husserl’s early theory of intentionality is substantially in agreement with the one defended by Heffernan (2015).


15 See Husserl (1894, p. 315): “Ähnliches gilt von jeder echten Relationswahrheit; denn das Sein der Relation schließt das Sein der Relationsglieder ein.”

16 See Süßbauer (1995, p. 111): “Nähmen wir an, Intentionalität wäre eine Beziehung zwischen einem Akt und einem davon verschiedenen Gegenstand, so könnte […] die Intentionalität allen Akten nicht wesensnotwendig zukommen, denn, wäre die Intentionalität eine Beziehung, so hiesse dies beispielsweise für das Vorstellen von Bill Clinton, dass in jeder möglichen Situation (möglichen Welt) ein solcher Vorstellungsakt in intentionaler Beziehung zu Bill Clinton stünde, und da nach Husserl das Bestehen einer Relation die Existenz der Relata impliziert, folgte daraus, dass ein solcher Vorstellungsakt nur in solchen möglichen Welten intentional sein kann, in welchen auch Bill Clinton existiert, was hiesse, dass die Intentionalität der Akte von der zufälligen (kontingenten) Existenz des Gegenstandes abhänge.”


See Husserl (1894, p. 341): “Existenz ist nur scheinbar ein Prädikat des nach der grammatischen Form sich darbietenden Subjekts; es drückt vielmehr aus, daß der Subjektvorstellung des grammatischen Existentialsatzes das Prädikat der Geltung zukomme.”


In outlining the three accounts I follow Centrone (2016, pp. 3–4).

References


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