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IS THERE SOMETHING LIKE A ('RAW') VISUAL SENSATION?

Andrea Marchesi
Sapienza Università di Roma
andrea.marchesi@uniroma1.it

ABSTRACT. Regarding Husserl's analysis of perception, the validity of concepts like visual sensation and 'raw', viz. 'unapprehended' sensation has been questioned. In this paper I discuss the issue with two American interpreters of Husserlian phenomenology: William McKenna and Quentin Smith, who respectively defend and criticize Husserl's account. My aim is to show that their attempts remain controversial. Moreover, I will mention a textual source in which Husserl indirectly justifies the existence of visual sensations.

KEYWORDS. Husserlian phenomenology · Perception · Visual sensation · Reflection · Intentionality

Husserl's descriptive analysis of perception has been discussed for decades; what has been especially questioned is the phenomenological validity of concepts like visual sensation and 'raw', viz. 'unapprehended' sensation. Husserl takes for granted claims such as the fact that seeing involves sensations and that it cannot be said that a sensation must be apprehended; on the other hand, some interpreters argued that reflecting on perception does not allow us to find this kind of entities, which therefore must be considered a mere theoretical construct. I would like to strike up a debate with two American interpreters of Husserlian phenomenology who provided a stimulating contribution to this discussion: William McKenna, whose paper develops a defense of Husserl's account; and Quentin Smith, who on the contrary criticizes it. I shall try to show that both the attempts remain controversial.

The first two sections are dedicated to a short introduction to Husserl's theory of outer perception; in the third section, I will show that the examples provided by McKenna are not convincing, at least when analyzed in the light of Husserlian framework; in the fourth section, I will show that the objection raised by Smith is based on an inaccurate exegesis of Husserl's account of reflection and intentionality. In the last section, I will mention a textual source in which Husserl indirectly provides an answer to the question of the validity of the concept of visual sensation.

1. SENSATION, ADUMBRATION AND OBJECTIVE PROPERTY

In all his works on perception Husserl stresses the difference between sensation and objective property. A complex of sensations cannot be confused with a complex of objective properties such as colouring and extension. In order to justify his claim, he resorts to the Lockean example of a red ball; as we read in the 5th *Logical Investigation*:

These two, the colour-sensation and the object's objective colouring, are often confounded [...] Here it is enough to point to the readily grasped difference between the red of this ball, objectively seen as uniform, and the indubitable and so necessary adumbration of the objec-

tive colour-sensations in perception – a difference that is repeated in all species of objectual properties and the sensory complex which correspond to them.¹

The red surface of the ball is seen as something uniform, while in the content of perception we find the adumbration, which is by definition something non-uniform. A 'sense datum', or more simply a 'sensation', corresponds to the adumbration, so that, given its relation with this latter, it is also necessarily something non-uniform. Since we have two contradictory predicates, the sensation cannot be identified with the objective property. It is important to underline that the example mentioned does not help us to show that *there is* something like a sensation; Husserl only invites us to precisely distinguish what he calls 'sensation' from the objective property; in other terms: the difference between the uniform colouring and the non-uniform colouring does not justify the *existence* of the sensation, but proves only that there cannot be any *identity* of the objective property with it.

An even thornier question concerns the relationship between the sensation and the adumbration. May they be identified one with the other? Following Husserl's suggestion, we have treated them as distinct entities, i.e. numerically as two things; for, although the concepts are not always clearly distinguished – especially in the first book of *Ideas*² –, there are passages in which Husserl states a sharp duality: in his manuscript of 1909 he defines the sensation as the «consciousness of the adumbration»,³ and in another one of 1915 he clearly separates the hyletic datum 'colour' from the 'perspectival adumbration' of the colouring, which is indicated as a part of the noema⁴. We will later appreciate the value of this distinction.

Moreover sensation and objective property differ in two further respects; the first is the mereological one: sensations are «real [*reelle*] contents» of the outer perception, namely they are 'in' it in proper sense; the objective property as such, on the contrary, belongs to the object, which in the case of the outer perception is not a real, but only an intentional content of the act.⁵ The second respect concerns Husserl's account of intentionality: indeed, what we are intentionally related to in an outer perception are not the sensations, but the object:

The sensations and also the "apprehending" or "apperceptive" acts are lived through [*erlebt*] therewith, but they do not appear objectually [*gegenständlich*]; they aren't seen, heard, "perceived" with any sense. The objects, on the other hand, appear, are perceived, but they are themselves not lived through.⁶

With regard to the outer perception, we can state the following formula: while the sensation is *lived through*, but is not objectual, the objective property is *objectual*, but is not lived through. This means that what is said to appear in such a perception is the objective property, not the sensation: according to Husserl what appears is what the outer perception intends, that is, what such an experience is intentionally related to. In other terms: what the experience is intentionally related to is what is objectual; thus what we see is the objective colouring.

2. THE 'CONTENT – APPREHENSION' SCHEMA

Husserl's fundamental idea is that the outer perception cannot be reduced to a mere complex of sensations; as we will see in more detail, the relationship between sensation and this kind of perception is a mereological relationship: if there are no sensations, then there is certainly no outer perception. Nevertheless, sensations are a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. In order to show this, Husserl elaborates

two 'arguments', which are clearly formulated in the lecture dated 1907, the *Dingvorlesung*:

These real contents themselves we call the sensory contents. Their complex does not make up, according to what we have already discussed, the entire content of perception. We have already mentioned the evidence indicating that the complex of the sensory contents is quite varied, and yet the corresponding perceptions, by their very essence, pass themselves off as perceptions of the same object. Conversely, it is also holds that the same complex of sensory contents can be the basis of diverse perceptions, perceptions of diverse objects, as every mannequin proves, inasmuch as here, from a fixed viewpoint, two perceptions stand in conflict, that of the mannequin and that of the presented man, both constructed on the same fundament of sensation.⁷

The first 'argument' states that the sensory complex can vary while the reference of the intentional experience remains constant: if we turn around the red ball, its colouring appears in a manifold of adumbrations, i.e. in a manifold of non-uniform colourings; correlatively there is a variation of the sensory complex. Despite this variation, we can recognize the constancy of the reference: in all the phases of our rotation, the objective property is objectual as unchanged, namely as uniform. But, if it is true that the sensory complex varies, or better if it is true that an unchanged objective property appears in a manifold of non-uniform colourings, what allows us to see the colouring of the ball as uniform? Husserl's answer is: the apprehension. It is precisely thanks to the apprehension that we can perceive the objective property as something that remains constant along the variation of the sensory complex. Thanks to the 'animating' function of the apprehension, the 'raw' sensation becomes a *pre-sentative* content, i.e. a content which presents an objective property.

The second 'argument' may be considered as the inverse proof: mere sensations cannot clarify the perception, since the reference of the intentional experience can vary while the sensory complex remains constant. In this regard the favourite example of Husserl is that of the man-mannequin: visiting a wax museum we see a man, but suddenly we realize that it is a wax figure. If the external conditions of perception remain unchanged, then during the transition from the perception of the man to that of the mannequin the sensory complex may remain constant as well. If, for instance, the illumination does not vary, then it is possible that the sensory complex does not change. So, if the argument is true, we have to admit that the sensory complex cannot determine the reference of the intentional experience; however the perception entails a determined reference; hence another constitutive function is necessary, that of apprehension.

The outer perception consists therefore of at least two components: sensations, also named «primary contents» or «hyle» (ὕλη),⁸ and apprehension, sometimes termed «interpretation».⁹ This is the reason why Husserl may say that the constitution of the object given in such a perception complies with the so-called 'content – apprehension' schema. In more technical terms, the outer perception can be described as a *whole* composed by two *parts*. In order to clarify this point, we have to introduce some laws of mereology exposed in the 3rd *Logical Investigation*: given two parts *x* and *y*, we have at least two possible relations: either *x* can exist only in a whole which connects it to *y*, or *x* can exist also out of the whole connecting it to *y*. In the first case, *x* is a non-independent part of the whole, i.e. a moment; in the second, *x* is independent part, that is a fraction.¹⁰

So we might ask: can the sensation exist only in a whole which connects it with an apprehension? In simpler terms: can a sensation exist only as animated? If we

consider a great number of passages in Husserl's writings, we see that he would question this hypothesis. In the *Dingvorlesung* he makes a very explicit claim:

We find physical data, as a rule, bound up with an animating apprehension. If we make them objects of a self-posing, then we either take as an object the whole unity of physical datum and apprehension, thus the whole perception, or we abstract from the apprehension, gazing exclusively at the physical. But we cannot say this involves an abstraction of the kind which brings to separate notice inseparable moments, such as the tonal intensity in abstraction from the pitch, etc. It cannot be said a priori that a physical datum requires an apprehension, thus that it must function as a presentative content.¹¹

The mentioned comparison is illuminating: the intensity of a tone is inseparable from its pitch, and viceversa; just as the tonal intensity can namely exist only in a whole which connects it with the tonal pitch, this latter can exist only in a whole which connects it with the former. Thus intensity and pitch are two moments of a whole (the tone). The relationship between the sensation and the apprehension is something different: we cannot say that the existence of a sensation entails the existence of an apprehension. This is a case that Husserl explicitly contemplates in the 1st *Logical Investigation*: it is possible that a subject who stays only visually in front of a tree «senses» like a subject who is intentionally related to it, i.e. who sees it as a tree; the first subject will live through the sensations, but these will not «mean anything»¹² to him, i.e. they will have no reference; the second subject will instead realize a perception in Husserl's sense. This claim is reiterated in the lectures of 1925, in which Husserl writes that we cannot say that the «sense data must stand in a presentative» or in an «adumbrating function»;¹³ it may not be stated that we live through them only when we see a spatial property as something uniform in a manifold of adumbrations. So we may express an analogical proportion: it is possible that a sensation is to perception as a fraction is to its whole. Ultimately, according to Husserl, it is possible that a sensation can remain 'raw'.

3. MCKENNA'S EXAMPLES

A visual sensation would be a sensation that we live through when we *see* an objective property. As we know, Husserl does not only state that such a sensation exists, but also that a visual perception cannot exist without it. The concept of 'visual sensation' has been often criticized: some interpreters have proposed considering it as a *noematic* component of the perceptual act;¹⁴ some others have simply refused that something like that may be taken into account.¹⁵ William McKenna tried to defend Husserl's account. He provided several examples, in order «to establish» the «existence» of sensations and «to resolve the issue of whether they are really intrinsic or they are noematic components of experiences».¹⁶ Two examples are drawn from the field of visual perception:

A person approaches from a distance. Although the person is seen to be of constant size, one may notice a gradual increase in the "size" of the figure. This increase in size is a hyletic phenomenon. [...] While walking down a straight narrow corridor we may note that there is a kind of "movement" taking place within our environment. The "walls" seem to "move apart" as we progress and the whole "corridor" seems to "open wider". This "movement" is one within the hyletic visual field. This example is perhaps more convincing than the previous ones, for one is less able to describe the changes in "objective (or noematic) terms" [...] In the example of the corridor, however, the "movement" of the "walls" does not have an analog in

some objective movement. Our own movement down the corridor could not be cited as that which we are “really” describing. The “movement” of the “walls” does seem to be a “subjective” phenomenon.¹⁷

Undoubtedly Husserl would state that in the described situations we live through sensations. On his turn, McKenna considers both cases as examples of sensory phenomena, but he also believes that only the second is exempt from objections; he argues that the first case could be described in «objective (or noematic) terms». What can be found through reflection is only an objective movement, that of the body of the person impeding the vision of what is behind it.¹⁸

I cannot here discuss in detail the suggested equivalence between what is ‘objective’ and what is ‘noematic’ – an equivalence that is not clear at all in Husserl’s writings. I wish rather to attempt a description of the second case through the tools of the Husserlian conceptual framework: when I walk down the corridor, I see the walls, which are the objects of my visual perception; the walls are given to me in a certain way, i.e. in a certain sense, and since a wall is a thing, it has properties that are perceived in a certain adumbration; then I have sensations of these properties: I have a visual sensation of its colouring and extension, which appear to me in a certain perspective; finally, my walking is indicated by kinaesthesias. We can perfectly adopt this description for the first case, except for the last point, since it is not clear whether I am at rest or not while the person approaches. Indeed, the second example is just a *non-veridical* perception – precisely an illusion –, whose phenomenological content can be quite indistinguishable from that of a veridical one; as Husserl points out in the *Logical Investigations*:

If the object does not exist, if perception must be considered as a deception, an hallucination, an illusion etc., then the visually perceived colour, that of the object, does not exist either. Such differences of normal and abnormal, of veridical and deceptive perception, do not affect the internal, purely descriptive, viz. phenomenological character of perception. [...] The creations of the productive phantasy, most objects of artistic presentation in paintings, statues, poems etc., hallucinatory and illusory objects exist phenomenally and intentionally, i.e., they do not really exist at all, but rather only the acts of appearance in question, with their real and intentional contents.¹⁹

This means that for Husserl also by describing a non-veridical perception we find a real and an intentional content. Therefore what distinguishes the two situations cannot be the fact that in the second one a sensation is lived through; since the first perception differs from the second one simply because the object of the latter does not exist or exists in a different way (the corridor *seems* to open wider, but it does not really). Only in this sense Husserl would label such a phenomenon as something «“subjective”». But if it is true, then the second example does not force us to admit the existence of visual sensations: whoever intends to deny them can describe the two situations just through the notion of ‘adumbration’, which, as we have seen, is conceived by Husserl also as something noematic.

4. SMITH’S CRITIQUE

If we consider the outer perception as the object of a «self-posing», as Husserl states in the *Dingvorlesung*, we can direct ourselves exclusively to the sensations; what in that context is called ‘self-posing’ is nothing other than an *immanent* perception, namely a reflection.²⁰ So it is true that by reflecting on outer perception we can sepa-

rate sensations from apprehension, and perceive them in themselves. Quentin Smith has questioned this point; he argued that

if we wish to intuit the sensations *as such*, we must abstract from all interpretation and meaning, and come to see them as *raw sensations*. [...] As Husserl phrases it in an "Appendix" to the *Logical Investigations*, when we "reflect on" these sensations we must "abstract" from all that we recently or usually meant by them, and take them simply as they are. I now attempt to do this. But I suddenly find there is an insurmountable problem. [...] For the sensation that I am trying to intuit cannot be intuited as being anything, for if it were intuited as a certain "what", this "what" would constitute an interpretation of the sensation. If I were to intuit the sensation of white, I could not be conscious of it *as white*, for this "as white" would then be a meaning with which the sensation is interpreted. Nor can I be conscious of this sensation *as a color*, or even *as something*, for these are both interpretative meanings. In fact, I cannot be conscious of it as being anything at all, for to do so would be to be conscious of an interpretative meaning of it. A sensation as such cannot appear to me, for to do so it must appear as a "what", and this "whatness", as a meaning, destroys its character as an uninterpreted, meaningless sensation.²¹

Smith's argument can be synthesized in the following terms: when we reflect on sensations, we interpret them as something, i.e. *as sensations*; therewith we perform necessarily an apprehension. Thus it is impossible to perceive immanently a 'raw' sensation.

We may notice that Smith's argument is based on a category mistake: because the possible 'rawness' of a sensation is not undermined by reflection, since it is rather established by the real possibility that in a *pre-reflective* experience a sensation can be lived through without functioning as a presentative content. Ascertaining an experience as 'really possible' means finding it through the descriptive analysis. If it were so, then – in Smith's terms – we would not intuit sensations merely *as something*, but *as something which can remain 'raw'*.

However, I think that the question is here especially technical. If we consider the Husserlian account of the reflection, then we can see how problematic Smith's argument is. In fact, according to Husserl, what distinguishes an immanent from a transcendent perception is precisely the fact that the former does not involve any apprehension; this aspect is highlighted in a passage of a manuscript dated summer 1913, written after the publication of the first book of *Ideas*:

In an immanent intuition [...] there is no representance [*Repräsentation*], no "appearance" of what is immanently objectual; there are no "presentative" or adumbrating contents that by virtue of the related apprehensions may become representatives for the represented objectual moments, which, being identical, can come to givenness through many other representatives or appearances [...] If we speak of apprehension or representance also with regard to the immanent intuitions, then it should be considered a mere *façon de parler* [...].²²

According to Husserl, the outer perception is a kind of *transcendent* perception; since the object of the outer perception is necessarily given in a certain adumbration, the relative sensation has to be apprehended, because otherwise we could not see an objective property as something uniform. This is the first reason that requires us to admit the constitutive function of apprehension; the second reason is that the reference can vary despite the constancy of the sensory complex. Now, both the variables are excluded in the case of an immanent perception: because not only what is objectual in such a perception cannot be given through adumbrations, but there cannot even be an «horizon of opened possibilities»,²³ namely a manifold of possible

references (e.g. 'as man' or 'as mannequin'). Consequently, there is no need for the apprehension.

What we have just said does not entail that in the reflection nothing is lived through: as Husserl explains in his lecture course of 1904, when I reflect on a part of the outer perception, such a part is lived through, although it does not perform its presentative function.²⁴ So, whereas in the outer perception what is objectual *is not* lived through, in the immanent one what is objectual is lived through. If I see, for example, an objective colouring, this latter is objectual, when it is not lived through; but if I reflect on a sensation, this latter is objectual but also lived through. In a brief formula: we live through what we reflect on.

However intending a certain content does not mean that I have to apprehend something; we can simply state it as follows: necessarily, if an experience intends something through an apprehension, then this experience is intentionally related to something; but the fact that an experience is intentionally related to something does not entail that this experience intends it through apprehension. If I reflect on a content, it means only that I intend it: hence, if the content is given, and if such a content can remain 'raw', then I can intend it without altering its nature. The possibility of a 'raw' sensation is not undermined by the nature of reflection; it would be undermined by the impossibility to find pre-reflective experiences in which we may *sense something* without *perceiving anything*. But this is another question that we cannot tackle here.

5. HUSSERL'S INDIRECT ANSWER

It seems that Husserl takes for granted the existence of visual sensations; from an exegetical point of view, this thesis sounds at least plausible: in effect, in Husserl's early works we cannot find a proper discussion about the phenomenological evidence of such a content. This notwithstanding, it does not mean that we cannot trace an *indirect* justification. In Husserl's framework visual sensations seem to be something that emerge descriptively as soon as we want to clarify the difference between perception and phantasy. This is the path pursued during the lecture course of 1904, in which we read:

Perceptual appearance and phantasy appearance are so closely related to one another, so similar, that they immediately suggest ideas about the relationship of original and image. In both cases we have objectivating apprehensions; and in both cases the same object can come to appearance, and even come to appearance with precisely the same determinations from the same profile falling into the appearance – in short, the appearances are indeed "the same" in both cases, except that in the one case it is precisely perception that we have and in the other case it is phantasy. What is responsible for the difference? Well, obviously two things: the contents serving the apprehensions and the apprehension's characters themselves.²⁵

It is really possible that a perceptual appearance and a phantasy appearance are indistinguishable with respect to their reference and mode of orientation. Husserl's perspective is clear: consider a visual perception of a tree, and then consider a phantasy which reproduces it or, in other words, represents the tree that was seen from the profile in which we saw it. What here is not expressly said is that the two forms of appearance can be indistinguishable also with respect to their *matter*, i.e. to the degree of determinacy by which the object is intended (e.g. 'as green' or 'as mantis').²⁶

However, if the mentioned factors cannot clarify the difference between the two forms of appearance, how can we clarify it? Husserl analyses three possible answers.

a) The first states that, unlike the phantasy appearance, the perceptual appearance derives from a peripheral stimulus. However, this is a psychological description that cannot be accepted as such by Husserl.

b) The second answer is given at the phenomenological level, but turns out to be nevertheless unsatisfactory: it is argued that the difference consists in the degree of fulness, that is to say: a phantasy is fragmentary and poor if compared to perception. Husserl remarks that this cannot clarify the difference at issue, «since the differences within the phantasy representations of the same object are at least as great as all of the differences that belong to the perceptual representations».²⁷ This implies a relevant consequence: since the fulness concerns the gradations of clarity, as stated in the *Logical Investigations*,²⁸ the adumbration in which the perceived colouring is given can be indistinguishable from the adumbration in which is given the phantasi-sed colouring.

c) The third answer results in an analogous objection: saying that a perception is generally more stable or steadier than a phantasy is not a solution, since both the acts show differences in this sense. In short: what Husserl tries to show is that the proposed answers concern merely *relative* differences, i.e. differences presupposing an absolute one.²⁹

Husserl's proposal appears in the last pages of his lecture course, and recalls the above-quoted passage; here two solutions are proposed: according to the first, perception and phantasy can be distinguished because the latter is simply a «modification» of the former; according to the second, what distinguishes them is that in the two acts we live through two different contents of apprehension: in perception we live through a sensation, while in phantasy we live through a phantasm.³⁰ It is not my interest here to opt for the second solution instead of the first.³¹ However, it is important to remark that, *if* the second solution was true, then we should admit not only that the notion of 'adumbration' is not sufficient to clarify perception, but also that something like a visual sensation does definitely exist.

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NOTES

1. EDMUND HUSSERL, *Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band (LU II)*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1984, p. 359; translated by J. N. Findlay, *Logical Investigations*, II, London-New York, Routledge, 2001, p. 83, slightly modified.
2. Cf. IDEM, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und einer Phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch (ID I)*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 85-86; tr. by F. Kersten, *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1983, pp. 88-89.
3. IDEM, *Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigungen. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1898-1925) (PBE)*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1980, p. 266; tr. by J. Brough, *Phantasy, image consciousness, and memory (1898-1925)*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2005, p. 324.
4. Cf. IDEM, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und einer Phänomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch. Ergänzende Texte (1912-1929)*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1988, p. 617, translation

mine: «The object simpliciter is given only in the form of what presents itself from this or that profile, in this or that “perspectival adumbration”, that is, in this and that colour-perspective etc. Thus in the noema we have not the hyletic datum ‘colour’ but the “colour-perspective”, not the hyletic datum ‘extension’ and ‘quasi-shape’ but rather the shape-perspective».

5. Cf. LU II, pp. 358 and 361; en. tr., II, pp. 82 and 84.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 399; en. tr., II, p. 105, sl. mod.
7. IDEM, *Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907* (DR), Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1973, p. 45; tr. by R. Rojcewicz, *Thing and space. Lectures 1907*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1997, p. 39, sl. mod.
8. Cf. LU II, p. 708; en. tr., II, p. 304 with ID I, p. 192, note n. 1; en. tr., p. 203.
9. Cf. LU II, pp. 399 and 406; en. tr., II, pp. 105 and 109.
10. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 267 and 270-271; en. tr., II, pp. 25 and 27-28.
11. DR, p. 48; en. tr., p. 41, sl. mod. This thesis is mentioned in the lecture course of 1904: «[...] sensations can occur also without presentative function» (IDEM, *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1893-1919)* (WA), Dordrecht, Springer, 2004, p. 25, tr. m.).
12. LU II, p. 80; en. tr., I, p. 214.
13. IDEM, *Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1968, p. 165; tr. by M. Farber, *Phenomenological Psychology: Lectures, Summer Semester, 1925*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1977, p. 127.
14. See notably HERMANN ASEMISSSEN, *Strukturanalytische Probleme der Wahrnehmung in der Phänomenologie Husserls*, Köln, Kölner Universitäts-Verlag, 1957, pp. 25-27 and ELMAR HOLENSTEIN, *Phänomenologie der Assoziation. Zu Struktur und Funktion eines Grundprinzips der passiven Genesis bei E. Husserl*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1979, pp. 93 and 101-107. These interpreters highlight some aspects of the Husserlian account of sensations which appears indeed problematic; for instance the fact that sensations are ascribed with a «spread» or an «extension» (see e.g. DR, p. 73; en. tr., p. 60), i.e. something that pertains the objective space: in fact we would literally have an *experience* characterized by spatiality, which properly speaking is a form of the natural object. In order to avoid this, the same interpreters propose to consider sensations as parts of the noematic side of perception. However, we reckon that the question is rather semantical than theoretical: Husserl often invites us to understand terms like «extension» and «spread» in a non-spatial sense (see e.g. *ibid.*, p. 166; en. tr., p. 141), and his view is clearly expressed in a manuscript dated 1913, where he writes: «Ascribing extension (*extensio*) in a literally spatial sense [...] to sense data in general [...] is a phenomenological nonsense [...]» (EDMUND HUSSERL, *Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erster Teil. Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuauflage der Logischen Untersuchungen (Sommer 1913)* (ERG I), Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2001, p. 149, tr. m.).
15. See e.g. ULLRICH MELLE, *Das Wahrnehmungsproblem und seine Verwandlung in phänomenologischer Einstellung. Untersuchungen zu den phänomenologischen Wahrnehmungstheorien von Husserl, Gurwitsch und Merleau Ponty*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1983, pp. 40-51, who nevertheless admits tactile sensations.
16. Cf. WILLIAM MCKENNA, *The Problem of Sense Data in Husserl's Theory of Perception*, in *Essays in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch*, ed. by Lester Embree, Washington D.C., University Press of America, 1984, pp. 223-239; now also in *Edmund Husserl. Critical Assessments of Leading Philosophers*, III, ed. by Rudolf Bernet, Donn Welton, Gina Zavota, New York, Routledge, 2005, pp. 145-57: 153.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.
18. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 154.
19. LU II, pp. 358 and 774; en. tr., II, pp. 82 and 348, sl. mod. See also a passage from the lectures of 1906: «And so, we have countless intuitive and conceptual thought acts that are objectless. Objectless, insofar as the objects that are represented and thought do not exist at all. And yet, not objectless, insofar as there is the consciousness of an object in all them: in hallucination an object stands “before our eyes” [...]» (EDMUND HUSSERL, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1984, p. 153; tr. by C. O. Hill, *Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge. Lectures 1906/07*, Dordrecht, Springer, 2008, p. 151, sl. mod.).
20. Cf. DR, p. 23; en. tr., p. 21. The equivalence between immanent perception and reflection is clearly stated in ID I, pp. 77-79; en. tr., pp. 78-80.

21. QUENTIN SMITH, *A Phenomenological Examination of Husserl's Theory of Hyletic Data*, «Philosophy Today», vol. XXI, 4, 1977, pp. 356-367: 363.
22. ERG I, p. 153, tr. m. with DR, p. 46; en. tr., p. 40. We have to recall that in the 1st edition of *Logical Investigations* Husserl tends to apply the 'content – apprehension' schema also to the 'inner' perception, i.e. to reflection. Cf. LU II, pp. 706-708; en. tr., II, pp. 303-304.
23. ERG I, p. 168.
24. Cf. e.g. WA, p. 19, tr. m.: «For example, if in the phenomenological analysis of thing-perception we consider the moment of belief, the consciousness of being or reality, then we turn to it, we intend it, we perceive it. This moment is lived through, but does not function as a presentative for something else [...]»
25. PBE, p. 10; en. tr., p. 10, sl. mod.
26. Cf. LU II, pp. 512 and 588; en. tr., II, pp. 166 and 220.
27. PBE, p. 14; en. tr., p. 14, sl. mod.
28. Cf. LU II, p. 614; en. tr., II, pp. 237-238 with ERG I, pp. 128-135.
29. Cf. PBE, p. 14; en. tr., p. 14.
30. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 106-108, en. tr., pp. 112-115. We have to notice that the second solution complies with the general account of *Logical Investigations*: there the concept of 'form of apprehension' is a *derived* concept, namely a concept which presupposes the notion of 'matter' (sense of apprehension) and 'representative' (presentative content): indeed, the form of apprehension is defined as the «unity of matter and representatives» (LU II, p. 621; en. tr., II, p. 243). An act can be said 'perceptual' because its matter is unified with sensations.
31. Later Husserl reconsidered the idea according to which the 'content – apprehension' schema is valid also for phantasy; in his personal copy of the *Logical Investigations* we find an annotation at page 399 of the second edition, in which there is a long digression on this schema; Husserl criticizes the view according to which every act is an «apperception of an immanent content»; for the schema «presentative content/animating apprehension» is valid only for certain acts; in the case of phantasy, instance, it is not so, since in the phantastic appearance there are neither representatives nor apprehension (cf. *ibid.*, p. 884). In a manuscript dating from the period of his stay in Bernau we find an analogous remark: phantasy has not to be conceived as the apprehension of a content, but rather as a «modification of perception» (EDMUND HUSSERL, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18)*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2001, p. 175, tr. m.). The goal here is to underline that the revision concerns only the concept of 'phantasm', not that of 'sensation'.