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Models of the History of Philosophy, Vol. III: The Second Enlightenment and the Kantian Age

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the ways that we do, and so they are the products of our free will” (84). Having refuted the argument against free will, Balaguer focuses on the scientific argument. Regarding Libet’s experiment he argues that “it just assumes that the readiness potential plays a certain kind of causal role in the production of our actions. But, in fact, we have no idea what the purpose of the readiness potential is. We don’t know why it occurs, and we don’t know what it does” (98). As to Haynes’s studies, he considers it possible to provide a different interpretation based on the same data, which is compatible with the existence of not-predetermined free will. “The pre-choice brain activity that Haynes found... was actually not very good at predicting the outcomes of his subjects’ choices. Indeed, it was only 10 percent more accurate than blind guessing” (103). The increase in predictability is determined by the subjects who failed to rightly perform the experiment. “A significant percentage of the subjects in Haynes’s study (say, 20 percent of them) unconsciously failed to make truly spontaneous decisions. ... They genuinely wanted to follow Haynes’s instructions, but for whatever reason, and without realizing it, they unconsciously formed prior-to-choice plans to push one of the two buttons” (109). This unconscious activity would correspond to that recorded by Haynes’s experiment. “If this is the right interpretation of Haynes’s results, then there is no problem here for free will. All these results show is that sometimes our decisions are influenced by unconscious factors. ... To establish that we don’t have free will, you would have to argue that all of our torn decisions are predetermined by unconscious factors” (110). To conclude, Balaguer regards the problem of free will as a scientific problem, to be settled by future research in the field of neuroscience. “Neuroscience has made some truly amazing strides in the last few decades. But this science is still in its infancy. We just aren’t ready right now to answer the question of free will” (125).

The book is tailored to a non-specialist audience, which is emphasized by the very short bibliography. I would not describe it as an introduction to the topic, because Balaguer does not limit himself to exposing various aspects and theories tied to the problem but provides a definition of free will and argues explicitly for the possibility of its existence. The professional philosopher will surely find *Free Will* a pleasant reading and a telling book, and might be prompted to study Balaguer’s position in further detail by referring to his *Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem* (MIT Press, 2010). On the other hand, the neophyte will draw from the book much food for thought, as well as a useful summary of the main arguments employed in the current debate.

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Models of the History of Philosophy, Vol. III: The Second Enlightenment and the Kantian Age, edited by Gregorio Piaia and Giovanni Santinello, Dordrecht, Germany, Springer, 2015, xxxii + 1000 pp., \$349.00 (cloth)

Models of the History of Philosophy is the English edition of *Storia delle storie generali della filosofia* (edited by Giovanni Santinello, Brescia: La Scuola, Roma/Padova: Antenore, 1979–2004). The Italian original is a monumental work in 5 volumes (7 tomes overall), devoted to the history

of philosophical historiography from the Renaissance to the end of the nineteenth century. In the same manner as its Italian counterpart, *Models of the History of Philosophy* is conceived and organized in an encyclopaedic fashion. Each volume covers a different historical phase, concerning the origin and development of the historiography of philosophy as an autonomous field of enquiry and literary genre. Within each volume, all schools and historiographic traditions relevant to a specific period of time and geographic area (with particular focus on the different national traditions and their peculiar intellectual milieus) are taken into account, and the various historians of philosophy and their texts are separately analysed. Specific objects of analysis are mainly works categorized as general histories of philosophy or, in other words, comprehensive accounts of the history of philosophy.

These historiographic accounts of past philosophies have the quality of mirroring their objects as they were represented within a specific cultural context. They allow us to better understand the instances and circumstances that prompted thinkers to turn to the historical study of various philosophies. They help to highlight different reasons why past philosophers and, more generally, the history of philosophy as a whole became the objects of study and research. The analyses of past models of the history of philosophy also give us insights into the evolution of the different approaches and methods employed in studying philosophical sources. Finally, the study of philosophical historiography sheds light also on the history of the reception of past thinkers, philosophical systems, and traditions of thought.

Edited by Gregorio Piaia and Giovanni Santinello, the third volume of *Models of the History of Philosophy* offers an improved, updated, and accessible edition, including all of the third, as well as part of the fourth volume published in the Italian version. The amount of material is impressive, covering the second half of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth, beginning with Denis Diderot and Jean D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* and ending with Kant and his followers. Approximately forty major authors receive a separate chapter and detailed treatment, which includes a biography, an account of the historian's thought and methodology, critical reviews and analyses of the relevant historiographic texts, and a selected bibliography.

The volume is divided into five parts. Part 1 concerns the historiography of philosophy developed in France, starting from the publication of the *Encyclopaedia* (1751–72) until the final years of the French Revolution. Within this framework, which saw the origin of Condillac's works (the volume analyses in depth his *Introduction à l'étude de l'histoire*, part of his *Cours d'étude pour l'instruction du prince de Parme*, 1775) and emblematically culminated with Condorcet's *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (1795), the study of the history of philosophy was often conceived as constitutive of a more general inquiry into the history of the progress of the human mind in every domain of knowledge.

Part 2 focuses on the historiographic tradition that originated in Italy during the second half of the eighteenth century, thanks to the work of authors such as Appiano Buonafede (1716–93) and Girolamo Tiraboschi (1731–94). The Italian historians' approach was often driven by religious apologetic goals, and it was mainly based on influential works belonging to the German historiographic tradition, such as those by Johann Franz Buddeus (1667–1729) and, in particular, Johann Jacob Brucker's *Historia Critica Philosophiae* (1742–44).

The third part turns to the Scottish Enlightenment. During this period erudition was generally neglected, yet a new appraisal of ancient sources arose. According to what is known as "philosophical history," past sources were selected and discussed, rather than narrated (385). The texts include Dugald Stewart's *Dissertation Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Philosophy* (1816), as well as Adam Smith's *Essays on Philosophical Subjects* (1795).

The fourth and fifth parts deal with the German historiography of philosophy. Part 4 begins by considering authors of popular textbooks (Formey, Büsching, Steinacher, Cäsar, Stöwe, Gurlitt, and Gmeiner) who, during the second half of the eighteenth century, helped to spread Brucker's history of philosophy, by systematically employing and referring to his work. Then,


it focuses on the prolific philosophical historiographic school that originated in the late eighteenth century around the University of Göttingen, which included Christoph Meiners (1747–1810) and Dieterich Tiedemann (1748–1804). This school of thought advocated the “so-called *Popularphilosophie*, a typical expression of the German later Enlightenment, which mediates the tradition of Leibnizian and Wolffian philosophy using the themes of English empiricism and French sensationalism” (517). The editors distinguish this perspective from the German historiographic tradition inspired by Kant’s account of a possible history of philosophy, conceived as a “systematic, non-empirical treatment of the work carried out by reason in the course of history” (698). The reconstruction and analysis of Kant’s position, as well as of his legacy in the historiography of philosophy—counting amongst its members the historians Johann Gottlieb Buhle (1763–1821) and Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann (1761–1819)—is the object of the fifth and final part of the volume.

To conclude, while *Models of the History of Philosophy* gives much space to single authors and texts, it endeavours nonetheless to provide an overall critical reading of how the study of the history of philosophy became an independent branch of knowledge, with its own finalities and methodologies. It is meant to facilitate the work of any specialist willing to address each historian separately, without overlooking the more general contexts within which different accounts of the philosophical historiography were developed. In this respect, *Models of the History of Philosophy* provides historians of philosophy worldwide with an invaluable resource—the most complete of its type—concerning the evolution of their very own domain of research.

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The Euro and the Battle of Ideas, by Markus K. Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2016, viii + 440 pp., £24.95 (cloth)

Let’s start with a declaration of interest in the subject matter of this book. The reviewer’s father fought in France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany in 1944–45; his grandfather was wounded by gas, fighting in France in August 1918. Had Europe not found an institutional path to peaceful co-existence after 1945 its postwar generations would have experienced very different and probably more fraught and fragile lives. The European Union is a precious thing: something that changed history for the better. This thought-provoking and insightful book is about whether its shared currency, and perhaps even the union itself, can survive.

The Battle of Ideas in the book’s title reflects differences in German and French economic philosophy and policy in informing the design of the euro but more importantly in managing its extended crisis. The German position revolves around “solidity—of not living beyond one’s means,” in a world of price stability. The French emphasis—rooted in national and pan-national solidarity—is on the management of the economy or “*planisme*.” The authors develop these basic positions drawing on historical and multidisciplinary sources and contexts. It’s possible to cavil at such ideal types but they are in the end convincing: as vehicles for thinking about the