

Linguistics as a Theory of Knowledge

Jesús Martínez del Castillo

Department of Philology, Almería University

Edificio C, despacho 2.19, 04120 Almería, Spain

Tel: 34-950-015-390 E-mails: jesus.gerardo@ual.es; apofansis@msn.com

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Abstract

A theory of knowledge is the explanation of things in terms of the possibilities and capabilities of the human way of knowing. The human knowledge is the representation of the things apprehended sensitively either through the senses or intuition. A theory of knowledge concludes about the reality of the things studied. As such it is *a priori* speculation, based on synthetic *a priori* statements. Its conclusions constitute interpretation, that is, hermeneutics. Linguistics as the science studying real language, that is, the language spoken, reverts to human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language thus must be studied as a theory of knowledge.

This article deals with the study of language as the human activity of speaking, saying and knowing. It analyzes the possibilities of a scientific theory, its characteristics and pre-requisites to see if language can be studied. The fact of language reverting to the individual speaking subject makes linguists to consider the peculiarities of language study as a human science. Since human subjects are free, creative and absolute, human facts cannot be but interpreted. This article concludes about the character of linguistics and the key points it must study and be based on.

Keywords: Intuition, Knowledge, Human subjects, Original knowledge, Beliefs

1. Intuition, Knowledge and Science

Science is nothing but the justified development of an *intuition* on an *object* thus constituting it in the *object of study* and making a *theory* out of it. For example, a particular linguist may think over the reality usually called ‘language’, and have an intuition on it thus saying, *language is an activity, the activity of speaking, saying and knowing*. In this statement the linguist in question can analyze the following elements: language=activity; activity=something being performed by a human subject involving something done; speaking=an activity involving always and at the same time speaking, saying and knowing;

saying=the definition of the human subject before the circumstance he is in; knowing=the apprehension of being in particular things by the human subject. So the linguist's intuition in this very act has constituted something to study, *language*, to be identified with *the object of study*, once translated into words, *language is the activity of speaking, saying and knowing*, and thus having a theory about it.

The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis made on the initial intuition is that one can adopt a theory on an initial intuition, translated into the words of a language, with a particular purpose (to study language), and a particular object of study (language in as much as it is the activity of speaking, involving speaking, saying and knowing). Since the linguist who had the initial intuition said above, is at the same time a linguist and a speaker of a particular language, his theory must be true, because as a speaker he has an internal experience of the universal, something known just because of intuition. As a statement, the theory can be formulated as, *language as (the activity of) speaking involves speaking, saying and knowing thus constituting its proper object of study*. So from now on, the linguist will not say language but the activity of speaking, saying and knowing or merely *speaking*.

Since speaking involves speaking, saying and knowing the linguist in question will have to study language in the elements it manifests itself in, that is, *speech acts*. With this the supposed linguist can complete his theory with the establishment of *facts*. Since language manifests itself in speech acts, these ones will be considered to be the facts of his theory. And since speech acts are born just at the moment of speaking—they are individual, sporadic, momentary, and depend on contexts and situations constituting the only elements in language with concrete existence—the assumed linguist can say that his theory studies language in its birth. Language is born whenever it is spoken (*linguistics of saying*, first formulated in 2004; see Martínez del Castillo 2015a-Martínez del Castillo2015d).

The initial intuition due to its larger or lesser complexity is necessarily solved in a *concept* and this one in a *statement* and eventually in a set of statements or a *theory*. In other words: a theory constitutes the development of a statement in so far as the statement is the development of a concept and the concept the formulation of an initial intuition. A theory then is nothing but a set of statements, either analytic (*a priori*) or extensive (*synthetic a priori*; see Kant 2004: 47-52), referring a set of facts verified in the real, in experience, thus ending in a new set of statements (see Whorf 1956: 220-221; Popper 2002, Ch. 1.).

In intuition, both the speaker or the scientist contemplate the object in its entire *reality*, either if this reality is *analytic* or *a priori* —a reality in the knowledge of which you do not need verification in experience, for example, $7+5=12$ (Kant 2004: 47-52)—, or *synthetic* (Ortega y Gasset 1989: 13-14) —a reality justified on the base of *verification* in experience (*sensibility*) plus something added to the *perception* of the experience involved (=creation formed out of *imagination* through the *intellect*). Intuition, since it is sensitive (*aisthesis*, αἴσθησις, Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 1, 425 a 14), the “sensation affecting me and only me in a particular sense and in particular moment”, is something one can or cannot have. Science consists in the *justification* and verification of an intuition in real objects just formulating a theory.

2. Types of Knowledge

Following with the example above, an initial intuition is made into a concept, the concept of

“language as the activity of speaking saying and knowing”, and the concept made into a statement or series of statements, *language is the activity of speaking saying and knowing. Speaking involves speaking, saying and knowing.* With these statements, the linguist of the example can analyze the reality of them in its elements, and say, *language exists merely as the activity of speaking, saying, and knowing.* Because of this, the linguist can conclude that *language does not have concrete existence*, and continue, but *existence in the minds of speakers, the conscience of speakers.* With this analysis the linguist gave *universality and necessity* to his statements, something added mentally (out of the intellect). So the knowledge got so far is based on the linguist’s intuition (other linguists may have this intuition or may have other intuitions; intuitions are not exclusive of anyone in particular). The initial *intuition*, since it is of sensitive character, is *individual*, but the thing added to it, the universality and necessity of the linguist’s statements, is something added by his intellect, not exclusive of his, but something in the linguist’s mind formed universally, historically, and individually (see Coseriu 1992: 15-35). Now the linguist must turn his eyes into the real, that is, into the different chunks of speech he can find in his daily life, that is, speech acts—the only facts of language capable of being verified in the real—, thus confirming that his intuition is right. But something must be remarked so far: it was the linguist’s intuition and from the linguist’s intuition that he concluded that language did not exist but in the conscience of speakers, etc. Because of this the linguist can say that the knowledge drawn from his intuition is *a priori*, that is, *analytic*. It was drawn from the very statement of the initial intuition with the help of the intellect thus looking for necessary connections (see Descartes in Ortega y Gasset 1992: 228) in it. So the reasoning performed so far constitutes *deductive knowledge*, based on the analysis of the concepts formulated in the statements, not needing anything else. Activity is something done, thus it has no concrete existence but virtual existence. Language as an activity has not concrete existence either (Coseriu 1988: 23).

But sometimes, the great majority of times, conclusions cannot be drawn from an initial intuition because one cannot find necessary connections in it. In these cases the scientist will have to verify the truth of his intuition in real things, although it is in one or a few items of the thing being analyzed. The scientist, linguists or not, needs experience, that is, he must verify their statements in experience and then attribute necessary connections by means of their intellect. In these cases their knowledge is not *analytic* but *synthetic*, fabricating *synthetic a priori statements*. It is a type of knowledge the truth of which is in the synthesis of both the initial intuition and experience, thus attributing necessary connections in the elements in the synthesis based on *analogy* (Ortega y Gasset 1992a: 148). It is a *synthetic knowledge* since it combines together intuition, which is sensitive (*sensibility*), verified in experience (*reality*), plus the necessary connections attributed to the combination, through the intellect with the help of *imagination*. It was imagination that found out how to justify what for the scientist was nothing but mute facts. It is the *synthetic connection of an initial intuition and the intellect with the help of imagination*.

For example, once the linguist had an intuition (an interior experience), and went out of his conscience and found out reality, he soon realized that the reality of the activity of speaking, saying and knowing is performed differently in the different territories in the world. Because of this fact, in terms of the theory stated, the linguist considered this fact to be universal. That

is, since it is impossible for anyone to verify this type of a statement in all speakers in all territories in the world, the linguist, based on analogy, added universality and necessity to his new intuition and felt entitled to say, as Coseriu does, *whenever you speak you will speak in a language* (Coseriu 1982: 308). Since the linguist verified his initial intuition in the real and attributed necessary connections to their statements, the knowledge drawn by the linguist is both *a priori* and *a posteriori*, that is, it is constituted with *synthetic a priori statement* (Kant 2004: 47-52). But in this fact lies the basis for another conclusion concerning the stated theory: there are two levels in the activity of speaking, one considering it as activity in itself, *language*, and the execution of the activity of speaking, that is, *a language*. And insisting in this fact, a new level can be drawn, the individual performance of the activity of speaking in contexts and situations of both language and a language, that is, *speech* (see Coseriu 1992: 15-35).

3. A Scientific Theory and Its Verification

Once the scientist's intuition is formulated and made into a concept, and this into a statement, and the statement into a theory, establishing with it and in accordance with it, the object of study of the theory, thus delimiting at the same time which facts are likely to be used in the theory, the scientist must verify the execution of the theory in the real, thus delimiting the *truth* of the theory. Anything the scientist can verify by means of his theory is something implicit in the initial intuition. Hence that a scientific theory must necessarily be deductive, that is, all theories must develop the initial intuition in accordance with analytic or deductive method, that is, science is primarily *knowledge a priori*. Then guided by the theory, once the scientist deduced the reality of things just from the theory, the scientist can verify it in the real. In the real one can only verify what previously has been anticipated in the initial intuition. And this is the sense of knowledge *a posteriori*. Knowledge *a posteriori* is nothing but the verification in the real of the thing intuited. In this sense theories are *a posteriori* but previous to verification they constitute knowledge *a priori*. Knowledge *a posteriori* cannot exist unless in the verification of a previous intuition made into a statement. And this is something having to do with the truth of a theory. Except for a few theories, which are only analytic (mathematics, for example), the truth of theories is constituted with the combination of both knowledge *a priori* and knowledge *a posteriori*. They all are deductive and must be verified in the real (experience). Hence that science, the same as with the human knowledge, be constituted in a synthesis of sensibility and intellect by means of imagination, that is, *science consists in a series of synthetic a priori statements*, fabricated by scientists, from which, put together and in contrast with one another and verified in the real, scientists can draw conclusions, relationships, connections, determinations and implications.

4. Theories and the Human Knowledge

A theory has a four-fold purpose: to constitute itself out of an intuition, to constitute its object of study, to state which pragmatic things constitute facts of that theory, and to establish the degree of reality of the real pragmatic things it studies either mental or objective. A theory, if true, will make science. It will not however constitute all science, but only an *interpretation* of the things studied (Ortega y Gasset 1987: 190) in a double sense: first as elements constituting classes and then verified as individual. What is attributed to the class is considered to be universal to be applied to all items in the class. What is considered

individual must always be liable to be verified. Because of this, the degree of reality of the initial intuition on which the theory lies must correspond with the degree of reality of the object of study. Something is real in as much as the concept of it, necessarily expressed in words of a particular language, describes what it represents (Ortega y Gasset 1992: 194). The human knowledge as it has been explained earlier, is not a direct apprehension of things, but a *symbolic representation* of them, consisting in the translation from the realm of the concrete and sensitive into the realm of the mental (Ortega y Gasset 1989: 41-42). The problem of the reality of things has to do with the peculiarities of human act of knowing.

5. The Human Knowledge and the Real

Pragmatic affairs, material and immaterial, concrete (=sensitive) and abstract, surrounding the human subject, constitute the so-called “things”, “the real”, or “reality”. As such they constitute something outside the conscience of speakers. The problem with knowledge and thus with science consists in explaining how to approximate to the real in order to apprehend it. This approximation, by means of the senses, gives the human subject the real aspect of things, that is, it gives a sensual image of what things really are or constitute their reality. The knowing subject approximates to things both mentally and physically. The only means the human subject has to approximate to them is their *senses, intellect and imagination*. The knowing subject must use these faculties in order to overcome their circumstance. This approximation constitutes what it is usually called *knowledge*.

The knowing subject as a living being is in a particular circumstance and must do something in order to survive (Ortega y Gasset 1994: 190). In order to survive the human subject can use the things surrounding him to his convenience. The first thing the knowing subject must do in order to survive is to eat, for example. When a human subject eats an orange he can perceive the orange in what an orange really is to him in his circumstance: it is something needed in order to survive. For him, it is un-important if the orange is juicy or not, if it is soft or hard, has a particular color, or scent, etc. The knowing subject in the need of surviving merely considers it as food, something necessary for him in his circumstance (Ortega y Gasset 1994: 190). For the human subject in this circumstance, eating is apprehending, perceiving and assimilating what he needs in his surviving in the world. This is the first aspect of the human way of knowing: the knowing subject can apprehend, perceive and assimilate something through his senses, because he lives and needs the thing apprehended for his overcoming his circumstance, his surviving in the world. This type of knowledge is very similar to the knowledge of animals.

But together with eating or living that orange, the knowing subject can apprehend that the orange of the example is juicy, it has a particular color, a particular form, a rough skin and stones, it is given in trees etc. These characteristics of the orange are perceived through the senses as well. Since the human subject wants to make real knowledge of the thing apprehended, he needs the contribution of his imagination and intellect to finding necessary connections in the thing apprehended. The orange as it presents itself before the knowing subject is an individual thing. The intellect neglects individual notes and looks for necessary connections in the thing apprehended. In this sense the knowing subject apprehends an individual item but *creates* the class the individual things perceived belongs to. Because of this, the apprehension of things by knowing subjects is double. It is made up of something

real and something added to the real, thus making a *mental representation* of the thing apprehended. Because it is a mental representation it is something in the knowing subject's *conscience*, thus constituting something they can keep for future use. But the mental representation created, with the help of the *intellect* and *imagination*, is not the thing the knowing subject apprehended and thus the thing known, but an *image* of the pragmatic thing called an orange, now representing all possible items of the *class of things* called an orange. That is, with the help of the intellect and imagination, the knowing subject created a *class* on the base of an *individual thing*. So the real thing, *the one the knowing subject apprehended* through his senses, and *the one represented in his conscience*, constitute two different things. The former cannot be but *lived*, the latter constitutes something the nature of which is mental. The knowing subject made a *transformation* of the nature of the real thing lived. The former is *sensitive* and *concrete*, the latter *mental* and *abstract*. The former is constituted only with an individual item but the latter is and represents a *class of objects*. And this is the peculiar way of approximating to real things by humans, that is, the exclusive way of conceiving things by human subjects. Things are changed in what they are thus *translating* them from the sensitive and concrete into the mental and abstract (Ortega y Gasset 1989: 41-42), something liable to be kept in the conscience of speakers and be *manipulated* by the subject to their convenience. Since it is the representation of the thing perceived, the human act of knowing is not mechanical but *free* (Coseriu 1988: 194-196), that is, creative and transcendent. So the human knowledge is nothing but the translation from the way of being of things (1), into the imaginative representation of the real (2), in their conscience (3), to dominate the things surrounding the human subject (4), in order to survive (5). The human knowledge thus is to be distinguished from animal knowledge in these five characteristics.

6. The Foundation of Theories in the Human Knowledge

Similar to the human act of knowing, science starts with real things (4), represents them in a theory (2), thus making a translation from the real into the mental (1), fabricating an image of them mentally (3), expressing the theory in a series of statements and words of a particular language (3), in order to dominate things and the world (4). But two things differ in science from knowledge. The human knowledge is necessary in all humans but science is optional and thus contingent. On the other hand, the human knowledge enables humans surviving in the world but science aims at re-creating things in the world linguistically thus representing them in the classes they may form.

Science, the same as with the act of knowing, being in principle individual and thus subjective, is made social on the base of, (a) the statement of it in words of a language; (b) the adequacy of the theory to the object of study; (c) the certainty of the theory; and (d) the purposes the theory as a whole aims at. The statement of the theory in words of a language involves another type of transformation in the way of being of the things conceived after the initial intuition: a *transformation from the mental into the linguistic*. The adequacy of a theory to the object of study is something defining the theory as *adequate*. The certainty of the theory has to do with the character and definition of the theory, thus separating human sciences from the natural sciences, also called *reality sciences* (Ortega y Gasset 1983: 73). And the purposes of the theory have to do with the aims the theory.

6.3. The statement of the theory in words of a language means the *creation of the theory* with

a peculiarity: things represented in the words and statements of a theory coincide with things designated. So words of a theory are defined in terms of the real things they describe. This means that the words and expressions of a language in a theory are no longer linguistic, but form part of a *terminology* or *nomenclature* (Coseriu 1985: 43; Coseriu 1981: 96), that is, they mean what they are defined for in the theory and cannot be altered. Language, on the contrary, attributes and delimits particular modes of being to things (see Coseriu 2006: 73-74).

7. The Degree of Reality of Things

A theory is the creation of a set of concepts made into statements to interpret reality (see Ortega y Gasset 1966: 119). Interpreting things involves conceiving things as real, certain and true. Conceiving things as real has to do with the object of study of sciences, something looking at the outside of the theory. The second and third aspects depend on the internal coherence of the theory: the formulation and statements of a theory must be coherent and logical. It cannot present any contradiction.

The interpretation made with theories does not entirely depend on the initial intuition. An initial intuition as an act of knowing responds to the way of conceiving things in a particular speech community (=a language). In some way or another science the formation of a theory and the establishment of the object it studies answer to *the mode of conceiving things* proper of this or that speech community. In this sense for speakers speech communities constitute *communities of thought*.

Things apprehended and known by human subjects living in a particular speech community are apprehended and learnt in a double sense. Some are apprehended directly by the speaking subjects as creators of their ideas. These ones are acquired and learnt individually, with effort and conscious participation. They form part of a subject's ideas and experience. But the great majority of ideas in a subject's background are given to him in the tradition, just because in some way or another, he accepted them at a particular moment in his life, with no conscious participation in the formation of them. These ideas constitute *beliefs*, existing in speaking subjects without their conscious intervention. As members of a speech community speaking subjects speak just like others (Coseriu 1985: 15). This means that speaking subjects will accept the ideas in vogue in the *community of thought* the speaking subjects are born and live in. The tradition of speaking in this way constitutes the base of the individual subject's thought (Martínez del Castillo 2013).

When scientists try to create a theory, they do not usually analyze things in what they really are but will accept the concepts and ideas representing things as they are given in their community of thought. Because of this, it is necessary to analyze and revise the initial intuition in order to see if the thing intuited is real or, on the contrary, if it is the result of the blind acceptance of ideas in vogue in the tradition of speaking. This fact, in principle is not a hindrance to the truth and adequacy of a theory if you deal with things in the world. However if you deal with the human manifestations it is necessary to analyze the degree of reality of the things to be studied. In scientific study one can find different degrees of reality of things.

The thing first intuited may appear as existing in itself; then the problem will consist in devising the methods to analyze it. It is the case of natural and concrete objects, for example,

tree. Trees, either in the concept they are denoted or in the real are given in themselves. So a scientist can say that from the point of view of science there is no difficulty in isolating trees from the reality they are given in. In accordance with this a scientist in the case of natural and concrete objects can start with the reality given in this or that language. The problem will be different if the scientist wants to study properties of things such as *color*. Color appears in itself linguistically but really it appears on a surface. However it is real since it can be verified: it can be seen because it appears objectively. The problem with it consists in devising the method to study it. In this way determining the degree of reality of the thing to be studied is not problematic either. The scientist can easily isolate it mentally because it is objective and can be perceived through the sense of sight.

In the world of things given in the tradition of speaking (=the world of meanings) of a particular language many other types of objects are transmitted. Some of them may be transmitted as if they were entities, denoting something independent, but in fact they have no concrete existence. Determining the degree of reality denoted in this case may be problematic. It is the case of realities such as *language, thought, the mind, freedom, creativity, etc.*, semantic objects existing as real, with the capacity of being conceived in themselves objectively linguistically and mentally. The problem with them is that they cannot be verified directly in the real, at the most indirectly. If these realities constituted as objects of study are concrete, the degree of reality they have must be concrete as well. If they are abstract, or cultural, or immaterial the degree of reality have must be abstract, cultural or immaterial. And here the problem lies. They must have the degree of reality of the reality they depend on, if any. So it is necessary to find out the reality they depend on. In a primary analysis one can see that these concepts or realities (*language, thought, the mind, freedom, creativity*) are not independent, they depend on the human subject who speaks, thinks, acts or creates. So the solution is finding out the *radical reality* (Ortega y Gasset 1996: 40-41. See section 10.4.), that is, the reality constituting the support of all these concepts and realities.

Determining degree of the reality of *language, thought, the mind, freedom, creativity* is impossible unless the scientist goes back to the human subject, the agent who created these concepts and realities with his capability of knowing. The human knowledge is creative, that is, it creates a symbolic representation of the thing conceived. This is so because human subjects are free and their capacity of both creating and knowing is the same. Language does not exist unless it is in the human subjects who create it whenever they speak. And the same can be said of the *mind, freedom and creativity*. They all depend on the human subjects in a double sense. Human subjects create those concepts and realities (*language, thought, the mind, freedom, creativity*) first as concepts and realities known, and second as concepts and realities being always being made when they are spoken and said of. In both cases they revert to the human capacity of knowing. So making a mental symbolic representation of a previous mental symbolic representation would lead the linguist to an infinite regress.

So in determining the degree of reality of these concepts and realities (*language, thought, the mind, freedom, creativity*) it is necessary to analyze the connection they have with their creators. Because of this, the usual way of creating theories explained so far is not valid. It is necessary to make a theory referring them to the subjects who at the same time intuit, create and perform those concepts and realities referring them to the human conscience. This cannot

be studied unless they are interpreted in a *theory of knowledge*. A human subject creates his knowledge with the intervention of his senses (initial intuition, ἀίσθησις), his intellect and imagination, the same faculties creating and performing or having created and performed the objects to study, always being created in a different way by all speakers whenever it is spoken.

Determining the degree of reality of objects, then, consists in looking for and finding out the reality they depend on for their existence. Human objects are nothing but the symbolic representation of partial aspects of the human life, the human reality. They all must be interpreted in terms of the totality they depend on. The reality objects may depend on is called the *radical reality*. If the starting point, the initial intuition in a theory is not real enough, it will be abandoned when a previous one is found out. If this one is not real enough either it will be abandoned again. And so forth till finding the radical reality.

8. Types of Sciences

This fact separates two types of sciences: natural sciences vs. human sciences; or said in a different way, natural or physical sciences vs. *a theory of knowledge*. Natural sciences start with assumptions, either real or fabricated. So the value and truth of the assumption adopted constitutes the perspective to be imposed on the things studied making them real, either if the assumption is real or fabricated. Human sciences, on the contrary, if they want to be real and true, must start with the so-called *original knowledge* of speakers (Coseriu 1999: 36), or determine the degree of reality of the object they study and find out *the radical reality*, thus neglecting all possible *beliefs* in the formulation of theories about the human reality and interpreting it.

So in sciences the most basic and radical distinction to be made is determined by the degree of reality of the object of study. There is a radical and absolute science studying the absolute, that is, the human. And there is an indefinite number of natural sciences (or reality sciences), studying partial aspects of reality. The first one is constituted with philosophy and those sciences the object of study of which is constituted by the human. The other ones, natural sciences, which are many, start with conceiving a fact under a particular perspective, *assumed it to be true*, and interpret things in the way assumed. These ones will never ask for the foundation their assumptions rely on. The former, philosophy and the human sciences, advance backwards, that is, they are to be developed looking for the radical reality they are based on and interpret the human reality. In this sense human sciences will eventually end up in *a theory of knowledge*. Natural sciences, on the contrary, will always advance forwards, because, for them, nothing exists prior to the *assumption* adopted. The sciences of the absolute basically bear with the problem of human knowledge and its foundations. Natural sciences omit the problem of knowledge and advance from their assumptions thus constituting the starting point for them.

Both types of sciences, however, are deductive and must verify their conclusions. Philosophy and the human sciences, once identified the radical reality, this one constitutes the initial and ultimate truth. Anything in the radical reality must manifest itself in the elements drawn from it in some way or another. In natural sciences, on the contrary, the fact considered under a particular perspective and constituting an assumption is considered to be the starting point, to be imposed on the things studied. They all constitute an act of knowing, they all perform the

synthetic connection of (the initial) intuition (see Kant 2004: 47-52).

9. Human Sciences: the Study of Language as a Theory of Knowledge.

9.1 The Presence of Beliefs in Language Studies

Some times what the scientist may consider an initial intuition is based on a previous concept not usually recognized as a concept thus constituting a *belief*. In this sense scientific theories entirely depend on the peculiar way of knowing of humans. As we saw earlier the human knowledge is active. It is the act of a free (Coseriu 1985: 32) and historical (Coseriu 1988: 43) subject, that is, a subject making himself in participation with others in a particular speech community and a particular period of history. Since the knowing subject is creative because he is free, human knowledge is the result of human freedom. But since the knowing subject is a historical subject, he accepts many ideas coming from the tradition of speaking the subject is born and lives in.

This problem must be recognized in human sciences. Human sciences different from natural sciences must necessarily start, not with an assumption, a hypothesis, or the like, but the *radical reality* or the so-called *original knowledge* by Coseriu (Coseriu 1999: 36). The problem with human sciences is in beliefs and the aim of them is to avoid beliefs. *Collective beliefs* constitute something unquestionable in the human life so that everything in a human life depends on them (Ortega y Gasset 1986: 99). This fact is due to the character of the human knowledge, at the same time creative and historical. It is creative because it is always new. And it is historical because it includes and accepts forms of knowing, sometimes beliefs, accepted from the tradition in vogue in a particular speech community or *community of thought*.

For Ortega y Gasset, men live based on beliefs acquired all along their lives. A human being as a child lives of his perceptions, but as an adult, the extremely rich contents in his memory and in particular the “theories known” or accepted from the tradition, act constantly against perceptions thus omitting the consistency of them and making them mere utensils of his remembrances, thus constituting his world known (Ortega y Gasset 2004: 820). But the problem with this is that adults are not conscious of the existence of those beliefs and prejudices in them. The influence of beliefs is so strong that they constitute the great component in the human life so that they are usually accepted as if they were the real truth (Ortega y Gasset 1986: 100). Since human subjects make themselves in history and accept ideas from the tradition, any man, at a particular moment of history bears with him the ideas having influenced and formed his civilization. Ortega y Gasset says of the man living at his time (1883-1955): “Considered in his performance in history any person [in the Western World] is a Stoic, a Christian as Saint Augustine, a Christian as Saint Thomas Aquinas, later on as Saint Francis of Assisi, and later as Erasmus or Vives, or different from these, as saint Ignatius; and then he gives up being a Christian and a Rationalist and today [1934] he is an Arbitrary” (Ortega y Gasset 1986: 101). And following with this line of thought we could add: and today, nearly one century later, he is a Marxist and a dis-Marxist, a Naturalistic and an Ecologist.

9.2 The Presence of Beliefs in Theories: An illustration

Initial intuitions in the creation of theories about language may be based on previous concepts.

A particular linguist, for example, may start with the belief that language is something existing, something being in itself, something there in front of him, that is, something *objective*. Since this conception is a belief, the linguist did not ever realize that this way of conceiving language was the usual way of conceiving concrete things in western languages. So this belief constitutes something acquired by him thinking it is the right way of conceiving language. The linguist of the example may be convinced that his intuition just had at the moment of formulating his theory that *language is innate* (Chomsky 1965: 25-27) may be the starting point to create a theory about language since, at first sight, nothing is previous to this statement. On the other hand, since physical sciences start with assumptions, he may take his intuition as an assumption or rather as a hypothesis (Chomsky 1965: 30). Since the linguist in question believes that language is objective and exists in itself, a concept never discussed, he may consider it licit to assume his intuition to be a hypothesis. So in terms of the internal logic (Popper 2002) of the hypothesis established as an assumption, he can draw the following conclusions.

Since language is innate (objective and exists in itself) it is an *organ* (Chomsky 2002: 64), or a *faculty* (Chomsky 1992: 68; Chomsky 1992: 70-71 and Chomsky 1992: 171), similar to the visual system (Chomsky 2002: 64): at the beginning the baby cannot speak, that is, it does not have the competence or faculty of speaking, but later on because of physical growth the child acquires the faculty of speaking. That is, because of analogy, he can draw the conclusion that language sprouts with growth because it is objective, the same as with the visual system, merely that the language organ has not been found out so far. But it will since it is a hypothesis of research: it must be somewhere either in the brain (Chomsky 2000: 77), or the human biology (Chomsky 2002: 64). As a matter of fact brains and minds constitute the same thing. They are objective as well and, as the thesis of emergent properties by Vernon Mountcastle would state, “Things mental, indeed minds, are emergent properties of brains”, it is very easy to accept that, “These emergences are not regarded as irreducible but are produced by principles that control the interactions between lower-level events —principles we do not yet understand” (Chomsky 2002: 55). If these two hypotheses are combined, the linguist in question can draw the conclusion, based on analogy as well, that *language is something natural* (Chomsky 1965: 25-27). This confirms the previous intuition that language is an organ or a faculty. So *language is part of human biology and should be studied in biology* (Chomsky 1984: 40-43). Language thus would be something growing with age, something developing as a faculty, something existing in it, not needing anything else to be but the physical growth of one’s body. Since language is natural and considering the variety of languages there must be a *universal grammar* (Chomsky 1965: 25-27), and the mechanisms of *language learning* —objective since they belong to the body—should be *innate* as well (Chomsky 1965: 27). Hence that in the latest formulation of Chomsky’s theory language should be studied in a naturalist approach (Chomsky 2000), considering ‘linguistic’ at the same level as ‘chemical’, ‘electrical or ‘optical’, “to select a complex of phenomena, events, processes and so on that seem to have a certain unity and coherence” (Chomsky 2000: 134). With this, one can see how language, for Chomsky, manifests itself: it is “a complex of phenomena, events, processes [...], that seem to have a certain unity and coherence”, just because it is natural, exists in itself and is objective.

9.3. *Substantive Being, the Usual Way of Being of Things, an Underlying Asset in Theories*

The underlying conception not mentioned by its author is the way of conceiving things: things are conceived in such a way as if they were entities. They all, concrete and abstract, are considered to exist, that is, they all have the same degree of reality as real entities. Language as something in the human life is conceived as a thing. At the most, it may be conceived as an emergent property of brains, which, since brains exist in themselves and are objective, language must be objective too. Chomsky, not posing the problem of how to conceive things, but accepting the traditional conception transmitted through the western languages that “being is existing in itself”, out of his initial intuition that language is innate concludes about the objectivity of language. In the history of thought, this way of conceiving things, is the so-called *substantive being*, thus acting as a non-formulated belief. The ultimate reason for the existence of language thus is its existence as something contrary and opposing its non-existence (non-language). And this is something that can be verified in the real: human beings speak (=they have language) but animals do not (=they do not have language but the contrary, non-language, except for bees, Chomsky 2002: 56). So the concept of language deduced from the non-formulated belief that being is existing in itself and objectively constitutes the basis for the formulation of a theory about language. Because of this Chomsky’s initial intuition that language is innate cannot be but a hypothesis (Chomsky 1965: 30) not yet found in the real.

This way of conceiving things as existing, that is, as entities constitutes a belief coming to us from the Greeks. Parmenides (ca. 540/539 B.C.) said that nothing can be said of Being. The only thing one can say is that “Being is and it is impossible for it not to be”. And together with this he added, “Being is and Non-Being is not”. As a consequence, “Being is one, eternal, immobile, it has no beginning or end” (Ferrater Mora, *Dictionary of philosophy*). This constitutes the first formulation of *substantive being* (Ortega y Gasset 1971: 38) in force all around the Mediterranean and broadcast all over the world through the Greek-Latin-Western Civilization, not existing outside the Western World.

The concept of substantive being is not given in Hopi (Whorf 1956: 258), a native language in Arizona; it is not found either in Ewe, a language in Togo (Benveniste 2007 vol. I: 71-72); nor was it in primitive Hebrew (Ferrater Mora, *Dictionary of philosophy*). On the other hand, contrary to this criticism, conceiving things as existing in themselves objectively (substantive being) has given rise to three important and decisive facts in the formation of the so-called Western Civilization: a) monotheism. The three monotheist religions were born around the Mediterranean: Judaism, Christianity and Muslim. They are absolute and claim to be the true one; b) the concept of things, conceived as if they existed objectively; and c) the concept of science. Science in the Western World is *objective* thus giving rise to technics and technology, a series of sciences having been developed because facts based could be established as assumptions as if they were entities. In the Eastern World, on the contrary, *Wisdom* is *subjective* thus aiming at the perfection of individuals. At the beginning, in Old Greece, ideas, that is, the essences representing classes were conceived as if they could be touched. The Aristotelian concept of νοῦς, ‘intellect’, meant approximating things through the senses, ἅπτεσθαι, that is, ‘touching’ (Ortega y Gasset 1992: 330). That is, ideas were conceived as entities, at the same level as real things. Later on, with the introduction of the Cartesian mode

of thinking (see Martínez del Castillo 2013a), the introduction of positive-ness in science (Galileo), the development of technics especially since 1750, and today with technology, things can be conceived as individual and objective, that is, as entities (see Martínez del Castillo 2013a).

The underlying ideas in the concept of substantive being can be summarized in four: a) being is a class. In Olden Times things were not conceived as individual but as classes. In Latin, for example, things were individualized with contexts, not with articles. In Old English, 5th to 11th centuries included, words did not mean individual things but processes (see Martínez del Castillo 2015e: 85-95). Old English numerals were structured in larger units (dozein(e) (first introduced in the language in the 13th century), scōru, hund) and the units of things were merely an approximation: *And hē rīcsode nigontēoþe healf gear* (Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, annal 855); literally, “And he reigned up to the nineteenth half year”, that is, and he (approximately) reigned eighteen years and a half; b) being is absolute, that is, things either material or abstract exist, that is, they are in being thus opposing their contraries; c) being is objective, that is, it “can be touched”, since it is performed in real things; and d) being is together with its contrary thus involving and opposing non-being, *nought*.

9.4. *A New Way of Conceiving Things, the Real Being*

But it was not up to the 20th century (in the Western World) that individual things were considered to exist as individual, that is, as real, presenting themselves before the knowing subject. Things are no longer entities but they are to be considered in the function they perform in the connection established with the knowing subject. Since Descartes (1596-1650), things were conceived in terms of the knowing subject. With this, the conception of things either concrete or abstract constitute real things in as much the concept in the knowing subject relates to the function they perform for him. That is, the knowing subject acts on things and things act on the subject (Martínez del Castillo 2013: 28-29). For example, language is something created by the human subjects. In spite of this language at the same time imposes on the subject who created it. The speaking subject lives language, that is, he intuits, creates, acquires, performs, speaks and says, uses, evaluates, and even speaks of language (Martínez del Castillo 2013: 28). At the same time the speaking subject must adapt his speech to the requirements of language in the performance and use of it. And with this, one can see that describing language is something implicit in the action of speakers on language: speakers, apart from intuiting, creating, acquiring, performing, speaking and saying, and using language can *evaluate* and *speak of language*. Linguistics is nothing but the interpretation of the verbal behavior (Coseriu 1992: 100) of speakers. But there is a difference between speakers and linguists: speakers justify their speech primarily, that is, intuitively and based on the tradition of speaking, but linguists must justify language in full (Coseriu 1992: 230-234).

10. The Adequacy of a Theory

10.1 *The Adequacy of Theories in Natural Sciences*

The adequacy of a theory is determined both externally and internally. A theory is determined externally if it is *adequate* to the object it studies. A theory is determined internally if it is *certain*, that is, if the theory does not present any contradiction in its terms. The adequacy of

the theory to its object of study constitutes the so-called the *verum*. The certainty of the theory constitutes the *certum* (Coseriu 1986b: 70). The combination of both, if adequate and certain, proves that the theory is *true*. This distinction in the determination of theories has to do with the two faces of the concept: the one looking at the outside, and the one looking at the inside (Ortega y Gasset 1992).

For K. Popper, science is not a system of concepts but a system of statements. Scientific discovery is impossible without a faith in ideas of purely speculative kind, a faith completely unwarranted from the point of view of science. For him, it is necessary to analyze the logical consequences of the theory in order to point out its fertility, that is, its power to elucidate the problems of the theory of knowledge (Popper 2002: 10-16). With this, Popper explicitly connects science with the human knowledge. The connection of the human knowledge with science is to be established in what he calls the logic of scientific discovery, that is, in the certainty of the theory.

All theories must be tested for adequacy with what Popper calls the *deductive testing of theories* and the *problem of demarcation*. The deductive testing of theories consists in analyzing theories and selecting them in terms of the results achieved in accordance with four criteria: a) analysis of the internal consistency of the theory; b) analysis of the logical form of the theory in order to determine if it has the character of an empirical or scientific theory, or it is, for example, tautological; c) comparison of the theory with other theories; and d) testing the theory with the empirical applications of the conclusions drawn from it. If the theory does not pass these tests, it is *falsified* and must be rejected (Popper 2002: 9-10).

The problem of demarcation is previous to the tests said in the previous paragraph. It consists in finding the criterion to distinguish between empirical sciences and mathematics, logic and metaphysical systems. The problem of demarcation emphasizes the diversity of sciences (see Section 8). The criterion of the problem of demarcation manifests that all theories depend on the human knowledge and thus are based on a theory of knowledge. In the end science, for Popper, is nothing but the application of the rules governing the human knowledge just because all theories are necessarily expressed in words of a language.

10.1.3. The *adequacy of the theory* is stated when it is *verified* in the real. The *certainty of the theory* is verified when the principles of knowledge prove that the theory is formulated on necessary connections. Science and theories depend on the characteristics of the human knowledge. Theories, the same as with the human knowledge, represent reality sensitively and mentally. Sensitively since they are a reproduction of the real based on analogy; and mentally since they create the universal to be applied to the real. In this sense they are transcendental in the Kantian sense (see Kant 2004).

10.2 The Adequacy of Theories in Human Sciences

In the case of human sciences the adequacy of a theory depends on the certainty the scientist has about his nature as a human subject. In human sciences the *verum* and the *certum* coincide. This fact makes human sciences specific. In the case of language studies the linguist is both a speaker and a scientist. In this way, the linguist knows before hand what language is and how it functions. The linguist must justify what he previously knows. And this justification cannot be done unless it is an interpretation of facts in terms of a *theory of*

knowledge.

But this problem is sometimes neglected in language study. In present-day linguistics there are two types of theories: those theories considering language as something objective, existing in itself and independent from speakers; and those theories considering language as something given in the human subject. The separation of both conceptions is very radical. In the first case language is considered to be an entity existing somewhere. In the second case language is the manifestation of the nature of the speaking subject; as such language is not an entity: it does not exist in itself. Language is born whenever it is spoken. In the two different approaches to language one can see two objects of study completely different. In the first case the object of study is language in as much as it is conceived as if it was a natural object. In the second case the object of study is not language but the human speaking, saying and knowing subject, manifesting his intelligence and freedom when he speaks. In the first case linguistics is dealt with as a natural science; and in the second it must be dealt with as a theory of knowledge.

Since language under the first consideration is objective, some authors feel the necessity to base language referred to the mass of speakers (De Saussure 1974: 145), society (Searle 1969; Eco 1972), nature (Austin 1988), psychology (Chomsky 1957; Chomsky 1965; Chomsky 1968; Chomsky 1980; Chomsky 1981; Chomsky 1984; Chomsky 1995; and Chomsky 2002), cognition (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1990; Langacker 1986; Langacker 1991), or to study it in a naturalistic approach (Chomsky 2000) or even in biology (Benitez Burraco 2006; Mendivil Giró 2006; Mendivil Giró 2014). So the different perspectives imposed on the same reality give way not only to different conceptions of what language is but different types of objects of study and different facts to analyze. Theories considering language in itself, conceive the adequacy of a theory in terms of something external to the speaking subject thus assimilating linguistics to natural sciences. They will establish facts based on objectified concepts taken from language use.

An objectified concept is, for example, language in the statement *language is a common human possession* (Chomsky 2002: 47). You cannot ever verify if language in that statement is verifiable because the only thing you can verify is speech acts, and even these ones, given the variety and extent of them, must be dealt in terms of previous concepts (language, a language, speech, the speaking subject, activity, creativity, etc.) and with previous models intuitively. And with this procedure, if one starts with an intuition to prove another intuition indirectly with no necessary connection with both, he will probably mismatch the thing to prove with the proof. A statement like that is nothing but an un-verified interpretation. If 'language' in the statement is abstract 'possession' must be abstract too. So you cannot verify something abstract in something else abstract if both concepts in the statement are not analytic (see Sections 1 and 2). In an analytic statement the extent in the syntactic subject (language) must have the same extent as the one in the predicate (possession), or the syntactic subject would be included in the predicate. If language exists in itself it does not necessarily have to be a human possession. And if language is objective possession must be objective as well. And so far that type of possession has not ever been found out. This conclusion is accepted in some way or another by its author, since he says that this statement is a hypothesis of research (Chomsky 1965: 30). It is clear that this statement is not analytic.

10.3 The Object of Study of Human Sciences

On the contrary, for theories considering language as something in the speaking subject, the object of study is the human subject in as much as he lives language, that is, as he intuitively, creates, performs, speaks and says, uses, evaluates and even speaks of language. In this sense since the agent of the reality to be explained is the same as the agent giving the explanation, that is, since the creative agent and the things continuously being created are rooted in the faculty of knowledge, language and human studies cannot be but *interpretation*, that is, *hermeneutics*, the justified explanation of human facts in terms of the human life.

In language study Coseriu, following with a long tradition coming from Aristotle, Vico, Pagliaro and Husserl starts with what he calls the *original knowledge*, “that type of a knowledge a human subject has about himself and his free activities (and of course about the aim of these activities)” (Coseriu 1999: 36). For Coseriu, the human subject, the *speaking subject* (Coseriu 1985: 14) is a free (Coseriu 1988: 196) and historical subject, who is *together-with-others* (Coseriu 1985: 31; Coseriu 2006: 27), who *participates with others* in the very creation of speech (Coseriu 1988: 70; Coseriu 1988: 194-196), thus making himself in history (Coseriu 1985: 32). Linguistics, for him, is nothing but the interpretation of the verbal behavior of speakers (Coseriu 1992: 100). Since in human sciences the *verum* and the *certum* coincide, the foundation of theories is nothing supposed to be certain but something speakers—and linguists in as much as they are speakers—previously know. In this sense, cultural sciences are better founded than natural sciences” (Coseriu 1986b: 70).

The reason for this is that in the realm of freedom the universal is known intuitively through an interior experience (Coseriu 1993: 29-30). As a consequence, in human sciences the exactitude, positive-ness, what is given positively and can be verified, is freedom, intention, invention, creation and free adoption motivated only purposefully (Coseriu 1988: 193). Because of this objective *verum* and subjective *certum* will always be liable to revision. In the end the interpretation of human sciences will always depend on the general conception of what to be a human being is. The conception of what a human being is has changed many times in history. To overcome this problem human subjects will have to start with a theory of knowledge. Human sciences, then, are interpretation, *hermeneutics*.

10.4 The Radical Reality in the Study of Language

In human sciences the initial conception of things proper of this or that community of thought may constitute the base of the initial intuition (see Section 9.1. and 9.2.). In order to avoid this, it is necessary to analyze the initial intuition looking for the radical reality it is based on. In this sense human sciences are nothing but the development of a *theory of knowledge*, that is, a philosophy. When he knows, a human being is based on what he considers of himself as a knowing subject. In this sense, human studies have to do with the most basic problem in humans, the *problem of knowledge*: what we know, how we know and why we know. But to know a human subject must know what he as the agent of knowledge is. If things in the world and even the world exist it is because the knowing subject is able to create, represent and interpret that continuum surrounding him. A human subject must necessarily do something in order to survive with the only means he is given when come into the world, his capability of knowing through his senses. In human studies the radical reality cannot be but the human life encompassing the whole reality of humans and going beyond it. In this sense the knowing

subject is *transcendent*, that is, the human subject in as much as he is able to create and interpret things and the world both sensitively and mentally thus making an interpretation of them (Kant 2004; Ortega y Gasset 1987: 190) and even an interpretation of his proper reality by means of language (Humboldt 1990, 83; Coseriu 1985: 32-33).

Since language is *the activity of speaking* (Coseriu 1985: 72), performed by free and intelligent subjects (Coseriu 1985: 32; Coseriu 1988: 196; Ortega y Gasset 1986: 130), who live in a particular circumstance (Ortega y Gasset 1992: 46-47), involving speaking saying and knowing (Martínez del Castillo 2015a; Martínez del Castillo 2015b; and Martínez del Castillo 2015c; and Martínez del Castillo 2015d), the creation of meanings, that is, language (Coseriu 1985: 205-206), and the fixing of those meanings in historical forms, that is, in a language (Coseriu 1985: 26-27), linguistics cannot study anything unless it starts with the human life manifest in language and his free activities, both in individual and historical forms. The radical reality for the study of language and linguistics is nothing but the knowing, saying and speaking subject, an individual, absolute and transcendent subject on the one hand, and on the other the knowing, saying and speaking subjects who speak and participate in a speech community (=a language, historical reality) thus having something in common. Both radical realities constitute the incontestable reality a linguist cannot doubt of (Martínez del Castillo 2013: 13-93).

11. Human Dimensions Manifest in Language

For Coseriu, language has two dimensions, the dimension subject-object, objective dimension; and the dimension subject-subject, subjective dimension (Coseriu 1985: 32-33). Because of the first dimension language has to do with the relation to the speaking subject with things in the world. That is, language has to do with the creation of things and concepts representing things and worlds full of things. But language does not create things, but delimits species, that is, language represents things as existing and members of a particular class (Coseriu 2006: 73-74). Because of the second dimension, language has to do with the speaking subject in connection with other speaking subjects (Coseriu 2006: 44; Coseriu 1985: 206). Language, first, is creative and meaningful; and language, second, is aimed at others, language is for others: the speaking subject pre-supposes the existence of the others, at least with the same capacity to speak as he himself has.

Both dimensions by Coseriu can be analyzed in four:

First, language evincing the subject, the “I”, as someone performing his freedom and intelligence, that is, language as *the creation of meanings*;

Second, language evincing the definition of the free, creative, intelligent, absolute, and transcendent subject before the world surrounding him, that is, language as *lógos* manifest in *saying*;

Third, language evincing the activity performed by this free, creative, absolute, intelligent, and transcendent subject involving others and creating the means of expression good for him and the others, that is, language as *a language*; and

Fourth, language revealing the subject involving and adapting to others: in this sense the subject creates the means of expression at the same time *individual* and *common*, *creative* and

participated, made in history, and thus contingent and limited, that is, language as *the tradition of speaking*.

These dimensions could be summarized in the following way (Martínez del Castillo 2013: 77):

- 1) The subject as he performs his freedom and intelligence in *speech* thus creating meanings;
- 2) The subject as he acts in his circumstance thus defining himself before the circumstance he is in, that is, the subject as it manifests his *logos*;
- 3) The subject as he aims at others thus creating historical objects; and
- 4) The subject as he has something in common with the others and determines his speech in contexts and situations thus creating *worlds of knowledge* (see Coseriu 2006: 72-74) and *speech universes* (see Coseriu: 1982: 318), that is, the subject as he belongs to a *tradition of speaking*.

12. Method in Science

As it has been said, the method in any science is double: it is method *a priori*, that is, deductive or analytic, corroborated with method *a posteriori* or experimental, the method of verification. Verification in the real is necessary if we want to reaffirm the synthesis made in the initial intuition. In this sense, science is *a synthesis of intuition* (=sensation, *αἴσθησις*) *and intellect by means of imagination* to know the real. Sensation, that is, intuition is the starting point. The so-called intellect is the set of mental operations by the human mind looking for necessary connections, that is, necessity and universality (see Ortega y Gasset 1992: 228). And imagination is the interpretation made by means of both faculties.

In some theories about language today, method *a priori* is rejected in principle. For example, Chomsky explicitly rejects method *a priori* expressing doubts about what it consists in (Chomsky 1992: 148). He speaks of it as dogmatism (Chomsky 2002: 79); excludes it from natural sciences (Chomsky 2002: 68); and believes it is a popular and unfounded method or rather a belief or set of beliefs (Chomsky 2002: 88-89). The same can be said of cognitivists (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 3; Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 7; Lakoff 1990: 6-7). Cognitivists would interpret method *a priori* as old-fashioned (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 245); or would speak of *a priori* philosophical compromises (Gibbs, in Cuenca and Hilferty 1999: 22). But as said above, all sciences are deductive, that is, *a priori*.

In accordance with this it is illicit in science to establish a hypothesis as a foundational truth. A hypothesis is nothing but a synthesis the verification of which has not yet been made. All elements constituting a hypothesis, that is, the synthesis already made and the method to verify it, must necessarily be anticipated. A real hypothesis is to be formulated within a theory. It deals with particular facts based on analogy with other facts, the former intuited but not yet verified and thus insufficient to be formulated as a truth. The theory is something necessarily prior to and going beyond the hypothesis. The verification of a hypothesis must be sufficient, that is, we cannot give anything for granted. Facts must always be real, never elaborations or statements made on facts although these may previously be known.

Adducing in defense of the “innateness hypothesis” (Chomsky 2002: 186), for example, statements such as the rapidity in language learning, the acquisition of language in connection with age, the coincidence of grammars, the hyper-determination of language in deaf-blind

children, the existence of universals, and the poverty of the stimulus (Smith 2001: 225), do not constitute proofs in favor of the so-called “hypothesis”. None of these statements can be verified in themselves. They are but non-verified conclusions of a particular non-formulated and previously accepted theory or assumption, that is, beliefs, some with no connection with the statement constituting the hypothesis (Martínez del Castillo 2010: Section 10.6).

Language learning as such is not a fact but a formulation of the problem of knowledge. Knowledge, and learning with it, is nothing objective, nothing liable to be verified objectively, but the result of a series of mental actions developing a series of personal and private intuitions, because of which a human subject learns something. The acquisition of language in connection with age is an interpretation of the evolution of human subjects performing a particular verbal behavior, something having to do with the evolution of thought and the mental activity of individuals, with no guarantee that it is specific of what we call language. It is thus an interpretation not a fact. The coincidence of grammars is an elaboration of a series of statements about the historical manifestation of language, thus an interpretation of the mode of thinking of some speech communities with a common cultural history. And in this the linguist does not speak of language as something universal in humans but of languages. Languages do not have to coincide with one another necessarily. Similar things can be said of the hyper-determination of language in deaf-blind children, the existence of universals and the poverty of the stimulus. They do not constitute facts but elaborations or fabrications, that is, interpretations, the result of a series of syntheses of intuition and intellect. In intuition we interpret things in what we consider it is the reality of them. But since these elaborations are accepted as facts, that is, since they are not discussed but accepted as if they really constituted facts, they are beliefs, something accepted from the tradition without any reflection on one’s part.

13. Conclusion

All sciences constitute knowing activity executed and performed on the object they study. Human sciences start and deal with the human, that is, the absolute and transcendent. Linguistics as a human science is nothing but the interpretation of the verbal behavior of the human subject in as much as he intuits, creates, acquires, performs, speaks and says, uses, evaluates, and even speaks of language. Linguistics as such is interpretation, that is, hermeneutics. It consists in speaking of language thus making a theory of knowledge. The guidelines in linguistics must be the dimensions of the human subject manifest in language, namely

- 1) The subject as he performs his freedom and intelligence creating meanings;
- 2) The subject as he acts in his circumstance thus defining himself before the circumstance he is in;
- 3) The subject as he aims at others thus creating historical objects; and
- 4) The subject as he has something in common with the others and adapts his speech to contexts and situations thus accepting worlds of knowledge and speech universes, that is, the subject as he belongs to a tradition in the technique of speaking.

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