

*The Gaze of the Mind: Cognitive Activity, Attention, and Causal Explanation
in 13th-14th Century Latin Medieval Psychology*

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Abstract

This dissertation covers a cluster of interrelated debates in Latin medieval philosophical psychology, chiefly those centered around the causal role of the soul's cognitive powers, be they active or passive in our most basic acts of cognition. In broad terms, these are all debates concerning "mind" (to use the modern term), body (and the rest of the corporeal world), and how they (causally) relate to each other. For this study, my focus is on a selection of notable medieval figures and their so-called "Augustinian" active views of cognition, roughly covering the mid-13th to the early-14th century: most notably, this includes Peter John Olivi (1248-1298), Gonsalvus of Spain (~1255-1313), and John Duns Scotus (1266-1308), along with, finally, the distinct figure, Durand of St. Pourçain (1275-1334), with his own active view.

In the first half of this dissertation, I start my investigation with the central active view of Peter John Olivi, which Olivi himself associates with Augustine and builds up in opposition to Aristotle, at least according to his common medieval followers (such as Thomas Aquinas and Godfrey of Fontaines). In short, roughly speaking, on Olivi's active view, cognition, even in its most basic acts, comes more from "within" than from outside the cognitive soul; this view stands in contrast to then common passive views which characterized cognition as, more so, a passive reception from external objects "outside" the cognitive soul, at least in its most basic acts. Along with Olivi, I also consider two other 13th century figures who, I argue, hold similar active views: the rather understudied Gonsalvus of Spain and the more well-known John Duns Scotus. In this part of my dissertation, I particularly focus on these active views in light of more general metaphysical concerns with respect to what counts as an active/efficient cause in the first place and how the object and the cognitive soul differ as causes in cognition but nevertheless co-operate. Although Olivi and Scotus are often put at odds in this debate, I argue that both ultimately come to an equally subtle position wherein, although the cognitive powers are primary, and more strictly, efficient causes, the objects of cognition still count as secondary or "broadly" efficient causes; as I argue, Gonsalvus, as a historical conduit between these figures, helps corroborate and clarify the common ground here between Olivi and Scotus.

In the second half of this dissertation, I build on the above and go further into the 14th century to compare Olivi's tradition with the somewhat peculiar later figure, Durand of St. Pourçain. Durand offers a more stripped-down active theory which serves as an interesting point of comparison and contrast. One of my ultimate aims for this dissertation, made clearer in the second half than the first, is to explicate two main features which, I argue, are essential to the active accounts of Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus: causally speaking, (i), cognition amounts to a sort of "self-motion", with the cognitive act strictly originating and remaining in the spiritual soul; nevertheless, "experientially", (ii), cognition still reaches out to the external, largely corporeal, world in the form of an active "*gaze*" or *attention* of the soul (hence this dissertation's title), "above" the body. Durand, I argue, despite his similarities with prior active accounts, seems to significantly differ on these points.

Résumé

Cette thèse couvre un ensemble de débats interdépendants dans la psychologie philosophique latine de l'époque médiévale, principalement ceux centrés sur le rôle causal des pouvoirs cognitifs de l'âme, qu'ils soient actifs ou passifs, dans nos actes de cognition les plus fondamentaux. En termes généraux, ces débats concernent tous l'esprit, le corps (et le reste du monde corporel), et la façon dont ils se rapportent l'un à l'autre ou « interagissent ». Pour cette étude, je me concentrerai sur une sélection de penseurs médiévaux qui soutiennent des théories actives dites « augustinienes » de la cognition, couvrant une période allant approximativement de la moitié du XIII^e au début du XIV^e siècle. Ce groupe inclut notamment Pierre de Jean Olivi (1248-1298), Gonzalve d'Espagne (~1255-1313) et John Duns Scot (1266-1308), ainsi que Durand de Saint-Pourçain (1275-1334), qui possède une conception active bien distincte.

Dans la première moitié de ma thèse, je commence mon enquête avec la conception active de Pierre Jean Olivi, qu'Olivi lui-même associe à Augustin et qu'il construit en opposition à Aristote, à qui ses sympathisants médiévaux (tels que Thomas d'Aquin et Godefroy de Fontaines) attribuaient une conception passive de la cognition. En bref, la conception d'Olivi est que la cognition, même dans ses actes les plus élémentaires, vient plus de « l'intérieur » que de l'extérieur de l'âme cognitive ; ce point de vue contraste avec les théories passives alors courantes qui caractérisaient plutôt la cognition comme une réception passive d'objets externes et d'impressions « extérieures » à l'âme cognitive, du moins dans ses actes les plus élémentaires. Avec Olivi, je considère également deux autres personnages du XIII^e siècle qui, je soutiens, ont des doctrines actives similaires : Gonzalve d'Espagne, plutôt peu étudié, et Jean Duns Scot, qui est mieux connu. Dans cette première partie, je considère ces théories actives à la lumière de préoccupations métaphysiques générales. Je m'intéresse notamment à comment ces auteurs définissent ce qui compte en tant que cause active/efficiente et à comment l'objet et l'âme cognitive jouent des rôles causaux différents mais coopèrent néanmoins. Bien qu'Olivi et Scot soient souvent présentés comme étant en désaccord dans ce débat, je soutiens que les deux arrivent finalement à une position tout aussi subtile dans laquelle, bien que les pouvoirs cognitifs soient des causes efficaces au sens strict et premier, les objets de la cognition jouent un rôle secondaire qui, au sens large, peut être dit efficace. Comme je l'explique, Gonzalve, en tant qu'intermédiaire historique entre ces figures, aide à circonscrire le terrain d'entente entre Olivi et Scot.

Dans la seconde moitié de ma thèse, je m'appuie sur ce qui précède et je vais plus loin dans le XIV^e siècle pour comparer la tradition d'Olivi avec une figure ultérieure qui occupe une position unique dans ce débat, soit Durand de Saint-Pourçain. Durand propose une théorie active plus dépouillée qui sert de point de comparaison et de contraste intéressant. L'un des objectifs de cette thèse, qui apparaîtra plus clairement dans la seconde moitié, est de mettre en valeur deux caractéristiques principales qui, à mon avis, sont centrales dans les théories actives d'Olivi, Gonzalve et Scot : au sens causal, (i) la cognition équivaut à une sorte d'« auto-mouvement », l'acte cognitif prenant naissance et restant strictement dans l'âme spirituelle ; néanmoins, du point de vue de l'expérience (ii) la cognition atteint toujours le monde extérieur et en grande partie corporel, sous la forme d'un « regard » ou d'une attention active de l'âme (d'où le titre de cette thèse), indépendamment du corps. J'avance que Durand, malgré ses similitudes avec les positions actives antérieures, semble différer sur ces points de manière significative.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction

Two General Pictures of Cognition: The Passive Container vs. Active Spotlight Models

This dissertation covers one of the central debates of 13th to 14th century philosophical psychology: to use the technical language of the day, the question here concerns whether the soul's powers are, essentially and effectively, active or passive with respect to even its most basic cognitive acts¹. Suppose, e.g., you were idly gazing out the window and a red ball rolled out into your line of vision. You take notice and see the red object. Perhaps you even instantly form the simple thought <ball!>. The question arises, are you, *qua* cognitive, in any active sense, the cause of these simple acts of sensory and intellectual cognition or, rather, is the effective cause more so the red ball, with you a mere passive recipient?

Although I will touch on both sides of this debate, this dissertation focuses on a selection of 13th and 14th century figures, so-called “Augustinians”, who take on a substantially *active* view with respect to this question². In broad terms, according to this active view of cognition, the cognitive soul is the primary active effective cause of cognition in its very outwards *gaze*, or “attention” (“*aspectus*”, “*attentio*”, “*intentio*”, etc.), without which no determinate act of cognition could come about. In other words, external objects are insufficient, on their own, to

¹ As we'll see, this debate also commonly intersects with concerns over the cause of acts of appetite (sensory and intellective) as well; although my focus for this dissertation will be on acts of cognition, at times I will cover what certain medieval figures say about appetite, especially volition, insofar as these figures tie together both sorts of acts (e.g., as having a parallel sort of activity). This point will be particularly relevant in Chapter 2, in my discussion of Gonsalvus, since Gonsalvus nominally devotes his text to volition, though quickly moves on to consider reasons common to both acts of volition and (at least) intellectual cognition.

² For some preliminary remarks on this “Augustinian” label, see §3 in this chapter, below. So as to avoid taking a stand on whether there is any one view which most deserves this label, or whether every part of these 13th/14th century theories is authentically sourced from Augustine himself, I will generally use scare quotes around this label (similarly, with “Aristotelian” theories). Nevertheless, as we'll see, the “Augustinian” theories which I'll discuss certainly trace at least some key theses from Augustine himself.

have any properly cognitive effect on the “higher” powers of our, or any, cognitive soul. Our primary representative of this view, which this dissertation will start with and center around, is the relatively earlier figure, Peter John Olivi (1248-1298). In addition, we will also consider the, as I’ll argue, largely similar “Augustinians”, Gonsalvus of Spain (~1255-1313) and John Duns Scotus (1266-1308) who immediately follow Olivi. Of final note, in the last chapter of this dissertation, we’ll also get to the more distinct active view of Durand of St. Pourçain (1275-1334), which will serve as a point of comparison and contrast.

On the face of it, this might appear to be a fairly technical debate and, so, only of narrow interests. Indeed, the bulk of this dissertation (in the subsequent chapters) will primarily work through this debate in rather fine detail, in the technical, famously “subtle”, terms and distinctions of Scholastic philosophy. However, as I’ll explain in this introductory chapter, this topic can be approached from a variety of angles, and, likewise, appeal to a variety of philosophical interests. In particular, I will use the next three sections of this introduction to set up three of the main angles with which this dissertation will approach this debate: (§1) the properly psychological, (§2) more general concerns with metaphysics and causation (insofar as they also apply to the domain of psychology), and (§3), broader historical concerns over the use of Augustine and Aristotle, as central authorities, in Latin medieval philosophy, and how different philosophical “camps” get framed in this debate. In the final section (§4), I’ll end with a brief outline of the rest of this dissertation, getting back to some of the more granular details of how this dissertation will proceed.

Overall, in broad terms, as I’ll explain, on one hand (see §1), this debate touches on some of the central questions of philosophical psychology, in both medieval and modern times. To put it in broad strokes, this debate pushes on two competing intuitions concerning how to approach

the “mind” (in modern terms) in general, be it, essentially, a sort of passive container of externally sourced information or an active, attentive, spotlight on the world³. On the other hand (see §§2-3), this isn’t to say that this debate isn’t also a product of its times, including technical medieval concerns over how to causally frame the world (including the mind) in general and, as we’ll see, these general metaphysical concerns, along with their psychological applications, are often couched in terms of predominantly “Aristotelian” or (Platonic) “Augustinian” sources. So, even within this debate’s technicalities, one can find broader topics of discussion, of especial interest to historians of ancient and medieval philosophy.

§1. The Concerns of Philosophical Psychology

§1.1. The Core Cases: Simple (vs. Complex) Acts of Cognition

This dissertation centrally concerns so-called “simple” (occurrent) acts of cognition in medieval philosophical psychology. To help get an initial grasp on the psychological phenomena at issue, let’s examine another example of such acts (like the case of cognizing the red ball, mentioned above). Consider the following typical, relatively basic, simple acts of sensitive and intellectual cognition: A rotund orange cat enters a well-lit room and parks in the middle of Jon’s visual field; Jon, fully awake, through some means or the other, comes to see the orange, rotund object, hears it purr, and perhaps even has some simple thought/intellection, such as, <What is

³ Apt to cause confusion, in the 13th-14th century, the root word for “mind” (*mens/mentis*), usually refers exclusively to the so-called intellectual soul, and includes both cognition and will, whereas our concerns, as in this dissertation, include acts of the sensitive soul as well (but not the vegetative powers of the soul). In this dissertation, I’ll usually use “mind” in the general sense and where I speak of the “soul” I usually mean to refer to the cognitive/appetitive powers, not the lower (vegetative) powers.

that?>, or, given some prior familiarity with this kind of object, simply thinks <cat!> or <That is a cat.>⁴.

According to common medieval terminology, the above are examples of, respectively, sensitive and intellective acts of “simple cognition” (or, “simple apprehension”, “simple comprehension”, etc.) (“*simplex cognitio*”/“*apprehensio*”/“*comprehensio*”); these simple acts stand in contrast with so-called “complex” acts of cognition which involve some sort of composition or division, such as in imagining a talking cat or thinking <Every cat is a mammal> or <No cat is rational>⁵. I take the above cases of simple acts of cognition to be relatively “basic” in the sense that, prior to any further activity (composition, reasoning, etc.), they provide our (relatively) initial means of cognitive contact with determinate objects and features of the world, with respect to our sensitive and intellective faculties. That is, relative to the sensitive faculties, the above includes acts of the so-called “external senses” (vision, hearing, etc.), oriented directly towards the external world, in contrast with acts of, e.g., compositive imagination, more “downstream” in the sensitive soul (in the so-called “inner senses”)⁶. Moreover, although under

⁴ Following contemporary usage, I here use corner brackets for (unvoiced) concepts and thoughts.

⁵ Note that, according to common medieval usage, an act of imagination is often referred to as an act of “cognition”, “apprehension”, or “comprehension”, in that some object/objects are presented to/entertained by the sensitive power; so, an act of compositive imagination would be a case of complex sensitive “cognition”. Our contemporary usage of “cognition”, and such terms, is a bit more ambiguous. Some take “cognition” to be necessarily factive, such that imagining some non-existent object wouldn’t count as “cognition”. Coming from a different direction, but likewise restrictive, some take “cognition” to be necessarily intellectual. In contrast, other contemporary philosophers and cognitive scientists use “cognition” to cover any “information processing”, whether that “information” is sensory or intellectual, or veridical or not. For the sake of convenience, I’ll use these terms in the broader sense, as in common medieval usage, to cover an appropriately wide range of psychological acts.

⁶ I’ll leave it open, at least for now, whether these typical acts of the external senses also involve some co-operation with our most basic “inner sense(s)”, such as the so-called common sense. Seemingly, for Averroes, sensation occurs through both the external senses and the common sense (in or just outside the brain, where the external senses first meet the “inner” senses); the common sense, e.g., “binds” the vision of orange and the vision of roundness (from each eye), and the hearing of purring (from each ear), all into a unified and genuine act of sensation. As far as I can tell, such an act of cognition is still “simple”, in common medieval usage, insofar as the inner sense doesn’t genuinely “compose” some new, complex act/object (including, it seems, an image of some

normal circumstances one might only think about cats after first seeing some cat(s), nevertheless, thinking <What is that?> or forming some notional concept <cat> comprises one's basic intellectual cognition of *that sort of thing* in general⁷. Thus, these basic, simple acts of cognition provide the (relatively) initial and simple "units" for further sensitive and intellectual cognition (our "food for thought", broadly construed).

For reasons which should become clear soon, I will largely focus on these types of simple acts of cognition for this dissertation, given their very simplicity and fundamentality. This way we can avoid the "noise" of more complicated cognitive procedures which might involve multiple psychological powers interacting in a variety of ways. For example, one might grant that complex acts (e.g., of imagination or discursion) are actively caused by us, but only after we passively receive simple acts of cognition first; one might claim this is due to some supposed difference in the more "inner" psychological faculties or due to some intrusion of the appetitive faculties of desire and will. As we'll see from Gonsalvus and company later in this dissertation, it might otherwise be argued that, in actuality, one cannot even grant passivity in simple acts of

absent object) out of prior simple acts. Aquinas seems to follow this view, at least insofar as his prime example of "complex" (non-simple) sensation is compositive imagination (of something absent or non-existent, such as a golden mountain), which he puts on par with complex intellectual cognition, such as in thinking <All A's are B>; in contrast, sensing a purring round orange thing seems to be put on par with the simple thought of humans as <rational animal>. That is, a simple intellectual concept, as it goes from a merely notional concept of 'that sort of thing' (e.g. just cognizing <A>, as a stand-in concept) to a proper definition, at least eventually requires a sort of "complexity" (of an equivocal sort) in order to develop the definition (e.g., cognizing <rational animal>), yet Aquinas still calls any definition of this sort a simple concept, produced/grasped in simple intellection (though, presumably, outside of direct intellectual vision, one did do some prior syllogizing to habituate oneself to think this simple thought, in this new way). So it seems, by analogy, a simple act of sensitive cognition can still involve an analogous sort of "complexity" in its sensory content, yet still count as a simple cognition, so long as this content is all present to the act at once, it seems (see, e.g., ST I, Q.85, a.2, ad.3).

⁷ For certain medieval figures, including many I'll be focusing on, prior to grasping the object in a general manner, the intellect can also grasp the singular object (e.g., that cat). However, I give here the less controversial case of intellectually cognizing cats in a general manner.

cognition without that passivity spreading into complex acts as well, down the causal chain. So, in general, we shall focus our inquiry into cognition where it all starts.

§1.2. The Central Questions of (Medieval) Philosophical Psychology

About our most basic acts of cognition, at the heart of (medieval) philosophical psychology, the broad question arises: “How does cognition come about?”, i.e., “What causes these acts of cognition?”. Although, of course, sensitive and intellective cognition differ in their own ways, the question here asks about what is common to acts of cognition in general⁸. This broad question admits of the following further sub-questions.

To begin, it has become traditional in the secondary literature to divide this general question into the following two, more precise, questions⁹:

Question 1: From what, as an effective principle, do our most basic acts of cognition originate?

In other words, assuming I am not always cognizing, what elicits or triggers me to cognize when I do? Do, e.g., external objects (perhaps *via* intermediary impressions) cause these acts, based on some corresponding passive reception in the given cognitive power, or does the given cognitive

⁸ Perhaps, more broadly, these concerns are common to our other main category of psychological acts, those of occurrent appetite/volition, as well.

⁹ For a few examples from the secondary literature, see, e.g., Adriaenssen (2011) and Hartman (2012): Hartman phrases the distinction as that between the questions, first, “What are the causes of mental acts—acts of seeing, hearing, thinking and so on—and what sort of cause are they?”, and, second, “What explains the aboutness, content, or intentional character of mental acts?” (e.g., Hartman 2012, p.5); Adriaenssen, similarly, raises the two questions, specifically for sensation: “The first question was, bluntly put, how the perceptual representations in the sensory soul originate (assuming that they are not innate). The second question was how, granted that the sensory soul processes perceptual representations, these representations represent what they do. In other words, what is so special about the representation that is currently processed by your sensory soul in virtue of which it is a representation of this page rather than anything else?” (Adriaenssen 2011, pp.324-325). For the further division which I raise in the second question below, between a general and a specific problem of intentionality, see, e.g., Normore (2010).

soul/power itself actively cause its acts of cognition? [Call this the issue of the *passivity/activity* of cognition.]

Question 2: In virtue of what do these acts of cognition have their intentionality, aboutness, representationality, reference, content, awareness, etc.? In other words, what causes these acts of cognition *with respect to these essentially cognitive characteristics*?¹⁰ To break this question down further:

Question 2a: In virtue of what do these acts of cognition have their intentionality, etc., in general? That is, in virtue of what do I cognize anything at all, as opposed to nothing? To consider a few options, is this intentionality etc. basic/intrinsic to the cognitive powers or do external “intentions”/representations exist mind-independently, though they may be ultimately received in one’s cognitive powers? [Call this the *general problem of intentionality*.]

Question 2b: In virtue of what is any given act of cognition fixed/determined to the object which it represents/is about, in particular? In virtue of what, e.g., am I seeing (this) orange (in this cat), as opposed to some other object? To consider some typical answers, is it because this object is what caused this given act of cognition, because this object and this act of cognition are sufficiently “similar” (in form), or through some (or no) other reason? [Call this the *specific problem of intentionality* or the *problem of representation-fixing*.]

At least nominally, the core question for this dissertation will be Question 1. Indeed, many of our texts of interest will start with some variation of this question, as, e.g., one can see from the title

¹⁰ Although not all of the above characteristics (intentionality, awareness, etc.) are necessarily mere synonyms, they all seem essential to the cognitive soul *qua* cognitive.

of Scotus's *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2 (expressed here in terms of intellectual cognition, at the start):

“Whether the intellective part of the soul, properly taken, or something of it, is the total cause generating, or a *ratio* of generating, actual cognition (*notitiam*)” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.282)¹¹.

However, as we'll see, although we can conceptually distinguish these questions as above, many of our authors, especially those defending an active view of cognition, will clearly proceed to treat these questions together. In particular, a common motivation we'll find for Olivi, Scotus, and company, in defence of their active view of cognition, is that the primary active effective cause of cognition (as per Question 1) should also explain what makes the act of cognition *qua cognitive* (as per Question 2a, especially), and what could explain this better, so the thought goes, other than one's own cognitive nature/soul¹²; to the extent that an object has any, secondary, causal role (as per Question 1), for Olivi and company, this seems to correspond to the more particular, secondary, job of determining an act of cognition to some particular object (as per Question 2b)¹³.

¹¹ “*Utrum pars intellectiva proprie sumpta vel aliquid eius sit causa totalis gignens actualem notitiam vel ratio gignendi.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.282).

Note that Scotus here disjunctively groups together either the soul, with respect to its intellective part, or something else of it (e.g., more strictly, the intellective power/(passive) intellect), as the (potential) effective cause of intellection; in the rest of this text, Scotus simply proceeds to speak interchangeably of the intellective “soul”/“power”/“intellect”. As we'll see, Olivi and Gonsalvus similarly interchangeably speak of “soul”, “spirit”, “power”, etc. in the texts we'll consider. In this dissertation, I will often similarly speak of the “soul/power” together. One might wish to be more precise on this matter; e.g., one might think that the activity of cognition, through a sort of “self-motion”, might make more or less sense if one can make some real distinction between the cognitive soul and a cognitive power (the mover and moved). However, for the sake of simplicity, I'll follow the language of Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus and leave it open whether there admits a relevant distinction here between a given cognitive power and the corresponding part of the soul. Indeed, in all the texts I've seen from these figures, this distinction never becomes a major part of the discussion in this debate. Nevertheless, future research is needed here into other potentially relevant texts, at least those of other medieval figures.

¹² Perhaps someone sympathetic to a passive view of cognition (as per Question 1) might take issue with this blurring together of Questions 1 & 2(a). For this dissertation, however, I'll have to set aside whether Olivi and company are exactly neutral in how they set the stage with these questions.

¹³ See Olivi's discussion of the object's secondary, “terminative”, causal role, which I will discuss at length in Chapter 2 (see, especially, §2.2).

In addition to the above, we can also distinguish a third question, often tied up in medieval discussions of the above two and brought up in the secondary literature as well. As we'll see, medieval accounts of cognition, in general, typically entertain the possibility of "intermediary" items between ourselves and the world (so-called "*species*"), to serve as *causal* or *representational* aids (e.g., in reply to the first two questions). At least, for our cognition of distant objects, the object must, it seems, affect the "medium" (e.g., the air) between ourselves and these objects. Perhaps, by extension, so certain passive accounts continue this thought, these objects also affect our cognitive powers, either producing the act itself or producing some intermediary causal disposition or representation in our powers (which then elicits an act of cognition)¹⁴. About such intermediary items, we might also ask the third, more clearly *epistemic* question:

Question 3: Under the assumption that acts of cognition represent external objects, do these acts themselves sufficiently represent their objects (when present) or does the cognitive power itself require pre-induced representations, distinct from the acts themselves, to mediate its access to external objects? Would the latter even give a cognitive power "access" to external objects? E.g., does a cognitive power require distinct pre-induced *species*, within the cognitive power itself, to gain access to the external world or, rather, can an object be sufficiently present in an act of cognition if just "outside" the power/soul? [Call this *the problem of direct vs. indirect realism*, or, *the threat of (epistemic) idealism*.]

As we'll see from Olivi and company, when setting up their active accounts of cognition, they often phrase their positive account in terms of an active attention which goes right to the object,

¹⁴ Indeed, this is the distinction Scotus has in mind above, in the title of *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2, where he distinguishes the generation of an act of cognition and the generation of some *ratio*/principle of cognition.

when present, in opposition to at least certain *species*-theories which posit pre-induced *species* in the very cognitive power/soul; for one thing, Olivi and company are opposed to such *species* insofar as they would entail any passivity in the cognitive powers/soul, from the outside, but they are also opposed for *epistemic* reasons particular to Question 3¹⁵.

Finally, we can also add a fourth, even broader, question, tied up with the above three:

Question 4: What *is* cognition (or, by extension, the cognitive power/soul) anyways? How does cognition fit into the corporeal or “natural” processes of the rest of the world or our more general metaphysical categories? Is cognitive “change”, e.g., analogous to water being heated by a hot fire, to fire heating water, or something more unique to non-corporeal entities? Is cognition, e.g., a passion, action, quality, or relation, or something outside of the categories entirely? [Call this the *mind-body problem*, at least in one variation, or, more generally, the *problem of the ontology of cognition*.]

In general terms, one can see the connection between this question and the previous three insofar as the typical answers to Questions 1-3 are often phrased in terms of whether cognition, and its essential characteristics, are to be explained, primarily, “internally”, through something intrinsic to the cognitive subject/soul, or “externally”, through some process of change initiated by an external, typically corporeal, object, acting on the corporeal medium, organs, and ultimately, acting on the cognitive soul as well.

¹⁵ Somewhat complicating this picture, as we’ll see later, the rather extreme passive account of Godfrey of Fontaines seems to be at least partially in agreement with the active accounts of Olivi and company on Question 3, insofar as Godfrey thinks an act of cognition suffices to represent its object without a pre-induced *species* coming to inhere in the cognitive power itself (at least, in the intellect) beforehand. However, nevertheless, Godfrey’s account doesn’t do away with *species* entirely, at least in the medium and organs, and, as I was getting at above, Godfrey’s account, *qua* passive, still seems to posit an analogy between the reception of *species/forms* from external objects, in the medium, and the reception of cognitive acts/forms, from external objects, in the cognitive power.

For a more specific example of the connection here, as we'll see later, starting with Olivi, one particular argument given for the active view of cognition is based on a certain ontological picture of the world according to which cognition is a "spiritual" and "vital" act of a corresponding "spiritual" and "vital" power; so, it is argued, cognition cannot be explained sufficiently through something "lower" in the typical medieval hierarchy of being, such as external objects, *qua* corporeal and non-vital, extrinsic to the cognitive soul; instead, acts of cognition are brought about by a sort of "self-motion" of the cognitive soul. In contrast, passive views of cognition, as we'll see with Godfrey of Fontaines in particular, are regularly motivated by an opposing metaphysical world view where even the "incorporeal" intellective soul cannot "self-move" given a general ban on such "self-motion" (i.e., for all change, be it corporeal or not). Godfrey's approach is in line with my point above, that such passive views of cognition ultimately extend more "naturalist" accounts of *species*, which at least involve passive effects of objects on the corporeal medium and organs, to the point where the cognitive soul is also passively affected by this corporeal process; thus, in this sense, cognition is explained "from the outside" rather than from "within".¹⁶

As we'll see, from a somewhat different direction, but still focused on the ontology of cognition, Durand takes it that the answer to our initial question on the cause of cognition (Question 1) is a consequence of what we answer to the question "what is cognition?" (Question

¹⁶ I call this debate the "mind-body problem" (of one variation) in full acknowledgement that there are certain potential differences between the medieval approach to this question and that of other time periods. For a while, there has existed a bit of a trend in the scholarship to stress the differences here, to the point of treating the "mind-body problem" as a non-starter for most medieval philosophers. As we'll see Hartman (2012), at times, falls into this trend (and trap): Olivi and other "Augustinians", Hartman claims, might hold a "spooky" division between "spirit" and "body", akin to the modern "mind-body" division, but Durand, it is claimed, is much too high-minded for this. One of the re-occurring topics in this dissertation will be to undermine this, I think, rather exaggerated take, especially with regards to the "spiritual" status of sensation for Olivi and company. In medieval terms, it seems to be quite natural to think that sensation, even with its co-operation in bodily organs, is not *entirely* corporeal, unlike in the case of the movements of the sub-lunar elements/bodies.

4). As Durand puts it, before inquiring into “from what” (*a quo sit*) intellection, and cognition in general, comes about, first it should be inquired “what it is” (*quid sit*) to cognize, “namely, whether it is anything added over the cognitive power, making with it a real composition” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.17-18)¹⁷. Durand’s concern is also, broadly speaking, with how cognition fits into the ontology of the rest of the world, though more specifically Durand’s question concerns whether cognition is some “absolute” entity in the world, something God could conceivably separate from our cognitive powers, or a mere relation, something that only exists relative to a cognitive power (and its given object). As we’ll see by the end of this dissertation, Durand’s approach ultimately shifts heavily into the infamous medieval discussion concerning “real” vs. merely “intentional” (or “objective”/“apparent”) being, which would come to dominate later 14th century philosophical psychology, but which is more suppressed in earlier “Augustinian” active accounts.

§1.3. Two General Pictures of Cognition and their Competing Intuitions

Encapsulating much of what we find in the above four questions in more intuitive, less theoretical, terms, Olivi helpfully offers the following illustrative passage which boils down the active and passive views of cognition into two general, opposed, pictures of cognition, motivated by two (seemingly) opposed intuitions; as Olivi puts it, we “experientially sense in ourselves” that cognition is, in some sense, from ourselves, internally, but also, in some sense, cognition seems to be from the object, externally, in such a way that we seem to be forced into either an

¹⁷ “*Dicendum ergo aliter ad evidentiam questionis, primo inquirendo, quid sit intelligere, vel universalius loquendo, quid sit cognoscere, utrum sit aliquid additum super potentiam cognitivam, faciens cum ea realem compositionem, secundo a quo sit intelligere et cognoscere in nobis.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.17-18).

extreme active or passive view of cognition (and appetite) (but, Olivi takes it, only the active view of cognition can ultimately save both intuitions):

“For, to the extent that it [i.e., cognition] comes from an internal cognitive principle, we sense that it is *our* action and it is a certain acting of ours that goes out from us and, as it were, stretches out (*tendens*) to the object and attends (*intendens*) to it.

But, to the extent that it comes from an object as a terminating thing, it seems to us *as if* it is a certain passion from an object and it has fallen into us with that object, *as if* that object were impressed and fallen into the innermost region of our power. And on account of this second experience, nearly¹⁸ all those were moved who said that cognitive, as well as affective, acts ‘flood in’ (*influi*) and are impressed by their immediate objects, not attending to the first experience, with its fundamental reasons touched on above and to be touched on amply in the following questions; nor attending to how each experience could be saved and verified through a concurrence of the two-fold cause and causality now given.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.38)¹⁹

We’ll return, at length in Chapter 2, to discuss Olivi’s nuanced take on how to save both intuitions here, with his distinct account of so-called “terminative” (secondary) causality from the object of cognition, but for now, let’s just focus on the two general pictures of cognition which Olivi paints in this passage.

Let’s call the first intuitive picture of cognition mentioned above, which Olivi ultimately favours, the *Active Spotlight Model of Cognition*: cognition comes from the inside out, as a sort of active *attention*, reaching out to and highlighting its external object. A bit earlier in this text,

¹⁸ Another translation that has been suggested to me here is “perhaps all...”, which would provide Olivi the benefit of a more cautious tone. However, as far as I can tell, this is not a standard translation of “*fere*”, though perhaps the manuscript is open to emendation (e.g., “*forte*” instead).

¹⁹ “*Ulterius sciendum quod quia ad actum cognitivum concurrat duplex causa praedicta: idcirco experimentaliter sentimus in ipso duas rationes quasi oppositas. Nam pro quanta exit ab interno principio cognitivo, sentimus quod est actio nostra et quoddam agere nostrum a nobis exiens et quasi in obiectum tendens et in illud intendens. Pro quanta vero fit ab obiecto tanquam a terminante, videtur nobis esse quasi quaedam passio ab oblecto et cum ipso obiecto intra nos illapsa, acsi ipsum obiectum esset in intima nostrae potentiae impressum et illapsum. Et propter hanc secundam experientiam moti sunt fere omnes illi qui dixerunt actus cognitivos et etiam affectivos influi et imprimi a suis obiectis immediatis, non attendentes primam experientiam cum suis fundamentalibus rationibus superius tactis et in quaestionibus sequentibus amplius tangendis, nec attendentes quomodo utraque experientia potest salvari et verificari per concursum duplicis causae et causalitatis iam praemissae.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.38).

and elsewhere, Olivi also gives his favoured analogy of rays of light, which properly come from the Sun, but are nevertheless shaped by the object which they fall upon as, e.g., when light takes on a triangular figure in a triangular vessel; similarly, cognition properly comes from our cognitive soul, from the inside, but nevertheless, in some sense, reaches out to external objects, fixing itself according to the actual objects which it experientially “falls upon” (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.35-38; cf. II Sent. Q. 58; II, pp.414-415). Clearly enough, this general picture of cognition speaks to Question 1 above, insofar as our internal cognitive principles are the proper effective cause of cognition, but also, e.g., Question 3, insofar as cognition reaches out to the external object itself, and not just to some inner representation, and Questions 2a and 2b, insofar as both cognitive power and object are given a role in fixing cognition so that it represents some object.

In contrast, let’s call the second intuitive picture of cognition mentioned above, which Olivi attributes to “nearly all” those who take a passive view of cognition (and appetite), the *Passive Container Model of Cognition*: cognition comes from the outside in, as if external objects were to fall into “the innermost region” of our cognitive powers (*via* internal representations or “influxes” of form); i.e., the mind (in broad terms) is essentially a sort of passive container for externally sourced information. Clearly enough, as above, but in the reverse, this general picture of cognition speaks to Question 1 above, insofar as external objects, or their “influxes”, are the proper effective cause of cognition, but also Question 3, insofar as cognition seems to stay within the cognitive “container”, where objects are brought in, and Questions 2a and 2b, insofar as objects, *via* their “influxes” (same or similar in form), seem to be sufficient to represent themselves to the cognitive powers. As Olivi admits, even though he ultimately thinks this general picture of cognition goes too far, the intuition behind this view still has its pull; we do seem to be, in some sense, constrained by our objects of cognition given that,

at the very least, we do not merely will ourselves to cognize whatever we please when we are concerned with cognizing the world as it is.

Given the, as Olivi puts it, “experiential” basis behind Olivi’s division of these two general pictures of cognition (and “the mind”, in general, including the appetitive powers), it is not surprising, I think, to see some variant of this division throughout different historical and philosophical traditions. Consider the following examples:

In a short, but interesting, essay from Jean-Paul Sartre, meant to introduce the fundamental notion of “intentionality”, according to early continental phenomenology, Sartre presents something like Olivi’s two general pictures of cognition, in rather poetic terms. First, for purpose of contrast, Sartre starts with a “prior” account of cognition, which he describes along the lines of the *Passive Container Model*:

“To know is to eat. [...] We have all believed that the spidery mind trapped things in its web, covered them with a white spit and slowly swallowed them, reducing them to its own substance. What is a table, a rock, a house? A certain assemblage of ‘contents of consciousness’. [...] Nutrition, assimilation!” (Sartre, *Intentionality: A Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology*; trans. Joseph P. Fell, 1970, in Moran & Mooney, 2002, p.382).

Immediately afterwards, Sartre presents the phenomenological account of cognition (and “mind” in general), in particular, as pioneered by Edmund Husserl, along the lines of the *Active Spotlight Model*:

“Husserl persistently affirmed that one cannot dissolve things in consciousness. You see this tree, to be sure. But you see it just where it is: at the side of the road, in the midst of the dust, [...]. It could not enter your consciousness, for it is not of the same nature as consciousness. [...] Husserl sees consciousness as an irreducible fact which no physical image can account for. Except perhaps the quick, obscure image of a burst. To know is to “burst toward”, to tear oneself out of the moist gastric intimacy, veering out there beyond oneself, out there near the tree and beyond it, [...]. I’m beyond it: it’s beyond me. [...] This

necessity for consciousness to exist as consciousness of something other than itself Husserl calls ‘intentionality’.” (Ibid., pp.382-383)

So, e.g., according to this general picture of the mind, the intentionality of cognition is something distinctly mental, intrinsic to the cognitive power, as per Questions 1 & 2a, but, nevertheless, such intentionality goes out all the way to the external objects, rather than remaining within a realm of inner representations, as per Question 3²⁰.

For some other examples, from early, to more recent, analytic philosophy, Gareth Evans, Hilary Putnam, and Ludwig Wittgenstein all form their own views on the intentionality, meaning, etc., of words and mental acts in opposition to something like the *Passive Container Model*. Evans, e.g., criticizes that “bad old philosophy of mind”, as he puts it, paraphrasing Wittgenstein, “if God had looked into your mind, he would not have seen there with whom you were in love, and of whom you were thinking” (Evans 1996, p.316; cf. Wittgenstein 2001, Pt. II, p.217). To a similar end, especially on the topic of Question 2b, Putnam famously claims that “meaning just ain’t in the head”; rather, our objects of thought are found in the external world but, nevertheless, relate back to us (e.g., Putnam 1975)²¹.

²⁰ This example is particularly relevant to our topic of medieval psychology insofar as the phenomenological tradition, going back to Brentano, quite famously claims heritage with the medieval notion of “intentions” beforehand. Now, plenty of debate has sprung up concerning whether Brentano, in particular, was exactly accurate in his understanding of this medieval notion; he seems to have at least glossed over different equivocal uses of the term and its development as a term of art (see, e.g., Brown 2000 and Normore 2009). One can also argue over how much Husserl and Sartre “fix” in their own accounts of intentionality, as distinct from the account of Brentano. Although I have my own opinions on this debate, space permits me to engage in this debate in detail in this dissertation. For now, I’ll just clarify here that the sort of “intending”/“attention” which Olivi and company speak of, as in the passage above, is not necessarily the only use of “intention”-language in the medieval tradition and, even in the above sense, where the term seems to capture a common psychological phenomena, differences may yet remain in the details concerning what Husserl, Sartre, Olivi, etc. have to say, in more theoretical terms.

²¹ See also, the recent discussion in contemporary analytic philosophy concerning the role for conscious attention, as a sort of active mental highlighting, in fixing reference/aboutness for both mental states and words (e.g., John Campbell (2003), Imogen Dickie (2015), and the lively literature that has sprung up around this topic).

For a time, at least in mainstream philosophy, it was regularly claimed that this “bad old philosophy of mind”, the *Passive Container Model*, ultimately traces back to early modern skeptical debates, especially according to the “inner theatre” view of the mind oft attributed to Descartes and Locke (at least, as understood and criticized since Thomas Reid). Pasnau (1997), e.g., cites such claims from Richard Rorty and J.L. Mackie: Rorty, e.g., calls the theory of “inner representations” a “product of seventeenth century philosophy” and Mackie claims such a theory was (though perhaps inadvertently) “introduced into philosophical discussion” by Locke in particular (Pasnau 1997, pp.4-5; cf. Rorty 1979, p.113, p.136; Mackie 1976, p.71). As Pasnau (1997) also cites, Reid himself makes the similar, though even more exaggerated, claim that, in fact, this theory traces back to all previous philosophers; as Reid puts it:

“All philosophers, from Plato to Mr. Hume, agree in this, that we do not perceive external objects immediately, and that the immediate object of perception must be some image present to mind.” (Reid, *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man*, II.7; cf. Pasnau 1997, pp.4-5).

Although Reid names even more “culprits” behind the passive model of cognition than Descartes and Locke, like Rorty and Mackie, Reid does seem to have thought that he started the surrounding debate insofar as he was, he claims, (one of) the first to argue against it, with something like the *Active Spotlight Model*.

However, although it might be true that early modern debates provide further examples of these two general pictures of the mind, and perhaps they also set the stage, more immediately, for the debates of early analytic and continental philosophy, the claim that this debate was fabricated by early modern philosophers surely, at least, misses out on the earlier debates of medieval philosophy. As Pasnau (1997), for one, points out, Olivi even beats Reid to his famous objection to such “inner theatre” views, objecting that, in opposition to certain medieval *species* theories, such inner representations would “veil” the gaze of the mind, rather than aid in its

cognition of external objects (Pasnau 1997, p.5; cf. Olivi, II Sent. Q.58, ad.14; II, p.469).

Furthermore, as Hartman (2012) points out, the 19th century editor of Reid's works, Sir William Hamilton, even names another medieval example, Durand, as at least one other prior example of someone who, like Reid, denies the *Passive Container Model*; as Hamilton puts it (though with some exaggeration still):

“Durandus, I may notice, seems to deny, like Reid, [...] absolutely and without reserve, the affection of sense by the agency of the object. He requires only the mutual approximation of the sense and its object; and then ensues the sensitive perception, simply because the one is capable of perceiving, the other capable of being perceived. [...] This doctrine is only correct if limited to the primary qualities; but it is a nearer approximation to the truth than, before Reid, was accomplished by any modern philosopher.” (*The Works of Thomas Reid*, 958b; Hartman 2012, p.6).

So, although this dissertation won't be the first to point this out, we can indeed find similarities, and even a continuous history, between the debates of medieval philosophy, early modern philosophy, and more contemporary debates, all of which center around the two general pictures of the mind which I've described above²². Moreover, in line with the more cautious remarks of Pasnau (1997) and Hartman (2012), there is a reason to be interested in the medieval examples of this debate, in particular, so as to question those contemporary narratives that wish to make this debate out to be some fabrication of one particular time period; unfortunately or not, even if we wish to ultimately oppose the *Passive Container Model* of the mind, as with Olivi and company, we cannot treat it as a mere accident of some “out of date” early modern principles.

²² Of course, I think one can also find some continuity further back with the debates of ancient philosophy. One might look, e.g., at the parallels between the *Passive Container* and the *Active Spotlight Models* and the Aristotelian “*intromissionist*” and the Platonic “*extramissionist*” theories of vision (for further discussion, see Lička 2019); or, going in a different direction, one might look at early “inner-theatre” views of the ancient skeptics, which were taken quite seriously by Aristotle and others given similar epistemic issues one might take with the *Passive Container Model* of cognition (see Roreitner 2018, Chapter 3). Most relevant, we'll also be consistently grappling with different, active and passive, interpretations of Aristotle and Augustine, employed in different ways by medieval philosophers, throughout this dissertation.

For some final examples of note, going further still into contemporary times, one can also look to a variety of technical debates in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science to find a similar focus on the notion of “attention”, as in the *Active Spotlight Model* of cognition of Olivi and others. E.g., one current debate concerns whether “attention”, of some sort, is a necessary component in sensory and conceptual cognition. One famous experiment discussed in contemporary debates, used to argue that attention (of some sort) is so necessary, is that of the “gorilla experiment” of so-called “inattention blindness”: in this empirical study, participants were tasked to keep track of a red ball being tossed around by people in a video; within this video, at a certain point a person in a gorilla costume walks through the scene, but most participants don’t report that they noticed this, given that they were too focused on their visual task (Simons and Chabris, 1999; cf. Mack and Rock, 1998). This example is used to argue for the claim that the gorilla, given that it was outside of attention, truly wasn’t seen, not just forgotten; such a striking sight, it is argued, surely would have been remembered if it were seen. In more general terms, this view of attention and cognition is meant to exemplify so-called “top down” causation from the attentional mind on our basic perceptual faculties, such that how the mind “attends” to the world, affects, and even enables, proper determinate perception²³. As we’ll see, Olivi, and other “Augustinians”, even argue for their own *Active Spotlight Model* of cognition with (seemingly) similar empirical cases of “inattention blindness” (i.e., cases of no cognition, where there is no attention, as when one is not attending to what is right in front of one’s eyes when asleep or in deep thought).

²³ In contrast, a merely “bottom up” model of perception would have it that our mind/brain functions in a purely linear process, with perception, in particular, “encapsulated”, such that no other cognitive power could alter what we see *properly speaking*.

For another recent example, Carolyn Dicey Jennings (2020), in her new book, *The Attending Mind*, takes it that there is, rightfully, a “renewed interest” in attention as a central concept in contemporary philosophy of mind. Interestingly enough, Jennings (2020) even starts her book, and subsequent literature review, by going right back to one particular medieval source for the modern notion of “attention”: Augustine (Jennings 2020, pp.1-2, pp.6-7, fn.7). Jennings (2020), not being a medievalist, unsurprisingly makes some questionable claims about exactly how much is embedded in Augustine’s notion of “attention” (*attentio*), and the surrounding history of the term, so as to justify what she takes to be uncontroversial about the term (viz., that “attention” signifies a process of selection or prioritization of excessive information)²⁴. Nevertheless, I take it that Jennings (2020) is at least generally on the right path to characterize attention for Augustine as, crucially, something the mind actively does and central for proper determinate cognition, fitting with the *Active Spotlight Model* I’ve mentioned above. Since Jennings ultimately wishes to pick up this same general approach to attention and give it a similarly central place in broader theories of the mind and cognition, I take it that she, and contemporary philosophy of mind in general, can indeed find something of interest in this dissertation insofar as we’ll discuss further “Augustinian” theories of the “attending mind”.

²⁴ I won’t list all of my nit-picks, though perhaps my biggest issues are: (i) Jennings (2020) claims that “attention” is something God wouldn’t have, while cognizing the entire world, according to Augustine’s terminology, but it’s not obvious to me that such a general “gaze” wouldn’t still count as “attention”, at least according to one general medieval use of the term; that is, medieval “attention”, through it might at times imply a foreground/background structure, as with determinate “attention” of some object among many, does not seem to require such a structure in essence or by definition. Moreover, (ii), most of Jennings’ (2020) citations to the secondary literature on Augustine are to the dissertation of McMahon (2008) which takes a peculiar approach to this material; e.g., McMahon (2008) (questionably) claims that Augustine’s terminology is exclusively “theological”, as an “attention” directed towards God for worship, in contrast to “attention” as a concept in early modern philosophy; McMahon (2008) (questionably) claims only the latter notion of “attention” is properly philosophical since it is a part of the scientific revolution (as if Descartes, e.g., made God no part of his philosophical system, or medieval psychology made no attempt at natural psychology). The approach of McMahon (2008) is likely due to the fact that it is written outside of philosophy or medieval studies, so perhaps, to be fair, it has different aims. Thankfully, at least at one point, Jennings (2020) cites the safer source, Brown (2007), on “attention” as a psychological notion according to Augustine and Descartes.

§1.4. Broader Concerns with the Activity of Appetite and Volition

As the reader may have already noticed, I have at times above more broadly spoken of the “mind”, in general, including not only its cognitive but also its appetitive powers/acts. For medieval thinkers, what we nowadays refer to as the “mind” essentially includes these two sorts of powers/acts, which, in humans, include both acts of sensitive appetite (including desires, wants, etc. aimed at sensible/pleasant goods, such as food and sex), which we have in common with lower animals, and acts of intellective appetite, i.e., the will (including intellectual desires and volitions ultimately aimed at the highest/truest good(s), such as knowledge and love of God). I bring this up here for two main reasons: (i) to provide further evidence of just how far-reaching this medieval debate is to the rest of medieval (philosophical) psychology and (ii) to clarify the somewhat complicated, and contentious, relationship between the activity/passivity of cognition and the activity/passivity of appetite (especially volition), at least according to Olivi and his fellow “Augustinians”.

On point (i), medieval figures often, though not always, took the debate concerning the activity/passivity of cognition to run parallel with the debate concerning the activity/passivity of appetite and will. If, e.g., certain arguments dictated that the cognitive powers are passive in the production of cognition, it was thought/worried (depending on one’s allegiances) that at least some of these arguments could easily be turned into arguments in favour of the passivity of appetite, especially the will²⁵. Indeed, Godfrey, e.g., took many of his arguments to show that the sole effective cause of both intellection and volition is the external object (in the case of intellection, *qua* intelligible, in the case of volition, *qua* intelligized as good). As Godfrey

²⁵ This makes particular sense for the general metaphysical arguments, which we’ll get to next.

summarizes his view, at one point, “the object, which moves the intellect to an act of intellection, also moves the will to an act of volition” (*Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; III, p.170).²⁶

Although, for some of the reasons discussed above, the medieval debate concerning the activity/passivity of cognition was popular enough, in its own right, in its day, in comparison, the medieval debate concerning the activity/passivity of appetite, especially will, was taken to be of even higher importance. For one thing, it was regularly argued, at least by those in favour of an active view, that if the will were indeed passive, then this would challenge our freedom of the will and, with it, all moral responsibility. Indeed, these concerns over the freedom of the will are perhaps some of medieval philosophy’s most oft cited contributions to “Western” thought. Even those with a tangential knowledge of medieval philosophy have probably heard of these debates, as framed in terms of the “intellectualists” versus “voluntarists”; where, according to intellectualism, volition (and action) are necessitated by cognition of what one thinks best to pursue, whereas voluntarism is the view that we are not so necessitated, such that, by design, we can will to pursue what is against what we see as best, even with clear eyes. As the secondary literature notes, this was indeed a hot topic at the time, often seen as one of the central dividing lines between two of the major Scholastic intellectual circles, the Dominicans (the intellectualists) and the Franciscans (the voluntarists), and even making its way into the infamous 1270/1277 condemnations, where the intellectualist position was condemned²⁷.

²⁶ “*Unde quantum ad praesens est dicendum quod voluntas proprie et per se non movet intellectum nec e converso, sed obiectum, quod intellectum movet ad actum intellectionis, movet etiam voluntatem ad actum volitionis*” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; III, p.170).

²⁷ For two recent references and discussion, see Kent (1995), focusing on the voluntarists, and Szlachta (2019), focusing on the intellectualists. As I’ll get to below, these intellectualist/voluntarist debates even get into some of the same historical issues concerning the alleged divergence between “Aristotelians” (the intellectualists) and “Augustinians” (the voluntarists); the former, for perhaps more obvious reasons in the case of the will, were portrayed at times by the latter as enemies of the Christian faith, insofar as they were seen as threatening Christian morality.

The activity and freedom of the will was indeed such a hot topic that for one of our medieval figures of note, Gonsalvus, his central text on the activity of cognition is initially framed in terms of the activity of the volition (though he quickly moves to arguments common to both powers) (see, e.g., Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.39-41)²⁸. Moreover, already Olivi, in his texts devoted to the activity and freedom of the will, offers a lengthy tangent on the activity of cognition, which he explicitly frames in terms of the common concerns between the two debates (see, e.g., Olivi, II Sent. Q.58, obj.14, ad. 14; II, pp.403-408, pp.461-515). Olivi even considers that one might contend otherwise, that cognition is passive, but volition is active, in other words, that one can be a “voluntarist” with respect to the will, but still hold cognition passive²⁹. However, Olivi expresses his discomfort with this conclusion and, as one can see from his arguments considered in II Sent. Q.58 (and later in II Sent. QQ.72-74, on cognition), Olivi indeed thinks that many of the relevant arguments run parallel for both powers.

I take it that these details also clarify what this medieval debate concerning the activity/passivity of cognition is all about (i.e., point (ii) above). That is, the core concern of this debate, and this dissertation, is not whether every act of cognition is actively caused by the soul *qua* appetitive/volitive, but rather, whether even our most basic cognitive acts are actively caused by the soul *qua* cognitive. The activity of appetite/will is another, though parallel, debate, at least for Olivi and company. Naturally enough, one sense in which one might call cognition “active” is with regard to cases (should they exist) where one voluntarily chooses to cognize. However,

²⁸ See the following question as well, I *Quaestiones*, Q.4, for more of Gonsalvus’s “voluntarist” arguments concerning the will in particular.

²⁹ Interestingly, Durand seems to go the other direction here, also diverging from Olivi, insofar as he seems to take cognition to be active but will to be passive (but nevertheless free, given certain “intellectualist” arguments which Durand picks up).

the medieval debate here centrally concerns a weaker sense of activity: i.e., is the cognitive soul *qua cognitive*, an effective cause of cognition, as fire, *qua hot*, naturally heats. If indeed this debate were primarily about whether our appetitive powers cause even our most basic acts of cognition, as in the case of explicit voluntary control, then (i) this would seem to be a much harder view to uphold. It would also then seem (ii) that one could very well hold that the cognitive powers are themselves passive, but nevertheless under the active control of the will (i.e., on this view, every act of cognition would be passively received in the cognitive powers, moved by appetite/will as the corresponding active principle); but Olivi and company clearly deny the latter option.

Now, Olivi and company do still seem to think it relevant whether our acts of cognition are, at least in principle, under the control of our appetitive powers. In particular, Olivi and Scotus present certain *experiential arguments* which claim that our acts of cognition are subject to our general “attention” to the world (where one attends, whether one attends at all, etc.). These cases are presented as arguments in favour of the active view of cognition since, so it is argued, cognition differs but the world remains static, thus one must look for a cause in the cognitive soul as the source of the difference. At least in some of these cases, Olivi and Scotus describe this attention as, at least in principle, under our voluntary control, as when one puts in more effort to cognize, and thus cognizes more perfectly. However, given what we’ve seen above, it seems that Olivi and company must think that the proper cause of cognition (*qua cognitive*) in these cases must be the soul’s attention, *qua cognitive*, even if, in line with their broader concerns with the parallel activity of appetite/will, cognition and volition can still co-operate in some way. Thus, one can understand Olivi and company, in such passages, as simply

highlighting the activity of both powers, where they happen to co-operate, in line with their broader interests.

§2. Medieval Psychology and the General Principles of Metaphysics

In sum, this dissertation on 13th-14th century medieval psychology engages with some distinctly psychological questions. These questions clearly have an empirical basis, as in the distinctly *experiential arguments* favoured by Olivi and company, based on how we, as a matter of fact, attend to and cognize the world. One can, however, also approach these questions in more general terms, as an application of one's more general metaphysical principles. Medieval figures with both passive and active views of cognition each have their own, sometimes competing, *metaphysical arguments*, most often concerning what it even means for something to be a "cause" and whether anything, including the soul, can even be a "self-mover" (strictly speaking), given one's foundational metaphysical principles.

Despite the fact that Olivi offers the passive view of cognition, on its behalf, its own experiential argument, based on the intuition that we are, in some sense, constrained by our given objects of cognition, medieval defenders of the passive view themselves most often focus on more general metaphysical arguments. As mentioned above, especially concerning Questions 1 and 4, on the effective cause and ontology of cognition, Godfrey of Fontaines, e.g., is most centrally motivated by the argument that nothing can be a "self-mover" (strictly speaking), given the very meaning of our causal terms; Godfrey argues, if the cognitive soul (even the incorporeal intellect) were the active cause of its acts of cognition, then it would be such a "self-mover", which is impossible, for then the same thing would be both active and passive, mover and

moved, etc., at the same time, in the same respect. In other words, Godfrey is motivated by the universal principle that everything which is moved is moved by another. As we'll see, at times Godfrey even explicitly defends his methodology, claiming that we must not be led astray by supposed special cases, as with human and angelic cognition, and should, by default, side with the more general principles of metaphysics since they are more certain grounds (see, e.g., Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; p.151, p.170)³⁰.

As we'll see, though clearly in opposition to Godfrey's metaphysical motivations, the active view of cognition, from Olivi and company, is not without its own metaphysical arguments. Some of these arguments are, naturally enough, defensive. Chapter 2 of this dissertation will especially focus on the arguments from Olivi and company in defense of the coherency of "self-motion", of some sort, in the case of the cognitive soul. This will require some fairly nuanced discussion concerning what sort of "causality" Olivi and company can grant to objects of cognition, even if they hold that the primary effective cause of cognition is, rather, the cognitive power. In this way, Olivi and company arrive at an appropriately "subtle" view concerning how causal co-operation, in general, can be construed (and sub-divided).

Moreover, some of the metaphysical arguments from Olivi and company are more directly positive. In what I'll refer to as *nobility* and *attribution arguments*, Olivi and company argue, in general terms, on the basis that an (active effective) cause must "contain" its effect, so as to explain what follows; as this applies to cognition, so the argument goes, one should look to the "higher" *cognitive* soul given that it, more so than its objects, "virtually contains" cognition, so as to explain cognition, *qua* cognitive effect. In more specific terms, the *nobility argument* of

³⁰ See Chapter 2, §3.5, for more on this argument, including some fairly caustic replies from Gonsalvus and Scotus.

Olivi and company (especially concerning Questions 1, 2a, and, 4) argues on the basis that cognition is a “spiritual” and “vital” act of a corresponding “spiritual” and “vital” power, and so cannot be explained sufficiently through something “lower” in the typical medieval hierarchy of being, such as external objects, *qua* corporeal and non-vital, extrinsic to the cognitive soul; instead, acts of cognition are brought about by a sort of “self-motion” of the cognitive soul.

Overall, the approach of Olivi and company also raises some interesting questions concerning their methodology, especially concerning how they balance more empirical/experiential arguments and those more generally metaphysical. Nowadays, the consensus surely is that psychology, even from the vantage point of philosophy, is beholden to certain empirical questions, whether those be about the physiology of the brain/body or, perhaps most relevant, how we (at least, test subjects in a lab setting) report on our own experiences. Gone are the days of early analytic philosophy when it was thought that one can pursue questions of psychology through pure conceptual analysis. Likewise, it seems to me that it’s often assumed that the earlier history of philosophical psychology is, similarly, full of more abstract, even purely “rationalist”, approaches to the mind; empirical claims (e.g., about Descartes’ infamous pineal gland), where they exist, are viewed with suspicion, but they can be abstracted away, or so it is hoped. If one grants this assumption, one naturally wonders, why study the history of psychology nowadays, with our more empirical concerns? However, while it may yet be true that certain, perhaps even many, historical philosophers have leaned towards more abstract arguments (perhaps Godfrey is an example), it’s interesting to see that Olivi and company differ. In fact, as we’ll see, the empirical arguments of Olivi and company, based on first-hand experience, though still contentious, are worth considering. Moreover, even their more

abstract theories seem to be at least partially beholden to these empirical results. Thus, while one may not entirely agree with everything we'll see from Olivi and company, in defense of their active view of cognition, there still, it seems to me, remains much of interest here for the contemporary philosopher.

§3. Keeping Track of “Augustinian” and “Aristotelian” Influences

In the background of the more conceptual questions raised above, this 13th-14th century debate over the activity/passivity of cognition also raises some tricky questions concerning its historical (ancient and early medieval) sources of influence. Of particular relevance, the active view of cognition, as endorsed by Olivi and company, is oft ascribed to the early medieval authority, Augustine, both by Olivi and company themselves and in the secondary literature. More controversially, this “Augustinianism” is also oft contrasted with some form of “Aristotelianism”, which is said to define the competing passive views. One of the broad goals for this dissertation will be to walk a fine line between, on one hand, explaining what seems to justify this division, while, on the other hand, pointing out where, especially on the side of the different active views of cognition, these influences can blur together.

Perhaps the one most to blame for this division of influences is Olivi himself. In one of the key texts on this topic, Olivi initially sets up the active account of cognition as “the view of the blessed Augustine who says that in no spirit is anything able to be brought about from a body through a direct influx” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 72; III, pp.15-17; see, e.g., Augustine, *De musica*,

6.5.8-12, *Supra Genesim ad litteram*, 12.16.32-33, *De Trinitate*, 10.5.7)³¹. As his major opposition, Olivi presents the passive account, which he says is “of Aristotle and his followers, who say that bodies and corporeal objects act on a spirit formally conjoined to a body [...] through a simple and impressive influx” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 72; III, p.13)³². Any account of cognition is passive, according to this line of thinking, insofar as it allows for any “direct influx”, something sufficiently caused by an external corporeal object, into the cognitive powers of the soul (or “spirit”).

One reason Olivi attributes the opposing passive view to “Aristotle and his followers” seems to be polemical. Olivi is well known to have complained about the, as he saw it, excessive

³¹ “*Quarta est beati Augustini dicentis in nullum spiritum posse fieri aliquid a corpore per rectum influxum sed solum per modum colligantiae et per modum termini obiectivi.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.15). For some of the references to Augustine which directly follow: “*Quod enim non per rectum influxum aliquid in spiritu seu anima faciat, dicit aperte in libro VI Musicae [cap.5, n.8], ubi postquam quaesivit an audire sit idem quod aliquid a corpore in anima fieri, subdit: ‘Semper absurdum est fabricatori corpori materiam quoquomodo animam subdere; esset autem corpori sic subiecta, si corpus in ea aliquos numeros operaretur; non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab his quos in sonis cognoscimus.’ [...] Item, paulo post: ‘Videtur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere.’ [...] Item, libro XII Supra Genesim ad litteram, capitulo 16, [n.32-33] dicit: ‘Quia omnis spiritus est omni corpore sine dubitatione praestantior, sequitur ut non loci positione, sed naturae dignitate praestantior sit natura spiritualis isto corporeo caelo, etiam illa ubi rerum corporalium exprimuntur imagines. Hinc est quod praestantior est imago corporis in spiritu quam ipsum corpus in substantia sua. [...] tamen eam eius imaginem non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in se ipso facit celeritate mirabili, quae ineffabiliter longe est a corporis tarditate.’ [...] Item, libro X De Trinitate, capitulo 5, [n.7] dicit quod, ‘quia anima non potest inferre introrsus ipsa corpora tanquam in regionem incorporeae naturae, imagines eorum convellit et rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa.’ Nota autem quod Augustinus censuit animam non posse subici actioni corporis non solum ratione suae formae intellectualis qua incomparabiliter praecellit omne corpus, sed etiam ratione suae spiritualis materiae, quia illam vult esse praestantior omnino forma corporali. Unde XIII libro Confessionum, circa principium, agens de materia seu de informi spirituali et corporali dicit: ‘Spirituale informe praestantius est quam si formatum corpus esset, corporale autem informe praestantius est quam si omnino nihil esset.’” (Ibid. pp.15-17)*

I’ll come back to this citation to *De Musica* below, when examining the nobility arguments of Olivi and Durand.

³² “*Prima est Aristotelis et sequacium eius dicentium quod in spiritum corpori formaliter coniunctum agunt corpora et corporalia obiecta non solum per modum colligantiae nec solum per modum termini obiectivi, immo etiam per simplicem et impressivum influxum.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.13).

As we’ll see below, in Chapter 3, one possible source for Olivi’s less common terminology of a passive “influx” (rather than simply an “impression”/“passion”/etc.) for the “Aristotelian” account, is Aquinas’s discussion in ST I, Q.84, a.6. In that text, Aquinas, at least in part, equates Aristotle’s theory of sensation with that of Democritus; Aquinas specifies that Aristotle’s view doesn’t strictly involve an “influx” of atoms, though nevertheless he says both involve some sort of passive impression in the sense power which brings about sensation. Olivi seems to have ignored this strict distinction in terminology and went with the looser sense of an “influx” as “impression”.

authority of Aristotle in his day, saying, e.g., that, “without reason he is believed, as the god of this age” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58, ad. 14; II, p. 482). Olivi is oft described as part of a trend among “reactionary” Franciscans, including his famous teacher, Bonaventure, who had their qualms about the explosion of interest in the works of Aristotle, and his Greek and Arabic commentators, in the 13th century in the Latin west after the massive influx of Latin translations of previously un-translated works in this corpus. According to this line of thinking, Augustine, as a major Christian thinker, was a safer authority than Aristotle, at least when the two authorities clashed, and “home grown” theories, formed before Aristotle’s wider corpus took over, were thought to be worth defending.

It should also be granted that there are plenty of textual claims from Aristotle that lend themselves to a relatively passive view of our basic acts of cognition and many medieval “Aristotelians” adopted such views. In these texts, sensation is said to be a sort of “motion” or “passion”/“undergoing” from external sensible objects, and intellection is, in some sense, said to be an analogous “undergoing” from intelligible objects (see, e.g. Aristotle, *De anima* III.4, 429a13-18; cf. Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp13-14)³³. Olivi is not alone here; consider these two

³³ “If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Thought must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.” (Aristotle, *De anima* III.4, 429a13-18; trans. J.A. Smith)

[“*Dicamus igitur quod si formare per intellectum est sicut sentire, aut patietur quoquo modo ab intellecto, aut aliud simile. [...] Oportet igitur ut sit non passivum, sed recipit formam, et est in potentia sicut illud, non illud. Et erit dispositio eius secundum similitudinem: sicut sentiens apud sensibilia sic intellectus apud intelligibilia.*” (Averroes, *Long Commentary on DA*, III, cc.2-3; pp.380-383).]

Now, notably there is some room for interpretation in this passage on just how much intellection, or sensation, is an “undergoing”, especially given the qualification that at least the intellect is, in some way, “non passive”. This is a point of controversy, but at least Averroes’s gloss is that Aristotle still means to say that the intellect has the “being of a passive power” (*esse de virtute passiva*), but “only insofar as the intellect receives the form which it comprehends”; the intellect is not “transmutable” insofar as it is not a body nor the power of a body (Ibid. p.382); i.e. the elemental bodies “transmute” into other elements through corruption and replacement of their proper accidents (hot to cold, dry to wet, etc.), but intellection is a perfection without such “transmutation”. Of sense,

typical arguments based on Aristotle's authority, presented by Scotus as the common arguments behind the view that intellection (as with sensation) is passive:

“[I]n [II] *De anima* [chapter 5], The Philosopher proves that sense is passive, not active, because if it were active, it would always act: just as ‘if the combustible were combusive, it would always combust.’³⁴ In this way it is argued on the matter at hand: if the intellective part were always active with respect to intellection, it would always intelligize, and even without the object, which is false. This is also confirmed from [III] *De anima* [chapter 2], ‘the sensible and sense is the same [in] act’, just as ‘sounding and hearing is the same act’³⁵. Therefore, similarly, the active motion of the object and the passive motion of the intellect, which is intellection, is the same act: therefore, intellection is from the object.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.282-283)³⁶

Averroes's gloss seems to be that it is “transmutable”, though that “transmutation” is, at least in some cases, accidental to sensation (Ibid. p.381). We'll return to this issue in Chapter 3 when we get to Durand's Aristotelianism.

For some other commonly cited passages, on sensation, see, e.g.:

“Sensation depends, as we have said, on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some sort of change in quality.” (*De anima* II.5, 416b33-34)

“As we have said, what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it.” (Ibid., 418a4-6)

“Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or the gold.” (*De anima* II.12, 424a16-21)

³⁴ “The power of sense is parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously, but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition; otherwise it could have set itself on fire, and would not have needed actual fire to set it ablaze.” (*De anima* II.5, 417b7-9).

[“*Sed est irrationabile quare sensus non sentiunt se, et quare etiam nullus sensus agit absque extrinseco, et in eis sunt ignis et terra et alia elementa, et sunt illa que comprehenduntur a sensu per se, et accidentia contingentia eis. Dicamus igitur quod sensus non est in actu, sed tantum in potentia, et ideo non sentimus; quemadmodum combustibile non comburitur a se absque comburente; et si hoc non esset, combureret se et non indigeret quod ignis esset in actu.*” (Averroes, *Long Commentary on DA*, II, c.52; p.209).] As we'll see below, Olivi also refers to this passage from Aristotle and provides a response (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.38-39).

³⁵ “The activity of the sensible object and that of the sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains. Take as illustration actual sound and actual hearing [...].” (*De anima* III.2, 425b25) [“*Et actio sensibilis et sensus eadem est; in esse autem non sunt eadem in eo eis; v. g. sonus qui est in actu et auditus qui est in actu. [...] Et si actio et passio et motus sunt in passivo, necesse est ut sonus et auditus qui sunt in actu sint in eo quod est in potentia. Actio enim agentis et moventis sunt in patiente; et propter hoc non est necesse ut moveatur quod movet. [...] Et iste idem sermo est de aliis sensibus et aliis sensibilibus. Quemadmodum enim actio et passio sunt in patiente, non in agente, ita actio sensuum et sensibilium sunt in sentiente. [...] Id est, et causa in hoc est quoniam, sicut actio et passio sunt in patiente, non in agente, ita actio sensuum et sensibilium sunt in primo sentiente, cum sensibilia sint virtutes agentes, sensus autem agentes et patientes, primum autem sentiens est patiens tantum.*” (Averroes, *Long Commentary on DA*, II, cc.138-140; pp.339-343).]

³⁶ “*Quia II* De anima [cap. 5] probat Philosophus sensum esse passivum, non activum, per hoc quod si esset activus, semper ageret: sicut 'si combustible esset combustivum, semper combustible combureret.' Ita arguo in*

As mentioned above, this initial argument, against any sort of “self-motion” in a cognitive power, comes up repeatedly in passive accounts of cognition (as, e.g., with Godfrey); likewise, this argument is regularly aligned with Aristotle’s authority.

All that being said, in the secondary literature, there have been years of unease over claims that there exists, in fact, any sharp and sweeping contrast between the authorities of Aristotle and Augustine in medieval philosophy (see, e.g., Kent 1995 & MacClintock 1956). After all, it’s undeniable that much of Latin medieval philosophy shares a common Aristotelian language, along with a respect for Augustine, both of which leave room for a variety of interpretations; moreover, even among the Franciscans, it’s unclear just how wide the “anti-Aristotelian” sentiment goes, beyond Olivi and Bonaventure, as one can see, e.g., from Scotus’s perfectly respectful Aristotelian commentaries and references. Yet, on this topic, Olivi’s division between the “Aristotelian” passive view and the “Augustinian” active view is most often taken seriously in the secondary literature. For one representative example from recent scholarship, which we’ll repeatedly return to in this dissertation, Jean-Luc Solère (2014) presents Durand as part of a defined tradition, including, most notably, Olivi (and other Franciscans) beforehand, which is, Solère claims, as “Augustinian” as it is “un-Aristotelian” on this topic (including some of the more general metaphysical principles that lay behind it, such as those touched on above) (Solère 2014, pp.189-190, fn.14, p.223, fn.127). There are certainly ways to justify this division, to a certain degree, on this topic in particular, nevertheless, I think that Solère (2014) ultimately

proposito: si pars intellectiva esset activa respectu intellectionis, semper intelligeret, et ita sine obiecto, quod falsum est. [Additio Scoti] Confirmatur, quia ex III De anima [cap. 2] ‘sensibilis et sensus est idem actus’, puta ‘sonatio et auditio est idem actus’. Ergo a simili, motio activa obiecti et motio passiva intellectus, quae est intellectio, est idem actus: ergo intellectio est ab obiecto.”* (Scotus, *Ordinatio I*, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica III/1*, pp.282-283). *I emended the book numbering here.

goes too far in the degree to which he cleanly cuts up this debate along “Aristotelian” and “Augustinian” lines.

One way in which this dissertation will challenge this clean division of authorities is to go back to Olivi and re-evaluate just how “un-Aristotelian” he is in his fundamental metaphysical principles. In Chapter 2, in particular, my focus will be on the common objection to Olivi’s active view of cognition that, if indeed the object is not the proper effective cause of cognition, then either Olivi must admit some new type of causality, outside of the standard four Aristotelian causes, or else the object is left with no appropriate causal role to explain why, e.g., I am cognizing this object in front of me. As I’ll argue, by looking at the view of Olivi’s student, Gonsalvus, and Gonsalvus’s student, Scotus, one can see that Olivi does in fact have the means to fit his view into a broadly Aristotelian causal framework; this will get us into some of the metaphysical arguments, mentioned above, concerning how secondary causes co-operate in a complex causal world.

Another way in which I will challenge Solère’s (2014) division, in particular, will be in Chapter 3, where I re-evaluate both just how “Augustinian” Durand’s account of cognition is, relative to the accounts of Olivi and company beforehand, and just how “un-Aristotelian” Durand’s own account is in its general principles. As I’ll argue, in certain regards, Durand’s account shares some perfectly Aristotelian metaphysical arguments with the “Augustinian” accounts of Olivi and company; in other regards, Durand’s account seems to ultimately differ from that of Olivi and company, in a way which, if anything, retains a more thoroughgoing “Aristotelian” influence with regard to the strict “impassivity” of the soul. On the latter point, this will even get us into some nuances of Aristotelian scholarship that seem to have been largely passed over by other medieval “Aristotelians”, such as Aquinas and Godfrey.

All that being said, in Chapter 3, in particular, I will also explain what is, nevertheless, reasonably “Augustinian” in the active accounts of Olivi and company, even if, as we’ll see, there exist competing medieval interpretations of Augustine as well, from figures more often described as more “Aristotelian” (e.g., Aquinas and Godfrey), in favour of more passive accounts of cognition. My aim will not be to defend the interpretation of Olivi and company as *the* correct interpretation of Augustine, but we will look at some of the source texts on which they rely.

§4. The Rest of the Dissertation in Outline

In addition to the three broad interests I’ve just described in the last three sections, this dissertation should also speak to more granular interests in the lesser known figures and micro-debates of 13th-14th century medieval philosophy. Although this dissertation will not offer an exhaustive survey of these debates, I will attempt to fill in some of the gaps between the more well-known figures in them, such as Aquinas and Scotus, and I will try to offer a fairly comprehensive look at the most common positions and arguments taken, at least, by the “Augustinian Franciscans” who I do include (namely, Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus), and their clearest opponents (e.g., Aquinas, Godfrey, and Hervaeus). I’ll also include at least one other alternate active account of cognition, namely, that of Durand. I simply don’t have the space to go into other alternate active accounts of this time as well (e.g., those of Henry of Ghent and Peter Auriol), or examine other “Augustinians” and their further in-fighting³⁷.

³⁷ I will, however, at least have some space in Chapter 3 to discuss some of Auriol’s objections to Durand’s view; I’ve saved further discussion of Auriol’s view for a future project, although I much of that research has already been completed in the process of writing this dissertation.

As one can see from the table of contents above, the rest of this dissertation is split into two major chapters, each divided into two parts, generally proceeding in chronological order from the mid 13th century (Olivi) to the early/mid 14th century (Durand):

Chapter 2: The Active Soul and its Objects: Asymmetric Causality from Peter John Olivi to Gonsalvus of Spain and John Duns Scotus

Part I: The Foundational Accounts of Olivi and Gonsalvus

Part II: Scotus in Context

Chapter 3: Durand of St. Pourçain and Prior Active Accounts: Their Common Grounds and Ultimate Differences

Part I: Durand's Context – The Common Features

Part II: Durand's Distinct Account and its Pushback

Let me now explain how this dissertation will proceed, and how best to read it, in a bit more detail.

Of more particular interest to the medievalist, one overall goal of Chapter 2 will be to spell out what I take to be common to the active accounts of cognition (and appetite) for Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus, despite some in-fighting over details and corresponding misunderstandings (both among each other and in the secondary literature). The secondary literature often favours the view that Scotus takes a true “middle path” approach to the activity of cognition, especially in contrast to the supposedly more “extreme” active view of Olivi, in line with how Scotus himself describes his approach (see, e.g., Cross 2014, pp.122-137, Hartman 2012, pp.49-82, Pasnau 1997, pp.125-150, Silva (2019, pp.64-68, and Solère 2014, pp.212-217). All of these authors, I believe, do a fine job presenting the basics of Scotus's view, at least by Scotus's own account; however, I think this faithfulness to Scotus's self-presentation has contributed to a potentially exaggerated view of the difference between Scotus's view and prior active accounts of cognition. In particular, as mentioned above, I will argue in this chapter that

Olivi and Scotus ultimately come to an equally “subtle” position where, consistent with the claim that the cognitive power is ultimately the proper/primary effective cause, both object and cognitive power nevertheless causally co-operate, albeit asymmetrically.

Moreover, Gonsalvus is a particularly interesting figure to bridge the gap between Olivi and Scotus here. Gonsalvus, although often disregarded as a “minor” and “unoriginal” historical figure, was personally acquainted with both Olivi and Scotus and, indeed partly because of his less “original” aspirations, does some interesting work to reconcile Olivi’s view with more mainstream medieval pushback, and, through this effort, ends up highlighting the deep similarities between the views of Olivi and Scotus, despite their nominal disagreements. In general terms, my guiding approach for this chapter is to be on guard to the distortions which result when one simply looks at the “big” names and their own, sometimes personally motivated, debates. By looking at a less “flashy” figure, such as Gonalvus, one can arrive at a more accurate picture of a given debate, including the, sometimes hidden, substantial common grounds.

Chapter 3, on the other hand, is generally motivated by the inverse caution: surface level similarities, and nominal agreements, can sometimes mask ultimately quite different underlying views. As I’ll argue, Durand’s active account of cognition is, it seems, despite its similarities, ultimately quite different from the active accounts of Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus. To get to this claim, Part I of this chapter will start with the similarities. In certain regards, Chapter 3, Part I, will serve as a second start to this dissertation with a more general and comprehensive explanation of the common arguments and disagreements in this medieval debate. Indeed, if less interested in the technicalities involved in harmonizing the accounts of Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus, one could start reading here. In this part of this chapter, I will confine myself to the parts

of Durand's texts where he quite clearly wishes to pick up the prior arguments and positions of those before him. In Chapter 3, Part II, I move on the details of Durand's own, proper view and where, it seems to me, he ultimately seems to part ways with Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus.

In sum, on one hand, ironically enough, Durand's account seems to fall prey to some of the same issues which Olivi and company take with the extreme passive view of, e.g., Godfrey, and his *Passive Container Model*. On the other hand, to the extent that Durand's account still fits the *Active Spotlight Model*, Durand's account arguably goes too far with the picture of the mind "extending" outwards, as a mere relation between the cognitive power and its object, disregarding the need for real changes "inside" a cognitive power.

For those interested in later 14th century debates, the last section of Chapter 3, Part II, will discuss some of the objections made explicitly to Durand, by Hervaeus Natalis and Peter Auriol, two quite different 14th century philosophers who, despite their differences, find common grounds to push back against Durand. Moreover, in this section, I will consider some room Durand may yet have to respond to these objections. Within Durand's room for response, we'll find certain 14th century developments in the technical medieval notions of "*subjective*" versus merely "*objective*"/"*intentional*" being. These terms will become an important part of later medieval debates concerning the activity/passivity of cognition (as, e.g., with the account of Peter Auriol and the active production of "*objective*"/"*apparent*" being in cognition), replacing certain concerns with the "real" production of cognitive acts in the cognitive soul; nevertheless, one can also see that the accounts of Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus, insofar as they take issue with Durand's reliance on merely "*objective*"/"*intentional*" changes in cognition, retain their significance in later debates (e.g., in the objections of Hervaeus and Auriol to Durand).

Aside from its broader goals, this dissertation aims to present a series of relevant texts, which will bring up a wide range of details in the psychological accounts of Olivi, Gonsalvus, Scotus, Durand, and some of their common opponents, such as Godfrey and Aquinas. Most sections of this dissertation are written so as to be as independently comprehensible as possible. This results in some repetition of details, but hopefully will aid in the reading of this dissertation according to one's own pace and interests. Feel free to skip around as you see fit and don't feel obliged to read this, (probably) too long, dissertation all in one sitting or to try to connect every dot at every moment.

Chapter 2

The Active Soul and its Objects:

Asymmetric Causality from Peter John Olivi to Gonsalvus of Spain and John Duns Scotus

One of the central debates of 13th-14th century philosophical psychology concerns the causal role the soul plays, especially in its cognitive and appetitive powers, in contrast with that played by its relevant objects, especially corporeal objects outside of the soul.³⁸ In recent literature, Peter John Olivi (1248-1298) has often been characterized as having a particularly radical view in this debate: that the soul's cognitive and appetitive powers are the proper efficient causes by which even their most basic acts are produced, while, in contrast, external corporeal objects are insufficient to produce any effect on the spiritual soul³⁹. In this chapter, I want to consider two sorts of issues that can be raised over Olivi's position. First, philosophically, there are concerns over how Olivi could take such a seemingly extreme view: surely the relevant objects must play some causal role in explaining why, e.g., I am cognizing

³⁸ As I explain more in Chapter 1, I'm especially concerned with what, following common medieval terminology, are called sensitive and intellective acts of "simple cognition" (or, "simple apprehension", "simple comprehension", etc.) ("*simplex cognitio*" / "*apprehensio*" / "*comprehensio*"), in contrast with "complex" acts of cognition.

However, the Franciscan tradition which I'll be focusing on in this chapter treats acts of appetite and volition together with acts of cognition, at least for the most part, and so, often goes back and forth between these acts, even in the same texts; in particular, Gonsalvus, in the text which we'll be looking at, treats the main objection to his view (in common with Olivi) in terms of volition. (Of course, for these Franciscans, acts of volition still ultimately come apart at some point from acts of cognition: e.g., volitions are "self-moved" in a special (non-natural) way and have dominium over the cognitive powers. It seems that this ultimate difference has caused some confusion in the secondary literature concerning whether acts of cognition are "self-moved", or only acts of volition, for these thinkers, but I flag now that this is just a special sort of "self-motion" and these thinkers all take it that the cognitive powers effectively cause their own acts as well, even when the will doesn't actively intervene).

³⁹ For some relatively recent literature which touches significantly on Olivi, concerning the activity of the soul, see, e.g.: Adriaenssen (2011), Pasnau (1997), Perler (2002), Silva (2019), Silva & Toivanen (2010), Solère (2014), Tachau (1988), and Toivanen (2003 & 2013). Olivi himself covers this topic, especially, in the massive Q. 58 and QQ.72-74, in his *Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, (henceforth, "II Sent."), edited in 3 vols. by Bernard Jansen (1922-26), which I will cite from below.

this object in front of me and not any other. Second, historically, it can be rather difficult to trace Olivi's influence on the wider debate, especially positively, given how extreme his view is oft presented (sometimes even by himself) and general controversies surrounding his name as well⁴⁰; e.g., Olivi often presents himself as going against common medieval "Aristotelian" theories of his day, in part given a personal agenda against what he perceived as the "slavish" use of Aristotle's authority, and this includes seemingly more moderate theories of cognition/appetite and causation, as we'll see.⁴¹

In the first half of this chapter, I argue that by examining Olivi alongside another, understudied figure, Gonsalvus of Spain (~1255-1313), both of the above issues can be dealt with⁴². Gonsalvus was a student of Olivi, eventually to become the General Minister of the Franciscan order, who was even "charged" by a critical party in his day with following certain views of Olivi⁴³. Below, I argue that Gonsalvus indeed follows Olivi on this topic in particular, though he takes a more "diplomatic" approach. As I take it, both Olivi and Gonsalvus still allow for a broadly efficient causal role for the objects of cognition and volition, albeit as secondary or "*sine qua non*" causes, in a way which is consistent with the claim that the cognitive and appetitive powers are the (primary) efficient causes of their respective acts. Gonsalvus, notably,

⁴⁰ For more historical details of Olivi's controversies, see, e.g., Burr (1976 & 1989).

⁴¹ Olivi is well known to have complained about the pervasive authority of Aristotle in his day, saying, e.g., that, "without reason he is believed, as the god of this age" (II Sent. Q.58, ad. 14; II, p. 482).

⁴² As far as I'm aware, to date only one full book has been devoted to discussing Gonsalvus, Martel (1968), a few notable articles, including Gracia (1969), have been published devoted to his ideas, and Sullivan (2010) devotes a large section of his dissertation to Gonsalvus on spiritual matter. In more general discussions concerning the activity of cognition and volition, Gonsalvus's name occasionally shows up, though most often with minimal discussion. Even Solère (2014), who offers an interesting analysis of Gonsalvus's account, which I will build on below, only bases his discussion on a few lines from Gonsalvus and only devotes a few pages to Gonsalvus himself (Ibid., pp.214-215, pp.226-227).

⁴³ For some information on Gonsalvus's academic life, see the editor's introductory material in Gonsalvus of Spain, *Quaestiones disputatae et de Quodlibet ad fidem codicum mss. editae cum introductione historico-critica*, edited by L. Amorós (1935). Hereafter, "*I Quaestiones*" will refer to the first (of two reports) of the disputed questions in this edition, which I will entirely restrict myself to.

takes a more conciliatory tone than Olivi, but I take this to show that Olivi could have made his view appear less radical, if that were his interest.

In the second half of this chapter, I extend my analysis to John Duns Scotus (1266-1308) on this topic to solidify the historical relevancy of Olivi and Gonsalvus and to paint a broader picture of this debate. Scotus, the more famous Franciscan, was a student of Gonsalvus (himself, as mentioned, a student of Olivi), with the two reportedly sharing a long personal acquaintanceship; Gonsalvus reports to have been “fully informed on” Scotus’s “laudable” life and “excellent” works, both, “partially though lengthy experience, partially through fame”; Scotus, at the very least, worked under Gonsalvus in Paris, when Gonsalvus was General Minister of their order⁴⁴. Moreover, as some recent authors have also discussed, at least in Scotus’s earlier Oxford lectures (which also survive in his *Ordinatio*), which we’ll be focusing on, Scotus seems to be aware of Olivi’s active view of cognition (and, perhaps, through Gonsalvus as well)⁴⁵.

However, especially on the topic of intellectual cognition, Scotus presents himself as offering a more moderate active view than those before him, one between an extreme active view

⁴⁴ Amorós (1935), in his aforementioned edition of Gonsalvus’s *Quaestiones*, includes a snippet of this report, written by Gonsalvus in 1304 as General Minister of the Franciscan Order, where Gonsalvus celebrates Scotus’s life and works, saying: “*Cum secundum statuta Ordinis et secundum statuta vestri conventus (Parisiensis) baccalaureus huiusmodi praesentandum ad praesens debeat esse de aliqua provincia aliarum a provincia Franciae, dilectum in Christo patrem Iohanem Scotum, de cuius vita laudabili, scientia excellenti, ingenioque subtilissimo aliisque insignibus conditionibus suis, patrim experientia longa, partim fama quae ubique divulgata est, informatum sum ad plenum*” (Ibid. pp.xxvi-xxvii).

⁴⁵ For further discussion of Scotus’s “middle path” approach to the activity of cognition, and his context, see, e.g., Cross (2014, pp.122-137), Hartman (2012, pp.49-82), Pasnau (1997, pp.125-150), Silva (2019, pp.64-68), and Solère (2014, pp.212-217); Cross (2014) goes to particular detail, walking through Scotus’s *Ordinatio* question for its own sake, while the other papers cited here have wider interests. Despite any qualms I might have, all of these authors, I believe, do a good job presenting the basics of Scotus’s view, at least by Scotus’s own account

of prior “Augustinians”, which he seems to attribute to Olivi, and an extreme passive view, which is at least a common target. I think, however, that Scotus’s self-portrayal is potentially misleading and has contributed to the popularity of the more exaggerated reading of Olivi’s prior active view. As I will argue, after establishing that the prior view of Olivi (shared also with Gonsalvus) isn’t as extreme as it might appear, we can doubt whether Scotus is in fact opposed to the active view of Olivi (and Gonsalvus) in substance. Even more, I take it that Scotus’s own positive view, on the “ordered” concurrent efficient causation of the soul and its objects, in fact provides further insight into how to understand the common core of their shared view. Overall, I take it that, according to all three figures, the soul and its objects are both, broadly, efficient causes, albeit asymmetrically, in the production of its cognitive and appetitive acts.

Part I: The Foundational Accounts of Olivi and Gonsalvus

§1. Activity vs. Passivity of the Soul: Olivi, Gonsalvus, and their Shared Opponents

§1.1. Distinguishing Three Competing Views

At the beginning of his response on the subject, Gonsalvus provides us with a helpful division of the major views in this debate, largely in line with Olivi’s earlier depiction. First, to the question whether acts of volition come effectively from the will (and intellection from the intellect), Gonsalvus says that there are “some” who answer in the negative, saying that, “the act

of no power is effectively [caused] from itself⁴⁶ (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.30); rather, these acts must be effectively caused by their external objects. Let's call this the *Fully Passive View*. As Amorós, the editor of I *Quaestiones*, notes, Gonsalvus likely has Godfrey of Fontaines in mind here. Godfrey expresses this view, in more particular terms, when he says, e.g., “the object, which moves the intellect to an act of intellection, also moves the will to an act of volition” (*Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; III, p.170).⁴⁷ In more general terms, as with Gonsalvus's presentation, Godfrey argues for this *Fully Passive View* on the basis of a strict understanding of the principle that everything which is moved is moved by another, i.e., nothing effectively moves itself *strictly speaking*. Strict self-motion is impossible, according to Godfrey, for this would require that the same thing be in act and in potency at the same time and location, with respect to the same form, which he takes to be a contradiction in terms⁴⁸. So, in other words, Godfrey takes it that if no power effectively causes an action from itself and in itself, then, rather, an active power must act on a distinct passive subject, when sufficiently proximate, to bring about its action. The will, e.g., is such that it isn't always willing, and so something else must bring the will to a particular act of

⁴⁶ “De hac tamen questione sunt opiniones contrariae. Aliqui enim dicunt quod nullius potentiae actus est effective ab ipsa.” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.30).

In general, the questions in I *Quaestiones* are initially phrased, in more theological dress, in terms of the cause of our “mentally praising God”; Q.2 asks, “*Utrum laudare Deum mentaliter sit actus potentiae laudantis*,” but quickly establishes that such an act is from the intellect (Ibid., Q.2; p.27); Q.3, which we'll be focusing on, asks, “*Utrum velle laudare mentaliter sit effective a voluntate*,” but quickly switches to the general question of how any sort of act of intellection or volition comes about, or, as he also puts it, whether the intellect and will are passive or active powers (Ibid. Q.3; pp.27-31). Gonsalvus goes on to give some arguments particular to the intellect and will, but I'll keep to what is common to both powers in this paper.

⁴⁷ “Unde quantum ad praesens est dicendum quod voluntas proprie et per se non movet intellectum nec e converso, sed obiectum, quod intellectum movet ad actum intellectionis, movet etiam voluntatem ad actum volitionis” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; III, p.170).

⁴⁸ For Godfrey's use of this sort of argument, see, e.g., the rest of his *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7, and Q.6 beforehand, and throughout his *Quodlibet* IX, Q.19. For Gonsalvus's summation of Godfrey's arguments, look to the initial objections which he starts his Q.3 with (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, args.3, 4, 5, & 10; pp.28-30). For further discussion of Godfrey's general arguments against self-motion, see, e.g., Wippel (1973) & Wippel (1981, especially, pp.184-202).

volition; on this picture, if not the will, the object of volition (i.e., some apparently good object) indeed seems to be the obvious alternative to serve as the active cause.

In contrast to this *Fully Passive View*, Gonsalvus says that there are “others” who say that a cognitive or appetitive power, such as the intellect and will, “brings about and efficiently produces (*exserit et efficit*) its act in itself”, and he immediately sides with this view (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.31)⁴⁹. However, within this general view, Gonsalvus makes a further distinction between, (i), a *Middle View*, according to which the cognitive or appetitive power must first receive some sort of impression or “disposition” (*dispositio*) from a given external object (“namely, a *species* in a cognitive power or an affection in an appetitive power”), which elicits the power to bring about its act, in itself; and, (ii), a *Fully Active View*, according to which a given power can at once cause its own act in itself, so long as it is in the presence of its object, without any “pre-induced disposition” (Ibid.).

This *Middle View*, (i), is still passive, it seems, insofar as this view holds that the relevant cognitive/appetitive power cannot self-move to initiate its action without being prompted by some impression or “excitation” on the soul from its object. Who does Gonsalvus have in mind for this view? Perhaps, at least in part, this is meant to capture the view of Boethius, which Gonsalvus cites a bit earlier, from *De consolatio* V (car.4, pro.5), where, in the case of sensation, as Gonsalvus puts it, “the senses are excited from exterior sensible objects, and

⁴⁹ For the rest of the passage, continuing from above: “*Alii vero dicunt quod utraque potentia, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, exserit et efficit in seipsa actum suum, et in hoc conveniunt in generali; differunt tamen quia aliqui dicunt quod obiecta inducunt in potentia aliquam dispositionem, scilicet, speciem in potentia cognitiva, vel affectionem in potentia appetitiva, et potentia sic disposita causat in se suum actum; omnis, inquam, potentia [est] habens in se suum actum. Alii vero dicunt quod omnia talis potentia ad presentiam obiecti statim efficit actum suum in se ipsa, absque tali dispositione praeinducta, saltem voluntas; et haec opinio videtur probabilior, scilicet, quae dicit potentiam in se efficere actum suum.*” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.31).

afterwards they cause their acts and interior forces” (Ibid., p.30)⁵⁰. However, given Gonsalvus’s terminology and context, it’s also likely that this *Middle View* is meant to cover a more standard version of the common “*species* theory” of cognition of his day, according to which, the intellectual power, e.g., is truly impressed (not just “excited”) with some distinct intelligible *species*, but there is still some active role for the intellectual power to produce its act on the basis of this impression. E.g., the reception of such a *species* (a “similitude” or representation) of felinity would serve to dispose and/or determine one’s intellect to, next, produce an occurrent act of intellection about that intelligible object. Amorós singles out John of Murro⁵¹, but it’s also likely Gonsalvus has Thomas Aquinas in mind as a proponent of this sort of view; see, e.g., Aquinas’s oft-discussed remarks that the senses and the intellect cognize, as so-called “immanent acts”, but “by way of” some *species* or similitude first received (see, e.g., ST I, Q.85, a.2).⁵²

⁵⁰ “*Istae quaestiones eadem via solvuntur, et simul dicendum ad ipsas secundum quod Boethius primam questionem videtur solvere manifeste, V De consolatione, carmine 4 et prosa sequenti, ubi videtur dicere quod sensus excitantur ab exterioribus sensibilibus, et postea agunt actus suos et interiores vires.*” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.30).

Along with Boethius, this view is also occasionally tied to the authority of Augustine and it enjoyed some popularity, at least prior to the later 13th/early 14th century, where the view seems to have fallen out of favour. Common proponents of this view include John Peckham and Matthew Aquasparta, where the object of, e.g., cognition “excites” or “inclines” (without causing) some change in the soul, in co-operation with the soul’s active role; Silva (2019), also finds earlier examples in the works of William of Auvergne and some anonymous Arts Masters and he discusses some forms of internal variation within this broad “excitation” view (Silva 2019, pp.43-59). As we’ll see next, despite the Augustinian heritage behind this view, Gonsalvus and Olivi both tend to group this view together with other *Middle Views* which allow for some impression in the soul/spirit from external objects. More specifically, Olivi argues that either (i) this “excitation” amounts to a passive impression, so falls in with other passive views, or it doesn’t; if, the latter, either, (ii) this “excitation” is noticed, like an intermediary representation, but Olivi takes issue with such a view for other reasons (given his commitment to *direct realism*); or (iii), it isn’t a passion in the soul or noticed, but then, Olivi thinks, his own active view can account for such “excitation” in his own preferred terms (see, e.g. II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.26-27). For this reason, we can put this view to the side for our discussion.

⁵¹ Amorós cites a passage from Gonsalvus of Balboa (a figure often confused with Gonsalvus of Spain) who (nevertheless) names John of Murro as holding a view described exactly in the same terms as above (Ibid. p.31, fn.1).

⁵² Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* (hereafter, “ST”), P. Carmello (ed), (Turin: Marietti, 1948-1950). For the relevant passages and further discussion of Aquinas’s view, see Chapter 3. To be clear, exactly how the *species* plays its role for Aquinas, e.g., either as an uncognized “disposition” or a mediate representation, is a topic of much debate; as we’ll see in Chapter 3, this debate gets explicitly formulated already in the 14th century, to say

In contrast with both the *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views*, the *Fully Active View*, (ii) above, is clearly the view of Olivi and later in I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, it becomes clear that Gonsalvus ultimately endorses this view as well. Olivi, in particular, positions himself against the aforementioned *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views* of cognition (and volition), which he claims are of “Aristotle and his followers”, insofar as they allow an object to directly cause some “simple impression” (or “influx”) on/in the soul (see, e.g., II Sent. Q.72; III, p.13).⁵³ As Olivi goes on to specify, this passive “influx” is said to either be, “[A] a cognitive action,” (or, appetitive action), i.e., as according to the *Fully Passive View* described by Gonsalvus, “or [B] the effective principle of such an action, or [C] an action that excites the power to a cognitive act”, (or appetitive act) i.e., as with either sort of *Middle View*, of Aquinas or Boethius, mentioned above (Ibid. p.24)⁵⁴. E.g., on view [B], a *species* in a cognitive power would serve as an “effective principle” to elicit an act of cognition. In contrast to both *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views*, Olivi describes his *Fully Active View* as, “the view of the blessed Augustine who says that in no spirit is anything able to be brought about from a body through a direct influx”, but only indirectly; so, Olivi ultimately concludes, rather than a corporeal external object, a given power,

nothing of the mass of contemporary scholarship on this topic among Aquinas scholars today. Moreover, whether a “disposition” is exactly a “habit”, in technical medieval jargon, is also up to debate, but for purpose of discussion I’ll occasionally run those terms together insofar as they at least seem to be similar sorts of things, loosely speaking. I thank Richard Cross for urging me to clarify these points of debate.

⁵³ “*Prima est Aristotelis et sequacium eius dicentium quod in spiritum corpori formaliter coniunctum agunt corpora et corporalia obiecta non solum per modum colligantiae nec solum per modum termini obiectivi, immo etiam per simplicem et impressivum influxum.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.13). This passage is more explicitly about cognition, but see also, Olivi, II Sent. Q.58, for parallel claims about appetite and volition. As we’ll see, this isn’t to say that Olivi is right to imply that the contrasting active view of cognition is entirely against the authority of Aristotle. For further discussion concerning the “Aristotelian” (vs. “Augustinian”) roots to Olivi’s claims, see Chapter 3; there I use Durand’s more stripped-down active theory of cognition, in particular, to see where these two traditions most cleanly intermingle.

⁵⁴ “*Item, aut influxus factus a corpore in spiritu est actio cognitiva aut principium effectivum ipsius aut est actio excitativa potentiae ad actum cognitivum.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72.; III, p.24)

insofar as it is spiritual, is the proper efficient cause of its act (of cognition or appetite); i.e., the power must bring about its acts “through itself and in itself”, following the words of Augustine (Ibid. pp.15-17).⁵⁵

§1.2. Two Common Arguments for the Fully Active View

At least against the *Fully Passive View*, considered above, Olivi and Gonsalvus both present a common *reductio* argument that the external object, rather than the cognitive or appetitive power, would more properly be said to cognize or will/want, if the external object were in fact the primary efficient cause. But this is absurd for we rather attribute these acts, and trace their intrinsic principles, to ourselves, with respect to our cognitive and appetitive powers. Let’s call this general type of argument an “*attribution argument*”.

As Olivi puts this argument, in the following passage, if the objects were the efficient cause:

⁵⁵ “*Quarta est beati Augustini dicentis in nullum spiritum posse fieri aliquid a corpore per rectum influxum sed solum per modum colligantiae et per modum termini obiectivi. Quod enim non per rectum influxum aliquid in spiritu seu anima faciat, dicit aperte in libro VI Musicae [cap.5, n.8], ubi postquam quaesivit an audire sit idem quod aliquid a corpore in anima fieri, subdit: ‘Semper absurdum est fabricatori corpori materiam quoquomodo animam subdere; esset autem corpori sic subiecta, si corpus in ea aliquos numeros operaretur; non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab his quos in sonis cognoscimus.’ Item, paulo post [n.9]: ‘Corporalia igitur, quaecunque huic corpori ingeruntur aut obiectantur extrinsecus, non in anima, sed in ipso corpore aliquid faciunt’. Item, paulo post [n.10]: ‘Videtur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere.’ [...] Item, paulo post [n.12]: ‘Cum ab iisdem operationibus suis aliquid patitur, non a corpore, sed a se ipsa patitur’[...] Item, libro XII Supra Genesim ad litteram, capitulo 16, [n.32-33] dicit: ‘Quia omnis spiritus est omni corpore sine dubitatione praestantior, sequitur ut non loci positione, sed naturae dignitate praestantior sit natura spiritualis isto corporeo caelo, etiam illa ubi rerum corporalium exprimuntur imagines. Hinc est quod praestantior est imago corporis in spiritu quam ipsum corpus in substantia sua. [...] tamen eam eius imaginem non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in se ipso facit celeritate mirabili, quae ineffabiliter longe est a corporis tarditate.’ [...] Item, libro X De Trinitate, capitulo 5, [n.7] dicit quod, ‘quia anima non potest inferre introrsus ipsa corpora tanquam in regionem incorporeae naturae, imagines eorum convellit et ‘rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa.’” (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.15-16; cf. *De Musica*, 6.5.8-12, *Supra Genesim ad litteram*, 12.16.32-33, *De Trinitate*, 10.5.7.) We’ll return to Olivi’s technical jargon of the “mode of connection” and “objective terminus” below, especially the latter, along with the sort of nobility argument which Olivi borrows from Augustine in these citations.*

“then to intelligize or to sense, or to want (*appetere*), taken actively, would be attributed to those objects rather than to the powers, just as to illuminate and to heat are attributed to the Sun or to fire rather than to the illuminated air” (II Sent. Q.58; II, p.463).⁵⁶

Moreover, against at least a sort of *Middle View*, Olivi goes on to make a similar argument against the view that a *species*, received in a cognitive power, e.g., would be a sufficient active cause of cognition; if the *species* were such a cause, then the act would be attributed to the *species*, more properly speaking, rather than to oneself (*via* one’s intrinsic cognitive power) (Ibid. pp.465-466)⁵⁷.

To arrive at a similar argument, Gonsalvus starts with a general causal principle that everything which is actually ϕ , insofar as it exists (i.e., in its nature), has a natural action to ϕ (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.32).⁵⁸ This principle can be understood by way of the examples from Olivi: e.g., because it is actually hot, insofar as it exists, fire is apt to go into its distinctive act and actively heat. So too, by analogy, because the intellectual soul, e.g., is what is actually intelligent, insofar as it exists, it must be what is apt to go into its distinctive act and actively intelligize⁵⁹. As Gonsalvus goes on to argue, it would be absurd to say that, in contrast, the

⁵⁶ “*Quia tunc intelligere aut sentire vel appetere active accepta potius deberent attribui ipsis obiectis quam ipsis potentiis, sicut et illuminare aut calefacere potius attribuitur soli vel igni quam aeri illuminato.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.463).

⁵⁷ E.g., Olivi says: “*quod sic nec nos debemus dici habere potentiam intelligendi aut sentendi, quamvis aliquando per huiusmodi species possimus intelligere et sentire.*” (Ibid. pp.465-466; cf. Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.24). I discuss this, and further details, concerning this sort of “attribution argument” more in Chapter 3.

⁵⁸ “*Prima est ex determinatione agentis, quia omne quod est in actu natum est agere, et si sit in tali actu, natum est agere talem actionem; omne enim quod agit, agit secundum quod in actu, ut dicitur IX Metaphysicae; et patet etiam per inductionem, quod existens in tali [actu], natum est agere talem actionem. Sed anima intellectiva est in actu, et in tali actu; ergo nata est agere talem actionem, scilicet intelligere et velle.*” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.32). As I discuss in Chapter 3, this type of argument seems to be more closely linked with the authority of Aristotle than Augustine, as one might already glean from this reference to the *Metaphysics* here; this use of Aristotle, of course, does not go unchallenged by those with more traditional *Passive/Middle Views*.

⁵⁹ That is, even with regard to the intellect in potency, the intellect is, in one sense, “intelligent” in first act, though directed to go into second act and actually intelligize. As we’ll discuss below, there is a limit to the analogy between an agent, such as the intellect, and a “univocal” agent, such as fire, in this case, insofar as, for one thing, the intellect acts by way of its substantial form, which exceeds its effect but “virtually” contains it, whereas fire simply acts by way of the same form which it causes in effect.

intellect, e.g., is given its ability to intelligize by something ultimately external to it (such as an intelligible object or *species*), like water is given the ability to heat by an external heat source; for then, just as, more properly speaking, it is the heat that heats, not the water *qua* water, so too it would be the object (or *species*) that would, more properly speaking, be said to intelligize, rather than the intellectual subject (Ibid. pp.32-33).⁶⁰

In addition, Olivi and Gonsalvus provide another common argument which we can label a “nobility argument”. This argument is even more obviously targeted at both *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views*, insofar as both views allow for some direct impression from external corporeal objects (i.e., the less noble) on the soul’s spiritual powers (i.e., the more noble).

First, Olivi and Gonsalvus draw on a common principle that to be active is nobler than to be acted on⁶¹. So, if the objects of cognition and volition, e.g., were to act directly on the soul, then in this respect they would be nobler. Second, Olivi and Gonsalvus claim that the soul and its powers, insofar as they are spiritual, are infinitely nobler than their typical objects, insofar as their objects are generally corporeal (bracketing the rarer cases of directly cognizing incorporeal objects, such as angels). Olivi, in particular, considers all the cognitive and appetitive powers to

⁶⁰ “*Quod ita sit [impossibile] patet, quia quod non potest agere nisi per aliud non causatum ab ipso, non habet aliquam virtutem agendi de se, quia quicquid potest agere de se, de se habet virtutem agendi; et e converso, quod non potest agere de se, non habet virtutem agendi, sicut aqua calida, quia non potest calefacere nisi per calefaciens ipsam, quod non est causatum ab ipsa, ideo ipsa de se non habet virtutem agendi vel calefaciendi; nec dicitur de se calefacere, sed calefaciens mediante ipsa dicitur calefacere. Sed, secundum istos, sic [est] de angelo et anima, quia non possunt agere actionem, etiam exteriorem, nisi per actum interiorem, qui non est causatus ab ipsis, sed per obiectum; quare sequitur quod angelus et anima non habent aliquam virtutem agendi, nec proprie dicentur agere, sed obiectum faciens intellectionem et volitionem, secundum istos, magis proprie dicitur agere angeli et animae quam angelus et anima.*” (Ibid. pp.32-33). Again, see Chapter 3 for more discussion.

⁶¹ See, for example, Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones* Q.3 (pp.34-35), cited below, and Olivi, II *Sent.* Q.72 (III, pp.6-9, pp.12-13, and pp.24-25). Note that this principle is sometimes expressed in slightly different terms, stating that a (primary and equivocal) cause is nobler than its effect, as perfection can only diminish if the effect is not the same as the cause (as in the case of a univocal cause, which is the same in kind as its effect).

be spiritual and non-extended and distinguishes them from corporeal and extended objects like your average corporeal objects of cognition (as well as any impressions or “*species*” which they might propagate in the medium and in the physical sense organs). In short, as Olivi puts it, it is absurd to say that a simple, spiritual (and “vital”) effect should sufficiently follow from the opposite sort of cause (an extended, corporeal, non-vital, etc., object or bodily impression) (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.21-25; cf. II Sent. Q.73; III, pp.83-84; Q. 58; II, p.489).⁶² Thus, Olivi concludes, corporeal objects can have no direct impression on the spiritual soul (not even to cause some pre-induced *species*). Rather, the cognitive/appetitive powers of soul/spirit must be the proper causal source for its proper acts.

Although it’s less clear for Gonsalvus whether he thinks *all* cognitive and appetitive powers are incorporeal, as Olivi does, Gonsalvus at least agrees that the intellect and will do not depend on any corporeal organ, and thus, in this manner they are incorporeal and nobler than corporeal objects (and even corporeal representations in imagination); from this, like Olivi, Gonsalvus argues that the will and intellect cannot be acted on directly by such inferior things⁶³.

⁶² “*Absurdum est autem dicere quod vita sit quidam immediatus influxus non vivi et simplicitas extensi et incorporeitas corporei et cognitivum non cognitivi et sic de allis.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.21-25; cf. II Sent. Q.73; III, pp.83-84; Q. 58; II, p.489). For more on Olivi’s use of such “vital” acts, see Chapter 3; I don’t stress this notion in this chapter given that it isn’t clearly discussed by Gonsalvus, but in the wider tradition here this term gains a fair bit of traction (note that Scotus will use the term below).

⁶³ “[S]ed impossibile est quod [actio] sit ab obiecto, quod patet: Primo, ex innobilitate obiecti, quia omne agens aequivocum est nobilius suo effectui. [...] Cum igitur obiectum sit agens aequivocum respectu actionis intelligendi et volendi, erit nobilius istis, quod est improbabile de multis obiectis, scilicet materialibus. – Nec valet si dicatur quod phantasma est obiectum ; quia quantumcumque phantasma sit illuminatum, innobilius est dictis actionibus ; quia etiam ipsum phantasma non est obiectum, sed res in phantasmate in quo ipsa videtur. Ergo dictae actiones non causantur ab obiecto. [...] Idem hoc probatur secundo sic: quia nullum corporeum potest agere in incorporeum ut est a corpore absolutum, licet possit agere in ipsum quatenus est corpori unitum; sed intellectus et voluntas sunt potentiae a corporibus absolutae, in quantum potentiae sunt, ita quod, licet habeant, potentias sensitivas ut subservientes, non tamen ut cooperantes. Cum igitur obiecta, saltem multa, sint corporea, et similiter ipsa phantasmata, non poterunt agere in dictas potentias causando in eis actus earum.” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.34-35). To be clear, as I discuss more in Chapter 3, I take it that Gonsalvus’s argument here isn’t just based on the spirituality/immateriality of cognition (*qua* spirituality/immateriality), but also on the general nobility of

§2. Objection and Response: On the Causal Role of the Object

§2.1. A Central Objection to the Fully Active View

Now that we've seen that Olivi and Gonsalvus both take largely the same view on the activity of the soul, let's raise one particularly forceful objection which both Olivi and Gonsalvus consider: In short, if a cognitive or appetitive act were effectively caused by the respective power, from and in itself, then it seems its objects would not and need not serve any causal/explanatory role; so, it seems, the powers must either always be in act with respect to every object, which is clearly false, or, at least, be innately disposed to produce any act independent of the given object (e.g., one could, at any moment, just choose to see orange or cognize some alien species one has no knowledge of), which also seems false. E.g., Olivi, at one point, gives this sort of argument, citing Aristotle, in *De Anima* II.5 (417b7-9), where Aristotle says, in Olivi's paraphrase:

“[...] when an agent, sufficiently actual to act, and a patient, sufficiently disposed to receive (*ad patiendum*), are present to each other, always and necessarily an action follows, as when the combustible and the combustibile are present to each other, combustion always comes about. But if a cognitive action is not from an object, nor from any influx from it, but is from the cognizer alone, then the agent for an act of cognition and a recipient are always present to each other, since that action comes about and is received in that cognizer; therefore, every cognition of whatever objects will always be in that [cognizer] in actuality.” (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.38-39; cf. II Sent. Q.58 arg.3; II, p.395).⁶⁴

cognitive/appetitive acts proper (and their own internal ranks), as is clear from his objection to “illuminated” phantasms being any better at causing intellection. In this, I take it that Olivi and Gonsalvus sufficiently diverge from the more modest nobility argument one might deduce for the *Middle View* where a distinct agent intellect is sufficient to “immaterialize” phantasms so that they can act on the intellectual soul to bring about intellection (see, e.g., Aquinas, ST I, Q.84, a.6).

⁶⁴ “*Ex hoc autem patet falsitas cuiusdam rationis quam, facit Aristoteles, II libro De anima, dicens quod quando agens sufficienter actualis ad agendum et patiens sufficienter dispositus ad patiendum sunt sibi praesentes, semper et necessario sequitur actio, ut, quando combustivum et combustibile sunt sibi praesentia, semper fit combustio. Sed si actio cognitiva non est ab obiecto nec ab aliquo per ipsum influxo, sed est a solo cognoscente: tunc agens actum cognoscendi et recipiens sunt semper sibi praesentes, quia illa actio fit et recipitur in ipso cognoscente, ergo omnis cognitio quorumcunque obiectorum semper erit actu in ipso.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.38).

As Gonsalvus puts this objection, at one point, in terms of the will: if the will were the effective cause of its volitions, rather than external objects (or any causal impressions from them), it would seem to follow that the will would be able to will any (willable) object (i.e., infinitely many objects); thus, the will would be infinitely powerful in itself; but this is impossible, at least for us finite creatures (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, arg.2; p.28).⁶⁵

§2.2. *Olivi's Response*

§2.2.1. *The Object as Terminative and Broadly Efficient Cause*

To forestall the above objection, Olivi explicitly gives some sort of causal/explanatory role for the objects of cognition and appetite: Olivi refers to these objects, most properly, as

For the original passage from Aristotle, in a modern translation: "The power of sense is parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously, but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition; otherwise it could have set itself on fire, and would not have needed actual fire to set it ablaze." (*De anima* II.5, 417b7-9).

For more of this passage, in close paraphrase, from the Latin Averroes: "*Sed est irrationabile quare sensus non sentiunt se, et quare etiam nullus sensus agit absque extrinseco, et in eis sunt ignis et terra et alia elementa, et sunt illa que comprehenduntur a sensu per se, et accidentia contingentia eis. Dicamus igitur quod sensus non est in actu, sed tantum in potentia, et ideo non sentimus; quemadmodum combustibile non comburitur a se absque comburente; et si hoc non esset, combureret se et non indigeret quod ignis esset in actu.*" (Averroes, *Long Commentary on DA*, II, c.52; p.209).

See also, this same argument, as reported by John Duns Scotus: "*Quia [II] De anima [cap. 5] probat Philosophus sensum esse passivum, non activum, per hoc quod si esset activus, semper ageret: sicut 'si combustibile esset combustivum, semper combustibile combureret.'* Ita arguo in proposito: *si pars intellectiva esset activa respectu intellectionis, semper intelligeret, et ita sine obiecto, quod falsum est.*" (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2, arg.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.282-283; I cite from the *Opera Omnia: Editio Minor - Opera Theologica*, G. Lauriola (ed.), (Quaderno: Alberobello, 2001).

Notably, this argument seems to capture the thrust of Godfrey's initial argument, discussed above, against self-motion, insofar as both arguments claim that active and passive powers essentially differ, but an action will (only) follow (from the active power and into the passive power) when the two powers are sufficiently proximate; so, no power, insofar as it is in potency with respect to its action, is held to self-initiate its action. Indeed, in much these terms, we'll later see Scotus call this Godfrey's best ("Achilles") argument (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.304-305; see, e.g., Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; pp.151-154).

⁶⁵ "*Item, si volitio esset effective a voluntate, tunc voluntas contineret in se virtualiter volitiones omnium volibilium, quae sunt infinita vel esse possunt secundum speciem, et sic in se contineret virtualiter infinitas volitiones secundum speciem, et sic voluntas esset virtutis infinitae, quod est impossibile. Quare etc.*" (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, arg.2; p.28; cf. *Ibid.*, arg.3-5; pp.28-29).

“terminative causes” of their corresponding acts, such that an act depends on and co-operates with its object to serve as its end-point (“*terminus*”), i.e. the determinate content of the act; e.g., in his own words, Olivi says:

“Concerning [...] how an object, insofar as it terminates the gaze/orientations (*aspectūs*) and acts of the [in this context, cognitive] powers, cooperates in the specific production of them, it should be known that an object, insofar as it is such a terminus, has the *ratio* of a ‘fixive’, and ‘illapsive’, and ‘presentative’, and ‘signative’, or ‘configurative’ and ‘representative’, or ‘cognitive’ terminus. For a cognitive act and gaze is fixed on an object and intentionally has that imbibed within itself; and that object presents itself or presentationally exhibits itself to a cognitive gaze and through the act it is configured as a certain representation of it; and on account of this, the cognitive act is called an ‘apprehension’ (*apprehensio*) or an ‘apprehensive intention’ (*apprehensiva tentio*) of the object⁶⁶. [...] and so that similitude and signative expression of the object [i.e., the determinate act] is brought about. And from this, that simple essence of a cognitive act has two noble *rationes*: The first of which is a sort of ground for the second and the second of which is a sort of differential determination of the first. [...] For an act of cognition, this two-fold cause concurs [i.e., from the object and the power] [...]” (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.35-38; cf. II Sent. Q.72; III, p.10 & p.15; II Sent. Q.58, ad.3; II, p.419)⁶⁷

⁶⁶ Note that Olivi seems to either be offering a non-standard etymology here for ‘*apprehensio*’ or he is blurring the line between two different verbal connections (perhaps truly reflecting the times). Olivi seems to suggest, against current etymology, that the nominal form of the verb ‘*apprehendere*’ is related to the verb ‘*tendere*’ (to extend, to stretch, etc.) (as a noun, ‘*tentio*’), rather than more simply coming from ‘*ad*’ + ‘*prehendere*’ (to grasp, etc.), or, perhaps, he thinks, whatever the exact etymology, nevertheless all these terms have come to be associated in medieval technical usage. Given this, it’s unclear to me if one might just as well translate ‘*apprehensiva tentio*’ as an ‘apprehensive grasp’ or ‘stretching out’ (seemingly, Olivi’s point is that the cognitive power does both, metaphorically speaking).

⁶⁷ “*Circa quartum vero principale, quomodo scilicet obiectum, in quantum terminat aspectus et actus potentiarum, cooperetur specificae productioni eorum, sciendum quod obiectum, in quantum est talis terminus, habet rationem termini fixivi et illapsivi et praesentativi et sigillativi seu configurativi et repraesentativi seu cognitivi. Nam actus et aspectus cognitivus figitur in obiecto et intentionaliter habet ipsum intra se imbibitum: propter quod actus cognitivus vocatur apprehensio et apprehensiva tentio obiecti. In qua quidem tentione et imbibitione actus intime conformatur et configuratur obiecto; ipsum etiam obiectum se ipsum praesentat seu praesentialiter exhibet aspectui cognitivo et per actum sibi configuratum est quaedam repraesentatio eius. Sicut enim actualis irradiatio vasis sphaerici vel quadrati fit sphaerica vel quadrata ex hoc solo quod lux generat illam cum conformitate ad figuram sui susipientis et continentis: sic, quia vis cognitiva generat actum cognitivum cum quadam informativa imbibitione actus ad obiectum et cum quadam sigillari et viscerali tentione obiecti, idcirco eo ipso quod sic gignitur, fit ipsa similitudo et sigillaris expressio obiecti. Et ex hoc est quod simplex essentia actus cognitivi habet in se duas nobiles rationes. Quarum prima est quasi fundamentalis ad secundam et secunda est quasi differentialis determinatio primae.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.35-36). The rest of the last line comes from a few pages down, which in full continues: “*Uterius sciendum quod quia ad actum cognitivum concurrat duplex causa praedicta: idcirco experimentaliter sentimus in ipso duas rationes quasi oppositas. Nam pro quanta exit ab interno principio cognitivo, sentimus quod est actio nostra et quoddam agere nostrum a nobis exiens et quasi in obiectum tendens et*

There's a lot to take in from this passage, but the ultimate conclusion is still clear: Olivi did not and need not hold that the cognitive and appetitive powers can cognize and will/want anything, completely independently of external objects, even though he says that the powers are efficient causes "in themselves" for their acts; both power and object have their distinct causal role to play. As Olivi puts it to the above "Aristotelian" objection, more explicitly: this objection is wrong to assume that cognition is not from the object in any way, for, cognition is,

"nevertheless, from that [object] as something terminative of an active gaze (*aspectus*) and of the act itself; and to this extent it is from the object, insofar it is from an agent broadly speaking, and, thus, the presence of the object here is necessary and, beyond this, that the gaze is fixed in that [object]" (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.38-39).⁶⁸

That is, as we'll see more clearly below, not only must some object be literally present, so that it can "do something" and constrain one's cognitive act, the object must also be psychologically/consciously present so that the object can be fixed under the cognitive power's attentive gaze, such that some exact content will terminate the cognitive act. In other words, the

in illud intendens. Pro quanta vero fit ab obiecto tanquam a terminante, videtur nobis esse quasi quaedam passio ab obiecto et cum ipso obiecto intra nos illapsa, acsi ipsum obiectum esset in intima nostrae potentiae impressum et illapsum. Et propter hanc secundam experientiam moti sunt fere omnes illi qui dixerunt actus cognitivos et etiam affectivos influi et imprimi a suis obiectis immediatis, non attendentes primam experientiam cum suis fundamentalibus rationibus superius tactis et in quaestionibus sequentibus amplius tangendis, nec attendentes quomodo utraque experientia potest salvari et verificari per concursum duplicis causae et causalitatis iam praemissae." (Ibid. p.38). For further discussion of this full passage, see the other chapters of this dissertation. Note that all of this comes to fruition right below this passage, as Olivi then raises the central objection we've been considering, as mentioned above (Ibid. pp.38-39).

⁶⁸ *"Maior enim et minor huius rationis est falsa aut duplex et ideo eius duplicitas est distinguenda. Si enim sub nomine agentis non includatur aspectus ipsius in obiectum et terminati ab obiecto seu in obiecto: tunc maior et minor sunt falsa. Quamvis enim cognitio non sit ab obiecto sicut ab agente proprie sumpto, est tamen ab ipso ut terminativo aspectus activi et sui actus; et pro tanto est ab obiecto tanquam ab agente large sumpto, et ideo exigitur ibi praesentia obiecti et ultra hoc defixio aspectus in ipsum. Et ultra hoc respectu actuum liberorum sunt falsae, sicut in quaestione de libero arbitrio est sufficienter ostensum [viz. QQ.57-58]. Nec est simile de combustivo et combustibili; tum quia ibi non exigitur obiectum aliud a combustibili; tum quia aspectus combustivi super combustibile non sic variatur aut deficit ipsis compraesentibus, sicut potentia et obiecto sibi compraesentibus potest potentia cognitiva non habere aspectum defixum in obiectum; tum quia combustivum non est agens liberum nec combustio est actio libera, sicut est libera actio liberae voluntatis." (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.38-39). Note that here Olivi also objects that cognition would *always and necessarily* follow, of whatever object, all at once; in contrast, (i) an attentive gaze can vary and, (ii), a cognitive power is ultimately under control of the will. Nevertheless, I stress Olivi's point on the necessity of the object, since the initial objection I raised above already considers that one might, at least, choose to cognize this or that object.*

object must be “mentally highlighted” to have a determinate act of cognition, as it is commonly put these days⁶⁹.

Admittedly, Olivi doesn’t strictly refer to such “terminative causes” as efficient causes, especially for the reasons we’ve seen above (in particular, the objects are not sufficient to “impress” themselves on these more noble powers) (Ibid.; see also, e.g., II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.6-10). Given this, one might wonder whether Olivi is positing some completely new and obscure sort of causality to solve his problem. Indeed, John Duns Scotus, whom we will discuss more below, seems to raise this exact objection to Olivi, claiming that this sort of response would require the addition of some “fifth” cause, beyond the standard four Aristotelian causes⁷⁰.

Now, on one hand, it’s not clear that Olivi would feel the full force of this objection, at least framed as such, insofar as he holds no fealty to Aristotle’s traditional division of causes⁷¹. However, on the other hand, it should be taken seriously that Olivi does qualify that, despite his restrictions, the object is “broadly” an efficient cause. As Olivi explains, earlier in this text:

“Nevertheless, the object can, broadly, be numbered among efficient causes; for one reason, because the object, insofar as it is such a terminus or terminating thing, doesn’t have the nature of a patient, or a possible or potential entity; rather, it more so has the nature of an act and an actual being; also,

⁶⁹ For some recent discussion in contemporary analytic philosophy for such a role for conscious attention in fixing reference/aboutness, for both mental states and words, see, e.g., John Campbell (2003), Imogen Dickie (2015), and the lively literature that has sprung up around this topic.

⁷⁰ Specifically, Scotus asks how an object could be held to be only necessary under the account of a *sine qua non* cause or terminus, and not as a *per se* cause, without introducing a fifth type of causality (i.e. beyond the standard four Aristotelian causes): “*Per hoc improbantur diversi modi tenendi ponentium istam opinionem. Si enim ponatur obiectum necessarium in ratione causae ‘sine qua non’, vel in ratione termini vel in ratione excitantis, si non detur sibi aliqua ‘per se causalitas’ (cum anima semper sit in se perfecta et passo approximate), nec aliquod impedimentum de novo, remotum, quomodo salvabitur quod ipsum necessario requiritur, nisi ponendo quinque genera causarum?*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1 pp.284-285). [Note that I think some of the extra punctuation (especially the brackets) in this edition can be misleading and should be ignored.]

⁷¹ I take it that this is the response of Toivanen (2013, p.149), although opinions are mixed (see the further citations below). However, while I think this interpretation is plausible, and is at least a fallback position for Olivi, as I’ll get to, I think more can be said to fit this type of causation in, broadly, within traditional sorts of efficient causation; we can see this on the basis of Olivi’s own remarks, along with Gonsalvus’s diplomatic reception of Olivi’s view.

because the active force of a cognitive power necessarily needs such a terminus and its termination in order to produce a cognitive act, *as if* the aforesaid terminus were to impress something into the cognitive force itself and into its act.” (II Sent. Q. 72; III, p.10)⁷²

Olivi’s first reason here appears to be that the object of cognition is not the passive subject of change in an act of cognition (cognition clearly doesn’t change its object), so it cannot be a material cause for this action. Moreover, the object/terminus is also not merely a possible object, insofar as the object must be fully ‘in act’, in order to actually present itself. So, rather, it is something actual, as an efficient cause should be. Olivi’s second reason is that the object is broadly an efficient cause insofar as the object is necessary in order to complete/“terminate” an act of cognition into some object/terminus; one has to cognize *something* to truly cognize, after all. The object, in other words, is a sort of “*causa sine qua non*”, to borrow a common Scholastic term⁷³.

Olivi’s favoured analogy of a vessel terminating some rays of light gives us a way to understand what he means when he says that such a “terminative” cause is broadly, though not strictly, efficient:

“Hence, the act [of cognition or volition] is assimilated to the object as if to its intimate terminus [...]. And one can give some example of this by referring to sunlight [...]. Because when the Sun illuminates a round or triangular vessel, the light which is in the vessel has a round or triangular figure. It is not the case

⁷² As the full passage goes: “*Secundo est praenotandum quod licet obiectum, pro quanto solum terminat aspectum virtutis cognitivae et suae actualis cognitionis, non habeat simpliciter et proprie rationem efficientis, quia formalis terminatio praedicti aspectum non est aliqua essentia realiter differens ab ipso aspectu et saltem non est influxa veleducta ab obiecto, in quantum est solum terminus ipsius aspectus et actus cognitivi: nihilominus potest large connumerari inter causas efficientes; tum quia obiectum, in quantum est talis terminus vel terminans, non habet rationem patientis aut entis possibilis seu potentialis, immo potius rationem actus et entis actualis; tum quia virtus activa potentiae cognitivae sic necessario eget tali termino et eius terminatione ad hoc quod producat actum cognitivum, acsi praedictus terminus influeret aliquid in ipsam vim cognitivam et in eius actum.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 72; III, p.10).

⁷³ For a rich discussion of some different historical uses of this term in medieval philosophy, see Solère (2014) and Toth (forthcoming).

that the vessel itself efficiently produced that figure in the light, it did so only terminatively.” (II Sent. Q. 58; II, pp.414-415; cf. Q.72; III, pp.35-36)⁷⁴

That is, although the vessel doesn't produce the light or shape it actively on its own, it nevertheless does constrain how the rays of light fall. Olivi appears to be hesitant to call the vessel an “efficient (or agent) cause” in the strict sense only because, given the common Aristotelean understanding, the term is most properly meant to signify the productive force of the event (that which produces the relevant form) and that's clearly the Sun in this example (hence why Olivi says it's only “as if” the vessel were doing the “impressing”)⁷⁵. However, just because the vessel isn't a causal force like the Sun, clearly doesn't mean the vessel isn't causally relevant to explain why the light falls as it does, and Olivi recognizes that. So, the same general point holds for the object of cognition (or volition) in that, like the vessel, the object constrains how the act “falls on” and fixes itself to its object, though the cognitive power is strictly the productive force and the object impresses nothing itself (i.e. without co-operating with the power). Olivi, here, reverses the usual analogy of an object impressing some form onto the power (like a stamp onto wax), as, instead, it is the power doing the “impressing” onto its object (metaphorically speaking, to some degree, at least)⁷⁶.

⁷⁴ *“Assimilatur igitur actus obiecto tamquam suo intimo termino [...]. Et potest huius dari quaecunque exemplum in lumine solis [...]. Cum enim sol illuminat unum vas rotundum aut triangulare, lumen quod est in vase habet figuram rotundam vel triangularem, non quod ipsum vas effective produxerit in eo hunc figuram, sed solum terminative”.* (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 58; II, pp.414-415). Note that this example is also used in the full passage from Q.72 at the beginning of this section, though in more condensed form: *“Sicut enim actualis irradiatio vasis sphaerici vel quadrati fit sphaerica vel quadrata ex hoc solo quod lux generat illam cum conformitate ad figuram sui susipientis et continentis.”* (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 72; III, p.36).

⁷⁵ As we'll see below, despite the ubiquity and primacy of this strict notion of an efficient cause, there is also a wider notion of an efficient cause in medieval Aristotelianism, at least for sub-ordinate causation.

⁷⁶ See Silva (2019) for more on the history of such reverse analogies, such as, e.g., a “living wax” forming itself to a sigil or a chameleon changing its own colours to match its surroundings.

§2.2.2. *Objection and Response: Deflating the Causal Role of the Object?*

However, one might wonder whether Olivi means to give such a substantial causal role for the object of cognition when he calls it a terminative “cause”. At least at one point, Olivi refers to terminative causation as a sort of final cause, at least more properly speaking (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.36-37)⁷⁷. As scholars have noted, Scholastics often spoke of an object intended as a final cause where the object is trivially a “cause” insofar as it is what is cognized and desired (i.e., what would complete the act). Moreover, if the object were such a final cause, it would seem that the external object cannot, in general, be an efficient cause, since this object might not even exist or be present, as with a future or distant object/state intended⁷⁸. So, similarly, someone might read the above passage on the “necessary” causal role of the object of cognition differently. Perhaps Olivi isn’t saying a given, causally efficacious, actual external object is necessary for cognition, he’s just saying that, trivially speaking, determinate cognition needs an intentional object, the object insofar as it is cognized, and this can be satisfied so long as the act ends up internally configured to fit with some possible object, whether or not that object is actually existent and there to causally constrain the power (in some broadly efficient manner)⁷⁹.

⁷⁷ *“Supposito igitur quod hae duae rationes non sint duae essentiae realiter diversae, sed solum una, tunc ambae fiunt a vi cognitiva sicut ab agente, et iterum ambae fiunt ab obiecto sicut a terminante; nam prima ratio actus praedicti ita parum potest fieri sine obiecto sicut secunda. Potest autem causa obiectiva proprie poni in genere causae finalis aut, si propriori nomine vis eam vocare, vocetur causa terminativa. Sicut enim causa materialis habet vere rationem causae respectu educti ex ea vel recepti in ea, quamvis non sit proprie causa efficiens eius: sic causa terminativa habet vere rationem causae, quamvis non sit proprie causa efficiens actionis terminatae in ipsa.”* (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 72; III, pp.36-37).

⁷⁸ See, e.g., the texts cited and discussion in Pasnau (2001).

⁷⁹ Adriaenssen (2011) seems to have this interpretation for Olivi given that he posits that only internal characteristics matter for determining an act of cognition for Olivi. Moreover, Pasnau (1997, p.171) seems to take Olivi seriously in calling the object a final cause; on the other hand, in the same text, Pasnau’s interpretation of Olivi’s theory of representation-fixing seems to depend on the object also being an efficient cause (see, e.g., Pasnau 1997, pp.119-120). Toivanen (2013, p.149), in contrast, presents reasons to be doubtful that Olivi has the normal sense of a “final cause” in mind and he is also skeptical of considering Olivi’s “terminative cause” as a sort of efficient causation; thus, he is ready to simply allow that Olivi posits a new type of causality. Although I think

In other words, it's clear enough from the above passage (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.35-39) that Olivi is expanding upon the question "from what comes about cognition", such that the object is not simply meant to play a causal role in "triggering"/eliciting an act of cognition; on its own, the object cannot even do this, hence Olivi says that the cognitive power is the proper efficient cause. So, it seems reasonable that, rather than simply play the role of such an eliciting cause, Olivi thinks the object plays a causal role in fixing/determining the aboutness, representationality, intentionality, etc. (or whatever you wish to call it) of a cognitive act into its given object. As I bring up in my introductory chapter, it's become traditional in the secondary literature to distinguish these two causal questions, such that the former ("from what comes about cognition?") is strictly about the *activity/passivity* of the cognitive (or appetitive) power (i.e., "what is the effective cause of the power's act?"), while the latter question (concerning what "fixes" cognition) is about the source of *specific intentionality* or *representation-fixing* for the power's act (e.g., "for what reason is an act of sensation an act about (*this*) orange quality/object?")⁸⁰. It's clear that Olivi is also engaging with the latter question insofar as he

there's something plausible in all of these accounts, I don't think Olivi is inherently opposed to calling the object an efficient cause, in a broad sense; and at the very least, Gonsalvus makes this explicit, while taking up essentially the same *Fully Active View* of cognition/volition as does Olivi.

⁸⁰ More specifically, I break this second question into two, and also add a third:

Question 1: From what, as an effective principle, do (basic) acts of cognition originate? Do, e.g., external objects (perhaps *via* intermediary representations) cause these acts (based on some passive reception in the given cognitive power) or does the given cognitive soul/power itself actively cause its acts of cognition? [Call this the issue of the *passivity/activity* of cognition.]

Question 2: In virtue of what do (basic) acts of cognition have their, to put it in a few ways, intentionality, aboutness, representationality, reference, content, or awareness? To break this question down further:

Question 2a: In virtue of what do these acts of cognition have their intentionality, etc., in general? That is, in virtue of what do I cognize anything at all, as opposed to nothing? To consider a few options, is this intentionality basic/intrinsic to the cognitive powers or do "intentions"/representations exist mind-independently/externally, though they may be ultimately received in one's cognitive powers? [Call this the *general problem of intentionality*.]

Question 2b: In virtue of what is any given act of cognition fixed/determined to the (intentional) object which it represents, in particular? In virtue of what, e.g., am I seeing (this) orange (in this cat), as opposed to some other object? To consider some typical answers, is it because this object is what caused this given act of cognition, because this object and this act of cognition are sufficiently "similar" (in form), or through some (or no) other reason? [Call this the *specific problem of intentionality* or *the problem of representation-fixing*.]

speaks of the object/terminus as “fixive”, “signative”, “representative”, etc., with the result being an act of cognition which is a “representation”, “similitude”, etc. of its object.

One might raise an objection here, however, with two more steps, which I take Adriaenssen (2011), for one recent example, to follow. First, one might take it that, not only does Olivi distinguish these two questions, Olivi is completely shifting the causal role of the object to answer the second question and not the first (Adriaenssen 2011, pp.324-325)⁸¹; thus, the cognitive power can be the sole effective cause, to answer the first question, while the object’s role as a “terminative cause” is to answer a separate question (the second question above). Second, to back up this distinction, one might also take it that answering the second question does not even require the object to play any (broadly efficient) causal role at all; a “terminative cause”, one might add, is a purely psychological notion and one that requires no real causal co-operation with an object, at any point. Adriaenssen (2011) seems to think this, given that his ultimate view is that an act of cognition becomes fixed to its object/terminus simply in virtue of

Question 3: Under the assumption that acts of cognition represent external objects, do these acts themselves sufficiently represent their objects (when present) or does the cognitive power itself require pre-induced representations, distinct from the acts themselves, to mediate its access to external objects? Would the latter even give a cognitive power “access” to external objects? E.g. does a cognitive power require distinct, pre-induced *species* in it to gain access to the external world or can an object be sufficiently present in an act of cognition if just “outside” the power/soul. [Call this *the problem of direct vs. indirect realism, or, the threat of (epistemic) idealism*] [As I say in my introductory chapter, I take it that Olivi treats Questions 1 and 2a as more-or-less equivalent, or at least deeply tied together, in that at least one of the main reasons why the cognitive power must be the primary efficient cause of its acts is that it has a role to play given its intrinsic sort of intentionality/attentiveness in cognition; this passage from Olivi here, I take it, justifies that point, in that the object is said to play a broadly effective causal role to determine the act in particular (to answer Question 2b) while the power has a primary effective causal role to as a ground/general attention for this determination.]

⁸¹ Adriaenssen, similarly, raises the two questions, specifically for sensation: “The first question was, bluntly put, how the perceptual representations in the sensory soul originate (assuming that they are not innate). The second question was how, granted that the sensory soul processes perceptual representations, these representations represent what they do. In other words, what is so special about the representation that is currently processed by your sensory soul in virtue of which it is a representation of this page rather than anything else?” (Adriaenssen 2011, pp.324-325).

becoming an internal “likeness”/similitude of its object⁸²; no (broadly efficient) causal connection to an external object is required: as Adriaenssen puts it, “an act of cognition represents the individual because it mimics and assimilates itself to the individual” (Adriaenssen 2011, p.345). To explain his view, Adriaenssen also uses the above analogy of light “fixing” and “assimilating” itself to some object’s shape, but he takes it that all that’s required here is that the light indeed ends up shaped in some way, whether or not an external object/vessel is even there to do this (perhaps God stops the rays of light, instead); an act of cognition, following this analogy, need only be “this object” shaped (metaphorically speaking) (Ibid. p.343-345). Of course, an act of cognition will not become literally “like” its object/terminus, so I take it that Adriaenssen believes the above light example to be only a pure metaphor.

However, I don’t think this counter-proposal makes much sense of Olivi’s claim that an object, at least initially, needs to be *actual* to *present itself* and fix/terminate the act of cognition. Indeed, Olivi is clear in multiple places that in basic/direct cognition, the object itself must necessarily be *present*, in actuality: e.g., Olivi says it is the “essence of vision” (perceptual cognition) that the things seen be “immediately present”⁸³, he argues that common *indirect realist* views would be absurd precisely because they would allow for cognition without external

⁸² Perhaps this is not a literal “likeness” between the object and cognitive act (e.g., a sensation of a blue object does not seem to be itself blue), but one might at least hold that the content of the cognitive act must be similar to some specific object (i.e., there must be some fit between what the act purports to represent and some real world object). Adriaenssen (2011) himself takes the view that, for Olivi, for an act to be “similar” to some object simply means that the act represents the object (though not through any intermediate “representation”, unless the object is absent).

⁸³ “[D]e essentia visionis est quod sit immediate praesens rebus visis.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 36; I, p.649).

objects⁸⁴, and he quite directly puts the necessity for an intentional object of cognition in terms of an *actual* and *present* object for basic/direct acts of cognition. On this last point, recall the passage above, where Olivi first says that an object is a broadly efficient cause insofar as it must be active/actual, not merely passive/possible. Moreover, consider the following relevant passage:

“Every gaze/attention (*aspectus*) directed toward an object necessarily has its terminus in something. For one cannot attend to (*aspicit*) nothing nor have a terminus in nothing. Also, that in which [the *aspectus*] is terminated must be *present* to it, so that the gaze/attention itself attains it virtually.” (II Sent. Q. 74; III, p.115)⁸⁵

Even in the case of derived/indirect cognition, when the ultimate object of cognition is absent, Olivi still says some present object is necessary in its place. As Olivi continues from the passage above:

“But when we cognize something that is not actual (or, if it is, is not present to our gaze/attention), then the gaze/attention cannot be fixed to and terminated in that thing. Therefore, in that case some image of the thing must be exposed to the gaze/attention and be its terminus.” (Ibid.)⁸⁶

So, that is, it’s clear that Olivi specifically says the direct “terminus” of cognition has to be literally present, as cognition works by fixing itself to some present object to provide its content. So, when (indirectly) cognizing an absent object, one’s immediate terminus of cognition must be some stand-in representation like a physical image (e.g., a painting), some leftover sensory image in imagination, or some intellectual memory; most properly speaking, it’s one of the latter

⁸⁴ As mentioned above, this pertains to the third major question tied up in this debate. For this same point, see, Pini (2011); for further discussion, see, e.g., Martin, (2019), especially, pp.310-312, and elsewhere in this dissertation.

⁸⁵ “[O]mnis aspectus ad obiectum directus terminatur necessario in aliquot, non enim potest aspicere nihil nec terminatur sibi sit praesens, ita quod virtualiter attingatur ab ipso aspectu.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 74; III, p.115).

⁸⁶ “Sed cum cogitamus aliquam rem quae non est actu, aut si est, non est nostro aspectui praesens: tunc aspectus non potest figi et terminari in illa. Ergo oportet quod aliqua rei imago obiciatur tunc aspectui et terminet ipsum.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 74; III, p.115).

objects one is cognizing in these cases, for Olivi (II Sent. Q. 74; III, pp.115-116). So, Olivi concludes, in these cases an object “truly co-operates in the production of that act” (Ibid.)⁸⁷.

Moreover, for such indirect cognition, Olivi even thinks that the external object (at least once present) is necessary for cognition in the sense that, e.g., the memory “*species*” one immediately cognizes then refers to its end object because that end object was once present and co-operated in the causing of the act of cognition in the first place. As Olivi says:

“The memory *species* left by such an act has this [determination to an object] as a result of the act itself by which it has been caused and which it expresses, in as much as that act is or was terminated in such an object.” (II Sent. Q. 72, III, p.37; cf. Q.74; III, pp.115-116).⁸⁸

That is, the memory image represents the object of the act which initially caused the memory (which initial act represents whatever object it was causally terminated in); so, the memory’s representation seems to be accounted for in causal terms, similar to how a photograph is often said to represent the object which co-operated in its production⁸⁹.

In sum, I take it that when Olivi speaks of cognition necessarily requiring a present object, most strictly as a “terminative” cause, he is elaborating on his point discussed above that the object of cognition (or volition) is “broadly” an efficient cause of the act, though in a

⁸⁷ “[O]biectum, in quantum terminans aspectum potentiae et eius actum, vere cooperatur ad productionem ipsius actus, ita quod impossibile est ipsum fieri absque tali cooperatione.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 74; III, p.115).

⁸⁸ “*Species vero memorialis ex tali actu relicta habet hoc ex ipso actu a quo est causata et quem exprimit, prout ipse actus est vel fuit in tale obiectum terminatus.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 72, III, p.37; cf. Q.74; III, pp.115-116).

⁸⁹ For a similar remark on this passage, see Pasnau (1997, p.120). Note that my overall interpretation of Olivi, nevertheless, seems to diverge from that of Pasnau (1997). In short, Pasnau seems to claim that the external object, what Pasnau calls the “bare causal facts”, does *all* of the work in fixing the representationality of an act of cognition to some object, ignoring any substantial role for the internal “assimilation” of a power to its object (Pasnau 1997, pp.119-120); however, on my interpretation, between the extremes of Pasnau (1997) and Adriaenssen (2011), both internal and external factors play a part in representation-fixing for Olivi, as I discuss more elsewhere in an unpublished manuscript, “Peter John Olivi on Reference-fixing in Cognition” (presented to a few different venues, at least).

subordinate sense. This is, indeed, to fix the representationality of an act of cognition, but so much is necessary to have a determinate act of cognition, hence the object answers the broad question “from what comes about cognition”, in conjunction with a cognitive power, and broadly *effectively*.

Moreover, I take it that Olivi’s favoured light example above is, in some sense, meant to be a literal example of such “terminative” causality as well, so Olivi isn’t completely shifting the debate to some psychological notion, even if the psychological sort of “termination” is special. After all, in the natural order, light will require such termination in an actual object to take such a shape; one might reasonably take it then that the object’s role is “broadly” effective insofar as the object piggybacks on the primary efficient causation, the light source, to reach its effect (light shaped as such). Thus, analogously, the object of cognition plays a “broadly” effective causal role. This, I think, makes better sense of this light example than Adriaenssen’s (2011) account does.⁹⁰

⁹⁰ Exactly how the cognitive power causally co-operates with its object is, as yet, less clear, but Olivi has more to say on that. In the afterlife and for other purely spiritual beings, Olivi’s answer might yet be that the soul just does “spiritually” reach out (in some extended sense of the word). In this life though, it’s worth considering that, along with that of a “terminative cause”, another key notion to understand Olivi’s position is that of a “mode of connection” or “*colligantia*” which he posits between the spirit/soul and its body (and changes therein from external objects); I explain this notion more in Martin (2019, pp.326-331).

In fact, when summarizing the core of his view, Olivi occasionally goes so far as to say that, whenever one doesn’t actively will to cognize, it is this connection with the body that is the efficient cause of cognition (I take it, nevertheless, through the cognitive power as the more direct effective cause): “*Si autem quaeras a quo sit tanquam a causa efficiente: patet quod vel a voluntate potentias movente vel aliquando per naturalem colligantiam fit ab aliquo motu vel mutatione sui organi vel totius corporis.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.73; III, p.66). Recall, from above, that Olivi even introduced his *Fully Active View*, in full dress, in Q.72, by admitting that the object can play an indirect role in cognition “*sed solum per modum colligantiae et per modum termini obiectivi.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 72; III, p.15).

§2.2.3. *Objection and Response #2: Olivi Against Causal Co-operation?*

Coming from another direction, one might object that Olivi is not entirely consistent on the causal co-operation of object and power. Despite the frequent claims we've seen above, especially from II Sent. QQ.72-74, that the object is “broadly an efficient cause” and “truly co-operates in the production” of an act of cognition (or appetite), there are places where, at least on the face of it, Olivi objects to any such causal co-operation. In particular, in his parallel discussion, in II Sent. Q.58, along with the competing *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views* we've seen above (drawn from Q.72), that an act of cognition comes about sufficiently from an object, or from a *species* impressed in the cognitive power, or from some sort of excitation, Olivi also considers another view, explicitly distinguished from the rest, where an act of a cognitive (or appetitive) power, comes about “partly from those *species* and partly from those powers” (II Sent. Q.58; II, p.463, pp.466-470)⁹¹; moreover, Olivi proceeds to object to this view and

⁹¹ In full, Olivi lists seven views (five of which, are stated by negation, two of which, in bold, he endorses): “[P]rimum est quod actus potentiarum non sunt immediate ab obiectis. – Secundum est quod non sunt a solis speciebus. – Tertium est quod non partim ab eis et partim a potentiis. – **Quartum est quod ipsi actus sunt vere species et similitudes.** – Quintum est quod anima non potest in se generare tales species per quas producat actus suos, et multo minus quod nec obiecta hoc possunt. – Sextum est quod potentiae non possunt excitari ab obiectis ad generandum huiusmodi species aut ad producendum suos actus. – **Septimum vero est quod potentiae sunt de se et per se sufficientes ad hoc ut sint aut esse possint principia effectiva suorum actuum absque aliqua cooperatione seu coefficientia facta ab obiectis vel a speciebus.**” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.463). The other additional view, not explicitly stated in Q.72, which Olivi denies in Q.58, states that, rather than directly from the object, a power produces its own *species*/representation in the power (or, more absurdly, produces its external object), distinct and prior to its proper act; Olivi goes on to point out the obvious circularity/redundancy in this view. Interestingly, Olivi here devotes a section for the positive view, relevant to more than one of the other views, that any “*similitude*” first formed in the power would just be the act itself (though Olivi clearly allows for leftover similitudes as well, as we’ll see).

The third view denied here, in Q.58, that an act comes partly from the power and partly from the *species*, is perhaps, at least in one form, considered in Q.72, insofar as Olivi considers (and denies) that cognition is sufficiently brought about from a *species*/object, in conjunction with an illumination from a distinct agent sense or agent intellect (e.g., the agent intellect acts on a phantasm so that the phantasm can act on the (passive) intellect). (I discuss Olivi on such “agent” powers more in the next chapter.)

Looking ahead to later in this chapter, we might file this third view under the more naïve model of instrumental causation, where one thing gives a power of acting to the other, in this case to act back on the first agent, which Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus all find ill-fitting for the matter at hand (at least, as a sufficient explanation for the production of a cognitive act).

conclude that these powers “have in themselves a sufficient active power for their acts, without any cooperation or, in other words, (*seu*) co-efficiency produced by the objects or *species*” (Ibid. p.477)⁹². Now, it’s worth considering whether Olivi is simply genuinely inconsistent (especially given the exploratory nature of his approach), or whether he has changed his mind between these questions (reportedly written some time apart, and with other differences, at least in tone, one can see, as well). Nevertheless, let me briefly explore at least some room for consistency here, especially to defend the view I favour, that the relevant powers and objects are in fact co-operating causes, with the object a broadly efficient cause, according to Olivi⁹³. In short, I think that Olivi’s main point of contention in these quoted passages isn’t so much with all theories of broadly efficient, causal co-operation, but more so with certain, more naïve, theories of causal co-operation, where both co-operants are full-fledged efficient causes, and more so with the *species* (as construed by prior *Middle Views*) as cooperant, than the object.

For starters, in Olivi’s initial objection to the view that the power and *species* are each partial causes, Olivi asks how the two things will co-operate to result in one simple effect, especially since acts of sensation and intellection, or at least many of them, according to Olivi, are simple entities (Ibid. p.466)⁹⁴. By this, Olivi means, a simple act of sensing orange or

⁹² “*Septimum autem, quod scilicet potentiae habent per se sufficientem virtutem activam suorum actuum absque aliqua cooperatione seu coefficientia facta ab obiectis vel a speciebus, sic probant [...].*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.477).

⁹³ Moreover, against the claim that Olivi changes his mind, it should be mentioned that, although II Sent. Q.72 doesn’t sharply distinguish the partial co-efficient cause view, II Sent. Q.74 does and, as we’ll see, comes to a fairly similar conclusion as Q.58 (II Sent. Q.74; pp.108-109, pp.127-130, pp.133-135).

⁹⁴ “*Tertium autem, quod scilicet non sint partim ab ipsis speciebus et partim a potentiis, hoc modo probant: Quia cum actus intelligendi et sentiendi sint simplices et ad minus non sint compositi ex essentiis diversarum specierum et generum et multo minus sint compositi ex diversis actionibus, cum actio non sit tale ens quod cum alia actione possit proprie concurrere ad constituendam unam tertiam essentiam, non possunt autem esse partim a potentia et partim a speciebus, quin haec omnia eis contingant, quia tunc unam partem accipient a potentia et aliam a*

thinking of felinity is not composed of multiple acts, as is an act of syllogizing. However, if a *species* imparts one action, and the cognitive power imparts another action, at least on one straightforward interpretation, the joint action, i.e., the act of cognition, will simply be some composite of the two; that is, this will be so in every case, even for “simple” acts, but such acts cannot be so composed to be simple. So, an inconsistency looms.

However, one might rather think, to offer another model of joint action, that the *species* co-operates by imparting some first effect (e.g., on the cognitive power), by which effect the power goes into its own simple action second, with the two actions combining into one effect, as with two sailors pulling on a ship for one shared motion in the ship. Moreover, at least on the face of it, this seems to be a more promising way to interpret prior *Middle Views* of cognition, where, by way of some impressed *species*, a power can then go into act, second, as a moved mover. However, Olivi pre-empts this sort of response, saying that, even if one wanted this sort of *Middle View*, where the *species* acts first, and then the power second, for one motion, it will be unlike the two sailors, for:

“[...] that [effect] which that power here will make through itself, it [the power] will be able to make without a *species*, since at least to that extent it [the power] will have a sufficient *ratio* of an active principle. For it cannot be said that, in the same way that, from two acts of pulling a ship, made from two people pulling it, one motion will follow, such that from one of those [two] alone it would not be able to follow, so it is the case for the matter at hand, since an act of intellection is the first action of some power of the agent, not made through any preceding act of pulling. However, although one of the pullers alone is not able to move the ship, it is possible that one puller make her first motion without the other.” (Ibid. pp.466-467)⁹⁵.

speciebus quae non habent idem genus cum potentia, et illud etiam quod ab utroque accipiet, actio erit.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.466).

⁹⁵ “*Praeterea, illud quod per se faciet ibi ipsa potentia, poterit facere absque specie, quia quantum ad illud habebit sufficientem rationem principii activi. Non enim potest dici quod sicut a duobus impulsibus navis factis a duobus impellentibus eam sequitur unus motus, ita quod ab uno illorum solo non posset sequi, quod sic sit in proposito; quia actus intelligendi est prima actio alicuius virtutis agentis non facta per aliquem praecedentem impulsus. Licet*

That is, I take it, Olivi's point is that this simple model of joint action, as with two sailors pulling a ship, might make sense of a sort-of joint motion, however, the joint action of a power and *species* is relevantly disanalogous. First off, the sailors are symmetric causes in that both can have some sort of effect on their own, pulling on the ship, and perhaps even moving it a little, without the other acting. Second, neither sailor needs to act on the other so that one can have their own effect (at least some sort of impulse) without the other. However, in contrast, Olivi contends that a cognitive power and a *species* (if we grant such entities), would have to be asymmetric causes. First off, the cognitive power and *species* would have different sorts of effects, where the *species* moves the power but only the cognitive power has the direct effect of cognition (this much must be in its own nature, after all). Second, this model is not even in line with the traditional *Middle View*, since, on that view, the cognitive power is first acted on/elicited by the *species* to have its own effect, but, in the case of the two sailors, neither needs to act on the other.

To add to Olivi's point, as he and Scotus touch on elsewhere, the joint action of the two sailors is clearly dissimilar to the case at hand since the two causes (the sailors) are equally principal, such that if one were just stronger, she could act alone; but clearly no one holds this of the *species* for an act of cognition, such that it could be equally principal with the power to act alone, if the *species* were just more perfect in itself⁹⁶.

autem unus impellentium solus non posset navem movere, potest tamen primam impressionem sui impulsus absque altero facere. " (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, pp.466-467).

⁹⁶ This is point is more clearly articulated by Scotus, as we'll see below. Olivi simply denies that anyone would hold that a power and *species/habitus* are equally principal in cognition/appetite: "*quia si haberent rationem plurium agentium, tunc aut unum eorum esset principale et aliud instrumentale aut omnia essent aequae principalia. Hoc autem ultimum nemo dat nec dare debet.*" (Olivi, II Sent. Q.74; III, p.127)

So far, these are some fairly simple models for causal co-operation, rather unlike the asymmetric view we've seen above, from Olivi, where the cognitive power is the proper, more principal, effective cause and the object is the secondary, terminative, broadly efficient cause, in the production of a simple act of cognition. However, to be fair, Olivi goes on to consider some more promising models for causal co-operation for the *species* (note, to foreshadow: not the object) and the power. As Olivi puts it first, "perhaps it will be said that the *species* is required as a certain sort of disposition of that power, without which (*sine qua*) the power cannot act, and to this extent they do not have the *ratio* of two principals of acting, only of one complete [agent, i.e., as the power so disposed]"; that is, in this way we can have the above *Middle View*, where the power acts as a moved mover, though unlike the two sailors model; or second, perhaps it will be said that the *species* is required only to serve as a representation required for an act of cognition, "and so in that way it would be said that the act of cognition is from the *species*"; or third, perhaps the *species* will be said to be a proximate and instrumental agent for the production of the act, while the power "has the *ratio* of a principal or remote agent applying the *species* to the act" (II Sent. Q.58; II, p.467)⁹⁷. So, on all three models the cognitive power and *species* will be asymmetric causes, unlike with the two sailors pulling a ship.

However, in response to the first two views, Olivi objects on the grounds that such a *species*, as a prior disposition/habit or mediating representation, is unnecessary when the object itself is present before the cognitive power (Ibid. pp.467-470). Against the first view, e.g., Olivi

⁹⁷ "Forte dicetur quod *species* exigitur tanquam quaedam dispositio ipsius potentiae sine qua potentia non potest agere, et ita non habent rationem duorum principiorum agentium, sed solum unius completi. Aut poterit dici quod *species* exigitur ad repraesentandum obiectum ipsi potentiae, ut scilicet sit ratio eius repraesentativa, ad quam repraesentationem potentia possit exire in actum cognoscendi et non aliter, et quod pro tanto dicatur esse actus cognoscendi ab ipsa specie, quia eius repraesentatio praeexigitur ad productionem ipsius. Aut forte dicetur quod potentia habet rationem principalis seu remoti agentis applicantis speciem ad actum, species vero rationem agentis proximi et immediati." (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.467).

admits that the cognitive powers can take on habits/dispositions, that they can act together with the power as one single agent for one simple effect, and that they are necessary to cognize more quickly, easily, and perfectly. However, according to Olivi, (i) one can still cognize without such habits/dispositions, just not so perfectly; and, so, Olivi claims, such habits/dispositions are not what others usually call a “*species*” (insofar as a “*species*” is taken to be a truly necessary pre-induced disposition, as, it seems, the typical *Middle View* requires). Moreover, (ii), conversely, such habits/dispositions, which Olivi allows for, are, rather, generated and augmented from initial and repeated acts of cognition; they come after, not prior to, acts of cognition (Ibid. p.467)⁹⁸.

Note that, even with all this being said, Olivi isn’t against this sort of effective causal co-operation between a cognitive disposition/habit and a power in principle; in fact, Olivi even admits such effective causal co-operation, after we’ve built up our cognitive dispositions/habits. Rather, Olivi’s point is just that he thinks such dispositions/habits are not necessary for basic acts of cognition, and this is one way in which *species* are commonly construed by his prior opponents⁹⁹.

⁹⁸ “*Sed isti contra primum arguunt sic: Quia ad minus secundum hanc viam sequetur quod sola virtus activa ipsius potentiae sit causa effectiva ipsius actus, licet hoc non sit nisi prout est sub tali dispositione. - Praeterea in virtutibus activis non exigitur ad aliud dispositio nisi ad coaptandum eas ad agendum debite et expedite, unde et sine habitu aliquid agunt et agree possunt, etsi non ita perfecte. Sed species non dicit tale quid, cum non dicat nisi solam similitudinem obiecti nec ponitur ista de causa a ponentibus ipsas species, sed potius quia actus diversarum specierum nolunt posse produci nisi a principiis diversarum specierum et quia volunt quod omnis cognitio sit per quandam assimilationem ad rem cognitam. Et si tale quid diceret, tunc posset aliqua cognosci sine speciebus, etsi non ita perfecte. Praeterea, dispositiones seu habitus remanet post actus et generantur et augmentantur ex actibus.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.467).

⁹⁹ See also II Sent. Q.74, where Olivi does not deny the need for habits for special purposes, such as for moral and intellectual perfection; moreover, Olivi says they do necessarily “co-operate”, in a broadly effective manner, but Olivi prefers to say this action follows as from one complete agent (i.e., the power so disposed to act, akin to a sword so sharpened to cut) rather than as multiple (I take it, disjointed) agents (e.g., Olivi, II Sent. Q.74; III, pp.127-130, pp.133-135).

Olivi also considers whether one might, instead, take such *species* to be necessary in a different way, as pre-induced representations or *similitudes*, akin to those “images” formed in memory, which Augustine speaks of. However, as Olivi understands it, this would be to opt for the second asymmetric view, mentioned above, such that the *species* would not so much play the role of an effective principle but more so that of an object/terminus (Ibid. pp.467-468)¹⁰⁰. More importantly, against such a second view of mediating *species*, Olivi launches into his well-known *direct realist* arguments, not strictly against the effective causal role *species* might play, but more against the role *species* are supposed to play in giving us epistemic access to external objects¹⁰¹. E.g., here Olivi makes his famous remark that if such a mediating *species* is taken to be a sort of internal object, like an inner image, interposed between the power and object, then one would more properly cognize this internal image than any external object, and so, rather, “that [*species*] would more so veil the thing from being seen (*aspici*) as present in itself than aid in this” (Ibid. p.469)¹⁰². Moreover, Augustine’s aforementioned memory images are not *pre-induced species*, as this sort of *Middle View* would require, as memory images are formed after initial acts of cognition, just as are built up cognitive dispositions. As we’ve seen above, Olivi

¹⁰⁰ “Sed illae species quae ponuntur esse principia effectiva et immediata ac tuum cognitivorum non durant secundum Augustinum, nisi quamdiu durat actus, nec generantur aut augmentantur ex actibus, licet illae quae sunt in memoria hoc habeant, Quae non tenent rationem principii effectivi immediati ipsorum actuum, sed potius rationem obiecti, unde et intellectus convertit se ad ea sicut ad obiecta. Ergo etc.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, pp.467-468).

¹⁰¹ See the Q.3, of the three major questions which are tied up in this overall debate by Olivi, as mentioned above and in my introductory chapter.

¹⁰² “Praeterea, nulla species ita repraesentat obiectum sicut ipsummet obiectum repraesentat se ipsum; ergo quando aspectus potentiae praesentialissime figetur in ipso obiecto, non oportebit quod per aliud sibi repraesentetur quam per semetipsum, immo si aliquid aliud interponeretur inter aspectum potentiae et ipsum obiectum, illud potius velaret rem et impediret eam praesentialiter aspici in se ipsa quam ad hoc adiuveret.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.469). I discuss this part of Olivi’s overall cognitive theory more elsewhere, and indeed it has been discussed plenty in the secondary literature as well (see, e.g., Pasnau 1997, Perler 2002, Lička 2019).

takes it be sufficient for the cognitive act and gaze itself to represent its object, so long as some object is present before the power and the power fixes itself to its object.

So, Olivi is not opposed to a model of causal co-operation between the power and *object* (whether the external object is present in itself or only through a memory image), he's just opposed to the necessity of *pre-induced species*/representations to play this role, as commonly construed. This, again, is consistent with what we've seen before on the co-operation between object and power. In fact, in this model, Olivi even appears to invoke his technical notion of a terminative cause, which, in basic acts of cognition, should apply to the external object (and, in indirect cognition, for memory images).

Finally, Olivi comes to the third, asymmetric, causal model proposed above, where the *species* is indeed an effective principle, but an instrumental one, with the cognitive power as the more principal agent. Here things get a bit more interesting. As we'll see with Gonsalvus and Scotus, the idea that the *species* (or, object) is an instrumental (or "*quasi-instrumental*") cause has legs. However, Olivi takes a restrictive view of what such instrumental causal co-operation looks like; as Olivi says, on this model, "every principal agent has a proper action through which an instrumental agent moves/brings about (*moveret*) that which (*quod*) does not follow from the principal agent in the way that heat follows from fire" (II Sent. Q.58; II, p.470)¹⁰³. That is, unlike fire, which can immediately bring about heat without any intermediate agent, a principal cause

¹⁰³ "[...] *omne principale agens habeat actionem propriam per quam moveret agens instrumentale, quod non resultat ab agente principali, sicut calor resultat ab igne [...]*" (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.470).

Note that the '*quod*' here might either refer to some thing which the instrumental agent more immediately acts on or to the effect/state of affairs that the instrumental agent more directly brings about; the latter at least makes sense of the hypothetical case below, where the *species*, as instrumental agent, acts back on the intellect, which also happens to be the principal agent.

cannot bring about its ultimate effect without an instrumental agent; nevertheless, a principal cause can at least immediately give an instrumental agent its power of acting and, thus, can act mediately on something else by way of the instrument. This sort of instrumental causation is exemplified in the use of a sword (the instrumental agent) by a hand (the more principal agent); as Olivi says explicitly elsewhere, this causal model is clear in “the hand which injures something through a sword wielded by the hand” (see also, Aristotle’s famous example of the hand which moves the stick which moves the stone) (II Sent. Q.74; III, p.127)¹⁰⁴.

However, in both of these places (Q.58 & Q.74), Olivi states that this model of causal cooperation would not fit for the cognitive power and the *species*/habit. As Olivi explains, on this model, the cognitive power’s proper action would be to impart some motion to the *species*, as instrument, so that the *species*, more immediately, would then elicit the cognitive act of the power, as the more remote agent (a sort of circular motion from the power to the *species* then back to the power); however, Olivi is at a loss for what movement the cognitive power would impart to the *species* as an initial action (II Sent. Q.58; II, p.470)¹⁰⁵. First off, “the first and more

¹⁰⁴ “*Si autem primum detur, tunc aut habitus est principale agens et potentia instrumentale aut e contrario. Et quodcunque horum detur, oportet quod principale habeat unam aliquam actionem, per quam moveat agens instrumentale, et quod istud ut sic motum agat aliam actionem sibi propriam, sicut patet, cum manus per ensem a manu vibratum vulnerat aliquid. Patet autem quod haec non possunt in potentia cognitiva et suis habitibus dari.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.74; III, p.127).

¹⁰⁵ As the full passage goes: “*Tertium autem sic improbant: Quia cum omne principale agens habeat actionem propriam per quam movet agens instrumentale, quod non resultat ab agente principali, sicut calor resultat ab igne, tunc oportebit quod potentia quae hic ponitur pro agente principali habeat aliquam actionem per quam moveat ipsam speciem ad actionem immediate eliciendam ab ipsa specie. Haec autem esse non possunt, quia primus et proprius actus potentiae est apprehensio seu cognitio, nec alius actus potest sibi attribui, nisi forte quod converteret se ad obiectum, quod nulla potentia potest facere nisi sola voluntas, quia nulla praeter ipsam potest se ipsam movere, et praeterea species haec non potest fieri in potentia, nisi ipsa primo fuerit se ad obiectum conversa. Ad hoc etiam quod species moveretur a potentia oporteret quod species diceret ens mobile et tale quod posset moveri et applicari ab ipsa potentia. Et tamen concessis istis omnibus eo ipso quo actus intelligendi poneretur immediate et totaliter elici ab ipsa specie, quamvis ab ea produci non posset nisi ut applicata et mota a potentia, eo, inquam, ipso staret adhuc maior pars praemissarum rationum quae factae sunt contra positionem huiusmodi specierum.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.470)

proper action of the power is”, more simply, “apprehension or cognition” (Ibid.). So, this wouldn’t do anything to the *species*, and moreover, this action is what we want to explain.

Or perhaps, instead, Olivi considers, one other action the cognitive power could have is to turn itself to the object, as when one turns one’s attention to this or that object, prior to determinate cognition (Ibid.). However, although Olivi isn’t against this sort of cognitive action in principle, he raises some issues with this second option as well, if it is to fit with this causal model¹⁰⁶. E.g., Olivi says that if the *species* were to be literally moved by the cognitive power by this act, then it must mean that the *species* is a “mobile being”, like a tool one must bring closer to use; e.g., the cognitive power would have to literally move the *species* from outside the power and into the power’s gaze, so that the *species* would then act instrumentally to fix one’s determinate cognition. However, against this, Olivi says the “greater part” of his aforementioned problems with intermediary *species* would still follow (Ibid.). E.g., why would the cognitive power need to move the *species* into the power to gaze upon it? If the power needs to first move the *species* closer, then it seems the power would have access to the *species* outside the power in the first place anyways, so that it could gaze upon it outside of the power. And of course, Olivi thinks that the cognitive power could more directly turn its attention to an external object instead, especially if a *species* is conceived as sort of intermediary image.

So, as with the first two models above, one of Olivi’s core issues with this model of causal co-operation (between the power and *species*) is particularly with the secondary cause

¹⁰⁶ One issue which Olivi raises, which I’m glossing over, is that he seems to say that the will alone moves the cognitive power’s attention, not the cognitive power itself (with or without a *species*). However, Olivi must only mean that the will alone moves the cognitive power *in this certain way*; as we’ve seen plenty of, Olivi often says the cognitive power is the direct effective principle of its acts, and, as discussed more in Martin (2019), in other places Olivi is willing to give the object, *via* its *colligantia* with the cognitive power, a role in effectively moving the power (to grab one’s attention), as must even be often the case, when we aren’t so voluntarily attending to the world.

being a *species*, as commonly construed by prior *Middle Views*. More interesting, however, in this case, it also seems that this model of causal co-operation wouldn't be any more fitting for an external object than for a *species* (either acting with the power). At the very least, if the more principal cause (in this case, the cognitive power) had to literally move/impress some power of acting onto the instrumental cause (in this case, the object), then it seems right, as Olivi suggests, to doubt that the power would need to literally do anything to its object in this manner; at the very least, this wouldn't obviously amount to cognition itself. So, this third model of causal co-operation seems to be as naïve, ultimately, and unfitting, as the initial symmetric model of the two sailors pulling a ship, for the case at hand. As we'll see while discussing Gonsalvus and Scotus below, however, there are some more imaginative ways to construe an instrumental cause (or "*quasi-instrumental cause*"), which Olivi simply does not address; at best, perhaps, they are meant to be subsumed under what Olivi calls a broadly effective, "terminative cause".

In sum, I take it that Olivi's main point of contention in these quoted passages isn't so much with all theories of, broadly efficient, causal co-operation, but rather with certain, more naïve, theories, where both co-operants are full-fledged efficient causes, and particularly with the *species* (as construed by prior *Middle Views*) as cooperant, and not the object. Thus, there is nothing inconsistent in these passages with Olivi's own preferred view of the object and power as, broadly efficient, causal co-operants, with one more properly an efficient cause than the other.

§2.3. Gonsalvus's (Similar) Response

§2.3.1. The Object as Agent Cause "Sine quo non"

Having considered Olivi's response, let's now turn to Gonsalvus's response to the central objection above (§2.1). To be clear, Gonsalvus speaks most explicitly of volitions here, but as we've discussed above, he generally moves back and forth between cognition and volition, so we can too. Gonsalvus begins his response by explicitly denying that he would respond as "some" have before him who say that the object of volition must first leave some direct impression on the power before it can act (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.2; pp.45-46)¹⁰⁷. According to this alternate response, volition (and similarly, cognition) would be constrained by what objects impress upon the power, and thus, the power need not be held (absurdly) infinite; but Gonsalvus doesn't want to take this route. In other words, Gonsalvus makes it especially clear that he is not defending the *Middle View*, e.g., of Aquinas (see §1), but rather the *Fully Active View* (i.e., Olivi's view), where a cognitive/appetitive power does not require some distinct *species* to be received in the power first, but merely requires the object to be present in some way.

Gonsalvus next turns to give his own response, which is rather short and condensed, and so worth quoting in full:

"But I say otherwise, for according to Augustine, in book IX of *De Trinitate*, last chapter, the object is reduced to an agent cause, but it is an agent *sine quo non* [i.e., without which the effect would not follow]. Nevertheless, it is a cause *per se* co-assisting with the impressing thing, although it impresses nothing. Nor is it necessary on account of this that it should be a cause accidentally, rather it is a cause *per se*. For Aristotle, in *Physics* II, puts a vessel with a drink among the causes *per se*, but mediately, and nevertheless it impresses nothing. Therefore, the will is aided in causing its volitions; because it is aided it is not an infinite power, especially because it is not the cause of that by which it is aided. Therefore, such an infinity of the will is relative, as such an infinity of

¹⁰⁷ "Ad secundum, si vellemus dicere, sicut aliqui dicunt, quod obiectum in voluntate causat affectionem mediante qua voluntas causat in se suam volitionem, essemus expediti, [eo] quod voluntas non habet vitutem infinitam, quia infinitas volitiones non causat virtute propria. Sed dico aliter [...]" (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.2; pp.45-46).

the will comes from the multiplication of the object and not from the force of the will.” (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.2; pp.45-46)¹⁰⁸

The first and most important thing to note here is that, despite the reasons we’ve seen above from Gonsalvus against positing the object as a sufficient cause of cognition or volition, he still admits that the object plays a necessary causal role, even as an agent/efficient cause and a *per se* cause. Gonsalvus qualifies, however, that the object is an agent cause “*sine quo non*” [without which the effect would not follow], presumably in contrast to the soul as the initiating causal force. Thus, as Gonsalvus puts it, the soul isn’t “infinitely powerful” on its own account, but only externally powerful through the multiplication of objects. Hence, from this position on the activity of the soul, it doesn’t follow that I can innately will (or cognize) infinitely many objects, which would be false.

The initial authority which Gonsalvus cites in order to justify his view is Augustine in *De Trinitate*, IX (12.18). As Jean-Luc Solère (2014), for one, notes, the particular line which is generally quoted in this sort of context is Augustine’s claim that any cognition (*notitia*) is brought about both from the cognizer and the thing cognized¹⁰⁹. Now, at first glance, one might think that, in this cited passage, Augustine is describing both cognizer and cognized as causes completely on a par; he doesn’t, e.g., explicitly say the object is only a “*sine qua non*” cause.

¹⁰⁸ “*Sed dico aliter, quia secundum Augustinum, IX De Trinitate, cap. ultimo, obiectum reducitur ad causam agentem, sed est agens sine quo non; nihilominus est causa per se coassistens imprimenti, sed nihil imprimit, nec oportet propter hoc quod sit causa per accidens, sed est causa per se. Aristoteles enim, II Physicorum, vas ponit inter causas per se cum potione et mediate, et tamen nihil imprimit. Iuvatur igitur voluntas in causando volitiones suas; quia igitur iuvatur non est infinitae virtutis, praesertim quia non est causa illius a quo iuvatur. Talis igitur infinitas voluntatis est secundum quid; talis etiam infinitas voluntatis est ex multiplicatione obiecti, et non ex vigore voluntatis.*” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.2; pp.45-46).

¹⁰⁹ “[...] *liquido tenendum ex quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus cogenerat in nobis notitiam sui; ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito.*” (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IX.12.18; p.309, pp.329-331 ; cf. Solère 2014, p.215). As we’ll see below, Scotus also cites this text for his account of joint but asymmetric causation in cognition.

However, elsewhere in *De Trinitate*, as we've seen Olivi cite above, Augustine argues that the soul causes its acts "from itself" and "in itself", given that corporeal objects cannot act directly on the spiritual soul. So, putting the pieces together, it makes sense that, given this latter context, Gonsalvus would refer to the object as a subordinate, "*sine quo non*", cause, while citing Augustine, but, given the above passage, still stress that the object is an agent/efficient cause and a cause *per se* (having at least that much in common with the soul as a cause).

More to the matter at hand, I take it that Gonsalvus is making the same point we've seen from Olivi that the object of volition (or cognition) does not directly impress anything on its own onto the soul, but nevertheless it does play a broadly efficient causal role by constraining how the soul "impresses on" (metaphorically) the object to form its act; i.e., *without which* object, the act would *not* exist, determined to some particular object, hence the object is called a *sine qua non* cause. Indeed, Gonsalvus's example of a vessel and drink seems apt to mirror Olivi's favoured example of a vessel taking in light; the vessel constrains how the drink falls, but it impresses nothing itself on the drink¹¹⁰. What Gonsalvus adds here is that he is willing to call the object an agent/efficient cause, even a cause *per se*, even though, like Olivi, he doesn't call it such without qualification.

¹¹⁰ For another, I think complementary, way to interpret this example, consider Scotus's use of the knife and hand analogy, which we'll see below, where the relevant point is that the hand can use the knife's sharpness without that sharpness needing to enter the hand itself; so, similarly, an appetitive/cognitive power can use an object to go into (an appetitive/cognitive) act, without the object impressing itself in the power. Nevertheless, what this explanation seems to share with Olivi's is that the primary agent and object/instrument co-operate at the boundary between the two; the hand, e.g., comes into contact with the knife's handle, without being impressed by the knife, and the cognitive power, e.g., looks upon and cognitively "grasps" the object, without being impressed by the object. Moreover, it should be noted that Scotus cannot take the knife/hand to be a perfect analogy, as he too distinguishes the ordered concurrent causation of a hand and its instrument and that of the soul and its object.

Nevertheless, plausibly, Gonsalvus and Olivi both seem to be open to posit a “broad” category of efficient causation, although it can be subdivided between a strict sense, where an efficient cause is the primary source of action, and a looser sense, where an efficient cause depends on some primary cause to co-operate with. So, in the above example, the vessel is still an efficient cause in that it depends on but completes the action of the light/drink to produce light/drink in the position it is in, and the same picture applies to the object and its powers.

§2.3.2. Gonsalvus and Aristotelian “Aiding” Causes

To repeat, what Gonsalvus adds to the picture we find in Olivi is that Gonsalvus is willing to call the object an agent/efficient cause, even a cause *per se*, even though, like Olivi, he doesn’t call it such without qualification. Moreover, Gonsalvus, unlike Olivi, defends calling the object a *per se* cause through the authority of Aristotle; Gonsalvus cites *Physics* II, where, he claims, “[Aristotle] puts a vessel with a drink among the causes *per se*, but mediately, and nevertheless it impresses nothing” (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.2; p.46).

Now, it’s rather unclear which passage Gonsalvus has in mind, as there is no mention of a vessel or drink in *Physics* II that clearly fits Gonsalvus’s description. Nevertheless, Gonsalvus could be referring to II.3. In *Physics* II.3, Aristotle considers that even among efficient causes, as well as the other three major types of causes, there can be further divisions made; of particular interest, a bit further on, Aristotle gives the division between what is prior and primarily the source for an action (but incomplete alone) and what is posterior and secondarily the source for the action (but most mediately the cause in union with the former) (*Physics* II.3, 195a27-b25).

As a concrete example, Aristotle mentions the art of building, as the “prior” cause of building, and a builder as secondary or instrumental, insofar as the builder most mediately builds, but builds in virtue of having the art of building (*Physics* II.3, 195a27-b25)¹¹¹. For another, seemingly similar example of such instrumental causation, elsewhere in the *Physics*, Aristotle also famously gives the case of the hand which moves the stick which moves the stone; the stick would not move if not through the hand’s motion (which must further trace its motion

¹¹¹ In modern translation, Aristotle says, e.g., after listing the four major types of causes: “Such then is the number and nature of the kinds of cause. **Now the modes of causation are many, though when brought under heads they too can be reduced in number. For things are called causes in many ways and even within the same kind one may be prior to another:** e.g. the doctor and the expert are causes of health, the relation 2:1 and number of the octave, and always what is inclusive to what is particular. Another mode of causation is the accidental and its genera, e.g. in one way Polyclitus, in another a sculptor is the cause of a statue, because being Polyclitus and a sculptor are accidentally conjoined. Also the classes in which the accidental attribute is included; thus a man could be said to be the cause of a statue or, generally, a living creature. An accidental attribute too may be more or less remote, e.g. suppose that a pale man or a musical man were said to be the cause of the statue.

All causes, both proper and accidental, may be spoken of either as potential or as actual; e.g. the cause of a house being built is either a house-builder or a house-builder building.

Similar distinctions can be made in the things of which the causes are causes, e.g. of this statue or of a statue or of an image generally, of this bronze or of bronze or of material generally. So too with the accidental attributes. Again we may use a complex expression for either and say, e.g., neither 'Polyclitus' nor a 'sculptor' but 'Polyclitus, the sculptor'.

All these various uses, however, come to six in number, under each of which again the usage is twofold. It is either what is particular or a genus, or an accidental attribute or a genus of that, and these either as a complex or each by itself; and all either as actual or as potential. The difference is this much, that causes which are actually at work and particular exist and cease to exist simultaneously with their effect, e.g. this healing person with this being-healed person and that housebuilding man with that being-built house; but this is not always true of potential causes—the house and the housebuilder do not pass away simultaneously.

In investigating the cause of each thing it is always necessary to seek what is most precise (as also in other things): thus a man builds because he is a builder, and a builder builds in virtue of his art of building. This last cause then is prior; and so generally.”

(Aristotle, *Physics* II, 195a27-b25; trans. R. P. Hardie & R. K. Gaye).

[From William of Moerbeke’s Latin translation: “*Causae quidem igitur hae et tot sunt specie. Modi autem causarum numero quidem sunt multi: capitales autem et hi minores. Dicuntur autem causae multipliciter. Et ipsarum similium specierum et prior et posterior altera altera; ut sanitatis medicus et artifex, et diapason duplum et numerus, et semper continentia ad unumquodque. [...] Oportet autem semper causam uniuscuiusque summam quaerere, sicut et in aliis: ut homo aedificat quoniam aedificator est, aedificator autem est secundum artem aedificandi: haec autem prima causa est. Et sic in omnibus.*”]

Note that Aristotle does not call every “posterior” (mediate) cause a proper (*per se*) cause here, as with the musical man building who only so happens to be musical (i.e., the musical [man] is a *per accidens* cause).

Gonsalvus, however, insists in the above passage that the object is a *per se* cause. Aristotle indeed seems to call the builder a *per se* cause, at least insofar as she has the art of building, but it’s left open here whether Aristotle would consider an object, as a “mediate” cause, to be such a *per se* cause or only one *per accidens*; this is particularly unclear in the hand/stick/stone example, which we’ll get to next. I’ll return to this point below, as a further point of puzzlement over Gonsalvus’ citation.

back to some unmoved mover) (*Physics* VIII.5, 256a4-b12)¹¹². So, at the very least, something can function as an agent/efficient cause, of some sort, even if it must depend “mediately” on a higher cause.

However, these particular examples, of the art/builder and hand/stick, don’t seem to exactly parallel the causal relation between the soul/object which Gonsalvus is after here. The art seems to give the power of acting to the builder, but it doesn’t seem right to say that the soul gives a power of acting to its object given that the object is intelligible/willable on its own accord, and in general, the soul doesn’t need to act on the object. Moreover, given that the object is said to impress nothing itself by Gonsalvus, it doesn’t sound like Gonsalvus is insinuating that the soul must give a power of acting to the object so that it can impress itself back on the soul¹¹³. Indeed, as we’ve seen above, Olivi is also against appealing to this sort of “instrumental” causation (at least for the *species* in cognition/volition) and, as we’ll see later, Scotus also denies

¹¹² “Now this may come about in either of two ways, either not because of the mover itself, but because of something else which moves the mover, or because of the mover itself. Further, in the latter case, either the mover immediately precedes the last thing in the series, or there may be one or more intermediate links: e.g. the stick moves the stone and is moved by the hand, which again is moved by the man; in the man, however, we have reached a mover that is not so in virtue of being moved by something else. Now we say that the thing is moved both by the last and by the first of the movers, but more strictly by the first, since the first moves the last, whereas the last does not move the first, and the first will move the thing without the last, but the last will not move it without the first: e.g. the stick will not move anything unless it is itself moved by the man. [...] Thus, if the stick moves something in virtue of being moved by the hand, the hand moves the stick; and if something else moves with the hand the hand also is moved by something different from itself. So when motion by means of an instrument is at each stage caused by something different from the instrument, this must always be preceded by something else which imparts motion with itself. Therefore, if this is moving and there is nothing else that moves it, it must move itself. So this reasoning also shows that, when a thing is moved, if it is not moved immediately by something that moves itself, the series brings us at some time or other to a mover of this kind.” (Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.5, 256a4-b12).

[From Willaim of Moerbeke’s Latin translation: “*Hoc autem dupliciter: aut enim non propter seipsum est movens, sed propter alterum quod movet movens; aut propter ipsum. Et hoc aut movens ex se proximum post ultimum; aut per plura media, ut baculus movet lapidem, et movetur a manu mota ab homine, hic autem non amplius eo quod ab alio moveatur. Utraque igitur movere dicimus, et primum et ultimum moventium, sed magis primum. Illud enim movet ultimum, sed non hoc primum; et sine primo quidem ultimum non movebit, illud autem sine hoc, ut baculus non movebit nisi moveatur ab homine. [...] Si enim ab eo quod movetur movetur omne quod movetur, aut hoc rebus existit secundum accidens, ut moveat quidem quod movetur, non tamen propter id quod movetur ipsum; aut non, sed per se. [...].”]*

¹¹³ Consider, e.g., how an agent intellect functions, according to Godfrey, as I discuss more in Chapter 3.

that the object and cognitive power co-operate in this sort of way (see, e.g., Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.470; Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).

For these same reasons, I doubt that Gonsalvus's drink/vessel analogy is meant to exactly model that of the hand which moves the stone which moves the stick. This would be similarly disanalogous to the will and its object, e.g., where the will, as primary cause, does not act on the object, as instrument, (nor does the object then do some impressing back on the will), unlike the hand, as primary cause, which would move the stick/vessel, as instrument, in space (and mediate move the stone/drink in space as well). Moreover, it's especially unclear whether Aristotle would even consider the stick/instrument, in the hand/stick/stone analogy, to be a *per se* efficient cause, as Gonsalvus says the object of volition is, given that the stick/instrument is given its status as a mover entirely from the outside¹¹⁴.

Nevertheless, the commentary tradition seems to extract more types of efficient causation from *Physics* II: Aquinas, e.g., likely *via* Avicenna, gathers that Aristotle distinguishes four types of efficient causation: “namely, perfecting, preparing, aiding, and advising” (*Physicorum* II.5; pp.270-271).¹¹⁵ Arguably, of these options, it would be fitting to consider the object (or vessel) to be an “aiding” cause. First, note that Gonsalvus explicitly uses the language of “*aiding*” (*adiuvans*), saying the power is aided (*iuvatur*) by the object. Second, it seems that object and

¹¹⁴ Look again at what Aristotle says in *Physics* VIII.5, cited in fn. 112 above.

¹¹⁵ “*Uterius autem dicit quod alio modo dicitur causa, a quo est 'principium motus et quietis, sicut consilians dicitur causa: et pater filii, et omnino commutans commutati.' Circa autem huiusmodi causas considerandum est quod quadruplex est causa efficiens: scilicet perficiens, praeparans, adiuvans, et consilians.*” (Aquinas, *Physicorum* II.5; pp.270-271; cited from, Thomas Aquinas, *Opera Omnia* – Vol.18: *Expositionem in VIII Physicorum*, V.J. Bourke (ed), New York, Musurgia Publishers, 1949).

As Kara Richardson (2014) notes and discusses, this four-fold division of causes in Aquinas has its origins in Avicenna's *Physics of the Shifā'* (1.10.3-4) (for texts and discussion, see Richardson 2014, pp.106-112).

vessel can both be understood as operating “for the end of another”, as Aquinas describes aiding causes (Ibid.)¹¹⁶. E.g., the will/intellect sets the end for the given subject to love/know (though not for the object to be willable/intelligible in itself) and the object helps complete this task by providing some determinate object for the given will/intellect to actually love/know. As for the vessel/drink, perhaps it can be said that either the drink’s heaviness or some human agent pouring the drink is what sets the end for the drink to move downwards and take shape below, though the vessel (below) terminates the end of the drink to be in the vessel, in whatever shape the vessel has (i.e., its particular location below)¹¹⁷.

Second, as mentioned above, note that neither object nor vessel seem to impress anything on the primary cause; the object does not act on the will/intellect, nor does the vessel impress itself on the falling drink or its heaviness, the hand pouring the drink, or whatever the primary agent is in this case)¹¹⁸. For Aquinas, an aiding cause, similarly, doesn’t impress anything directly, at least on its primary cause, which provides the end; Aquinas seems to restrict such impressing for perfecting and advising causes (given that only they are said to essentially produce some new form, putting it into something lacking that form) (Ibid.). To be clear, it’s

¹¹⁶ “*Perficiens enim est, quod dat complementum motui vel mutationi, sicut quod introducit formam substantialem in generatione. Praeparans autem seu disponens est, quod aptat materiam seu subiectum ad ultimum complementum. Adiuvans vero est, quod non operator ad proprium finem, sed ad finem alterius. Consilians autem in his quae agunt a proposito, est quod dat agenti formam per quam agit. Nam agens a proposito agit per suam scientiam, quam consilians sibi tradit; sicut et in rebus naturalibus generans dicitur movere gravia vel levia, in quantum dat formam per quam moventur.*” (Aquinas, *Physicorum* II.5; pp.270-271).

¹¹⁷ That is, on one reading, the human agent at least initially pours the drink with the purpose/end that it falls into the cup below and not, e.g., on the floor (though, ultimately, the end of the drink would be to be drunk). Alternatively, the drink, *qua* heavy, can be said to have the end to move downwards and the cup would terminate that end, at least momentarily (even if the ultimate end of the heavy thing is to be even further down, at the centre of the universe).

¹¹⁸ Alternatively, if we go with Scotus’s use of the knife/hand analogy, then perhaps Gonsalvus’s point is that the instrument (the vessel), does not have to impress itself on the hand, in order for the hand to use the vessel to drink with.

likely that Aquinas would think to apply this much to the stick, as an instrumental cause, as well, at least insofar as it doesn't impress itself on the hand; however, we can also widen our consideration to other sorts of aiding causes that (i) have a certain sort of causality and end from themselves, and (ii), don't impress anything themselves either (unlike the stick which moves the stone), at least, not necessarily.

For another example of such an "aiding" cause, which at least brings in feature (i), think of another typical Aristotelian case of a subordinate builder, working under the broad task set by a master craftsperson, who aids in the completion of the master's action. Although, of course, the sub-ordinate builder may do some impressing on some materials, I take it that what's important is that he doesn't directly act on or produce the original blue-print provided by the master (or try to change her mind with respect to the overall plan); the sub-ordinate just does enough to provide the material details of the original plan and aid in the master craftsman's action. Analogously, at least the object of volition/cognition doesn't act on the will/intellect (the primary agent). Moreover, the object does "do something", to provide the, metaphorical, "matter" (i.e., content) for volition/intellection to fully take shape¹¹⁹.

Nevertheless, this is perhaps not a perfect analogy, given that the master does need to impress her plan on the subordinate, unlike with the will/intellect and its object. Even better, we can slightly tweak this example to one of pre-ordained co-operation: e.g., consider two animals acting from their own individual natures, though one more perfect in its effect than the other, to accomplish some common good in the eco-system (e.g., as, on a medieval Christian picture, to

¹¹⁹ Not that the object should be called a material cause (*contra*, e.g., Aquinas, in ST I, Q.84, a.6, c.).

keep the food supply chain going for humans), without either needing to impress their own goal on the other¹²⁰. I take it that this would be closer to the case of the intelligible/willable object and the intellect/will, each created with their own goal, though incomplete without the other for their common task to produce intellection/volition. In this way, we can get around Olivi's concern that the intellectual power, e.g., would require some first action to move its aiding cause, as, here, the intelligible object naturally aids from itself.

Finally, perhaps most importantly for our interests, an aiding cause is referred to as a proper efficient cause in this tradition; so, in this sense, Gonsalvus can hold that an object of volition/cognition, co-assisting in the act, is still a *per se* cause, as he says above. This *per se* status, following Aristotelian lines, is justified by that fact that an aiding cause functions under the framework of some end and so it is genuinely explanatory, and not a *per accidens* cause, as with some coincidental cause, like a musical person *qua* musical building a house. In other words, one can explain how the cause leads to the effect it does, all other things being equal, by considering the cause's end. E.g., by considering the object *qua* intelligible/(apparently) good, one understands that intellection/volition is its proper effect (though, for Gonsalvus, not an effect which the object impresses, so much as something that intellect/will impresses on itself, by aid of the object).

This *per se* causal status is especially clear when, as with the intelligible/willable object, the end (shared with the primary cause) is internal to the secondary/aiding cause. So, in this

¹²⁰ As we'll see, Scotus explicitly argues for this type of "ordered" concurrent causation to apply to the intellect and its object, unlike the hand/stick/stone sort; he also gives a somewhat closer analogy of the mother and father co-operating in conception, even though neither gives the power of conception to the other (of course, they do nevertheless interact though).

sense, this sort of efficient cause is more clearly a *per se* cause than, e.g., the stick, which is a lesser/extrinsic sort of “aiding” cause, at best. As mentioned above, it’s not entirely clear that the stick, e.g., should be called a *per se* efficient cause for motion, according to Aristotle, given that it doesn’t have this causality/end from itself; this is one of the initial puzzles over what exactly Gonsalvus is extracting from Aristotle’s *Physics*, in calling the object, such as a vessel, a mediate but *per se* (agent) cause. Nevertheless, in contrast, the intelligible/willable object is safely a *per se* efficient cause (even if as an aid to the intellect/will, as primary agent), given that the object has its causality/end by nature¹²¹.

So, in sum, at the very least, there does seem to be room for Gonsalvus to extract the type of subordinate efficient causation he wishes to hold of the object from the Aristotelian tradition behind the *Physics*. Nevertheless, Gonsalvus’s reference to *Physics* II remains puzzling, especially since there is no explicit example of a “vessel” (*vas*) and drink¹²². As said above, more clearly than anything explicit in Aristotle, Gonsalvus’s example of a vessel and a drink still

¹²¹ To call an object intelligible/willable/sensible etc. might depend logically on the notion of an intellect/will/sense, etc., as the latter comes first conceptually, but I take it that the former doesn’t effectively depend on the latter.

¹²² One might also think to look to *Physics* book IV, which does speak of vessels and location. E.g., Aristotle regularly considers location to be similar to a vessel (“*vas*” in the Latin translation from William of Moerbeke, also contained in Aquinas’s *Physicorum*) and at one point, using language somewhat similar to that of Gonsalvus (when he says *vas* “*nihil imprimit*”), Aristotle argues that the vessel is “nothing to the stuff” (“*nihil rei*”); in other words, Aristotle argues the vessel is not akin to matter (and so, neither is location, in general) (Aquinas, *Physicorum* IV, III; p.327). However, (i) Aristotle seems to be speaking of a different sort of “vessel” here, as in the case of a boat in water, as opposed to a cup containing water. Moreover, (ii) Aristotle herein doesn’t seem to describe a vessel to be a cause in the way in which Gonsalvus describes; e.g. where Aristotle does make a distinction between *per se* and accidental causation, he discusses causation in terms of motion and seems to think neither a vessel nor a drink is a *per se* cause of motion, given, as mentioned above, they are not movers by their own natures (though both are at least *per se* movable since they have extension, unlike the whiteness, e.g., in a vessel) (*Physics* IV.4, 211a13-211b3).

seems to best mirror Olivi's favoured example a vessel constraining how light fills it, though the vessel impresses nothing.

§2.3.3. *Aside: My Account and the (Scant) Existing Secondary Literature on Gonsalvus*

I take my interpretation of Gonsalvus above to largely build on the brief account of Solère (2014). To a similar end, Solère (2014), drawing ultimately from Cicero, provides a useful distinction between different types of efficient causes: first, Solère distinguishes between an efficient cause which is entirely sufficient to complete its action and an efficient cause which requires some sort of *sine qua non* cause to aid in the completion of the action; in other words, in the first sense, the efficient cause, in itself, necessitates the effect, as an efficient cause is traditionally thought to do, but in the second sense, the effect follows only given the right external help. Second, Solère distinguishes between a weaker sort of *sine qua non* cause/condition, one which merely names a sort of required background condition which needs to be in place for the primary efficient cause to act, like the absence of an obstacle, (e.g. the lack of an interfering agent) so that a stone can fall downwards, and a stronger *sine qua non* cause/condition, one which truly “does something” positive to co-assist, in a broadly efficient manner, with the primary efficient cause, so that the relevant action will follow (Solère 2014, pp.198-201). Moreover, Solère also gives Gonsalvus as an explicit example of this stronger sense of *sine qua non* causality, drawing from the above passage, and, although Solère seems to vacillate on this, at least at times he also uses Olivi as an example of this sort of “broadly efficient” *sine qua non* cause (Ibid. p.215).

However, there is at least one point where I would differ in framing from Solère (2014), which I also think provides further evidence for this general take on efficient causation. Rather

than appeal, by Solère's account, to a less traditionally "Aristotelian" authority like Cicero, in order to find some precedent for Gonsalvus's general account of "*sine quo non*" but *per se* efficient causation, I take it that, as I've argued above, we also find a more direct/"traditional" channel of influence to understand Gonsalvus's appeal to Aristotle's *Physics*, in the commentary tradition¹²³.

Solère's (2014) interpretation is not the only one in the secondary literature. Indeed, in an earlier text, an otherwise enlightening treatment of medieval debates over voluntarism and the will, Kent (1995) claims that Gonsalvus's "*sine quo non*" or "co-assisting" cause is not an efficient cause. She writes:

"The position he [Gonsalvus] endorses is quite close to Peter Olivi's and probably closer still to Henry's. According to Gonsalvus, the object presented by the intellect is only a *causa coassistens* or *sine qua non* of volition; although it is not merely an accidental requirement, neither is it an efficient or formal cause of the will's acts. If the object were the efficient cause of volition, Gonsalvus argues, we would not be master of our acts. An act of will would be traceable to the object, and sin could not be imputed to the agent himself." (Kent 1995, p.142; citing, in particular, Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, c & ad.2; p.40 & pp.45-46).

However, Kent's claim that the object, as "a *causa coassistens* or *sine qua non*", is not an efficient cause is not clearly found in the text she cites; indeed, this text, as seen above, seems to claim the opposite, that the object is indeed an agent and *per se* cause, though requiring another primary agent. Moreover, Kent's argument rests on conflating Gonsalvus's many arguments for

¹²³ As I'll discuss more in the next chapter, in general, Solère (2014) has a somewhat strict, and contentious, understanding of what counts as "Aristotelian" in these debates, largely following the common medieval gloss of Aristotle wherein Aristotle is the central authority for passive, rather than active, views.

the conclusion that the object cannot be a sole efficient cause with the conclusion that the object cannot be an efficient cause whatsoever. But Gonsalvus does not clearly go that extra step.

In general, Kent (1995) seems to run together different medieval accounts of *sine qua non* causation, such that they would all be of the weaker sort, as distinguished by Solère above; while such a conception seems fitting for Henry of Ghent, it's not obvious that Olivi or Gonsalvus take such an interpretation, as they seem to opt for the stronger, "broadly efficient" sort of causation. Moreover, as I've argued above, although Kent is right to bring up the further notion of a "co-assisting" cause for Gonsalvus, on this notion as well, there is further precedent to treat such aiding causes as efficient causes¹²⁴.

§2.4. Conclusion: Gonsalvus's Diplomatic Reception of Olivi's Active View

In sum, whether or not Gonsalvus strictly follows Aristotle in his reference to the *Physics*, what's interesting is that he is explicitly trying to forestall any objection that his view requires positing some new type of causation, beyond the standard four Aristotelian causes; i.e., Gonsalvus wants to fit his account within the authority of Aristotle in general. Olivi, on the other hand, is quite famous for making explicit remarks against "slavishly" following the authority of Aristotle, so it makes sense that he wouldn't be interested in making these sorts of conciliatory efforts to fit his view with the words of Aristotle where it might seem strained. Gonsalvus shows that at least some work can be done to fit the same sort of *Fully Active View* as Olivi's with

¹²⁴ I bring up Kent's (1995) alternate interpretation to clarify that what little has been written on Gonsalvus is not without controversy. Moreover, since Solère (2014) doesn't respond to this alternate interpretation, I thought it worth adding a response on behalf of us both. 1995 was a long time ago, though, so I'm not sure if Kent would still endorse her earlier interpretation.

broader Aristotelian views on causation and thus, the view need not appear quite as radical as it might appear in Olivi's words. Hence, Gonsalvus is a particularly interesting historical conduit between the views of Olivi and his wider community and his position here reinforces the conclusions of Gracia (1969) and Martel (1968) who see Gonsalvus as providing an important connection between 13th and 14th century thought. As Gracia concludes:

“Gonsalvus is important to us as a good example of the transitional period between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. He shows particularly in his attitude towards Aristotle both a certain respect and an ability for a critical examination of his doctrine. [...] Moreover, his thought and perspicacious insights, celebrated during his own times, did not die with him but influenced others and especially those of his great pupil Duns Scotus. Thus the student who approaches his writings is not only rewarded with clarity and acumen of thought but also with historical insight into Gonsalvus' times and successors.” (Gracia 1969, 35-36).

As we'll get to in the second part of this chapter, next, although Garcia here speaks of another topic, the influence of Gonsalvus (and so, Olivi as well) is also notable in Scotus's view on the topic at hand, on the activity of the soul and the causality of its objects.

Part II: Scotus in Context

§3. Scotus's Own Asymmetric Account of Cognition (*Ordinatio I, D.3, pars 3, QQ.2-3*)

Now that we have examined the shared perspective of Olivi and Gonsalvus on this debate, over the activity of the soul and the causality of its objects, let us turn to the perspective of Scotus. As we will see, our previous discussion can add to our understanding of Scotus's position, which has been the topic of some recent literature. Conversely, discussing Scotus's position can also add to our understanding of the position of Olivi and Gonsalvus, on the

asymmetrical causal roles of the soul and its objects. In general, as mentioned above, this will provide us with a fuller picture of this medieval period and the lines of influence herein.

In *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2, from his earlier Oxford lectures, Scotus phrases his question in terms of, “whether the intellective part of the soul, properly taken, or something of it, is the total cause generating, or a *ratio* of generating, actual cognition (*notitiam*) [i.e., an occurrent act of cognition]” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.282)¹²⁵. Scotus also mentions, in his later additions, that similar points hold for the will as well, and he sometimes expresses himself in terms of the soul in general, also including acts of sensation as well. Moreover, elsewhere in his *Ordinatio*, Scotus sets up a very similar discussion in terms of the will (e.g., *Ibid.* p.285; cf. *Ordinatio* II, D.25, Q.1)¹²⁶. Nevertheless, for simplicity, we will focus on the intellective soul here, at least for the most part. Although Scotus considers six opposed views, and argues against them, he primarily situates his position between the two extremes of either positing the soul to be the “total cause”, or the object (whether in itself or through a *species*) to be the “total cause”.¹²⁷ As Scotus puts it, his “*propria opinio*” on the

¹²⁵ “*Utrum pars intellectiva proprie sumpta vel aliquid eius sit causa totalis gignens actualem notitiam vel ratio gignendi.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.282).

On the dating of these texts, see the careful discussion of Dumont (2000); the *Ordinatio* was, of course, unfinished and continually worked upon until Scotus’s death, but, most importantly, the base material we’ll be looking at is largely unchanged from Scotus’s earlier Oxford Lectures. Moreover, although it seems Scotus modified his view with regard to the will in his later Paris Lectures, his positive view of intellection seems not to have changed (though, based on the what he says in the context of discussing the will, he seems to have become less suspicious of ‘*sine qua non*’ explanations, at least in general).

¹²⁶ For example: “[*Addito Scoti*]: *Haec tamen ratio concluderet simili modo, ut videtur, contra actionem voluntatis [...]*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.285)

¹²⁷ Scotus sometimes more strictly distinguishes between the external object of cognition and a distinct *species* (to serve as an intermediary “*ratio/principle of cognition*”), at least, as he puts it, when the object isn’t able to be present itself. However, for now, I’ll ignore this distinction, as Scotus largely speaks interchangeably of them in this question and the next.

For those interested, the full six views, according to the labels in Lauriola’s edition and Scotus’s count, are those of Olivi, Godfrey, two of Henry of Ghent (Scotus reports that Henry changed his mind), Giles/Aegidius of Rome (which sounds very close to that of Aquinas as well), and, finally, Thomas of Sutton (whose view Scotus ultimately collapses into the view of Godfrey, for his purposes, insofar as Sutton identifies the *species* in the intellect and the

question is that, “if neither the soul alone nor the object alone is the total cause of an actual intellection – and those alone seem to be required for an intellection – it follows that those two [the soul and its object] are together the cause of the generated cognition” (Ibid. p.298)¹²⁸. Before getting to Scotus’s own view, let’s first look at Scotus’s treatment of these two “extremes” in turn.

§3.1. *The Soul as Total Cause*

To begin, let’s look at Scotus’s take on the extreme active view that the soul is, as Scotus puts it, the “total cause” of cognition and consider to what degree he seems to have Olivi in mind (and if so, to what degree he has Olivi right). In Lauriola’s (2001) edition of Scotus’s text, Lauriola labels this first view as the “*opinio Olivi*”¹²⁹ which, as Scotus describes, “attributes total activity for an act of intellection to that soul, and is attributed to Augustine”; this view, Scotus explains, is explicitly drawn from passages where Augustine argues that, since spirit is more noble (*praestantior*) than body, “body should not be held to act on spirit”; so, the spiritual soul must produce its acts “in itself with amazing quickness” or, to put it otherwise, “in itself and from itself” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.283; cf. *De Genesi ad*

act, and they are passively received). One might also count a seventh, Scotus’s own view. At times, Scotus describes the views of Henry and Giles such that they broadly fit into the *Middle View(s)* described above, and raises some of the same sorts of nobility and attribution arguments used by Olivi and Gonsalvus above. To the extent that Scotus finds a “middle path”, as we’ll see, he still seems, at least by his own account, to diverge from what I’ve labelled as the more traditional “Middle Views” above.

¹²⁸ “*Si ergo nec anima sola nec obiectum solum sit causa totalis intellectionis actualis – et illa sola videntur require ad intellectionem – sequitur quod ista duo sunt una causa integra respectu notitiae genitae. Et ista est sententia Augustini IX De Trinitate cap. Ultimo, sicut allegatum fuit arguendo contra primam opinionem (‘Liquido tendenum’ etc.).*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).

¹²⁹ Cross (2010, pp.122-126) follows Lauriola in attributing this view to Olivi as well in his chapter on Scotus on the mechanisms of cognition.

litteram 12.6.28-29 & *De Trinitate* 10.5.7)¹³⁰. As we've seen above, Olivi expresses his view in much the same way and indeed he explicitly cites these exact remarks from Augustine, concerning body and spirit (see, e.g., II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.15-17).

Furthermore, Scotus goes on to consider the two sorts of arguments which are advanced for this position, in line with the two arguments we've seen from Olivi (and Gonsalvus) above, one based on the *nobility* of the soul (this time in terms of vitality rather than spirituality) and the other based on the proper *attribution* for an action:

“For that view it is argued through reason so: An effect does not exceed a cause in perfection. ‘However, everything living is better than the non-living’, according to Augustine in *The City of God* [VIII.6]. Therefore, a vital operation cannot be unless [enacted] by a principle of acting of a vital or living [thing]. Those operations of cognition are vital operations; therefore, they are from that soul as in the manner of an agent.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284)¹³¹.

“[Also, it is argued]: since an action, properly speaking, and as it is distinguished from a production (*factionem*), denominates the agent. ‘To

¹³⁰ “*In ista quaestione est una opinio, quae attribuit totam activatem respectu intellectionis ipsi animae, et imponitur Augustino, qui dicit XII Super Genesim cap.28: ‘Quia imago corporis est in spiritu’, qui est ‘praestantior corpore’, ideo ‘praestantior est imago corporis in spiritu quam ipsum corpus in sua substantia’; et sequitur (cap. 29): ‘Nec putandum est corpus aliquid agere in spiritu, quasi spiritus corpori facienti materiae vice subdatur. Omni enim modo praestantior est illa res quae facit illa re de qua facit, neque ullo modo praestantius est corpus spiritu, immo spiritus corpore. Quamvis ergo incipiat imago esse in spiritu, tamen eadem imaginem non corpus in spiritu sed spiritus in se ipsum facit celeritate mirabili’, sequitur, ‘imago enim, mox ut oculis visa fuerit, in spiritu videntis sine interpolatione formatur.’ Item, X De Trinitate cap. 5: ‘Anima convolvit et rapit imagines corporum, factas in simetipsa et de simetipsa: dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae; servat autem in se aliquid liberum, quo de tali specie iudicet, et hoc est mens, id est rationalis intelligentia, quae servatur ut iudicet; nam illas animae partes quae corporis similitudinibus informantur, etiam cum bestiis non habere communes sentimus’. Ergo, ipsa anima in se format imagines ipsorum cognitorum, ut dicit ista auctoritas, etiam expressius, allegata.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.282-283; cf. *De Genesi ad litteram* 12.6.28-29 & *De Trinitate* 10.5.7).*

¹³¹ “*Pro ista opinione arguitur per rationes sic: effectus non excedit causam in perfectione: ‘melius est autem omne vivum non vivo’, secundam Augustinum De civitate Dei [VIII, cap.6]; ergo operatio vitalis non potest esse nisi a principio agendi vitali vel vivo. Istaes operationes cognoscendi sunt operationes vitales, ergo sunt ab ipsa anima sicut a ratione agendi.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284).

intelligize’, however, denominates a human according to the intellective part, therefore, etc.” (Ibid.)¹³².

Scotus goes on to make use of these arguments himself, with some qualifications, but we can get to that later.

Perhaps the most telling passage about who Scotus has in mind for this view is when, after presenting the sort of central objection we’ve considered above to the view of Olivi (and Gonsalvus)¹³³, that, in short, the object must play some sort of causal role, Scotus presents the following response, that the object only plays a non-standard sort of causal role; as mentioned above, Scotus objects to the novelty of such supposed “causes”:

“This [objection, that both object and power must be efficient causes] is rejected through diverse ways by those holding this view (*opinionem*). For if it should be held that the object is necessary in the reason of a cause ‘*sine qua non*’, or the reason of a terminus, or the reason of an exciter, [and] if it [the object] should not be given to it some ‘*per se* causality’ [...], how will it be

¹³² “*Quarto, et idem est, quia action proprie dicta, et prout distinguitur contra factionem, denominat agens. ‘Intelligere’ autem denominat hominem secundum partem intellectivam, ergo etc.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284).

Scotus calls this argument the same as (“*idem est*”) an argument he gives right above, but deduced from Aristotle’s authority: “*Item, tertio, Philosophus I Ethicorum [cap. 1] et IX Metaphysicae [cap. 8] et III Physicorum [cap. 3] distinguit inter actionem et factionem, et vult quod action proprie dicta manet in agente, sicut exemplificat de ‘speculatione’, ibi [scil. Metaphysicae IX, cap. 8]: intellection ergo proprie est operatio manens in agente; manet autem in parte intellective, ergo erit ab ea ut ab agente.*” (Ibid.).

This argument is, obviously, much more condensed than that of Olivi or Gonsalvus above, but I discuss its common “Aristotelian” mechanics more in Chapter 3.

¹³³ To be clear, I don’t want to imply, or base my argument on, the claim that Scotus definitely had Gonsalvus, in particular, in mind at this point of time; the evidence, it seems to me, is ambiguous on this. On one hand, the original written records of Scotus’s Oxford Lectures, for this question, is dated to around the late 1290’s, while the original written records of Gonsalvus’s I *Quaestiones* lecture material is dated to around 1300, just afterwards. On the other hand, as mentioned above, Amoros (1935) notes in his introductory material to I *Quaestiones* that Gonsalvus speaks of having a lengthy friendship with Scotus, with Gonsalvus the senior figure, and it’s oft been speculated that Scotus had an earlier trip to Paris, prior to his Oxford Lectures, where the two could have met; so, there’s some reason to believe that the two could have exchanged ideas prior to the dates of these recorded lectures (see, e.g., Amoros 1935, in I *Quaestiones*, pp.xxvi-xxvii). Moreover, of course, other third parties likely served as intermediary influences as well, such as Henry of Ghent and the general “Augustinian” heritage behind Gonsalvus and Olivi alike. Nevertheless, it’s at least of interest that this general tradition had an influence on Scotus; moreover, comparing the reception of Olivi in Gonsalvus and Scotus, even if independent, already says a lot with respect to how the ideas themselves might be interpreted, depending on one’s rhetorical goals.

saved that this is required necessarily, unless by holding five kinds of causes?”
(Ibid. pp.284-285)¹³⁴

Although not exclusive to Olivi, the notion that an object plays an explanatory role, in this context, as a “terminus” is explicitly used by Olivi, especially when he refers to the object as a “terminative cause”, as we’ve seen above. So, this expression does indeed suggest that Scotus could at least partly have Olivi in mind. Moreover, referring to the object as a cause “*sine qua non*” for an act of cognition, as I argued above, also fits well with the view of Olivi. Although this term is used more explicitly by Gonsalvus (and others), nevertheless, Olivi and Gonsalvus arguably share the same view. Furthermore, it is understandable why Scotus would think that Olivi, in particular, gives no *per se* (efficient) causality to the object and, so, posits a fifth type of cause instead, given, as we’ve seen, Olivi’s frequent remarks that the object, as a “terminative cause”, is not *strictly* one of the standard four causes (at least not an efficient cause).

¹³⁴ “*Per hoc improbantur diversi modi tenendi ponentium istam opinionem. Si enim ponatur obiectum necessarium in ratione causae ‘sine qua non’, vel in ratione termini vel in ratione excitantis, si non detur sibi aliqua ‘per se causalitas’ (cum anima semper sit in se perfecta et passo approximate), nec aliquod impedimentum de novo, remotum, quomodo salvabitur quod ipsum necessario requiritur, nisi ponendo quinque genera causarum?*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.284-285).

I’ve left aside the somewhat confusing (and over-punctuated) aside in the middle here. I would expand the brackets (if kept at all) so that they would span over “*cum anima semper... approximate*” up to and including “*nec aliquod impedimentum de novo remotum*” (with the last comma also removed before “*remotum*”); i.e., “since the soul would always be perfect[ly in act] in itself and in contact with its passive component, nor would any impediment be removed *de novo* [...]” I take it that Scotus here is qualifying that a *sine qua non* cause is acceptable when something (i) puts an agent and patient into sufficient proximity or, otherwise (ii) removes some other obstacle in between; however, to do either thing would seem to require having some efficient causality (e.g., moving the agent/patient into proximity or removing an obstacle, as when one removes something blocking a stone so that it may continue to fall). Here, Scotus is drawing from further arguments made by Godfrey, which he later call his “Achilles” argument, against active views of cognition and volition, generally focused on the critical question as to why these acts wouldn’t always follow, if the agent and patient were always seemingly present to each other in the same subject (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.304-305); see, e.g., Godfrey: “*Praeterea, quando activum per se est praesens passivo per se sequitur actio et in hoc est exclusum omne impedivum, ut patet per Philosophum, nono Metaphysicae. Si ergo in voluntate ponatur activum et passivum quae semper sibi sunt praesentia quia sunt id ipsum, ut dicit ista positio, vel sunt unum subiecto, ut dicit alia, sequitur actio et huic non potest praestari impedimentum. Quid enim potest impedire quod idem non sit praesens sibi ipsi? et cetera.*” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; pp.151-152).

As mentioned above, in essence, this is the central argument we started with above, especially as phrased by Olivi.

However, it should first be pointed out, to make a minor correction to Lauriola’s label of this view as simply “the view of Olivi”, that Scotus cannot exclusively have Olivi in mind here. As I just mentioned, when Scotus refers to those who posit that the object is a cause “*sine qua non*”, this is not explicitly a phrase used by Olivi, though it is used by Gonsalvus (and others)¹³⁵. Moreover, when Scotus refers to the view that the object is an “exciter” for an act of cognition, but not a cause, this is part of the view of thinkers like Peckham and others, which, as mentioned above, Olivi explicitly rejects. Indeed, following much the same argument as Olivi, Scotus even “especially” singles out this view as confused, given that an excitation must either be a cause, but this is what it is meant to be distinguished from, or it can do nothing to explain an act of cognition (Ibid. p.285)¹³⁶. Moreover, we’ve seen above that Olivi and Gonsalvus both put this “excitation” view closer to the *Middle View* (e.g., of Aquinas), in distinction to their own *Fully Active View*, so this is also a sign that Scotus is blurring together a number of distinct views to fit within his classification of an “extreme” active view (the soul as “total cause”)¹³⁷.

¹³⁵ It also seems that Scotus would have Henry of Ghent in mind here. Although, as Solère notes, Henry only explicitly refers to the object of volition, not intellection, as a *sine qua non* cause, nevertheless, one might reasonably attribute such a view to Henry, or intentionally meld the two accounts; moreover, one might think Henry has an “excitation” view of intellection, given that Henry occasionally refers to an object of intellection as only “inclining” and not, strictly, impressing on the intellective soul (Solère 2014, pp.211-212; cf., e.g., Henry, *Quodlibet* XI, Q.5).

¹³⁶ “*Specialiter etiam illud de ‘excitatione’ non videtur valere. Quero enim quid sit ‘excitare’? Si ‘aliquid causare’ in intellectiva, ergo obiectum aliquid causat antequam intellectiva de se agat; ergo intellectiva non est tota causa prima respectu cuiuscumque in se causati, sed etiam obiectum. Si ‘excitare’ non sit ‘aliquid causare’ in potential intellective, non aliter habet in se post excitationem quam ante, et ita non magis excitatur nunc quam prius.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.285). See above for a similar argument from Olivi.

¹³⁷ This isn’t to say that Scotus is exactly wrong to classify this “excitation view” as a view of the “followers of Augustine”; Olivi and Gonsalvus are perhaps the odd ones out in this regard.

Nevertheless, despite this mess, it does seem plausible that Scotus is at least partly referring to Olivi and his view (shared with Gonsalvus), especially when referring to the object as a terminus (and a *sine qua non* cause) to explain its role in cognition. However, as a second and more important point of correction, it should be questioned whether Scotus is accurately reflecting the view of Olivi (and Gonsalvus) in his objection here. Thus, we can question whether Scotus is actually opposed to Olivi's tradition in substance. First off, in this passage in particular, note that Scotus doesn't simply take issue with the idea that an object is a terminus or *sine qua non* cause for an act of cognition, unless, further, "if" the object is held to have no *per se* causality. However, as I've argued above, Olivi does not outright deny that the object plays some "broad" efficient causal role. Furthermore, as we've seen, Gonsalvus, who develops this same *Fully Active View*, argues that an object can still be a *per se* agent/efficient cause of volition/cognition., even if it is a *sine qua non* cause of the same act as well¹³⁸.

Moreover, one might take issue with Scotus's phrasing that, for the prior "Augustinian" *Fully Active Views* of cognition we've seen, the cognitive power is in fact the "total cause." First, Gonsalvus explicitly says that, unlike God, "the will is not a total cause of its act", given that it is able to receive some further perfection from outside, in the sense that the will can become more perfect by becoming determined to some (good) object; i.e., in line with what we've already seen from Gonsalvus, the object aids in the will's activity, without which the will could not perfect itself (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.16; p.49)¹³⁹. Moreover, by all accounts, what Gonsalvus says about the will here should apply to the intellect as well. Although Gonsalvus does give *some* arguments

¹³⁸ In other words, for Gonsalvus, to say that the object is a *sine qua non* cause does not imply that it is only a(n) efficient) cause *per accidens*, entirely by proxy of some other (true) agent. Nevertheless, Gonsalvus might still acknowledge a weaker sort of *sine qua non* cause as well, as in the distinction of Solère (2014), considered above.

¹³⁹ "Ad ultimum dicendum quod simile non est, quia Deus est tota causa creaturae, et non potest aliquid recipere; voluntas non est tota causa actus et aliquam perfectionem recipit." (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.16; p.49)

specific to the will¹⁴⁰, the arguments we've focused on above are all presented as "reasons common to intellect and to will", and so if Gonsalvus explicitly says that the will isn't a "total cause", he should say the same about the intellect (Ibid. p.32)¹⁴¹. Indeed, the reason concerning perfection just given should presumably apply to the intellect as well since, in line with Gonsalvus's general account, the human intellect should certainly also need to perfect itself through the help of external objects (as "aiding" causes). If anything, one would expect the will to be a more total cause than the intellect, given the voluntarist arguments specific to the will which Gonsalvus gives, so it's all the more telling that Gonsalvus doesn't say the will is a total cause.

Now, at one point, Solère (2014, p.215) seems to suggest that Gonsalvus says otherwise, at least for the intellect, pointing out that Gonsalvus says, at one point, that the "entire act (*totus actus*) of the intellect is *caused* by that intellect as a natural being" (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.7; p.48)¹⁴². However, when considering the rest of the context of this passage, it is clear that Gonsalvus is focused here on the point that the act of intellection is entirely/totally a natural effect from the intellect (and its object), in contrast with the will's effect, not that it is totally

¹⁴⁰ For Gonsalvus's arguments specific to the will, largely focused on the freedom and dominium of the will (even over intellect), see (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.39-41). Although I didn't mention them above, Gonsalvus raises two quick but interesting arguments specific to intellection, both based on the idea that to speak is an action, but external/corporeal speech proper requires intellectual/spiritual "speech" prior (Ibid. p.38); i.e., although he doesn't say this explicitly, Gonsalvus appears to be appealing to the forming of so-called mental words in intellection (something Peter Auriol, for another example, appeals to at length in his active account of intellectual cognition).

¹⁴¹ E.g., before giving the attribution and nobility arguments cited above, Gonsalvus starts with: "*Et primo induco rationes communes intellectui et voluntati.*" (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.32)

¹⁴² "*Ad septimum dicendum quod totus actus intellectus causatur ab ipso intellectu ut est ens naturale; voluntate vero ut ens in genere moris.*" (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.7; p.48). I say that Solère "seems" to read this passage in this way, given that, as discussed above, in the details, Solère (2014) otherwise argues for some genuine causal co-operation between the object and the intellect for Gonsalvus; so, Solère shouldn't want to claim that Gonsalvus has such an "extreme" active view.

from the intellect alone (and in no way from its object). As this passage immediately follows, quite tersely: [intellection is] “from the will, however, as a being in a kind of custom (*moris*)”; i.e., in this way, the will is able to have an effect on the intellect (Ibid.). To explain further: the argument which Gonsalvus is responding to is concerned that an act of intellection can only be caused immediately by the intellect, so the will must cause some mediating thing (e.g., an intelligible *species*) in the intellect, upon which the intellect acts, if one is to ever freely intelligize (e.g., to praise God) (Ibid. arg.7; p.29)¹⁴³. However, I take it that Gonsalvus’s response is that, given his general view, for intellection to come about through the will, the will need only *present* some intelligible object to the intellect to “entice it”, while the intellect (and object) determinately does the rest, as according to his *Fully Active View* discussed above. The will, however, is not determined to do this by any (willable) object, hence it is standard medieval jargon to say the will is not entirely a “natural” power, unlike the intellect (in itself), and so the will acts by a less determinate “custom”¹⁴⁴. So, overall, this discussion bears simply on how the will and intellect co-operate and says nothing to imply that the object is any less a (secondary) cause than Gonsalvus’s general account dictates.

The case for Olivi and the expression of a power as a “total cause” is a bit more complicated; admittedly, as discussed above, he does seem to have used that expression

¹⁴³ “*Item, si voluntas movet intellectum facit actum intellectus; hunc actum enim non potest facere nisi mediante actu. Sed non causat actum intellectus, quia causatur ab intellectu.*” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, arg.7; p.29). To understand where this objection might be coming from, consider the sort of principle Gonsalvus appeals to in his attribution argument above, which says that the direct, internal, proper effect of the will should be volition, and of the intellect, intellection.

¹⁴⁴ Parasitically speaking, in this way the intellect too can freely operate, but only in an extended sense, hence Gonsalvus can still call the intellect a “natural” power in itself.

occasionally (see, e.g., II Sent. Q.58; II, p.462)¹⁴⁵. Nevertheless, Olivi also certainly refers to the object and the powers as “twofold causes”, “concurring”, and “co-operating” in cognition, such that an object is required to complete an act of determinate cognition (and, it seems, appetite/volition as well), as discussed above (e.g., II Sent. Q.72; III, p.38). In general, all the reasons discussed above imply that Olivi does not deny that external objects have some, broadly efficient, causal role in cognition and volition.

Moreover, much as we’ve just seen from Gonsalvus (denying that the will is a “total cause” since it is not infinite in itself, as with God’s powers), Olivi too denies that a cognitive power, or even the will, for us creatures, is able to go into act “from itself alone” (*ex se sola*), nor is it, in other words, “omnipotent”, even if, as Olivi holds, such powers are essentially active (and, in the case of the will, essentially free); the latter does not follow from the former, Olivi explains, since an active power, such as our cognitive or volitive powers, can still, “accidentally”, require the presence of some object and the termination of the power’s *aspectus* in that object in order to produce its act, as we’ve seen from Olivi’s account above (II Sent. Q.74; III, pp.129-130)¹⁴⁶.

¹⁴⁵ At the very least, at the beginning of Olivi’s digression into the activity of the cognitive powers in II Sent. Q.58, Olivi objects to those who consider either the object or *species* to be a “*tota causa*”, he eventually takes issue with the *species* (at least) and object as partial causes, as we’ve seen above, and, in general terms, Olivi says that it seems to be true, and closer to faith, rather, what other prior figures say, that the cognitive powers are the “total and immediate” effective principles of their acts; and accordingly the will, by comparison, can be defended even more strongly and evidently to be “active and free”: “*Quoniam autem via illorum qui ponunt potentias esse principia effectiva ipsorum actuum immediata et totalia videtur hoc quod secundum fidem nostram de potestate activa nostrae libertatis tenemus fortius et evidentius defendere a contrario errore.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.462). [I confess that the search function for my pdf copy of II Sent. might not be perfect, for I didn’t find any better examples of Olivi using this “total” terminology for the cognitive/appetitive powers.]

¹⁴⁶ “*Secundo deficit, quia cum dicitur, ‘haec potentia non potest per solam suam essentiam exire in aliquem actum, ergo non est secundum essentiam suam potestas activa vel libera’: non est ibi bona consequentia, quia constat quod absque accidentali aspectu in obiectum aliquod actualiter terminato non potest nostra potentia volitiva vel cognitiva aliquem actum cognitivum vel volitivum producere, nec aliqua potentia creata potest aliquem actum producere absque praesentia patientis et absque virtuali aspectu in ipsum protenso et terminate. Verumtamen*

Moreover, a bit below this cited passage, also in line with what we've just seen from Gonsalvus, and our discussion above on Olivi's partial endorsement of the necessity of cognitive dispositions/habits, at least to cognize better and more perfectly (in Q.58 & Q.74), Olivi holds that the cognitive/appetitive powers of creatures, such as ourselves, cannot simply perfect themselves through will power alone; as Olivi puts it,

“if an object, insofar as it is terminative of a mental *gaze/aspectus* and act, were not to co-operate with an act, but wholly and absolutely it were from the power of the mind, then it would be impossible for an act to excel over its effective principle” (Ibid. pp.134-135)¹⁴⁷.

First off, to will something good and cognize something true is a perfection in one's mental act and *gaze/aspectus*, and so, such perfection requires a present object, as we've seen above. But, moreover, these acts also generate and augment habitual perfections to will/cognize more such proper objects, and more easily and more perfectly, as when one gains more knowledge about some object, or other objects, over time; thus, such habits are also required to perfect these powers even more. Thus, Olivi says, “is not miraculous if an act with its power and habit and *gaze/aspectus*, taken together, is better than the power alone” (Ibid.). Thus, as with Gonsalvus's point above, these powers are not able to infinitely perfect themselves, from themselves alone, and thus, in this sense, they should not be called “total causes” or “infinite” in power¹⁴⁸.

bene sequitur quod si ex se sola non potest exire in actum, quod eius vis activa non est ex se sufficiens aut omnipotens, sicut est potentia Dei.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.74 ; III, pp.129-130).

¹⁴⁷ “[D]icendum quod si obiectum, in quantum terminativum actus et aspectus mentalis, non cooperaretur actui, sed omnino absolute esset a potentia mentis, tunc impossibile esset actum praevalere suo principio effective. Ex terminatione vero actus in obiectum optimum trahit quasi ipsammet bonitatem obiecti, quia non solum est terminatio uniens et configurans obiecto, sed etiam ipsum comprehendens et possidens. E contra vero est, quando obiectum est falsum et pravum. Tunc enim malitia actus est pro tanto peior quam malitia habitus, pro quanta est actualior et incorporatior obiecto. Et rursus sciendum quod quia actus praesupponit et quodammodo includit suas causas et non e contrario: ideo non est mirum, si actus cum potentia et habitu et aspectu sumptus est melior quam sola potentia aut quam potentia cum habitu et aspectu.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.74 ; III, pp.134-135).

¹⁴⁸ Olivi also often talks about other “internal” imperfections on the part of a power's *aspectus* and activity, such that the power is not always entirely vigilant and active, as when one is asleep, mad, or drunk. As we'll see in Chapter 3, this seems to be one of the defining differences between Olivi's active account of cognition and that of

So, in general, it would be misleading to say that the view of Olivi (and Gonsalvus) is that the soul is the “total cause” in the sense that the object has no causal/explanatory role. Scotus’s rhetorical motivations to argue against a more extreme caricature of prior active views seem clear enough; (i) in fairness, it simplifies the debate and makes the opposed motivations sharper; (ii) more selfishly, it makes his own account seem like a distinct and perfect ‘golden mean’. Moreover, admittedly, there is some reasonable room for confusion over Olivi’s view, in particular. Nevertheless, this isn’t enough to show that Scotus is opposed to the substance of Olivi and Gonsalvus’s view, according to a more moderate interpretation of the latter. Moreover, as we’ll see, near the end of this text, Scotus himself even goes on to shift to a more conciliatory tone when it fits his purposes to make more positive use of this prior tradition.

§3.2. *The Object as Total Cause*

After arguing against the view that the soul alone is the total cause of an act of cognition, Scotus moves on to argue against the other extreme, the view that the object alone is the total cause of an act of cognition. As the editor, Lauriola notes, Scotus undoubtedly has Godfrey, in particular, in mind here (see also, e.g., Cross 2014, pp.125-128, Hartman 2012, pp.49-73). Indeed, Scotus’s description of this view cites Godfrey’s exact argument against self-motion and comes to Godfrey’s exact conclusion:

Durand of St. Pourçain, insofar as, I take it, these mark “real” changes in the power for Olivi, but for Durand the power is, in itself, unchanged and entirely active (though able to have purely “relational” obstacles). One might also contrast Olivi’s account with that of Descartes, at least as traditionally understood, where the latter’s cognitive soul seems to require constant, conscious, cognition to exist, especially if unmoored from the body, but Olivi’s cognitive soul has spiritual potency, such that it can go in and out of activity, with mediate states as well.

“There is another view, which is totally in the other extreme, which says that [...] the intellective soul, as intellective, has no activity with respect to intellection. For the possible intellect does not have such causality (whether informed by an intelligible *species*, as they deny, or nude)¹⁴⁹, since according to them the same thing is not able to act on itself. They prove this, since, because the agent should be in act such as the patient [is] in potency¹⁵⁰ – III *Physicorum* [chapter 2] and I *De generatione* [chapter 5] – it follows that the same thing would be in potency and in act, which, for one, seems to be opposed to a first principle of metaphysics known through the definition [*ratio*] of act and potency. [...]

What, then, will effectively cause intellection? They respond that ‘the same object according to reality’ effectively produces (*efficit*) intellection and volition, and this insofar as it shines back in a phantasm, by way of an illumination of an agent intellect, [but] not effectively [...].” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.286-287)¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ To be clear, there are times when, more precisely, Godfrey is willing to admit intelligible *species*, so long as they are equated with acts of intellection, and many after describe Godfrey’s view this way (see, e.g., Durand and Auriol) (moreover, Godfrey’s view on sensible *species* seems to be even more complicated); nonetheless, Scotus is right that Godfrey assuredly denies that the intellect takes in or stores distinct intelligible *species*, insofar as they are something really distinct from the act of intellection; see, e.g.: “*Item, quia ad evitandum ista, dicitur in secunda positione quod obiecto agente fit similitudo eius in intellectu et intellectus secundum illam factus in actu elicit actionem intelligendi, non videtur bene dictum, tum quia non potest poni ratio propter quam talis species, ut est aliquid aliud realiter ab actu intelligendi, ab obiecto fiat intellectus.*” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* IX, Q.19; p.273).

¹⁵⁰ I.e., an agent should be in act ϕ (e.g., fire hot in act) and its patient in potency ϕ (e.g., a log hot in potency); see §3.5.1 for more on Godfrey’s argument.

¹⁵¹ “*Alia est opinio, quae totaliter est in alio extremo, quae dicit, sicut colligitur ex diversis locis sic opinantis, quod anima intellectiva ut intellectiva est, nihil habet activitatis respectu intellectionis. Non enim habet talem causalitatem intellectus possibilis (sive informatus specie intelligibili, quam ipsi negant, sive nudus), quia secundum eos idem non potest agere in se ipso. Quod probant, quia cum agens sit tale in actu quale patiens in potentia – III *Physicorum* [cap. 2] et I *De generatione* [cap. 5] – sequitur tunc quod idem esset in potentia et in actu, quod primo videtur esse oppositum primi principii metaphysici noti per rationem actus et potentiae ; tunc etiam idem esset efficiens et materia, quod videtur esse contra Philosophum II *Physicorum* [cap. 7], ‘materia et efficiens non coincidunt’. [...] Quid ergo causabit effective intellectionem? Respondent quod ‘obiectum idem secundum rem’ efficit intellectionem et volitionem, et hoc in quantum relucet in phantasmate, illustrato intellectu agente non effective, sed quasi respectu intellectu intelligibilis formaliter concurrente.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.286-287).

I discuss Godfrey’s peculiar view of the agent intellect’s role in intellection more in Chapter 3; for now, consider the following illustrative passage: “*Item, esto quod ita esset, tamen adhuc non posset dici proprie quod intelligere esset ab intellectu ut actio ab efficiente et movente, quia illud ratione cuius non agit ad actum intelligendi nisi secundum quod agit ad hoc quod illud quod debet movere intellectum possibilem habeat actu rationem moventis et obiecti. Obiectum ergo intelligibile habet rationem moventis et agentis respectu intellectus possibilis educens ipsum de potentia secundum actum intelligendi ad actum secundum illud, et sic intellectus nec ut agens nec ut possibilis posset dici efficere actum intelligendi in se ipso. Sed obiectum est quod habet rationem efficientis et moventis, licet non habeat quod sit obiectum nisi in virtute eius quod habet rationem intellectus agentis; et intellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passivi et receptivi. Sic ergo intelligere non potest dici actio respectu intellectus possibilis sic quod habeat esse ab intellectu possibili ut ab agente et movente; immo potius sic est actio respectu obiecti.*” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* IX, Q.19; IV, pp.275-276 ; cf. Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; III, p.170).

This *Fully Passive View* is motivated by the argument that no power effectively moves itself, strictly speaking (not even by way of a distinct agent intellect in one's soul), as Godfrey repeatedly claims.

Here, against this *Fully Passive View*, the positive influence of Olivi's tradition on Scotus should be uncontroversial. The same (*nobility* and *attribution*) arguments which Scotus refers to in favour of the extreme active view (that the soul is a total cause), which, as we saw in the last section, come from Olivi's Augustinian tradition, are used by Scotus to argue against this extreme passive view (that the object alone is the total cause of an act of cognition). Ultimately, Scotus also uses these arguments for his own view, insofar as he concludes that an external object is not sufficient to bring about cognition, nor is it a primary efficient cause.

Like earlier thinkers who employ *nobility arguments*, Scotus argues from the principle that the lower, especially the corporeal, cannot act on the higher, especially the incorporeal. Against the view of Godfrey, Scotus argues that it would "strongly vilify the nature of the soul" if an object, by way of a phantasm (an impression from an object stored in a corporeal organ), were to directly cause a more noble effect, an act of intellectual cognition, since "an effect does not exceed the its cause", and every act of the intellect is "more noble" than any corporeal object or phantasm (Ibid. pp.287-288)¹⁵².

¹⁵² "[Additio Scoti] Nihil ergo aliud a deo active se habet respectu intellectionis cuiuscumque nisi phantasma tantum. Hoc videtur inconueniens, quia vilificat valde naturam animae. Nullum enim perfectionem videtur phantasma posse causare in intellectu excedentem nobilitatem eius [phantasmatis], quia effectus non excedit suam causam, sed deficit ab ea, specialiter effectus aequivocus. Ergo nihil causatur praecise a phantasmate in intellectu, sicut ponit ista opinio. Omnis enim intellection, au test perfectior phantasmate, aut nulla erit in homine." (Scotus, *Ordinatio I*, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.287-288).

Moreover, when Scotus gets to his own view, he even explicitly refers back to the exact nobility argument cited above (viz. the one in terms of the “vitality” of cognition), used by Olivi and prior “Augustinians”, saying that this argument, “concludes in my favour (*pro me*), since cognition is a vital operation, it does not come from the non-living as a total cause” (Ibid. p.301; cf. p.284).¹⁵³ As we’ve seen above, Olivi also argues that something vital cannot come about directly/totally from something non-vital, such as the typical external object (viz. it’s sensible and intelligible properties or *species* of such properties) (e.g., II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.21-25).

Furthermore, Scotus also says that he “concedes” the prior *attribution argument(s)*, cited above, “namely, from an action, as it is distinguished in contrast to a production (*factionem*), and that an action denominates the agent” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.301; cf. p.284)¹⁵⁴. For, as Scotus explains, intellection truly is an immanent action, one that

¹⁵³ “Ad rationem primam pro illa opinione [cf. p.285, cited above]: *concludit pro me, quia cogitatio cum sit operatio vitalis non est a non-vivo sicut a totali causa; potest tamen non-vivum esse causa partialis alicuius vivi, vel effectus vitalis, sicut sol non-vivus est causa partialis cum patrem ad generandum filium vivum, et multo magis in proposito est possibile, quia hic causa principalior est vita, sicut patebit in sequenti quaestione.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.301). We’ll get to Scotus’s own qualification on this argument below.

¹⁵⁴ “Alia duo argumenta, videlicet de actione ut distinguitur contra factionem, et quod actionem denominat agens, concedo. Pono enim actum intelligendi vere manere in agente quod est eius causa partialis ; non tantum in supposito agente, ita quod non transeat extra suppositum, sed quoniam nec transit extra patrem intellectivam in sensitivam, nec [...] in appetitivam, nec extra principium eius activum in aliam potentiam, sed manet in parte intellectiva, quae est causa partialis eius. Non oportet autem actionem proprie dictam manere in sua causa totali, sed sufficit quod maneat in sua causa partiali.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.301).

As I discuss more in Chapter 3, Godfrey has an attempt to work around this argument, claiming that such “immanent actions” are not real, but merely “grammatical” actions. Scotus responds to this move from Godfrey explicitly:

“Item, secundo, ‘intellectio’ secundum Philosophum est actionem immanens.

Respondent quod intelligere secundum modum significandi grammaticalem significat actionem, et ‘intelligi’ passionem, tamen secundum rem ‘intelligere’ est passio, et quod intelligitur est agens. Quid autem ‘intelligere’ habeat de ratione actionis? Dicunt quod ‘intelligere’ non significat aliquid ut habet ‘esse’ in subiecto, in se et absolute, sed quasi tendens in alterum ut in obiectum, sive ut in terminum; ‘et quia actionis est procedere ab agente et tendere in passum, ideo tales perfectiones’, quae in re sunt passionem, hoc est manentes in eo quod denominator ab eis per modum actionis, ‘dicuntur esse actionem immanentes’.

Contra. Philosophus distinguens actionem a factione I et VI Ethicorum [cap. 1 et 5] et IX Metaphysicae [cap. 8], assignat diversa principia ac propria actioni et factioni, quod non oporteret si intelligeret quod illud quod assignat esse actionem esset passio, quia tunc non oporteret assignare sibi principium activum proprium. Non enim oporteret prudentiam esse activam sicut ars est habitus factivus, si actionem nihil esset nisi quaedam forma recepta in

remains in its (primary) agent, and not only does it not leave (*transeat extra*) the acting supposit (i.e., the person) to act, as with so-called “transient actions”, neither does it necessarily act on some other part of the person’s soul/body (Ibid.). I take it that Scotus’s thought here is that such transient actions, e.g., on the appetitive powers, would be merely accidental to intellection. So, by elimination, intellection must be an immanent action instead, which can only possibly be attributed to the agent, since it doesn’t leave the agent; in contrast, a “production”, as in a transient action, might well be attributed to what is produced/the subject of such an action, as “building” can name the thing built.

Moreover, perhaps closer to the thrust of the *attribution arguments* of Olivi and Gonsalvus beforehand, the first argument which Scotus explicitly raises against Godfrey’s *Fully Passive View* is that, on this view, the intellectual soul would have no active power or nature/*ratio* of intellection, with respect to any act of intellection of any object, rather the object alone would; more precisely, Scotus says, against Godfrey, following this passive view, either the phantasm would be the sole effective principle for intellection, as the more proximate cause, or God alone, as the ultimate cause of the illuminated phantasm (Ibid. p.287)¹⁵⁵. This, I take it, is so absurd to Scotus precisely because the very nature of the intellect is to intelligize¹⁵⁶.

alio, ut in eo quod dicitur ‘agens’.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.289; cf. Godfrey, *Quodlibet* IX, Q.19; IV, pp.276-281).

¹⁵⁵ “*Contra istam opinionem. [...] Ex hoc sequitur quod nihil in intellectiva – et hoc ut intellectiva comprehendit agentem et possibilem – habebit aliquo modo rationem activi, sive ut agentis sive ut rationis agendi, respectu cuiuscumque intellectionis sive respectu obiecti intellectionis, et ita tantum phantasma effective se habet ad intellectionem; vel si sit sibi efficientia alia, per quam fiat irradiatio vel illustratio super phantasmata, illa efficientia erit praecise ipsius Dei, qui creavit tale lumen in intellectu possibili.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.287).

¹⁵⁶ It’s more precisely from this base that Scotus then continues, in his ‘addition’ mentioned above, to add his nobility argument on top of this, and then transitions into his “second” argument, more precisely based on the status of intellection as an immanent action.

So, in sum, we can see Scotus drawing heavily from Olivi's "Augustinian" tradition to make a case against their clearly shared opposition, viz., the view that (at least corporeal) objects are sufficient to cause acts of the soul (especially of the intellect).¹⁵⁷ As for the initial arguments cited above, used in favour of the *Fully Passive View* (from Godfrey), based on an appeal against self-motion, Scotus saves his response for later in this text; here too, as we'll see below (in §3.5), Scotus's arguments line up with those of Olivi and, in particular, Gonsalvus.

§3.3. Scotus's Own Mixed Account: The Soul and Object as Joint, but "Ordered", Causes

Finally, after presenting a few more remarks against the views that take the soul alone or the object alone to be the total cause of an act of cognition, Scotus comes to his "own view" that both the soul and its object must be co-operating causes (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.297-298). However, as he continues, Scotus points out that there are (three) different ways in which causes can concur, so one must determine what type of concurrent causation the soul and its object take part in.

First, Scotus considers that two things can co-operate as causes as equals, such as in the case of two individuals dragging the same body (*Ibid.* p.298)¹⁵⁸. In contrast to such equal concurrent causes, Scotus says there are also "ordered" concurrent causes, where one cause is

¹⁵⁷ As I discuss at length in Chapter 3, there are more arguments which at least Olivi and Scotus share, such as what I call "experiential arguments", generally based on our experience of actively attending to the world, and lacking cognition to the extent that we attend less.

¹⁵⁸ As the full paragraph goes: "*Quaedam enim ex aequo concurrunt, sicut duo trahentes aliquod idem corpus. Quaedam non ex aequo, sed habentes ordinem essentialem, et hoc dupliciter: vel sic quod superior moveat inferiorem, ita quod inferior non agit nisi quia mota ex superiore, et quandoque causa talis inferior habet a superiore virtutem illam seu formam qua movet, quandoque non, sed formam ab alio, et a causa superiore solam motionem actualem, ad producendum effectum; quandoque autem superior non movet inferiorem, nec dat ei virtutem qua movet, sed superior de se habet virtutem perfectiorem agendi, inferior habet virtutem imperfectiorem agendi.*" (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).

sub-ordinate to the other. Ordered concurrent causes, however, can be further distinguished into two types. In the first, “the superior [cause] moves the inferior, such that the inferior does not act unless because it is moved by the superior”, or in other words, the superior “gives a power to the inferior by which it can move” (Ibid.). The example Scotus gives of this type of causation is the case of the hand moving the stick which moves the stone (Ibid. p.299)¹⁵⁹. Finally, Scotus considers the second type of ordered concurrent causes where, “the superior does not move the inferior, nor gives the power to it by which it acts, but the superior on its own has a more perfect power of acting and the inferior has a less perfect power of acting”, but the inferior adds something by which the effect is able to be even more perfect than if from the superior cause alone (Ibid., p.298). An example Scotus gives of this type of ordered causation is that of the mother and father co-operating as causes to produce a child; each seems to be an active cause in itself (i.e., it seems the father does not give the active power of conception to the mother, nor vice versa), yet, nevertheless, each requires the other to produce an effect more perfect than what either could do alone (Ibid., p.298)¹⁶⁰. As Scotus explains more in another text, which Cross (2014) helpfully cites, the father is held to be the superior cause of procreation, providing the initial seed/form, though the mother is a necessary cause, even, according to Scotus, a co-efficient cause, which aids in, completes, and perfects the father’s initiating action to produce a

¹⁵⁹ *“Exemplum primi membri huius divisionis: de potential motiva quae est in manu, et baculo, et pila.”* (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).

¹⁶⁰ *“Exemplum secundi: si mater ponatur habere virtutem activam in generatione prolis, illa et potentia active patris concurrent ut duae causae partiales, ordinatae quidem, quia altera perfectior reliqua ; non tamen imperfectior recipit suam causalitatem a causa perfectiore, nec total illa causalitas est eminenter in causa perfectiore, sed aliquid addit causa perfectiore et imperfectiore quam a sola perfectiore.”* (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).

full-fledged child with its final determinate features (not entirely similar to the father) (*Ordinatio* III, D.4, Q.1; *Opera Theologica* III/2, pp.59-68; Cross 2014, p.129, fn.20)¹⁶¹.

Of these three types of concurrent causes, first, Scotus argues that the intellective soul and its object don't concur as "equal" causes. As Scotus explains, this would imply that if the object alone or the soul alone were to simply increase in perfection, then either the object or the soul alone could cause an act of cognition, but Scotus has already shown that neither can cause an act of cognition alone. For example, it would imply that if the soul were to simply increase in its effort to act, it could cause an act of cognition alone, without any object, which is false, just as if one individual dragging a body were just stronger, then she could drag the body alone instead of with another; or, if the intelligible object or *species* were to just increase in perfection, it would become intellective, which is even more absurd (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).¹⁶²

So, instead, Scotus argues, if the soul and its object do not concur as equal causes, then they must be unequal and have an "essential order" as causes. However, Scotus does not consider the soul and its object to take part in the first type of concurrent, ordered causation. As he argues, the object (or *species*) has its causal power to be intellectuated/understood from itself

¹⁶¹ Against a traditional "Aristotelian" view (which Scotus attributes to Aquinas, as one medieval proponent), Scotus thinks the mother is not simply a material cause, but is also an efficient cause in procreation.

¹⁶² "Ad propositum. Obiectum intelligibile praesens in se vel in specie intelligibili et pars intellectiva non concurrunt ut 'causae ex aequo' ad intellectionem, quia tunc alterum haberet causalitatem talem imperfectum, et reliquum suppleret eam; et si alterum esset perfectum, posset habere in uno totam causalitatem amborum, sicut si virtus motiva unius esset perfecta, suppleret virtutem alterius: et tunc species esset quasi quidam gradus intellectivitate, supplens gradum intellectivitate deficientem intellectui, et tunc si fieret perfectior intellectus secundum gradum talem, posset sine specie and sine obiecto habere actum intelligendi, quod falsum est." (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).

(i.e., it is itself intelligible), so it is not given this power by the intellect¹⁶³. Nor does the intellectual soul need to be given the power to intelligize/understand from the object (or from some intelligible *species*), for this follows from the intellectual soul's own nature; in this, Scotus even appeals to the sort of attribution argument we've seen from Olivi and Gonsalvus above, which Scotus uses against the view of Godfrey (Ibid. p.298).¹⁶⁴

By process of elimination, Scotus concludes that the second type of concurrent ordered causes must be what applies to the intellectual soul and its object. As Scotus adds, we can also see that this type of causation befits this case: for one thing, the one cause, i.e., the soul, is more perfect/noble *simpliciter* than the other cause, i.e., the object (at least typically), and so has a more perfect contribution to its effect (Ibid., p.298)¹⁶⁵. Moreover, although, as just mentioned, the intellectual soul has its own causality perfectly in itself (the power to intelligize/understand) and the object has its own causality perfectly in itself (to be intelligible) (*contra* the first type of ordered cause above), such that neither has to perfect the other in this regard, the soul and the object still require each other to complete an act of intellection about this object; in this sense, the result of both together is more perfect than what either could do on its own (Ibid.). That the soul is the more perfect cause than the object also lines up with the qualified conclusion which Scotus gathers from prior *nobility* and *attribution arguments* used against Godfrey above; i.e.,

¹⁶³ That is, neither object nor power is given the ability to act, in first act/second potency; obviously Scotus thinks neither is sufficient alone to complete their action, nonetheless.

¹⁶⁴ "*Concurrunt ergo ista duo ut habentia ordinem essentialem. Non tamen primo modo, quia nec intellectus dat obiecto vel speciei rationem suae causalitatis, non enim obiectum natum est, in se vel in specie sui, facere intellectionem per aliquid quod recipit ab intellectu, sed ex natura sua, nec intelctus recipit suam causalitatem ab obiecto vel specie obiecti, sicut probatum est prima ratione contra secundam opinionem [viz. of Godfrey].*" (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).

¹⁶⁵ "*Sunt ergo causae essentialiter ordinatae, ut ultimo modo, videlicet quod una est simpliciter perfectior altera, ita tamen quod utraque in sua propria causalitate est perfecta, non dependens ab alia.*" (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).

naturally the spiritual and inherently intellectual soul will be the more perfect cause of a spiritual and intellectual effect than the corporeal and non-cognitive object.

Furthermore, especially in the following question (Q.3), Scotus argues that the intellectual soul is more perfect, relative to its end, since the more perfect cause is more indeterminate (in that it can cause more) than what is more determinate (in that it is restricted in its causal role), and the intellectual soul is more indeterminate relative to intellection (in that it can cause all sorts of acts of cognition, about this or that object), but the object is less determinate relative to intellection (in that it can only lead to an act of cognition about itself) (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.3; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.312-313)¹⁶⁶. So, in this way, the object is subordinate to the primary action of the intellectual soul, as in the second type of ordered causes above.

Moreover, Scotus gives a second argument for this same conclusion in Q.3, saying that: “the more principal cause is that, by way of acting, the other cause co-acts, and not conversely from the other; but it is by way of our intellect, being an agent for intellection, that the object co-acts (either in itself or in a *species*)” (Ibid. p.313)¹⁶⁷. That is, I take it that Scotus’s point is that

¹⁶⁶ “Videtur quod pars intellective habeat principaliorum causalitatem respectu intellectionem modo nobis naturaliter convenientium: primo, quia quando causarum ordinarum altera est indeterminata ad multos effectus, et quasi illimitata, altera autem secundum ultimum virtutis suae determinata ad certum effectum, illa quae est illimitata et universalior videtur esse perfectior et principalior; exemplum de sole et de particularibus generantibus. Intellectus etiam habet virtutem quasi illimitatam et indeterminatam respectu omnium intellectionum, obiecta autem naturaliter a nobis cognita habent virtutem determinatam respectu determinatarum intellectionum quae sunt ad ipsa, et hoc secundum ultimum suae virtutis, sicut quodlibet ad intellectionem sui; ergo, etc.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.3; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.312-313).

¹⁶⁷ “Secundo, quia illa est principalior causa, qua agente, alia causa coagit, et non e converso quam alia; intellectu autem nostro agente ad intellectionem, obiectum, in se vel in specie, coagit; est enim in potestate nostra ‘intelligere’ quia ‘intelligimus cum volumus’, II *De anima* [cap.5]; hoc non principaliter propter speciem – quae est forma naturalis – sed propter intellectum, quo uti possumus cum volumus; principaliter autem actionem intellectus

the more principal agent is that which (in nature if not also in time) initiates the action, setting the end, while the less principal agent is that which then takes up the task to aid in its completion, as we've discussed with such "aiding causes" above, as employed by Gonsalvus. This, Scotus says, fits with the intellective soul and its object, at least for natural objects (Scotus excludes the beatific vision, which, conversely, exceeds the intellective soul), since such objects (or *species*) are not so much "received by the intellect", so much as they are *quasi*-instruments for the principal action of the intellective soul, with both nevertheless co-acting for a common effect (Ibid.)¹⁶⁸; see, again, Gonsalvus's description that the object aids in the soul's action (e.g., cognition or volition) but "impresses nothing".

Finally, to add to Scotus's point that the object is sub-ordinate as a sort of "aid" or quasi-instrument, let's jump back to Q.2. Here, Scotus responds to a critical question as to how an intelligible object, or, more specifically, a *species*, will play a part in perfecting the intellectual operation, along with the intellect, if not by informing/impressing itself upon the intellect first (i.e., as with the *Fully Passive* or *Middle Views*), which seems to be barred, since, "in such

conquiritur actio speciei, quae nata est esse semper uniformis ex parte speciei. " (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.3; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.313; cf. Aristotle, *De anima* II.5, 417b22-25). Note that, as the full passage goes, Scotus appeals to the fact that we can "intelligize when we wish", as Aristotle famously says, and so it is all the more obvious that the intellective soul initiates its action. That being said, I think the main point here is the idea that objects/*species* are "used" rather than sufficiently move the cognitive power (as Scotus gets to below), which could very well be said for acts of sensation, even if they aren't brought about through volition; in line with Olivi's response to the central objection above, we might rather focus on the idea that a cognitive power is not "uniform" in its gaze/act, unlike purely natural active powers like fire or sensible objects (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.38-39).
¹⁶⁸ "*Tamen aliquod obiectum, excedens multum facultatem partis intellectivae, puta obiectum beatificum ut clare visum, posset poni habere totam causalitatem respect visionis, aut principalem quam pars intellective [...]. De obiectis tamen quae modo naturaliter cognoscimus, prima pars responsionis videtur esse vera. Videtur enim intelligibilium a nobis naturaliter intellectorem species in intellectu esse quasi instrumentum ipsius intellectus, non motum ab intellectu ut agat, quasi scilicet aliquid recipiat ab intellectu, sed quo intellectus utitur ad suam actionem: utpote quando intellectus agit, species illa tamquam minus principale agens coagit ad idem ut ad effectum communem.*" (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.3; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.313).

essentially ordered causes, neither is a perfection of the other, therefore an intelligible *species* will not be a form of that intellect”; similarly, the objector asks, (paraphrasing), “how will the combined entity (the intellect with a *species*) act as one thing to have a single, unified effect?” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.298-299)¹⁶⁹. In response to both questions, Scotus explains that such a *species* need not, at least necessarily, inform the intellect in order to concur with the intellect as a partial cause in intellection, for one common effect; to back this up, Scotus gives the analogous case of a hand acting together with a knife, as an instrument, for a single coherent action, to cut some body, without the hand needing to itself become sharp (even if the hand could become sharp itself) – the hand need only be sufficiently ‘approximate’ and ‘conjoined’ (temporarily) to the knife, in order to make use of the knife (and its sharpness):

“It is accidental to the *species*, insofar as it is a partial cause with respect to intellection, concurring with the intellect as another partial cause, that it [*ipsa* (*species*)] would perfect the intellect, since even if it perfects it, nevertheless it does not give to the intellect any activity, pertaining to the causality of the intellect. Example: the motive power in a hand is able to use a knife insofar as it [i.e., the knife] is sharp, for dividing some body. That sharpness, if it were in the hand as in a subject, the hand would be able to use it for the same operation, and nevertheless it would be accidental to the hand – insofar as a motive power is in it – that [such] sharpness would be in it; and conversely, since the sharpness would give no perfection to the hand pertaining to its motive power [i.e., for grasping (the knife)]. That is clear since the [hand’s] motive power is equally perfect without such sharpness, and it uses that [i.e., the sharpness] when it is in another thing conjoined to the hand (for instance, a knife), just as [the hand] would use that [sharpness] if it were in the hand.

And such [is the case] in the matter at hand, if a *species* were to be something ‘existent in’ (*inexistens*) the intellect, without inhering in the way of a form; if, in that way, the *species*, by being in-existent, should be or could be

¹⁶⁹ “*Si arguitur contra istud quod ‘in causis talibus essentialiter ordinatis neutral est perfectio alterius, igitur species intelligibilis non erit forma ipsius intellectus’, similiter, ad idem, ‘si sit [scil. species] perfectio intellectus, et totum hoc [scil. intellectus habens speciem] sit ratio agenda, ergo uno operatio (utpote intellectio) non habebit unam rationem formalem agendi’, et similiter, ‘ab ente per accidens (quale est hoc totum, intellectus habens speciem) erit una per se operatio, quod inconueniens, quia quidquid non est per se unum ens, non est ratio formalis agendi’.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.298-299).

sufficiently conjoined to the intellect, those two things would be capable to be partial causes – the intellect and the *species* – one conjoined to the other into the same operation, into which they would now be able [to bring about], when (*quando*) the *species* informs the intellect. This is also clear by positing that something intelligible is present without a *species*: for that object is a partial cause, and it does not inform the intellect, which [intellect] is another partial cause; but just by those two partial causes being brought appropriately close, they cause one common effect, without one being informed by the other, with only the approximation [of the two] being required.” (Ibid. p.299)¹⁷⁰.

The end of this passage gets us into some complications, which we can save for later, as to what sort of manner of existence an object could have, with respect to the intellect, in order to be sufficiently “in hand” for the intellect, according to Scotus (whether through a *species* as a real form, or through merely “intentional inexistence”, whatever that means, or through the object’s presence in itself)¹⁷¹. Nevertheless, what’s clear is that, at least for the matter at hand, Scotus does not require the object to *impress* an actual form into the intellectual power in order for the intellect to make use of the object/*species* for one common effect; rather, the object (through

¹⁷⁰ In full, Scotus says: “*Responsio ad primum: Accidit speciei in quantum est causa partialis respectu actus intelligendi, concurrans cum intellectu ut alia causa partiali, quod ipsa perficiat intellectum, quia etsi perficiat eum, non tamen dat intellectui aliquam activitatem, pertinentem ad causalitatem intellectus. Exemplum: potentia motiva in manu potest uti cultello in quantum acutus est, ad dividendum aliquod corpus. Ista acuties si esset in manu ut in subiecto, posset manus uti ea ad eandem operationem, et tamen accideret – in quantum est in ea potentia motiva – quod acuties in ea esset, et e converso, quia acuties nullam perfectionem daret manui pertinentem ad potentiam motivam. Quod apparet, quia aequae perfecta est potentia motiva sine tali acuties, et eodem modo utitur ea quando est in alio, coniuncto manui (ut cultello), sicut uteretur ea si esset in manu. Ita in propositio. Si species posset esse inexistens intellectui absque inhaerentia per modum formae, si illo modo inexistens esset vel posset esse sufficienter coniuncta intellectui, possent istae duae causae partiales – intellectus et species – coniunctae sibi invicem, in eandem operationem in quam modo possunt quando species informat intellectum. Quod etiam apparet ponendo* aliquod intelligibile praesens sine specie: illud enim obiectum est causa partialis, et non informat intellectum, qui est altera causa partialis; sed istae duae causae partiales approximatae, absque informatione alterius ab altera, per solam approximationem debitam causant unum effectum communem. * [Adnotatio Scoti: ‘ponendo’: nota quod non oportet obiectum, vel supplens vicem obiecti, necessario fare principium actionis immanentis illi in quo est obiectum, vel supplens].” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.299). [As Scotus adds later, “note that it is not necessary that an object, or something supplying instead for the object, necessarily name the principle of that immanent action in which there is the object or supplying thing”, in reference to those holding a *Fully Active View*, like Olivi.]*

¹⁷¹ Something particularly confusing here, as I’ll take up below, is that it might seem uncharacteristic for Scotus to admit that an object/*species* could have mere intentional existence, regardless of any real form in the cognitive power, given what he says elsewhere (even in this question and the very question (Q.1) prior to this, especially against Henry) and how later medieval figures tend to characterize Scotus’s view here (see, e.g., Peter Auriol, I Sent., D.35, pars 1, a.1, II Sent., D.11, Q.3, a.1, & *Quodlibet*, Q.8, a.3).

“intentional inexistence” in a *species*, or as present in itself) can simply “aid” in the intellect’s operation, analogous to how a hand uses a knife’s sharpness without becoming sharp.

Interestingly, here Scotus even makes explicit reference to the *Fully Active View* of Olivi and Gonsalvus (those “*ponendo*” that only the object, in its presence, is required for the intellect to go into act), saying that even they can agree that the object and power causally co-operate for one single effect¹⁷². This fits particularly well, given what we’ve seen of such “aiding” causes that co-act but “impress nothing”, especially from Gonsalvus¹⁷³.

Now, technically, as Scotus would admit, this knife/hand example is of the first type of essentially ordered causes, not the second (as with intellection). As we saw above, Scotus denied that strict instrumental causation (e.g., with the hand, stick, and stone) is perfectly analogous to the type of causation in cognition. So, Scotus must only take this example to be an imperfect analogy. What I take Scotus to gather from this analogy is that the primary agent and object/instrument co-operate at the boundary between the two agents: the hand comes into contact with the knife’s handle to use it, without being impressed by the knife, and the cognitive power looks upon and cognitively “grasps” the object, without being impressed by the object¹⁷⁴. Nevertheless, Scotus must admit that the analogy only goes so far here, insofar as the knife owes

¹⁷² This reference makes particular sense since, as we’ve seen above, Olivi himself considers the objection (at least against a naïve causal co-operation account) that two separate causes cannot seem to have a simple effect (a problem for a spiritual/non-extended effect like intellection in particular).

¹⁷³ To be clear, this isn’t to say that there’s nothing gained in Scotus’s general account of essentially ordered causes, at least over the broad “Aristotelian” division, cited above, from, e.g., Avicenna and Aquinas, between “perfecting”, “preparing”, “aiding”, and, “advising” cases, and the more standard example of master and subordinate. E.g., on both points, one might think that there’s more room for “perfecting” in a subordinate (ordered) cause for Scotus, thus blurring the lines between “aiding” and “perfecting” causes, since Scotus takes such causes to nonetheless contribute to a more perfect effect than what the primary cause/master could do alone. Moreover, it’s unclear to me if a sub-ordinate (ordered) cause is as distant from the end for Scotus, at least in certain cases, such as the mother and father co-operating in child birth, as well as in raising the child and running the household (as Scotus describes more elsewhere); there seems to be more room for shared, even if unequal, end-setting here, compared to a master/subordinate framework (though, I admit, perhaps the latter framework is not as rigid as it might seem at first glance). These are all matters for future research, though.

¹⁷⁴ See fn.110 above for some previous discussion on this point, with respect to Gonsalvus’s vessel example.

its ability to move to the hand; an object, in contrast, does something on its own, to present itself, and meets the cognitive power in the middle, to aid in and terminate the power's primary action, as Olivi would agree.

So, now that we have Scotus's full own view, it should be clear that this is largely the view of Olivi and Gonsalvus, as I presented them above, though with some further clarification and terminology. Thus, Scotus is clearer in what sense both the soul and its object co-operate as causes. As I proposed above (§2.3.1), in regards to the remarks from Olivi and Gonsalvus that the object is "broadly" an efficient cause (and even, at least for Gonsalvus, a "*per se*" cause), although only "terminatively" or as a "*sine qua non*" cause; plausibly, "Gonsalvus and Olivi both seem to be open to posit a "broad" category of efficient causation, although it can be subdivided between a strict sense, where an efficient cause is the primary source of action, and a looser sense, where an efficient cause depends on some primary cause to co-operate with"¹⁷⁵. Scotus's terminology of "ordered causes" helps clarify exactly this point, especially with respect to the second type of ordered causation.

Olivi's analogy of a vessel co-operating with a light source to cause light of a particular shape is fitting here: the light source, by its nature, illuminates, and the vessel, by its nature, can restrict the light flow, so this is not a case of the first type of ordered causation where the superior gives the power of acting (entirely) to the inferior cause¹⁷⁶. But neither light nor vessel

¹⁷⁵ See p.86 above.

¹⁷⁶ In II Sent. Q.72 Olivi also explicitly presents the idea of a higher entity co-operating with a lower by way of the higher giving the lower the power to impress on the higher, but he argues that this isn't the best way to understand the way in which the spiritual soul co-operates with corporeal objects in acts of cognition.

alone can cause light formed to a particular vessel¹⁷⁷, as the light source is the superior cause which initiates the action (which alone is indeterminate), but the vessel completes and determines this action through its causal role, so this fits with the second type of ordered causation; and the same can be said of the soul and its object in causing an act of cognition determined to that object.

So, in sum, Scotus, though perhaps unwittingly, further confirms that there is nothing inconsistent in the view of Olivi and Gonsalvus, where (i) the soul and its powers (e.g., the intellect and will) cannot be sufficiently effectively moved by external objects, rather, (ii) the soul's proper acts (e.g. intellection and volition) are most properly effectively caused by their respective cognitive/appetitive power, yet, (iii) these objects can still play some subordinate efficient causal/explanatory role in the production of these acts. That is, this subordinate type of causal cooperation from the object can still be grouped under efficient causation, broadly speaking, and, so, one need not be concerned that this requires positing a fifth type of cause outside of the standard four Aristotelian causes.

§3.4. Scotus's Own Qualified Acceptance of Prior Augustinian Accounts

In the rest of the final section of Scotus's *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2, where he gives his own view, Scotus goes on to address the competing prior views, either to find some qualified room for agreement or to undermine their primary motivations. For our interests, it will be worth

¹⁷⁷ It's in this sense that the object/vessel depends on the soul/light, such that the expression "*sine qua non*" makes sense, not in the sense that the object/vessel depends on the soul/light to even be intelligible/opaque to light (their causal role).

looking at how Scotus turns back to the “Augustinian” accounts of Olivi’s tradition, as he explicitly admits a fair amount of qualified agreement, especially with respect to their Augustinian sources and their positive arguments. Moreover, in the next sub-section (§3.5), we can also see this common ground by looking at how Scotus comes back to Godfrey’s view, at this point of his text, to defend the general coherence of self-motion against Godfrey’s primary argument.

To begin, Scotus returns to the initial passages from Augustine which, as we’ve seen, get used by prior proponents of active accounts of cognition (according to which, the soul is a “total cause”, or so Scotus claims). These are the passages where Augustine says, e.g., that “body should not be held to act on spirit” and that, so, the spiritual soul must produce its acts “in itself and from itself” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300; *De Genesi ad litteram* 12.6.33 & *De Trinitate* 10.5.7). These passages ground the *nobility arguments* of prior “Augustinians”, such as Olivi, where the nobility of the cognitive soul and its acts, over its general external objects, is expressed in terms of the inherent nobility of the spiritual over the corporeal. At this point, Scotus’s aim is to argue that these passages can still fit with his own, as he takes it, more nuanced active view.

Scotus begins his look at these passages by clearing up some ambiguities in Augustine’s terminology, especially that of an “image” which, more precisely, is what Augustine says is formed by the soul (from and in itself), in these passages from *De Genesi ad litteram* XII (6.33) and *De Trinitate* X (5.7), and in the surrounding texts. First, Scotus specifies that, of this “image”, which is said by Augustine to have “being in spirit”, “it is necessary that it is understood to be in the soul or in some part of the soul as in a subject, and not precisely in the

body so mixed¹⁷⁸, otherwise it would not be concluded that that image is more noble than every body”; what is commonly called a “*species*”, Scotus specifies, is something else, which is received in the corporeal organ alone, while “what is received in the soul, or a power of the soul, is an act of cognizing” and an “image” is such an act (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300)¹⁷⁹. This interpretation is interesting given that it upholds the strict distinction between mere impressions in the body and acts of cognition in the soul/spirit, made by prior “Augustinians”, such as Olivi. Given that the soul and body are said to be “mixed up” in the corporeal sense organs, one might think that Augustine could consider some acts of cognition, such as vision, to exist in the corporeal organ, but that’s not Scotus’s gloss here.

Furthermore, in line with this last point, Scotus specifies that this “image” should be understood to be an act of sensation/vision, properly speaking, for Augustine. Here Scotus takes up a particular point of confusion over Augustine’s terminology: Elsewhere in *De Trinitate* (book XI), Augustine speaks of a “trinity” in sensitive cognition, such as vision, which includes (i) the external corporeal object, (ii) some form from the object “impressed” in the relevant sense organ (*qua* corporeal), and (iii) some desire/will/attention/gaze (*voluntas/intentio/aspectus*), of

¹⁷⁸ This “body so mixed” (*corpus sic mixtum*) might refer to a few different things: e.g., (i) the body of a cognizer, insofar as it is “mixed”, or, conjoined, to the soul, (ii) the body of a cognizer, insofar as it is “mixed” up with different elements, and not just some simple element or heap of simple elements, or (iii) the finer “mixed up” bodies connecting the rest of one’s body and their soul (i.e., *pneuma*). As Richard Cross has asked of me here, it would perhaps be odd for a Scholastic philosopher to speak of soul and body as “mixed”, properly speaking; perhaps this rules out (i), or perhaps Scotus is just picking up Augustine’s looser, pre-Scholastic, language.

¹⁷⁹ “*Primo, ad auctoritates Augustini, dico quod ‘imago’, quae ponitur ab eo ‘esse in spiritu’, oportet quod intelligatur esse in anima vel in aliquo animae ut in subiecto, et non praecisae [or: praecise] in corpore sic mixto, aliter non concluderetur illam imaginem esse nobiliores omni corpore, quod tamen ipse dicit XII Super Genesim. Quod autem est in anima vel in aliquo animae ut in subiecto, non est illa species quae communiter dicitur ‘species’, sed illa recipitur in parte organi quae est corpus sic mixtum; sed illud quod recipitur in anima vel potentia animae, est actus cognoscendi: ergo per ‘imaginem’ intendit ipse talem actum.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300). Scotus makes this qualification about the word “*species*” given that Augustine, as quoted earlier by Scotus, uses that word to refer to an “image” (“*quo de tali specie iudicet*”) in the spiritual soul, seemingly meaning something different than the common Scholastic term, especially as used by the *Middle View* of Aquinas and others (where a *species* is something prior to any cognitive act) (Ibid. p.283; cf. *De Trinitate* 10.5.7).

the soul proper, which, in some manner, combines (or “copulates”) the object and impression (and brings about a distinct “image” of the object in the soul proper). However, as Scotus points out, apt to cause confusion, “that information of the sense [i.e. (ii)], which comes about from body alone, is called a ‘vision’ [by Augustine]” (Ibid. p.300; see, e.g., *De Trinitate* 11.2.2).¹⁸⁰

¹⁸⁰ “*Ista glossa arguitur ex dicto eius XI De Trinitate cap.2, ubi vult quod informatio sensus, quae fit a solo corpore, ‘visio’ dicitur.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300).

For the relevant passages from Augustine: “***Trinitas quaedam in visione: Cum igitur aliquod corpus videmus, haec tria, quod facillimum est, considerata sunt et dignoscenda. Primo, ipsa res quam videmus sive lapidem, sive aliquam flammam, sive quid aliud quod videri oculis potest; quod utique iam esse poterat, et antequam videretur. Deinde, visio, quae non erat priusquam rem illam obiectam sensui sentiremus. Tertio, quod in ea re quae videtur, quamdiu videtur sensum detinet oculorum, id est animi intentio.*** Primum quippe illud corpus visibile longe alterius naturae est, quam sensus oculorum, quo sibimet incidente fit visio. Ipsaque visio quae quid aliud, quam sensus ex ea re quae sentitur informatus apparet? Quamvis re visibili detracta nulla sit, nec ulla omnino esse possit talis visio, si corpus non sit quod videri queat; nullo modo tamen eiusdem substantiae est corpus quo formatur sensus oculorum, cum idem corpus videtur, et ipsa forma quae ab eodem imprimatur sensui, quae visio vocatur. Corpus enim a visu in sua natura separabile est; sensus autem qui iam erat in animante, etiam priusquam videret quod videre posset, cum in aliquid visibile incurreret, vel visio quae fit in sensu ex visibili corpore, cum iam coniunctum est et videtur; sensus ergo vel visio, id est sensus non formatus extrinsecus vel sensus formatus extrinsecus, ad animantis naturam pertinet, omnino aliam quam est illud corpus quod videndo sentimus, quo sensus non ita formatur ut sensus sit, sed ut visio sit. Nam sensus et ante obiectum rei sensibilis nisi esset in nobis, non distaremus a caecis, dum nihil videmus, sive in tenebris, sive clausis luminibus. Hoc autem distamus, quod nobis inest et non videntibus, quo videre possimus, qui sensus vocatur; illis vero non inest, nec aliunde nisi quod eo carent, caeci appellantur. Itemque illa animi intentio, quae in ea re quam videmus sensum tenet, atque utrumque coniungit, non tantum ab ea re visibili natura differt; quandoquidem iste animus, illud corpus est, sed ab ipso quoque sensu atque visione; quoniam solius animi est haec intentio. Sensus autem oculorum non ob aliud sensus corporis dicitur, nisi quia et ipsi oculi membra sunt corporis, et quamvis non sentiat corpus exanime, anima tamen commixta corpori ei instrumentum sentit corporeum, et idem instrumentum sensus vocatur. Qui etiam passione corporis, cum quisque excaecatur, interceptus exstinguitur, cum idem maneat animus, et eius intentio, luminibus amissis, non habeat quidem sensum corporis quem videndo extrinsecus corpori adiungat atque in eo viso figat aspectum, nisi tamen ipso indicet se adempto corporis sensu, nec perire potuisse, nec minui. Manet enim quidam videndi appetitus integer, sive id possit fieri, sive non possit. ***Haec igitur tria, corpus quod videtur, et ipsa visio, et quae utrumque coniungit intentio, manifesta sunt ad dignoscendum, non solum propter propria singulorum, verum etiam propter differentiam naturarum.***

Atque in his cum sensus non procedat ex corpore illo quod videtur, sed ex corpore sentientis animantis, cui anima suo quodam miro modo contemperatur; tamen ex corpore quod videtur gignitur visio, id est, sensus ipse formatur; ut iam non tantum sensus qui etiam in tenebris esse integer potest, dum est incolumitas oculorum, sed etiam sensus informatus sit, quae visio vocatur. Gignitur ergo ex re visibili visio, sed non ex sola, nisi adsit et videns. Quocirca ex visibili et vidente gignitur visio, ita sane ut ex vidente sit sensus oculorum, et aspicientis atque intuentis intentio; illa tamen informatio sensus, quae visio dicitur, a solo imprimatur corpore quod videtur, id est, a re aliqua visibili. Qua detracta, nulla remanet forma quae inerat sensui, dum adesset illud quod videbatur; sensus tamen ipse remanet qui erat et priusquam aliquid sentiretur; velut in aqua vestigium tamdiu est, donec ipsum corpus quod imprimatur inest; quo ablato nullum erit, cum remaneat aqua, quae erat et antequam illam formam corporis caperet. Ideoque non possumus quidem dicere quod sensum gignat res visibilis; gignit tamen formam velut similitudinem suam, quae fit in sensu, cum aliquid videndo sentimus. Sed formam corporis quod videmus, et formam quae ab illa in sensu videntis fit, per eundem sensum non discernimus; quoniam tanta

Indeed, this ambiguous terminology is not lost on those who defend more passive views of cognition; Godfrey, e.g., takes this definition of “vision”, as something impressed from the body alone, in isolation, such that he argues that Augustine would agree with him that, by extension from the case of vision, any passive change in a cognitive power is simply identical to the relevant act of cognition (*contra* the interpretation of the usual active “Augustinians”, such as Olivi) (*Quodlibet IX, Q.19; p.274*).¹⁸¹

However, Godfrey says nothing to make sense of the surrounding context to this passage. So, instead, reasonably enough, in line with Scotus’s general take on the *nobility* of soul proper for Augustine, Scotus prefers to interpret (ii), this impression (“vision” loosely speaking) brought about in body alone, such that it is only a sensible/visible *species* of some sort (in the organ alone, not the soul), while “sensation”/“vision”, properly speaking, is an “image” and sensitive act of cognition, brought about in the soul proper; as Scotus says, the latter is “more perfect than that prior similitude, which is customarily called a ‘*species*’” (*Ordinatio I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2;*

coniunctio est, ut non pateat discernendi locus. Sed ratione colligimus nequaquam nos potuisse sentire, nisi fieret in sensu nostro, aliqua similitudo conspecti corporis. Neque enim cum anulus cerae imprimitur, ideo nulla imago facta est, quia non discernitur, nisi cum fuerit separata. Sed quoniam post ceram separatam manet quod factum est ut videri possit, propterea facile persuadetur, quod inerat iam cerae forma impressa ex anulo et antequam ab illa separaretur. Si autem liquido humori adiungeretur anulus, eo detracto nihil imaginis appareret. Nec ideo tamen discernere ratio non deberet, fuisse in illo humore, antequam detraheretur, anuli formam factam ex anulo, quae distinguenda est ab ea forma quae in anulo est, unde ista facta est quae detracto anulo non erit, quamvis illa in anulo maneat unde ista facta est. Sic sensus oculorum non ideo non habet imaginem corporis quod videtur quamdiu videtur quia eo detracto non remanet. Ac per hoc tardioribus ingeniis difficillime persuaderi potest, formari in sensu nostro imaginem rei visibilis, cum eam videmus, et eandem formam esse visionem.
(Augustine, *De Trinitate* 11.2.2-3)

¹⁸¹ “Cum ergo virtus apprehensiva secundum quod huiusmodi per se sit solum in potentia ad ipsuni actum cognoscendi vel ad ipsam cognitionera, in ipsa ab agente non fit aliquid per se nisi hoc; et sic videtur quod nec sensibile nec intelligibile secundum quod huiusmodi faciant in sensu et intellectu per se nisi ipsum actum. Unde dicit Augustinus, undecimo de Trinitate, capitulo quarto [in fact, 2.2], quod, cum aliquod corpus videmus, est ibi accipere illa tria realiter distincta, scilicet ipsum corpus visibile et ipsum visum qui visione eius informatur et ipsam visionem, quae non est aliud quam ipse sensus ex ipsa re qua sentitur informatus. Et subdit: ipsa forma quae cum viso visui imprimitur visio ipsa vocatur.” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet IX, Q.19; p.274*). See Chapter 3, where I also discuss how Aquinas’s *Middle View* interprets these passages, such that an external act of sensation is indeed a passive reception, while an “image” is rather an act of compositive imagination (*phantasia*), upon which, furthermore, the intellect must act further to generate an act of intellection.

Opera Theologica III/1, p.300)¹⁸². Moreover, Scotus isn't coming out of nowhere with this proper definition of "vision"/"sensation", relative to the text, insofar as Augustine's whole point in raising this "trinity" in vision is that vision is what results from all three parts together as one, not just one part on its own. As Scotus quotes from Augustine, "vision is generated from the visive agent (*vidente*) and the visible thing (*visibili*)"; i.e., the cognitive act is generated from the cognitive soul proper, *qua* spirit (with its will/attention/gaze), and the visible thing, as present through a visible *species*, in the organ, *qua* body (Ibid.; cf. *De Trinitate* 11.2.3).

Lastly, with respect to these passages, Scotus argues that his interpretation of Augustine here fits his active account of cognition, indeed even better than those who take the soul to be a "total cause", insofar as cognition, as we've just seen, is said by Augustine to be generated from the soul and its object. Given Augustine's *nobility* claims, it's true that the object cannot act on the soul directly, but it can leave an impression in the body, which the soul, as primary cause, can then use as a partial (*quasi-instrumental*) cause (Ibid.; cf. p.301)¹⁸³.

¹⁸² "*Illam autem 'informatio' est propria species, quae recipitur in parte organi, scilicet in corpore sic mixto; hoc patet ex hoc quod dicit quod 'gignatur a solo corpore quod videtur'. Sicut ergo illud quod est proprie imago dicitur 'visio', ita e converso visio potest dici 'imago' et multo verius, quia 'visio' – secundum veritatem – est quaedam qualitas, et talis qualitas quae est quaedam similitudo obiecti, et forte perfectior quam illa similitudo prior, qua dicitur usitate 'species'.*

*Hoc intellecto, faciliter patet ad auctoritates eius. Concedo enim quod illam 'imaginem', quae est 'sensatio', non causat corpus in spiritu ut totalis causa, sed anima causat in se, 'mira celeritate', non tamen ut tota causa, sed ipsa et obiectum; unde dicit ibi XII, quod 'mox ut visum fuerit' etc., innuens quod praesentia obiecti requiritur in ratione visibilis, ut anima faciat visionem in se, et non requiritur nisi ut aliquo modo causa partialis, sicut ipse exprimit in XI De Trinitate cap. 2, quod 'a vidente et visibili gignitur visio'." (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300).*

¹⁸³ Note that all of this is said about sensitive cognition, but presumably Scotus thinks its safe to infer something general to intellectual cognition as well; indeed, Augustine himself goes on to speak of the "image" formed in vision as the stand-in for an object/*species* for the intellective soul to make use of in intellection too (*De Trinitate* XII).

In more general terms, Scotus also accepts the general *nobility* principle which is commonly derived from Augustine's nobility arguments, e.g., in terms of the spirituality of the soul, so long as the right qualifications are made:

“That ‘an agent is more excellent than its effect’ is not true unless of an equivocal and total cause: however, it is possible that some cause be a partial agent to some effect more noble than it, as an element, in virtue of the celestial bodies, is able to act in the generation of something mixed, which is more noble than that element which acts as a partial cause.” (Ibid. p.300).¹⁸⁴

By “equivocal cause/agent”, Scotus means a cause which is different in type/form than its effect, such as God causing lesser creatures¹⁸⁵; in contrast, a univocal cause is the same in type/form as its effect, such as a human begetting another human (Ibid. p.302)¹⁸⁶. The “qualification” that an agent will not (necessarily) be more excellent than its effect in the case of a univocal agent is not entirely new; Gonsalvus, e.g., states that univocal agents are equally as noble as their effects, at least with respect to the general type/form (e.g., one human is equally human to the other), and so he states that the nobility principle, which he also derives from Augustine, is only about equivocal agents/causes (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.34-35)¹⁸⁷. More to his point, Scotus's

¹⁸⁴ “[I]lla autem quod ‘agens est praestantius effectu’ non est vera nisi de causa aequivoca et totali; potest autem aliqua causa esse partialiter agens ad aliquem effectum nobiliorem se, sicut elementum in virtute corporum caelestium potest agere ad generationem mixti, quod est nobilius ipso elemento, agente ut partiali causa.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300)

¹⁸⁵ Indeed, God, as cause of everything other than itself, by way of this very nobility principle, will necessarily create something less noble/excellent (and God, conversely, must be the most perfect thing); as Gonsalvus clarifies below, this exact theological context is one place where one can derive this nobility principle from Augustine.

¹⁸⁶ A bit later, as we'll get to, Scotus gives the following explicit definitions of these terms: “[A]gens agit univoce, hoc est inducit in passum formam eiusdem rationis cum illa per quam agit [...]. In agentibus autem aequivoce, id est illis agentibus quae non agunt per formas eiusdem rationis cum quam agunt [...].” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.302).

¹⁸⁷ “[S]ed impossibile est quod [actio] sit ab obiecto, quod patet: Primo, ex innobilitate obiecti, quia omne agens aequivocum est nobilius suo effectu. . Hoc dicit Augustinus, 83 Quaestionum, quaest. [28] ; et Boethius, III De consolatione, prosa 10 ; et Richardus [of St. Victor], I De Trinitate, cap. 12. Nisi etiam ita sit, tollitur via inquirendi nobilitatem divinam, quia ex factis. – Ipsi etiam ostendentes quod non potest aliquid esse virtualiter tale et potentia formaliter tale, dicunt quod agens aequivocum est nobilius suo effectu, et agens univocum aequae nobile. Cum igitur obiectum sit agens aequivocum respectu actionis intelligendi et volendi, erit nobilius istis, quod est improbable de multis obiectis, scilicet materialibus.” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.34-35).

For the reference to Augustine: “28. Quare Deus mundum facere voluerit:

qualification in terms of “total causes” is meant to fit his own terminology and account: a total equivocal cause will always have a less noble effect, so a less noble object cannot sufficiently cause the more noble effect, i.e., an act of cognition (this much Scotus admits with prior accounts); but the object, as a partial cause, by way of another partial cause (viz. the cognitive power), can result in a more noble effect (i.e., cognition). Scotus gives another example of the celestial bodies, such as the Sun, aiding in the generation of a more noble effect (e.g., a human being), at least by way of partial and less noble causes, such as the sub-lunar elements which the celestial bodies control/maintain; e.g., the Sun heats sub-lunar elements, like water and air, to help maintain the “vital heat” required, as a partial cause, for the parents, as primary causes, in generation.

To a similar end, Scotus also returns to the prior *nobility argument*, framed in terms of the “vitality” of cognition, which, as seen above, Scotus attributes to Augustine and his followers; i.e., recall:

“For that view it is argued through reasons so: An effect does not exceed a cause in perfection. ‘However, everything living is better than the non-living’, according to Augustine in *The City of God* [VIII.6]. Therefore, a vital operation cannot be unless [enacted] by a principle of acting of a vital or living [thing]. Those operations of cognition are vital operations; therefore, they are from that soul as in the manner of an agent.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284)¹⁸⁸.

Qui quaerit quare voluerit Deus mundum facere, causam quaerit voluntatis Dei. Sed omnis causa efficiens est. Omne autem efficiens maius est quam id quod efficitur. Nihil autem maius est voluntate Dei; non ergo eius causa quaerenda est.” (83 Questions, Q.28; emphasis mine).

¹⁸⁸ “Pro ista opinione arguitur per rationes sic: effectus non excedit causam in perfectione: ‘melius est autem omne vivum non vivo’, secundam Augustinum *De civitate Dei* [VIII, cap.6]; ergo operatio vitalis non potest esse nisi a principio agendi vitali vel vivo. Istaes operationes cognoscendi sunt operationes vitales, ergo sunt ab ipsa anima sicut a ratione agendi.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284).

For the reference to Augustine: “*Philosophia naturali platonici Deum quaerunt [...] Consideraverunt enim, quidquid est, vel corpus esse vel vitam, meliusque aliquid vitam esse quam corpus [...]*” (*The City of God*, VIII.6). [“For they [the Platonists [who] seek God by natural philosophy] considered that whatever exists is either a body or a life (*corpus esse vel vitam*), and it is better to be a life than a body”.] In the rest of this section, Augustine presents a typical hierarchy of being for medieval thinkers (though with its roots in ancient thought), from the purely

As I've touched on above, Scotus goes on clarify that this argument is still broadly "in his favour" in this section, and he clearly uses this argument structure earlier against Godfrey's *Fully Passive View*; but, as Scotus continues, he only accepts this argument with the right caveats:

"[That prior argument] is in my favour because cogitation, since it is a vital operation, does not come from the non-living as a total cause. Nevertheless, it is possible that something non-living is a partial cause of something living, or a vital effect, as the non-living Sun is a partial cause with the father for generating the living child; and all the more so, it is possible, since in this case the more principal cause is a life" (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.301).¹⁸⁹

In other words, although the father, *qua* living, is the more principal cause, such that the non-living Sun cannot have a vital effect on its own, the non-living Sun can still have a partial causal/explanatory role for a living and, thus, more noble effect; this is not meant to violate the principle of nobility, which Scotus draws upon, since he clarifies that it is only impossible for the inferior/non-vital to have a more noble/vital effect if it were the "total" cause.

As brought up above, this is also where Scotus explicitly "concedes" prior *attribution arguments*, though, predictably, with the same qualification we've just seen in his nobility arguments; in short, an immanent action, such as intellection, nominates a partial agent, that

corporeal, such as the elements, to the merely living, requiring nutrition and growth, such as plants, to the sensitive lives, such as non-rational animals, to the (partially simple?) intellective and sensitive lives, such as humans, to the simple and immutable intellective lives, such as angels, and ultimately, the most blessed simple intellective life, God.

¹⁸⁹ "Ad rationem primam pro illa opinione: concludit pro me, quia cogitatio cum sit operatio vitalis non est a non-vivo sicut a totali causa; potest tamen non-vivum esse causa partialis alicuius vivi, vel effectus vitalis, sicut sol non-vivus est causa partialis cum patre [better: patrem] ad generandum filium vivum, et multo magis in proposito est possibile, quia hic causa principalior est 'vita', sicut patebit in sequenti quaestione [i.e., Q.3]." (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.301).

Note that, unlike the traditional position attributed to Aristotle, and oft found in Islamic Medieval philosophy, that the heavenly bodies are separate intelligences, moving through soul, Scotus and other Latin Medieval philosophers deny that the sun and stars are living, appetitive, or intelligent beings. Gonsalvus, e.g., points out that the claim that the heavenly bodies are willing, intelligent, and, thus, ensouled is an "excommunicated article and expressly against [John] Damascene" (Gonsalvus, *I Quaestiones*, Q.12; p.231); in his edition, Amoros provides the citation to John Damascene: "Nullus porro caelos aut luminaria animata esse arbitretur; anima quippe et sensu carent." (Ibid. fn.4; Damascene, *De fide orthod.*, II, c.6).

which the action remains in, though another thing, such as the object, can still be a partial cause (Ibid. p.301). To be more specific, as Scotus explains in the following question (Q.3), also discussed above, the intrinsic principle of such an action, such as the intellective power, will be the primary cause, as well, with the object co-operating as a subordinate cause; so, in this sense the thrust of the prior attribution argument(s) of Olivi and Gonsalvus still holds.

So, overall, Scotus goes to great length in this section to fit his own account with the authority of Augustine, as used in prior active accounts (e.g., from Olivi). According to Scotus, to put it one way, these prior “Augustinians”, in fact, should have ended up with his self-ascribed more moderate view, where the cognitive power need not be a total cause, even if the cognitive power needs to bring about its acts “in itself and through itself”, as the primary cause. Moreover, note that even back when he first gives his own view, Scotus ties his account to that of Augustine, specifically to *De Trinitate* IX, “the last chapter”, to argue that the soul and its object are joint causes in cognition (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.297-298). Note, as well, that one of the final objections which Scotus uses to frame his account, is that if, otherwise, the intellect were a total cause, it would be “infinite” in perfection (Ibid. p.297)¹⁹⁰.

However, given the more nuanced interpretation these prior “Augustinians” discussed above, Scotus’s “qualified” concession to these prior active accounts seems actually to be an adoption of those views, at least those of Olivi and Gonsalvus in substance; e.g., we’ve even seen

¹⁹⁰ “Videtur etiam, quarto, quod tunc esset infinita activitas in intellectu, in quantum intellectus est activus respectu omnium intellectionum, quia ad unam intellectionem requiritur aliqua perfectio in causa illius intellectionis, et ad aliam intellectionem alterius rationis requiritur tanta perfectio, vel maior, quia continens virtualiter duas perfectiones causarum propriarum, hic et ibi ; ergo, habens hanc et illam, erit perfectius quam habens illam tantum, et ita habens infinitas tales ut totalis causa, est infinitum perfectione.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.297).

Olivi and Gonsalvus explain how an effect can exceed its primary cause (taken in itself) in the case of cognitive and appetitive improvement, as the power can become more perfect through its acts and habits, fixed in co-operation with external objects (see, e.g., II Sent. Q.74; pp.134-135). Moreover, this last reference to *De Trinitate*, from Scotus, is especially noteworthy given that Gonsalvus cites this exact text of Augustine, using the exact same phrasing, responding to the exact same sort of objection (i.e., that the soul would be infinite in perfection if it were a primary efficient cause of its acts). Recall, moreover, that Gonsalvus glosses from this text that the object still plays a role as an agent/efficient cause, albeit as a *sine qua non* cause (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, arg.2; p.28 & ad. 2; p.45)¹⁹¹. So, this is one more reason to see common ground between Scotus's account and other "qualified" Augustinian active accounts of cognition, such as those of Olivi and Gonsalvus.

At the very least, it's clear enough that, even in Scotus's own voice, he leans much more towards prior active accounts than passive accounts. As we'll see next, this is even clearer in how Scotus responds to the arguments behind prior *Fully Passive Views*.

¹⁹¹ Compare, e.g., the rather specific phrasing in citing Augustine, "*IX De Trinitate, cap. ultimo*", that both citations are responding to the same objection to an "infinite" active view, and that both views, I take it, argue for co-efficient causes (ultimately leaning on the role of the cognitive power):

"*Sed dico aliter, quia secundum Augustinum, IX De Trinitate, cap. ultimo, obiectum reducitur ad causam agentem, sed est agens sine quo non; nihilominus est causa per se coassistens imprimenti, sed nihil imprimit, nec oportet propter hoc quod sit causa per accidens, sed est causa per se.* (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.2; pp.45-46).

"*Si ergo nec anima sola nec obiectum solum sit causa totalis intellectionis actualis – et illa sola videntur requiri ad intellectionem – sequitur quod ista duo sunt una causa integra respectu notitiae genitae. Et ista est sententia Augustini IX De Trinitate cap. ultimo, sicut allegatum fuit arguendo contra primam opinionem ('Liquido tendenum' etc.)." (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298).*

"[...] *liquido tenendum ex quod omnis res quamcumque cognoscimus cogenerat in nobis notitiam sui; ab utroque enim notitia paritur, a cognoscente et cognito.*" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, IX.12.18).

To be clear, as mentioned before, despite the order in seniority, Scotus's text seems to have come first, so, Gonsalvus could be responding to Scotus here rather than the inverse (if either direction at all).

§3.5. Scotus and Gonsalvus in Defence of Self-Motion

After conceding much to the arguments for prior active accounts of cognition, Scotus next turns to the arguments used by Godfrey for his *Fully Passive View*, which rely on denying any strict self-motion (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.302-305). As we'll see, Scotus is much more disparaging of Godfrey's arguments than those of Olivi and company. Moreover, the similarities between Scotus and Gonsalvus are particularly noticeable, given that both are explicitly responding to Godfrey (unlike Olivi, who most likely has a prior target).

§3.5.1. Godfrey's Argument from So-Called Principles of Metaphysics

To recall, the first argument of Godfrey, in Scotus's paraphrase, goes as follows:

“There is another view, which is totally in the other extreme, which says that [...] the intellective soul, as intellective, has no activity with respect to intellection. For the possible intellect does not have such causality (whether informed by an intelligible *species*, as they deny, or nude) since according to them the same thing is not able to act on itself. They prove this so: since the agent should be in act such as the patient [is] in potency – III *Physicorum* [chapter 2] and I *De generatione* [chapter 5] – it follows that the same thing would be in potency and in act, which, for one, seems to be opposed to a first principle of metaphysics known through the definition [*ratio*] of act and potency.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.286).

In other words, Godfrey's argument is that if the intellective soul, e.g., (with respect to the part which intelligizes, i.e. the potential intellect) were to directly bring about its own act in itself, two contradictory things would be required: (i) less controversially, the intellective soul would have to be, on one hand, a patient, in potency to the form of intellection, just as a log is a patient for heat, insofar as it is only potentially hot (since, by assumption, the intellect does not always have an actual act of intellection and, so, must be brought to act); yet, (ii), on the other hand, the

intellective soul would also have to be, at the same time and in the same respect, an agent, in act to intellection, just as fire is an agent for heating insofar as it actually has the form of heat. So, if the intellect were to self-move, the same thing would both have the relevant form (i.e., intellection) it needs to act, while also lacking said form, just as if fire would need to both have and lack heat, if it were to self-heat. So, instead, Godfrey concludes that intellection, as with everything else, must be a total effect from something distinct, which is appropriately in act (viz., in this case, an intelligible object).

§3.5.2. Scotus and Gonsalvus in Response: On Equivocal Agents, Virtually in Act and Formally in Potency

In response to Godfrey's above argument, both Scotus and Gonsalvus make use of two technical distinctions, first, that between *univocal* and *equivocal agents/causes*, and second, even more crucially, that between a thing being "*formally*" or "*virtually*" in act/potency¹⁹². Consider their two responses in full:

Scotus: "When it is argued that the possible [intellect] cannot have any causality, since 'no same thing acts on itself' (*nihil idem agit in se*)¹⁹³, I

¹⁹² Note that prior to both Scotus and Gonsalvus, Godfrey himself considers this distinction, on behalf of his opponent. E.g., Godfrey considers the view that the will is "virtually" in act, insofar as it is a general appetite for the good, but can still be, at the same time, "formally" in potency, insofar as it lacks a particular volition for some (apparently) good object, in the will as in a subject and patient: "*Ideo motum volitionis facit voluntas quae est appetitus rationalis eo quod rationalis est ut una parte eius, in appetitu autem in quantum est simpliciter ut in subiecto receptibili et passivo ut in alia parte eius. Verum est etiam quod agens sive movens semper est tale in actu quale est mobile in potentia; sed esse tale contingit dupliciter, scilicet virtualiter vel formaliter. In quibusdam enim est agens tale virtute quale passivum potentia, sicut in sole qui est calidus virtute et inducit caliditatem formalem in aliquo corpore mixto.*" (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; III, p.150). [See more of this passage below] Henry of Ghent is also known to have used this distinction. Who, in particular, started using this distinction in this medieval debate, is, however, open to question. Thus, I should caution that I make no claims as to whether Scotus or Gonsalvus take this distinction from the other, given that both would likely have been aware of the distinction independently.

¹⁹³ To translate this otherwise: "Nothing brings about the same thing in itself", or, more simply, "Nothing acts on itself".

respond that that proposition [*nihil idem agit in se*] is not true except about univocal agents, nor does the proof of this proposition follow that ‘then the same thing would be in act and in potency’ except when an agent acts univocally, i.e., when an agent induces into a patient a form of the same *ratio* with that through which it [the agent] acts; for if something were to act on itself in such a way, therefore it would have at once ‘the form of the same *ratio* through which it is moved’ and while it is moved to that [form], would lack that [form]; so, at once it would have that and not have that, at least, this follows for two forms of the same type or for one of the same [form].

However, in equivocal agents, i.e. in those agents which do not act through forms of the same *ratio* with which they act, that proposition that ‘nothing moves itself’ (*nihil movet se*) does not have necessity, nor does its argument, that ‘the same thing would be in potency and in act with respect to the same thing’, conclude anything: for it is not the case here that the agent is formally such in act, as the patient is formally such in potency; rather, the agent is virtually such in act, as the patient is formally in potency; and there is no contradiction that the same thing should be virtually such in act and formally such in potency.

Example: to be virtually hot in act and formally [hot] in potency, in themselves, do not include a contradiction or repugnance, and thus in no subject do they include a repugnance, such that the [the two] could not be at once, nor the one [be the case] here, since [it is] the other; the Sun is such that it is virtually hot, but cannot be formally hot, and yet this is not principally on account of a repugnance of those [properties], since Saturn is cold virtually and yet it cannot be hot formally; thus, a virtual act should not be the cause in it of repugnance, but something else, which is common to the Sun and Saturn, for instance, that they are incorruptible bodies and heat is a corruptible quality.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.302)¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ “*Ad argumenta pro secunda opinione. Quamvis posset ibi tangi, utrum illa causalitas quae attribuitur intellectivae parti, conveniat proprie intellectui agenti vel possibili, tamen illam difficultatem dimitto usque alias [cf. Quodlibet, Q.15].*

Cum probatur quod ‘possibilis’ non potest habere causalitatem aliquam, quia ‘nihil idem agit in se’, respondeo quod illa propositio non est vera nisi de agente univoco, nec illa probatio eius quod ‘tunc idem esset in actu in potentia’ concludit nisi quando agens agit univoce, hoc est inducit in passum formam eiusdem rationis cum illa per quam agit; si enim sic aliquid ageret in se, ergo haberet simul ‘formam eiusdem rationis ad quam movetur’, et dum movetur ad illam, careret illa; ergo simul haberet illam et non haberet, saltem hoc sequitur de duabus formis eiusdem speciei, vel de eadem.

In agentibus autem aequivoce, id est illis agentibus quae non agunt per formas eiusdem rationis cum quam agunt, propositio illa quod ‘nihil movet se’ non habet necessitatem, nec probatio eius quod ‘aliquid sit in potentia et in actu respectu eiusdem’ aliquid concludit: non enim ibi agens formaliter tale in actu quale passum est formaliter in potentia, sed agens est virtualiter tale in actu quale formaliter est passum in potentia; et quod ‘idem’ sit virtualiter tale in actu et formaliter tale in potentia, nulla est contradictio.

Exemplum: esse calidum virtualiter in actu et in potentia formaliter, de se non includunt contradictionem vel repugnantiam, et ideo in nullo subiecto includunt repugnantiam quod propter hoc non possint esse simul, nec alterum ibi quia alterum; tamen sol, qui est calidus virtualiter, non potest esse calidus formaliter, tamen hoc non

Gonsalvus: “To the third [argument, that nothing can move itself or bring itself from potency into act, since then something would be, at once and simultaneously, in potency with respect to the same thing (as it is in act)], I say that the will does not move itself according to the same [respect], for, in as much as it moves it is virtually [in act]; however, in as much as it is formally in potency, it is moved. And it is possible that something that is virtually such, should also be formally such in potency.” (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.3; p.46).¹⁹⁵

First off, Scotus at least clearly concedes Godfrey’s argument as it applies to so-called univocal agents, like fire making hot insofar as it is hot, since such self-motion would indeed face a vicious regress; e.g., to make itself hot(ter), fire would need the very heat which it lacks.

However, Scotus does not take the intellect (or other powers of the soul) to be such a univocal agent, at least in not the production of its most basic acts; rather, the intellect is an equivocal agent. As Scotus here explains, an equivocal agent acts by way of a form which exceeds the form of its effect, though the effect is contained “virtually” in the agent.

The contrast being drawn here is that between being virtually and formally an agent. For something to be “formally” in act/potency is for something to have that very form, in the usual way required to be in act/potency; e.g., with respect to an accident, such as intellection, for something to be formally in act would be for it to have that accidental form, while to be formally in potency would be to lack that accidental form, but be in direct potency to receive said form. In contrast, to be merely “virtually” in act would be to have a form which exceeds but “virtually” contains that form, without requiring that lesser form in act (i.e., formally). Scotus gives the

est propter repugnantiam istorum primo, quia saturnus est frigidus virtualiter, tamen hoc non potest esse calidus formaliter; ergo actus virtualis non erat in eo causa repugnantiae, sed aliquid aliud, quod est commune soli et saturno, puta quod ista sunt ‘corpora incorruptibilia’, et calor est ‘qualitas’ corruptibilis.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.302).

¹⁹⁵ “Ad tertium dico quod non movet seipsum secundum idem, quia secundum quod est virtualiter tale movet; secundum autem quod est potentia formaliter tale movetur. Possibile autem est quod sit virtualiter tale, et potentia tale formaliter.” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.3; p.46).

For the original (third) argument, as presented by Gonsalvus, earlier in the text: “3. Item, nihil potest seipsum movere seu reducere de potentia ad actum, quia iam aliquid simul et semel esset in potentia respectu eiusdem; hoc autem contingeret si dicti actus essent a dictis potentiis effective. Quare etc.” (Ibid. p.28; see, e.g., Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; III, p.149).

example of the Sun, which, following a common medieval Aristotelian view, is considered to not have actual heat “formally” (and thus, the Sun differs from a corruptible body like fire, with actual heat in its essence), yet the Sun can heat sub-lunar bodies, so it must act with an even more excellent/noble form (it is “virtually” hot just insofar as it has a power/virtue to cause heat)¹⁹⁶.

Both Scotus and Gonsalvus argue, there is no contradiction in an equivocal agent, in its initial state, being merely virtually in act and formally in potency, since this does not necessitate that the same thing both have form F and not have form F, in the same respect (i.e., formally). Thus, it is coherent for the intellect/will to bring itself, as an equivocal agent, from being merely virtually in act and formally in potency, into being formally in act, with respect to some act of intellection/volition; the power would not be stuck in a vicious regress for it does not act through the same form which it lacks. To put it otherwise, following the details of the accounts of Scotus and Gonsalvus, which we’ve seen above, the will, e.g., insofar as it exists and is in sufficient activity, has a standing desire to seek the good, but might lack a particular act of volition (formally in act) about some object; thus, it can gain some perfection by bringing itself further

¹⁹⁶ Note that Scotus gives the Sun example for this reason, to explain what it is to be virtually in act but not formally in act, as a self-mover would have to be in its initial state; this is not, however, to provide an example of self-motion (the Sun, obviously, cannot heat itself, since it cannot contain heat formally in act). More worryingly, one might point out that although the Sun is not formally hot in act, it’s also not formally in potency either (insofar as it is not able to be actually hot, at least naturally), so it isn’t a perfect example to disprove Godfrey’s principle of act/potency (i.e., something virtually such in act, while formally such in potency); indeed, Godfrey himself points to this discrepancy and claims that it is because the Sun is virtually hot that it cannot be formally hot (cf. Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; p.150). However, at the very least, as he explains in the passage above, Scotus argues that the Sun lacks the potency to be hot for a distinct reason (because it is an incorruptible body), not because it is virtually hot; this is why Scotus gives the example of Saturn, which also cannot be formally hot, even though it isn’t virtually hot either (in fact, it is virtually cold). Moreover, so the argument goes, this example still illustrates that, in principle, something can act in virtue of a form which is not the same in kind as the effect, thus, something, in principle, should be able to bring about some form without literally having that form, as in the case of the cognitive soul bringing about an act of cognition from its greater virtue. (If God could infuse the form of the Sun into a corruptible body, this would also provide a coherent case of self-motion.)

into act, to produce a determinate act of volition about some apparently good object (assuming the object is present in some manner to aid in the will's action)¹⁹⁷.

§3.5.3. *In Reply to Godfrey (via Hartman): A Dubious Distinction?*

Hartman (2012), showing his sympathies for Godfrey, says he finds it hard to find examples of such “equivocal” agents, merely “virtually” in act and claims that, “the fact that it is hard to come up with better examples suggests something about the dubious nature of the distinction itself” (Hartman 2012, p.57, fn.23)¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹⁷ To be clear, Scotus does not himself reference the need for the object to be a “partial cause” in his response here to the first argument from Godfrey, where Scotus is focused on the general coherency of something being an equivocal agent, virtually in act and formally in potency, at the same time and in the same respect; nevertheless, Scotus makes use of his full account, where the object is a “partial cause”, when he next turns to the “Achilles” argument of Godfrey, which is essentially the central objection raised above, as to why an action would not always follow if mover and moved were in the same subject (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1. pp.304-305).

¹⁹⁸ As Hartman takes it, this is part of Godfrey's own skepticism with regard to this objection, which we'll get to more explicitly in the next section. It should be noted, however, that Godfrey himself does not deny the distinction between a univocal and equivocal agent, he just thinks one cannot infer self-motion from this distinction (see, e.g., (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; p.150; Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VIII, q. 2; p.22). For further context, it should be noted that Hartman shows his sympathies in Godfrey's skepticism on account of that fact that Hartman's (2012) larger project is to defend the alternate active view of cognition of Durand of St. Pourçain. In particular, Hartman takes it to be an advantage of Durand's approach, over Scotus and company, that Durand doesn't need to violate/modify Godfrey's principles against self-motion (see, e.g., Hartman 2012, p.119). On Durand's active view of cognition, a cognitive power, such as the intellect, is not strictly a self-mover so much as an unmoved mover, so in this way he gets around Godfrey's principles. To put it otherwise, on Durand's view a cognitive power is essentially in act, such that it lacks nothing *formally* (at least, absolutely), but it is merely in “accidental potency” whenever it lacks a present object to cognize; cognition is a mere relation, upon the presence of some object, as it does not “superadd” any absolute form to the cognitive power; to use the more common Aristotelian terms, when an object is present, the power, inherently “in first act”, can then proceed into “second act”, it's natural place, without the power needing to “impress” any new absolute form onto itself (see, e.g., Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.20-23). Now, although I would agree with Hartman that Durand's approach has its theoretical elegance, it's not clear to me that it's the more principled, or better overall, view, in comparison to that of Scotus and company. For one thing, Scotus and company would agree with Durand that a cognitive power is inherently, by its substantial form/nature, meant to go into act, as an unmoved mover, and so in this way there's no confusion as to why the effect follows, even on Aristotelian lines; where they disagree is more so (i) as to whether some new absolute form also results in cognition (ii), in general, whether there is such formal (but still accidental) room for perfection within a creature's cognitive powers, and (iii), as to whether the intellectual power is always in “first act”, ready for every type of act of intellection, without first needing to undergo some change (as,

However, while Scotus's example of the Sun above might seem weird and unique to a modern reader, I think one can find common enough examples of such equivocal agents, in a medieval context. Moreover, when one considers the principles behind these examples, one can be more assured that Scotus is not merely creating *ad hoc* examples of "causation" to fit his argument; in short, medieval theories of causation aren't limited to univocal agents, merely spreading the same exact form.

First off, it's a common medieval thought that at least certain forms (e.g., substantial forms and qualities) are more noble/perfect than other forms (e.g., quantities or lesser qualities), at least insofar as the latter depend on the former in some way for their being; e.g., on one common view, the colour in a surface causes a "similar" but still less perfect effect, a so-called "*species*" / "*intention*" of colour in the air, in "diminished being", which also depends on the colour to be conserved in being in the air; one need not say the surface also *formally* contains the *species*, since it has an even more perfect form and thus only virtually contains it. So, the colour counts as an equivocal agent of this less perfect effect¹⁹⁹.

e.g., in the self-acquisition of an intelligible *species* prior to universal intellection of material objects, in natural circumstances). On point (ii), I would echo many of Durand's later detractors that it seems he makes the intellectual power out to be formally perfect, in itself, and so just like the divine intellect in this regard; but the idea that creaturely intellects have room for improvement seems hard to drop. Moreover, on point (i), the view of Scotus and company strikes me as more intuitive, and Godfrey's so-called principles as questionable, as we'll see, so I don't take the view of Scotus and company to be unprincipled in this regard. On point (iii), it does seem that at least for some acts of cognition, Scotus and Gonsalvus would agree that the cognitive power is in "first act" or "accidental potency", in substance, and so the effect naturally follows in the presence of the object, as Durand would agree with; nevertheless, it probably wouldn't be quite right to equate these terms (first act/accidental potency) with that of "virtual actuality", given some divergent cases.

¹⁹⁹ Hartman himself, the page over, gives at least one more example that fits this case, that of the heavy thing which naturally moves in location by its form of heaviness, which heaviness itself can, thus, be said to contain a "virtual similitude" of the "location below" (i.e. centre of the earth), differing from location itself, yet able to cause a change in location (Hartman 2012, p.58, fn.25). Hartman gets this example from Godfrey, though Godfrey does not ultimately agree that the heavy moves itself: "*Et ad declarandum quomodo uoluntas mouet seipsam, dicunt quod [... u]erum est etiam quod agens siue mouens semper est tale in actu quale est mobile in potentia. Sed esse tale contingit dupliciter, sc. uirtualiter et formaliter. In quibusdam enim est agens tale uirtute quale passiuum est in*

For another, perhaps more illustrative, example: the craftsperson can be said to “virtually contain” all sorts of artifacts, insofar as she has the skill to build all sorts of things, even if she doesn’t literally contain the form of any such artifact (nor even, in certain cases, need she have a particular form (say, some chair) in mind before building)²⁰⁰. Yet, all these artifacts, given, e.g., that they are not natural substances, are less noble/perfect. Thus, the craftsperson counts as an equivocal agent when she produces such an artifact. And, of course, all the more so, any

*potentia, sicut in sole, qui est calidus uirtute, et inducit caliditatem formalem in aliquo corpore mixto; sicut etiam graue habet formam secundum quam habet similitudinem uirtualem ad locum deorsum et ideo mouet se ad illum, amoto impedimento; ita etiam appetitus humanus habet a creante formam liberi arbitrii qua uult secundum actum, aut potest uelle, amoto impedimento, quod est absentia obiecti, quo facto praesente in intellectu per cognitionem, libere uult illud, si sit finis, uel potest uelle liberum arbitrium, si sit ad finem. Sed ista positio non uidetur rationabilis [...].” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; p.150).*

Scotus also brings up the example of locomotion, explaining that being moved to a location is a sort of quantitative change, according to Aristotle’s categories, but the form of location (or ‘having been moved there’) in, e.g., some stone must be caused by some motive form/quality, e.g., of itself, i.e. its heaviness, or of some other agent, ultimately, an unmoved mover; so, since this motive form (a quality or substantial form) can cause a change in location in a thing (a quantitative effect) without itself being the latter, the motive form must exceed the effect; i.e., it is an equivocal agent which virtually contains such an effect in act.

As Scotus puts it: “*Ista glossa de agentibus univoce et equivoce necessaria est, quia Philosophus posuit ‘motum’ non tantum in genere qualitatis, sed quantitatis et ‘ubi’.* In quantitate autem et ‘ubi’ nullum est agens univocum, quia in genere quantitatis et ‘ubi’ nulla forma est quae sit principium inducendi similem formam, immo – ut generaliter dicatur – quicumque motus est ‘non ad formam activam’, non est ab agente univoco, quia ex quo forma terminans non est activa, nulla eiusdem rationis est principium agendi. Sunt ergo apud Philosophum multi ‘motus’ ab agente non univoco sed aequivoco, et ibi agens est tale virtualiter in actu quale patiens in potentia formaliter.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.302).

Note that, not only does Scotus claim that these effects, ‘motion’ (*motum*) and location/place (*ubi*), can be caused by a more excellent form (e.g., the principle of motion in an unmoved mover), Scotus claims that these effects cannot be caused by a like form, i.e., univocally. Now, one might think that the motion caused, e.g., in a stick, insofar as it is moved, would count as such a ‘*motum*’, and that such motion in the stick is an agent of motion for motion in other objects; so, e.g., motion in the stick would be a univocal cause of motion in the stone. Perhaps, to alleviate this issue, one might grant that a stick’s motion can indeed cause more motion, but prefer not to call it a univocal agent insofar as this power is entirely granted by an external mover.

²⁰⁰ Objection: One might think that the craftsperson can only produce an artifact if she has a specific form in mind (e.g., the blueprint to a specific chair) and acts on this basis of said form; thus, the craftsperson indeed counts as a univocal agent, acting through the same form which she impresses on some matter (e.g., some wood).

Response: First off, it’s unclear to me that having the similitude of a chair in mind would even count as having the form itself of the chair “formally” in act, in the mind, if it’s not the self-same form but a mere representation (and all the more noble, insofar as the form spiritually exists in an act of intellection); such “formal identity” theories of mental representation were commonly called into question in medieval philosophy.

Second, it’s unclear to me that the craftsperson indeed begins to act only once she has an exact blueprint in mind. Having the art/skill of building is at least prior to any individual act of building and, it seems to me, would enable the craftsperson to start to build before having a specific plan, using the product-in-progress as the medium with which she chooses what to do next.

Christian medieval philosopher must admit that God is such an equivocal agent, insofar as everything He creates is less noble/perfect than Him, but produced through his greater being. Clearly enough, these created forms, such as corporeality, can only be said to be “virtually” contained in the divine essence, insofar as God has the power to create these things but cannot be formally like them (in every respect). Overall, both the divine and human artificers, as equivocal causes, still provide a sufficient explanation for their effects, and thus are still perfectly good (even better!) causes²⁰¹.

In general, one can see that Scotus and Gonsalvus are working from the common medieval principle, which can also be found elsewhere in their texts, that a cause, insofar as it explains what follows, must “contain the effect”, in some manner²⁰². So, if the cause does not

²⁰¹ In this way, e.g., God can indeed be the sufficient cause of all the animals, instead of requiring each animal to have been caused univocally by a prior animal, same in species, from eternity (*contra* Aristotle).

²⁰² See, e.g., Gonsalvus’s “nobility argument” that the intellective soul must be the more proper cause of intellection (or volition), rather than the object: i.e., since (i) every equivocal agent is more noble/perfect than its effect, and (ii) every corporeal object is less perfect/noble than an incorporeal act of the soul, then, (iii) the average external object (*qua* less noble) cannot be a sufficient cause of an act of intellection/volition (*qua* more noble). As one can see, Gonsalvus explicitly ties the existence of such “equivocal” causes, and this nobility principle, to the traditional arguments made to prove God’s ultimate perfection over His creation; so, he claims, even Godfrey should be committed to this much as well:

“[S]ed impossibile est quod [actio] sit ab obiecto, quod patet: Primo, ex innobilitate obiecti, quia omne agens aequivocum est nobilius suo effectui. . Hoc dicit Augustinus, 83 Quaestionum, quaest. [28] ; et Boethius, III De consolatione, prosa 10 ; et Richardus [of St. Victor], I De Trinitate, cap. 12. Nisi etiam ita sit, tollitur via inquirendi nobilitatem divinam, quia ex factis. – Ipsi etiam ostendentes quod non potest aliquid esse virtualiter tale et potentia formaliter tale, dicunt quod agens aequivocum est nobilius suo effectui, et agens univocum aequae nobile. Cum igitur obiectum sit agens aequivocum respectu actionis intelligendi et volendi, erit nobilius istis, quod est improbable de multis obiectis, scilicet materialibus.” (Gonsalvus, I Quaestiones, Q.3; pp.34-35).

For Scotus’s qualified endorsement of this argument, see, e.g., the following two passages:

“[I]lla autem quod ‘agens est praestantius effectui’ non est vera nisi de causa aequivoca et totali; potest autem aliqua causa esse partialiter agens ad aliquem effectum nobiliorem se, sicut elementum in virtute corporum caelestium potest agere ad generationem mixti, quod est nobilius ipso elemento, agente ut partiali causa.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300).

“Ad rationem primam pro illa opinione: concludit pro me, quia cogitatio cum sit operatio vitalis non est a non-vivo sicut a totali causa; potest tamen non-vivum esse causa partialis alicuius vivi, vel effectus vitalis, sicut sol non-vivus est causa partialis cum patrem ad generandum filium vivum, et multo magis in proposito est possibile, quia hic causa principalior est ‘vita’, sicut patebit in sequenti quaestione [i.e., Q.3].” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.301).

literally act through the same form, as fire makes hot through heat, then a cause must act through an even greater form, (i.e., as an equivocal agent). In this sense, the intellect, e.g., intelligizes through being intelligent in substance; in particular, for Scotus and Gonsalvus, the intellectual soul, having/being an intrinsic and intellectual substantial form, produces accidents of intellection in itself (accidents, taken in isolation, being less perfect than substances).

Hartman, I think, reasonably doubts that an equivocal agent acts directly through its “virtual” form of the accident of intellection itself, as if it were some shadow of its effect. However, it must be remembered that an equivocal agent does act through a fully real form, just a more excellent form (e.g., a substantial intellectual form).

This explication lines up with some further remarks which Scotus makes in this section, in response to Godfrey’s general arguments against self-motion. E.g., Scotus explains that there is nothing incoherent in a substance bringing itself into act, to produce an accidental form in that same subject, which is what happens when the intellectual/volitive soul produces an act of intellection/volition in itself; this is not the same as holding that something creates itself anew, which, in contrast, would entail a vicious regress in dependence:

“It is not repugnant for the mover and moved to be either in the same nature or in the same supposit, since here is not posited an essential dependence, such as the relations of cause and caused posit/entail, nor is it posited thence that the same thing should exist before it itself exists, [...], but only to this extent it is posited here that the same thing depends on itself, with respect to an accidental act, as the moved depends on the mover with respect to an accidental act,

See also, Gonsalvus’s argument, based on the authority of Aristotle, that natural substances have natural effects, and so the cause can be inferred from the effect, just as we can infer that the intellectual soul is the cause of intellection and volition: “*Prima est ex determinatione agentis, quia omne quod est in actu natum est agere, et si sit in tali actu, natum est agere talem actionem; omne enim quod agit, agit secundum quod in actu, ut dicitur IX Metaphysicae; et patet etiam per inductionem, quod existens in tali [actu], natum est agere talem actionem. Sed anima intellectiva est in actu, et in tali actu; ergo nata est agere talem actionem, scilicet intelligere et velle.*” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.32).

which it [the moved] receives from it [the mover].” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.303)²⁰³

For another relevant remark, a bit below, Scotus explains that:

“[W]hatever is in potency to some act ‘formally’ and yet simultaneously has the same actuality ‘virtually’ (as when the same thing moves itself) is in some way indefinite/unlimited (*aliquaqualiter illimitatum*); for it is nevertheless not only posited to be capable of that perfection, but as causing it. Therefore, here, on account of a sort of lack of limitation (*illimitationem aliquaalem*), those opposed relations are themselves very well (*bene*) co-suffered.” (Ibid. pp.303-304)²⁰⁴.

That is, first of all, in line with what we saw from Scotus in the last chapter (§3.3), such a creaturely power, such as the human intellect, is said to be in some way indefinite/unlimited, as, e.g., the intellect is indefinite for many sorts of intellections (i.e., about many sorts of objects), in particular, to *cause* all sorts of intellections (and in this way, “virtually” contains them, as these acts exist in its power/virtue) (cf. *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.3; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.312-313). Here, Scotus also compares the cognitive soul to God since He is indefinite/unlimited (*illimitata*) in his power to cause an even wider range of effects (i.e., all of creation).

Nevertheless, given, as we’ve seen above, the necessity of the cognitive soul to co-operate with external objects, and it’s much more limited range of effects, clearly such a creaturely power isn’t as perfect as God’s indefinite/unlimited nature. Moreover, a creaturely power is also still in formal potency for these effects, that is, as accidents of perfection in itself, whereas God does not

²⁰³ “‘*Movens et motum’ nec in eadem natura nec in eodem supposito repugnant, quia hic non ponitur dependentia essentialis, qualem ponunt relationes causae et causati, nec ibi ponitur quod idem sit antequam sit, [...] sed tantum ponitur hic quod idem dependet a se quantum ad actum accidentalem, sicut motum a movente dependet quantum ad actum accidentalem quam recipit ab eo.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.303).

²⁰⁴ “*Incompossibilitatem ergo aliquarum relationem realium oportet reducere ad aliquam impossibilitatem priorem, et ubi illa prior non invenitur, ibi nec relationum realium oppositarum impossibilitas concluditur. Hoc etiam amplius declaratur, quia sicut istae relationes ‘producentis et producti’, quae sunt repugnantes in eodem supposito, possunt fundari in eadem natura ‘illimitata’, sicut in essentia divina, ita istae relationes ‘moventis et moti’, quae multo minorem habent repugnantiam, possunt fundari in eadem natura ‘aliquaqualiter illimitata’. Quidquid autem est in potentia ad aliquem actum ‘formaliter’, et tamen cum hoc habet eandem actualitatem ‘virtualiter’ – sicut cum idem movet se – est aliquaqualiter illimitatum; ponitur enim non tantum capax illius perfectionis, sed ut causans eam. Ibi ergo, propter illimitationem aliquaalem, bene compatiuntur se illae relationes oppositae.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.303-304).

need to be so perfected. So, it makes sense (i) that the intellective power, in contrast to God, would need to formally perfect itself (with the help of intelligible objects), since such perfections are “accidental”/in addition to its essence. Moreover, it makes sense that (ii) the intellective power would have such a (imperfect) power to perfect itself, “equivocally”, insofar as it is “virtually”/“indefinitely” able to cause any act of intellection, in principle, thanks to what the intellective power is by nature (in this way, though less perfectly so, the intellective power is still analogous to God’s “virtual” power insofar as it acts through an “equivocal” form to cause less perfect effects in form). As Olivi, in particular, would put this last point, in further detail: the intellective power has a general “gaze” towards the world, at least insofar as it is sufficiently vigilant, and thus the intellect provides this causal role in producing acts of intellection; nevertheless, as we’ve discussed further above, the presence of some intelligible object is still needed to terminate and fix this gaze into some determinate act.

§3.5.4. In Reply to Godfrey #2: On the Burden of Proof

In response to all these sorts of “difficulties” for Godfrey, that seem to falsify his so-called principles of metaphysics, Godfrey has a general objection in his pocket, which Scotus loosely cites, that: “such metaphysical principles [e.g., that nothing moves itself], since they are general, must not be denied on account of some specific difficulties [i.e., in specific cases]”²⁰⁵.

²⁰⁵ *“Sed si obicias quod ‘talía principia metaphysica, ex quo sunt generalia, non debent negari propter aliquas difficultates speciales’; respondeo: nulla sunt principia metaphysica quae habent multa singularia falsa; intelligendo autem quod nihil est in actu virtuali et in potentia ad formalem, et quod ista repugnantia accipiatur ex ratione actus et potentiae, multa sunt singularia satis patenter falsa, ex quo satis sequitur quod istud non est principium metaphysicum; sed quod nihil est in actu formali et in potentia respectu eiusdem actus formalis, est verum, scilicet quod sic nihil est simul in actu et in potentia. Et si omnino contendas quod ‘etiam loquendo de actu virtuali et potentia ad formalem actum, sit principium metaphysicum’, quomodo alii erant ita caeci, et ille solus ‘videns’, ut rationem terminorum communium*

To put this response in less desperate terms, I take Godfrey's point is that these principles, which he bases his argument around, are certain, in general terms, but these apparent counter-examples are singular and more contentious, so there must be some workaround for these difficulties.

Scotus, however, responds quite caustically: "there do not exist metaphysical principles which are false in many singular cases" (Ibid.). Perhaps if the Sun, as an equivocal agent, was his best example, Godfrey would have a point, but Scotus, clearly enough, is not in any doubt that there are indeed many cases of self-motion and, more generally, equivocal agents (virtually in act and formally in potency, at the same time and with respect to the same form).

Moreover, Scotus repeats here that he doesn't even deny the principle that nothing is *formally* in act and *formally* in potency at the same time and in the same respect, so qualified. But, Scotus points out, some contend that even the negation of the claim "something can be virtually in act and formally in potency, at the same time and in the same respect" is a principle of metaphysics; these people contend, Scotus describes sarcastically, that "as others err because they are blind, that one alone 'sees'" that these terms (act and potency) cannot be so positively

metaphysicorum non possent concipere, et ex eis apprehendere veritatem talis complexi quod ipse ponit 'principium metaphysicum'? quod non tantum ab aliis non ponitur 'principium', immo in multis falsum, et nusquam necessarium ratione terminorum." (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.302). Scotus (and Gonsalvus, next) loosely quote here from Godfrey: "*Deinde inducuntur aliae difficultates de potentiis animae. Sed quia, ut dicit Aristoteles in principio de anima : omnino penitus difficillimorum est accipere aliquam fidem de animae substantia et natura, ideo circa ipsam et eius potentias et operationes multi fuerunt errores et adhuc sunt multae et diversae opiniones quaedam falsae, quaedam verae, licet ignoretur quae sint verae. Et sunt etiam plurimae difficiles dubitationes, scilicet non inductae et quaedam aliae quas nescire bene dissolvere. Tamen ad praedictas dubitationes dissolvendas primo supponimus quod, quia aliqua principia esse certissima oportet, alioquin nihil etiam posset per ea investigari, communia ergo illa principia metaphysicae, quae quodam modo est omnis scientia, debent in qualibet scientia speciali supponi; et ideo quia ex metaphysica hoc scire debemus quod unum et idem non potest esse in actu et potentia et quod illud quod est in potentia ad aliquid non potest se reducere ad actum secundum illud et hoc pertinet ad metaphysicam, quia est commune omni enti, ideo hoc debemus supponere circa angelos et circa animam et, hoc supposito, alia quae ad ipsam animam specialiter pertinent investigare, nec propter ignorantiam vel dubitationem circa posteriora debemus certissima et prima negare."* (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; p.170). Note that, to be fair, Godfrey seems especially concerned with making room for special cases like angels and separate souls, which indeed seem less certainly understood.

combined (even with qualification), and so, by attending to the complex, only that ‘seer’ is able to “apprehend the truth” of the negative principle (Ibid.). However, Scotus repeats that there are many false cases of this so-called principle, so it cannot be such an evidently true principle, from the terms alone (Ibid.).

As with Scotus, though more to the point, Gonsalvus also responds to this objection, as follows:

“Fifth, [it is objected that] even on account of some ill-fitting particular, if we do not know how to get around that, we must not doubt a self-evident principle (*principium per se notam*), of which sort it is that nothing is at once in act and in potency with respect to the same thing. [...] To the fifth [objection it should be said] that it is not a principle that everything which is moved is moved by another, since that is not principle of which there is some particular doubt or where it is not manifest to the senses. Such is the case here, since it is certain that a heavy thing is moved, however, by what it is moved, whether by itself or by another, is doubtful, nor is it manifest to the senses.”²⁰⁶

In other words, like Scotus, Gonsalvus argues that if it were truly a self-evident principle that nothing moves itself, in Godfrey’s strict sense, then anyone “looking” at these terms (e.g., mover and moved) shouldn’t be able to doubt that they cannot be so combined (i.e., such self-motion shouldn’t be even coherent). Yet, for just one example, the motion of a heavy thing downwards creates such doubt. And of course, we can add the examples of intellection and volition themselves. So, in general, Gonsalvus, reasonably enough, takes the burden of proof to be on Godfrey here, to dispel such apparent counter-examples, if indeed his position is based on such evident principles.

²⁰⁶ “5. Item, etiam propter particulare aliquod inconueniens, si ipsum vitare nescimus, non debemus negare principium per se notam, cuiusmodi est quod nihil simul est in actu et in potentia respectu eiusdem. [...] Ad quintum, quod non est principium quod omne quod movetur ab alio moveatur, quia illud non est principium cuius aliquod particulare est dubium, nec est manifestum ad sensum. Sic est hic, quia certum certum gravia moveri; a quo autem moveatur, utrum a se vel ab alio, est dubium, nec manifestum ad sensum. [...] Item, principium est apud Philosophos quod accidens non est sine subiecto. Si ergo per Scripturam innuatur quod accidens est sine subiecto, ut in Sacramento altaris, numquid negabimus illud principium? sed negabimus Scripturam?” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ob.5 & ad.5; pp.28-29, p.47).

Moreover, right below the passage quoted above, Gonsalvus adds a corroborating argument, not found explicitly in Scotus's response above:

“Also, it is a principle among the Philosophers that an accident is not without a subject. If, however, it is intimated in Scripture that there is an accident without a subject, as in the Sacrament of the altar, should we not deny that principle rather than deny Scripture?” (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.5; p.47).

That is, Gonsalvus is making a rhetorical argument, much as Olivi beforehand regularly does, that even if the Greek philosophers, such as Aristotle, held that it is a principle that everything which is moved, is moved by another, as they held that every accident exists in a subject, we should not take this to be a sufficient argument, since, as with the latter principle, Christian Scripture occasionally provides its own counter-examples, which should be believed over these mere human (and pagan) authorities. In the case of the latter, Gonsalvus here is referring to the Christian medieval view that the sensible accidents of the bread, in holy communion, remain, while the substance (the bread) “transubstantiates” into the body of Christ. This sort of argument might sound unphilosophical, but it does fit well with the prior point of Scotus and Gonsalvus, that with a wider imagination and conceptual framework, one can find ways to make coherent what, in prior traditions, may have only seemed incoherent given the framework of that tradition.

I bring Gonsalvus's above argument up for a more general reason as well, since it shows that Gonsalvus fits well between Olivi and Scotus in their tone toward Aristotle's authority on this overall topic. Here, even Gonsalvus, who elsewhere expends more effort than Olivi to fit their common *Fully Active View* of cognition/volition into the causal framework of Aristotle, is willing to step back from whether this view is fully “Aristotelian” or not. Interestingly, at least with respect to the principle that everything which is moved, is moved by another, Scotus, on the other hand, does not raise the Eucharist as a rhetorical trump card; elsewhere, Scotus even goes

into some quite subtle textual analysis to question Godfrey's attribution of this principle to Aristotle (based, in part, on the transmission of the Greek text into Latin)²⁰⁷.

§3.6. Conclusion

So, overall, in this last part of *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2, we can see that Scotus, even by his own admission, leans more heavily towards the *Fully Active View* of intellection (in particular) of prior "Augustinians", such as Olivi, and away from the *Fully Passive View* of Godfrey, even going so far as to completely undermine Godfrey's general arguments against self-motion.²⁰⁸ Here Scotus's tone, at least at times, comes across as less antagonistic to Olivi and company, as Scotus is even willing to come to their aid so that they can come to a common "Augustinian" active view, which prioritizes the soul's activity in cognition and leaves the soul (literally) "unimpressed" from the outside. In contrast, Scotus is much more damning of Godfrey's view and arguments, only willing to give some favour to Godfrey's "Achilles" argument (i.e., the central objection we've been considering from the start), such that objects of intellection can be given a partial, though lesser, causal role.

Moreover, regardless of Scotus's tone, after putting Scotus's position alongside that of Olivi and Gonsalvus, in detail, we can see just how much "subtlety" is already to be found in these other accounts. In particular, we've seen that Olivi and Gonsalvus also give a partial,

²⁰⁷ See texts and discussion in King 1994, pp.280-290.

²⁰⁸ For those curious, in the rest of the above section of Scotus's *Ordinatio* which we've been discussing, Scotus finally turns to a second argument of Godfrey. As mentioned in a footnote above, Scotus calls this the "Achilles" argument of Godfrey, which is essentially the central objection raised above, as to why an action would not always follow if mover and moved were in the same subject (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.304-305). As to be expected, Scotus responds by appealing to the secondary causal role of object, as partial efficient cause for intellection (e.g.), much as, according to my interpretation, Olivi and Gonsalvus respond above.

though secondary, causal role to objects of cognition (and appetite), which is at least “broadly” efficient. Nevertheless, the clarity of Scotus’s account has helped with this backwards analysis, so I do not mean to challenge his own famous “subtlety” in this regard. Moreover, admittedly, compared to Olivi, Scotus puts more effort to fit this causal role for external objects (of cognition/appetite) into a broader Aristotelian framework; in this, our analysis of Gonsalvus, and the even wider Aristotelian tradition, has played a necessary role to bridge these sorts of, at least nominal, differences between Olivi and Scotus.

§3.7. *One Final Complication: Mediating Species for Scotus?*

In this last section, let’s consider one last lingering question over a point of detail in Scotus’s overall account of cognition which, as we’ll see, houses a potential objection to my interpretation, insofar as I group Scotus together with Olivi and Gonsalvus, rather than more traditional “*Middle Views*”.

First off, as I flagged in the footnotes above (see fn.127), throughout *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, QQ.2-3, Scotus largely sets aside the question whether the object of intellection is meant to play its partial causal role “in itself or through a *species*”, often using that ambiguous phrase itself. Indeed, this phrase is especially ambiguous, as, on one reading, e.g., it might be read as offering two real-world natural possibilities, insinuating that the object *can* be present in itself, in basic acts of intellection, prior to the reception of any *species*, while intellection only requires a stand-in *species* (as, e.g., in memory) when the object is not, as a matter of fact, present. However, on another reading, this phrase might simply be read as offering two nominal possibilities, relative to two competing theories of intellection, those which require *species* prior

to every act and those which don't. On a third reading, between these two, this phrase only assumes that an intelligible object can possibly be directly present, without *species*, under certain real-world but special circumstances (e.g., in the afterlife or by divine intervention). An objection to my interpretation of Scotus lurks here, as depending on how one reads this phrase, it seems Scotus either is or isn't in line with Olivi's overall stance against pre-induced intelligible *species* (most importantly, as supposed causal intermediaries), and thus one might object that Scotus's view of cognition isn't in line with the *Fully Active View* of Olivi and Gonsalvus.

In more particular terms, I can imagine the following objection on this issue: "First off", someone might point out, with a passing knowledge of Scotus's other, more famous, views on intellection, "it's well known that Scotus does, as a matter of fact, take a stance on prior *species* here. Even more famous than Scotus's above discussion on the activity of the intellectual soul, in the very prior question, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.1, Scotus defends the need for intelligible *species*, especially against Henry and Godfrey, in order for intelligible objects to be present to the intellect. Indeed, Scotus even, at least briefly, references this in Q.2, stating, near the start of his own *respondeo*, that it is clear that a present object concurs with the soul in intellection, "and this [object is present] in an intelligible *species*, just as it was said in the preceding question, since in no other way is it [the object] present, as actually intelligible, speaking of the sensible and material object" (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.297)²⁰⁹. Moreover, Olivi and Gonsalvus both distinguish their own *Fully Active View* of intellection, e.g., from more common *Middle Views*, such as that of Aquinas, in terms of whether the object can be present in itself or only through a prior *species*; according to the former view, an object can be present in

²⁰⁹ "Apparet autem hic quod oportet concurrere animam et obiectum praesens, et hoc in specie intelligibili, sicut dictum est in praecedenti quaestione, quia alio modo non est praesens ut actu intelligibile, loquendo de sensibili et obiecto materiali." (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.297).

itself, such that the intellective power can bring itself into act, while, according to the latter view, a prior *species* must be first impressed in the intellective power, such that only the intellect, so moved, goes into act. So, if Scotus indeed takes a stance on the above issue, that an intelligible object cannot be present in itself, but rather requires a prior *species*, then it seems his view is in some ways more like the run of the mill *Middle View* than the *Fully Active View* of Olivi and Gonsalvus.”

“Moreover,” this objection might continue, “one should also read Scotus’s view on the concurrent ordered causation of object and soul accordingly: just like with a more traditional *Middle View*, the object is a *per se* efficient cause because it sufficiently moves the intellect to the reception of a *species*, and upon being so moved, the intellect then performs its own act and produces intellection. So, on this reading, we can also question the claim that Scotus’s view of concurrent (asymmetric) causation fits with that of Olivi and Gonsalvus. Even on a more nuanced reading of Olivi and Gonsalvus, where the object is broadly an efficient cause, but impresses nothing, Scotus would diverge, insofar as the object, on this reading of Scotus, must indeed impress something on the intellective power, prior to intellection, to be a proper efficient cause.” And so the objection goes²¹⁰.

However, while I would agree that there’s some truth in the above objection, there are at least two major points where I disagree. First, while I would fully admit that Scotus does give some role for intelligible *species* in *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.1 (and Q.2), it would be a leap to

²¹⁰ This, as we’ll see, misguided objection is not meant to throw shade at any one particular modern scholar (though quick summaries of Scotus’s position might create some similar blurry lines here). Even later Scholastics, such as Auriol, seem to blend together Scotus’s view with that of Aquinas on this issue, focusing instead on other points of difference (e.g., as to whether intellection is strictly an action or a quality, even if naturally actively produced). So, I take it, Scotus’s subtleties here can easily be missed by a reader with other interests, especially in the sea of contentious details in this period as a whole.

say this holds for all acts of intellection. Scotus qualifies at the beginning of his *respondeo*, back in Q.1, that he takes it that prior intelligible *species* are only necessary, in the natural order, for universal intellection, not singular intellection; here Scotus at least puts aside the possibility of singular intellection, a view he famously wavers on, though does seem to ultimately commit himself to (e.g., *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.1; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.270-271; on singular intellection for Scotus, see, e.g., Cross 2014, pp.43-64)²¹¹. Moreover, one can also see in the passage above, from Q.2, that Scotus says that that an intelligible *species* is only necessary for the presence of an object as intelligible in act, “speaking of sensible and material objects”. Here Scotus leaves the door open, quite intentionally, for singular and universal intellection of inherently intelligible and immaterial objects²¹²; e.g., acts of intellection themselves, in the immaterial intellect, are such and Scotus believes they can be directly apprehended in higher-order, so-called “reflex” acts of intellection²¹³.

Finally, any necessary role for intelligible *species* which Scotus does posit is restricted to the natural order, since, e.g., through God’s power, or just by one’s own near-angelic powers in

²¹¹ “[*Opinio propria*] *Contra istam positionem [opinio Henrici et Godefridi] arguo. Sive singulare intelligatur, sive non, non curo modo; certum est enim quod universale potest intelligi ab intellectu et magis a philosophis intellectus ponitur potentia distincta a potentiis sensitivis propter intellectionem universalis, et propter compositionem et divisionem, et propter syllogizationem, quam propter cognitionem singularis, si possit intelligere singulare. Ex hoc ergo manifesto, scilicet quod intellectus potest intelligere universale, accipio hanc propositionem: ‘intellectus potest habere obiectum actu universale, per se sibi praesens in ratione obiecti, prius naturaliter quam intelligat’. Ex hoc sequitur propositum, quod in illo priore habet obiectum praesens in specie intelligibili, et ita habet speciem intelligibilem priorem actu.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.1; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.270-271).*

²¹² Scotus’s phrasing, moreover, seems to also leave it open for the intellect to grasp singular material objects in a singular manner, without such intelligible *species*, since the main role for said *species* seem to be to make singular material objects intelligible in the manner of universals; e.g., in looking at Socrates, through the senses, the intellect might be thought to share in this view, so that it can then abstract from it or just compose a complex thought about the singular Socrates.

²¹³ Indeed, Scotus even uses the existence of such reflex acts in some of his further objections, in the texts at hand, against Godfrey’s *Fully Passive View* (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.290). See Chapter 3, on traditional “experiential arguments”, for a brief explanation of Scotus’s argument.

the afterlife, Scotus leaves the door open for more direct intellectual cognition through miracles and in the afterlife, when untethered to one's corporeal limits²¹⁴.

Second, against the above objection, it should also be pointed out that even in the cases where Scotus does posit some need for prior intelligible *species*, Scotus denies that it would follow that, as with a more traditional *Middle View*, the intellect only moves, having been first *impressed/moved* (from the object or prior *species*). In *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.3, Scotus explicitly considers this sort of objection: First, if indeed, as Scotus holds, the intellectual soul and object concur in intellection, then one of the two must be an unmoved mover, the other a moved mover. Second, since the object is traditionally said to be an unmoved moved, that must mean that, in contrast, the intellect only moves having been moved, i.e., by its object (in itself or in a *species*). Thus, it is argued, of the object and intellect, the object must be the primary cause, with the intellect like the stick, which only moves having been so moved (against Scotus's intentions). Against this objection, Scotus has the following rich response:

“I say that the act of the intellect with respect to objects which are not present in themselves, of which sort [of objects] are those which we now naturally intelligize, is two-fold: the first act is the *species* by which the object is present as an actually intelligible object; the second act is that actual intellection; and for each act, the intellect acts unmoved by that [object], which is a partial cause with it [the intellect], concurring for that action, although one act of the intellect is preceded by its [the intellect's] motion to the other act.

For the first act, however, the agent intellect acts with a phantasm, and here the agent intellect is the more principal cause than the phantasm, and both integrate into one total cause with respect to the intelligible *species*. For the second act, the intellectual part (whether the agent or possible intellect, I do not care now) and the intelligible *species*, as two partial causes, act, and here the intellectual part acts unmoved by the *species*, rather it [the intellectual part] moves prior,

²¹⁴ Again, as one can see from Scotus's arguments against Godfrey's *Fully Passive View*, Scotus objects that his view would leave separated souls and angels unable to acquire new intellections through their own powers, since material objects wouldn't be able to act on them for sensation (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.288); in general, Scotus is famous for arguing against many deflationary views of our intellectual powers on the basis that what the lower can do, the higher can too, and so if the senses can, e.g., grasp singular objects, by their own power, then the intellect can too, without the senses, at least in principle.

i.e., like an agent, so that the *species* co-acts with it.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.3; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.313-314)²¹⁵.

Of interest to us, first of all, although mostly set aside in Q.2, here Scotus gives a more traditional role, with respect to Latin medieval philosophers, for the so-called “agent intellect”, along with an object as present in a given phantasm, to at least begin a proper act of intellection, at least in certain cases; the agent intellect, with its phantasm, first acts (traditionally described as a sort of “illumination” or “abstraction”) to make its object actually intelligible to the given intellectual subject, in an intelligible *species*. However, as Scotus explains above, (i) this traditional first act of the (agent) intellect is to be distinguished from actual intellection, (ii) which actual intellection, Scotus prefers, is more plainly attributed to the intellectual soul insofar as it intelligizes; as Scotus makes clear above, he is unconcerned whether this is exactly the so-called “agent intellect”, at least as traditionally conceived, that goes into second act. Moreover, for both such acts, Scotus applies his model of joint, essentially ordered, causation, as we’ve seen it above: (iii) even for the first act of the intellect, the agent intellect and phantasm cooperate, as one single agent, although the agent intellect is the more principal cause and the phantasm the less principal cause; this first act presents the object in an intelligible *species*, with

²¹⁵ “*Ad primum argumentum [‘obiectum movet autem movet non motum [...] intellectus autem non movet nisi motus’] dico quod duplex est actus intellectus respectu obiectorum quae non sunt praesentia in se, qualia sunt illa quae modo naturaliter intelligimus: primus actus est species, qua obiectum est praesens ut obiectum actu intelligibile, secundus actus est ipsa intellectio actualis, et ad utrumque actum agit intellectus, non motus ab eo quod est causa partialis secum concurrans ad illam actionem, licet unum actum intellectus praecedat motio eius ad alium actum.*

*Ad primum autem actum agit intellectus agens cum phantasmate, et ibi intellectus agens est principalior causa quam phantasma, et ambo integrant unam totalem causam respectu speciei intelligibilis. Ad secundum actum agit pars intellectiva (sive intellectus agens sive possibilis, non curo modo) et species intelligibilis sicut duae partiales causae, et ibi agit pars intellectiva non mota a specie, sed prius movens, id est quasi agens ut species sibi coagat. Cum ergo dicis ‘obiectum movet non motum’, dico quod utraque actione obiectum est secundarium movens, licet non sit motum, id est aliquid recipiens in se a principali sive priore movente. Cum dicit ‘intellectus non movet nisi motus’, dico quod non movet seucunda motione nisi motus priore motione : haec autem comparatio est duarum motionum intellectus, non autem duarum causarum partialium concurrentium in una motione. Si compares causas partiales in utraque motione, dico quod utrobique intellectus movet, non motus a causa partiali concurrente in eadem motione.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.3; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.313-314).*

which (iv), as discussed above, the intellective soul acts, as the more principal cause, to produce an act of intellection proper (i.e. intellection in full/second act).

Most importantly, (v), given this model of joint causation, Scotus takes it that in neither case does the intellect act only upon being first moved; rather, it is always the intellect which initiates its action, with the object, as present in a phantasm or *species*, following along to aid in the completion of the intellect's action. This lines up with Scotus's use of the analogy of a hand and knife discussed above, as seen in Q.2, where the hand uses the knife's sharpness without needing to be impressed with the knife's sharpness; the intellect here, at least for these sorts of acts, rather, is aided by the phantasm or intelligible *species* as a *quasi*-instrument, without being first impressed by either. The only sense in which the intellect is first moved, given what Scotus says above, is that in the production of the intellect's second act, the intellect must first (at least in nature, if not also in time) move itself into first act, with the aid of a phantasm, to produce its intelligible *species*. However, even here, Scotus prefers not to over-sell the causal role of the object or the intelligible *species*, as he says the intellect goes into second act as an unmoved mover, by its own accord.

Now, admittedly, at least for this second sort of act, e.g., in the natural universal intellection of some material object, like a cat, Scotus is willing to take a stand, where before he was ambiguous, that an object can only function as a secondary cause if it is present in an intelligible *species*; so, Scotus here does seem to diverge from the full account of someone like Olivi, on this matter, insofar as the object does not suffice for the object to be present outside of the intellective power for this sort of act²¹⁶. Nevertheless, (i), the reason Scotus diverges is not

²¹⁶ More precisely, Olivi's view on the universal intellection of material objects appears to be that the object is more directly present in a phantasm (at least in most cases?), prior to intellection; nevertheless, the intellect does

strictly a matter of disagreement over the *activity/passivity* of the intellectual power so much as a disagreement concerning how directly an *intelligible object* can be present, *qua* intelligible (a question concerning *direct vs. indirect representation* (of a particular sort of act) more than *causation*). This is clear given that Scotus is willing to apply the same model of joint causation, however an object is to be present, and even admits to some cases of direct apprehension of intelligible objects, such as in reflexive acts of intellection. Moreover, (ii), by Scotus's own self assessment, this is still not to adopt a common *Middle View* of intellection, where the intellect only moves after being first moved (by its object or some *species*); so, in this regard, at least for this sort of intellection, Scotus finds a position between the precise *Fully Active View*, especially of Olivi, and a traditional *Middle View*, yet without diverging from the main thrust of the *Fully Active View* insofar as Scotus and Olivi (and Gonsalvus) deny that the intellect only goes into act after being moved by an object/*species*²¹⁷.

not have to form a distinct intelligible *species* in the intellectual power, prior to intellection (the act is itself its similitude of the object *qua* intelligible); for further discussion on this topic, see, e.g., Adriaenssen 2014.

²¹⁷ For further proof that Scotus distinguishes himself from more traditional *Middle Views*, at least by his own account, consider his *nobility argument* against one of the views of Henry. Of the two views which Scotus attributes to Henry, according to one, first an illuminated phantasm causes a "confused" or "imperfect" cognition which serves as a principle for, second, eliciting or causing a "distinct" or "perfect" act of cognition (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.291-292). However, Scotus responds with a similar *nobility argument*, as we've seen, e.g., from Olivi against Aquinas: "a more imperfect act is not able to be a formal *ratio* of causing a more perfect act, since then it could not be proved that God is a most perfect being, if an effect were able to exceed its total cause in perfection; but distinct cognition is more noble than confused cognition; therefore that, 'confused', is not a formal *ratio* for eliciting or causing that, 'distinct'." [*"Si autem dicas quod respectu secundi est activus virtute actus primi; contra: actus imperfectior non potest esse ratio formalis causandi actum perfectiorem, quia tunc non esset unde posset probari Deum esse perfectissimum ens, si effectus posset excedere causam suam totalem in perfectione; cognitio autem distincta est nobilior cognitione confusa; ergo illa 'confusa' non est formalis ratio eliciendi vel causandi illam 'distinctam'."*] (Ibid. p.292).

Looking ahead to a later figure, Peter Auriol also makes frequent use of this argument against this sort of *Middle View*, seemingly with Aquinas and his followers in mind, but also, awkwardly enough, Scotus too. E.g., Auriol argues: "*Secundo probo, quod non requiritur species in ratione elicientis actum una cum intellectu, quia impossibile est effectum excedere in perfectione causam suam aequivocam; sed intellectio est perfectior ipsa specie; ergo impossibile est, quod sit effectus aequivocus ipsius speciei: sed non potest esse effectus univocus eius, cum sint alterius rationis, alias duo accidentia eiusdem speciei essent in eodem; ergo.*" (II Sent. D.11, Q.3, a.1; p.129).

Moreover, similar points likely hold with respect to sensible *species* and acts of sensation for Scotus in that his view seems to land somewhere between that of Olivi and more traditional *Middle Views*. In fact, the difference between Scotus and Olivi is likely even less pronounced for sensation insofar as Scotus doesn't seem to cut up sensitive cognition of singular objects into two acts, as Scotus does with the natural intellection of material universals (i.e., neither seem to distinguish, in first act, a *species* in the sensitive power itself, then, sensation proper, in second act). Although Scotus's exact view of sensible *species* isn't entirely clear, even to specialists in the scholarship, we've seen above that Scotus at least attributes sensible *species* to Augustine, to make sense of some potentially inconsistent remarks in his *De Trinitate*: recall, as I said above, Scotus here says that what is commonly called a "*species*" is something which is received in the corporeal organ alone, while "what is received in the soul, or a power of the soul, is an act of cognizing" and an "image" (e.g. actual vision) is such an act (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300). This interpretation is interesting given that, even granting the existence of *species*, Scotus nevertheless upholds a strict distinction between mere impressions in the body and acts of cognition in the soul/spirit, as do prior "Augustinians", such as Olivi. Given that the soul and body are said to be "mixed up" in the corporeal sense organs, one might think that Augustine could consider some acts of cognition, such as vision, to exist in the corporeal organ, but that's not Scotus's gloss here. Nevertheless, the fact that Scotus seems to give any clear role to sensible *species*, even if they only exist in the organ (and medium), and that Scotus doesn't seem worried that they might be intervening "veils" between an object and the senses, at least distinguished his approach from Olivi's²¹⁸.

²¹⁸ See Martin (2019) for more on Olivi here. Note that, as I explain more in Martin (2019), I think there's at least some room to question whether Olivi is quite so against sensible *species* as he makes out.

Chapter 3

Durand of St. Pourçain and Prior Active Accounts: Their Common Grounds and Ultimate Differences

In the last chapter, I focused on active accounts of cognition from certain 13th century “Augustinian Franciscans”, viz. Peter John Olivi (1248-1298) and, most immediately following him, Gonsalvus of Spain (~1255-1313) and John Duns Scotus (1266-1308). We’ve especially looked at how these active accounts, in similar terms, qualify that even with the cognitive power as principal cause, external objects can be admitted some subordinate, “broadly effective”, causal role. In this chapter, we consider the following generation to look at another important medieval figure of his day, Durand of St. Pourçain (1275-1334), with a, broadly speaking, active account as well. This chapter will provide a more general survey of different medieval active accounts of cognition, using Durand’s account both to highlight where they overlap with each other and, particularly, where they ultimately diverge.

Durand is perhaps most well known as a figure of controversy, in open conflict with the leading members of his own Dominican order in his day. During this time, the Dominican order was, at least in broad strokes, establishing the authority of their deceased brother, Thomas Aquinas, but Durand often went his own way, much to the chagrin of his superior, Hervaeus Natalis.²¹⁹ Thus, even though Durand wasn’t a member of the Franciscan order, as were the other figures I’ve been focusing on in this dissertation, from the outset one shouldn’t be surprised to

²¹⁹ For further historical details on Durand’s conflict with his fellow Dominicans, see, e.g., Hartman 2012, pp.1-4, Iribarren 2005, vi-viii, pp.1-11, and throughout Lowe 2003.

see Durand cross party lines in this debate²²⁰. Indeed, on the face of it, Durand’s cognitive theory appears to show a fair amount of influence from Olivi and like-minded fellow Franciscans. Jean-Luc Solère (2014), e.g., places Durand alongside these “Augustinian-Franciscans”, especially Olivi and Gonsalvus, who hold that the cognitive soul cannot be directly acted on by external corporeal objects and, hence, the cognitive soul must be the active cause of cognition instead. Although I have my reservations with the extent to which Solère’s account goes, in the first half of this chapter I will also focus on the overlap between Durand and this prior tradition.

In the latter half of this chapter, however, I will argue that, despite the similarities, Durand takes up a notably different active account of cognition from Olivi and company with regard to some standard theses, and that, consequently, there is a less distinctly “Augustinian” influence on his account overall²²¹. As I’ll explain, one defining thesis for Olivi and the “Augustinian-Franciscan” tradition which he is a part of, one tracing back to Plato, is that one’s cognitive powers are active to the extent that they principally produce their acts through strict *self-motion* such that there is some real change in the cognitive powers when they go into act. In contrast, Durand’s ultimate view is that the cognitive powers are impassive to the extent that cognitive acts do not come to inhere in the soul as absolute qualities; rather, a cognitive act is a

²²⁰ This isn’t to say that there wasn’t a large amount of influence going back and forth between the two orders, but there was at least some pressure to hold certain opposing views under certain periods of leadership in these orders. I only use these broad divisions for the purpose of setting a very broad picture and, of course, all broad claims admit of fuzzy boundaries and exceptions.

²²¹ To this extent I’m here engaging with a small dispute in the secondary literature between Solère and Peter Hartman who argue over how informative it is to refer to Durand as an “Augustinian” in this debate. Hartman, e.g., expresses reservations over referring to Durand as an “Augustinian” given Durand’s own reservations over the use of human authority (Hartman 2012, p.40). Solère, however, takes the overlap between Durand and the prior “Augustinian” tradition, along with some references which Durand gives to Augustine himself on this topic, to be significant (Solère 2014, fn.14, fn.127). As I’ll explain, in some sense I think both Solère and Hartman are right, and not in conflict, in that Durand has some influence from a defined “Augustinian” tradition, without simply following this tradition; however, in another sense, I would diverge from both Solère and Hartman in that I think that where Durand diverges from the “Augustinian” tradition it isn’t because he’s entirely free from any prior influence, but, at least in part, because he takes up a particular interpretation of Aristotle, one which is in at least apparent conflict with some of the standard tenets of this “Augustinian” tradition.

mere relation between a bare cognitive power and its object and, so, Durand seems to argue, neither object nor power need serve as a proper efficient cause. As I'll explain in this chapter, Durand can be better understood as picking up a particularly strong interpretation of Aristotle's view that the cognitive soul is simply *unmoved*, rather than self-moved, in cognition. Now, of course, Durand, as medieval thinkers generally do, makes some attempt to harmonize both traditions, and we'll see that there is indeed a fair amount of grey area here; part of the purpose of this chapter will be to continue to make clear what is still "Aristotelian" in the accounts of prior "Augustinians" in this debate as well. Nevertheless, Durand's final position appears to end up more thoroughly Aristotelian on this issue than those of Olivi and company²²². Thus, Solère's (2014) frequent assessment that Durand's account is as "un-Aristotelian" as it is "Augustinian" needs to be qualified.

Along with self-motion, another notion tied up with the accounts of prior "Augustinian-Franciscans" on this topic is that our cognitive activity involves a sort of *attention*, in the soul and "above" the body, which determines just how we *experience* the world. This is one point where Olivi and company bring together concerns with the activity of both cognition and volition. In this paper, I will also argue that Durand, at least with the evidence given here, seems to stand apart from Olivi's tradition in this regard as well. The "activity" which Durand accords to cognition ultimately appears to be the same in form for lower living functions in plants, and arguably not too far from the activity of the elements in their natural activities as well; at the very least, any cognitive "attention", which Durand appeals to, appears to be as fixed in its result as

²²² To be clear, I'm not claiming that Olivi and, especially, those following him, don't make use of their own brand of Aristotelianism in this debate, even with respect to this issue of self-motion; my point is, rather, a comparative one about the details and where the emphasis lies. Moreover, part of the point of this chapter will also be to flag exactly what common "Aristotelian" ground there is between Olivi, Gonsalvus, Scotus, and Durand.

other natural activities. Here again, I take my interpretation to differ from that of Solère (2014), who takes Durand’s active view of cognition to be constituted by this sort of “Augustinian” attention (specifically, of the soul onto impressions in the body) (Solère 2014, p.159). Although I entertain what grey area remains here, nevertheless, I take it that Durand’s view ultimately still differs on this matter from the “Augustinian” accounts of Olivi and company.

Overall, by the end of this chapter, I also wish to simply assess Durand’s theory on its own merits, through the lens of prior theories as well as through the pushback Durand himself received in his day. In the final section of this chapter (§6), I will especially consider the objections explicitly raised against Durand by his peers and how these objections uniquely apply to Durand’s active account and not those of Olivi and company. One particular issue concerns how Durand’s rather deflationary account of cognitive “change” accounts for the different ways in which we seem to change “inside”, whether it be with learning or various forms of occurrent cognition. This discussion will draw out how Durand’s account remains distinctive, apart from his aforementioned influences²²³.

Part I: Durand’s Context - The Common Features

§1. Setting up the Debate

Let’s start with what seems to be right about Solère’s position that Durand’s active account of cognition shares some significant similarities with, and is influence by, prior

²²³ Although I won’t be able to cover this in detail, Durand seems to independently converge on some similar, seemingly nominalist, views with Ockham, especially over the “reality” of efficient causation, which is worth future study.

“Augustinian-Franciscan” active accounts (from Olivi and company)²²⁴. In this first section (§1), I’ll cover how these figures generally cut up the debate, including Durand, as there is indeed some common ground here. In the next section (§2), I’ll turn to some of the major arguments prior “Augustinians” give against their common opponents. As we’ll see, Durand clearly picks up at least some of these core arguments, so here too there is common ground. Subtle differences will emerge as we proceed, but I’ll save the detailed discussion of such differences for afterwards (§3 and on).

More generally, these next few sections (§§1-3) will also serve to organize, and, at times, expand upon, the results from my previous chapters. In particular, in order to provide some explanation for Solère’s (2014) way of framing this debate, I’ll try to lay clear what is particularly “Augustinian” in the prior active accounts of Olivi and company, along with what seems to be, at least at first glance, “un-Aristotelian”. However, as we move through this paper, we’ll eventually start to see some more distinctly “Aristotelian” grounds behind these “Augustinian” active accounts as well; I’ll come back to these “Aristotelian” grounds in more detail when we get finally get to the body of Durand’s positive position (§§4-5).

§1.1. The Prior Division

§1.1.1. The Central “Augustinian” Division: Activity against Any Passivity

²²⁴ To be clear, my presentation here is my own and will cover some details Solère (2014) doesn’t. I also won’t get to all of Solère’s three major points of comparison (the notions of (i) one-way causality, (ii) accidental potency, and (iii) ‘*sine qua non*’ causation) until later sections. For this section, I’ll mostly focus on point (i), since it’s the most apparent point in how medieval figures divided this debate.

As I've discussed in previous chapters, Olivi describes his account as “the view of the blessed Augustine who says that in no spirit is anything able to be brought about from a body through a direct influx”; so, Olivi ultimately concludes, rather than a corporeal object of cognition, a given cognitive power, insofar as it is spiritual, is the proper efficient cause of its act of cognition, as the power must bring about its acts “through itself and in itself”, following the words of Augustine (II Sent. Q. 72; III, pp.15-17; see, e.g., Augustine, *De musica*, 6.5.8-12, *Supra Genesim ad litteram*, 12.16.32-33, *De Trinitate*, 10.5.7)²²⁵. As his major opposition²²⁶, Olivi presents a general description of the contrary, passive account, which he says is “of Aristotle and his followers, who say that bodies and corporeal objects act on a spirit formally

²²⁵ “*Quarta est beati Augustini dicentis in nullum spiritum posse fieri aliquid a corpore per rectum influxum sed solum per modum colligantiae et per modum termini obiectivi.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.15). For some of the references to Augustine which directly follow: “*Quod enim non per rectum influxum aliquid in spiritu seu anima faciat, dicit aperte in libro VI Musicae [cap.5, n.8], ubi postquam quaesivit an audire sit idem quod aliquid a corpore in anima fieri, subdit: ‘Semper absurdum est fabricatori corpori materiam quoquomodo animam subdere; esset autem corpori sic subiecta, si corpus in ea aliquos numeros operaretur; non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab his quos in sonis cognoscimus.’ [...] Item, paulo post: ‘Videtur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere.’ [...] Item, libro XII Supra Genesim ad litteram, capitulo 16, [n.32-33] dicit: ‘Quia omnis spiritus est omni corpore sine dubitatione praestantior, sequitur ut non loci positione, sed naturae dignitate praestantior sit natura spiritualis isto corporeo caelo, etiam illa ubi rerum corporalium exprimuntur imagines. Hinc est quod praestantior est imago corporis in spiritu quam ipsum corpus in substantia sua. [...] tamen eam eius imaginem non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in se ipso facit celeritate mirabili, quae ineffabiliter longe est a corporis tarditate.’ [...] Item, libro X De Trinitate, capitulo 5, [n.7] dicit quod, ‘quia anima non potest inferre introrsus ipsa corpora tanquam in regionem incorporeae naturae, imagines eorum convellit et rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa.’ Nota autem quod Augustinus censuit animam non posse subici actioni corporis non solum ratione suae formae intellectualis qua incomparabiliter praecellit omne corpus, sed etiam ratione suae spiritualis materiae, quia illam vult esse praestantior omnino forma corporali. Unde XIII libro Confessionum, circa principium, agens de materia seu de informi spiritali et corporali dicit: ‘Spirituale informe praestantius est quam si formatum corpus esset, corporale autem informe praestantius est quam si omnino nihil esset.’” (Ibid. pp.15-17)*

I’ll come back to this citation to *De Musica* below, when examining the nobility arguments of Olivi and Durand.

²²⁶ For purpose of discussion, at least at the moment, I’m glossing over two in-between views which Olivi more briefly considers and rejects where a separate agent intellect or agent sense plays an active role in cognition, making an object intelligible or sensible prior to cognition (Ibid. pp.14-15). However, I’ll get back to these views briefly below (§1.1.3). For now, I’ll say that one reason I’m glossing over this further division from Olivi is that it’s not even a clean division; Olivi at least acknowledges some sort of role for an agent intellect, even for the “simple passive” view, as it’s standardly understood, so the further division seems to reflect some even finer nuance (Ibid. pp.13-14). For another division of this debate from Olivi, see also II Sent. Q.58 (II, pp.461-463), which offers more elaborate, though more organized, sub-divisions; nonetheless, the relevant material there is mostly covered by the views I’m focusing on here. I’ll bring up a few times when the differences seem to matter in the footnotes below.

conjoined to a body [...] through a simple and impressive influx” (Ibid., p.13)²²⁷. Any account of cognition is passive, according to this line of thinking, insofar as it allows for any “direct influx”, something sufficiently caused by an external corporeal object, into the cognitive powers of the soul (or “spirit”).

I take Olivi’s above division to be based on those who do and do not follow what Solère calls the “‘*downwards only causation*’ (*DOC*) principle”, where “that which is ontologically superior” (in this case, soul or spirit) “can act upon that which is inferior,” (in this case, typically corporeal objects) “but not the reverse” (Solère 2014, pp.185-189). Solère, and others in the secondary literature, take the application of this principle to be one of the defining features of what they label as the particularly “Augustinian” active account in this debate; and indeed we can see above that Olivi frames this active account by attributing it to Augustine in these

²²⁷ “*Prima est Aristotelis et sequacium eius dicentium quod in spiritum corpori formaliter coniunctum agunt corpora et corporalia obiecta non solum per modum colligantiae nec solum per modum termini obiectivi, immo etiam per simplicem et impressivum influxum.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.13).

As we’ll see below, one possible source for Olivi’s less common terminology of a passive “influx” (rather than simply an “impression”/“passion”/etc.) for the “Aristotelian” account, is Aquinas’s discussion in ST I, Q.84, a.6. In that text, Aquinas, at least in part, equates Aristotle’s theory of sensation with that of Democritus; Aquinas specifies that Aristotle’s view doesn’t strictly involve an “influx” of atoms, though nevertheless he says both involve some sort of passive impression in the sense power which brings about sensation. Olivi seems to have ignored this strict distinction in terminology and went with the looser sense of an “influx” as “impression”.

terms²²⁸. I'll return to the details of this principle, and its Augustinian roots, when we get to its use in the typical "*nobility arguments*" used by Olivi and company, in the next section (§2)²²⁹.

As for why Olivi attributes the opposing passive view to "Aristotle and his followers", I'll say more about that as we go along and see what this view amounts to. For now, however, just note two things: First, as a point of caution, despite Olivi's tone, one shouldn't assume his

²²⁸ In another survey on the influence of Augustine in this debate, José Filipe Silva draws a similar principle from Augustine himself, which he calls the "Principle of ontological hierarchy [...]: physical objects cannot be the cause of cognitive acts of the soul" (Silva 2019, p.40; citing, *De Trinitate* 11.2.5, *De Musica* 6.5.8). One can also see Russell Friedman describe this line of thinking, and apply it to Peter Auriol as well, when he says: "Auriol is part of one pronounced strain of medieval thought (deriving from Augustine and ultimately from Plato) that rejects that the soul and its powers are passively affected by extra-mental objects. (See on this Tachau 1988, Friedman 2000.) Cognitive powers are, for Auriol, active." (2015b). I, myself, have said more about this in previous chapters as well; e.g., I point out that Scotus starts his list of *opinioniones* on this debate by also picking out an active view of cognition which is, he starts with, "attributed to Augustine", especially citing the passages where Augustine says that "it should not be held that body brings about anything in spirit" and that, so, the spiritual soul must produce its acts "in itself with amazing quickness", "in itself and from itself" (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.283; *De Genesi ad litteram* 12.16.28-33 & *De Trinitate* 10.5.7). Olivi, indeed, cites exactly these passages from Augustine, along with similar lines from *De Musica* 6.5.8 and elsewhere, and Olivi seems to be a prime reference point on this *opinio* for Scotus (II Sent. Q. 72; III, pp.15-17). Scotus himself also uses these passages and adopts a similar active view, though one he takes to be less extreme. Another point I'll repeat is that none of this is to say that there is only one, clearly defined, account which can be attributed to Augustine in this debate and is common to every later medieval thinker. Authority figures are often cherry picked by those citing them and this is bound to be worse with Augustine since he is notorious for expressing different and seemingly inconsistent views in his psychology. In line with this, Solère, e.g., notes that some later medieval thinkers even cited Augustine to back up the opposing passive view of cognition in this debate, though perhaps less often or persuasively (2014, p.190, fn.14). Nevertheless, as Solère puts it, there are still loosely defined "camps" in this debate and this active "Augustinian" view is one such "camp" which medieval thinkers explicitly tied themselves to (Ibid.). Although his influence is perhaps more pervasive and less internally inconsistent (though open to many different interpretations nonetheless), similar points can be made about the authority of Aristotle, and how medieval thinkers did or didn't put him (*via* one of his different associated camps) in conflict with Augustine (*via* one of his different camps) over particular points of detail. As I've discussed before, Olivi stands out with just how explicitly he puts the authority of Augustine and Aristotle into conflict for this debate; others who take up similar active accounts, such as Gonsalvus and Scotus, put more work into harmonizing these two authorities, although while still acknowledging that opposing passive "camps" are set up based on their reading of Aristotle for this issue. Below, I'll say more about how I think Durand fits into all of this.

²²⁹ As a point of precision, I think the "downwards only" part of the name Solère gives to this principle is a bit misleading since this principle allows for same-level causation as well; one might prefer to call this the "no upwards causation" principle, though I'll use Solère's name below for the sake of conversation. I think what might be motivating Solère's phrasing is that he's restricting this principle to what are called "equivocal agents", where the effect is different in type than the cause (e.g., a substance causing an accident, even if both are spiritual), and it is held that the effect is always less noble than the cause, so in this sense this type of causation is "downwards only". A human generating a human, e.g., is same-level causation though, and permissible. See below, or above in prior chapters, where I discuss nobility arguments for more of these details.

“Augustinian” approach is necessarily entirely at odds with “Aristotelianism”, at least according to some medieval interpretations of Aristotle. That being said, second, there are also certainly some standard medieval interpretations of Aristotle with which Olivi’s approach is at odds; these interpretations are typically based on Aristotle’s claims that sensation is a sort of “motion” or “passion”/“undergoing” from external sensible objects, and that intellection is, in some sense, an analogous “undergoing” from intelligible objects (see, e.g. *De anima* III.4, 429a13-18; cf. II Sent. Q.72; III, pp13-14)²³⁰. Olivi is not alone here; consider these two typical arguments based on Aristotle’s authority, presented by Scotus as the common arguments behind the view that intellection (as with sensation) is passive:

“[I]n [II] *De anima* [chapter 5], The Philosopher proves that sense is passive, not active, because if it were active, it would always act: just as ‘if the

²³⁰ “If thinking is like perceiving, it must be either a process in which the soul is acted upon by what is capable of being thought, or a process different from but analogous to that. The thinking part of the soul must therefore be, while impassible, capable of receiving the form of an object; that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the object. Thought must be related to what is thinkable, as sense is to what is sensible.” (Aristotle, *De anima* III.4, 429a13-18; trans. J.A. Smith)

[“*Dicamus igitur quod si formare per intellectum est sicut sentire, aut patietur quoquo modo ab intellecto, aut aliud simile. [...] Oportet igitur ut sit non passivum, sed recipit formam, et est in potentia sicut illud, non illud. Et erit dispositio eius secundum similitudinem: sicut sentiens apud sensibilia sic intellectus apud intelligibilia.*” (Averroes, *Long Commentary on DA*, III, cc.2-3; pp.380-383).]

Now, notably there is some room for interpretation in this passage on just how much intellection, or sensation, is an “undergoing”, especially given the qualification that at least the intellect is, in some way, “non passive”. This is a point of controversy, but at least Averroes’s gloss is that Aristotle still means to say that the intellect has the “being of a passive power” (*esse de virtute passiva*), but “only insofar as the intellect receives the form which it comprehends”; the intellect is not “transmutable” insofar as it is not a body nor the power of a body (Ibid. p.382); i.e. the elemental bodies “transmute” into other elements through corruption and replacement of their proper accidents (hot to cold, dry to wet, etc.), but intellection is a perfection without such “transmutation”. Of sense, Averroes’s gloss seems to be that it is “transmutable”, though that “transmutation” is, at least in some cases, accidental to sensation (Ibid. p.381). We’ll return to this issue when we get to Durand’s Aristotelianism.

For some other commonly cited passages, on sensation, see, e.g.:

“Sensation depends, as we have said, on a process of movement or affection from without, for it is held to be some sort of change in quality.” (*De anima* II.5, 416b33-34)

“As we have said, what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other and is identical in quality with it.” (Ibid., 418a4-6)

“Generally, about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or the gold.” (*De anima* II.12, 424a16-21)

combustible were combusive, it would always combust.’²³¹ In this way it is argued on the matter at hand: if the intellective part were always active with respect to intellection, it would always intelligize, and even without the object, which is false. This is also confirmed from [III] *De anima* [chapter 2], ‘the sensible and sense is the same [in] act’, just as ‘sounding and hearing is the same act’²³². Therefore, similarly, the active motion of the object and the passive motion of the intellect, which is intellection, is the same act: therefore, intellection is from the object.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.282-283)²³³

As we’ll see, especially this first argument, against this sort of “self-motion” in a cognitive power, will come up repeatedly in passive accounts of cognition, along with these attributions to Aristotle’s authority²³⁴.

²³¹ “The power of sense is parallel to what is combustible, for that never ignites itself spontaneously, but requires an agent which has the power of starting ignition; otherwise it could have set itself on fire, and would not have needed actual fire to set it ablaze.” (*De anima* II.5, 417b7-9).

[“*Sed est irrationabile quare sensus non sentiunt se, et quare etiam nullus sensus agit absque extrinseco, et in eis sunt ignis et terra et alia elementa, et sunt illa que comprehenduntur a sensu per se, et accidentia contingentia eis. Dicamus igitur quod sensus non est in actu, sed tantum in potentia, et ideo non sentimus; quemadmodum combustibile non comburitur a se absque comburente; et si hoc non esset, combureret se et non indigeret quod ignis esset in actu.*” (Averroes, *Long Commentary on DA*, II, c.52; p.209).] As we’ll see below, Olivi also refers to this passage from Aristotle and provides a response (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.38-39).

²³² “The activity of the sensible object and that of the sense is one and the same activity, and yet the distinction between their being remains. Take as illustration actual sound and actual hearing [...].” (*De anima* III.2, 425b25) [“*Et actio sensibilis et sensus eadem est; in esse autem non sunt eadem in eo eis; v. g. sonus qui est in actu et auditus qui est in actu. [...] Et si actio et passio et motus sunt in passivo, necesse est ut sonus et auditus qui sunt in actu sint in eo quod est in potentia. Actio enim agentis et moventis sunt in patiente; et propter hoc non est necesse ut moveatur quod movet. [...] Et iste idem sermo est de aliis sensibus et aliis sensibilibus. Quemadmodum enim actio et passio sunt in patiente, non in agente, ita actio sensuum et sensibilium sunt in sentiente. [...] Id est, et causa in hoc est quoniam, sicut actio et passio sunt in patiente, non in agente, ita actio sensuum et sensibilium sunt in primo sentiente, cum sensibilia sint virtutes agentes, sensus autem agentes et patientes, primum autem sentiens est patiens tantum.*” (Averroes, *Long Commentary on DA*, II, cc.138-140; pp.339-343).]

²³³ “*Quia III* De anima [cap. 5] probat Philosophus sensum esse passivum, non activum, per hoc quod si esset activus, semper ageret: sicut ‘si combustibile esset combustivum, semper combustibile combureret.’ Ita arguo in proposito: si pars intellectiva esset activa respectu intellectionis, semper intelligeret, et ita sine obiecto, quod falsum est. [Additio Scoti] Confirmatur, quia ex II* De anima [cap. 2] ‘sensibilis et sensus est idem actus’, puta ‘sonatio et auditio est idem actus’. Ergo a simili, motio activa obiecti et motio passiva intellectus, quae est intellectio, est idem actus: ergo intellectio est ab obiecto.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.282-283). *Note the incorrect book numbering.

²³⁴ For some passages from Aristotle that seem to motivate a more active account of cognition, see, in particular, §4.4 below.

§1.1.2. Two Passive Accounts: The Fully Passive and Middle Views

Adding more detail to what opposing “Aristotelian” passive views might look like, Olivi distinguishes a few different versions of the general passive account: what, above, Olivi calls a passive “influx” brought about in a cognitive power from an external object, is held to be either, “[i] a cognitive action, or [ii] the effective principle of such an action, or [iii] an action that excites the power to a cognitive act” (II Sent. Q.72.; III, p.24)²³⁵. Gonsalvus cuts up the debate over the activity of the intellect, and the will as well, in the following extended passage, in which Gonsalvus starts with two passive views which capture, at least, views [i] and [ii] above, both of which contrast with, finally, a distinct *Fully Active View*:

“About this [question] nevertheless there are opposing views.

- For some say that [**Fully Passive View**] the act of no power is effectively [caused] from itself.

- But others say that each of both powers, namely the intellect and the will, brings forth and efficiently causes (*efficit*) its own act in itself, and in this they agree in general; nevertheless they disagree since some say that [**Middle View**] objects induce some *dispositio* in the [relevant] power, namely a *species* in the cognitive power or an affection in the appetitive power, and the power so disposed causes its own act in itself; in other words, every power has in itself its own act. But others say that [**Fully Active View**] every such power in the presence of an object at once causes its act in that [power] itself, without such a pre-induced *dispositio*, at least in the case of the will; *and this view seems more probable, namely, [the view] which says that the power in itself efficiently causes (efficere) its own act.*” (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.30-31; *Amoros’s (ed.) emphasis*)²³⁶

²³⁵ “Item, aut influxus factus a corpore in spiritu est actio cognitiva aut principium effectivum ipsius aut est actio excitativa potentiae ad actum cognitivum.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.24).

²³⁶ “De hac tamen questione sunt opiniones contrariae. - Aliqui enim dicunt quod nullius potentiae actus est effective ab ipsa. - Alii vero dicunt quod utraque potentia, scilicet intellectus et voluntas, exerit et efficit in seipsa actum suum, et in hoc conveniunt in generali; differunt tamen quia aliqui dicunt quod obiecta inducunt in potentia aliquam dispositionem, scilicet, speciem in potentia cognitiva, vel affectionem in potentia appetitiva, et potentia sic disposita causat in se suum actum; omnis, inquam, potentia [est] habens in se suum actum. Alii vero dicunt quod omnia talis potentia ad presentiam obiecti statim efficit actum suum in se ipsa, absque tali dispositione praeducta, saltem voluntas; et haec opinio videtur probabilior, scilicet, quae dicit potentiam in se efficere actum suum.” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.30-31).

In what I've labelled the "*Fully Passive*" and "*Middle Views*", we can see that Gonsalvus sets up and distinguishes the major opponents to the "*Fully Active View*" in a similar way to Olivi. For starters, what I've labelled the "*Fully Passive View*", reported by Gonsalvus above, is clearly the first passive view which Olivi considers, [i] above, where the passive effect from an object just is an act of cognition, with the cognitive power playing no active role; the intelligible object, e.g., simply causes intellection itself, immediately, in the intellectual power.

This view is most commonly, both in his day and in the secondary literature now, attributed to Godfrey of Fontaines (~1249-1306)²³⁷. Godfrey repeatedly claims that the external object is the sole immediate efficient cause of cognition, for both sensation and intellection, and of appetitive acts as well. For both acts of intellectual cognition and volition, Godfrey says, e.g., "the object, which moves the intellect to an act of intellection, also moves the will to an act of volition" (*Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; III, p.170)²³⁸. Moreover, along the same lines as the "Aristotelian" position summarized by Scotus above, Godfrey argues that intellection just is, in reality, a "passion" in the intellect, with the external object as the agent; and this is so by analogy with sensation, which Godfrey takes to be a movement in the sense power as patient, from some

²³⁷ This isn't to say that I think Olivi necessarily had Godfrey exactly in mind. Olivi at least seems to have written the first parts of his *II Sent.*, which cover this topic, well before Godfrey's major writings. Wippel (2018) dates Godfrey's first *quodlibet* to 1285, which is around the time the later parts of Olivi's *II Sent.* were finished, but well after the earlier parts of *II Sent.*, dated to the mid 1270's, which already contains Olivi's set-up of this debate. That being said, Wippel (2018) places Godfrey in Paris in the early 1270's, where, by the mid 1270's, Godfrey compiled a "Student Notebook" which showcases, in Wippel's words, "Godfrey's interest in the writings of Radical Aristotelian Arts Masters at Paris in the 1260s and 1270s" (*Ibid.*). So, it's still possible (i) Godfrey and Olivi at least crossed paths in the early 1270's while both were in Paris, (ii) otherwise gained word of the other, or, (iii) most likely, had some common earlier "Radical Aristotelian" sources on this topic, such as those Godfrey compiled in his "Student Notebook". I'm not aware of any discussion in the secondary literature of the exact relationship between Olivi and Godfrey, whether direct or indirect, but this would be an interesting topic for future study.

After Olivi, however, Godfrey's direct influence is much more evident; Godfrey is most certainly the go-to reference on this topic for such a *Fully Passive View* of cognition (and volition), as we'll see below, for Gonsalvus, Scotus, and Durand, to name just a few examples.

²³⁸ "*Unde quantum ad praesens est dicendum quod voluntas proprie et per se non movet intellectum nec e converso, sed obiectum, quod intellectum movet ad actum intellectionis, movet etiam voluntatem ad actum volitionis.*" (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; III, p.170). See Chapter 2 or below, for more on Godfrey.

sensible object as agent (*Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.275-276; cf. *Quodlibet I*, Q.9; *Quodlibet X*, Q.12)²³⁹. In general, Godfrey’s best known motivation for this view is that he denies any instances of strict “self-motion”, whether in the intellect, will, or any other thing, which he believes would follow if, e.g., an external sense or the intellective soul were to be the cause of its own act (see, e.g., *Quodlibet VI*, Q.7; III, pp.150-152; *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.271-273); for more on Godfrey’s take on “self-motion”, see §3 below.

In what I’ve labelled the “*Fully Passive View*” above, Gonsalvus clearly describes this same sort of view, starting, in this passage, with a general denial of “self-motion”. Moreover, when considering the rest of Gonsalvus’s text and context, it becomes clear that he has Godfrey in particular in mind. Gonsalvus is known to have publicly targeted Godfrey and debated his followers over this issue, and the rest of Gonsalvus’s question is full of direct responses to specific details from Godfrey’s arguments²⁴⁰.

Second, in what I’ve labelled the “*Middle View*” above, Gonsalvus presents another, at least partially, passive view which overlaps with the view Olivi opposes in [ii], and perhaps [iii] as well, where the object of cognition first impresses some sort of disposition or *species* into the cognitive power, which serves as a principle to elicit, or perhaps “excite”, a subsequent act of

²³⁹ “*Licet enim non possit dici quod lapis intelligat, potest tamen dici quod lapis causat et efficit intelligere quo intellectus possibilis formaliter intelligit. Unde intelligere quantum ad id quod significat est actio obiecti et est ab ipso ut ab agente et est passio intellectus possibilis et est in ipso ut in subiecto et patiente. Et similiter est de visibili respectu visus. Visus enim in actu videndi immutatur et movetur a visibili, et non e converse.*” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.275-276). See below, for further comments on the specific context of this passage, along with more explicit references to Aristotle from Godfrey.

Moreover, note that Godfrey also presents a similar threefold division of this debate, even though he takes on the most opposing view to Gonsalvus (see, e.g., Godfrey, *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.270-276).


²⁴⁰ See, e.g., Amoros (1935, lxix-lxxi), for these historical details. For the many references to Godfrey, see the numerous footnotes contained throughout Amoros’s edition of I *Quaestiones*, Q.3.

cognition from the power. Unlike the *Fully Passive View*, where the external object immediately causes the act of cognition itself, Olivi and Gonsalvus both consider this a more moderate view which posits two steps to cognition rather than one; the first step is, in some sense, passive, and the second, in some sense, active. The general idea behind this *Middle View* is that an act of cognition, whether sensitive or intellectual, is an action of the relevant cognitive power; however, in order to be able to cognize, first one must receive some distinct *species* of *some* object in the cognitive power to dispose/habituate/determine it for a specific act of cognition; one has to cognize *something*, after all, to truly cognize.

This *Middle View* has a varied history of proponents and specifications. For the sake of discussion, it'll be best to put aside the "excitation" account [iii], as it seems to be an unusual and uncommon view; as we'll see below, Durand doesn't even bring it up. That leaves us with the more common *Middle View*, which holds that the first impression or "*species*" in a cognitive power is a sort of representation and/or causal intermediary "by which" we cognize, where this impression is distinct from and prior to cognition itself. As we'll see, Olivi and Godfrey, e.g., when characterizing this *Middle View*, typically describe such a *species* as a form/similitude of some object, such that, once received in a given cognitive power, one would then be disposed/habituated to cognize that object; or, at least, one would have a sort of internal "image" which one could then turn towards to enable and determine cognition of that represented object. As I've touched on before and will again below (§1.2.1), this *Middle View* is most often associated with Aquinas and his followers, though it's also widely adopted, and debated, in medieval philosophy at large.

For a simplified comparison of these two views, see the following graphic representations:

Figure 1: The Fully Passive and Middle Views in Comparison (Simplified)



Note that the above is simplified to represent basic acts of either sensation or intellection, so it ignores any intermediary role for phantasms, agent intellect, etc., which are unique to intellection. I've left the relationship between soul, sense, and organ ambiguous here, given that this is a matter open to debate. That being said, obviously no organ is relevant for the intellect. Moreover, at least in some sense, for the traditional version of both views, for the external senses, the "influx" in the organ *is* the "influx" in the sense power (whether sensation itself, or a sensible *species*), at least, barring any obstructions (Godfrey, e.g., seems to admit of some nuance here, in *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19). I've also left some room here for differing views on how the object, *species in medio*, and *species* in organ/power causally connect (whether the object instantaneously causes all such species, or each species causes the next one) but the difference can be ignored for our purposes. [Crucially, note that despite Godfrey's phrasing that the object itself, rather than a cognitive "*species*", causes cognition, Godfrey's view still requires *species in medio*, between the object and power (the object is still called the proper cause insofar as it's first effect is the composite of both the *species* and the cognitive act, all at once).]

§1.1.3. *The Fully Active View*

Finally, in what I've labelled the "*Fully Active View*" above, Gonsalvus presents the view of Olivi, which Gonsalvus eventually endorses as well, that the intellect (and will) are self-movers, able to cause simple acts of cognition without needing to first receive some impression or "influx" from an external object in the relevant power, so long as the object is, in some sense, present.²⁴¹

Summing up what I've argued in prior chapters, proponents of this *Fully Active View* of cognition (and appetite), such as Olivi and Gonsalvus, still admit some causal role for external objects; to deny this would be ridiculous. However, the causal role granted to external objects is subordinated to the more proper and principal causal role of the given cognitive power. Olivi, e.g., denies that an external object is "simply and properly" an efficient cause of cognition, but "nevertheless it can be broadly counted among efficient causes"; for one reason, because the presence of an object is still necessary to fix or "terminate" an act of cognition onto some particular object (II Sent. Q.72; III, p.10)²⁴². Elsewhere, Olivi calls the object a "terminative

²⁴¹ Now, admittedly Gonsalvus is a bit ambiguous in this introductory passage above concerning whether he endorses this fully active view, especially for the intellect and not just the will; however, throughout the rest of this text, as I've discussed before, Gonsalvus seems to treat intellect and will together in this regard and favour the *Fully Active View* in general terms. See, e.g., I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, pp.32-38, where Gonsalvus starts explicitly with arguments common to both intellect and will; the only distinction Gonsalvus explicitly makes between intellect and will is that only the latter is said to have "control" (*dominium*) and, thus, is responsible for moral freedom and responsibility (Ibid. p.39). See also, the passage below from Gonsalvus, which is specifically raised about volition, but appears to apply just as much to cognition; indeed, in his explanation, Gonsalvus cites Augustine's *De Trinitate*, where Augustine also seems to run together how the lovable and the will together cause love and the knowable and the mind together cause knowledge (Ibid., ad.2, pp.45-46; cf. *De Trinitate* IX.12.18). Moreover, as Solère (2014) points out, elsewhere Gonsalvus expresses further doubts specific to the *Middle View* for intellection, where an intelligible *species* is posited before an act of cognition and its subsequent habit: "*Ista quaestio tria dubia supponit: primum est quod species in intellectu requiritur propter actum intelligendi, quod est mihi dubium, et quomodo species est aliud ab habitu et actu intelligendi.*" (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.7; p.403; cf. Solère 2014, p.226).

²⁴² "*Secundo est praenotandum quod licet obiectum, pro quanto solum terminat aspectum virtutis cognitivae et suae actualis cognitionis, non habeat simpliciter et proprie rationem efficientis, quia formalis terminatio praedicti*

cause” and likens the object’s secondary role in cognition to that of a vessel, such as a cup, which constrains the shape of some rays of light falling into it, without properly causing the rays themselves (that’s more so the causal work of the Sun) (Ibid. pp.36-39; cf. II Sent. Q.58; II, pp.414-419).

In a similar vein, Gonsalvus calls the object a necessary cause, “*sine quo non*”, which “co-assists” with a power’s self-motion, “but impresses nothing”; Gonsalvus even gives a similar analogy, in his case of liquid falling into its place according to its vessel’s place (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.2; p.46)²⁴³. So, overall, for this *Fully Active View*, a cognitive (or appetitive) power is still the more proper and principal efficient cause of its act, since an object impresses no act on its own nor any habit or *species* in the power prior to and distinct from an act of cognition (or appetite). In this way, this account differs from both the *Fully Passive* and even the *Middle View*.

I take it that Scotus’s account of cognition also falls under the umbrella of what I’m calling “*Fully Active Views*”, although with some caveats noted in prior chapters²⁴⁴. At the very least, in

aspectum non est aliqua essentia realiter differens ab ipso aspectu et saltem non est influxa vel educta ab obiecto, in quantum est solum terminus ipsius aspectus et actus cognitivi: nihilominus potest large connumerari inter causas efficientes; tum quia obiectum, in quantum est talis terminus vel terminans, non habet rationem patientis aut entis possibilis seu potentialis, immo potius rationem actus et entis actualis; tum quia virtus activa potentiae cognitivae sic necessario eget tali termino et eius terminatione ad hoc quod producat actum cognitivum, acsi praedictus terminus influeret aliquid in ipsam vim cognitivam et in eius actum.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.10).

²⁴³ “[...] secundum Augustinum, IX De Trinitate, cap. ultimo, obiectum reducitur ad causam agentem, sed est agens sine quo non; nihilominus est causa per se coassistens imprimenti, sed nihil imprimit, nec oportet propter hoc quod sit causa per accidens, sed est causa per se. Aristoteles enim, II Physicorum, vas ponit inter causas per se cum potione et mediate, et tamen nihil imprimit. Iuvatur igitur voluntas in causando volitiones suas; quia igitur iuvatur non est infinitae virtutis, praesertim quia non est causa illius a quo iuvatur. Talis igitur infinitas voluntatis est secundum quid; talis etiam infinitas voluntatis est ex multiplicatione obiecti, et non ex vigore voluntatis.” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, ad.2; p.46). One difference between Olivi and Gonsalvus, as one might note from this passage, is that Gonsalvus appears to be more willing to refer to the external object as an agent cause and a cause *per se*, even if it’s still a secondary cause. For further discussion of this passage, see my prior chapter, along with Solère (2014, pp.214-215).


²⁴⁴ In short, one caveat is that, at least given what he says in *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.1, Scotus seems to admit the need for a distinct *species* in the intellect prior to universal/abstractive cognition in this life, since there the object isn’t sufficiently present on its own; so, in other words, Scotus only seems to take on the full active view where intuitive cognition is possible and the object is sufficiently present on its own. The other caveat is that, at least in

Ordinatio I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2 & Q.3, Scotus presents, as his own, the view that the intellect and its object, when present, are essentially ordered efficient causes, with the intellect as the more perfect and principal cause and the object as the secondary and subordinate cause; the intellect's self-motion dictates that its effect will be *intellection*, but the object aids in completing and fixing the act of intellection so that it is an act of intellection *about this or that object* (see, e.g. *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298; Q.3; pp.312-314). So, in general, like Olivi and Gonsalvus, Scotus takes the cognitive power, rather than the object, to be the more principal cause. Moreover, as we'll see below, Scotus clearly has some opponents in common with Olivi and Gonsalvus, especially Godfrey's *Fully Passive View* and at least certain *Middle Views*, and he picks up many of the arguments from Olivi and Gonsalvus against these opponents.

For a representation of the *Fully Active View*, at least of Olivi, see Figure 2 below:

Ordinatio I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2 & Q.3, Scotus presents prior active accounts from Olivi and company as an even further extreme, where external objects are in no way efficient causes, with his own account as a "middle" option, where both power and object are efficient causes. However, I've argued previously that Scotus's presentation is a bit misleading and misses just how similar his own view is to that of Olivi and, especially, Gonsalvus, both of whom admit some broad sense in which external objects are efficient causes.

Figure 2: The Fully Active View in Comparison with The Middle View (Simplified)



Crucially, for this *Fully Active View*, the red line represents where the lower cannot cross to (at least sufficiently) act on the higher; the object’s causal effects on the medium and organs (*qua* bodily) are greyed out since their role is, at best, secondary. Whether somehow through its corporeal effects or not, the object is a secondary cause, nevertheless, in the object’s termination of the soul’s cognitive attention/*aspectus*. The higher cause acts first, and can, at least metaphorically, reach below, wherever the object presents itself; here the soul’s gaze, or “*aspectus*”, conforms itself to its object (reflected in a sort of self-motion, back on the soul/power). Note how the *Fully Active View*, switches the order, from the *Middle View*, in which a “*species*” (*qua* habit/memory image) is formed.

§1.2. Durand's Division of the Debate

§1.2.1. Common Targets: The Fully Passive and Middle Views

The first notable similarity between Durand²⁴⁵ and these prior thinkers, especially Gonsalvus, is that Durand also splits up the passive views of his opponents into the same major two-fold division, and, at least on the face of it, he endorses a similar third, more fully active view, distinguished from both passive views. Characterizing his opponents, Durand starts with a *Middle View* about intellection and then extends it to include sensation, as those before him:

“The first [view] says that to intelligize (*intelligere*) is an action of the intellect informed by a *species* of the intelligible thing, really differing from each [viz., the intellect and the object]” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.8).²⁴⁶

“[I]f a *species* in the intellect is a principle by which the intellect actively elicits an operation of intellection, through the same reason a *species* in the senses is a principle by which the senses actively elicit an operation of sensing” (Ibid., p.11).²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵ I'll be focusing almost entirely on the earliest writings of Durand on this topic, especially the first version [A] of his commentary on book II of the Sentences, D.3, Q.5, edited in Koch (1935). In this text, Durand starts explicitly with the traditional question, “whether angels cognize everything which they cognize through their essence or through *species*”, but very quickly he moves the topic to cognition in general, especially for humans and, ultimately, Durand re-frames the debate in a way which challenges this traditional dichotomy. As we'll get to now, Durand prefers to divide the debate into three views, none of which consider that cognition, in humans or angels, is through turning to innate content in one's essence, which is one of two traditional views in this debate. Reportedly, Durand's general cognitive theory changes over time, but I won't get into those details here. That being said, at least with respect to this question, as far as I can tell, Durand doesn't explicitly deny anything he says about cognition in the second [B] and third [C] redactions, which were forced by his Dominican order. Instead, Durand simply leaves out most of this section dedicated to human cognition, to avoid controversy, but retains everything he says about angelic cognition; he even leaves some of his general arguments against the need for any passive reception in cognition (of *species*). The only thing Durand explicitly goes back on is that, in II Sent. [A], Durand frames his discussion of human cognition by arguing that we should expect human and angelic intellection to be largely analogous (Ibid. p.8), whereas by II Sent. [C], Durand states that we should instead be cautious to argue by analogy between humans and angels (II Sent. [C], D.6, Q.6*; p.pp.139-141). [*Note that the sections get renumbered in the later versions.]

²⁴⁶ “*Prima dicit quod intelligere est actio intellectus informati specie rei intelligibilis realiter ab utroque differens [...]*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.8).

²⁴⁷ “[...] *si species in intellectu est principium, quo intellectus elicit active operationem intelligendi, per eandem rationem species in sensu est principium, quo sensus elicit active operationem sentiendi.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.11).

Second, Durand also considers the same *Fully Passive View* as those before him and he distinguishes it from the first, more moderate view:

“Others say otherwise, that intellection and sensation (*intelligere et sentire*) comes about in us through this alone, that the object moves the power, not by causing in it some *species*, which would represent the object or elicit an act, but by [that object] immediately causing sensation or intellection of that [object]” (Ibid., p.12).²⁴⁸

So, overall, like Olivi and Gonsalvus above, Durand divides his opponents in terms of whether they hold that the first effect from an external object passively received in the cognitive power is a sort of principle/*species* from which the cognitive act follows or is simply the cognitive act itself.

It’s also clear that Durand has some of the same figures in mind as do Gonsalvus and Olivi as advocates of both opposing views, and sees similar “Aristotelian” motivations behind them. For the first, i.e. *Middle View*, Durand specifies in the quote above that the initial impression, or *species*, held by this view is said to serve as principle of cognition in that it can either “[i] represent the object or [ii] elicit the act” (Ibid., p.12). According to [i], the object of cognition impresses some sort of representation into the cognitive power so that the power can then turn upon this representation and produce an act of cognition about that represented object. According to [ii], the object would cause a disposition in the cognitive power from which the act is “elicited”, as water, having been made hot by fire, is now disposed to go into act itself (and make hot another object)²⁴⁹.

²⁴⁸“*Alii dicunt aliter quod intelligere et sentire per hoc solum fiunt in nobis, quod obiectum movet potentiam, non causando in ea aliquam speciem, que sit obiecti representativa vel actus elicitiva, sed immediate causando ipsum sentire vel intelligere.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.12).

Note that this edition regularly leaves ‘ae’ abbreviated to ‘e’ (e.g., ‘*que*’ above for ‘*quae*’).

²⁴⁹ First off, note that an “excitation” view seems to drop out of the conversation here. This helps narrow down who Durand has in mind here. Second, note that here Durand is describing this division in the *Middle View* by way of Godfrey’s description in *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19. (See below for Durand’s direct citation to this text.) This also helps tie down a target for Durand here, by proxy.

Notably, Durand seems to prioritize this second explanation, [ii], when he initially describes the *Middle View* in the passage quoted above, which in full reads:²⁵⁰

“The first [view] says that to intelligize (*intelligere*) is an action of the intellect informed by a *species* of the intelligible thing, really differing from each other; in which case, the intellect, informed by a *species*, is disposed for action just as water, having been made hot, is disposed for making hot (*califacere*) a foot or hand. For just as water, which through itself is not hot, cannot actually make hot a foot or hand unless previously it received heat in itself, so our possible intellect cannot go into an act of intellection unless previously it was brought into act through a *species* of the intelligible thing; and just as the heat received in water is its cause (*ratio*) of actively making hot another, so a *species* of an intelligible thing is our intellect’s cause of actively eliciting an act of intellection; nor is there a difference here and there unless since making hot is a transient act into an exterior matter, which is not the case for an act of intellection.” (Ibid., pp. 8-9).²⁵¹

As Hartman (2012), e.g., has pointed out, critics of Durand most often read him as targeting Aquinas and his followers in this passage; e.g., when criticizing Durand, Hervaeus points to Aquinas’s oft discussed account of *species* as that “by which” we cognize, in particular, as reported in his *Summa Theologiae* (ST) *pars* 1, Q.85, a.2 (Hartman 2012, p.21, fn.14)²⁵².

²⁵⁰ There is, perhaps, some room for overlap here though, insofar as a *species* might elicit an act of cognition by bringing the power to turn back upon the *species*, for example; or, perhaps, one might hold that the *species* can somehow elicit a corresponding act of cognition in accordance with the representation, without any explicit turning upon the *species*. As we’ll see below, Durand takes issue with all of these accounts nonetheless.

²⁵¹ “*Prima dicit quod intelligere est actio intellectus informati specie rei intelligibilis realiter ab utroque differens, ad quam se habet intellectus specie informatus sicut aqua facta calida ad calefactionem pedum vel manus. Sicut enim aqua, que de se non est calida, actu non potest calefacere pedem aut manum, nisi prius in se recepto calore, sic intellectus noster possibilis non potest in actum intelligendi, nisi prius fiat in actu per speciem rei intelligibilis; et sicut calor receptus in aqua est sibi ratio calefaciendi alterum active, sic species rei intelligibilis est intellectui nostro [ratio] eliciendi actum intelligendi active, nec est hic et ibi differentia, nisi quia calefacere est actus transiens in materiam exteriorem, [quod] non est intelligere.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.8-9).

²⁵² Hartman (2012) refers to the report established by Hervaeus and other Dominicans to censure Durand’s views (*Articuli in quibus magister Durandus deuiat . . .*, n. 58): “*Eadem d. a. 5 reprobatur modum quo Thomas p. 1 q. 85 a. 2 ostendit speciem intelligibilem esse principium quo intellectionis.*”

To add to Hartman’s evidence, consider, as well, Peter Auriol’s description of Aquinas’s view on this matter, for which Auriol also cites ST I, Q.85, a.2: “*Opinio Thomae, parte prima, quaestione 85, articulo secundo, et hoc contra Godofredum. Dixerunt vero alii quod intelligere consistit in quodam agere, nec est ipsa species intelligibilis, sed intellectus per speciem factus in actu intelligit et cognoscit tamquam ratione intelligendi. Hoc autem potest multipliciter declarari, sicut enim se habet actio quae transit in rem exteriorem ad agens ipsum, sic modo suo se videtur habere actio immanens ad suum agens. Sed actio transiens, scilicet calefacere vel secare, quod provenit ex*

In this article, Aquinas makes the same analogy which Durand does, above, between a form (a *species* or similitude) and an act of cognition (such as vision or intellection), and a form of heat and the action of making hot, where in both cases a form serves as a principle according to which the thing which receives the form acts:

“An intelligible *species* is related to the intellect as that by which the intellect intelligizes. This much is clear, since ‘action’ is two-fold, just as it is said in *Metaphysics* IX [cap.8]: one which remains in the agent [i.e. an “immanent action”], such as sensation and intellection, and the other which goes out into an exterior thing [i.e. a “transitive action”], such as making hot and cutting, and both come about according to some form. And just as a form, according to which a transitive action proceeds, is a similitude of the object of the action, as heat making hot is a similitude of something made hot, similarly a form, according to which an immanent action proceeds, is a similitude of its object. Hence, a similitude of a visible thing is that according to which vision sees, and a similitude of an intellected thing, which is an intelligible *species*, is the form according to which the intellect intelligizes.” (ST I, Q.85, a.2, c.)²⁵³

As Aquinas puts it, the action, e.g., of *vision* follows the reception of a similitude/*species* of some *visible* object in the seer, and, similarly, the action of *making something hot* follows what Aquinas calls a “similitude of *something made hot*” (in this case, he just seems to mean heat) in the thing making hot, now actualizing this form in some other object as well (Ibid.). Also in line

aliqua similitudine obiecti <actionis sicut patet quod calor calefacientis est similitudo calefacti. Ergo actio immanens, scilicet intelligere aut videre, est ab aliqua similitudine obiecti> [...] existente in anima, et ita intellectus per similitudinem obiecti elicit actum immanentem, qui est intelligere, ut videtur.

Praeterea, ultima perfectio hominis non potest consistere in pura receptione, et in pure pati; unde Philosophus I et X Ethicorum dicit quod felicitas consistit in operatione. Sed manifestum est quod consistit in intelligere. Ergo intelligere est aliquod agere et non purum recipere sive pati.” (I Sent., D.35, pars 1, a.1; lines 145-158). Note, also, this last argument, which clarifies that Aquinas’s view is that intellection is “in some way to act and not a pure reception or undergoing”; i.e. Aquinas leaves some room for intellection to be, in part, passive, to keep in line with the common saying of Aristotle that intellection is in some sense a passion/undergoing.

²⁵³ *“Dicendum est quod species intelligibilis se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus. Quod sic patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, sicut dicitur IX Metaphysicae [cap. 8], una quae manet in agente, ut uidere et intelligere, et altera quae transit in rem exteriorem, ut calefacere et secare, utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma, secundum quam provenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est similitudo obiecti actionis, ut calor calefaciens est similitudo calefacti, similiter forma, secundum quam provenit actio manens in agente, est similitudo obiecti. Vnde similitudo rei uisibilis est secundum quam uisus uidet, et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit.”* (Aquinas, ST I, Q.85, a.2, c.). Admittedly, Aquinas’s presentation here is a bit unique insofar as he puts the stress on the relevant form playing the role of a “similitude of its object” in both cognitive and non-cognitive cases; this is a rather awkward way to phrase things and differs from Durand’s presentation above.

with the passage from Durand above, Aquinas clarifies that these actions, nevertheless, differ in that the former sort (e.g. vision and intellection) are so-called “immanent actions”, where the action remains in the agent, but the latter sort (such as heating and cutting), are “transient actions”, where the action goes out into an external patient; vision, e.g., doesn’t change its object, but making hot does (Ibid.; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics IX*(Θ).8, 1049b3-15, 1050a23-b2)²⁵⁴.

So, Aquinas indeed seems to be a target for Durand here, as he was for Olivi and Gonsalvus before him, on behalf of this *Middle View*, where cognition involves, first, a sort of passive reception, but, by which reception, the cognitive power itself can still be said to actively go into its distinct action and cognize²⁵⁵.

²⁵⁴ As we’ll return to below, this distinction will also come up frequently in the arguments surrounding this topic, with differing opinions on how to understand this distinction in more theoretical terms.

²⁵⁵ However, this isn’t to say that these are conclusive reasons to think that Aquinas held this exact view overall or consistently, and there is an extensive debate in the secondary literature on this topic.

Certain Thomists, both past and present, such as Bernard Lonergan (2007) and Thomas of Sutton, wish to downplay Aquinas’s distinction between act and *species* arguing that both are ultimately passively received from something outside the cognitive power (for the external senses and material intellect) and in no way efficiently caused by the given cognitive power itself; in this way, this view comes closer to the *Fully Passive View* of Godfrey, where cognition is a passion and no real action is enacted by a subject between receiving a *species* and going into act. For a useful collection of relevant passages in favour of this view, see Lonergan (2007, Appendix I: Immanent Operation, pp.532-557); e.g., “[...] sentire consistit in moveri et pati [...]” (InDA, lect.10, §350); “[...] forma recepta in aliquo non movet illud in quo recipitur; sed ipsum habere talem formam, est ipsum motum esse; sed movetur ab exteriori agente; sicut corpus quod calefit per ignem, non movetur a calore recepto, sed ab igne. Ita etiam et intellectus non movetur a specie iam recepta, vel a vero quod consequitur ipsam speciem; sed ab aliqua re exteriori quae imprimat in intellectum, sicut est intellectus agens, vel phantasma, vel aliud aliquid huiusmodi.” (Aquinas, *De veritate*, Q.22, a.5, ad.8); “Omnis enim actio vel est potentiae activae, vel passivae. Obiectum autem comparatur ad actum potentiae passivae, sicut principium et causa movens, color enim in quantum movet visum, est principium visionis. Ad actum autem potentiae activae comparatur obiectum ut terminus et finis, sicut augmentativae virtutis obiectum est quantum perfectum, quod est finis augmenti.” (Aquinas, ST I, Q.77, a.3, c.); “Dicendum quod relatio in hoc differt a quantitate et qualitate: quia quantitas et qualitas sunt quaedam accidentia in subiecto remanentia; relatio autem non significat, ut Boetius dicit, ut in subiecto manens, sed ut in transitu quodam ad aliud; unde et Porretani dixerunt, relationes non esse inhaerentes, sed assistentes, quod aliquantulum verum est, ut posterius ostendetur. Quod autem attribuitur alicui ut ab eo in aliud procedens non facit compositionem cum eo, sicut nec actio cum agente. Et propter hoc etiam probat philosophus V Phys., quod in ad aliquid non potest esse motus: quia, sine aliqua mutatione eius quod ad aliud refertur, potest relatio desinere ex sola mutatione alterius, sicut etiam de actione patet, quod non est motus secundum actionem nisi metaphorice et improprie; sicut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus, quod non esset si relatio vel actio significaret aliquid in subiecto manens.” (Aquinas, *De potentia*, Q.7, a.8, c.).

Consider, as well, how this passage from Durand immediately continues:

[As for] the saying of the Philosopher in *De anima* [III.4, 429 a13-18]²⁵⁶, that to intelligize is to undergo (*pati*), [these people] put forth that this is not true essentially, but concomitantly, since we do not intelligize unless a *species* of the intelligible thing is first received, which reception is called a ‘passion’ broadly speaking.” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.9)²⁵⁷

First, this passage confirms that this account is meant to be a true *middle* view of cognition, with both a sort of passivity and a sort of activity involved. Second, this passage also shows that Durand casts both the *Middle View* and the *Fully Passive View* as two views which share a common “Aristotelian” foundation for positing some sort of passivity in cognition. As we’ve seen with Olivi and company above, both *Middle* and *Fully Passive Views* are commonly tied to Aristotle’s claim that intellection, like sensation, is, in some sense, a passion/undergoing, e.g., in *De anima* III.4, cited here by Durand. As Durand explains, the *Middle View*, however, qualifies this Aristotelian claim such that it primarily refers to the reception of some *species* prior to, but “concomitant” with, a subsequent act of cognition²⁵⁸. As one can gather from the passage we just covered from Aquinas, this qualification is at least partly motivated to fit with another Aristotelian claim (e.g., from *Metaphysics* IX.8), that cognition is, despite involving some initial passivity, itself an immanent “*action*”.

This interpretative strategy contrasts with that of the *Fully Passive View* which more simply claims that intellectual cognition, e.g., is “effectively from an object and it is a certain

²⁵⁶ See above for the cited passage.

²⁵⁷ “*Dictum autem Philosophi 2* De anima, quod intelligere est pati, exponunt quod hoc verum est non essentialiter, sed concomitative, quia non intelligeremus, nisi prius recepta specie rei intelligibilis, que receptio est passio large dicta.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.9).

²⁵⁸ At least, this reception is necessary for creatures, such as humans, but it isn’t “essential” to cognition. Thus, on this view, at least God’s cognition can be a simple action with no undergoing.

undergoing, not only concomitantly, as the first view says, but essentially” (Ibid. p.13)²⁵⁹. So, as with Godfrey, the *Fully Passive View* has a more simplified understanding of Aristotle’s claims about passivity such that an act of cognition just is a passion in a cognitive power, identical to an action from the object of cognition (*Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.275-276; cf. *De anima III.2*, 425b25). Indeed, for many other reasons as well, it is clear that Durand has Godfrey in mind here, as did Gonsalvus and Scotus before him²⁶⁰; e.g. as we’ll explore below, Godfrey has a

²⁵⁹ “Igitur in intellectu non fit species preter ipsum intelligere, quod est ab obiecto effective, et est quoddam pati, non solum concomitative, ut primi dicunt, sed essentialiter, quamvis secundum nomen sit actio, eo quod per verbum activum significatur.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.13). As we’ll see below, this claim that cognition is only an “action in name” is a reference to Godfrey’s view that cognition is a merely “grammatical action”.

²⁶⁰ See above for more on the passive reading of this Aristotelian passage from Godfrey and others.

That Durand has Godfrey in mind specifically is also clear from the fact that Durand provides a direct quotation to Godfrey, as Koch’s (1935) edition points out. When Durand describes this *Fully Passive View* of “others”, he includes this reference to a passage from Godfrey:

Durand: “Dico autem in sensu, quatinus sensus est, quia organum sensus, quatinus communicat cum medio in aliqua qualitate, ut pupilla cum aere in dyaphaneitate, preter sensationem, quam recipit sensus in quantum huiusmodi, recipit etiam speciem intentionalem rei sensibilis ratione qualitatis, in qua communicat cum medio, que tamen species **non est essentialiter ipsa sensitio; alioquin sensitio esset in medio et in organo, virtute sensitiva corrupta.** Intellectus autem, cum non sit virtus organica, non potest immutari, nisi in quantum est virtus apprehensiva. Ipsa, in quantum huiusmodi, non est in potentia nisi ad intelligere, et ideo nichil recipit nisi intelligere.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.12).

Godfrey: “Consimili etiam mutatione potest et ipsum organum immutari, quae etiam **non est essentialiter sensitio, alioquin etiam esset sensitio in medio et etiam in organo, virtute sensitiva corrupta.** [...] Sed in quantum est vis animalis et sensitiva sola sensatione immutatur; et sic illud, quod per se immutat sensibile in potentia sensitiva ut sensitiva est, non est nisi ipsa potentia secundum quod talis, et illud secundum quod sensibile ipsam potentiam sensitivam immutat non est nisi sensitio; sed tamen hoc etiam aliter immutatur modo praedicto. **Cum ergo intellectus non sit potentia organica, non potest ab aliquo immutari nisi secundum quod potentia apprehensiva; ipsa autem in quantum huiusmodi non est in potentia nisi ad apprehensionem;** ergo nec ad aliud per se immutatur. Sed huic non obstat quod ex huiusmodi actibus habitus posterior derelinquitur, ut alias visum est. Sed nihil potest fieri in ipsa potentia ante ipsum actum intelligendi. Sic ergo videtur dicendum quod non fit in eo nisi ipsa intellectio, sive actus intelligendi per se et immediate.” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, p.274) [The second part in bold is not exactly quoted by Durand, but is very close to the line immediately after Durand’s quotation.] As Durand puts it, Godfrey’s *Fully Passive View* concedes to the *Middle View* that a sensible *species* and an act of sensation “essentially” differ, in some sense; however, this is only due to the organic nature of the sense organs and so the same cannot be said of intellection. Notably, the original passage from Godfrey here includes some further explanation for how a *species* impressed in a sense organ, *qua* sensitive, is still, in some sense, identical to sensation; i.e., the two can still be said to overlap in reality (accidentally), even if they don’t necessarily overlap (i.e. essentially). Note that none of this, moreover, is to deny that sensation is still “essentially” a passion for Godfrey; so this much, at least, is common with intellection. Godfrey likely adopts these nuances to try to respond to some of the common objections against his view, as we’ll see.

particular strategy, which Durand refers to, to deflate Aristotle’s claim that cognition is an immanent action by claiming that an immanent action is an “action” in name alone.

Nevertheless, despite the interpretive differences between these views, Durand takes aim at the passivity claimed in both *Middle* and *Fully Passive Views*. Thus, at least at first glance, Durand seems to be following Olivi’s lead against the “Aristotelian” roots to both *Middle* and *Fully Passive Views*. I mention this since it’s important for how Solère (2014), and others in the secondary literature, frame this debate, as Durand and other “Augustinians” against these “Aristotelian” passive views; this is something with which I will take some issue later.

§1.2.2. Durand’s Active View: First Pass

Finally, Durand presents his own view in contrast to both opposing views, in a manner which comes especially close to Gonsalvus’s description of the *Fully Active View* above. Consider, e.g., Durand’s condensed statement of his own account: “Only the intellect and **the presence of its object** are required for intellection” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5.; p.26)²⁶¹; and compare with Gonsalvus above: “every such power **in the presence of an object** at once causes its act in that [power] itself, without such a pre-induced *dispositio*” (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.31). For another passage which showcases Durand’s positive account, see the following passage in which, more generally, Durand extends his account to sensation as well, and adds some further details:

“To intelligize and to sense (*intelligere et sentire*) are in us *per se* from the giver of sense and intellect, i.e. the creator or generator, from the object

²⁶¹ “*Sed ad intelligere solum requiritur intellectus et presentia obiecti, ut declaratum est.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5 ; p.16).

however just as a cause *sine qua non*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.20).²⁶²

Here Durand distinguishes his account from both *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views* insofar as, for him, the external object is only a necessary condition or a *sine qua non* cause, while the cognitive power is in itself able to cognize (thanks, ultimately, to the “giver” of the cognitive power)²⁶³. So, at the very least, Durand’s positive account is similar to Olivi’s and Gonsalvus’s insofar as Durand also doesn’t posit that the external object is sufficient to produce any effect on the cognitive power; rather, the cognitive power is, in some sense, sufficient to go into its natural act and cognize, only requiring an object to present itself, play some subordinate causal role, and thus complete the natural action of the cognitive power. So, these prior active accounts and Durand seem to posit a similar causal asymmetry between the power and the object. However, whether or not Durand ultimately aligns with Olivi and company is something we can get back to below, when we get to Durand’s positive account (§3), where one can see the differences in the details²⁶⁴.

§1.3. Aside: Putting Aside any Agent Intellect or Agent Sense*

There is one more thing I want to clarify about the division of this debate, as Olivi and company understand it. Although not as central, strictly speaking, this will nevertheless become relevant later; in particular, this will help, (i), illustrate what “activity” is at the heart of this

²⁶² “*De secundo dicendum, quod intelligere et sentire sunt in nobis per se a dante sensum et intellectum, quod est creans vel generans, ab obiecto autem sicut a causa sine qua non.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.20).

²⁶³ In more specific terms, Solère (2014) devotes much of his paper to finding the source for Durand’s notion of a “*causa sine qua non*” in the prior accounts of figures such as Olivi and Gonsalvus, but I’ll touch on this below.

²⁶⁴ For now, note that it’s a bit unclear from these passages whether Durand would say the cognitive power is a proper efficient cause of its own act, as Olivi and Gonsalvus say, or if, rather, the only efficient causation traces back to “the giver” in generating the cognitive power.

debate for these thinkers, and, (ii), flag another potential common point between Durand and Olivi's company.

For Olivi and company, along with Durand, an Aristotelian "agent intellect", or an (Averroist) "agent sense", is both explicitly and implicitly put aside in this debate, despite the "activity" one might think these entail. Such "agents", it is argued, are insufficient and/or unnecessary to account for the relevant sort of "activity" in cognition which these thinkers take to be at issue.

Consider, for instance, what I've been calling Godfrey's "*Fully Passive View*", where, e.g., the power which actually intelligizes, viz. the so-called "potential"/"material"/"passive" intellect, is entirely passive with respect to intellection. In addition to a passive intellect, Godfrey follows the typical (Latin) medieval Aristotelian tradition and posits an (in some sense) distinct "agent intellect" in each human as well. For Godfrey, this agent intellect is said to operate on (or "illuminate") phantasms in the material senses, so that the singular objects represented in these phantasms will become "abstracted" from their singular and material conditions, such that the objects in these phantasms will become actually (in second act) intelligible, able to then act on an individual's (incorporeal) passive intellect and, thus, bring about intellection; Godfrey insists that the object is still the entire agent of intellection in this process, as otherwise the same thing, the intellectual soul, would be both mover and moved, a consequence Godfrey strongly resists, as noted above (see, e.g., *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.275-276)²⁶⁵. Notably, even on Godfrey's side

²⁶⁵ *"Item, esto quod ita esset, tamen adhuc non posset dici proprie quod intelligere esset ab intellectu ut actio ab efficiente et movente, quia illud ratione cuius non agit ad actum intelligendi nisi secundum quod agit ad hoc quod illud quod debet movere intellectum possibilem habeat actu rationem moventis et obiecti. Obiectum ergo*

of the debate, the agent intellect is not said to be that which “intelligizes”; i.e., it is the act in the passive intellect which is at issue, not the “illumination” of the agent intellect. In response to this sort of agent intellect, Olivi and company also make it clear that the agent intellect’s sort of activity can be put aside in this debate. Olivi and company even go further and argue that this sort of distinct agent power isn’t of any obvious help either.

In their “*nobility arguments*”, discussed in more detail below, Olivi and company argue against any *Passive View* (e.g., of Godfrey or of Aquinas) insofar as it requires the lower to act on the higher in the process of cognition (whether in intellection or sensation). In this context, Olivi, in particular, provides an extended nobility argument to explicitly set aside any agent intellect, or an analogous agent sense, which might be held to bridge this gap from the lower (external object) to the higher (cognition itself); as Olivi puts it:

“Body would not be able to flow into spirit through an irradiation of an agent intellect, or of another cognitive power. [...] Every action of a cognitive power which is not cognition is incomparably inferior to every action which is cognition itself. But an irradiation preceding an act of cognition is not itself

intelligibile habet rationem moventis et agentis respectu intellectus possibilis educens ipsum de potentia secundum actum intelligendi ad actum secundum illud, et sic intellectus nec ut agens nec ut possibilis posset dici efficere actum intelligendi in se ipso. Sed obiectum est quod habet rationem efficientis et moventis, licet non habeat quod sit obiectum nisi in virtute eius quod habet rationem intellectus agentis; et intellectus possibilis simpliciter habet rationem passivi et receptivi. Sic ergo intelligere non potest dici actio respectu intellectus possibilis sic quod habeat esse ab intellectu possibili ut ab agente et movente; immo potius sic est actio respectu obiecti.” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.275-276).

Note that, on Godfrey’s view, the will is also not able to directly/properly move the intellectual soul, since he holds that they are the same subject (given the intellectual soul’s lack of extension, Godfrey doesn’t think any real division can be made therein); as we’ll see, any action of the intellectual soul, for Godfrey, must be on something outside of it, though this at least includes one’s body/corporeal powers (if one should even call this “activity”). On the other hand, Aquinas, and those following his *Middle View*, seems to make a more “real” distinction between the passive intellect, the agent intellect, and the will, such that in principle one part could act on the other. Nevertheless, Aquinas, and those following him, share with Godfrey the view that the agent intellect’s “abstraction”/“illumination” is not itself an act of cognition. In this respect, most Latin Medieval philosophers seem to diverge from another possible interpretation of DA III.5, where the agent intellect isn’t just that by which everything thinks, but also that which itself always thinks.

cognition. Therefore, it is incomparably inferior to it. [Therefore, etc.]” (II Sent. Q. 72; III. pp.27-29)²⁶⁶.

Here, like Godfrey, Olivi distinguishes an act of cognition itself from any, supposed, “irradiation” (i.e., “illumination”) of a distinct agent intellect/sense (even if the latter are acts of a “cognitive” power). But with this distinction, Olivi departs from prior *Passive Views* and argues that the relevant “activity” in cognition must be in the act of cognition itself, as caused by the proper cognitive power (e.g., sense/intellect). In short, Olivi argues that, if an agent power were to itself lack cognition and merely “irradiate”/“illuminate” its object, while a passive power were to merely receive cognition, there would be a mismatch in nobility, since, as Olivi holds, to cognize is in every way more noble than to “irradiate”/“illuminate” (and any other act which isn’t itself cognition), and an effect does not exceed its cause in nobility. Thus, it follows that such an agent power, with its inferior “illumination”, could not sufficiently cause cognition itself, the superior act (impressed in a distinct passive power). In contrast, Olivi holds that any power which cognizes must, more simply, be that same power which, at least primarily, actively brings about its proper act of cognition (from and in itself); i.e., the most relevant active power should itself be the power which cognizes, not that which enables cognition in a corresponding passive power²⁶⁷.

²⁶⁶ “[C]orpus non possit influere in spiritum per irradiationem intellectus agentis vel alterius potentiae cognitivae. [...]Item, omnis actio potentiae cognitivae quae non est cognitio est incomparabiliter inferior omni actione quae est ipsa cognitio. Sed irradiatio actum cognitionis praecedens non est ipsa cognitio. Ergo est incomparabiliter inferior illa.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.27-29).

²⁶⁷ Olivi and Gonsalvus also take issue with more traditional distinctions between passive and active powers in the soul in general. See, e.g., Olivi (e.g., II Sent. Q.16, Q.55), and Gonsalvus (I *Quaestiones*, Q.13), where it is argued that the potential and agent intellects are the same in reality and only differ according to reason [*ratio*] (seemingly, they differ as spiritual matter to form) (discussed in Gracia 1969). This, perhaps, is not directly relevant to this debate according to Godfrey, since, while he seems to hold a similar, less than fully real, distinction between active and passive powers, at least, for the immaterial intellectual soul, he nevertheless differs on the above issue and still denies self-motion. Nevertheless, this does seem to be relevant according to Aquinas and those who seem to make a “real” distinction between these powers. It’s less clear to me exactly where to place Scotus on this issue.

For different, but related, reasons, which we'll explore in more detail below, Durand comes to a somewhat similar conclusion as does Olivi: if the so-called “passive”/“material” intellect/sense, which cognizes, is not passively moved by external objects in cognition, then one can collapse the distinction between a so-called agent intellect/sense and a passive intellect/sense²⁶⁸. One can find two parallel texts, outside Durand's II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5, where Durand explicitly puts aside the need for any distinct agent intellect or agent sense. First, in his *Commentary on Book I of the Sentences*, Durand includes the following comment about a supposed agent intellect:

“Concerning the intention of Aristotle in positing an agent intellect, there isn't any doubt that this was his intention. And perhaps he was motivated to do so because he believed that [something] should move that [intellect to intellection] and, hence, he posited an agent intellect in virtue of which this action should come about, since singular material things or phantasms don't have in themselves the ability to move the intellect, since no material thing in itself is able to [move] an immaterial thing. But this motivation is not sufficient, for, as will be shown in book two, distinction three [i.e., II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5], no object effectively moves a power, whether sensitive or intellective, for its cognitive act. Rather, the object is a mere *sine qua non* cause. Hence, just as the heaven acts upon inferior things but is not affected (*patitur*) by them—since it does not share (*communicat*) with them in [the same] matter—and yet it still “touches” (*tangit*) those things, in terms of a metaphysical contact (*tactu metaphysico*), so too the immaterial soul united to the body moves the body but is not moved by the body, nor does it receive anything from body.” (I Sent., D.3, Q.5; f. 77rb; cf. Hartman 2012, p.43, *translation modified*)²⁶⁹

²⁶⁸ To be clear I take it that Olivi's argument above is mainly against the sufficiency of a distinct agent intellect/sense, but Durand's arguments seem to be more precisely against their necessity. Moreover, as we'll see, although Olivi seems to collapse this distinction in such a way that the cognitive power is a strict self-mover, Durand's argument seems to be more that a cognitive power is neither moved nor mover with respect to an act of cognition.

²⁶⁹ “*De intentione Aristotelis ponentis intellectum agentem, non est dubium hanc fuisse intentionem eius. Et forte motus fuit quia credebatur quod ipsum moueret et quia singulare materiale uel phantasma non habent de se uirtutem mouendi intellectum, quia nullum materiale de se potest in immateriale, ideo posuit intellectum agentem, in cuius uirtute haec actio fieri. Hoc autem motuum non est sufficiens, quia ut patebit 2 libro, dist. 3, nullum obiectum mouet effectiue potentiam quamcumque sensitiuam uel intellectiuam ad cognitionem sui, sed solum est causa sine qua non. Vnde sicut coelum agit in haec inferiora et ab eis non patitur, quia non communicat cum eis in*

Second, in his *determinatio* of Durand's II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5, included in Koch's (1935) edition, Hervaeus starts his summary of Durand's position by claiming that he provides the following nobility argument against the claim that an object is an effective cause of intellection, along with this response to an objection, positing a role for an agent intellect to concur with an external object in bringing about intellection:

“That [intellection is] not from the object, they [i.e., Durand] first prove so: since an effect would be more noble than its cause, since an act of intellection is more noble than the object. If you were to say that this [conclusion] is not necessary, since an agent intellect concurs [i.e., with the object, in intellection], [it is said] in response (*contra*): since in sense, there is not an agent sense, therefore, neither is it here [i.e., in intellection, is there the need for an agent intellect].” (*Quodlibet* III, Q.8; p.61)²⁷⁰

We'll return to the details of this sort of *nobility argument* below, but for now it at least seems clear that both Olivi and Durand take it that according to their own active/impassive accounts of cognition, a distinct agent intellect or agent sense is not sufficient, or even necessary, to bring about cognition. To borrow Hartman's (2012, pp.41-44) way of putting it, Durand's account, and seemingly Olivi's as well, have the virtue of *parsimony* on their side, since both seem to rely on one active/impassive cognitive power (per type of cognitive act), rather than two. In this second argument attributed to Durand, one can also see a similar claim for consistency/simplicity, given

materia, tangit tamen ea tactu metaphysico, sic anima immaterialis unita corpori mouet corpus et a corpore non mouetur nec aliquid recipit a corpore.” (Durand, I Sent., D.3, Q.5; f. 77rb).

²⁷⁰ “*Quod non ab obiecto probant primo sic, quia effectus esset nobilior sua causa, quia actus intelligendi est nobilior obiecto. Si dicas, quod non oportet, quia concurrat intellectus agens, contra, quia in sensu non est sensus agens. Ergo nec ibi.*” (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; p.61).

As Koch (1935) acknowledges, this reference to an agent intellect/sense is not exactly found in Durand's II Sent. [A] (at least, in the manuscripts he worked with). Nevertheless, as we'll see, the general nobility argument described here does show up in Durand's words in II Sent. [A]. Even better, as Danya Maslov has helpfully pointed out to me, this reference to an agent intellect/sense can be found even more explicitly elsewhere in Durand's I Sent., D.3, Q.5, the text we just quoted from above, in a passage included in Pattin 1988:

“*Secundo, quia per omnem modum et per omnem rationem quibus isti ponunt intellectum agentem esse et una cum phantasmate agente in intellectum possibilem potest poni quod sit dare sensum agentem qui una cum obiecto sensibili agat in sensum passivum, quod non ponitur communiter. Ergo nec illud debet poni.*” (Durand, I Sent., D.3, Q.5; Venice 1571, p.27, Paris, *Bibl. Nat. lat.* 15874, f.31; cf. Pattin 1988, p.16).

that positing an “agent sense” is quite controversial at this time, despite the common claim for an agent intellect; perhaps there is a way to account for this asymmetry, but Durand at least raises a demand for such an explanation.

Speaking more broadly, this pushback from Olivi and Durand, against the traditional medieval Aristotelian notion of an “agent intellect”, can also help us understand why both these figures are typically pitted against Aristotle’s authority in this debate. As mentioned above, it is part of Solère’s (2014) strategy to frame this debate as Durand and other “Augustinians”, with their comparable *Fully Active Views*, against “Aristotelian” *Passive Views*. Perhaps, as I’ll argue below, this is an exaggeration overall, though this pushback against a traditional “agent intellect” does seem to be one place where Olivi and Durand seem perfectly willing to leave behind at least one part of common medieval Aristotelianism.²⁷¹

§2. Standard Arguments Against Passivity

Now that we’ve seen that Durand and these earlier “Augustinian Franciscan” figures have some common opposition at least, let’s turn to some of the standard arguments they use against their opponents. I’ll consider three main argument types, which I’ll call, “*experiential*

²⁷¹ As I’ll get to below, another common similarity raised between Durand and prior “Augustinians”, especially Olivi, is that both seem to have *direct realist* views of cognition, at least for basic acts of cognition of externally present objects. Now, this isn’t strictly a matter of the *activity* of cognition; in some sense, Godfrey, with his *Fully Passive View*, agrees on this, against the traditional depiction of the *Middle View*. Nevertheless, to have both an *active* and *direct realist* account does suggest a general picture of cognition, intentionality, and representation, wherein a cognitive power is generally more self-sufficient (in some sense, inherently able to cognize, without, in particular, passively received *species* in the power itself). In this sense, both Durand and certain “Augustinians” seem to agree that cognition is a sort of “reaching out”, with the power itself unable to be affected from below, as depicted in the graphic representation of Olivi’s *Fully Active View*, above. All that being said, this still leaves plenty of room for some major disagreements.

arguments”, “*nobility arguments*”, and “*attribution arguments*”. As we’ll see, there are some indeed some notable similarities here as well, between Durand and these earlier figures, especially with respect to the more plainly metaphysical arguments, the “nobility” and “attribution” arguments. Nevertheless, by the end of this section, we’ll also start to see what is conspicuously missing in Durand’s arguments or obscurely present at best, laying the groundwork for further clarification in **Part II**.

§2.1. *Experiential Arguments*

Let’s start with two connected types of argument given by Olivi and others in favour of their active accounts of cognition: let’s call these “*experiential arguments*” and “*nobility arguments*”²⁷². *Experiential arguments* are those arguments founded on some feature of cognition which, it is claimed, we can experience in ourselves, “from the inside”. Olivi, e.g., generally argues that the active nature of cognition is something that we “experientially sense in ourselves”; in opposition to the view that cognition effectively “flows into” our internal powers, from the object outside, Olivi says that, “insofar as [cognition] comes from an internal cognitive principle, we sense that it is our action and it is a certain acting of ours that goes out from us and, as it were, reaches out (*tendens*) to the object and attends (*intendens*) to it” (II Sent. Q. 72; III,

²⁷² What I’m calling “nobility arguments”, which I’ll get to next, have also been covered widely in the secondary literature as a common argument among many medieval figures (see, e.g. Hartman 2012, pp.36-46; Silva 2019; Silva & Toivanen 2010; Solère 2014, pp.185-189). On the other hand, although it’s well known that Olivi makes use of the sort of “experiential arguments” I consider below, this has less commonly been treated as a common argument type in this debate. E.g., in an interesting comment I’ll return to below, Hartman (2012, p.119, fn.54) makes note of Olivi’s “phenomenological considerations”, but he doesn’t attribute any similar considerations to Durand, nor does Hartman dedicate a section to this type of argument; instead, Hartman’s major division is between metaphysical/nobility arguments and what he calls “linguistic” arguments.

p.38)²⁷³. This is perhaps the most blunt version of this type of argument insofar as it holds that you can directly experience the very conclusion Olivi is after, at least with the proper attention to experience. To be fair, however, experiential arguments don't stop here.

To back up this experiential claim, Olivi, and others such as Scotus, also appeal to more specific contrast cases where, given a difference in activity, we can experience that cognition differs. For example, consider the following passages:

Olivi on impressions in sleep: “[F]requently many impressions (*passiones*) come about in our senses which do not appear to us, as is clear in one sleeping with open eyes and ears and nostrils. For impressions which come about in the senses are not actual sensations (*actuales sensus*), although they are the same impressions in kind with those which come about in the awake.” (II Sent. Q.58; II, p.484)²⁷⁴

“It happens that, when one is sleeping, with ears and nostrils open, and with clothes joined to one [i.e. on one's body] present to touch, *species* from the present objects will be wont to (*habebunt*) flow into the open organs of the

²⁷³ As the full passage goes: “*Ulterius sciendum quod quia ad actum cognitivum concurrunt duplex causa praedicta: idcirco experimentaliter sentimus in ipso duas rationes quasi oppositas. Nam pro quanta exit ab interno principio cognitivo, sentimus quod est actio nostra et quoddam agere nostrum a nobis exiens et quasi in obiectum tendens et in illud intendens. Pro quanta vero fit ab obiecto tanquam a terminante, videtur nobis esse quasi quaedam passio ab obiecto et cum ipso obiecto intra nos illapsa, acsi ipsum obiectum esset in intima nostrae potentiae impressum et illapsum. Et propter hanc secundam experientiam moti sunt fere omnes illi qui dixerunt actus cognitivos et etiam affectivos influi et imprimi a suis obiectis immediatis, non attendentes primam experientiam cum suis fundamentalibus rationibus superius tactis et in quaestionibus sequentibus amplius tangendis, nec attendentes quomodo utraque experientia potest salvari et verificari per concursum duplicis causae et causalitatis iam praemissae.*” For the central intuition here, see also, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.24: “[...] nos expresse sentimus nostros actus videndi vel cognoscendi exire seu produci a nostris intimis et hoc intime”, and II Sent. Q.58; II, pp.463-464: “[...] nos intime experimur in nobis actus istos procedere a nobis et quod nos vere operamur illos.”

As I've discussed in Chapter 1, part of what's interesting about Olivi's longer passage above is that he also provides a counter-intuition for the passive theories of cognition: we also feel as if a cognitive object flows into us when the object constrains our cognition. Thus, Olivi provides an explanation for how his opponents, caught up in this other apparently passive experience, can miss the experience of actively cognizing. Moreover, as we've seen, Olivi also provides an alternate way to “read” the counter-intuition without granting any actual traditional passive aspect to cognition. So, overall, even Olivi's comparatively blunt appeal to experience here still contains a fair bit of nuance.

²⁷⁴ “[F]requenter multae passiones fiunt in nostris sensibus quae nobis non apparent, sicut patet in dormiente apertis oculis et auribus et naribus. Passiones enim quae tunc fiunt in sensibus non sunt actuales sensus, quamvis sint eadem passiones secundum speciem cum illis quae fiunt in vigilantibus.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.484).

senses; and nevertheless, this is not sufficient for vision or hearing or the sensing of smell or touch, unless an actual gaze (*aspectus*) of the senses vigilantly should attend (*intendat*) there.” (II Sent. Q.73; III, p.89)²⁷⁵

Scotus on cognition vs. corporeal reception: “About sense, [...] if that *species* which is vision²⁷⁶ should be anything of the same *ratio* with that which is in the medium, then there, in the medium, will be vision formally; therefore, the medium, formally having that [*species*], will be formally seeing. [Which is absurd.] [...] This is also clear since in a blind eye, nevertheless remaining mixed as it was before, a *species* is caused; and it is similar for the eyes of the sleeping, [...] nevertheless in those [cases] there is not vision.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.295)²⁷⁷

Olivi and Scotus start in the passages above with the experiential claim that when there are passive impressions from objects in our sense organs while we are asleep (or blind), without any sort of active tending to the world, we don't experience sense cognition. Moreover, it is argued that we should expect the same for impressions in non-cognitive media (e.g., the air) as well; e.g., the air does not sense red through being impressed with the *species* of red. So, the argument goes, passive changes from external objects of cognition are insufficient to cause cognitive acts and this is precisely because cognition essentially involves something extra: viz., some distinct activity from the cognitive power, one which we can find in experience when we are, in contrast, actually attending to the world. However, passive theories of cognition seem to claim that these same sorts of passive impressions from objects, e.g., sensible *species*, either just are acts of

²⁷⁵ “*Quod ergo praeter omnes species vel habitus exigantur praedicti aspectus probo sic. Constat enim quod dormiens, auribus apertis et naribus et tactu praesente vestibis sibi iunctis, habebunt fluere species a praesentibus obiectis in aperta organa sensuum; et tamen non sufficit ad videndum et audiendum vel ad sensum odoratus et tactus, nisi actualis aspectus sensuum pervigiliter ibi intendat.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.73; III, p.89).

²⁷⁶ That is, counter-factually, according the opponents view here (of Thomas of Sutton) which states that cognition is identical with a *species*; to be clear, Scotus is providing a *reductio* argument against such an identification here.

²⁷⁷ “*In sensu, quia si species illa quae est visio sit aliqua eiusdem rationis cum illa quae est in medio, illa in medio erit formaliter visio; ergo medium, habens eam formaliter, erit formaliter videns. [...] Principale enim etiam propositum patet, quia in oculo caeco, remanente tamen sic mixto ut prius, causatur species; similiter in oculo dormientis, alias non excitaretur ab excellenti visibili praesente, nec etiam alias excitaretur a sono excellenti nisi prius esset in aure, tamen in istis non est visio.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.295).

cognition [*The Fully Passive View*] or enable the recipient to cognize [*The Middle View*]; Olivi and Scotus argue that the above experiences testify against this²⁷⁸.

In addition, going beyond the extreme contrast cases found while one is either awake or asleep, Olivi and Scotus also present contrast cases with finer differences in activity and experience, even while one is still awake. E.g., right after the quotation above from II Sent. Q.73, Olivi argues that it should not be so surprising that passively received *species* are insufficient for cognition, especially for acts of memory and intellection, because even with every habit of knowledge and memory held constant in the intellect and the inner senses, it's commonly agreed that one must turn one's attention to some image to actually think or recollect (II Sent. Q.73; III, pp.89-90)²⁷⁹. Here, in particular, Olivi has in mind the famous claim from Aristotle that thinking is "up to us" insofar as we humans never think without images/phantasms, but such

²⁷⁸ To be specific, Scotus's main target in the above passage is Thomas of Sutton. Sutton defends the view that a *species* in a cognitive power is identical to an act of cognition, which is similar to Godfrey's *Fully Passive View*. Indeed, on the face of it, Scotus's argument only seems to get to the conclusion that cognitive activity is necessary to modify cognition; the same act of cognition might occur first passively, though imperfectly before any effort of attention is added. Furthermore, Olivi's arguments here might seem to cede to the *Middle View* that there can be a passive reception of *species* in a cognitive power prior to cognition, at least in sensation. However, in the wider context of the texts above, Olivi distinguishes between a reception in (at least, sleeping) organs and a reception in the sensitive soul; the latter only comes about by way of a prior activity from the power. So, Olivi's wider aim is to argue against the *Middle View* as well.

²⁷⁹ "*Nec mirum, quia etiam noster intellectus, quibuscunque scientiis valde habitatus, non potest actu recordari ea quae habet in sua memoria nec suosmet habitus nec se ipsum etiam cogitare, nisi per actualem conversionem aspiciat et intendat in species memoriales aut in alia interiora sua, nec sensus nostri non consopiti sed vigilantes percipiunt sua obiecta praesentia, cum per vehementem attentionem ad alia est actualis intentio sensuum retracta a suis obiectis. [...] Item, sensibiliter experimur quod in transitu nostri aspectus de uno obiecto in aliud vel per intermedium spatium usque ad obiectum fit quaedam sensibilis mutatio vel protensio in nostro aspectu, nec tamen potest dici quod haec mutatio sit species ab obiecto influxa. Quando etiam in ipso aspectu sentimus resistantiam obstaculorum prohibentem aspectum conantem transire in ultra, id est, conantem aspicere et videre ulteriora, et non praevallet aut, si aliquando praevallet, facit hoc cum sensibili difficultate et cum forti acuitione et emissionem seu protensione aspectus: fiuntne haec et omnia consimilia a speciebus influxis per quas videmus obiecta resistantia nobis?" (Olivi, II Sent. Q.73; III, pp.89-90).*

images/phantasms are in our control; these claims were commonly accepted in some formulation by Olivi's "Aristotelian" opponents, such as Aquinas (cf. *De anima* III.7, 431a15-17)²⁸⁰.

Moreover, bringing in the external senses as well, Olivi adds that even while awake, one can fail to perceive what's in front of one's eyes if a "vehement attention to another thing" retracts one's sensitive gaze from those present objects (II Sent. Q.73; III, pp.89-90). Olivi likely has in mind an example such as Augustine's oft-discussed case of someone walking a trail while deep in thought (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 11.8.15)²⁸¹. In this situation, after some time walking, focused on some abstract thoughts, suddenly, one realizes they haven't been perceptually aware of the path they've been walking. The reason Augustine gives for this sort of situation is that one's attentive gaze can be directed elsewhere, rather than attending to (what would be in)

²⁸⁰ "To the thinking soul images serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul never thinks without an image." (Aristotle, *De anima* III.7, 431a15-17).

"*Et in anima sensibili inveniuntur ymagines secundum modos sensuum. Et cum dicimus in aliquo ipsum esse malum aut bonum non secundum affirmationem et negationem, tunc aut querimus aut fugimus. Et ideo nichil intelligit anima sine ymaginatione.*" (Averroes *Long Commentary on DA*, III, c.30; p.468, lines 1-5).

²⁸¹ "*Voluntas porro sicut adiungit sensum corpori, sic memoriam sensui, sic cogitantis aciem memoriae. Quae autem conciliat ista atque coniungit, ipsa etiam disiungit ac separat, id est voluntas. Sed a sentiendis corporibus motu corporis separat corporis sensus, ne aliquid sentiamus, aut ut sentire desinamus; veluti cum oculos, ab eo quod videre nolumus, avertimus, vel claudimus; sic aures a sonis, sic nares ab odoribus. Ita etiam vel os claudendo, vel aliquid ex ore respuendo a saporibus aversamus. In tactu quoque vel subtrahimus corpus ne tangamus quod nolumus, vel si iam tangebamus, abicimus aut repellimus. Ita motu corporis agit voluntas, ne sensus corporis rebus sensibilibus copuletur. Et agit hoc quantum potest. Nam cum in hac actione propter conditionem servilis mortalitatis difficultatem patitur, cruciatus est consequens, ut voluntati nihil reliqui fiat, nisi tolerantia. Memoriam vero a sensu voluntas avertit, cum in aliud intenta non ei sinit inhaerere praesentia. Quod animadvertere facile est, cum saepe coram loquentem nobis aliquem aliud cogitando non audisse nobis videmur. Falsum est autem; audivimus enim, sed non meminimus, subinde per aurium sensum labentibus vocibus alienato nutu voluntatis, per quem solent infigi memoriae. Verius itaque dixerimus, cum tale aliquid accidit: "Non meminimus", quam: "Non audivimus". Nam et legentibus evenit, et mihi saepissime, ut perfecta pagina vel epistula, nesciam quid legerim, et repetam. In aliud quippe intento nutu voluntatis, non sic est adhibita memoria sensui corporis, quomodo ipse sensus adhibitus est litteris. **Ita et ambulantes intenta in aliud voluntate, nesciunt qua transierint. Quod si non vidissent, non ambulassent, aut maiore intentione palpando ambulassent, praesertim si per incognita pergerent; sed quia facile ambulaverunt, utique viderunt. Quia vero non sicut sensus oculorum locis quacumque pergebant, ita ipsi sensui memoria iungebatur, nullo modo id quod viderunt etiam recentissimum meminisse potuerunt. Iam porro ab eo quod in memoria est, animi aciem velle avertere, nihil est aliud quam non inde cogitare.**" (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 11.8.15).*

perception (Ibid.)²⁸². At the very least, if not the entire journey's path, arguably this person walking would at least have missed seeing many small and insignificant objects, outside of their attention, even if those objects crossed their eyes and left impressions therein.

In general, Olivi argues that we can "sensibly experience" that, even holding the *species* in our organs constant, we can change what's in our cognitive gaze (*aspectus*) at any given moment, turning from one object into another; since this change in one's cognitive gaze isn't through a change in *species*, *species* cannot be sufficient to explain these differences (II Sent. Q.73; III, p.90). Presumably, Olivi has in mind a case where one's eyes are set forward and the objects in front of one don't move, but one nevertheless can carefully shift one's cognitive attention, without refocusing one's eyes; e.g., one might attend to an object in one's peripheral vision or, perhaps more easily, turn inward into some memory that strikes one at the moment.

Although Scotus does not have as elaborate a theory of cognitive "attention" as Olivi, Scotus presents some similar ideas in a short bit from his arguments against, at least, *Fully*

²⁸² This isn't to say that I think Olivi necessarily exactly agrees with Augustine's explanation in the details. How exactly to interpret this case is a subject of much controversy in both medieval and contemporary debates. E.g., it's unclear whether it's right to say the walker doesn't see the path. Augustine himself admits that there's some sort of sensation, since this person wasn't "groping in the dark"; though, there isn't "memory" nor "cogitation". On the other hand, it's unclear what Augustine means by "vision" here, as he sometimes uses this term, in this text, to merely name an affection in the body which may or may not come with any awareness of anything "seen". Notably, Olivi switches between talk of "vision" and "perception" (*percipere*) here; moreover, his larger argument, as we've seen, is for the claim that even simple acts of sensation, such as vision, depend on a prior "attention" of some sort.

This case of a "long distance peripatetic" (to give it a name) seems to mirror the so-called "long distance truck driver" case, where a driver suddenly realizes she seems to have been driving "on auto-pilot" without experiencing the road, as brought up in contemporary discussions of "inattentive blindness" (cf. Armstrong 1968, Mack and Rock, 1998). Another famous example of "inattentive blindness" discussed in contemporary literature is the "gorilla experiment"; in this empirical study, participants were tasked to keep track of a red ball being tossed around by people in a video; within this video, at a certain point a person in a gorilla costume walks through the scene, but most participants don't report that they noticed this, given that they were too focused on their visual task (Simons and Chabris, 1999). This example is used to argue for the claim that the gorilla outside of attention truly wasn't seen, not just forgotten, since such a striking sight would have been remembered if it were seen.

Passive Views of cognition²⁸³. Of particular interest, a bit before the passage I quoted above, Scotus presents the following argument against the view that cognition is identical to a passively received *species*:

“As much in the sense as in the intellect, with the same representation posited, a greater attention makes an act more perfect. For the same [human] having the intelligible *species* or phantasm, more perfectly intelligizes/understands (*intelligit*) that which one puts a greater effort to understand, and less [understands], when less [the effort]. So much also in sense, with the same object present and in the same light, something is more perfectly seen on account of a greater attention in seeing.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.294)²⁸⁴.

So, the argument goes, holding the *species* or representation constant, a cognitive act, whether sensitive or intellectual, can still differ in degree of clarity or “perfection”, and so this calls for another cause rather than just a passively received *species* alone. E.g., with greater attention, one might taste the wine one is drinking more strongly or even distinguish the flavours more clearly²⁸⁵. That difference, Scotus argues, comes from a difference in the active “attention” of the

²⁸³ In particular, in this context Scotus’s main targets appear to be Godfrey and Thomas of Sutton.

²⁸⁴ “[T]am in sensu quam in intellectu, posito eodem repraesentante, maior attentio facit actum perfectionem. Idem enim habens eandem speciem intelligibilem vel phantasma, perfectius intelligit illud ad cuius intellectionem magis conatur, et minus, quando minus. Ita etiam in sensu, eodem obiecto praesente et in eodem lumine, perfectius videtur aliquid propter maiorem attentionem in videndo.

Patet etiam ex hoc quod magis quandoque laeditur visus propter maiorem attentionem, immo, ceteris paribus, unus oculus magis attentus posset multum offendi in visione alicuius in qua alius minus offenderetur, sicut patet per experientiam. Patet etiam secundum Augustinum XI De Trinitate cap. 2 quod ‘in attento multum remanet species post visionem’, quae non remanent in oculo non attenti sensu.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.294).

I’ve included two short additional arguments Scotus adds here from experience and from Augustine. I should also add that in a later “addition”, Scotus qualifies below that this “attention” is from the will applying a lower power to its object, so that the lower power receives more from its object. Especially with this qualification, someone defending the passive account might question whether the reception in the organ or power is the truly the “same” in the relevant sense; one might also wonder whether the object, as being applied to the power, is more truly the cause of the change in experience. However, it seems that, at the very least, Scotus has some room to hold on to the claim that the *species* is held constant, even if it merely changes in degree, insofar as that change isn’t explained by a numerically different *species* being received. Moreover, at least this change is still being explained through some effort in the agent first, even if there’s also some passive reception in the sense power.

²⁸⁵ This isn’t to say that effort alone will suffice at once to perfectly grasp some object, that requires further practice and learning; but improvement has to start somewhere and even the expert can pay more or less attention.

given cognitive power. By “attention”, Scotus means some greater effort in the act of cognizing; moreover, although this “effort” is, in this sense, cognitive, Scotus also seems to think it is more broadly under the control of the will; so, at least in paradigm cases, the idea here is that one can command a cognitive power to be more alert/active and, as a result, it can more clearly cognize some object. Like Olivi, Scotus appeals to Augustine’s *De Trinitate* XI for this notion of “attention”; to give another example of such “attention”, Scotus adds the case of after-images in vision, which, as Scotus paraphrases from Augustine, “do not remain in the eye without the sense attending” (Ibid.; cf. *De Trinitate* 11.2.3). Overall, one interesting thing which Scotus’s argument here adds is that in his examples we can find a difference in the experience of cognition, not just in actively attending to one object rather than another. but in actively attending to one object to a greater degree²⁸⁶.

Finally, Scotus also makes some other similar arguments here against, at least, *Fully Passive Views*, with respect to even more obviously distinct cognitive experiences, such as forming more abstract and complex intellections, syllogizing, and explicit reflection on one’s first-order intellections (Ibid. pp.291-292; cf. pp.288-290). In short, Scotus argues that even if one grants some sort of indirect activity, not in cognition but on the part of a person’s will, in order to alter the inner senses to form different phantasms to think with (as Godfrey, e.g., holds), this is not sufficient to explain how one can still think in many different ways with just one phantasm; e.g., forming an image of a rose, I might intelligize rose-ness, planthood, life, etc., think “a rose is a plant”, “a plant is alive”, or other complex thoughts; and with all that I might

²⁸⁶ Of course, this isn’t to say that Olivi doesn’t talk elsewhere about a difference in degree of attention, as we’ve seen in previous chapters.

also syllogize and reach a conclusion, such as, “a rose is alive”. The object, as imagined, cannot be sufficient to cause all these variations in intellectual cognition, and it’s not clear what other phantasms could sufficiently fill the gap; so, some extra activity particular to the intellect must be posited²⁸⁷.

Moreover, if cognition is essentially a passion produced by the object which is cognized, and an act of intellection cannot directly cause another act of intellection, since that would require the intellect to actively move itself (something Godfrey explicitly bars), then it seems I cannot directly reflect on my intellections and know that I am thinking when I am, since that reflective intellection couldn’t be a passion directly caused by my first-order intellection²⁸⁸.

Since, for the sake of simplicity, I’ve chosen to focus on “simple” acts of cognition/apprehension in this dissertation, I won’t linger for long on these more “complex” cases. Nevertheless, let it be noted that Scotus, and others, extend these “experiential” concerns to at all sorts of cognitive acts, against these *Passive Views*; I take this to speak to just how

²⁸⁷ Admittedly, we’re now getting a bit farther from the explicitly “experiential” claims of Olivi above. Nevertheless, I call these arguments “experiential” since they are clearly based on claims that we can only truly verify by our experiences of cognition (or reports thereof); first principles of metaphysics alone won’t give us all of these distinctions in our psychology.

²⁸⁸ Although Gonsalvus, in his relatively short text, admittedly doesn’t cover many of the experiential arguments above, this argument, with respect to reflection, is one argument which he does spend a fair bit of time with (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.42-44). Here Gonsalvus, e.g., considers a response from Godfrey, that our acts of intellection, along with their corresponding volitions, can mediate cause reflection, by, first, causing us to have certain phantasms whereby, second, the objects, as imagined, cause another act of intellection. However, Gonsalvus objects that this doesn’t get at the right immediate object for reflection proper; e.g. if I cognize that I am thinking of a flower, I might have a phantasm of both myself and a flower, but then it seems the object of my cognition would just be the flower and/or me, as imagined, according to Godfrey’s account, and I couldn’t single-out my cognition. Perhaps Godfrey ought to appeal to my “inner speech” in phantasms, e.g. the sound of the word “cognition”, to get at more abstract objects; however, even if one grants that much, it still doesn’t obviously get at direct cognition of *my* act of cognition, which I am more intimately aware of.

passive these views, especially Godfrey's, are taken to be, insofar as even complex acts of cognition are taken to be passive effects from the outside²⁸⁹.

§2.2. *Nobility Arguments*

In contrast with *experiential arguments*, based on empirical considerations, *nobility arguments* are based on more general metaphysical principles, e.g., those concerning the nature of causation and levels of “nobility” in being; in short, *nobility arguments* rule out any sort of sufficient “upwards” causation from the less noble on the more noble, such as from external objects on the “higher” cognitive soul (see Solère's DOC principle above).

One such causal principle to which Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus appeal is that an effect is never more noble than (or, “does not exceed”) its total or principal cause²⁹⁰. Gonsalvus, e.g., draws from Augustine, and other Neo-Platonic Christians, that every “equivocal” agent is more noble than its effect (an equivocal agent is an efficient cause different in type/form from its effect, such as a human building a house, in contrast to a “univocal” agent, which is same in

²⁸⁹ As I'll get to below, Godfrey and Sutton also deny that such complex acts of cognition and judgement are any more real activities than simple acts; rather, they are all merely “grammatical” actions.

²⁹⁰ Two other ways to express this principle are, (i), the inverse of the above, an “equivocal” effect (one which is different in type from its cause) is always less noble, as perfection diminishes as it moves further from its source, (though an effect which is same in type is as noble in type as its cause), and (ii), to be active is more noble than to be passive, so it is something ignoble to be acted on. For discussion on this from Olivi, see, e.g., II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.6-9, pp.12-13, and pp.24-25, from Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones* Q.3; pp.34-35, and from Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.287-288, pp.291-291, and pp.300-302. Another way to phrase this principle, in more general terms, is that an efficient cause must “contain” its effect in order to explain how the effect comes about; but, if the cause isn't the same in form as its effect, as with a univocal agent, then the cause differs, as an equivocal agent, and so must be more eminent than and “virtually” contain its effect. As discussed in the last Chapter (§3.5), the sun, e.g., is held by medieval philosophers to not itself be hot, in reality, and yet the sun is capable of causing heat since the sun has an even greater form that “virtually” contains heat.

type/form as its effect, such as a human generating another human)²⁹¹. If this principle were not held, Gonsalvus says, this would remove the way of Augustine, and others, of proving that God is the most perfect/noble thing, more perfect than everything else, which He creates (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.34; cf. Augustine's 83 *Questions*, Q.28)²⁹². That is, this nobility principle dictates that God, like a human creating some artifact different from itself, must be more noble than its effect; in fact, since God is the cause of everything other than Himself, we may reason, as Augustine did, that God, *qua* Creator, must be the most perfect/noble being.

Finally, to complete this sort of *nobility argument*, it is held that cognitive powers and acts are, for separate reasons, more noble than typical external objects of cognition. Thus, given the nobility principle, it is argued that objects of cognition, being less noble in general, cannot be the total or principal causes of acts of cognition, since they are more noble in general.

²⁹¹ Although Gonsalvus doesn't explain these terms very well, one can find an explicit definition from Scotus when Scotus explains how an agent can act on itself: "*Cum probatur quod 'possibilis' non potest habere causalitatem aliquam, quia 'nihil idem agit in se', respondeo quod illa propositio non est vera nisi de agente univoco, nec illa probatio eius quod 'tunc idem esset in actu in potentia' concludit nisi quando **agens agit univoce, hoc est inducit in passum formam eiusdem rationis cum illa per quam agit**; si enim sic aliquid ageret in se, ergo haberet simul 'formam eiusdem rationis ad quam movetur', et dum movetur ad illam, careret illa [...].*

In agentibus autem aequivoce, id est illis agentibus quae non agunt per formas eiusdem rationis cum quam agunt, propositio illa quod 'nihil movet se' non habet necessitatem [...]: non enim ibi agens formaliter tale in actu quale passum est formaliter in potentia, sed agens est virtualiter tale in actu quale formaliter est passum in potentia ; et quod 'idem' sit virtualiter tale in actu et formaliter tale in potentia, nulla est contradictio.

*Exemplum : esse calidum virtualiter in actu et in potentia formaliter, de se non includunt contradictionem vel repugnantiam [...]; tamen sol, qui est calidus virtualiter, non potest esse calidus formaliter, tamen hoc non est propter repugnantiam istorum primo [...]; ergo actus virtualis non erat in eo causa repugnantiae, sed aliquid aliud, quod est commune soli et saturno, puta quod ista sunt 'corpora incorruptibilia', et calor est 'qualitas' corruptibilis." (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.302). We'll get back to the larger argument from Scotus on self-motion in this passage later.*

²⁹² "*Quarto ratio est quia, secundum vere opinantes, actio aut fit a potentia aut ab obiecto; sed impossibile est quod [actio] sit ab obiecto, quod patet : Primo, ex innobilitate obiecti, quia omne agens aequivocum est nobilius suo effectu. Hoc dicit Augustinus, 83 Quaestionum, quaest. [28] ; et Boethius, III De consolatione, prosa 10 ; et Richardus [of St. Victor], I De Trinitate, cap. 12. Nisi etiam ita sit, tollitur via inquirendi nobilitatem divinam, quia ex factis." (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.34). See below for a similar claim from Scotus.*

For the reference to Augustine: "28. *Quare Deus mundum facere voluerit:*

Qui quaerit quare voluerit Deus mundum facere, causam quaerit voluntatis Dei. Sed omnis causa efficiens est.

Omne autem efficiens maius est quam id quod efficitur. Nihil autem maius est voluntate Dei; non ergo eius causa quaerenda est. (83 *Questions*, Q.28; emphasis mine).

What justifies the claim that cognition is, in fact, more noble than its objects? This is where things get interesting, as different factors get brought up to warrant cognition's claimed nobility. Olivi, e.g., often speaks of the spirituality of cognition in contrast with the corporeality of typical external objects of cognition. This much is at least commonly agreed upon for intellectual cognition (and volition); even according to commonly accepted medieval Aristotelianism, the intellectual power is incorporeal/immaterial insofar as it is not directly situated in any material organ. Gonsalvus, for one example, at least initially, bases his nobility argument on this more common ground. Right after stating the "Augustinian" nobility principle above, Gonsalvus continues his argument on the basis that intellection is an incorporeal/immaterial act, but many objects of cognition are corporeal/material and, thus, they are less noble. Thus, Gonsalvus argues, it's unfitting for an act of intellection to be caused by any such less noble object, as *Fully Passive Views* hold, since then the effect would be more noble than the cause (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.34-35)²⁹³.

²⁹³ "[...] sed impossibile est quod [actio] sit ab obiecto, quod patet : Primo, ex innobilitate obiecti, quia omne agens aequivocum est nobilius suo effectui. [...] Cum igitur obiectum sit agens aequivocum respectu actionis intelligendi et volendi, erit nobilius istis, quod est improbabile de multis obiectis, scilicet materialibus. – Nec valet si dicatur quod phantasma est obiectum ; quia quantumcumque phantasma sit illuminatum, innobilius est dictis actionibus ; quia etiam ipsum phantasma non est obiectum, sed res in phantasmate in quo ipsa videtur. Ergo dictae actiones non causantur ab obiecto. [...] Idem hoc probatur secundo sic: quia nullum corporeum potest agere in incorporeum ut est a corpore absolutum, licet possit agere in ipsum quatenus est corpori unitum; sed intellectus et voluntas sunt potentiae a corporibus absolutae, in quantum potentiae sunt, ita quod, licet habeant, potentias sensitivas ut subservientes, non tamen ut cooperantes. Cum igitur obiecta, saltem multa, sint corporea, et similiter ipsa phantasmata, non poterunt agere in dictas potentias causando in eis actus earum." (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; pp.34-35).

For a similar argument from Scotus, see *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2 (*Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.288-289) where he says that it would "strongly vilify the nature of the soul" for the effect to "exceed the nobility" of its cause and, thus, objects to the view that phantasms could directly cause acts of intellection given the higher status of the latter to the former.

However, to be clear, nobility arguments aren't simply against crossing the line from corporeality to pure incorporeality, with respect to the intellect, since things can differ in nobility, and "(in)corporeality", in more ways as well. E.g., in the above argument, Gonsalvus responds to a suggestion that a phantasm in the soul, rather than an external material object, could cause an act of intellection; Gonsalvus makes the condensed response that "however much a phantasm were illuminated, it is less noble than the aforementioned acts [intellection and volition]" (Ibid.). To explain: By default, phantasms are singular representations typically held to be "material" insofar as they are tied to a corporeal organ (the brain), which is the organ of the "inner senses" of the sensitive soul. So, even if phantasms are in this lower part of the soul, and thus are of a higher status than external objects, these phantasms still aren't sufficiently incorporeal to cause acts of intellection. But here Gonsalvus responds to a suggestion that these phantasms can be "illuminated" (by an act of the agent intellect) so that they can take on a more incorporeal existence in order to affect the incorporeal intellect and, thereby, cause intellection²⁹⁴. However, Gonsalvus objects that this isn't sufficient either, since even such an illuminated phantasm would still be less noble than an act of intellection by the very fact that it isn't that higher sort of act (e.g., intellection itself) (Ibid.).

To put it otherwise, as we've seen from Olivi above in our aside on the agent intellect, even if one posits such an "illumination", issued by an incorporeal power, that illumination "is

²⁹⁴ Gonsalvus appears to be offering this response on behalf of Godfrey, though it should be noted that, as we've seen above, Godfrey doesn't wish to say that a phantasm is technically an efficient cause of intellection (nor is the agent intellect); rather, the object as represented in the phantasm is the immediate efficient cause (see, e.g., Godfrey, *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.275-276). Indeed, one can even see in the full passage that Gonsalvus uses this as another objection to this response, insofar as it would not even be consistent with Godfrey's full account: "*quia etiam ipsum phantasma non est obiectum, sed res in phantasmate in quo ipsa videtur*" (*I Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.35). At times, Henry of Ghent seems fine with calling an illuminated phantasm an efficient cause, however, so Gonsalvus could also have Henry in mind here. For more detailed discussion on the role of phantasms for Godfrey and Henry, see Scotus (*Ordinatio I*, D.3, *pars 3*, Q.2; *Opera Theologica III/1*, pp.288-289, pp.291-292).

not itself cognition; therefore, it is incomparably inferior to it” (II Sent. Q. 72; III. p.29). And even if one considers a phantasm to be an imaginative act of cognition, it is still an inferior act of cognition to intellection. Thus, a nobility argument still holds since both the illumination and the phantasm are still inferior to a proper act of intellection.

In general, this sort of argument applies to any *Passive View* that posits some extra thing in the process of cognition, where this thing is prior to and then sufficiently causes or elicits an act of cognition; insofar as the former entity is still less noble than an act of cognition, a nobility argument still holds. Thus, besides applying to the qualified *Passive View* we just considered, a nobility argument also applies to any *Middle View* which posits a really distinct intelligible *species*, received in the intellect by way of the illumination of a phantasm, prior to intellection (see, e.g., Aquinas, ST I, Q.84, a.6). So the argument goes, even if one posits such an intelligible *species*, crossing right into the intellect, that *species* isn’t itself an occurrent cognitive act, so it’s still too inferior to sufficiently cause or elicit such a higher effect; a *species*, insofar as it isn’t itself an occurrent act of cognition, is “incomparably inferior”, to use Olivi’s expression above²⁹⁵.

²⁹⁵ In response to the latter sort of *Middle View*, commonly attributed to Aquinas, Olivi frequently makes this exact argument, in line with Olivi’s use of this argument above against simply appealing to an agent intellect or agent sense for “active” cognition (see, e.g., Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.24-25; pp.28-29). Of the two views which Scotus attributes to Henry, one also seems to be more a sort of *Middle View* than a sort of *Fully Passive View*; according to this view, first an illuminated phantasm causes a “confused” or “imperfect” cognition which serves as a principle for, second, eliciting or causing a “distinct” or “perfect” act of cognition (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.291-292). However, Scotus responds with a similar nobility argument: “a more imperfect act is not able to be a formal *ratio* of causing a more perfect act, since then it would not be able to be proved that God is a most perfect being*, if an effect were able to exceed its total cause in perfection; but distinct cognition is more noble than confused cognition; therefore that ‘confused’ [cognition] is not a formal *ratio* for eliciting or causing that ‘distinct’ [cognition].” [“*Si autem dicas quod respectu secundi est activus virtute actus primi; contra: actus imperfectior non potest esse ratio formalis causandi actum perfectiorem, quia tunc non esset unde posset probari Deum esse perfectissimum ens, si effectus posset excedere causam suam totalem in perfectione; cognitio autem distincta est nobilior cognitione confusa; ergo illa ‘confusa’ non est formalis ratio eliciendi vel causandi illam ‘distinctam’.*”] (Ibid. p.292). *For more on this Theological point, see Gonsalvus above.

Furthermore, what is perhaps most distinctive about the nobility arguments by, at least, Olivi and Scotus, is that they are also applied to sensitive, not just intellectual, cognition; acts of sensitive cognition, they claim, are also more noble, *in every way*, than external objects of cognition (or at least, their sensible qualities) or any supposed sensible *species* or impressions in the corporeal organs caused by these objects, distinct from and prior to sensation. In this context, the “higher” status of cognition, both sensitive and intellectual, is most generally spoken of in terms of a distinct sort of “vitality”, but also, though less often, in terms of a broad sort of “spirituality” or “incorporeality”.

Olivi, in particular, says that “vitality”, along with a broad sort of “spirituality”, is of the essence of all cognitive acts and, from this, he provides a family of arguments against passive theories, of both sensation and intellection, that hold that a “non-vital” impression from an external object could “exceed” its status and itself be an act of cognition [*Fully Passive View*] or provide an effective principle (a *species* or habit) sufficient to bring about such an act [*Middle View*]. Olivi argues, e.g., that, “it is absurd to say that the vital should be an immediate influx from the non-vital, simplicity from extension, incorporeality from the corporeal, the cognitive from the non-cognitive” (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.21-25; cf. Q.58; II, pp.463-465, p.489; Q.73; III, pp.83-34)²⁹⁶.

Looking ahead to a later figure, Peter Auriol also makes frequent use of this argument against this sort of *Middle View*, seemingly with Aquinas and his followers in mind, but also, awkwardly enough, Scotus too. E.g., Auriol argues: “*Secundo probro, quod non requiritur species in ratione elicientis actum una cum intellectu, quia impossibile est effectum excedere in perfectione causam suam aequivocam; sed intellectio est perfectior ipsa specie; ergo impossibile est, quod sit effectus aequivocus ipsius speciei: sed non potest esse effectus univocus eius, cum sint alterius rationis, alias duo accidentia eiusdem speciei essent in eodem; ergo.*” (Auriol, II Sent. D.11, Q.3, a.1; p.129).²⁹⁶ “*Item, simplicitas et vitalitas et spiritualitas seu incorporeitas speciei influxae in spiritum est sic ipsi speciei essentialis quod non videtur dicere diversas essentias, ita quod simplicitas et incorporeitas et vitalitas sint quaedam*

Moreover, one can find the source for Olivi's own nobility arguments in his initial ascription of this *Fully Active View* to Augustine (i.e., the view that no corporeal "influx" from the outside is sufficient to cause anything in the cognitive "spirit or soul") (II Sent. Q. 72; III, pp.15-16). The first citation to Augustine which Olivi provides is to *De musica* VI, which concerns whether, for acts of sensation, such as hearing, "anything comes about in the soul (*anima*) from a body":

"It is always absurd to subject (*subdere*) the soul in some way as matter for a bodily artificer (*fabricatori corpori*)²⁹⁷. [For soul is never inferior to body, and all matter is inferior to an artificer.]* It [i.e. the soul], however, would be subjected to body in such a way, if a body were to bring about (*operaretur*) any [musical] numbers²⁹⁸ in it. Therefore, when we hear, it is not the case that numbers come about in the soul from these sounds which we cognize." (Ibid.; cf. *De musica*, 6.5.8, *added from Augustine's original text)²⁹⁹.

essentiae superadditae essentiae ipsius speciei. Ergo ab eodem a quo influitur essentia illius speciei influitur eius simplicitas et incorporeitas et vitalitas. Absurdum est autem dicere quod vita sit quidam immediatus influxus non vivi et simplicitas extensi et incorporeitas corporei et cognitivum non cognitivi et sic de aliis." (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.23). To be clear, in some sense, I don't think this argument, as phrased here, needs to appeal explicitly to a nobility principle; to that extent, this argument can be placed under the attribution arguments, which I'll cover in the next sub-section.

See also: "*Quarto, quia actus simplex et spiritualis non potest influxive gigni a specie extensa et corporali. Sed omnis actus cognitivus est simplex et spiritualis. Quod clamat non solum communis ratio cognitionis, quae in tantum est nobilis ut Deo proprie ascribatur et per quam omne cognoscens, in quantum tale, in infinitum excedit omne quod caret cognitione et potentia cognoscendi. Immo etiam clamat hoc eius immediatum subiectum, quia sicut dictum est, non potest primo et immediate esse nisi in simplici et spirituali potentia animae.*" (Olivi, II Sent. Q.73; III, pp.83-84). ["For, a simple and spiritual act cannot be generated in the manner of an influx (*influxive gigni*) by an extended and corporeal *species*. But all cognitive acts are simple and spiritual. This pertains not only to the common *ratio* of cognition, which is so much noble [...], to the extent that every being that is capable of cognition, as such, exceeds infinitely everything that lacks cognition and a power of cognizing. Rather, this also pertains to the immediate subject of an act of cognition. As has been said, an act of cognition can primarily and immediately exist only in a simple and spiritual power of the soul."]

²⁹⁷ More literally: "body as an artificer".

²⁹⁸ In the context of hearing music, these "numbers" seem to refer to poetic rhythms/meter.

²⁹⁹ "*Quarta est beati Augustini dicentis in nullum spiritum posse fieri aliquid a corpore per rectum influxum sed solum per modum colligantiae et per modum termini obiectivi. Quod enim non per rectum influxum aliquid in spiritu seu anima faciat, dicit aperte in libro VI Musicae [cap.5, n.8], ubi postquam quaesivit an audire sit idem quod aliquid a corpore in anima fieri, subdit: 'Semper absurdum est fabricatori corpori materiam quoquomodo animam subdere; esset autem corpori sic subiecta, si corpus in ea aliquos numeros operaretur; non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab his quos in sonis cognoscimus.'*" (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.15-16).

For the first passage cited here from Augustine: "*Verumtamen ne illud occurrat, arboris vitam meliorem esse quam nostram, quoniam non accipit sentiendo a corpore numeros (nullus enim ei sensus est); diligenter considerandum est utrum revera nihil sit aliud quod dicitur audire, nisi aliquid a corpore in anima fieri. Sed perabsurdum est*

Augustine's argument can be glossed as a standard nobility argument: (i) soul (including the power of hearing) is in every respect more noble than bodily things³⁰⁰ [*Nobility of Cognition*]; (ii) to be a passive principle, as matter, is less noble than to be active, as an "artificer" [*Nobility of Activity*]; so, (conclusion) an inferior bodily object (such as extended reverberations in the air or, even, in the ear) cannot itself be identical to or bring about a passion in the more noble soul (such as for an act of hearing)³⁰¹.

We can see here that Augustine, like Olivi, contrasts the sensitive soul and its acts with corporeal things and impressions, such that acts of sensation, not just intellection, are sufficiently incorporeal and more noble to warrant a nobility argument. Exactly what Olivi or Augustine mean by "vital acts" in this sort of context, however, and whether they mean the same thing, is less clear. Although not explicit in Olivi's quotation, right before the quoted passage above (*De musica* 6.5.8), Augustine uses the language of "vitality"; Augustine claims that the life (*vita*) of a tree is not better than our life, since there is no sense in a tree (Ibid.). From this, we can at least gloss that when Augustine proceeds to speak of the greater nobility of the soul (i.e. a principle of *life*) and its acts, in comparison to the corporeal, he is, most of all, speaking of the nobility of a *cognitive life*/"vitality" and *cognitive "vital acts"*. At least for the sake of this argument, with respect to acts of hearing, one can put aside the exact nature of the "vital acts" of non-cognitive

fabricatori corpori materiam quoquo modo animam subdere. Numquam enim anima est corpore deterior; et omnis materia fabricatore deterior. Nullo modo igitur anima fabricatori corpori est subiecta materies. Esset autem, si aliquos in ea numeros corpus operaretur. Non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab iis quos in sonis cognoscimus." (Augustine, *De musica*, 6.5.8).

³⁰⁰ Although implicit in Olivi's shortened quotation from *De musica* above, Olivi make this nobility claim explicit at the beginning of his following citation to another text from Augustine: "*Item, XII libro Supra Genesim ad litteram, capitulo 16 [nn.32-33], dicit: 'Quia omnis spiritus est omni corpore sine dubitatione praestantior [...].'*" (Ibid. p.16).

³⁰¹ Augustine makes his conclusion even clearer a bit below this cited passage, which Olivi also cites, where it is stated that, "it seems to me that, although soul senses in a body, it is not the case that it [i.e. soul] undergoes anything from that" (Ibid.; cf. *De musica*, 6.5.10). That is, although the soul, in sensation, might in some way use the body, no corporeal object or impression in the body can sufficiently bring about a passive impression in the (sensitive part of the) soul.

living things, since they must be less noble than the cognitive anyway, whether or not the life of, e.g., plants is to be contrasted with the corporeal³⁰². This seems to offer another connection between Augustine and Olivi insofar as Olivi simply groups together life/vitality, cognition in general, and spirituality/incorporeality (and, likewise, simplicity/non-extension) in his nobility arguments; all, it seems, Olivi wishes to extract from Augustine for his argument is that a “vital” act of cognition is sufficiently “spiritual” and more noble than corporeal objects and corporeal impressions, and that such vital acts are found only in the cognitive soul/powers. As I (and others) have discussed in further detail elsewhere³⁰³, Olivi’s exact terminology seems to be ultimately distinctive; in this sort of context, Olivi somewhat oddly equates “vital”, “cognitive”, “spiritual”, and “simple”, and elsewhere, Olivi restricts “spirituality” to the cognitive (and appetitive), in contrast with the merely living (i.e., plants).

Olivi’s somewhat peculiar terminology seems to be taken up by certain figures in the 14th century and afterward. See, e.g., the following definition of “vital acts” from Peter Auriol, which seems to exclude any act that isn’t itself cognition (or appetite/affection):

“Those acts are called ‘vital’ through which an intentional power is united with its object, which is a special/distinct (*proprius*) mode of union. For example, if intellection were a “dead” quality (*qualitas mortua*), through which the [cognitive] power were merely assimilated to its object, then it would certainly not be ‘vital’. But, since an object is united [with a power] in cognitive being, thus it is called ‘vital’, [which is different than mere assimilation] since it is a special (*specialis*) and unique mode of similitude. And the same is true of love [i.e., an appetitive power]. Hence Augustine says that nothing is so present as what is held in cogitation: but an object is united with an act of a sensitive

³⁰² As cited below, later in *De musica*, Augustine calls non-sensitive things like bones and plants, “not wholly not-living/vital”, and offers some explanation for why soul is not as present in these things so as to make them cognitive (for reasons, in part, to do with their more crude corporeality) (*De musica*, 6.10.15).

³⁰³ See, e.g., Toivanen (2009 & 2013) for a particularly rich discussion of Olivi’s terminology. I’ve discussed Olivi’s peculiar terminology of “vital acts”, and its later uptake, in “Consciousness and Vital Acts in Medieval Cognitive Theory”, presented at a few venues, and in further work in progress on Peter Auriol’s context.

appetitive power in a vital and intentional way.” (III Sent., D.15, Q.1, a.1; p.441)³⁰⁴

That is, as I take it, Auriol considers “vital acts” to be those which involve some object actually appearing before one (in “cognitive”, “intentional”, or “apparent being”), as happens with occurrent acts of cognition/appetition. Auriol contrasts such vital acts with mere “similitudes” or *species*, brought about in some organ/power, or anything else which similarly lacks an aforementioned “apparent object” of cognition/appetition. At least on the face of it, no plant, e.g., will have such “vital acts”.

Scotus, as well, discusses the “vitality” of cognitive acts, whether sensitive or intellective, for use in a nobility argument, and he even provides another Augustinian source. For context, in Scotus’s summary of prior active accounts of cognition, Scotus starts with the same claims we’ve seen from Olivi above in presenting the view of “the blessed Augustine”: cognition in the spiritual soul is more excellent than corporeal things, and thus, the spiritual soul must bring about its cognitive acts, in itself and through itself, as Augustine oft says (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.283; see, e.g., *De Trinitate* 10.5.7)³⁰⁵. More to the point, right after this, Scotus presents further arguments “from reasons” for this account, the first of which speaks more explicitly of “vitality” and is also attributed to Augustine:

“An effect does not exceed a cause in perfection. ‘However, everything living is better than the non-living’, according to Augustine in *The City of God*

³⁰⁴ “*Item actus vitales dicuntur, quibus potentia intentionalis obiecto unitur, qui est proprius modus unionis: verbi gratia, si intelligere esset qualitas mortua, per quam solum potentia assimilaretur obiecto, certe non esset vitalis, sed quia ponitur obiectum uniri in esse cognito, ideo vocatur vitalis, quia est specialis modus similitudinis & singularis: ita de amore. Unde dicit Augustinus, nihil tam praesens, quam quod cogitatione ponitur: sed actui appetitus sensitivi unitur obiectum potentiae modo vitali & intentionaliter.*” (Auriol, III Sent., D.15, Q.1, a.1; p.441) See also, a bit below, where Auriol offers a shortened nobility argument that boiling blood cannot sufficiently cause sensory affection: “*Isti actus sunt vitales, ut probatum est. Tunc sic. Intra tamen formam vitalem nil intrat, nisi vitale: sed transmutationes corporales sunt non vitales: ergo.*” (Ibid.)

³⁰⁵ See above for more of these citations to Augustine from Olivi and Scotus.

[VIII.6]. Therefore, a vital operation cannot be unless [enacted] by a principle of acting of a vital or living [thing]. Those operations of cognition are vital operations; therefore, they are from that soul as in the manner of an agent.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284)³⁰⁶.

Although Scotus has some qualms with prior active accounts, when he gets to his own active account, Scotus still accepts a qualified nobility principle that “an agent is more excellent than its effect [...] for a total and equivocal cause”, and he agrees with Olivi that, “since cognition is a vital operation, it does not come from the non-living as a total cause” (Ibid. pp. 300-301)³⁰⁷.

In the passage from Augustine which Scotus cites, as with *De musica* VI, Augustine contrasts soul and life/vitality with body; as Augustine puts it, “whatever exists is either a body or a life, and it is better for something to be a life than a body” (*The City of God*, 8.6)³⁰⁸.

³⁰⁶ “Pro ista opinione arguitur per rationes sic: effectus non excedit causam in perfectione: ‘melius est autem omne vivum non vivo’, secundam Augustinum De civitate Dei [VIII, cap.6]; ergo operatio vitalis non potest esse nisi a principio agendi vitali vel vivo. Ista operationes cognoscendi sunt operationes vitales, ergo sunt ab ipsa anima sicut a ratione agendi” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284).

³⁰⁷ “[I]lla autem quod ‘agens est praestantius effectu’ non est vera nisi de causa aequivoca et totali. [...] Ad rationem primam pro illa opinione [see the fn. above]: concludit pro me, quia cogitatio cum sit operatio vitalis non est a non-vivo sicut a totali causa.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.300-301). As I’ve discussed before, an “equivocal cause” is a cause different in type than its effect, such as a substance causing an accident, God causing creatures, a builder causing a house, or, for the example Scotus gives, the sun (which is held not to be actually, but “virtually”, hot) causing heat and fire. For more of this argument type in Scotus’s own voice, see also the footnotes above where I cite Scotus’s use of nobility arguments against the views of Godfrey and Henry.

³⁰⁸ Here’s the full passage from Augustine, which describes the way in which even the “Platonists by natural philosophy” seek God, going from mutable and purely corporeal things, to living mutable things, and ultimately to an eternal, incorporeal/simple, and intellectual life: “**Philosophia naturali platonici Deum quaerunt...** Viderunt ergo isti philosophi, quos ceteris non immerito fama atque gloria praelatos videmus, nullum corpus esse Deum, et ideo cuncta corpora transcenderunt quaerentes Deum. Viderunt, quidquid mutabile est, non esse summum Deum, et ideo animam omnem mutabilesque omnes spiritus transcenderunt quaerentes summum Deum. Deinde viderunt omnem speciem in re quacumque mutabili, qua est, quidquid illud est, quoquo modo et qualiscumque natura est, non esse posse nisi ab illo, qui vere est, quia incommutabiliter est. Ac per hoc sive universi mundi corpus figuras, qualitates ordinatumque motum et elementa disposita a caelo usque ad terram et quaecumque corpora in eis sunt, sive omnem vitam, vel quae nutrit et continet, qualis est in arboribus, vel quae et hoc habet et sentit, qualis est in pecoribus, vel quae et haec habet et intellegit, qualis est in hominibus, vel quae nutritorio subsidio non indiget, sed tantum continet sentit intellegit, qualis est in angelis, nisi ab illo esse non posse, qui simpliciter est; quia non aliud illi est esse, aliud vivere, quasi possit esse non vivens; nec aliud illi est vivere, aliud intellegere, quasi possit vivere non intellegens; nec aliud illi est intellegere, aliud beatum esse, quasi possit intellegere non beatus; sed quod est illi vivere, intellegere, beatum esse, hoc est illi esse. Propter hanc incommutabilitatem et simplicitatem intellexerunt eum et omnia ista fecisse, et ipsum a nullo fieri potuisse. Consideraverunt enim, quidquid est, vel corpus esse vel vitam, meliusque aliquid vitam esse quam corpus,

Moreover, in this passage, Augustine presents a typical medieval hierarchy of being, from the purely corporeal, such as the elements, to the merely living, requiring nutrition and growth, such as plants, to the sensitive lives, such as non-rational animals, to the (partially simple?) intellectual and sensitive lives, such as humans, to the simple and immutable intellectual lives, such as angels, and ultimately, the most blessed simple intellectual life, God (Ibid.)³⁰⁹.

Unlike Olivi, Scotus more plainly follows the traditional terminology of Augustine here and explicitly includes non-cognitive “vital acts” when discussing the general causal principles behind this sort of nobility argument; e.g., to explain his qualified nobility principle, mentioned above, Scotus gives the case of the vital act of reproduction, where a father, *qua* living, must be the more principal cause in generating the life of a child, though, nevertheless, the non-living Sun (along with the non-living sub-lunar elements) is still a partial, though less principal, cause

*speciemque corporis esse sensibilem, intellegibilem vitae. Proinde intellegibilem speciem sensibili praetulerunt. Sensibilia dicimus, quae visu tactuque corporis sentiri queunt; intellegibilia, quae conspectu mentis intellegi. Nulla est enim pulchritudo corporalis sive in statu corporis, sicut est figura, sive in motu, sicut est cantilena, de qua non animus iudicet. Quod profecto non posset, nisi melior in illo esset haec species, sine tumore molis, sine strepitu vocis, sine spatio vel loci vel temporis. Sed ibi quoque nisi mutabilis esset, non alius alio melius de specie sensibili iudicaret; melius ingeniosior quam tardior, melius peritior quam imperitior, melius exercitator quam minus exercitatus, et idem ipse unus, cum proficit, melius utique postea quam prius. Quod autem recipit magis et minus, sine dubitatione mutabile est. Unde ingeniosi et docti et in his exercitati homines facile collegerunt non esse in eis rebus primam speciem, ubi mutabilis esse convincitur. Cum igitur in eorum conspectu et corpus et animus magis minusque speciosa essent, si autem omni specie carere possent, omnino nulla essent: viderunt esse aliquid ubi prima esset incommutabilis et ideo nec comparabilis; atque ibi esse rerum principium rectissime crediderunt, quod factum non esset et ex quo facta cuncta essent. Ita quod notum est Dei, manifestavit eis ipse, cum ab eis invisibilia eius per ea, quae facta sunt, intellecta conspecta sunt; sempiterna quoque virtus eius et divinitas; a quo etiam visibilia et temporalia cuncta creata sunt. Haec de illa parte, quam physicam, id est naturalem, nuncupant, dicta sint.” (Augustine, *The City of God*, 8.6).*

³⁰⁹ Notably, in this hierarchy, Augustine is also clear that, despite the contrast with the merely corporeal, in another sense, sensation isn’t as fully “incorporeal”, or “simple”, as intellection, especially in the case of angels and God, since sense powers operate through the use of bodies and, thus, sensitive lives share in the mutability of bodies (Ibid.).

(providing, e.g., the necessary heat) (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.300-301)³¹⁰.

These differences in the details aside, most importantly, Scotus and Olivi seem to agree that *cognitive* vital acts are said to be more noble than non-cognitive “vital” acts, in the overall hierarchy of being, and intellectual acts are more noble than sensitive acts, and thus cognitive vital acts have their own associated nobility arguments. Moreover, in his *De anima* commentary, when discussing the cognitive powers, Scotus seems to prefer the terminology of “animal” (*animalis*) acts and changes, over “vital” acts, in order to avoid these ambiguities and more exclusively cover the sorts of cognitive/appetitive psychological acts which Olivi has in mind³¹¹.

³¹⁰ “[I]lla autem quod ‘agens est praestantius effectu’ non est vera nisi de causa aequivoca et totali; potest autem aliqua causa esse partialiter agens ad aliquem effectum nobiliorem se, sicut elementum in virtute corporum caelestium potest agere ad generationem mixti, quod est nobilius ipso elemento, agente ut partiali causa. [...] Ad rationem primam pro illa opinione: concludit pro me, quia cogitatio cum sit operatio vitalis non est a non-vivo sicut a totali causa; potest tamen non-vivum esse causa partialis alicuius vivi, vel effectus vitalis, sicut sol non-vivus est causa partialis cum patrem ad generandum filium vivum, et multo magis in proposito est possibile, quia hic causa principalior est vita, sicut patebit in sequenti quaestione.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.300-301.; cf. *Ibid.* Q.3; pp.312-314)

Note that, unlike the traditional position attributed to Aristotle, and oft found in Islamic medieval philosophy, that the heavenly bodies are separate intelligences, which locomote through soul, Scotus and other Latin medieval philosophers deny that the sun and stars are living, appetitive, or intelligent beings. Gonsalvus, e.g., points out that the claim that the heavenly bodies are willing, intelligent, and, thus, ensouled is an “excommunicated article and expressly against [John] Damascene” (*I Quaestiones*, Q.12; p.231); in his edition, Amoros provides the citation to John Damascene: “Nullus porro caelos aut luminaria animata esse arbitretur; anima quippe et sensu caret.” (*Ibid.* fn.4; *De fide orthod.*, II, c.6).

³¹¹ See, e.g., InDA QQ.4-5, where Scotus distinguishes between so-called “natural” changes and “animal” changes (which also include mere “intentional” and “spiritual” change), such that Scotus can make sense of Aristotle’s famous remark that the senses receive “the form of the object without its matter”. As Scotus puts it, it’s accidental that a sense organ ever receives a form/quality same in being as its object as, e.g., when the organ of touch is literally heated; moreover, even with touch, this sort of change does not reach the sensitive power properly speaking. In contrast, to sense heat is an animal act brought about principally by the spiritual soul itself (nevertheless, the organ and power do co-operate in this life). Admittedly, some ambiguity remains here, as to whether Scotus also extends “animal”/“intentional” changes to the medium and organ, as, e.g., when the illuminated air or eye jelly receives a *species* of colour; my sense is that Scotus would only call these changes “animal” insofar as they are actively in service to an act of cognition (properly in the animal soul). See also, *Ordinatio* II, D.13, Q.1, where Scotus distinguishes between two sorts of “intentional” being; for one sort, as with *species* of colour in the medium, the form of colour is there in reality, albeit diminished in being, in certain ways behaving as corporeal/extended things, in other ways, as spiritual/nonextended things; for the other, more distinct, sort, as with an object cognized, the object in “intentional” being exists in contrast with real being,

Overall, from the above, one can extract two major distinct features in this “Augustinian” argument. **First**, as mentioned above, the sensitive powers (and acts of sensation), not just the intellect (and acts of intellection), are said to be noble enough that they cannot be sufficiently acted on (and its cognitive acts brought about) by lower, corporeal objects. In contrast, consider Aquinas’s ST 1, Q.84, a.6, which Aquinas himself dedicates to contrast his own “Aristotelian” view from that of Augustine (at least, insofar as Augustine seems to generally follow Plato) [more specifically, as we’ll see, Aquinas situates Aristotle’s account between those of Plato and Democritus]³¹². As Aquinas describes this latter view, Augustine seems to follow Plato such that, although intellection and sensation are said to differ (*contra* Democritus), “neither does intellectual cognition proceed from sensible things, nor even does sensible cognition totally [proceed] from sensible things”; as evidence for this claim, Aquinas cites two typical passages from Augustine, which we’ve seen Olivi and company cite as well, where it is said that: (i) it is more noble to actively “make”, and spirit is more noble than body, thus, body cannot “make” acts of cognition in the spiritual soul; and, (ii), “body does not sense, but the soul through body, which [body], like a report[er], the soul uses in order to make in itself what is reported from

although the cognitive act is perfectly real (as I would add, the act is full-on “spiritual” insofar as it is an act of spirit/soul).

³¹² Interestingly, Aquinas describes Aristotle’s view as a sort of “middle view”, but not in the same way as the *Middle View* I’ve set up above, where cognition is partly active and partly passive. Instead, Aquinas uses two different metrics here: Aristotle’s view is said to be similar to Plato, but dissimilar to Democritus, insofar as Aristotle and Plato both make a clear distinction between acts of sensation and intellection; on the other hand, Aristotle’s view is said to be similar to Democritus, but dissimilar to Plato, insofar as Democritus and Aristotle both treat sensation as the result of a passive influx (of atoms) or impression (of forms). Based on this text, if any act of cognition is partly active and partly passive according to Aristotle/Aquinas, that would only seem to fit with intellection.

outside” (ST 1, Q.84, a.6, ob.2 & c.; cf. *Super Genesim ad Litteram*, 12.16.33 & 12.24.51)³¹³. So, that is, it’s clear that Aquinas is, so far, broadly describing the *Fully Active View*, and its associated nobility argument, of the later Augustinians whom we’ve been discussing.

However, more to the point at hand, Aquinas contrasts this Platonic/Augustinian position with that of Aristotle, at least with respect to sensation. According to Aquinas, Aristotle holds

³¹³ “*Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, XII super Gen. ad Litt., non est putandum facere aliquid corpus in spiritum, tanquam spiritus corpori facienti materiae vice subdatur, omni enim modo praestantior est qui facit, ea re de qua aliquid facit. Unde concludit quod imaginem corporis non corpus in spiritu, sed ipse spiritus in seipso facit. Non ergo intellectualis cognitio a sensibilibus derivatur.*

Praeterea, effectus non se extendit ultra virtutem suae causae. Sed intellectualis cognitio se extendit ultra sensibilia, intelligimus enim quaedam quae sensu percipi non possunt. Intellectualis ergo cognitio non derivatur a rebus sensibilibus. [...]

Respondeo dicendum quod circa istam quaestionem triplex fuit philosophorum opinio. Democritus enim posuit quod nulla est alia causa cuiuslibet nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab his corporibus quae cogitamus, veniunt atque intrans imagines in animas nostras; ut Augustinus dicit in epistola sua ad Dioscorum. Et Aristoteles etiam dicit, in libro de Somn. et Vigil., quod Democritus posuit cognitionem fieri per idola et defluxiones. Et huius positionis ratio fuit, quia tam ipse Democritus quam alii antiqui naturales non ponebant intellectum differre a sensu, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de anima. Et ideo, quia sensus immutatur a sensibili, arbitrabantur omnem nostram cognitionem fieri per solam immutationem a sensibilibus. Quam quidem immutationem Democritus asserebat fieri per imaginum defluxiones. Plato vero e contrario posuit intellectum differre a sensu; et intellectum quidem esse virtutem immaterialem organo corporeo non utentem in suo actu. Et quia incorporeum non potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio intellectualis non fit per immutationem intellectus a sensibilibus, sed per participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, ut dictum est. Sensum etiam posuit virtutem quandam per se operantem. Unde nec ipse sensus, cum sit quaedam vis spiritualis, immutatur a sensibilibus, sed organa sensuum a sensibilibus immutantur, ex qua immutatione anima quodammodo excitatur ut in se species sensibilem formet. Et hanc opinionem tangere videtur Augustinus, XII super Gen. ad Litt., ubi dicit quod corpus non sentit, sed anima per corpus, quo velut nuntio utitur ad formandum in seipsa quod extrinsecus nuntiatur. Sic igitur secundum Platonis opinionem, neque intellectualis cognitio a sensibili procedit, neque etiam sensibilis totaliter a sensibilibus rebus; sed sensibilia excitant animam sensibilem ad sentiendum, et similiter sensus excitant animam intellectivam ad intelligendum.” (Aquinas, ST 1, Q.84, a.6).

I’ve included the full passage here (along with the preceding part in the fn. below) for the extra details. For one thing, it’s notable that the reference to Democritus here uses the terminology of “*defluxus*” and “*influxus*” to describe impressions in the soul; as we’ve seen, Olivi picks up this terminology later when describing his opponents. Second, it’s interesting that here Aquinas uses the terminology of “excitations” from body to soul to describe the view of Augustine; however, as we’ve seen, Olivi and other later Augustinians take issue with the sort of view this “excitation” terminology seems to imply. Third, it’s notable that although Aquinas attributes the theory of innate knowledge to Plato, it’s not clear he’s attributing that much to Augustine here; at the very least, later Augustinians, such as Olivi, very much try to distance themselves from any full-on Platonic innatism. Finally, it should be noted that Aquinas does give some wiggle room as to whether Augustine actually follows Plato with respect to sensation; by the end of this article, Aquinas raises some fair questions as to whether Augustine is only speaking of acts of imagination and intellection in the texts cited; as mentioned in the footnotes above, this is one reason why *De musica VI* is the more interesting text for Olivi and company to cite, since that text clearly pertains to an external sense.

that sensation is not an act of the sensitive soul alone, but of the conjunct of soul and body, and so, “it is not unfitting that sensible things, which are outside the soul, should cause something in the conjunct,” [viz., the operation of sensation is caused by way of sensible impressions/*species* made in the sense power]; to this extent, for sensation, Aristotle is held to be in agreement with Democritus, against Plato (though, as mentioned above, Democritus differs from both insofar as he is held not to distinguish acts of sensation and intellection) (Ibid.)³¹⁴.

In other words, although Aquinas might agree with the Platonic/Augustinian position, that the sensitive soul/power is more noble than merely sensible objects/qualities, in some respect, he wouldn't agree that the sensitive soul/power is more noble *in every respect*. In particular, Aquinas holds that the sensitive soul/powers share in corporeality with sensible objects outside the soul, and thus, he argues, the latter can act on the former; *in this respect*, insofar as they are more active/actual with respect to cognition, objects are held to be more noble than the sensitive power/soul. The organ of touch, e.g., insofar as it is realized in a wet and dry body, and is in mere potency for heat, can be moved by fire, insofar as fire is more noble/perfect with respect to heat, being actually hot. Analogously, the organ of touch, being sensitive in potency, but lacking

³¹⁴ “*Aristoteles autem media via processit. Posuit enim cum Platone intellectum differre a sensu. Sed sensum posuit propriam operationem non habere sine communicatione corporis; ita quod sentire non sit actus animae tantum, sed coniuncti. Et similiter posuit de omnibus operationibus sensitivae partis. Quia igitur non est inconveniens quod sensibilia quae sunt extra animam, causent aliquid in coniunctum, in hoc Aristoteles cum Democrito concordavit, quod operationes sensitivae partis causentur per impressionem sensibilium in sensum, non per modum defluxionis, ut Democritus posuit, sed per quandam operationem. Nam et Democritus omnem actionem fieri posuit per influxionem atomorum, ut patet in I de Generat. Intellectum vero posuit Aristoteles habere operationem absque communicatione corporis. Nihil autem corporeum imprimere potest in rem incorpoream. Et ideo ad causandam intellectualem operationem, secundum Aristotelem, non sufficit sola impressio sensibilium corporum, sed requiritur aliquid nobilius, quia agens est honorabilius patiente, ut ipse dicit. Non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorum, ut Plato posuit, sed illud superius et nobilius agens quod vocat intellectum agentem, de quo iam supra diximus, facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu, per modum abstractionis cuiusdam. Secundum hoc ergo, ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. Sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sit totalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodammodo est materia causae.*” (Aquinas, ST 1, Q.84, a.6).

the sensible *species* of heat, so too can be moved by fire, insofar as fire is actually sensibly hot, and thus, more perfect and active with respect to sensitivity/sensation (cf. *Ibid.* ad.2)³¹⁵.

Aquinas holds that Aristotle only follows the Platonic/Augustinian position for intellection, not for sensation, at least in one respect. As Aquinas puts it, both Aristotle and Plato/Augustine agree that intellection is an operation without direct “communication” with a bodily organ, and that, “since the agent is more honourable than the patient”, a more noble agent than an impression in the body/senses is required (*Ibid.*). More specifically, Aquinas refers to Aristotle’s “agent intellect” as this more noble agent, operating with phantasms in the sensitive soul (i.e., to move the “possible intellect” to intellection) (*Ibid.*; cf. ad.3)³¹⁶. As discussed above, this is another point where Aquinas’s “Aristotelian” position diverges from the Augustinian tradition, since Olivi and company hold that a distinct agent intellect, lacking cognition itself, does not suffice to bridge the nobility gap here.

A **second major distinctive thesis** of the “Augustinian” position, especially in Olivi, is that the most relevant sort of “nobility” and “vitality” is found in the soul *qua* cognitive or “attentive”. Thus, in line with the above, the part of the soul which brings about cognition must be the very part which cognizes, not some distinct non-cognitive agent power, and this is necessary both for sensation and intellection, since sensation is just as cognitive as intellection. As mentioned above, for Olivi and company, a “higher” principle of cognition isn’t just necessary to cross some boundary from the corporeal/particular to the incorporeal/intelligible, as with the more traditional medieval Aristotelian position. This point of distinction also lines up

³¹⁵ “[...] *corpus sensibile est nobilius organo animalis, secundum hoc quod comparatur ad ipsum ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, sicut coloratum in actu ad pupillam, quae colorata est in potentia.*” For further discussion of Aquinas’s position, see Solère (2014, pp.186-189).

³¹⁶ “*Ad tertium dicendum quod sensitiva cognitio non est tota causa intellectualis cognitionis. Et ideo non est mirum si intellectualis cognitio ultra sensitivam se extendit.*” (Aquinas, ST 1, Q.84, a.6).

with the special place of “vital acts” in this tradition, especially for Olivi, for whom this term seems to be exclusively applied to occurrent cognitive (and appetitive) acts, whether sensitive or intellectual, and not to anything in the soul or body below (e.g., mere habits/*species* or any supposed “illumination” distinct from cognition). Overall, as I take it, for Olivi and company, the cognitive soul/power sits above the body, acting from itself, (though perhaps through some sort of co-operation with the body), stretching outwards and attending to its objects, as Olivi puts it in his initial experiential argument above (II Sent. Q. 72; III, p.38).

§2.3. The “Augustinian” Connection between Experiential and Nobility Arguments

To add to the above, let’s return to *De musica VI*, where we can find an Augustinian source to connect these *nobility arguments* with the aforementioned *experiential arguments*.

As we’ve seen above, back where Olivi initially endorses the *Fully Active View* “of the blessed Augustine”, in II Sent. Q.72, Olivi starts with Augustine’s *nobility argument* from *De musica VI* (5.8) and comes to the conclusion that cognition, in general, does not come about from a direct “influx” from corporeal objects. Olivi continues to cite from the proceeding passages of *De musica VI*, along with other texts of Augustine (including *De Trinitate*), in order to flesh out how cognition comes about, if not from some external “influx” from corporeal things (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.15-17)³¹⁷. Most notably, Olivi cites Augustine’s claim that, although

³¹⁷ “Quarta est beati Augustini dicentis in nullum spiritum posse fieri aliquid a corpore per rectum influxum sed solum per modum colligantiae et per modum termini obiectivi. Quod enim non per rectum influxum aliquid in spiritu seu anima faciat, dicit aperte in libro VI Musicae [cap.5, n.8], ubi postquam quaesivit an audire sit idem quod aliquid a corpore in anima fieri, subdit: ‘Semper absurdum est fabricatori corpori materiam quoquomodo animam subdere; esset autem corpori sic subiecta, si corpus in ea aliquos numeros operaretur; non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab his quos in sonis cognoscimus.’ [...] Item, paulo post [cap.5, n.10]: ‘Videtur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere.’ Item, paulo post: ‘Cum adhibentur

corporeal things make no impression in the soul, they do bring about impressions in one's bodily organs, and to these impressions, the soul, somehow, "turns to or meets up with" them, so that the soul can bring about acts of (sensitive) cognition in itself; or, as Augustine also puts it, "when the soul senses in the body, it does not undergo anything from that [external corporeal thing], rather, it [i.e., the soul] more attentively (*attentius*) acts with regard to the impressions of the body (*in eius passionibus*)" (Ibid.; cf. *De musica*, 6.5.9-10)³¹⁸. Exactly what Augustine, or Olivi, mean by this "turning" or "attention" ("*advertus*", "*aspectus*", "*attentio*", "*intentio*", etc.) of the soul is open to interpretation. Nevertheless, it's at least clear that on this Augustinian view, the soul, being more noble, sits above the body with this "attention" which, when sufficiently active, meets up with corporeal impressions in one's sense organs or, more directly, gazes upon and cognizes the external objects themselves.

As we've seen above, and in previous chapters, Olivi makes much of this sort of "attention" in his own account of cognition, especially in his *experiential arguments*. Recall that Olivi claims that impressions in the sense organs cannot be sufficient to bring about sensation since, when and where the soul does not sufficiently attend, there is no determinate sensitive act; e.g., in sleep, the cognitive powers are not sufficiently attentive/vigilant, and thus we do not sense; moreover, Olivi adds that even while awake, one can fail to perceive what's in front of

ea quae nonnulla, ut ita dicam, alteritate corpus afficiunt, et exerit anima attentiores actiones suas quibusque locis atque instrumentis accommodatas, tunc videre vel audire vel olfacere vel gustare vel tangendo sentire dicitur; has operationes passionibus corporis puto animam exhibere, cum sentit, non easdem passiones recipere. Item, paulo post [cap.5, n.12]: 'Cum ab iisdem operationibus suis aliquid patitur, non a corpore, sed a se ipsa patitur.' [...] Item, libro X De Trinitate, capitulo 5, [n.7] dicit quod, 'quia anima non potest inferre introrsus ipsa corpora tanquam in regionem incorporeae naturae, imagines eorum convellit et rapit factas in semetipsa de semetipsa.'" (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.15-17).

³¹⁸ "*Corporealia ergo quaecumque huic corpori ingeruntur aut obiciuntur extrinsecus, non in anima, sed in ipso corpore aliquid faciunt, quod operi eius aut adversetur, aut congruat. [...] Et ne longum faciam, videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere: et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur.*" (Augustine, *De musica* 6.5.9-10).

one's eyes if a "vehement attention to another thing" retracts one's sensitive gaze from those present objects (II Sent. Q.73; III, pp.89-90).

As discussed above, Olivi seems to also be drawing from Augustine's discussion of sensation, and cognition in general, in *De Trinitate* XI. In this text, Augustine speaks of a "trinity" in sensitive cognition, such as vision, which includes (i) the external corporeal object, (ii) some form from the object "impressed" in the relevant sense organ (*qua* corporeal), and (iii) some pre-cognitive "attention"/"gaze" ("*intentio*", "*attentio*", "*aspectus*", etc.; sometimes also called an appetitive desire/will, or "*voluntas*") of the soul proper, which, in some manner, "combines" (i) + (ii), the object and impression (and, thus, brings about a distinct "image" of the object in the soul proper) (see, e.g., *De Trinitate* 11.2.2). To explain this account, Augustine gives the example of someone walking a trail while deep in thought who, due to a lack of attention to the sensible objects along the trail, does not properly see those objects, even though they impinge on the walker's sense organs (*De Trinitate*, 11.8.15). As Olivi would have it, in this case, the distracted walker's sensitive soul did not sufficiently attend to those external objects "behind" their bodily impressions, so it did not form its own "image" (i.e., sensation proper), in the soul proper, of these objects.

Scotus, as we've discussed in the last chapter (§3.4), comes to a similar interpretation of these remarks in *De Trinitate* XI. As Scotus puts it, the sensitive soul produces a properly "spiritual" act of (sensitive) cognition (what Augustine calls an "image") in the soul/spirit proper, based on the impressions received in the corresponding bodily organ (*qua* corporeal). Like Olivi, Scotus takes it that Augustine's "*intentio*" of the soul (i.e. (iii) in the above trinity), is a sort of standing desire or general attention to cognize (appropriate objects), which, in some sense, "brings together" the object behind the impression (i.e. (i) + (ii) from the above "trinity")

such that the soul is now cognizing some determinate object with its own “image” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300)³¹⁹.

Moreover, although the soul’s attention (“*intentio*”), in the above sense, acts autonomously, Scotus, like Olivi, also argues that one can witness the soul’s activity insofar as the soul’s attention is open to voluntary variation. For example, Scotus’s *experiential argument* above has it that with greater attention, one can cognize more intensely and, through effort, as Augustine says in *De Trinitate* XI, one can even briefly hold onto a sort of after-image when an object, perceived intensely, goes away (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.294; cf. *De Trinitate* 11.2.3). Similarly, consider as well, Olivi’s claim, discussed more fully in the last chapter and Martin (2019), that a cognitive power and object are disanalogous to a combustible flame and combustive log (where combustion always follows, with the two being co-present) in at least three, related, regards: (i) the combustive flame does not take the combustible log as an “object” (i.e., as a terminative cause); moreover, as Olivi puts it, (ii) “the *aspectus* of the combustive over the combustible is not so variable or lacking, when the two are co-present, as in the manner that a cognitive power is able to not have its *aspectus* fixed in an object, even when the power and object are co-present”; also, (iii), “the combustive is not a free agent, nor is combustion a free action in the way that, of a free will, there is a free action” (II Sent. Q.72; III, p.39)³²⁰. So, in other words, as in the case of Olivi’s *experiential arguments*, even with impressions in a sense organ, a cognitive gaze/attention (“*aspectus*”) can vary in

³¹⁹ As Augustine also gets into, a similar account holds of intellectual cognition, though with “images” and intelligible objects rather than bodily impressions and sensible objects.

³²⁰ “*Nec est simile de combustivo et combustibili; tum quia ibi non exigitur obiectum aliud a combustibili; tum quia aspectus combustivi super combustibile non sic variatur aut deficit ipsis compraesentibus, sicut potentia et obiecto sibi compraesentibus potest potentia cognitiva non habere aspectum defixum in obiectum; tum quia combustivum non est agens liberum nec combustio est actio libera, sicut est libera actio liberae voluntatis.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.39).

experience and fail to capture a determinate object, either through natural means, given our embodied life, as when one is asleep and insufficiently attentive/vigilant, or through volition, as when one willingly focuses one's cognitive gaze more on some other object (e.g. in imagination or thought).

So, overall, for Olivi and Scotus, this Augustinian “attention” of the soul, above the body, is part and parcel with how they interpret the most relevant “nobility” of the soul over the body. The exact nature of this “attention” might still be unclear (perhaps, e.g., as fire can have an equivocal sort of “*aspectus*”, so too can the vegetative soul) (see Martin 2019); nevertheless, the paradigm examples from Olivi and Scotus are of the sort of “attention” we can find in experience, as in the formation of determinate acts of cognition. Thus, as with the **two major points** raised above which I claim distinguish the “nobility arguments” of these “Augustinians”, the cognitive (and appetitive) soul is given a special place above the “lower” (e.g., the merely vegetative soul and simple bodies/heaps), and this holds for acts of sensitive and intellectual cognition (not just the latter, even though the intellect is more obviously “incorporeal”)³²¹.

³²¹ As mentioned in Chapter 1, although not obviously the same notion, Augustine also talks of a sort of “*aspectus*”/“*intentio*” of the soul, in places where he, either literally or figuratively, picks up prior extra-missionist theories of vision (see also, Martin 2019 and Lička 2019). Later “Augustinians” also adopt this terminology, mixing it up with the above, although explicitly only in figurative terms. E.g., first in more general terms, Olivi says: “I call this *aspectus* here a virtual or intentional conversion of a power to an object. Of which, Augustine said, in I *Soliloquorum*, that it is predetermined to what an eye should see because, should it be healthy and gaze [or, be oriented] (*aspiciat*) on something, and so forth, it follows what it should see.” (II Sent. Q. 59; II, pp.543-544). From this, Olivi goes right into his own distinction between what he calls a universal or general *aspectus* and a particular *aspectus*; the former falls upon all objects which can be said to be present, “as an eye, by being open, is actually directed to exterior objects and gazes [or, is oriented] upon the entire hemisphere”; the later is a “determinate conversion of that power to a certain object” and is open to more voluntary control, in line with the determinate “attention” we’ve seen from Olivi above (Ibid.). [*Aspectum autem hic voco conversionem virtualem seu intentionalem potentiae ad obiectum. De quo loquitur Augustinus, I Soliloquorum, quod ad hoc quod oculus videat praexigitur quod sit sanus et quod aspiciat et sic tandem sequitur quod videat. Et horum aspectuum quidam est universalis, quidam vera particularis. Universalem autem voco generalem conversionem ab omnia obiecta quae sibi praesentia dici possunt; sicut oculus eo ipso quo est apertus et actualiter directus ad exteriora, aspicit totum*

Now, of course, these texts from Augustine are ambiguous enough to permit other interpretations, as from those holding *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views*, but that Olivi and company interpreted them as they did points to the distinctness of their own “Augustinian” approach. Moreover, many of these alternate interpretations seem to be attempts to fit Augustine’s words with a pre-established account with more explicitly “Aristotelian” motivations, as we’ve discussed above, rather than the reverse. And, in general, none of these alternate interpretations give reason to deny that Olivi and company offer the view with more adamant vocal appeal to Augustine.

One ambiguity in Augustine’s texts, which Scotus points out, is that, “that information of the sense [i.e. (ii) above], which comes about from body alone, is called a ‘vision’ [by Augustine]” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300; see, e.g., *De Trinitate* 11.2.2).³²² This ambiguous terminology was not lost on those who defend more passive views of

hemisphaerium, sicut et quilibet punctus lucis solaris. Particularem autem voco determinatam conversionem ipsius ad certum obiectum.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 59; II, pp.543-544; Augustine, *Soliloquiorum*, I, c.6, 7, 22).]

Looking ahead, Peter Auriol also picks up this Augustinian terminology and explicitly contrasts this “*aspectus*”/“*intentio*” of the soul with corporeal processes; as he says: “An act of cognition or judgement is not something confined inside (*infra*) a surface, since it is intentionally extended a great distance outside (*extra*), just as Augustine says in *De Trinitate*, XIV, chapter 6: for he says that the eye is fixed in the body, nevertheless its *aspectus* is stretched and extended into those things which are outside, and all the way to the stars. So, [...] it is manifestly clear that this is an operation in some way abstracting from the conditions of quantity.” (I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.2; lines 961-970). [*“Ex parte quidem iudicii, quoniam quantitatis est claudere rem et terminare per lineas et superficies, ut Commentator dicit, VII Metaphysicae, commento 3. Ait enim quod substantia terminata a lineis et superficiebus est corpus. Individua namque substantiae sunt terminata, quia sunt corpora existentia per se; actus vero cognitivus sive iudicium non est aliquid conclusum infra superficiem, cum extendatur intentionaliter multum distanter ad extra, sicut Augustinus dicit, XIV De trinitate, capitulo 6. Ait enim quod ipse oculus est loco suo fixus in corpore, aspectus tamen eius in ea, quae extra sunt tenditur et usque ad sidera extenditur. Sic igitur cum iudicium non claudatur superficie nec determinetur ad situm illius in quo est, immo intentionaliter extendatur ad ea quae sunt in distantissimo situ, manifeste patet quod est operatio aliquo qualiter abstrahens a condicionibus quantitatis.”* (Peter Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.2; lines 961-970).]

³²² “*Illam autem ‘informatio’ est propria species, quae recipitur in parte organi, scilicet in corpore sic mixto; hoc patet ex hoc quod dicit quod ‘gignatur a solo corpore quod videtur’. Sicut ergo illud quod est proprie imago dicitur ‘visio’, ita e converso visio potest dici ‘imago’ et multo verius, quia ‘visio’ – secundum veritatem – est quaedam qualitas, et*

cognition. Godfrey, e.g., focuses on this definition of “vision”, as something impressed from the body alone, and argues that Augustine would agree with him that, by extension from the case of vision, any passive change in a cognitive power is simply identical to the relevant act of cognition (*contra* the interpretation of the usual active “Augustinians”, such as Olivi) (*Quodlibet* IX, Q.19; p.274)³²³. However, Godfrey makes no attempt to make sense of the more active-sounding “attention” of the soul in this place, so it seems clear that Godfrey is just making a rhetorical response to undermine other “Augustinians” here.

Aquinas, in the passages which we were discussing in the last section, has an admittedly more promising interpretation of Augustine’s “trinity” in sensation. As Aquinas takes it, as with Godfrey, the impression in the sense organ which Augustine speaks of is indeed sensation proper; nevertheless, the sensitive soul, broadly construed to include the inner senses as well, can still be active to form an “image”, which is, rather than an act of the external senses, a typical

talis qualitas quae est quaedam similitudo obiecti, et forte perfectior quam illa similitudo prior, qua dicitur usitate ‘species’.

*Hoc intellectu, faciliter patet ad auctoritates eius. Concedo enim quod illam ‘imaginem’, quae est ‘sensatio’, non causat corpus in spiritu ut totalis causa, sed anima causat in se, ‘mira celeritate’, non tamen ut tota causa, sed ipsa et obiectum; unde dicit ibi XII, quod ‘mox ut visum fuerit’ etc., innuens quod praesentia obiecti requiritur in ratione visibilis, ut anima faciat visionem in se, et non requiritur nisi ut aliquo modo causa partialis, sicut ipse exprimit in XI De Trinitate cap. 2, quod ‘a vidente et visibili gignitur visio’.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300).*

As I also explained back in Chapter 2, Scotus isn’t coming out of nowhere with this proper definition of “vision”/“sensation”, relative to the text, insofar as Augustine’s whole point in raising this “trinity” in vision is that vision is what results from all three parts together as one, not just one part on its own; e.g., as Scotus quotes from Augustine above, “vision is generated from the visive agent (*vidente*) and the visible thing (*visibili*)”; i.e., the cognitive act is generated from the cognitive soul proper *qua* spirit (with its will/attention/gaze), and the visible thing, as present through a visible *species*, in the organ *qua* body.

³²³ “*Cum ergo virtus apprehensiva secundum quod huiusmodi per se sit solum in potentia ad ipsuni actum cognoscendi vel ad ipsam cognitionera, in ipsa ab agente non fit aliquid per se nisi hoc; et sic videtur quod nec sensibile nec intelligibile secundum quod huiusmodi faciant in sensu et intellectu per se nisi ipsum actum. Unde dicit Augustinus, undecimo de Trinitate, capitulo quarto [in fact, 2.2], quod, cum aliquod corpus videmus, est ibi accipere illa tria realiter distincta, scilicet ipsum corpus visibile et ipsum visum qui visione eius informatur et ipsam visionem, quae non est aliud quam ipse sensus ex ipsa re qua sentitur informatus. Et subdit: ipsa forma quae cum viso visui imprimatur visio ipsa vocatur.*” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* IX, Q.19; p.274). See Chapter 3, where I also discuss how Aquinas’s *Middle View* interprets these passages, such that an external act of sensation is indeed a passive reception, while an “image” is rather an act of compositive imagination (*phantasia*), upon which, furthermore, the intellect must act further to generate an act of intellection.

medieval-Aristotelian “phantasm” in compositive imagination (ST 1, Q.84, a.6, ad.2)³²⁴.

Nevertheless, this comes on the heels of Aquinas defence of Aristotle’s view of cognition as the golden mean, between the views of Democritus and Plato, so it would be implausible to say Aquinas is here taking on a *distinctly* “Augustinian” view. Moreover, to interpret sensation this way is simply to abandon an active view for basic acts of sensation, so Aquinas’s overall interpretation remains distinct from that of Olivi and company, for all the reasons discussed above³²⁵. Furthermore, even if this offers a tenable interpretation of *De Trinitate*, it’s not clear this interpretation can be reconciled with *De musica* VI, which seems to more explicitly uphold the activity of even basic acts of sensation (especially given the initial *nobility argument* therein).

³²⁴ “Ad secundum dicendum quod Augustinus ibi non loquitur de intellectuali cognitione, sed de imaginaria. Et quia, secundum Platonis opinionem, vis imaginaria habet operationem quae est animae solius; eadem ratione usus est Augustinus ad ostendendum quod corpora non imprimunt suas similitudines in vim imaginariam, sed hoc facit ipsa anima, qua utitur Aristoteles ad probandum intellectum agentem esse aliquid separatum, quia scilicet agens est honorabilius patiente. Et procul dubio oportet, secundum hanc positionem, in vi imaginativa ponere non solum potentiam passivam, sed etiam activam. Sed si ponamus, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, quod actio virtutis imaginativae sit coniuncti, nulla sequitur difficultas, quia corpus sensibile est nobilius organo animalis, secundum hoc quod comparatur ad ipsum ut ens in actu ad ens in potentia, sicut coloratum in actu ad pupillam, quae colorata est in potentia. Posset tamen dici quod, quamvis prima immutatio virtutis imaginariae sit per motum sensibillum, quia phantasia est motus factus secundum sensum, ut dicitur in libro de anima; tamen est quaedam operatio animae in homine quae dividendo et componendo format diversas rerum imagines, etiam quae non sunt a sensibus acceptae. Et quantum ad hoc possunt accipi verba Augustini.” (Aquinas, ST 1, Q.84, a.6, ad.2).

As I said above, I think this is a promising interpretation; indeed, see Nawar 2021, who, independently, comes to this interpretation of Augustine’s *De Trinitate* (and somewhat more tenuously extends this interpretation to Augustine’s earlier texts as well).

³²⁵ This fully passive view of sensation also doesn’t obviously sit well with Aquinas’s seeming *Middle View* either (as mentioned in the footnotes above, Aquinas is not clearly consistent on this).

§2.4. Attribution Arguments

The last sort of argument used in this debate which I want to consider here we can call “*attribution arguments*”³²⁶. As we’ll get to, this argument type is less distinctly “Augustinian” in its sources, and more explicitly tied to Aristotle, but nonetheless common to the active accounts of Olivi and company. In broad terms, *attribution arguments* are those arguments which, usually based on some analogy with other causal events or how we speak of them, raise the objection that passive theories of cognition *misattribute* to what cognitive acts properly belong. More specifically, as we’ll see, it is argued that passive views misattribute our cognitive acts to things ultimately external and dissimilar to our intrinsic/natural cognitive powers.

Consider, e.g., the following collection of arguments from Olivi, which, at least at first, are specifically aimed against the *Fully Passive View* which holds that external objects are the immediate cause of cognition:

“[That view] cannot be granted. First, since someone seeing is said actively ‘to see’ rather than passively ‘to be seen’. [...] [Also], since then the body bringing about (*agens et influens*) cognitive acts would cognize the subject or subjects terminated by those acts of it, through those [acts], rather than be cognized by the subject of those [acts], through those [acts].” (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.24-25)³²⁷

³²⁶ Part of my inspiration for singling out this type of argument comes from Hartman’s division of arguments based on metaphysical considerations (see the nobility arguments above) vs. those arguments based on “linguistic intuitions” about attribution (Harman 2012, pp.29-36). As we’ll see, however, I have some doubt that these attribution arguments are primarily linguistic, or entirely non-metaphysical, so I’ll cast the net a bit wider here for this argument type. If anything, I would put both nobility arguments and attribution arguments together on the side of largely metaphysical considerations, whereas what I call experiential arguments above make up a more distinct category. [Indeed, the first example Hartman gives in this section is one from Olivi which seems to more directly be based on experience than language: “*Secundo, quia nos expresse sentimus nostros actus videndi vel cognoscendi exire seu produci a nostris intimis et hoc intime.*” (Ibid. p.30; II Sent. Q.72; III, p.24); oddly Hartman even skips over the more linguistic argument Olivi gives directly above this line, which I’ll get to next.] As a more direct source, I would also point to Gonsalvus, who explicitly distinguishes this “attribution” argument type from the nobility argument we’ve seen from him above.

³²⁷ “*Primum autem, quod scilicet [influxus a corpore in spiritu] sit ipsa actio cognitive, non potest dari. Primo, quia videns dicitur active videre potius quam passive videri. Secundo, quia nos expresse sentimus nostros actus videndi vel cognoscendi exire seu produci a nostris intimis et hoc intime. [...] Sexto, quia tunc corpus agens et influens actus*

“Since then, ‘to intelligize’ (*intelligere*) or ‘to sense’ (*sentire*), or ‘to want’ (*appetere*), taken actively, would be attributed to the objects rather than to the powers, just as ‘to illuminate’ and ‘to make hot’ are attributed to the Sun or to fire rather than to the illuminated air.” (II Sent. Q.58; II, p.463)³²⁸

Moreover, a bit below these passages, Olivi adds that he thinks much the same arguments hold for a more moderate *Middle View* which holds that an external object, first, causes a *species* or impression in the relevant cognitive power to serve as a principle to then, second, elicit an act of cognition³²⁹. Overall, Olivi’s argument, in its most general form, is that if we were to grant that an act of cognition was passively brought about in one’s cognitive power, either through the immediate action of an object or mediately through a *species*, then, either way, it seems we should attribute the act more so to the object or *species* rather than to the cognizer. If this were the case, we should better say “the object [or *species*] cognizes”, just as one says, “the fire burns the log” (more so because of the fire, as agent, than the log, as patient). But, when we use verbs of cognition, and analogous cases, we don’t say, e.g., “Peter is cognized [by the stone]” or, conversely, “the stone cognizes Peter”, but rather, “Peter cognizes the stone” or “the stone is cognized by Peter”; and this is on account of Peter, *via* his cognitive powers, as agent.

On the face of it, it might seem that Olivi’s argument here is entirely based on an appeal to conventional language. At least at first, Olivi does plainly appeal to the fact that verbs of cognition, such as ‘*videre*’, used in the active voice, take the cognizer as the subject, both in grammatical form and in meaning; and this same linguistic argument can be applied to the

cognitivos potius cognosceret per eos subiecta seu subiectos terminos ipsorum actuum suorum quam cognosceretur a subiecto eorum per ipsos.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.24-25).

³²⁸ “*Primum igitur, quod scilicet actus potentiarum non sint immediate ab obiectis, probant sic: Quia tunc intelligere aut sentire vel appetere active accepta potius deberent attribui ipsis obiectis quam ipsis potentiis, sicut et illuminare aut calefacere potius attribuitur soli vel igni quam aeri illuminato.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, p.463).

³²⁹ E.g., right after the first passage from Q.72, Olivi starts his next section with: “*Secundam etiam, quod scilicet influxus a corpore in spiritum immissus sit principium effectivum actus cognoscendi, non potest stare non solum propter omnes rationes superius praemissas, sed etiam [...]*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.24). Olivi says a bit more in Q.58, but we’ll get to that below.

object, such that if the object were the agent of cognition and the cognizer the patient, then one should either say “the cognizer is cognized” or, conversely, “the object cognizes”, the latter of which sounds particularly wrong. However, one might reasonably doubt whether reality must always match up with conventional language. As Hartman (2012) notes, Godfrey, e.g., tries to forestall any simple linguistic objection and goes to some length to argue that verbs of cognition can be rather misleading on this matter (*Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.276-281; cf. Hartman 2012, pp.33-36)³³⁰. In short, Godfrey’s position is that a verb such as ‘to intelligize’ (*intelligere*) can, in one sense, signify a real passion in the intellect, as brought about by the object as a real agent³³¹; but, in another sense, this verb need only signify a merely “grammatical” action from the intellect and a corresponding “grammatical” passion in the object (*Ibid.*, p.276)³³². On the latter

³³⁰ Hartman (2012, pp.33-34, fn.36-37) provides a number of other interesting examples of medieval figures, and one modern, who raise similar points of caution over following linguistic form here: e.g., Thomas of Sutton, who also defends a *Fully Passive View* similar to Godfrey’s, says, “*Et ideo multa uerba actiua attribuuntur intellectui respectu actus intelligendi, sc. quod intellectus eliciat actum, id est extrahat, et quod iudicet, et quod formet uerbum et gignat et exprimat, quamuis secundum ueritatem istae operationes non sint ab intellectu actiue sed solum secundum apparentiam ut dictum est.*” (*Quaest. Ord.* 2 59).

³³¹ More specifically, Godfrey thinks that, strictly speaking, an “action” only ever refers to some passion in reality, but with respect to some real agent bringing about this passion.

³³² From Godfrey, see, e.g.: “*Licet enim non possit dici quod lapis intelligat, potest tamen dici quod lapis causat et efficit intelligere quo intellectus possibilis formaliter intelligit. Unde intelligere quantum ad id quod significat est actio obiecti et est ab ipso ut ab agente et est passio intellectus possibilis et est in ipso ut in subiecto et patiente. Et similiter est de visibili respectu visus. Visus enim in actu videndi immutatur et movetur a visibili, et non e conuerse. Non potest ergo intelligere ut comparatur ad intellectum possibilem, in quo est subiective, habere rationem actionis ut a quo sit effective realiter et non solum secundum modum significandi, quia intelligere est uerbum actiuum transitiuum cui respondet uerbum passiuum et denominet ipsum intellectum in quo est sicut actio non tamen transiens extra, scilicet in illud quod denominatur a uerbo passiuo, sed manens intra, quia est ut in subiecto in intellectu quem denominat. Unde sic est ponere actionem, sicut etiam est ponere passionem proportionaliter et e conuerse. Eo modo ergo quo intelligere dicitur actio, dicitur etiam intelligi passio.*” (*Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, p.276). For a nice summary of Godfrey’s arguments, see, e.g., Auriol’s condensed summary in *I Sent. D.35, pars 1, a.1* (lines 101-143), especially: “*Praeterea, sicut se habet intelligi ad intelligibile, sic intelligere ad intelligentem. Sed intelligi respectu obiecti intelligibilis significatur quidem passive; est tamen uera actio, quia intelligibile nihil patitur dum intelligitur, sed potius uidetur obiectum agere in intellectum. Ergo intelligere in intelligente erit recipere et pati, quamuis significetur active. [...] Addunt uero secundo quod magis significatur per modum actionis quam passionis pro eo quod refertur realiter ad intelligibile et non e conuerso. Unde apprehenditur ut tendens in obiectum sicut in terminum. Per ipsum ergo uidetur intelligens quasi agere in obiectum et tendere in ipsum, sicut graue descendere deorsum et ignis sursum. Sic igitur intelligere est actio grammaticalis, quamuis realiter sit passio. Unde posset obiectum denominari ut diceretur “intelligefacere” et intellectus “intelligefieri”, obiectum enim facit intellectionem et intellectus recipit eam. Addunt quoque tertio quod ideo dicuntur actiones immanentes intelligere et uidere non*

sense, Godfrey explains that we can be misled by the form of an active transitive verb and think that the subject performs some real action; by a “real” action, Godfrey means an action that causes some real passion in its object. However, in some cases, the object of a transitive verb might merely name some “*terminus*” with respect to the grammatical subject of the verb; i.e., such a “*terminus*” is just some end-point of some relation, founded in the subject at the other end. Godfrey gives the further example, “the heavy falls downward”, where downwards (ultimately, the centre of the earth) is the location the heavy object aims at (it’s proper place), but not something thereby moved (Ibid.). In such cases, there is no need for a real passion in the grammatical object (e.g., the earth downwards need not change), so, Godfrey argues, there is no need for the grammatical subject to be a real agent (e.g., Godfrey thinks, rather, the heavy thing is merely moved to its proper place). This at least fits with verbs of cognition insofar as they do not really change their objects and, indeed, that much is commonly agreed upon when cognitive acts are referred to as “immanent”, rather than “transient”, acts. In contrast, for the aforementioned “real” sense for such verbs, Godfrey says verbs of cognition might better be read as, e.g., ‘to make seeing’ (*videfacere*), in the active voice, and ‘to be made seeing’ (*videferi*) in the passive voice; in this way, there is nothing unusual in naming the object as the real agent (making seeing) and the cognizer as the real patient (being made to see) (Ibid. p.276; cf. p.279).

However, although Godfrey might have a point against any simple attempt to read off reality from linguistic convention, I think there’s more to Olivi’s wider argument above, and what I’m calling “attribution arguments” in general. As I take it, Olivi’s wider attribution

quin realiter transeant (sunt enim impressiones factae ab obiecto), sed quia prout sunt actiones grammaticae remanent in agente grammaticae denominato. Est enim intelligere in intelligente, sicut lucere in lucente.” (Ibid. lines 116-119, 133-143). For an extended discussion of Godfrey’s interesting notion of a “grammatical action” and its *terminus*, in the context of his theory of volitions, see Szlachta (2019, pp.118-123).

argument is meant to appeal to the general metaphysical reasons behind our causal language. Consider again Olivi's appeal above to the analogous cases of illumination and making hot (II Sent. Q.58; II, p.463): We attribute these actions to luminous bodies, such as the Sun, and hot things, such as fire, *because* they explain these actions, *qua* actions, more than the illuminated/heated air does. It's standard medieval Aristotelianism to hold that light (*lux/lumen*) has its own principle/nature to illuminate (*illuminare*) and that the heat (*calido*) inherent to fire can make hot (*calificare*) something cooler; on the other hand, it's a "violent" motion for something inherently cool, like an earthen log, to be made hot, as actual heat isn't in the earthen log's nature. So, the log, as patient, doesn't provide the same sort of explanation as fire, as agent, since the latter, whenever it can, goes into its natural act and provides the heat not found inherently in the log³³³.

A bit below the above passage, Olivi gives a more explicit argument along these lines, in this case against a more moderate *Middle View* that an object first impresses a principle of cognition, rather than directly causing an act of cognition. Overall, Olivi argues that even if, on this view, the active principles of cognition were to enter us rather than remain in external objects, so that in some sense we can be said to act, similar issues still arise, as with *Fully Passive Views*. First off, Olivi argues that it would follow for this view that there would be as many powers in us as we will have *species*, since those *species* will come in diverse kinds and each will be its own principle/power for cognition (e.g. of this or that object) (II Sent. Q.58; II,

³³³ So, following these analogous cases (especially, *calificare*), even to say, e.g., that the power to make vision (*videfacere*) is actively attributed to the object alone rather than the visive power, would similarly seem to make vision into a violent act with respect to the subject, with the primary explanation for vision coming from the object; but, rather, it is in the nature of the visive power to have actual vision, in some respect similar to fire which has actual heat in its nature.

pp.465-466)³³⁴; but this is absurd, as it ignores that our active principles for cognition are inherent to what we are, as sensing and intelligizing things, and, thus, have their own unity (e.g., as sense and intellect). Olivi brings back the analogy to illumination here, adding that, against the opposing view above, “it should rather follow that, just as it’s not well said that air has a power of illuminating, although sometimes, by means of light flown into it, it may be able to illuminate”, so also, we ought not attribute a power/principle of intelligizing or sensing to the reception of a *species*, “although sometimes we may be able to intelligize and sense through a *species* of this kind” (Ibid.). So, in other words, the reason that we don’t properly say that air has

³³⁴ “*Praeterea, cum istae species omnino sint diversi generis et diversae essentiae ab essentia et genere potentiarum nostrarum, si actus totam suam essentiam trahunt ab eis et ita per consequens totam rationem sui generis: nullam unitatem generis accipient ipsi actus a potentiis nostris, sicut nec actus caloris, splendoris et saporis recipiunt a suis subiectis, sed potius a qualitatibus activis a quibus exeunt. Et sicut tot, ut ita dicam, sunt potentiae in igne quot qualitates habet activas: sic in nobis tot erunt potentiae quot habebimus species. Quin potius sequetur quod sicut non bene dicitur quod aer habet potentiam illuminandi, quamvis aliquando per lumen sibi influxum possit illuminare: quod sic nec nos debemus dici habere potentiam intelligendi aut sentiendi, quamvis aliquando per huiusmodi species possimus intelligere et sentire.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.58; II, pp.465-466).

Note that the first part of this argument could very well be considered its own argument type, if we were to be more fine-grained in our divisions here. Gonsalvus, e.g., before giving his nobility argument, but after giving his own attribution argument, which we’ll get to next, offers the following “assimilation” argument: “*Secunda ratio est quia omnis actio ab eo potissime agitur cui potissime assimilatur, II De consolatione, prosa 6, et De bona fortuna, ubi dicitur: “Ipsium autem quia tale secundum esse” etc. Et hoc patet: calefactio enim est a calefaciente, quia sibi assimilatur, et si calefactio denominetur a termino, hoc non est nisi in quantum assimilatur calefacienti.*” (I Quaestiones, Q.3; p.33). That is, the action of making hot follows from something already hot, as agent and act/effect must, in some sense, share in the relevant form (viz., heat); in contrast, many objects in form can be heated, and only in terms of the respect to which they lack the form of heat, so, in this sense, objects (prior to being heated) are more dissimilar in form. So, in other words, the objects, with respect to all of their different forms, can’t be the active cause of the act/effect (heating) since they lack the relevant form (heat) to bring about and unify the relevant type of effect. Similarly, the intellect and intellection are most similar in form, thus, the former must be what individuates and primarily causes the latter, rather than objects, which are multiple in form. [Gonsalvus also adds some further differences between the realities of intellect/intellection and (at least most of) its objects: “*Sed intelligere et velle plus assimilantur potentiae quam obiecto, quia istae actiones sunt simplices, immateriales et abstractae; istae autem conditiones sunt potentiarum non obiectorum, saltem plurium. Etiam in actione considero positivum quid, scilicet eius entitatem realem et habitudinem ad obiectum. Nunc autem, similitudo actionis ad potentiam fundatur super absolutum: sed similitudo eius ad obiectum fundatur super relationem; quare plus assimilatur potentiae quam obiecto; ergo potissime et potentia agitur.*” (Ibid.)] For a similar argument from Scotus, see, e.g., *Ordinatio* I, D.3, pars 3, Q.3 (*Opera Theologica* III/1, p.312-314), where he argues that the intellect must be the more principal cause of intellection, rather than objects, because the intellect is the more common and unifying cause, while, in contrast, there are as many potential acts of intellection as there are intelligible objects. I mention this, as we’ll see Durand present a similar, finer-grained argument below, among his broadly “attribution” arguments.

its own active power/principle (or, nature) to illuminate, is that, to the extent that air can illuminate, it's entirely through something external acting on the air. For that same reason, opposite to air, we shouldn't say that a cognizer's active power to cognize is repeatedly given to her solely through a reception of *species* from the outside; unlike the air, but more like light, it should be agreed upon that we *are* born with our own internal powers to go into acts of cognition (i.e., we have sense and intellect)³³⁵.

Gonsalvus, as well, provides an *attribution argument* like Olivi's, though with a more clearly unified presentation and more explicitly Aristotelian sources. Indeed, the very first argument Gonsalvus considers, in this context initially raised against the *Fully Passive View* for intellection (and volition), begins with the following general metaphysical considerations:

“The first [argument] is from the determination of the agent, since everything which is in act, has a nature to act, and if it should be in some such act, has a nature to produce [correspondingly] such an action; for everything which acts acts in as much as it is in act, as is said in book IX of the *Metaphysics*³³⁶; and this is also clear through induction, that something existing in some such act, has a nature to produce such an action. But the intellectual soul is in act, and in such an act; thus, it has a nature to produce such an action, namely to intelligize and to will.” (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.32)³³⁷

³³⁵ Of course, a proponent of a *Middle View* of cognition might respond that a *species* is not intended to replace one's inner principle of *cognition*, so much as add a principle of cognizing *this* or *that object*; so, e.g., one's visive organ/power is a principle of *vision*, but a *species* of red is a principle of seeing *red*. At least in II Sent. Q.58, Olivi considers this to be a separate view from the one considered above (thus, seemingly distinguishing this view from the *Middle View* Olivi sets up in II Sent. Q.72). This other view is one where acts of cognition are said to be “partially from *species* and partially from the powers” and Olivi raises a number of concerns with this view, some similar, some unique, based on a few different interpretations; on at least a few interpretations, Olivi seems to take this two-cause view to collapse into a *Fully Active View*, of sorts (II Sent. Q.58; II, pp.466-470). See Chapter 2 for more on Olivi concerning this two-cause view. Notably, Olivi never seems to consider that a principle of cognition could be passive or a merely formal cause, rather than an active efficient cause; this is something that we'll see Durand, however, give some response to below (pp.245-256), whether or not it is entirely convincing.

³³⁶ See, in particular, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* IX(Θ).8; this claim is commonly referred to as the “In-Act Principle” in medieval Aristotelianism (see, e.g., Fisher 2017); as we'll see, its exact meaning and scope is a topic of debate.

³³⁷ “*Prima est ex determinatione agentis, quia omne quod est in actu natum est agere, et si sit in tali actu, natum est agere talem actionem; omne enim quod agit, agit secundum quod in actu, ut dicitur IX Metaphysicae; et patet*

Gonsalvus's clearest causal principle here is that everything which is actually ϕ , insofar as it exists (i.e., in its nature), has a natural action to ϕ . This principle can be understood by way of the examples from Olivi above: because it is actually luminous, the light of the Sun is apt to go into its distinctive act and actively illuminate, and because it is actually hot, fire is apt to go into its distinctive act and actively heat/make hot. So too, because the intellective soul is what is actually intelligent insofar as it exists, it must be what is apt to go into its distinctive act and actively intelligize³³⁸.

Immediately following this passage, Gonsalvus considers an objection that this causal principle, which he derives from Aristotle, is only meant to apply to agents insofar as they act on other things (i.e., transient acts) (Ibid.)³³⁹. E.g., this principle makes sense for the transient act of making hot since fire, insofar as it has the form of heat in act, can bring about that form of heat in something else, insofar as that other thing lacks that form in act but is still potentially hot. But, so the objection seems to go, it's not clear that any power truly acts on itself, in this sort of way (as Gonsalvus seems to be arguing of the intellect here). To put it otherwise, we can gloss from this objection that Gonsalvus thinks that, with respect to this causal principle, one should treat internal/immanent acts, such as intellection, as real actions, as much as transient acts, even

etiam per inductionem, quod existens in tali [actu], natum est agere talem actionem. Sed anima intellectiva est in actu, et in tali actu; ergo nata est agere talem actionem, scilicet intelligere et velle." (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.32).

Notably, Godfrey himself takes this Aristotelian source to provide one of the main arguments for the fully active view of cognition, which he ultimately opposes (see, e.g., *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.270-271).

Note also, if you're following Gonsalvus's numbering, that this "first" argument is cleanly distinguished from his "fourth" argument, which contains his nobility argument, discussed above.

³³⁸ That is, even with regard to the intellect in potency, the intellect is, in one sense, "intelligent" in first act, though directed to go into second act and actually intelligize. That being said, by induction, Gonsalvus seems to add that one can glean the former from the latter as well, so one could also read him as saying that from something (i.e. the intellect) intelligizing in act, one could gather that this thing (i.e. the intellect) must be the cause of this proper act.

³³⁹ "*Sed dicitur ad hoc quod 'existens in actu et in tali actu, natum est agere talem actionem', verum est secundum modum secundum quem aliquid natum est agere; aliquid autem non est natum agere in seipsum sed in alterum; quare non concluditur potentiam aliquam posse agere in se ipsam.*" (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.32).

though they are actions which remain in the agent; but, the objector (viz. Godfrey) insists that internal/immanent actions need only be regarded as merely “grammatical” actions (for Aristotle and in truth)³⁴⁰.

However, here Gonsalvus responds that this is not a satisfactory objection, since this restriction would leave it unexplained how our distinctive internal actions, such as intellection and volition, would come about. According to those who give this objection (viz. Godfrey), the intellectual soul, e.g., could only truly act on other things, but neither intellection nor volition are such external/transient acts (I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.32)³⁴¹. Moreover, against the claim that an external object should, instead, be the sole cause of the intellectual soul’s acts, Gonsalvus responds with an analogy similar to Olivi’s above: Gonsalvus starts with the analog of hot water, which, *qua* water, cannot be said to have a power of making hot, since that is rather due to the heat which is only in the water through some external heat source; but, Gonsalvus continues, those holding a *Passive View*, such as Godfrey, would be treating the intellectual soul like water in need of some external source to act:

“But, according to those [opposed], such is the case for angels and souls, because they are not able to enact an action, even external, unless by an internal act, which is not caused by them, but by an object; therefore it follows that angels and souls do not have any power to act, nor will they properly be said to act, but an object producing an intellection or a volition, according them, will be said more properly to enact [the action] of the angel or the soul than the angel or the soul.” (Ibid. pp.32-33)³⁴²

³⁴⁰ As we’ve discussed in Chapter 2, Godfrey’s broader concern here is that Gonsalvus’s principle, as applied to immanent acts, would entail that the intellect, e.g., would be going in circles, providing its own activity to ϕ , by being ϕ ; however, Gonsalvus devotes a fair amount of space to discuss this exact concern elsewhere in his text (see Chapter 2 for more).

³⁴¹ “*Sed istud non satisfacit, quia actu tale natum est facere actionem talis generis, ut patet in corporalibus, ut caldum calefacit, et frigidum frigefacit. Sed isti non dant intellectui et voluntati aliquam actionem sui generis, ex quo non agunt nisi in alterum, non agunt nec intelligere nec velle. Quare etc.*” (Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3; p.32).

³⁴² For the full passage: “*Quod ita sit [impossibile] patet, quia quod non potest agere nisi per aliud non causatum ab ipso, non habet aliquam virtutem agendi de se, quia quidquid potest agere de se, de se habet virtutem agendi; et e converso, quod non potest agere de se, non habet virtutem agendi, sicut aqua calida, quia non potest calefacere*

Notably, here Gonsalvus’s wider argument ends as Olivi’s argument above starts, with the *misattribution* objection. Moreover, Gonsalvus interestingly adds that, if one were to follow this *Passive View*, if internal actions cannot be attributed to intellectual souls and angels, neither can external actions. As Gonsalvus argues, it’s common to hold that, for a proper external action, an agent must first have an internal action; e.g. a person first forms the immanent act in thought that an apple in front of them is good, and a corresponding volition, and from that, ultimately, comes the external action³⁴³ to move one’s body in place to eat the apple³⁴⁴. However, according to this *Passive View*, this initial internal action, in reality, would be a passion from an external object, and thus the corresponding external action, as much as the internal action, should be more properly attributed to the external object starting the causal chain, for the reasons explained above. That would be an unfitting consequence, so we should reject the *Passive* starting point. And to say that these actions are, or are based on, merely “grammatical” actions for intellectual souls, with no basis in reality for such activity, is no obvious help either.

For a final example, we can see that Scotus, too, presents an attribution argument, at least against the *Fully Passive View* for intellection. Keeping it brief, Scotus argues that, “an action, properly speaking, and as it is distinguished from a production (*factionem*), denominates the

nisi per calefaciens ipsam, quod non est causatum ab ipsa, ideo ipsa de se non habet virtutem agendi vel calefaciendi; nec dicitur de se calefacere, sed calefaciens mediante ipsa dicitur calefacere. Sed, secundum istos, sic [est] de angelo et anima, quia non possunt agere actionem, etiam exteriorem, nisi per actum interiorem, qui non est causatus ab ipsis, sed per obiectum; quare sequitur quod angelus et anima non habent aliquam virtutem agendi, nec proprie dicentur agere, sed obiectum faciens intellectionem et volitionem, secundum istos, magis proprie dicitur agere [actionem] angeli et animae quam angelus et anima.” (Gonsalvus, I Quaestiones, Q.3; pp.32-33). *An extra word seems necessary here to deal with the, otherwise weird, word order of this last line (especially those prior genitives); perhaps this word is missing or at least implied.*

³⁴³ For more on Godfrey’s distinction between the intellectual soul and the rest of a person, see below.

³⁴⁴ For a more general example, which we’ll see from Durand below and Gonsalvus could have in mind, consider the transient action of making hot (*califacere*) which, in the first place, requires the immanent action to simply heat (*calere*).

agent. ‘To intelligize’, however, denominates³⁴⁵ a human according to the intellective part, therefore, etc.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284)³⁴⁶. Following Gonsalvus, Scotus also bases this argument on the authority of Aristotle, especially *Metaphysics* IX.8 (*Ibid.*)³⁴⁷. According to Scotus, Aristotle makes it clear that an immanent action, such as intellection, is an action properly speaking. In fact, Scotus seems to argue that an immanent action is even more properly attributed to the agent than a transient action (i.e., a production), since the latter necessarily goes out into an external patient, whereas the former remains in and perfects the agent; e.g., the act of building a house extends beyond the builder and its perfection

³⁴⁵ That is, an act of intellection is not itself a direct (“homonymous”) name for the intellect, but it does indirectly name the intellect, insofar as the intellect is what intelligizes. See also, Aristotle’s example of the grammarian “named” through grammar for such “paronymous” naming/denomination (*Categories* 1, a13-15).

³⁴⁶ “*Quarto, et idem est, quia actio proprie dicta, et prout distinguitur contra factionem, denominat agens. ‘Intelligere’ autem denominat hominem secundum partem intellectivam, ergo etc.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284).

To be clear, although Scotus initially presents these arguments in his summary of prior active accounts, Scotus later makes use of them against the view of Godfrey and in the body of his own response; e.g., in the latter context, he says: “*Alia duo argumenta, videlicet de actione ut distinguitur contra factionem, et quod actio denominat agens, concedo.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.301).

Moreover, even more explicitly than Gonsalvus, Scotus responds to Godfrey’s argument that verbs of cognition are only “grammatical” actions, at least in terms of the correct reading of Aristotle:

“*Item, secundo, ‘intellectio’ secundum Philosophum est actio immanens.*

Respondent quod intelligere secundum modum significandi grammaticalem significat actionem, et ‘intelligi’ passionem, tamen secundum rem ‘intelligere’ est passio, et quod intelligitur est agens. Quid autem ‘intelligere’ habeat de ratione actionis? Dicunt quod ‘intelligere’ non significat aliquid ut habet ‘esse’ in subiecto, in se et absolute, sed quasi tendens in alterum ut in obiectum, sive ut in terminum; ‘et quia actionis est pcedere ab agente et tendere in passum, ideo tales perfectiones’, quae in re sunt passiones, hoc est manentes in eo quod denominatur ab eis per modum actionis, ‘dicuntur esse actiones immanentes’.

Contra. Philosophus distinguens actionem a factione I et VI Ethicorum [cap. 1 et 5] et Metaphysicae [cap. 8], assignat diversa principia ac propria actioni et factioni, quod non oporteret si intelligeret quod illud quod assignat esse actionem esset passio, quia tunc non oporteret assignare sibi principium activum proprium. Non enim oporteret prudentiam esse activam sicut ars est habitus factivus, si actio nihil esset nisi quaedam forma recepta in alio, ut in eo quod dicitur ‘agens’.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.289)

³⁴⁷ Scotus calls this argument the same as (“*idem est*”) an argument he gives right above, but deduced from Aristotle’s authority: “*Item, tertio, Philosophus I Ethicorum [cap. 1] et IX Metaphysicae [cap. 8] et III Physicorum [cap. 3] distinguit inter actionem et factionem, et vult quod actio proprie dicta manet in agente, sicut exemplificat de ‘speculatione’, ibi [scil. Metaphysicae IX, cap. 8]: intellectio ergo proprie est operatio manens in agente; manet autem in parte intellective, ergo erit ab ea ut ab agente.*” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284).

Scotus’s argument here is rather condensed but, as we’ll see below, Durand will pick up this attribution argument in terms of “immanent actions”, especially in the body of his account, and provide some further explanation.

is more found in the house built, whereas intellection remains in the agent cognizing and is simply a perfection of the cognizer. Admittedly, Scotus initially presents this argument when summarizing prior active accounts, but, as with the nobility arguments above, Scotus still accepts this argument in the body of his own response for his own view that a cognitive power is the more principal cause of cognition (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.301)³⁴⁸.

Taking a step back, one general point I want flag here is that, as Scotus's presentation makes particularly clear, despite the broad "Augustinian" heritage behind these Franciscan active accounts of cognition (e.g., in the above *experiential* and *nobility arguments*), these *attribution arguments* tend to be more explicitly tied to a particular reading of Aristotle's general metaphysics of activity and, in particular, so-called "immanent actions". And, indeed, it seems true that the attribution arguments presented by Olivi and Gonsalvus above, unlike experiential and nobility arguments, don't clearly have any distinctly Augustinian roots, at least when considered in isolation³⁴⁹. Nevertheless, as we've seen, these attribution arguments still make up part of the common framework for Olivi and company use to argue against the *Fully Passive* and

³⁴⁸ E.g., Scotus says: "*Alia duo argumenta, videlicet de actione ut distinguitur contra factionem, et quod actio denominat agens, concedo.*" (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.301).

³⁴⁹ That being said, as I'll get to below, when arguing for the activity of volition, Olivi and Gonsalvus stress the need to properly attribute volitions to the willing agent, not to external objects; this "extended" attribution argument is made to justify moral responsibility, and, in this context, this argument form does get tied to Augustine. Moreover, as mentioned above, at times, attribution arguments can somewhat blend together with nobility arguments, and thus, in this wider sense, attribution arguments can get bolstered with more typically "Augustinian" considerations; see, in particular, Gonsalvus's "assimilation argument" in the footnotes above, which seems to offer a clear bridge between attribution and nobility arguments in terms of the similarity of form between cause and effect.

Middle Views considered above, and against their competing “Aristotelian” grounds for positing some passivity in cognition.

§2.5. Durand’s Initial Arguments Against Passive Views

Now that we’ve seen some of the common arguments used by Olivi and company beforehand, let’s turn again to Durand. In particular, in this section we’ll finish covering the earlier half of II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5, where Durand raises his arguments against prior *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views* of cognition, before he gets to his own proper view (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.8-17). As we’ll see, Durand clearly makes use of some of the same arguments we’ve just covered. Overall, by his own count, Durand first raises one primary concern and then numbers 4 arguments against the *Middle View*; next, against the *Fully Passive View*, Durand numbers 6 arguments. However, one can see that 9 out of 11 of these arguments are connected, or similar in content, and broadly fall under the *attribution* and *nobility arguments* covered above. The remaining 2 arguments are distinct, but can be put aside for our purposes. For the sake of space, I won’t present each numbered argument in detail here, but we’ll cover a fair sample to establish the general patterns and consider some interesting details.

§2.5.1. Against the Middle View: Attribution Arguments

To begin, recall from above (§1.1.2) how Durand, at least initially, sets up the *Middle View* of cognition:

“The first [view] says that to intelligize (*intelligere*) is an action of the intellect informed by a *species* of the intelligible thing, really differing from each; in which case, the intellect, informed by a *species*, is disposed for action just as

water, having been made hot, is disposed for making hot (*califacere*) a foot or hand.” (Ibid. p.8)

Much as with the *attribution arguments* of Olivi and Gonsalvus, Durand’s initial concern with this position stems from the unfitting (*inconveniens*) analogy that would follow between a given cognitive power, impressed with some *species*, for its action (i.e., cognition), and water, after being made hot, for its action (i.e., making hot):

“However, that way does not seem fitting, first since, whenever some act is founded on (*principiatur a*)³⁵⁰ two things, of which one is material and the other is formal, it is founded more truly on the formal than on the material, as is clear in the example of heated water. But according to this view, our intellection is founded on the intellect informed by a *species*, but in such a way that the *species* is the form and act[ualization] of the intellect, through which, [i.e.] the intellect being brought into act, [it] is able to elicit an act of intelligizing. Therefore, our intellection is more truly caused by the *species* than by the intellect, nay rather, even more so, since, although the whole composed from the intellect and the *species* is that which acts or elicits an act of intelligizing, nevertheless, the *species* alone, and in no way the intellect, is the principle by which [the intellect acts], just as the heat alone of the water is the principle by which hot water makes hot, although the whole composed from water and heat may be that which makes hot.” (Ibid. p.9)³⁵¹.

As Durand puts it here, although this *Middle View* can make some sense of attributing an act of cognition to a cognitive power, such as the intellect, when impressed with a *species*, nevertheless, more truly the *species* alone would be the efficient cause and active principle of the action, with the intellect, considered in itself, a mere material cause and passive principle, just as hot water only makes hot through the heat given to the water, with the water, considered in itself, a mere material cause for receiving heat. However, Durand takes there to be something unfitting

³⁵⁰ Alternatively: “principally caused by...”.

³⁵¹ “Iste autem modus non videtur conveniens, primo quia quodcumque aliquis actus principiatur a duobus, quorum unum est materiale et reliquum formale, verius principiatur a formali quam a materiali, ut patet in exemplo de aqua calefacta. Sed secundum hanc opinionem intelligere nostrum principiatur ab intellectu informato specie, ita tamen, quod species est forma et actus intellectus, per quam factus in actu potest elicere actum intelligendi. Ergo verius causatur nostrum intelligere a specie quam ab intellectu, immo plus, quia licet totum compositum ex intellectu et specie sit illud, quod agit vel elicit actum intelligendi, sola tamen species est principium quo et nullo modo intellectus, sicut solus calor aque est principium, quo aqua calida calefacit, licet totum compositum ex aqua et calore sit illud, quod calefacit.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.9).

about this lop-sided causal role for the *species* over the cognitive power. Already at this stage of the argument, Durand insinuates that this *Middle View* isn't all that different from the *Fully Passive View* with respect to whether any cognitive activity can be truly attributed to the cognitive power. Something ultimately external to the power, whether the object or the *species*, is what would rather be the sole active cause/principle on either view.

Durand makes his point clearer as he goes on, adding further arguments to explain what's so unfitting about this *Middle View*, given that a *species* would be the sole active principle for cognition. Consider, e.g., Durand's first additional argument:

“It is absurd to say that an act of life (*actus vitae*), inasmuch as it is of this kind, should be principally or totally from what has nothing of a living thing, but come from something extrinsic. But to intelligize and, as a whole, to cognize, is an act of life; a *species* however is no part of that living thing and it comes from something extrinsic. Therefore, it is unfitting that intellection should come about totally or more principally from a *species* rather than from the intellect.” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.9-10)³⁵²

This argument walks the line between both the *attribution* and *nobility arguments* we've seen above. First off, Durand seems to specifically allude here to Scotus's condensed and qualified formulation of the nobility argument: “since cognition is a vital operation, it does not come from the non-living as a total cause” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.301). As with Scotus, Durand specifies that the vital does not come from the non-vital “totally” (i.e. as a “total cause”), leaving it open that the non-vital can play some sub-ordinate or, as Scotus also puts it, less “principal” causal role; and, of course, as with Olivi as well, Durand picks up the notion that cognition, of any sort, is a “vital act” and, thus, needs a correspondingly vital cause.

³⁵² “Istud autem est inconveniens propter multa: Primo, quia ridiculum est dicere, quod actus vite in quantum huiusmodi sit principaliter vel totaliter ab eo, quod nichil est viventis, sed advenit ab extrinseco. Sed intelligere et totaliter cognoscere est actus vite; species autem nichil est ipsius viventis, sed advenit ab extrinseco. Ergo inconveniens est, quod intelligere sit totaliter vel principalius a specie quam ab intellectu.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.9-10).

Admittedly, however, Durand doesn't explicitly appeal to any nobility principle right here; that comes up more clearly in his arguments against the *Fully Passive View*, as we'll see below. So, for now, this presents a second way to read Durand's argument here, in terms of a more direct attribution argument. Understood this way, the central issue is that a "vital" act is one that is proper to the internal form (specifically, the soul/living principle) of a correspondingly vital thing, so a vital act cannot come about entirely through some extrinsic and dissimilar/non-vital form. E.g., the intellect is the form by which a human being is an intelligent living thing, so it should be what internally determines its corresponding proper/vital act of intellection, rather than just some ultimately extrinsic and non-vital form (e.g., an intelligible *species*). But, as Durand argues above with the hot water analogy, this *Middle View* treats the intellect as a mere material cause and passive principle, with some extrinsic *species* as the relevant form and sole active principle. So, in this way, this view attributes too much to something external and dissimilar to our vital/intellective powers, as if those external and non-vital things were the principal causes of our internal and intellective life (with respect to our proper/vital acts of intellection, or cognition in general).

For another corroborating argument, consider Durand's third additional argument against this *Middle View*. Here Durand starts with the argument that the *Middle View* should apply just as much to sensation as intellection, so if this view is wrong about sensation, it's also wrong about intellection; to this point, Durand adds the following proof against the *Middle View* for sensation:

"Everything that has a form which is the principle of some action is able, through that form which it has, [to go] into that action. But the medium has the same form in kind which sense, for instance, vision, has; for the same *species* received in the eye is also received in the medium. Therefore, if that is the principle of actively eliciting the operation of sensing, as, e.g., through it the

eye sees, so through the same thing the medium would sense; which is not true. Therefore, that [*species*] is not a principle for actively eliciting an operation of sensing.” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.11)³⁵³

As an aside: the first thing one might spot about this argument is that it overlaps, at least in part, with one we’ve already seen from Scotus above, when covering his *experiential arguments*; i.e. they both raise the argument that if the reception of sensible *species* is sufficient to bring about sensation, and the same sensible *species* (e.g. of some visible colour) received in a sense organ (e.g., in the eye) is also received in the medium (e.g. in the air), then that reception in the medium would bring about sensation (e.g., vision) in the medium as well (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.295). Moreover, likely enough, part of what Durand would find so absurd about the consequence that the air, e.g., would see, is that air doesn’t experience/apprehend anything in any way.

However, all that being said, unlike Scotus, Durand doesn’t draw a further parallel between *species* in the medium and *species* in a sleeping or blind eye in order to add any introspective evidence to this argument. So, Durand doesn’t seem to be giving a full *experiential argument*, as with Scotus, or Olivi, beforehand. Instead, Durand’s argument here appears to stick to the same sorts of metaphysical concerns he draws from the hot water analogy above. For starters, Durand’s argument begins with the conclusion of his initial attribution argument, that, for this *Middle View*, a form/*species* serves as the sole active principle for eliciting its proper action of cognition; in this case, a sensible *species* would be such a principle for sensation. From this,

³⁵³ “*Tertio, quia si species in intellectu est principium, quo intellectus elicit active operationem intelligendi, per eandem rationem species in sensu est principium, quo sensus elicit active operationem sentiendi. Sed istud est impossibile, ut probabo. Ergo et primum. - Probatio assumpte: Omne, quod habet formam, que est alicuius actionis principium, potest per formam, quam habet, in illam actionem. Sed eandem formam secundum speciem quam habet sensus - puta visus - habet medium; qualis enim species recipitur in oculo, talis recipitur in medio. Ergo si ipsa est principium eliciendi active operationem sentiendi, sicut per eam sentit oculus, ita per eandem sentiret medium; quod non est verum. Ergo ipsa non est principium eliciendi active operationem sentiendi.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.11).

Durand argues that, since the medium receives this same form which the sense organs receives, then the same form (e.g. a *species* of some *visible* colour) should be sufficient for actively eliciting the proper act of sensation (e.g. *vision*) in the medium (e.g. the air) as much as in the sense organ (e.g. the eye), following this *Middle View*. But this is absurd, since it's commonly agreed upon that any elemental medium, such as air, is not a sensitive thing.

Of further interest, right below this passage, Durand considers a standard response from proponents of this *Middle View*: the medium and the sense organ differ, not actively, but as subjects, in that only the latter is receptive of an act of sensation; so, it's not enough that the medium receives the same form which would, otherwise, actively elicit an act of sensation (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.11)³⁵⁴. However, Durand objects that this response is excluded for this view given what is generally agreed upon, according to the oft-cited part of *Metaphysics* IX.8, where it is glossed that sensation and intellection are immanent acts, remaining in the agent *per se* and not *per accidens*; “on account of which, whatever is receptive of the form, which is the active principle of such an action, is similarly receptive of the action” (Ibid. p.11; cf. Ibid. p.10)³⁵⁵. Durand's full reasoning here isn't entirely clear. However, his general thought seems to be that a merely *passive* principle, as subject, cannot elicit a different action than what the

³⁵⁴ “Sed dicitur, quod non, quia actus non solum requirit principium a quo sit, sed etiam subiectum in quo sit. Licet autem species sensibilis, quantum est de natura sua, sit elicitora actus sentiendi, tamen medium non est eius susceptivum, sed organum solum. Et ideo medium non sentit, sed organum. Istud autem excluditur per id quod prius dictum est, quod sentire est actus manens in agente per se et non per accidens. Propter quod quicquid est receptivum forme, que est principium activum talis actionis, est similiter receptivum actionis.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.11).

³⁵⁵ The reference to above is for the following passage: “Sed istud non valet, quia intelligere est actus manens in agente, et non quidem per accidens; tum quia posset non esse in agente, tum quia de hiis, que sunt per accidens, non est doctrina, que tamen est de hoc, quod intelligere est actio manens in agente, ut patet ex 9 Metaphisice. Est ergo intelligere actio manens in agente non per accidens, sed per se. Sicut ergo intelligere est active ab intellectu informato specie, verius tamen et principalius a specie quam ab intellectu, sic eius subiectum susceptivum erit intellectus informatus specie, verius tamen et principalius ratione speciei quam ratione intellectus.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.10).

corresponding active principle determines. But, as argued above, for this *Middle View*, both the medium and sense organs are merely passive principles and both receive the same active principle (i.e. the same form/*species*). Moreover, Durand seems to add, it cannot be the case that the reception of the form/*species* in the medium only elicits a proper act of sensation in the adjacent sense organ, since that would make sensation a transient act for the medium, leaving its proper agent, rather than an immanent act, remaining in the agent. But it's agreed upon that sensation is an immanent act for proponents of this *Middle View*; e.g. we've seen Aquinas (ST 1a, Q.85, a.2) say as much above.

Overall, as will become even clearer later, Durand seems to be generally grounding his attribution arguments on similar "Aristotelian" causal concerns as those which, e.g., Scotus and Gonsalvus derive from *Metaphysics* IX.8 above, where it is glossed that intellection and sensation are immanent acts, and thus should be attributed to an internal rather than an external agent, and that, in general, a proper/natural action to ϕ (e.g. to live/sense/intelligize) follows from something which, by its nature, has the relevant form ϕ in (first) act, insofar as it exists (e.g. as alive/sensitive/intellective)³⁵⁶. So, rather than putting a cognitive power on par with water, in need of an extrinsic form (heat) to its nature to go into act (make hot), a cognitive power should be thought of more like fire, with the relevant form (heat), which is needed to go into act (make hot), already inherent to its nature; the only difference is that, in the case of an immanent act like cognition, the action would remain in the agent. Indeed, as we'll see below, Durand takes up more from these "Aristotelian" grounds in the positive arguments he gives for his own exact

³⁵⁶ See also, Durand's fourth additional argument against the *Middle View*, which also draws on the claim that the intellect is an internal nature/principle and intellection a corresponding natural act: "*Quarto, quia nulla potentia naturalis ad eliciendum actum sibi connaturalem et proportionatum indiget aliquo extraneo tanquam principio causativo actus; esset enim illud connaturalius actu elicito. Sed intellectus se habet ad intelligere tanquam ad actum sibi proportionatum et connaturalem. Quare etc.*" (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.11-12).

view as well, coming to the conclusion that a cognitive act is, in fact, so intimately tied to its cognitive power that it is simply identical to the power, in second act, in relation to some present object.

§2.5.2. *Against the Fully Passive View: Nobility Arguments*

After arguing against this *Middle View*, but before getting to his own exact view, Durand raises further, though similar, objections to the *Fully Passive View* of cognition. To refresh your memory, here again is how Durand sets up this latter target:

“Others say otherwise, that intellection and sensation (*intelligere et sentire*) come about in us through this alone, that the object moves the power, not by causing in it some *species*, which would represent the object or elicit an act, but by [that object] immediately causing sensation or intellection of that [object].” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.12).

As mentioned above, Durand especially has Godfrey in mind here. E.g., a bit below this passage, Durand clarifies further that, on this view, cognition is essentially an undergoing (*pati*) from an external object, and it is only held to be an action “according to name, in that it is signified through an active verb”; i.e., ‘to cognize’, in general, is only a “grammatical action”, as Godfrey calls it, while, in reality, it is simply a passion from some external object (Ibid. p.13; see, e.g., Godfrey, *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, pp.275-276)³⁵⁷. Against this *Fully Passive View*, Durand numbers 6 arguments, 5 of which fall under the same sorts of *nobility* and *attribution arguments* we’ve seen from Olivi and company beforehand. Most importantly, as I said I would get back to

³⁵⁷ “Igitur in intellectu non fit species preter ipsum intelligere, quod est ab obiecto effective, et est quoddam pati, non solum concomitative, ut primi dicunt, sed essentialiter, quamvis secundum nomen sit actio, eo quod per verbum activum significatur.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.13).

above, we can see that Durand’s nobility arguments are more fully elaborated here than against the *Middle View*.

Indeed, Durand’s first argument against this *Fully Passive View* starts with a clear nobility principle:

“Although an agent is not always more excellent than a patient with respect to what that [patient] is according to substance/supposit – e.g. fire is not more excellent than a human on which it acts – nevertheless, universally it is necessary that an agent, with respect to the principle by which it acts, is more excellent and more noble than a patient, with respect to that by which the patient is affected (*patitur*), just as the heat of fire, through which it acts, is more noble than the dryness and wetness of a human, through which she is affected by fire.” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.13)³⁵⁸.

In other words, an agent, *qua* active, is always more noble than a patient, *qua* passive, just as the active principle of heat in fire is more noble than the passive principles of dryness and wetness which merely receive heat. This holds universally, even though some patients, when considered more broadly as substances, might yet be more noble; e.g., a human, with respect to her distinctly human attributes, is more noble than fire, and yet, with respect to her dry/wet body, she is passive and less noble. Overall, this is one way in which Olivi and company, in their prior nobility arguments, also express the idea that it is better to act than to be acted upon.

Immediately after presenting this nobility principle, Durand finishes his argument here and applies this principle to sensation and intellection:

“But a sensible quality, through which, so they [e.g., Godfrey] say, a sensible thing acts on the sense, is not something more noble and more perfect than a sensitive power, and the same is understood about an object of the intellect and

³⁵⁸ “*Primo, quia, quamvis agens non semper sit prestantius patiente quantum ad illud, quod est secundum suppositum - puta ignis non est prestantior homine, in quem agit - tamen oportet universaliter agens quantum ad principium, quo agit, esse prestantius et nobilior patiente quantum ad id, quo patiens patitur, sicut nobilior est caliditas ignis, per quam agit, quam sit siccitas et humiditas hominis, per quam ab igne patitur. Sed qualitas sensibilis, per quam sensibile agit in sensum, ut isti dicunt, non est aliquid nobilior et perfectius potentia sensitiva, et idem intelligitur de obiecto intellectus et potentia intellectiva. Ergo obiectum sensus et intellectus non potest causare in sensu et intellectu sentire et intelligere.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.13).

the intellective power. Therefore, an object of sense and of intellect is not able to cause sensation in the sense and intellection in the intellect.” (Ibid.).

This, as we’ve seen, is the core structure of the prior nobility arguments of Olivi and company as well: i.e., the cognitive powers of sense and intellect are more noble than typical external objects of cognition, and thus, given the aforementioned nobility principle, the latter cannot sufficiently act on the former to cause acts of cognition (against the *Fully Passive View*)³⁵⁹.

Now, how exactly does Durand think that these cognitive powers are more noble than external objects? Just as with Olivi and other “Augustinians” beforehand, Durand’s first thought seems to be in terms of the intrinsic nobility of soul over body. Right after the above argument, Durand adds that, “this is the reason of Augustine in *De musica VI*”, and he provides the following direct quotation, which concerns whether, in what is said to hear, “anything comes about in the soul (*anima*) from a body”:

“But it is absurd to subject (*subdere*) the soul in some way as matter for a bodily artificer (*fabricatori corpori*)³⁶⁰. For soul is never inferior to body, and all matter is inferior to an artificer. Therefore, in no way is the soul subjected as matter for a bodily artificer. It would be, however, if a body were to bring

³⁵⁹ For another argument that overlaps with prior nobility arguments, consider Durand’s third, which also makes use of the idea of a “equivocal” cause as one which is more noble to and “virtually” contains the effect: “*Tertio, quia omnis causa, que non agens solum instrumentaliter sed principaliter, habet formam, per quam agit, que est eiusdem rationis cum ea, quam inducit, si sit agens univocum, vel est perfectior ea, si sit agens equivocum. Sed obiectum sensus secundum istos est causans sentire in sensu, non solum instrumentaliter, ut posset dici de obiecto intellectus ratione intellectus agentis, sed principaliter. Ergo sensibile, cum sit agens equivocum, haberet in se formam et actum nobiliorem quam sit sentire, quod est absurdum.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.16). Notably, this is another argument which walks the line between nobility and attribution/assimilation arguments, and even offers a bridge between the two, insofar as it offers an explanation for why a less noble cause won’t lead to more noble effect in terms of an asymmetry in form/similarity (the less noble equivocal cause would lack the relevant form which a univocal or more noble cause would have).

³⁶⁰ More literally: “body as an artificer”.

about (*operaretur*) any [musical] numbers³⁶¹ in it [i.e., the soul].” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.13.; cf., Augustine, *De musica*, 6.5.8)³⁶².

So, in other words, Durand takes this argument to be just that which he gave above: (i) soul, including the power of hearing, is in every respect more noble than bodily things, and (ii) to be a passive principle, as matter, is less noble than to be active, as a “maker”; so, (conclusion) an inferior bodily object, such as a reverberation in the air or, even, in the ear, cannot itself bring about a passion in the more noble soul, such as for an act of hearing. Augustine makes his conclusion even clearer a bit below this cited passage, where he states that, “it seems to me that, when soul senses in a body, it [i.e. soul] doesn’t undergo anything from that” (*De musica*, 6.5.10)³⁶³. That is, although the soul, in sensation, might in some way use the body, no corporeal object or impression in the body can sufficiently bring about a passive impression in the (sensitive part of the) soul proper; but, Godfrey, e.g., identifies a passive impression in the senses with sensation, so in this, Durand argues, he must be wrong.

Notably, as discussed above, *De musica* VI is the exact same text of Augustine which Olivi first cites when he gives his own *Fully Active View*, which he attributes to “the blessed Augustine”, that cognition is not a passive “influx” from some corporeal object, since body

³⁶¹ In the context of hearing music, these “numbers” seem to refer to poetic rhythms/meter.

³⁶² “*Et hec est ratio Augustini (6 Musice) ubi dicit sic: ‘Considerandum, utrum re vera nichil aliud sit, quod dicitur audire, nisi aliquid a corpore in anima fieri. Sed absurdum est fabricatori corpori materiam quodammodo animam subdere. Nunquam enim est anima corpore deterior, et omnis materia fabricatore deterior. Nullo igitur modo anima fabricatori corpori subiecta materies. Esset autem, si aliquos in ea numeros operaretur corpus.’ Hec sunt verba eius.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.13).

For the original passage from Augustine: “*Verumtamen ne illud occurrat, arboris vitam meliorem esse quam nostram, quoniam non accipit sentiendo a corpore numeros (nullus enim ei sensus est); diligenter considerandum est utrum revera nihil sit aliud quod dicitur audire, nisi aliquid a corpore in anima fieri. Sed perabsurdum est fabricatori corpori materiam quoquo modo animam subdere. Numquam enim anima est corpore deterior; et omnis materia fabricatore deterior. Nullo modo igitur anima fabricatori corpori est subiecta materies. Esset autem, si aliquos in ea numeros corpus operaretur. Non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab iis quos in sonis cognoscimus.*” (*De musica* 6.5.10).

³⁶³ “[...] videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati [...]”. As we’ll get to, when Durand gets to his own exact view, he returns to *De musica* VI, and cites this passage as well (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.23).

cannot directly act on “spirit” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 72; III, pp.15-16)³⁶⁴. As Solère (2014) has pointed out, Durand’s reference here to Augustine’s *De musica* is one of the most explicit points of connection between Durand and this prior Augustinian “camp” in this debate (Solère 2014, pp.186-189, fn.14). In particular, one can gloss a defining nobility, or “DOC”, principle from this text, as we’ve seen above, that to be active is more noble than to be passive. Moreover, to the question at hand, one can also gloss from *De musica* VI, and those who cite it, that cognition is held to be more noble, and thus active, insofar as it is an act of “soul” rather than “body”. *De musica* VI is especially interesting insofar as it is primarily and unambiguously about acts of sensation (especially, hearing), not just intellection, and it contrasts even acts of sensation with “body” (both external corporeal objects and impressions in one’s own body)³⁶⁵. So, this suggests that, likewise, along with prior “Augustinians” who cite this text, Durand is not exclusively concerned with the less controversial sort of “incorporeality”, and consequent nobility, of the intellect. Rather, as we’ve seen above from prior “Augustinians”, such as Olivi, the senses, as well, are said to be sufficiently “incorporeal” to warrant a nobility argument. This is another part of what makes this “Augustinian” position distinct.

³⁶⁴ “*Quarta est beati Augustini dicentis in nullum spiritum posse fieri aliquid a corpore per rectum influxum sed solum per modum colligantiae et per modum termini obiectivi. Quod enim non per rectum influxum aliquid in spiritu seu anima faciat, dicit aperte in libro VI Musicae [cap.5, n.8], ubi postquam quaesivit an audire sit idem quod aliquid a corpore in anima fieri, subdit: ‘Semper absurdum est fabricatori corpori materiam quoquomodo animam subdere; esset autem corpori sic subiecta, si corpus in ea aliquos numeros operaretur; non ergo, cum audimus, fiunt in anima numeri ab his quos in sonis cognoscimus.’ [...] Item, paulo post: ‘Videtur mihi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere.’” (Olivi, II Sent., Q.72; III, pp.15-16).*

³⁶⁵ As mentioned before, in some of the other common references to Augustine on this matter, such as those to *De Trinitate*, it’s a bit more ambiguous as to whether acts of sensation, at least of the external senses, are first passively received in the body. This could be one reason why Durand doesn’t bother to cite these other texts, unlike, e.g., Olivi and Scotus, given that Durand is equally interested in sensation and intellection here.

Of further interest on this point, in what Durand labels as his “second” and “fifth” arguments against the *Fully Passive View*, Durand also presents nobility arguments in terms of the “vitality” of cognition. In his second argument, Durand again starts with a similar nobility principle that, “every action is more perfect and more noble than its corresponding passion”; but, Durand continues, according to the *Fully Passive View*, e.g. of Godfrey, ‘to be intelligized’ (*intelligi*) will name a real action from the object, just as the corresponding active verb ‘to intelligize’ will name a real passion in the intellect; “therefore, ‘to be intelligized’ (*intelligi*) [i.e. the real action] will be more perfect and more noble than ‘to intelligize’ (*intelligere*) [i.e. the real passion]” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.14)³⁶⁶. As Durand explains, this is absurd:

“since the act of a living (*viventis*) and cognizing (*cognoscentis*) thing is always more noble than every proper [act/attribute] common to living and non-living, cognizing and non-cognizing things. But, to sense (*sentire*) and to intelligize (*intelligere*) are common only to living and cognizing things; and to be sensed (*sentiri*) and to be intelligized (*intelligi*) are common to non-living and non-cognizing things. Therefore, etc.” (Ibid.)³⁶⁷.

To explain: first off, to sense and to intelligize are said to be vital and cognitive acts since they are found only among things with a cognitive life (i.e., a cognitive soul). On the other hand, although living and cognitive things can be sensed and intelligized, this isn’t on account of those things being living and cognitive since even something non-living and non-cognitive can be sensed and intelligized; e.g. a white rock is sensible thanks to its colour, which is common to a

³⁶⁶ “Secundo, quia si intelligere est pati secundum rem, intelligi erit actio secundum rem, licet e contrario sit utrobique secundum nomen. Semper enim actio et passio proportionaliter designantur verbo activo et passivo; sed omnis actio perfectior et nobilior est passione sibi correspondente. Ergo perfectius et nobilior est intelligi quam intelligere.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.14). Note that Durand expands on the “linguistic” concern he raises at the beginning of the argument here, but I’ll get to that below.

³⁶⁷ “Quod est absurdum, quia actus viventis et cognoscentis semper est nobilior omni proprietate communi viventibus et non viventibus, cognoscentibus et non cognoscentibus. Sentire autem et intelligere competunt solis viventibus et cognoscentibus; sentiri autem et intelligi commune est non viventibus et non cognoscentibus. Ergo etc.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.14).

white human as well, so being sensed, in act, is not a vital and cognitive act with respect to an object's colour.

Moreover, as Durand frames this argument, vital and cognitive acts are said to be more noble than every non-vital and non-cognitive act/attribute; e.g. it is more excellent to see, which is an act proper to the visive power, than to have a colour, which is an act/attribute proper to any surface/body. This is in line with the way in which Olivi and company beforehand, as we've seen before, interpret the standard medieval hierarchy of being, where living things and their proper acts are above the non-living, and, most importantly, cognitive living things and their proper acts are above both the merely living (e.g., plants and their acts of nutrition and growth) and the non-living.

However, according to Godfrey's *Fully Passive View*, the real action of a non-living and non-cognitive thing, such as a white rock, in being sensed or intelligized (passive in name alone), would be sensation or intellection; so, the white rock's action, with respect to the agent, would be more noble, *qua* action, given the nobility principle above, but, in contrast, it would have to be less noble, *qua* non-vital and non-cognitive. Conversely, if sensation or intellection, with respect to the patient, were a real passion in sense or intellect, it would be less noble, *qua* passion, but, at the same time, more noble, *qua* vital and cognitive. Thus, to resolve this tension, Durand argues that one should abandon the claim that sensation or intellection is a real passion effectively caused by some non-vital and non-cognitive thing alone.

[As an aside, note that Durand also adds a quick corroborating argument (“*Item...*”) here:

“Also, an agent acts not because the patient is affected (*patitur*), but the reverse. But an object is intelligized because the intellect intelligizes.

Therefore, to be intelligized is not to act, nor is to intelligize to undergo/be affected (*pati*).” (Ibid.)³⁶⁸

Hartman (2012, pp.30-36) takes this, along with the start of this “second” argument above, to be a sort of *attribution argument*, in particular, one based on a linguistic “intuition”, similar to initial linguistic concerns we examined in Olivi’s attribution arguments above³⁶⁹. As Hartman puts it:

“Just as ‘to see’ picks out a passion on the side of the one seeing, so too ‘to be seen’ picks out an action—indeed, the corresponding action—on the side of the item being seen, i.e., the object. But, even if we allow language its quirks, and so allow that the active forms of certain verbs are active in form but passive in meaning, it is a stretch to suppose that the passive form of verbs of cognition are passive in form but active in meaning as well. For one thing, Durand points out, if the passive form of a verb of cognition were active in meaning, then it would pick out the action on the side of the object which corresponds to the passion on the side of the subject which the active form of that verb picks out. *But then we would seem to be committed to the thesis that I see the object because the object is being seen; but our intuitions on the matter seem to run in the other direction: the object is seen because I see it and not the other way around.*” (Hartman 2012, p.35; emphasis mine).

While I suppose it’s true enough that Durand appeals to some facts of grammar above, and that he would take this second premise to be “intuitive”, I would think to read this argument here as one more about metaphysics than language, as with the *attribution arguments* I considered above. The first premise makes the standard medieval Aristotelian claim that a cause/action, in reality (not just in name), is prior to an effect/undergoing, in that the former explains the latter (e.g., as a builder (building) is prior to a building built) (cf. *Metaphysics* IX.8). Moreover, the second premise states that an intellect intelligizing is prior to something being intelligized, in that the former seems to explain the latter, not the reverse. So, the conclusion is that being

³⁶⁸ “*Item non propter hoc agens agit, quia passum patitur, sed e contrario. Sed obiectum propter hoc intelligitur, quia intellectus intelligit. Ergo intelligi non est agere, nec intelligere pati.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.14).

³⁶⁹ See, in particular, from Olivi: “*Primum autem, quod scilicet [influxus a corpore in spiritu] sit ipsa actio cognitive, non potest dari. Primo, quia videns dicitur active videre potius quam passive videri.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, p.24). Hartman himself also makes the connection with Olivi; that being said, as discussed above (see fn.325), Hartman seems to go back and forth as to whether Olivi’s “intuition” here is largely experiential or “linguistic”.

intelligized cannot be the real action of the object; rather, the real action is the intellect's intelligizing³⁷⁰.

To the extent that Durand might take this second premise to be based on an “intuition”, as Hartman puts it, I would take it to be more of a corresponding metaphysical intuition rather than simply a linguistic one. Indeed, it would be rather unfair to Godfrey to rest this argument on the grammar of these verbs alone, since Godfrey admits that language can be misleading here. More specifically, I suspect that Durand has in mind some of the general metaphysical claims he's referenced above, against the *Middle View*, with his attribution arguments there, with which he could back up any metaphysical “intuition” behind this second premise. E.g., the intellect is prior to the intelligized object in explanation, since the intellect is intellective in form/(first) act; so, all the more, the intellect intelligizing in (second) act, is prior in explanation to the object being intelligized in act. Moreover, Durand is likely playing off of parts of the “vitality” argument he just made at the beginning of his second argument here against this *Fully Passive View*; e.g., based on those considerations, one can argue that the intellect should be prior in explanation to an object's role in intellection, since intellection is a vital and cognitive act proper to a vital and cognitive power, and the intellect is such a vital and cognitive power, but an object need not be vital nor cognitive to be cognized.]

³⁷⁰ Of further interest, immediately following this object, Durand goes to some lengths to respond to a reformulation of the *Fully Passive View*, where, as Durand puts it, according to this reformulation, although ‘*intelligere*’, e.g., follows from an action from the object (perfecting the intellect) and, consequent, passion in the intellect, ‘*intelligere*’ isn't itself an action or a passion (Durand, *II Sent.* [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.14-16). Although not quite what Godfrey says, this response seems to run off from Godfrey's preferred expression, discussed above, that the real action of an external object is a perfecting of a given power *qua* apprehensive. In short, Durand argues that if the external object leaves a real passion in a given power for sensation/intellection, in such a way that sensation/intellection is also conserved by the object, as a sigil leaves an impression in water only for as long as the sigil remains, then sensation/intellection is the real passion from the object; i.e., sensation/intellection can't just be said to follow from some first passion without being that passion. And from this, Durand concludes, all the same unfitting consequences above follow.

In fact, with a similar focus on the “vitality” of cognition, Durand’s fifth argument against the *Fully Passive View* starts with the simple argument: “as was said before [i.e., against the *Middle View*], it seems very unfitting that a vital act, such as sensation and intellection, would be in us effectively from something non-living” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.16)³⁷¹. To this, Durand adds two corroborating arguments:

“First, since less noble vital acts, such as nutrition and growth, are in us by an intrinsic principle and in no way effectively (*effective*) by something extrinsic. Second, since living things are distinguished from non-living things by sense and by motion, and more by sense than by motion; but living things are moved in place by themselves, rather than moved effectively by anything extrinsic. Therefore, *a fortiori* (*fortiori ratione*), to sense is not in us by an extrinsic active principle.” (Ibid. pp.16-17)³⁷².

As with Durand’s argument in terms of “vital acts” of cognition against the *Middle View* above, these arguments also walk the line between what I’ve been calling *attribution* and *nobility arguments*. As with the *attribution arguments* we’ve seen before, the general argument here is based on the idea that a vital act should be entirely *attributed* to a similarly vital active principle, and a vital principle, insofar as it is a principle by which a thing lives, is something intrinsic to that thing’s nature. Moreover, Durand’s first corroborating argument here builds up to this same conclusion by starting with the less *noble*, and, perhaps Durand thinks, less controversial, vital acts, from which he argues *a fortiori* for the more *noble* vital acts of sense and intellect.

Durand first argues that, since it is commonly granted that less noble vital acts, such as nutrition and growth, are attributed to intrinsic active principles, it should be agreed that more

³⁷¹ “Quinto, quia sicut prius dicebatur, inconveniens valde videtur, quod actus vitalis, ut est sentire et intelligere, sit in nobis effective a non vivente propter duo: [...]” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.16).

³⁷² “Primo, quia actus vitales minus nobiles, ut nutriri et augeri, sunt in nobis a principio intrinseco et nullo modo ab extrinseco effective; secundo, quia viventia distinguntur a non viventibus sensu et motu, et magis sensu quam motu; sed viventia moventur secundum locum a se ipsis, non mota effective ab aliquo extrinseco. Ergo fortiori ratione sentire non est in nobis a principio activo extrinseco.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.16-17).

noble acts, such as sensation and intellection, are also attributed to intrinsic active principles. E.g., we process food, keep alive, and grow by way of the powers of the so-called vegetative (part of the) soul, intrinsic to us. These are vital acts/powers which we humans, and non-rational animals, have in common with plants, below us in the standard medieval hierarchy of being, and thus these are less noble. So, in other words, Durand argues that it would be unfitting if our more noble vital acts, e.g., of sensation and intellection, didn't also come from active principles inherent to us, since it is a noble thing to have such active principles; i.e., phrased this way, this argument also makes use of an implicit *nobility principle*, as with prior *nobility arguments*.

With a similar *a fortiori* argument, in Durand's second corroborating argument, he considers the less proper vital act of locomotion. Here, Durand argues that, since even a vital act less properly definitive to the animal/sensitive soul, i.e., locomotion, is attributed to an intrinsic and vital active principle, by which we move ourselves, it should follow that sensation, which even more properly defines the sensitive soul, should likewise be attributed to an intrinsic and vital active principle (i.e., the animal/sensitive soul). By this, Durand seems to be referring to Aristotle's discussion of "imperfect" animals, such as starfish and barnacles, which were thought to lack the power for locomotion, but, nevertheless, have the sense power of touch (and thus, qualify as animals); on the other hand, every animal with locomotion also has sense, in particular, a distal sense, and corresponding desires, as otherwise nature would act in vain, for there would be no need for an animal to move in place, if it couldn't see where it's going or desire to move in the first place (see, e.g., *De anima* II.2-3, III.11-12). One might also think of Gonsalvus's argument above, where he describes the process by which we move in place by way of internal acts of sense, thought, and desire; as he argues against Godfrey, if we didn't have these internal acts first, we couldn't even be attributed with external acts wherein we

intentionally move our bodies in place³⁷³. So, in these ways, sensation is more fundamental than locomotion and thus more proper to animal life; thus, if the latter vital act is actively attributed to an intrinsic principle, so too should the former.

§2.5.3. A Grey Area: Durand on “Vital Acts”

Durand’s extended use of the terminology of “vital acts”, in the above *a fortiori* arguments, raises some interesting questions over the general motivation and inspiration behind Durand’s *nobility arguments*. At least initially, Hartman (2012) seems to partially agree with Solère (2014), as mentioned above, who puts Durand alongside prior “Augustinian Franciscans” insofar as they agree that acts of sensation are noble enough, as “vital acts” of the soul, to warrant a nobility argument, in contrast with more traditional figures, such as Aquinas, who have no problem with sensible qualities impressing themselves onto the sense powers (Hartman 2012, pp.36-40). However, given that, as we’ve just seen, Durand is willing to apply the terminology of “vital acts” to lower acts of the soul, such as the purely “biological” acts of nutrition and growth, so as to warrant nobility arguments there as well, Hartman (2012) goes on argue that this should distance Durand from prior “Augustinians”. In his own words, Hartman (2012) says:

“One upshot here is this: on Durand’s view, what matters is whether or not a property, event, or thing is biological, which is only as spooky, so to speak, as the entities postulated in the biological sciences: it is, at the very least, less spooky than immateriality or spirituality—which I take it drives the ‘Augustinian’ position. [In the attached footnote: “See, esp. Peter John Olivi

³⁷³ For one last *assimilation argument*, see Durand’s fourth argument against the *Fully Passive View*, similar to those of Olivi and company above, where it is argued that if the form/*species* of each external object were a sufficient active principle for intellection, then there would be no unity to our intellections *qua* intellective: “*Quarto, quia diversorum agentium secundum speciem sunt diverse actiones et effectus secundum speciem. Sed intelligibilia differunt specie, ut homo et asinus. Ergo intelligere causata ab hiis differunt specie. Quod est inconueniens, quia proprius actus speciei non potest plurificari secundum speciem; sed intelligere ex fantasmatis vel ratiocinari est actus specificus hominis. Ergo omne intelligere hominis est unum secundum speciem; non enim potest homini assignari alia propria operatio preter suum intelligere.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.16).

who argues that even sensory perceptions are not material”.] Durand is not appealing to a mind-body gap nor is he appealing to an immaterial-material gap, but a more general gap between biology and physics. (Hartman 2012, pp.45-46; cf. fn.65).

According to Hartman (2012), Durand agrees with the common medieval opinion that the intellectual soul is an incorporeal (i.e., separable) thing, but, Hartman takes it, this is “orthogonal” to the issue at hand, given that “purely corporeal things, like plants and dogs, are animate”; according to Hartman, Durand’s nobility arguments are, rather, only in terms of an “animate-inanimate” gap (i.e., in terms of the autonomy of ensouled things, and the science(s) of them, at least as autonomous from the lower domain of mere soulless elements) (Ibid. p.38, fn.50).

However, given the ambiguity we’ve explored above with the terminology of the “vital” and “immaterial”/“spiritual”/“incorporeal”, as used by prior “Augustinians”, one should question Hartman’s (2012) argument here. First off, although it is true that the intellect is most strictly referred to as “incorporeal” (and “spiritual” and “immaterial”) in common medieval terminology, it doesn’t follow that living/animate things, such as plants and dogs, are exactly “purely corporeal”. Indeed, see, e.g., Durand’s above reference to *De musica* VI, which clearly contrasts anything living, insofar as it has soul/spirit, with the purely corporeal (“body”) (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.13). So, in other words, *contra* Hartman’s (2012) distinction above, an “animate-inanimate” gap for Durand seems to in fact be a sort of “immaterial-material” gap; “immateriality”/“incorporeality” admits of degrees, as, e.g., in the case of plants and non-intellective animals.

Second, *contra* Hartman, it should also be noted that Scotus, for one prior “Augustinian” example (putting Olivi aside), also presents a nobility argument in terms of the “vital act” of

procreation, an act of the nutritive soul, in contrast with the purely corporeal acts of the elements and heavenly bodies, with further Augustinian grounds as well (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.284, pp.300-301; cf. Augustine, *The City of God*, 8.6). So, Durand isn't necessarily diverging from the entire "Augustinian" tradition here insofar as he posits an "animate-inanimate" gap as well and applies the terminology of "vital acts" to acts of the nutritive soul, and not just to acts of the cognitive (sensitive/intellective) soul.

Finally, third, as discussed above, given the typical medieval hierarchy of being, even if it's true that Durand, and Scotus, would posit a "nobility gap" between the realms of physics (at least, of the elements) and biology, it doesn't follow that there isn't also a "gap", further up the chain, with regards to the realm of psychology (where things get even further from the purely "corporeal" end). Indeed, above Durand even specifically calls acts of sensation "more noble" and "more proper" to the soul/living principle, so as to argue, as he puts it, "*a fortiori*" (i.e., from the lesser to the stronger, given that the debate at hand concerns the "higher" (cognitive) acts of the soul)³⁷⁴. So, although it might be true that Durand, as with prior "Augustinians", isn't *simply* making use of a modern mind-body gap, insofar as Durand would also claim a physics-biology gap, there is still clearly room for some sort of "gap" in nobility and causal explanation here between external corporeal things and the cognitive/psychological realm, higher up the chain of being³⁷⁵.

³⁷⁴ Surely even Olivi could make such an *a fortiori* argument here as well, even if he understands the biological to be more on the corporeal end of things.

³⁷⁵ In more general terms, I would also add that I think Hartman's (2012) above effort to distinguish Durand from "spooky" mind-body or material-immaterial gaps is undermotivated. First off, I think it's perfectly plausible, even to contemporary philosophers, to posit some sort of explanatory gap between lower, physiological processes, and properly cognitive ones. Second, I'm not sure it's any more plausible in a modern context, which Hartman seems to be speaking to, if Durand's view requires an explanatory gap between the physical and the biological (in particular, so as to posit "vital spirits").

All that being said, I will admit that Hartman (2012) does seem to have at least touched on a grey area here and is right to be cautious to infer from Durand's *nobility arguments* all that is found in prior "Augustinian" accounts, especially from Olivi, here. As I put it above, in the larger picture, prior "Augustinians", such as Olivi and Scotus, put together their *nobility arguments* with certain *experiential arguments*, so as to conclude that the activity/nobility of the cognitive soul is most especially found in a sort of "attention" of the soul, above the body, which varies just how we experience the world (e.g., attending to this or that, or nothing at all); I take it that this is what Hartman is most strictly concerned with when he says that prior "Augustinians" seem to be driven by a sort of "mind-body gap" (Hartman 2012, pp.45-46). Exactly how this fits with the "nobility"/activity of lower vital acts is at least a grey area, I would admit. Moreover, a bit later on in his dissertation, Hartman seems to add to this point with the astute observation that, unlike Olivi (and, I would add, Scotus), Durand does not argue much on the basis of "phenomenological considerations", i.e., what I've called "*experiential arguments*" (Hartman 2012, p.119, fn.54)³⁷⁶. As I've also noted above, so far Durand's arguments have been largely based on the general metaphysics of causation and ranks of being, as in his *nobility* and *attribution arguments*, which dominate his objections to the *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views*. So, although I have some qualms with how Hartman (2012) makes his point, I agree that there is at least a grey area here which we should flag for later, when we get to Durand's own account in

³⁷⁶ More specifically, Hartman makes the questionable claim that "Durand also doesn't ever talk about the attention or intention of the soul (unlike Suarez, Henry of Ghent, and Olivi), at least not in this discussion", despite the fact that he immediately follows up this up with the admission that "The adverb '*attentius*' appears once in the text, as part of a quotation from Augustine meant to bolster his defense of the claim that the sense object doesn't act on the soul but on the organ and so *then* can be said to be present or not-hidden from the soul" (Hartman 2012, p.119, fn.54; cf. Durand, II Sent. [A] D.3, Q.5; p.23). We'll have to return to this point below, as this takes us beyond Durand's negative arguments and into his positive account.

detail, considering what is indeed at least missing in explicit terms from Durand's negative arguments so far.

§2.5.4. *Summary: The Common Points so far*

To sum up a bit, we've now seen the following points of connection between Durand and the prior "Augustinian" tradition:

- As we saw further above, in §1.2.1, Durand is also, surely, pitted against the same two common opponents, both of which allow some form of passivity in the soul, as in the *Fully Passive View* of, e.g., Godfrey and the *Middle View* of, it seems, Aquinas.
- As we've seen more immediately above, in §2.5, Durand also utilizes at least two core arguments from the prior tradition against these same common opponents, what I've labelled *nobility arguments* and *attribution arguments*; these arguments, most precisely, are also used to object to any *passivity* in the soul from external/less noble objects.
- To fit with Solère's (2014) assessment that Durand's view is as "Augustinian" as prior active accounts, especially from Olivi, we've at least seen that Durand indeed ties his initial *nobility argument* to Augustine, most explicitly citing *De musica* VI, as we've seen cited by Olivi beforehand as well.
- To fit with Solère's (2014) assessment that Durand's view is as "un-Aristotelian" as prior active accounts, especially from Olivi, we've at least seen, in an earlier aside, in §1.3, that Durand and Olivi similarly put aside the need for any "agent intellect" (as it is commonly construed in Latin medieval philosophy) in this debate.

However, going forward, we should note at least a few points which already raise some suspicion over Solère's (2014) assessment of Durand and prior "Augustinians":

- Of Durand's two major arguments which we've seen so far, although his *nobility arguments* can indeed be traced back to Augustine, his *attribution arguments* seem to have a more Aristotelian ground (see especially, *Metaphysics IX.8*); although this isn't necessarily a point to distinguish Durand from prior "Augustinians", such as Olivi, this does blur the lines between what is "un-Aristotelian" about any of these accounts.
- Entirely missing from Durand so far are the more unique *experiential arguments*, based on various ways in which attention can differ cognition, which we've seen from Olivi and Scotus in particular; as noted above, the notion of "attention" in these arguments is oft attributed to Augustine as well, tied together with his full *nobility arguments*.
- In general, so far Durand's one reference to Augustine, from *De musica VI*, has only been used to argue for the *impassivity* of the soul in cognition, but not for the sort of "activity" which Augustine goes on to speak of; that is, as we'll get to next, although Augustine, and those following him, seem to attribute some genuine "self-motion" to the soul, Durand has conspicuously avoided any mention of this.

Part II: Durand's Distinct Account and its Pushback

§3. Distinguishing Two Nearby Principles

§3.1. The Prior “Augustinian” Tradition on Self-Motion

Going back above to how Olivi and company divide the debate, we've seen that one of the major dividing lines is based on whether external corporeal objects can have any sort of sufficient effect or “influx” on/into the cognitive soul/power, whether that effect is cognition itself or a pre-cognitive *species*. An account is active insofar as it denies this sort of passive effect on the cognitive soul/power. One way to justify this sort of active account is by appealing to what Solère calls the “downwards only causation (DOC) principle”, which we've seen in action in what I've called “*nobility arguments*” above. Moreover, we've also seen that Solère, along with others in the secondary literature and the primary authors themselves, especially Olivi, defend these active accounts as “Augustinian” with reference to some version of this *DOC principle*. Going further, however, I want to distinguish this DOC principle from a second common tenet for these “Augustinian” active accounts of Olivi and company: self-motion is possible and the cognitive power causes its act of cognition in a case of (strict) self-motion (call this the “*self-motion principle*”, while we're giving names to keep track of things)³⁷⁷. For the rest of this section, let's discuss the use of this principle by Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus in some more detail. As I'll explain, this discussion will help, first, focus more on this central point of contention between active and passive accounts, as they are commonly divided by Olivi's

³⁷⁷ Silva (2019), who, as I mentioned in the footnotes above, provides another survey of Augustinian active accounts, also mentions this common tenet and calls it the “Principle of auto-causation” which holds that “cognitive acts are self-caused but determined in what concerns their content by particular things” (Silva 2019, p.42); this is a separate principle from the other one I mentioned above, which he calls the “Principle of ontological hierarchy [...] physical objects cannot be the cause of cognitive acts of the soul” (Ibid., p.40).

“Augustinian” camp, and, second, set up how Durand’s view appears to operate outside of this common division, which we’ll turn to in the next section (§3)³⁷⁸.

To begin, the self-motion principle is clearly enough related to the DOC principle since, if external objects cannot cause acts of cognition, then the cognitive power seems like the obvious alternate cause³⁷⁹. Although implicit in my presentation of the nobility arguments above, this is how Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus, broadly speaking, complete their arguments to get to the claim that cognition comes from the cognitive power as an active cause. For example, in II Sent. Q.72, where Olivi sets up his view by way of the “view of the blessed Augustine” (Ibid.; III, pp.15-17), he starts with Augustine’s use of the DOC principle, then ends with Augustine’s oft-quoted line that the cognitive soul must cause its acts “in itself and through itself” (*De Trinitate* 10.5.7), which one can characterize as a sort of self-motion. Moreover, where Olivi defends his view in his own words, e.g. when utilizing nobility arguments focused on the vitality and spirituality of cognitive acts (II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.17-27), he regularly claims that the “effective principle” must be the corresponding cognitive power rather than anything ultimately external (the object or *species*)³⁸⁰.

Similarly, in a passage where Scotus seems to have Olivi³⁸¹ (and others) in mind, he completes the argument for their view, seemingly going from an instance of the DOC principle

³⁷⁸ To put this second point in other words, even if Durand holds the DOC principle in common with Olivi and company, it’s not clear that he holds the self-motion principle. This, in itself, is already a notable divergence from Olivi’s “Augustinian” camp, but how he justifies it also makes his final position seem all the more different.

³⁷⁹ Looking ahead, there are some less obvious alternate options here including, in some sense, positing no proper active cause at all (beyond that which caused the “power” in the first place), and, though perhaps this sounds wild, this is one way to interpret where Durand departs from Olivi and company. Other options which a medieval philosopher at this time might consider include an agent sense and/or intellect, as discussed above, separate from the cognitive power which “receives” the cognitive act.

³⁸⁰ I’ll discuss some examples below.

³⁸¹ In the 2001 edition of Scotus’s text, the editor, Lauriola labels this view as the “*opinio Olivi*”. Cross (2010, pp.122-126) follows Lauriola in attributing this view to Olivi as well in a chapter of his on Scotus on the

to an instance of the self-motion principle, and he gives passages from Augustine which are held to support both principles; Scotus starts by saying that this view “attributes total activity for an act of intellection to that soul [i.e. the part of the intellect which cognizes], and it is attributed to Augustine”; e.g., Scotus continues, Augustine is mentioned to say that “it should not be held that body brings about anything in spirit” and so, the spiritual soul must produce its acts (or, “images”) “in itself with amazing quickness”, and, “in itself and from itself” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.283; cf. *De Genesi ad litteram* 12.6.28-33 & *De Trinitate* 10.5.7)³⁸². Ultimately, as I’ve discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 (see, especially, §3.4), although Scotus himself does not accept that the intellect is a *total* cause, he nevertheless buys this sort of nobility argument, and the authority of Augustine, insofar as they establish that the intellect is the principal cause of intellectual cognition, and this is enough for Scotus to consider that the cognitive power in this case is a self-mover.

mechanisms of cognition. As I’ve argued in a previous chapter, although I think it’s true that Scotus has Olivi in mind here, (i) he clearly has some other “followers of Augustine” in mind as well who differ in the details with Olivi, and (ii), Scotus’s presentation of Olivi’s view isn’t entirely a fair representation (the two, I think, come to a fairly similar view in essence).

³⁸² “*In ista quaestione est una opinio, quae attribuit totam activitatem respectu intellectionis ipsi animae, et imponitur Augustino, qui dicit XII Super Genesim cap.28: ‘Quia imago corporis est in spiritu’, qui est ‘praestantior corpore’, ideo ‘praestantior est imago corporis in spiritu quam ipsum corpus in sua substantia’; et sequitur (cap. 29): ‘Nec putandum est corpus aliquid agere in spiritu, quasi spiritus corpori facienti materiae vice subdatur. Omni enim modo praestantior est illa res quae facit illa re de qua facit, neque ullo modo praestantius est corpus spiritu, immo spiritus corpore. Quamvis ergo incipiat imago esse in spiritu, tamen eadem imaginem non corpus in spiritu sed spiritus in se ipsum facit celeritate mirabili’, sequitur, ‘imago enim, mox ut oculis visa fuerit, in spiritu videntis sine interpolatione formatur.’ Item, X De Trinitate cap. 5: ‘Anima convolvit et rapit imagines corporum, factas in simetipsa et de simetipsa: dat enim eis formandis quiddam substantiae suae; servat autem in se aliquid liberum, quo de tali specie iudicet, et hoc est mens, id est rationalis intelligentia, quae servatur ut iudicet; nam illas animae partes quae corporis similitudinibus informantur, etiam cum bestiis non habere communes sentimus’. Ergo, ipsa anima in se format imagines ipsorum cognitorum, ut dicit ista auctoritas, etiam expressius, allegata.” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, pp.282-283; cf. *De Genesi ad litteram* 12.6.28-29 & *De Trinitate* 10.5.7).*

§3.2. Looking Ahead at Durand: Pulling Apart the DOC Principle and Self-Motion Principle

Getting back to Durand, so far we've primarily looked at how Durand positions himself against opposing passive views of cognition, whether they are *Fully Passive* or some *Middle View*, and how he argues against them; the primary point of similarity between Durand and the active accounts of Olivi and company so far has been that they all argue for a strong impassivity of the cognitive soul/power from normal corporeal objects outside, based on what we've been calling "*the DOC principle*" and its related "*nobility arguments*". Just now, we've clarified how Olivi and company tie together this impassivity view with the distinguishable view that the cognitive soul/power is a self-mover (what I've called the "*self-motion principle*" for short), and thus they end up with their positive accounts concerning the activity of cognition more precisely. In the following sections, I now turn to focus on the details of Durand's own positive account on this issue. Looking ahead, my main point, in short, will be to argue that even if Durand follows Olivi and company with their use of the DOC principle, Durand does not obviously adopt a similar self-motion principle; rather, for Durand, the cognitive power/soul is simply impassive or, "unmoved", absolutely speaking, in cognition. In this way, Durand appears to be motivated by his own take on Aristotle on this topic, which differs in a noteworthy way from the use of Aristotle's authority by those I've focused on so far.

§4. Durand's Positive Position: The Soul as Unmoved in Cognition

§4.1. The First Stage of Durand's Overall Argument: Answering 'What is Cognition?' (A Relation)

In the text of Durand's which we've been focusing on (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5), after engaging with the opposed views we've seen above, Durand begins a section for his own

positive account. Here Durand starts by stating that, before inquiring into “from what” (*a quo sit*) intellection and cognition in general comes about, first it should be inquired “what it is” (*quid sit*) to cognize, “namely, whether it is anything added over the cognitive power, making with it a real composition” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.17-18)³⁸³. Durand immediately answers in the negative:

“It seems it should be said that ‘to sense’ and ‘to intelligize’ do not name any real thing added to sense or intellect, making with them a real composition. This is clear in multiple ways.” (Ibid. p.18)³⁸⁴

In particular, Durand starts with three arguments. Let’s start with his third argument, since I think it provides a relatively more simple and distinct argument for Durand’s general view on the nature of cognition, as just stated, then move onto his first and second arguments. Looking ahead, after this, we can then get into the second stage of Durand’s overall argument, concerning what causes acts of cognition (“*a quo sit*”).

Durand’s third argument is based on the “inseparability of intellection and sensation themselves from sense and intellect” (Ibid. p.19)³⁸⁵. This argument provides some explanation

³⁸³ “*Dicendum ergo aliter ad evidentiam questionis, primo inquirendo, quid sit intelligere, vel universaliter loquendo, quid sit cognoscere, utrum sit aliquid additum super potentiam cognitivam, faciens cum ea realem compositionem, secundo a quo sit intelligere et cognoscere in nobis.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.17-18).

Recall from above (fn.232), that the ultimate question of this text of Durand’s concerns angelic cognition, which he finally returns to at the bottom of Ibid., p.23; Durand begins his side inquiry into cognition in general above this point in the text, when he considers the standard arguments against passivity in the cognitive powers, which we started with above.

³⁸⁴ “*Quantum ad primum videtur esse dicendum quod sentire et intelligere non dicunt aliquid reale additum super sensum et intellectum, faciens cum eis realem compositionem; quod patet multipliciter.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.18).

³⁸⁵ As the full passage goes: “*Tertio patet idem ex inseparabilitate ipsius intelligere et sentire a sensu et intellectu sic: Quecumque differunt per essentiam absolutam, possunt divina virtute separari secundum existentiam, nisi alicui eorum secundum se repugnet ratio actualis existentie, ut est materia prima, de qua dicunt aliqui, quod, cum sit pura potentia, non potest existere sine forma. Omne autem accidens absolutum, cum sit actus quidam, potest existere divina virtute sine subiecto; sentire autem non potest existere sine sensu, nec intelligere sine intellectu. Ergo non dicunt aliquid reale absolutum supra sensum et intellectum.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.19).

for what Durand is generally getting at in his conclusion statement that a cognitive act does not add any “real” thing over its cognitive power. Synonymously, Durand says here that a cognitive act does not add an “absolute accident” over its subject. As Durand explains, an absolute accident is one that is “able to exist without the subject by divine power” (Ibid.). Of entities in general, Durand says that something *cannot* be so separated only if it is absurd according to definition (*ratio*) for this thing to exist without some other thing; Durand gives the example of prime matter which, it is commonly argued, cannot exist on its own, without some form, since by definition prime matter is pure potency, without any actuality, and only exists relative to some actual entity with form inhering in said matter (at least, ultimately) (Ibid.). Notably, although one might think no accident could have existence independent of a subject given what an accident is, in contrast to a substance, by the 14th century it was a common view that, although it might not occur naturally, at least certain accidents, such as qualities, can exist without a substance by divine power; most famously, this was commonly held about the sensible qualities of the bread in the eucharist during transubstantiation, where those qualities remain in existence without a subject, since the bread is no longer there and its sensible qualities don’t seem to be those of the body of Christ either (human flesh and bread certainly look and taste different).

After Durand’s own explanation of what an absolute accident is, Durand quickly finishes this argument with just one more premise:

“[...] to sense, however, is not able to exist without sense, nor to intelligize without intellect. Therefore, they do not name some absolute real thing over sense and intellect.” (Ibid.)

Durand provides no extra argumentation for this premise, and this is not a completely uncontroversial claim at this time³⁸⁶, but it is, to be fair, hard to imagine a free-floating act of

³⁸⁶ See, e.g., Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.1 & *Quodlibet*, Q.13.

cognition without a cognizer. Moreover, Durand would likely also appeal to his other arguments, as we'll get to next, for corroboration. For now, what I take to be clear from this argument is that Durand does not think of cognition as a sort of quality or any other absolute form added over the relevant cognitive power; rather, cognition simply is the cognitive power, in a certain "respect" (*respectus*), and as Durand eventually puts it, it is with respect to, or relative to, a certain object being grasped³⁸⁷.

Moving on, Durand's first and second arguments, which we can group together, are both based on the "nature of an operation", in the first case considered "in itself and absolutely", and in the second case considered with reference to the operation's status as an "immanent operation" more specifically (Ibid. p.18). Consider Durand's first argument in full:

"First, [it is clear] from the nature of an operation considered in itself and absolutely: First act is form, just as with the intellect in a human and heat in fire; but second act is an operation, as intelligizing and being hot or making hot, and so on for similar cases. However, an operation is not able to be a form distinct from that which is first act, since then an operation would not be second act but first. For form, whether substantial or accidental, indicates first act. And furthermore, if an operation in itself were some form, that form would have some operation, and this would proceed infinitely such that there would be form of form and operation of operation. Hence it is better to stop at the first point, in other words, that an operation of a form is not a form added to it." (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.18)³⁸⁸.

³⁸⁷ Durand makes this last part more explicit when he gets to the role of the object in cognition, which I'll get to in a few pages. For now, consider Peter Auriol's initial introduction to Durand's view when considering what category, if any, acts of intellection belong to: "*Opinio quorundam: Dixerunt quoque alii quod actus intelligendi nihil est absolutum additum ad potentiam, sed tantum respectus ad obiectum.*" (Auriol, I Sent., D.35, pars 1; lines 292-293).

³⁸⁸ "*Primo ex natura operationis secundum se et absolute sic: Actus primus est forma, sicut intellectus in homine et calor in igne; sed actus secundus est operatio, ut intelligere et calere vel calefacere, et sic de similibus. Operatio autem non potest esse forma distincta ab ea, que est actus primus, quia tunc operatio non esset actus secundus, sed primus. Forma enim quecumque substantialis vel accidentalis dicit actum primum. Et iterum, si operatio secundum se esset aliqua forma, eius esset aliqua operatio, et procederetur in infinitum, quod forme esset forma,*

Here Durand starts with a standard medieval Aristotelian distinction between first act, or actuality, and second act, where, e.g., a cognitive power exists insofar as it is in first act, but is in potency with respect to its distinctive action or operation, in this case to cognize; but the power is in full actuality when it is in operation, i.e., in second act³⁸⁹. It's uncontroversial enough that first act is form in the case of sense or intellect, but to get to the more controversial claim that the operation of either power is not another (in this case, accidental) form added to it³⁹⁰, Durand presents a regress argument: In short, if the operating of a power were to require an additional (absolute) form in that same power to go into act, then, by that same reasoning, it seems that new form, since it would also be an absolute form, should also require an additional form to operate, and so on, with form upon form and the power never reaching full actuality³⁹¹; but this regress can be stopped if a power's operating requires no additional form in the power. So, e.g., sense/intellect does not require an additional form added to it to go into operation, as that would lead to a similar regress; instead, sensation/intellection just is sense/intellect insofar as it is in its proper operation³⁹².

At this point it might be objected that although a power might not require an additional form in the acting power to operate (i.e., to go into act), it still might require an additional form

et operationis operatio. Quare melius est sistendum in primo, sc. quod operatio forme non est forma ei addita." (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.18).

³⁸⁹ I'll return to the Aristotelian sources behind this terminology below.

³⁹⁰ Or to the person with said power, if one wants to make that distinction. Durand's argument seems to run as much either way.

³⁹¹ Alternatively, perhaps the issue here is more so that, on this view, every form, by operating, would be able to produce another form, and so on, and thus there could be an actual infinity at once, but one shouldn't grant such an infinity, at least from a finite cognitive power. So, even if one grants that the first form is in full act through its operation, nevertheless one shouldn't grant the infinite production of additional forms at once, especially in a creaturely sense/intellect. Peter Auriol's presentation of Durand's argument here is rather truncated, but it seems to lean this way by putting the stress on the "unfitting" infinite that follows: "*Praeterea, si operatio sit forma absoluta, procedetur in infinitum, cum omnis forma absoluta possit habere operationem. Sed hoc est inconveniens. Igitur non est possibile quod operatio intellectus sit forma aliqua absoluta.*" (I Sent. D.35, pars 1, a.1; lines 297-299)

³⁹² See §4.2 below for more on Durand's thought that the intellect in operation just is (or, depends solely on) the intellect (in the presence of some object).

insofar as an operation seems to require a product. E.g., the hot fire must create a form of heat in the log next to it in order to be said to be conducting the operation of making hot. Why not think cognition is like this? Durand's second argument provides some means to address this concern.

Durand's second argument is based on a distinction between operations with respect to their end result; one sort of operation goes out into some exterior matter to produce an external product, including operations such as making hot, cutting, or baking a cake; but the other sort of operation remains internal to the agent, including, traditionally, operations such as sensation and intellection. Following the common medieval terminology we've seen above, the former sort are called "transient operations/actions/acts", while the latter are called "immanent operations/actions/acts"³⁹³. Although a transient operation such as making hot requires an additional form (of heat) as an external product (e.g., in some log), cognitive acts are held to be immanent operations since, at the very least, they don't seem to operate through creating some product outside of the power; e.g. in seeing the red thing, one doesn't cause some absolute change in the red thing, unlike when cutting or heating the red thing.

Beyond this traditional description, Durand also asserts that, for immanent actions, first and second act only differ in manner of speaking:

"first and second act, which is to say, form and operation, do not really differ, such that they would make a composition with each other; rather they differ only as the verbal and nominal form of a word, such as 'light' (*lux*) and 'to light/shine' (*lucere*), 'heat' (*calor*) and 'to be hot' (*calere*), 'whiteness' (*albedo*) and 'to be white' (*albescere*), and so on for other cases; but to sense

³⁹³ As quoted in full above, for another traditional account of this distinction, see Aquinas (ST 1a, Q.85, a.2): "Action is of two kinds, as is said in *Metaphysics IX* [1050a23-b2]: one that remains in the agent, like seeing and intelligizing; another that passes into external things, like making hot and cutting." Note that, looking ahead, Durand diverges from Aquinas's further claim, discussed above, that both types of action still occur in virtue of another form, distinct from the agent and the operation itself, as a "likeness of the action's object".

(*sentire*) and to intelligize (*intelligere*) are immanent acts, therefore, [etc.]”
(Ibid. pp.18-19)³⁹⁴.

The case of light (*lux*) and shining (*lucere*) is probably Durand’s clearest example: one can see that, in the Latin, the same root word can be put in a nominal form and in a verbal form; and it makes sense to think that both, nonetheless, refer to one thing, viz. some light source in operation simply by existing and shining forth. However, it might be said that Durand’s other examples of immanent operations seem a bit inclusive; “Of course making hot (*calefacere*) is an operation, but what’s being done in simply being hot or white, for example?” you might ask. In response, to be fair to Durand, these words (*calere*, *albescere*) are hard to translate into English and can just as well be interpreted as meaning something like ‘emitting heat’ or ‘emitting whiteness’, like a shining light, even if nothing external is actually receiving these properties; this sounds more active. Moreover, I take it that part of Durand’s thought here is that, following his first argument above, even a transient operation such as making hot must trace back its activity to the agent

³⁹⁴ As the full passage goes: “*Secundo patet idem ex natura operationis intramantis sic: Ubi cumque actus secundus non transit in materiam exteriorem, actus primus et secundus, sc. forma et operatio, non differunt realiter sic quod faciunt ad invicem compositionem, sed differunt solum dictione verballi et nominali, ut lux et lucere, calor et calere, albedo et albescere, et sic de aliis; sed sentire et intelligere sunt actus intramantes; ergo sunt idem realiter quod sensus et intellectus, nisi quod designantur verbaliter et illa nominaliter. Unde satis irrationabiliter videntur aliqui dicere ponentes, quod intelligere non est exercere aliquam actionem, sed solum habere formam aliquam, sicut calere non est exercere aliquam actionem, sed solum habere formam caloris; et tamen dicunt, quod intelligere non est solum habere intellectum, sed est intellectum habere quandam aliam formam, que est ipsum intelligere; quod est simile, ac si diceretur, quod calere non est habere calorem, sed est calorem habere quandam aliam formam, que sit ipsum calere, quod est ridiculum.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.18-19).

The argument at the end here is interesting, in that Durand seems to provide some justification for how he defines immanent operations, but he seems to have a very specific target (not just someone who thinks intellection requires another form, but also someone who has a completely passive view of cognition (so, perhaps Godfrey or Thomas of Sutton), and who uses the verb “*intelligere*” in two equivocal ways), rather than provide a neutral argument, so I’ve left it to the side here:

“Hence it seems irrational enough that some people hold that *intelligere* is not to exercise any action, but only to have some form, just as to be hot is not to exercise any action but only to have the form of heat; and yet they say that *intelligere* is not only to have an intellect but to have a certain other form which is that *intelligere*; but this is the same as if they were to say that the be hot is not to have heat but to have a certain other form which is to be hot, which is ridiculous.”

The obvious response to this seems to be that *intelligere* can, in one sense, be used to describe a thing as having an intellect and being in potency to operate, and, in a second sense, be used to pick out that operation in full act; being hot doesn’t admit of this division since something is simply hot to the extent it has heat.

being hot, and so, considered independent of the external effect, something is being done *via* the form of heat. For another example, it is also traditional to hold that the form of white, or any other colour, is in itself able to act on an adjacent medium/sense organ, assuming all obstacles are removed, without the colour undergoing any change itself (i.e., colour is an “unmoved mover”); following Durand’s reasoning, this sort of transient action on a medium/organ can be said to depend on some prior immanent “activity” in the form of white, considered in itself, insofar as it is, in itself, sensibly white (i.e., “emits” whiteness) (*albescere*).

So, at the very least, Durand provides a general argument here for the existence of immanent acts, since they explain the activity of transient acts as well. Thus, we need not think of the activity of cognition in terms of any separate product such as a new absolute form of cognition; sense/intellect and sensation/intellection are only distinct in manner of speech.

§4.2. The Second Stage of Durand’s Argument: Answering ‘From What does Cognition Come About?’

However, even with everything Durand says above, more explanation is needed to fill in Durand’s account. In particular, latter in this text, Durand himself admits that these examples of immanent acts don’t completely match the operations of sensitive and intellectual cognition which are, he explains later, indeed more like the transient operation of making hot in some respect. In short, the forms of light and heat, e.g., are always in second act, shining and hot, independent of external circumstances, but, in contrast, sense and intellect are forms which, at least for us, are not always in second act, sensing or thinking; the latter are dependent on external circumstances to move into second act, and in this respect these operations are like the transient

act of making hot which depends on something present to heat. Peter Auriol makes this point clear in his explication of Durand's view:

“They [at least, Durand] say that just as ‘light’ and ‘to light/shine’ are related to each other as first and second act, so too ‘intellect’ and ‘to intelligize’; except that light is always shining, since it does not need any object or any external thing present. The intellect, however, requires the presence of an object to intelligize [i.e., to think about], just as something making hot, to make hot, requires something with the power to be made hot; and hence, this is why it is said that the intellect does not always intelligize, not since intellection adds anything absolute to the intellect, but since there is not always an object present.” (Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 309-314)³⁹⁵

In this section, let's unpack how Durand himself explains this point by covering the second part of Durand's master argument in his text.

To begin, after he gives the three arguments above on what cognition is in general, Durand returns to the more pertinent question concerning from what cognition comes about. Durand begins by explicitly connecting these two topics, arguing that the answer to the latter question follows from his answer to the former:

“Of the second [question], it should be said that to intelligize and to sense (*intelligere et sentire*) are in us *per se* from the giver of sense and intellect, i.e., the creator or generator, from the object however just as a cause *sine qua non*. This first part is clear from these things which were said [above]. For, if to intelligize and to sense are not anything added over sense and intellect, it follows that each of both [power and operation] are from the same thing.” (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.20).³⁹⁶

Durand immediately continues from this passage to build on this argument “from reason and authority” to make his position clear (Ibid.): the first part of this discussion builds on the quick

³⁹⁵ “Dixerunt ergo isti quod sicut lux et lucere se habent sicut actus primus et actus secundus, sic intellectus et intelligere, nisi quod lux semper est in lucere, quia non exigitur aliquod obiectum vel aliquod extrinsecum praesens. Intellectus autem indiget praesentia obiecti ad intelligere, sicut et calefaciens ad calefacere indiget potentia calefactibilis; et hinc est quod intellectus non semper dicitur intelligere, non quia ad intellectum addat intelligere aliquid absolutum, sed quia non est semper praesens obiectum.” (Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1; lines 309-314).

³⁹⁶ “De secundo dicendum, quod intelligere et sentire sunt in nobis per se a dante sensum et intellectum, quod est creans vel generans, ab obiecto autem sicut a causa sine qua non. Primum patet ex hiis, que dicta sunt. Si enim intelligere et sentire non sunt aliquid additum supra sensum et intellectum, consequens est, ut ab eodem sit utrumque.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.20).

argument just quoted and pertains to Durand's claim that the only *per se* (efficient) cause of an act of cognition is what creates the cognitive power in the first place, and the second part clarifies how acts of cognition nonetheless depend on external objects (but as *sine qua non* causes, as Durand says). Put together, this will give us the full reasoning behind Auriol's explication of Durand above and give us a more complete picture of the "relational" aspect of Durand's view.

§4.2.1. The Birth of the Cognitive Powers as the per se Cause of Cognition

Durand continues the first part of this discussion with a general "reason": a "proper" or characteristic act of some kind/species of thing is ultimately from what gives that form through which that thing is put into its relevant kind/species; but an act of sensation or intellection is an act "proper to" what has sense or intellect, respectively, to the extent that a thing has such form(s), so these acts, similarly, "are *per se* from the giver of sense and intellect" (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.20-21)³⁹⁷. To give another sort of example: a horse is the kind of animal it is (and an animal at all) insofar as it has a particular sort of substantial form (*equinity*), which it received from parents of that same kind³⁹⁸; so the thought goes, along with this substantial form also comes the horse's characteristic acts of, e.g., sensation and locomotion, and neighing, which

³⁹⁷ "Patet etiam hoc ratione et auctoritate. Ratio est, quia actus proprius speciei est a dante formam, per quam res in specie reponitur. Sed intelligere est proprius actus habentis intellectum et sentire est proprius actus habentis sensum, in quantum huiusmodi. Ergo sentire et intelligere sunt per se a dante formam sensus et intellectus." (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.20-21).

Note that I've tried to break this argument down above to make it a bit less condensed.

³⁹⁸ Or perhaps, given its form by some higher being with access to this form; it's a common medieval belief, e.g., that each human is given its intellectual soul directly by God.

follow from that animal form³⁹⁹. Durand himself explains this argument further with Aristotle's help and some other examples:

“The authority of Aristotle, *Physics* VIII [chapter 4]⁴⁰⁰, is also for this; for he says here explicitly that the generator giving form also gives the operation and motion corresponding to the form, as what gives heat to fire, gives to it such that, with a flammable thing present, it makes hot, and what gives levity to it [fire], gives to it *per se* upward motion; for what has form alone is in accidental potency for the operation and motion corresponding to the form; and therefore it follows, so that it should be reduced into act, the thing does not need an agent giving a new form, since then it would not be in accidental potency alone, but essential. Therefore, from the same thing, by which it has a form, it also has what it should be according to second act, to the extent that it depends on itself (*quantum est de se*) [i.e., to go into second act].” (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.21)⁴⁰¹

The example of fire heating and going upwards helps clarify what Durand means by something being given a “proper” operation. You can force fire downwards by pushing it down with a wet blanket, but this would only be a violent motion for the fire as it is not internally “meant” to go

³⁹⁹ To use a modern argument, which I think captures part of the thought here, even if something came to be, similar to a given animal, by way of a chance coming together of atoms in a swamp, it wouldn't, so the thought goes, biologically speaking, be that type of animal or, perhaps, even be a “living”, “breathing”, “sensing”, “animal” at all, properly speaking, at least at that moment of creation, since it has no explaining cause or “law” to govern it under such kinds. For a somewhat less extreme example, consider Aristotle's case of a “monstrous” child, born from humans but accidentally resembling a ram or bull, rather than its parents, which child still wouldn't be ram or bull (*Generation of Animals*, 4.3); though, insofar as the child is born from human animals, it could still perform proper acts of sensation and such, but not any proper acts of a ram or bull.

⁴⁰⁰ For more on Durand's Aristotelian sources, see §4.4 below. As we'll see, Durand's reference to Aristotle here is not without further textual support.

⁴⁰¹ “*Auctoritas etiam Aristotelis 8 Phisic. est ad hoc; dicit enim ibi expresse, quod generans dans formam dat etiam operationem et motum convenientem forme, sicut dans calorem igni dat ei ut calefaciat combustibile presens et dans ei levitatem dat ei per se motum sursum; habens enim formam solum est in potentia accidentali ad operationem et motum convenientem forme; et ideo ad hoc, ut reducatur in actum, non indiget agente dante novam formam, quia iam non esset in potentia accidentali solum, sed essentiali. Ab eodem ergo, a quo habet formam, habet etiam, quantum est de se, quod sit sub actu secundo.*” As the rest of the passage goes: “*Et potest ex hoc formari ratio concludens utrumque articulum sic: Illud, quod est solum in potentia accidentali, non est in potentia ad novam formam nec indiget ad hoc, ut reducatur in actum, agente dante novam formam. Sed habens actum primum solum est in potentia accidentali ad actum secundum, qui est operatio. Ergo etc. Maior et minor patent ex 8 Phis.; patet igitur primum, sc. quod sentire et intelligere sunt per se a dante formam sensus et intellectus.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.21).

For some explanation of this translation choice for the phrase “*quantum est de se*”, see what follows. Another way, perhaps, to express the point here is that a cognitive power just is the sort of thing which cognizes, so, in this sense, the act of cognition is, to this extent, from the cognitive power itself.

that way. So far, Durand's argument is in line with the Aristotelian principles we've seen in the *attribution arguments* above, wherein, e.g., everything which is actually ϕ , insofar as it exists (i.e., in its nature), has a natural action to ϕ , such as fire, being inherently light and hot, having natural actions to rise and heat. Moreover, Durand is utilizing the safe Aristotelian claim that something being ϕ in the first place is due to something giving that ϕ -form at creation (viz., another ϕ thing or something, in some other sense, containing ϕ); e.g., as mentioned above, the horse's parents give the form of equinity to the child horse (*via* some matter) at conception; similarly, fire is given its form of heat from some other fire (*via* some cool, dry earth made hot and combusted), or from the Sun, which, as discussed more in the last chapter, is held to "virtually" contain heat insofar as it heats without being actually hot.

Durand, however, takes his argument a step further from these relatively common claims. In particular, this language, in the passage above, of form in "accidental potency" for its operation helps clarify just how close of a connection Durand is positing between form and operation; and this is despite the fact that these are examples where, like cognition, the form is not always in operation. Fire, in its essence, rises and makes things hot, and in this sense, Durand argues, its forms of levity and heat just are its proper operations. However, external factors can happen to prevent these operations (e.g., a ceiling might be present to stop fire's movement upwards or something cool/heatable might be missing to heat) and in this sense it is only accidental or, as Durand puts it below, "contingent" that fire is not actually engaging in these acts at all times. Thus, as Durand puts it, fire is only accidentally in potency with respect to these operations and so it does not itself require a "real" change, with a new form, to go from first act into second act. In contrast, to use Durand's terminology, an object like a cool, dry log is in "essential potency" to be heated or ignited since it needs to be given a new form, the form of

heat, to undergo either such change. So, if indeed cognitive form and operation are related to each other as accidental potency to its proper operation, the same thing which causes the form also causes the operation, to the extent that the operation is sufficiently grounded in absolute being in the form.

To be clear, Gonsalvus and company, with their similar Aristotelian foundations, would still agree with Durand here that the natural activity on the side of the agent, to “get things going” requires no change, at least in principle (e.g., the cognitive power in first act is still an unmoved mover, as a natural form for a natural effect)⁴⁰²; moreover, they would agree that the fire’s transient activity, in making some wood hot doesn’t require a real change in the fire. Nevertheless, Durand differs from Gonsalvus and company beforehand insofar as the latter company still posit a normal formal change, a new accidental form (viz., a quality), at the end of the process. For Gonsalvus and company, the form of a cognitive act comes to inhere in the cognitive subject at the completion of the power’s natural activity and, since this is the same cognitive subject that acts, cognition is dubbed a sort of “self-motion”. For Durand, in cognition, no extra self-motion occurs; the cognitive power’s change is merely relational (an object is now present, such that the power is now unobstructed to be in its natural state, in a cognitive relation with its object).

⁴⁰² To be clear, this isn’t to say that the cognitive power is always in “first act” for all types of cognition for Gonsalvus and company; there’s more room for formal (qualitative) change/variation within the power for these figures. Nevertheless, I don’t think this goes against the “essential” activity for their view, as we’ve seen in Chapter 2 and will return to below.

§4.2.2. *The Objects of Cognition as Sine qua non, per Accidens Causes*

Durand picks up this general argument, with this language concerning “accidental potency”, in the second part of this discussion, where Durand transitions from the causal work of the giver of form to the role of the object of cognition. Much of what Durand says in the section above carries over, but here he is more explicit in what way we should think that a cognitive power is in accidental potency to its act; namely, a cognitive power is in accidental potency to its operation relative to its object cognized. As Durand puts his point at the beginning of this section: by considering the object of cognition as a *sine qua non* cause, a third thing will also be made clear, “namely, how intellectual and sensitive cognition are in us, and why we are not always sensing our intelligizing, although we always have sense and intellect” (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.21-23)⁴⁰³.

Finally getting to what I hinted at earlier, in this passage Durand admits that acts of cognition are, in one respect, more like transient acts, such as making hot (*calefacere*), than

⁴⁰³ I'll just include the full passage here: “*Secundum patet sc. quod sint ab obiecto sicut a causa sine qua non; et in hoc apparebit tertium principale, sc. qualiter intelligere et sentire fiant in nobis, et quare non semper intelligimus aut sentimus, cum semper habeamus sensum et intellectum. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum, quod actus primus et secundus quandoque perficiunt rem secundum se et absolute vel sic significantur, ut calor et calere, albedo et albescere. Et in talibus simul et inseparabiliter res ab eodem efficitur sub primo actu et secundo; simul enim et ab eodem aliquid est calidum et calet, album et albescit. Quandoque autem actus primus et secundus perficiunt rem non absolute, sed in habitu ad alterum et sic significantur, ut calefactivum et disgregativum, calefacere et disgregare; et respectum talem importat actus primus secundum potentiam, actus autem secundus secundum actum, et in talibus non semper simul est aliquid sub actu primo et secundo, sed contingit quandoque habere actum primum sine secundo. Cuius ratio est, quia actus primus requirit presentiam eius, ad quod dicitur, solum secundum potentiam; sed operatio vel actus secundus requirit presentiam eius secundum actum. Ad hoc enim, quod aliquid sit calefactivum, sufficit, quod possit habere calefactibile, sed ad calefacere requiritur actualiter presens calefactibile; et quia contingit aliquid esse presens secundum potentiam, quod tamen non est actu presens, ideo contingit aliquid esse sub actu primo absque actu secundo. De numero autem talium actuum sunt intellectus vel principium intellectivum et intelligere; dicitur enim utrumque non omnino absolute, sed in habitu ad intelligibile, quam habitudinem importat intellectus secundum potentiam, intelligere autem secundum actum. Propter quod habens intellectum non semper intelligit, quia non semper habet intelligibile actu presens. Per quid ergo reducitur de potentia intelligendi ad actum? Dicendum, ut tactum est, quod per illud, quod dat intellectum per se, quia dans intellectum, quantum est de se, dat intelligere, quia habere intellectum est intelligere presens obiectum; obiectum autem presentatum vel presentans obiectum est causa sine qua non pro eo quod intelligere non est perfectio mere absoluta, sed in comparatione ad alterum.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.21-23).

invariable immanent acts, such as being hot (*calere*): the latter cannot but be in operation so long as the relevant form, such as heat, exists, but acts of cognition, like transient acts, are not always in operation. Our cognitive acts are not always in operation since, at least for finite creatures such as ourselves, cognitive acts are said with respect to/relative to some external thing which may or may not be present. So, in this respect, given this variance and dependency, cognitive acts are similar to transient acts (Ibid.)⁴⁰⁴.

In the case of a transient act, such as making hot, the operation is *relative* to an external product and depends on the literal presence of something external to act on to generate that product in (e.g., a cold log to heat/burn). Nevertheless, as explained above, this act is still just the form performing its proper operation; i.e., this operation is entirely founded upon its form in absolute being and so the form only essentially depends on itself to go into operation. The form is merely in accidental potency to its operation when it does not have anything present to act on. Similarly, an act of cognition is *relative* to the presence of something else, namely, at least paradigmatically, an external object to cognize. Nevertheless, considered in itself, cognition is just the cognitive power in full act, performing its proper operation; indeed, Durand explains, sense and intellect are each called a “power”/“potency” (*potentia*) mainly with respect to its accidental state of being in potency, whereas its proper state is *actually* cognizing (Ibid.).

Both for cognition, and for a transient act like making hot, the presence of something external is considered a *sine qua non* cause in that it is a “cause” in the most deflationary sense:

⁴⁰⁴ In contrast, God is always present to everything intelligible, and thus always in full act. Now, one may wonder why a finite creature might not always at least cognize themselves, but Durand doesn't address that here. Perhaps, given what he says here, part of Durand's thought would be that cognitive powers are not cognizable unless in full act, which is a standard medieval Aristotelian position. That still leaves other consistently present objects, such as one's body, to at least sense, but these can at least be obstructed from sensation by sleep, it appears. Either way, it still stands that sensation and intellection are still episodic in us, following what is grasped at any moment, and Durand is at least explaining that sort of “change” in us.

the presence of something external is a mere removal of an obstacle, without which removal the power cannot be in full act, as the fire needs something to make hot to be in the operation of making hot and the cognitive power needs something to sense or think to be said to actually sense or think.

However, although left unsaid here, it's clear enough that these acts still differ in that a transient act, such as making hot, changes something external, whereas cognition does not itself change its external object (nor, strictly speaking, does it change some form in itself), so cognition is still said to be an immanent act in this respect⁴⁰⁵. Nevertheless, the similarity holds that to cognize a log or to heat up a log are both relative to some log and, in general, a cognitive power and heat/fire can be said to be in mere accidental potency when not performing these respective operations; thus, Durand can argue that neither agent need take on a new form to be in operation, they just need the removal of an obstacle (even if, in the case of heating a log, some new form comes to be outside of the heating agent).

§4.3. Summary of Durand's Overall Argument

To summarize, going back to the start of this section (§4.1), Durand's master argument has two major parts, where the second part can also be split into two. The first claim Durand wants to establish is that (i) cognition is not some *absolute* form *really* distinct from its cognitive power. Given this non-distinctness, Durand argues that (ii) the only efficient cause needed for cognition is what caused the cognitive power to come to be in the first place, i.e. the "giver of form", and

⁴⁰⁵ Moreover, at least in principle these operations differ in that at least God's act of cognition can never be obstructed, at least from Himself, and thus cognition can in this case be related to its form as light to shining and other invariant immanent acts.

likewise, (iii) the object of cognition is not needed as an efficient cause, to give a new form to the power, but is a mere cause *sine qua non*; i.e., although cognition, considered in itself, just is the cognitive power in operation, still, considered with respect to its end, the power needs an object present without which it would not be cognition *of/in relation to* anything. Overall, to use an analogy, a cognitive power when not in full act is like a spring being held back, but when the cognitive power has something to cognize it is released into its natural state, like the spring released into its rest state, taking on no *absolute* change⁴⁰⁶. [Or, to use another analogy, a cognitive power is like a window, in itself able to put some object into view without any internal change, but requiring an object and other external conditions to perform its job.] Durand himself nominally cuts up his first section to cover topic (i) (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.17-20), then his second section to cover conclusions (ii) & (iii) (Ibid. pp. 20-23), but as I've been trying to make clear in my presentation, topic (i) extends into his second section, where Durand adds further arguments "from reason and authority"; in particular, Durand picks up the authority of Aristotle and the language of a power in "accidental potency" to further explain the claim that cognition is not really distinct from its cognitive power. Moving forward, I want to return to these additional points and cover more of Durand's use of Aristotle as a whole. So far, I've kept fairly close to Durand's presentation, but here on I want to zoom out a bit more to see the larger context of Durand's view.

⁴⁰⁶ If the change in size of the spring seems too real (i.e. absolute) to you, then take this as a metaphor. However, it seems to be the case that Durand, like Ockham, would take this sort of quantitative change in shape to be a non-absolute change; the spring is only de-compressed like a line being stretched out but retaining the same number of points. For Durand's views on shape and number, Hartman (forthcoming) helpfully provides the following citations: Sent. [B] 1.17.3, n. 33; Sent. [A]/[B] 3.23.1, n. 21; Sent. [C] 1.43.2, n. 27; Sent. [C] 1.44.2, n. 20; Sent. [C] 4.12.1, n. 7; Quodl. Par. 1.1, 42–43; and Quodl. Par. 1.5 (cf. Hartman forthcoming, p.5, fn.13).

§4.4. Reflecting on Durand’s Aristotelian Foundations

§4.4.1. An “Accidental” Power and its Proper Activity (Form in First and Second Act) – Physics VIII

To repeat, as we’ve seen above, Durand presents his first explicit argument from authority by citing Aristotle, *Physics VIII*, to claim that “the generator giving form also gives the operation and motion corresponding to the form”, which Durand further explains in terms of form being in “accidental potency” for its operation, from its initial generation, and thus no new form is required for the operation, unlike for an “essential potency” to go into act (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.21). Interestingly enough, as others have noted, Durand does not take this terminology of “accidental” and “essential potency” directly from the Latin translations of Aristotle; rather, most directly, Durand seems to have picked up these terms from the glosses of the Latin Averroes. As Hartman (2012) mentions, Hervaeus even “pedantically” complains about this fact in his determination of Durand’s text:

“As to what is said of being in accidental potency, it should be known that those words, ‘being in accidental or essential potency’, are not directly the words of Aristotle in *Physics VIII*, but of his Commentator, who seems to have derived this distinction from the words of Aristotle there, where he says that it is one thing for something to be in potency for being located above, where something is light in potency and in potency for being above, and it is another thing for something to be actually light and in potency for being above. The first of which the Commentator calls being in essential potency, but the second he calls being in accidental potency.” (*Quodlibet III*, Q.8; pp.73-74; cf. Hartman 2012, pp.102-103)⁴⁰⁷

⁴⁰⁷ “Ad illud autem, quod dicitur de esse in potentia accidentali, sciendum, quod ista verba ‘esse in potentia accidentali vel essentiali’ non sunt directe verba Aristotelis in 8 Phis., sed sui Commentatoris qui istam distinctionem videtur accepisse ex verbis Aristotelis ibi, quibus dicit, quod aliter est in potentia ad esse sursum illud, quod est in potentia leve et in potentia ad esse sursum, et aliter illud, quod est actu leve et in potentia ad esse sursum. Quorum primum vocat Commentator esse in potentia essentiali, secundum autem esse in potentia accidentali.” (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet III*, Q.8; pp.73-74).

Indeed, in his commentary on *Physics* VIII, much as Durand says, Averroes uses this terminology to differentiate (i) the state of, e.g., fire or air, which is only in potency (i.e. not actually) in an above location, insofar as it is restricted from its natural motion upwards, and (ii) that state of, e.g., some dry earthen wood or water, which is “in potency” to be above at a farther remove, insofar as it needs to first be acted on by some fire, to receive heat, so as to change in substance into fire or air. The former is a state of mere “accidental potency” with respect to this activity (i.e., being above), insofar as it is accidental/contingent that the air/fire is not in its proper activity (i.e. in “second act”); the latter is a state of “essential potency” insofar as the earth/water is missing the principle of this activity, being above, in its essence (fire/air is essentially light, but earth/water is essentially heavy) (see Averroes, *Commentary on Physics* VIII, c.32; pp.368-369). More commonly, in Aristotelian scholarship, this former state is referred to as a state of “second potency”/“first act”, the latter, a state of mere “first potency”.

Hervaeus’s qualification aside, one can still see how Durand, and Averroes before him, would read the original text of Aristotle, *Physics* VIII (specifically, book 4), with the above terminological distinction; see, e.g., the following excerpt from Aristotle, also brought up by Hartman (2012):

“In the same way, too, what is potentially of a certain quality or of a certain quantity or in a certain place is naturally movable when it contains the corresponding principle in itself and not accidentally (for the same thing may be both of a certain quality and of a certain quantity, but the one is an accidental, not an essential property of the other.) So when fire or earth is moved by something the motion is violent when it is unnatural, and natural when it brings to actuality the proper activities that they potentially possess. But the fact that the term ‘potentiality’ is used in more than one way is the reason why it is evident whence such motions as the upward motion of fire and the downward motion of earth are derived. [...] Thus what is cold is potentially hot: then a change takes place and it is fire, and it burns, unless something prevents and hinders it. So, too, with heavy and light: light is generated from heavy, e.g. air from water (for water is first such potentially), and air is actually light, and will at once realize its proper activity unless something prevents it.

The activity of lightness consists in the thing being in a certain place, namely high up: when it is in the contrary place, it is being prevented. [...] As we have said, a thing may be potentially light or heavy in more ways than one. Thus not only when a thing is water is it in a sense potentially light, but when it has become air it may be still potentially light; for it may be that through some hindrance it does not occupy an upper position, whereas, if what hinders it is removed, it realizes its activity and continues to rise higher.” (*Physics* VIII.4, 255a25–b23; trans. R. Hardie and R. Gaye; cf. Hartman 2012, pp.101-102).

Indeed, as with Averroes’ gloss, Aristotle distinguishes two states: (i) there is the potential for something to be in an act which is “natural” to what that thing is, as, e.g., fire, *qua* light, is naturally above, and earth, *qua* heavy, is naturally below (only accidentally, through something external, are the elements not in their natural place); and, in contrast, (ii) there is the potential which is “violent”, as, e.g., the heavy is not naturally above, nor is the light naturally below (though the elements *can* be placed by an external agent into these non-natural places)⁴⁰⁸. From this, as Durand says, it indeed appears fair to say that the former, “natural”, potency and its act are both generated at the same time insofar as it is merely accidental that, e.g., something heavy by nature isn’t below, or something light by nature isn’t upwards; so, as Durand puts it, “the generator giving form also gives the operation and motion corresponding to the form”, as, e.g., that which generates a heavy element gives it both heaviness and its natural act (to be below/go downwards) (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.21). So, so far, nothing seems decidedly “un-Aristotelian” in Durand’s terminology.

⁴⁰⁸ In one sense of “essential” and “accidental”, Aristotle seems to speak of the first sort of potency as “essential”, insofar as it is tied to a thing’s essence to go into act, and the latter sort of potency as “accidental”/“non-essential”, insofar as it goes against a thing’s nature/essence to go into act. Note, however, that the Averroist terminology swaps the order here, and uses another sense of “essential” and “accidental”, where the first sort of potency is “accidental” (i.e., only accidentally in potency, even though it is of the thing’s essence to be in act) and the latter sort is “essential” (i.e., essentially in potency, and only accidentally is the thing in act otherwise to its nature/essence).

§4.4.2. *Cognition as a Natural and Immanent Act – Metaphysics IX*

For another explicit reference to Aristotle from Durand, in line with the above terminology, one can also look at Durand's above *attribution arguments*, especially where he cites *Metaphysics IX.8* (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.9-11, p.19). As we've explored, the guiding idea of any *attribution argument* is that a cognitive act needs to trace its activity back to a correspondingly *cognitive power, qua active cause*, the former being a natural act of the latter; for Durand, the extra move here is to argue that the cognitive power and its natural act are so intimately connected so as to be one and the same in absolute form. First and foremost, Durand cites *Metaphysics IX.8* to justify the claim that cognition, whether sensitive or intellectual, is indeed an action, albeit an "immanent" act, in distinction to "transient" acts/productions. Moreover, as we can see, in this text Aristotle also describes cognition as a "natural" act, which traces its activity back to a corresponding cognitive "nature" or "power", and this lends itself to Durand's particular view.

At the beginning of *Metaphysics IX.8*, Aristotle starts by expanding his terminology of "powers"/"potentiality", as principles of change (or rest), to include not just the active power of one thing to act on another thing "insofar as it is other" (as, e.g., fire has a power to heat wood), or the passive power to be acted on by another thing (as wood has a power to be heated by fire), but also "all starting-points of change or remaining at rest in general"; from this, Aristotle gives the strict definition of a "nature" as that which contains its own principle for change:

"For nature is also in the same kind as potentiality. For it is a starting-point of movement - not, however, in another thing but in the thing itself insofar as it is itself." (*Metaphysics IX.8*, 1049b4-10; trans. C.D.C. Reeve).

For the rest of this text, Aristotle's aim is to argue that activity is prior to potentiality for all these sorts of "potentialities", even the last sort.

In the oft cited part of this text, where Aristotle distinguishes so-called immanent and transient acts, Aristotle is discussing one of the senses in which activity is prior to potentiality, as in the case of a power/“capacity” and its use/function:

“For the function is the end, and the activity is the function, and this is why the name ‘activity’ is said of things with reference to function, and extends to actuality. And, whereas in some cases it is the use that is the ultimate thing (for example, seeing in the case of sight, and nothing else beyond this comes to be from sight), from other things something [else] does come to be (for example, from the craft of building a house comes to be that is beyond the activity of building), yet the use is in the former case no less the end, and in the latter case more the end than the capacity is. For the activity of building is in what is being built and comes to be and is at the same time as the house. In the use, in those cases the activity is in what is being produced – for example, the activity of building is what is being built, of weaving is in what is being woven, and similarly in the other cases, and in general the movement is in what is being moved. But in all the cases where there is not some other work beyond the activity, the activity is in the relevant things – for example, the seeing is in the one who sees, the contemplating in the one who contemplates, and the living in the soul (which is why happiness is also in it, since it is a certain sort of living). So it is evident that the substance and the form are activity.” (*Metaphysics* IX.8, 1050a20-1050b1).

Based on Aristotle’s above strict definition of a “nature” as a principle for change which remains in a thing insofar as it exists, it appears that Aristotle would especially have in mind the latter sort of principles for “immanent” change/activity, as in the examples of the sense power for sensation, the intellective power for intelligizing/contemplating, and the soul as a principle for living in general, all of which have activities which remain in the relevant power. Moreover, given Aristotle’s aim in this passage, these given “natures”, although initially described as “potencies”, are, in essence, active/actual prior to being “potential”; that is, e.g., the sensitive power/subject is what it is insofar as it is sensing, in act, but only accidentally does not sense.

Since such immanent actions are said to remain in their corresponding subjects/substance essentially, Aristotle finally concludes in the above passage that, in these cases, “the substance and the form are activity”. This last part especially lends itself to Durand’s view (as in his above

argument based on the nature of immanent acts, in particular) that, in essence, a cognitive power/substance just is its substantial/natural form, *qua* cognitive, in act; i.e., no additional form is required for such a substance to go into its natural/immanent act since, by essence, a substance/substantial form just is its activity and only accidentally is not in act (as, e.g., when obstructed, missing an object to cognize).

Of course, one might take issue with Durand's exact interpretation of Aristotle here (perhaps, e.g., there is still some sense in which a substance in act includes some real accidental form, as an internal product, for Aristotle). Moreover, one might question whether Aristotle or Durand is exactly consistent in what they call a "nature" above (e.g., isn't fire "naturally" a power to heat other things despite this action leaving the power?). Nevertheless, so far Durand's view still seems perfectly "Aristotelian" in its core metaphysical motivations.

§4.4.3. *The Soul as Unmoved in Act – De anima II & III, Physics VII*

In line with Durand's above (explicit) references to Aristotle, in II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5, one can also find similar appeals to Aristotle, especially the *De anima*, outside of II Sent. [A]. First off, although missing in, at least, Koch's (1935) edition of II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5, we can find a citation to *De anima* II at the beginning of Auriol's explication of Durand's position; in particular, Auriol here explicates Durand's position with the help of Durand's first unique argument, as discussed above, based on the distinction between form, as first act, and operation, as second act:

"Also, some [i.e., Durand] have said that an act of intelligizing is nothing absolute added to a power, but only a relation towards an object (*respectus ad obiectum*). This, however, is able to be clarified in multiple ways. For [example]: those things which are distinguished by opposition [from each

other] are not able to be one and the same thing. But first act and second act are distinguished, as is clear from *De anima* II. However, first act is an absolute form, therefore, second act and operation will be a relative form.” (Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 292-296; cf. Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.18)⁴⁰⁹.

Within *De anima* II, Auriol seems to have in mind *De anima* II.5 in particular; here, similar to *Physics* VIII, Aristotle also distinguishes two types of potentiality and two types of actuality in terms of first and second potentiality and first and second act (Aristotle, *De anima* II.5; 417a21-418a5). Notably, one of Aristotle’s examples given in II.5 is even that of sensation, which Aristotle says is naturally in second potency/first act from birth (i.e., when the sense power is put into existence from the male parent as the giver of form), whereas second act consists in the exercise of sensation (Ibid. 417b19-19)⁴¹⁰. So, this reference indeed seems to help corroborate Durand’s own “Aristotelian” account of cognition, at least for sensation, as discussed above.

However, what is perhaps Aristotle’s most famous example in this text, especially for the distinction between first and second act, is that of intellectual knowledge, as in the case of the grammarian who either (i) “knows” but is not exercising her knowledge or (ii) “knows” and is exercising her knowledge; indeed, Aristotle centers his explication of these distinctions around this example:

“But we must now distinguish different senses in which things can be said to be potential or actual; at the moment we are speaking as if each of these phrases had only one sense. We can speak of something as a knower either as when we say that man is a knower, meaning that man falls within the class of beings that know or have knowledge, or as when we are speaking of a man

⁴⁰⁹ “*Dixerunt quoque alii quod actus intelligendi nihil est absolutum additum ad potentiam, sed tantum respectus ad obiectum. Hoc autem potest multipliciter declarari. Illa enim quae ex opposito distinguuntur, non possunt esse unum et idem. Sed actus primus et secundus distinguuntur, ut patet in II De anima. Actus autem primus est forma absoluta, ergo actus secundus et operatio erit forma respectiva.*” (Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 292-296; cf. Aristotle, *De anima* II.5, 417a21-418a5).

⁴¹⁰ “In the case of what is to possess sense, the first transition is due to the action of the male parent and takes place before birth so that at birth the living thing is, in respect of sensation, at the stage which corresponds to the possession of knowledge. Actual sensation corresponds to the stage of the exercise of knowledge.” (Aristotle, *De anima* II.5, 417b16-19; trans. J.A. Smith).

who possesses a knowledge of grammar; each of these has a potentiality, but not in the same way: the one because his kind or matter is such and such, the other because he can reflect when he wants to, if nothing external prevents him. And there is the man who is already reflecting - he is a knower in actuality and in the most proper sense is knowing, e.g., this A. Both the former are potential knowers, who realize their respective potentialities, the one by change of quality, i.e. repeated transitions from one state to its opposite under instruction, the other in another way by the transition from the inactive possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise.

Also the expression 'to be acted upon' has more than one meaning; it may mean either the extinction of one of two contraries by the other, or the maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, as actual to potential. For what possesses knowledge becomes an actual knower by a transition which is either not an alteration of it at all (being in reality a development into its true self or actuality) or at least an alteration in a quite different sense. Hence it is wrong to speak of a wise man as being 'altered' when he uses his wisdom, just as it would be absurd to speak of a builder as being altered when he is using his skill in building a house. What in the case of thinking or understanding leads from potentiality to actuality ought not to be called teaching but something else. That which starting with the power to know learns or acquires knowledge through the agency of one who actually knows and has the power of teaching either ought not to be said 'to be acted upon' at all - or else we must recognize two senses of alteration, viz. the change to conditions of privation, and the change to a thing's dispositions and to its nature." (Aristotle, *De anima* II.5; 417a21-b16).

Interestingly, in another text of Durand's, the report to his *Disputed Questions with an Anonymous Person* (also included in Koch's (1935) edition of II Sent. [A] D.3, Q.5), Durand provides a similar reference to *De anima*, though this time to book III, where Aristotle gives the same sort of case of "habitual knowledge"; as Durand argues:

"That which is in accidental potency alone is not in potency for any form making a real composition. But the intellect after it is habituated is in accidental potency alone with respect to an act of intelligizing. Therefore, etc. The major is clear, since that which is in accidental potency, for this which should actually come about, does not require a transmutation. But what is in potency to form requires a transmutation since a form is not able to be brought about (*induci*) in a subject, nor drawn out (*educi*) from a subject, unless through an action of an agent of transmutation⁴¹¹. Hence, in *De anima* III, it is

⁴¹¹ Although it doesn't matter too much for our purposes, Durand might mean two things by this contrast between a form being brought about/drawn into (*induci*) or drawn out from (*educi*) a subject; most simply, (i) Durand might have in mind the contrast between a form being added to something (e.g., heat added to a log by fire) and a form

said that it is one thing for the intellect to be in potency before a habit of knowledge and after a habit, since, in the first case, it is in essential potency with respect to form, in which case it requires a transmutation, from/with respect to the senses (*a sensibus*), for intellection; in the second case, it [i.e., the habituated intellect] is in accidental potency alone, in which case it does not require a transmutation; rather, from itself, when it wishes, it is able to go into act, upon the removal of an obstacle, as is clear of the motion of the heavy downwards⁴¹².” (Durand, *Disputatio*; p.41; see, e.g., Aristotle, *De anima* III.4, 429b5-9)⁴¹³.

That is, as with *De anima* II.5, Durand reads Aristotle as making a distinction between (i) a knower in first potency, or “essential potency” (in complete potency for knowledge of some fact), (ii) a knower in first act/second potency, or “accidental potency” (as with someone who knows some fact of grammar but is not contemplating that knowledge), and (iii) a knower in second act or operation (as in the case of someone in an occurrent act of intellectual contemplation of this fact of grammar). Most importantly, at least in the case of the move between (ii) and (iii), no absolute “transmutation” is said to be required, as one is simply exercising some knowledge already acquired; by a “transmutation”, Durand seems to mean some

being taken away from something (e.g., heat taken away from a log by cold water), thus covering both positive and negative changes; alternatively, (ii), Durand might have in mind two different types of positive changes, one where a form is completely lacking from a thing, but added to it by some agent with said form (e.g., heat from the fire entering the cold log), another where a form exists in a sort of “seminal”/inchoate state in a thing, but this form must be “drawn out” into full actuality by an outside agent (e.g., the tree in the seed).

⁴¹² That is, I take it Durand’s point is that the heavy object is only analogous to the intellect insofar as both go into act upon the removal of an obstacle; the heavy object does not also “wish” to fall, at least not in the same sense as the intellectual substance.

⁴¹³ “*Uterius ad principale: Illud quod est in potentia accidentali tantum, non est in potentia ad aliquam formam facientem compositionem realem. Sed intellectus post habitum est in potentia accidentali tantum respectu actus intelligendi. Ergo etc. Maior patet, quia illud quod est in potentia accidentali, ad hoc quod fiat actu, non indiget transmutatione. Sed quod est in potentia ad formam, indiget transmutatione, quia forma non potest induci in subiecto nec educi de subiecto nisi per actionem agentis transmutantis. Unde 3 de anima dicitur, quod aliter est in potentia intellectus ante habitum scientie et post habitum, quia primo [modo] est in potentia essentiali que respicit formam, in quo indiget transmutatione a sensibus ad intellectum; secundo modo est in potentia accidentali tantum, in quo non indiget transmutante, sed seipso cum voluerit potest exire in actum, remoto prohibente, sicut patet de motu gravis deorsum.*” (Durand, *Disputatio*; p.41).

“When thought has become each thing in the way in which a man who actually knows is said to do so (this happens when he is now able to exercise the power on his own initiative), its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery; and thought is then able to think of itself.” (Aristotle, *De anima* III.4, 429b5-9).

change in opposites, from lacking to having some absolute form/quality, as, e.g., in the case of something cold taking on the contrary form of heat. Hence, in this way, Durand seeks to make sense of Aristotle's claim that this "move", at least from (ii) to (iii), is not an "alteration" in the intellectual subject, at least in the strict sense of the term. So, at the very least, Durand takes it that an Aristotelian should not, in principle, take issue with his claim that a cognitive power in first act/second potentiality can go into second act/operation without requiring any "absolute" change of some additional form/quality within the cognitive power (i.e., some real "transmutation"); one can "think when they wish", so long as nothing obstructs the exercise of this intellectual knowledge.

However, all that being said, as Durand seems aware of, this case of habitual knowledge might not seem to perfectly match with what Aristotle says about sensation, or Durand's own general account of cognition. As Durand admits in his explication of *De anima* II/III above, Aristotle still says the intellectual power, seemingly in contrast to the senses, needs to be "habituated" from state (i), in essential potency, to state (ii), in accidental potency, and this is through some sort of absolute "transmutation" from/with respect to the senses. So, this seems to describe a sort of *Middle View*, at least of intellectual cognition, as discussed above, where the intellect takes on some absolute *species*/habit before it can go into (second) act (most immediately caused by some phantasm/*species* in the senses); on this interpretation, it seems only the move from the intellect in habit to actual intellection is not a strictly "real" change for Aristotle.

However, although the above might be the typical medieval interpretation of Aristotle, it should be pointed out that Durand at least leaves it ambiguous what sort of "transmutation"

happens between states (i) and (ii) for intellection/knowledge. Durand very ambiguously says that, in the “habituation” of the intellect, there is a transmutation from/with respect to the senses (*a sensibus*), which might only refer to a change in the senses/sense organs, in *phantasia*; so, e.g., an intellectual subject becomes disposed to contemplate felinity insofar as she has received and retained images of different cats in her inner sense organs, though no absolute change has occurred in the intellect properly speaking. A bit below the cited passage above, Durand indeed seems to commit Aristotle to this interpretation, insofar as Durand cites another text of Aristotle, *Physics* VII, where, as Durand puts it, “it is said that, for the intellect, there is no alteration” (*Disputatio*; p.42)⁴¹⁴. In particular, Durand seems to have in mind *Physics* VII.3, where Aristotle indeed says that “the states of the intellectual part of the soul are not alterations”, that even “the original acquisition of knowledge is not a becoming or an alteration”, and that, nevertheless, “in either case, the result is brought about through the alteration of something in the body”; as Aristotle concludes, “it is evident, then, [...] that alteration and being altered occur in sensible things and in the sensitive part of the soul and, except accidentally, in nothing else” (*Physics* VII.3, 247a28-248a8; trans. R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye)⁴¹⁵. So, in other words, if at least the intellectual part of the soul is not capable of absolute alterations or “transmutations”, but the body or sensitive part of the soul is capable of such alterations, then any habituation of the

⁴¹⁴ “*Preterea 7 Phis. dicitur, quod circa intellectum non est alteratio; sed si intelligere esset res faciens realem compositionem, tunc intellectus alteraretur, cum factus sit de non intelligente actu intelligens. Ergo etc.*” (Durand, *Disputatio*; p.42; cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VII.3).

⁴¹⁵ [From Moerbeke’s Latin translation: “*At vero neque in intellectiva parte animae est alteratio: sciens enim ad aliquid maxime dicitur. Hoc autem manifestum est: secundum enim nullam potentiam motis, fit in nobis scientia, sed cum extiterit quiddam. [...] Manifestum igitur quod ipsum alterationis in sensibilibus est, et in sensibili parte animae: in alio autem nullo, nisi secundum accidens.*”]

Note that there is some debate as to whether Aristotle changes his mind between the *Physics* and the *De anima* on this topic; in particular, there is some contention as to whether Aristotle more universally disregards strict “change” in the soul in the *De anima*, even for the sensitive soul (see Menn 2002). This interpretation would help Durand’s case insofar as, ultimately, he wishes to have a similarly general account of cognitive “change”, as we’ve seen; in this case, Durand would strictly regard any “changes” in the senses (as mentioned of *phantasia* above) to be in the body, not the sensitive soul proper.

intellect need only be preceded by the latter such changes. So, in this way, even the change between states (i) and (ii) above do not require the addition of some new form/quality in the intellect proper, according to this reading of Aristotle, and thus, this is in line with Durand's relational view of cognition, as we've seen it above.

Overall, it's notable that Durand's account here seems perfectly "Aristotelian" in its motivations, despite the fact that, as I just said, he's diverging from the typical medieval interpretation. This is not to say that prior medieval "Aristotelians" were unaware of these passages, wherein Aristotle seems to disregard strict change in the soul; rather, they simply preferred to stick to a looser, broader, sense of "change" for the purposes of this debate. E.g., as mentioned in the footnotes above (fn.230), the Latin Averroes gives a non-committal gloss on a similar passage from Aristotle's *De anima* [III.4], saying that Aristotle still means to say that the intellect has the "being of a passive power" (*esse de virtute passiva*), despite the fact that he admits it is "only insofar as the intellect receives the form which it comprehends"; the intellect is not "transmutable", Averroes explains, insofar as it is not a body nor the power of a body, as in the case of elemental changes (Averroes, *Long Commentary on DA*, III, cc.2-3; p.382). Of sense, Averroes's gloss seems to be that the sense power is "transmutable", though that "transmutation" is, at least in some cases, accidental to sensation (Ibid. p.381).⁴¹⁶

Of particular interest, Godfrey, in his *Fully Passive View* of cognition, similarly, is well aware of such a distinction, for Aristotle, between corporeal "transmutations" and whatever "change" occurs in the soul/intellect, but still regards the latter as "passions" in the relevant

⁴¹⁶ See fn.229 above for these passages and prior discussion.

sense; indeed, Godfrey uses this very distinction to argue that, since the intellect has no organ for corporeal “transmutations”, the only change it can undergo is intellection (*Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, p.274)⁴¹⁷. Moreover, as we’ve seen in Durand’s explication of the typical *Middle View*, according to Aristotle’s *De anima* [III.4], the “reception [of an intelligible *species*] is called a ‘passion’ broadly speaking” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.9; cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III.4, 429 a13-18)⁴¹⁸. That is, proponents of the *Middle View* still admit of passive changes in the intellect, even if Aristotle does not refer to these changes as “passions” in the strict sense; nevertheless, they disagree with Godfrey and the like only in terms of whether this “passion” is an intelligible *species* prior to intellection or intellection itself. So, in other words, both the *Fully Passive* and *Middle Views* are in agreement that, for this debate, so it is claimed, this technicality doesn’t matter; any initial “change” in the soul/intellect, whether a *species* or an act of cognition, is still broadly a “change” for Aristotle, and passive either way.

Durand, in contrast, clearly wants to take Aristotle seriously on the claim that the soul is not strictly “changed” in this debate concerning the activity/passivity of the soul in cognition. Durand’s view might easily be mistaken as “un-Aristotelian” relative to these more popular medieval views, also tied to Aristotle’s authority, but, as we can see, Durand simply has a

⁴¹⁷ “*Consimili etiam mutatione potest et ipsum organum immutari, quae etiam non est essentialiter sensatio, alioquin etiam esset sensatio in medio et etiam in organo, virtute sensitiva corrupta. [...] Sed in quantum est vis animalis et sensitiva sola sensatione immutatur; et sic illud, quod per se immutat sensibile in potentia sensitiva ut sensitiva est, non est nisi ipsa potentia secundum quod talis, et illud secundum quod sensibile ipsam potentiam sensitivam immutat non est nisi sensatio; sed tamen hoc etiam aliter immutatur modo praedicto. Cum ergo intellectus non sit potentia organica, non potest ab aliquo immutari nisi secundum quod potentia apprehensiva; ipsa autem in quantum huiusmodi non est in potentia nisi ad apprehensionem; ergo nec ad aliud per se immutatur. Sed huic non obstat quod ex huiusmodi actibus habitus posterior derelinquitur, ut alias visum est. Sed nihil potest fieri in ipsa potentia ante ipsum actum intelligendi. Sic ergo videtur dicendum quod non fit in eo nisi ipsa intellectio, sive actus intelligendi per se et immediate.*” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet IX*, Q.19; IV, p.274)

⁴¹⁸ “*Dictum autem Philosophi 2* De anima, quod intelligere est pati, exponunt quod hoc verum est non essentialiter, sed concomitative, quia non intelligeremus, nisi prius recepta specie rei intelligibilis, que receptio est passio large dicta.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.9).

different take on Aristotle for this debate. Indeed, Durand’s take on Aristotle does not even seem so far from modern scholarship which has, similarly, sought to take seriously Aristotle’s view that the soul is, strictly speaking, unmoved in cognition (or in any of its other natural activities) (see, e.g., Menn 2002 & Roreitner 2018)⁴¹⁹.

§5. Durand and Prior Augustinian Accounts: Second Pass

§5.1. *Durand’s (Partial) Appeal to Augustine: The Soul’s “Attention”*

So far, we’ve covered the core of Durand’s proper account, that cognition is *per se* from the giver of the cognitive power and only *per accidens* from the external object, as a *sine qua non* cause. As we’ve seen, in favour of this account, Durand explicitly appeals to the authority of Aristotle; Durand’s own arguments, moreover, clearly draw from Aristotle’s general principles as well (albeit with Durand’s own touch). Before moving on, however, it should be addressed that Durand also makes an explicit appeal to the authority of Augustine, at the very end of this section of II Sent. [A] D.3, Q.5. As we’ll see, exactly how much Durand intends to draw from Augustine here is tricky to determine, but likely not as much as one might think.

⁴¹⁹ One can see similarities, e.g., in Durand’s above “regress” argument against the need for additional absolute “forms” in natural actions and Aristotle’s many regress arguments against the old Platonic view that all motions stem from something in motion (so, e.g., on this Platonic view, for the soul to be a source for motion it must be constantly in a sort of circular motion and “drag” the body along with it). As, e.g., Menn 2002 & Roreitner 2018 explain, these latter arguments make up the very core of Aristotle’s view of the soul. To be clear, this isn’t to say that I think the opposing “Augustinian” accounts of Olivi and company have a similarly crude account of the soul’s self-motion, as with the old Platonic view; indeed, as we’ve seen, Scotus and company still make sense of Aristotle’s core idea that the soul is a source for motion without being in motion; nevertheless, Durand does seem to end up with a more simplified “Aristotelian” view insofar as he requires no additional absolute accidents in the soul, strictly speaking, even as sorts of inner products.

In (almost) full, Durand's appeal to Augustine goes as follows:

“And the same thing [that an object is only a *sine qua non* cause] is so concerning an act of sensation, of which the blessed Augustine also puts forward the aforementioned thought, in *De musica* VI, saying the following: ‘Corporeal things, whichever of which are presented to this body from the outside, produce something not in the soul but in the body.’ And afterwards, [Augustine says]: ‘And lest we make this long-winded, it seems to me that the soul, when it senses in the body, does not undergo anything from that [body], rather, it [the soul] more attentively acts with regard to the passions of the body (“*sed in passionibus eius attentius agere*”); and these actions, whether easy, on account of a fit, or difficult, on account of an ill-fit (“*inconvenientiam*”), [so long as] they are not hidden to the soul [*eam*]”⁴²⁰, this [circumstance] is what we call sensation.’ He [Augustine] wishes to say, just as it is clear from these things which are said in the same [book] VI, that the sensible [thing] does not act on the sensitive power, but on the organ, by means of qualities disposing that; which action [i.e., of the sensible thing] is not hidden to that [sense], when it⁴²¹ is present to the sense, and thus it is sensed; nor is it otherwise to sense, except that the sensible thing present is not hidden to being sensed; this in itself is to cognize in some way, and in a similar way it was said of the intellect.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.23; cf. Augustine, *De musica*, 6.5.9-10)⁴²²

⁴²⁰ Here I'm reading this *eam* as referring to the soul; see below, for other cases of *'non latere'* taking the accusative for what is being shown something, with an implicit double accusative construction, as with other Latin verbs of showing. However, based on the original passage, it's possible Augustine might rather be referring to the *'(in)convenientiam'* of the impression in the body, the attention to which (or, at least, with regard to) he calls delight when it is fitting/appropriate for the sense, as with a pleasant sight, pain or labour when it is ill-fitting/harmful, as with an intense and noxious smell. See, e.g., the following, more complete, passage: “*Corporalia ergo quaecumque huic corpori ingeruntur aut obiciuntur extrinsecus, non in anima, sed in ipso corpore aliquid faciunt, quod operi eius aut adversetur, aut congruat. Ideoque cum renititur adversanti, et materiam sibi subiectam in operis sui vias difficulter impingit, fit attentior ex difficultate in actionem; quae difficultas propter attentionem, cum eam non latet, sentire dicitur, et hoc vocatur dolor aut labor. Cum autem congruit quod infertur, aut adiacet, facile totum id vel ex eo quantum opus est, in sui operis itinera traducit. Et ista eius actio qua suum corpus convenienti extrinsecus corpori adiungit, quoniam propter quiddam adventitium attentius agitur, non latet; sed propter convenientiam, cum voluptate sentitur. At cum desunt ea quibus corporis detrimenta reficiat, egestas consequitur; et hac actionis difficultate cum fit attentior, et talis eius operatio non eam latet, fames aut sitis, aut tale aliquid appellatur. Cum autem supersunt ingesta, et ex eorum onere nascitur difficultas operandi, neque hoc sine attentione fit; et cum talis actio non latet, cruditas sentitur: attente etiam operatur cum eicit superfluum, si leniter, cum voluptate; si aspere, cum dolore. Morbidam quoque perturbationem corporis attente agit, succurrere appetens labenti atque diffluenti; et hac actione non latente morbos et aegrotationes sentire dicitur.*” (Augustine, *De musica* 6.5.9).

⁴²¹ Here it's unclear if the subject switches to the sensible thing or if the subject is still the action (of the sensible thing); perhaps, in some sense, Augustine means to refer to both at once, as the sensible object is present through its action on the sense organ.

⁴²² “*Et idem est de actu sentiendi, de quo profert beatus Augustinus (6 Musicae) iam dictam sententiam, dicens sic: 'Corporalia quaecumque huic corpori obiciuntur extrinsecus non in anima, sed in corpore aliquid faciunt.'* Et post: ‘*Et ne longum faciamus, videtur michi anima, cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in passionibus eius attentius agere; et has actiones, sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non*

Along with Durand’s earlier appeal to *De musica* VI (as discussed above, where Durand recites the common *nobility argument* against passive views of cognition), this passage makes up Durand’s only other explicit reference to Augustine in this text. So, naturally, Solère (2014), given his “Augustinian” interpretation of Durand, puts a lot of emphasis on this passage. For purpose of discussion, let’s just look at Solère’s full take on the above passage (which takes place after he discusses Durand’s earlier *nobility argument*):

“[...] the DOC principle holds entirely and a material thing can act in no respect on the soul. This impossibility entails, in its turn, that the soul alone is the active, efficient cause of its cognition of material objects. And this is true not only of intellection, but also of sensation although a large part of passivity appears to be included in it. As a matter of fact, our body is affected, in its sensory organs, by external bodies. But sensation does not result from the transmission of that affection to the soul. What happens is that, as Augustine phrases it, through the permanent attention it gives to the body, the soul notices the physical modifications of the organs caused by the sense objects. [In a footnote here, Solère cites Durand’s above quotation and gloss above from *De musica* 6.5.10]. It is this noticing (which is an action) that constitutes perception properly said, and it is therefore exclusively an activity of the soul. To that extent, Durand takes up a fundamental tenet of Augustine’s philosophy of mind.” (Solère 2014, p.189; cf. fn.13)

In general, Solère seems perfectly right here that Durand, as Augustine himself is quoted to say, does not take corporeal things to sufficiently act on the soul proper, though they do make some (qualitative) impressions on the body, with which, somehow or other, the soul senses, while unmoved. Moreover, as Solère touches on, it seems true that Durand takes the soul’s “attention”,

eam latere, et hoc est, quod sentire dicimus.’ Vult dicere, sicut apparet ex hiis, que dicuntur in eodem 6, quod sensibile non agit in potentiam sensitivam, sed in organum ratione qualitatum disponentium ipsum, que actio, cum sit presens sensui, non latet ipsum, et ideo sentitur, nec est aliud sentire, nisi sensibile presens non latere sensum, qui secundum se est quoddam cognoscere, quemadmodum dictum est de intellectu.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.23).

Durand, indeed, closely quotes Augustine here, even if, as we’ll discuss, he’s somewhat selective in what he leaves out. For the original lines, quoted above:

“Corporalia ergo quaecumque huic corpori ingeruntur aut obiciuntur extrinsecus, non in anima, sed in ipso corpore aliquid faciunt, quod operi eius aut adversetur, aut congruat. [...] Et ne longum faciam, videtur mihi anima cum sentit in corpore, non ab illo aliquid pati, sed in eius passionibus attentius agere, et has actiones sive faciles propter convenientiam, sive difficiles propter inconvenientiam, non eam latere: et hoc totum est quod sentire dicitur.” (Augustine, *De musica* 6.5.9-10).

as Augustine puts it here, to that which is not hidden, to constitute sensation, and cognition in general (however this is to be understood). As I would put it, more broadly speaking, in this passage Durand seeks to justify the coherency of his own account, such that the soul's acts of cognition do not require being *per se* moved by their objects, nor does the soul require any absolute self-motion at all; so long as its object is appropriately present to the cognitive power, just outside of it with no other obstruction, there is cognition.

However, one key issue I have with Solère's interpretation here is that he claims that, for both Augustine and Durand, cognition is constituted by attention to physical/corporeal impressions in the organs, rather than to the external objects themselves. Although this might be one way to read Augustine here, it's not obvious this is the point which Durand wishes to extract from his carefully selected quotations. Admittedly, this is perhaps the most natural interpretation of Augustine, especially in light of his further remarks. In another text, e.g., as I and others have discussed elsewhere, Augustine uses a similar formulation, such that sensation is defined as a bodily impression "that is not hidden, in itself, to the soul" and, on this passage, even the sympathetic reader, Olivi, remarks, and subsequently complains, that, at least on the face of it, this seems to imply that an impression in the body is the object of sensation for Augustine (*De quantitate animae* 25.48; Olivi, II Sent. Q. 58; II, p.484; cf. Martin 2019, pp.311-312; Silva & Toivanen 2010, pp.270-272)⁴²³. However, in contrast, at least Durand's final gloss states that the

⁴²³ Augustine himself: "*Iam video sic esse definiendum, ut sensus sit passio corporis per seipsam non latens animam: nam et omnis sensus hoc est, et omne hoc, ut opinor, sensus est.*" (Augustine, *De quantitate animae* 25.48). [Note that even this passage can be stretched to read that the passion of the body does not hide the thing itself to the soul in sensation; for this interpretation, see Kalderon 2021.]

Olivi's concern: "*Et tamen in hoc dicto includi videtur quod ipsa passio sit ipsum obiectum quod sentitur [...] Hoc etiam, scilicet, non latere animam, aut dicit solam negationem latentiae aut ultra hoc dicit aliquam actualem notitiam ipsius animae. Primum autem nullo modo stare potest; tum quia negatio latentiae non potest esse ubi nulla est notitia; tum quia tunc nihil reale adderet in definitione [...] Si autem ultra hoc dicit actualem notitiam, sed illa actualis notitia dicit totam essentiam actus sentiendi. Ergo ad passionem additur totus actus sentiendi, et hoc*

sensible thing itself is what is present to the soul in sensation; that is, as he says above, “nor is it otherwise to sense, except that the sensible thing present is not hidden to being sensed” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.23). Moreover, even Durand’s selected quotes from Augustine, taken in isolation, leave open some room for interpretation concerning exactly what it means that the soul, being more attentive, acts with respect to its bodily passions (“*in passionibus eius*”). Although at certain points Augustine, even here, seems to say these bodily passions (i.e., actions of the sensible object) are what is not hidden to the soul, at other times it seems Augustine at least means to also include the sensible object itself. In general, it seems that Durand wishes to simply suggest that these bodily impressions do not hide the sensible thing itself to the soul’s attention (however it is that bodily impressions aid in this).⁴²⁴

In line with this last point, Durand even explicitly puts it aside whether cognition, in general, functions through some *species*, technically speaking, or anything else, according to his own account, regardless of what the right interpretation of Augustine is. As Durand says, right after the above cited passage:

“Through what, however, the sensible thing should be present to the sense, and the intelligible thing to the intellect, whether through a *species* or through anything else, it will not be said now, since elsewhere this will be explicitly addressed. But this much should be had from the things said, that a *species* is not required, as eliciting an act *per se*, but only as representing the object, if it is even ever required.” (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.23)⁴²⁵.

non qualitercunque, sed ut habens ipsam passionem pro obiecto. Ergo haec definitio habet in se vitium contrarietatis et ultra hoc vitium nugationis.” (Olivi, II Sent. Q. 58; II, p.484).

⁴²⁴ Perhaps these bodily passions are the first objects of cognition, but they at least aren’t the only objects. Alternatively, one might wonder whether the ‘*attentio*’ of the soul onto the body, in its basic state, is not cognition/cognitive in itself, but nevertheless a means to cognition; for a wider consideration of this interpretation of Augustine, see, e.g., Silva (2018) & Nawar (2021); as I’ve considered before, this might well be Olivi’s own view (see Martin 2019).

⁴²⁵ “*Per quid autem presentetur sensibile sensui et intelligibile intellectui, utrum per speciem vel per aliquid aliud, non dicetur modo, quia alias per intentionem agetur de hoc. Sed hoc tantum ex dictis habeatur, quod species non requiritur ut eliciens actum per se, sed solum, ut representans obiectum, si tamen unquam requiritur.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.23).

So, that is, Durand leaves it open here whether or not a bodily impression is even required to function as a sort of intermediary object of attention/cognition, or some analogous *species* in the intellect for intellection; all Durand wishes to extract from Augustine, in *De musica* VI, as mentioned above, is that such impressions (which Durand here calls *species*) are not required as principal effective causes of cognition. Moreover, as Hartman (2012) discusses in further detail, “elsewhere”, when Durand takes up this topic with more commitment, he more clearly rejects such intermediary impressions/*species* (Hartman 2012, pp.138-175)⁴²⁶. So, in other words, even if Solère were right that Augustine is committed to such intermediary impressions/*species* (*qua* representations), Solère goes too far when he suggests that Durand would follow suit⁴²⁷.

§5.2. Durand vs. “Augustinian” Self-Motion

In general, given Durand’s above restriction, I would be cautious to draw much more from Durand’s reference to Augustine here, other than what I just said. To be more specific, a second key issue I have with Solère’s “Augustinian” interpretation of Durand is in Solère’s assessment that, just as with Augustine, Durand thinks the soul’s “attention”/“noticing” of an object/impression is an “action” of the soul, strictly speaking (Solère 2014, p.189). What

⁴²⁶ Even in this very text, Durand shows his allegiance with Godfrey insofar as he at least disregards any intelligible *species* in the intellect (an object is sufficiently represented in a phantasm, which Durand elsewhere seems to place in the body, outside the soul entirely), and Durand goes on to say that *species* are at least not required in principle, as in the case of separated and angelic intellects (Durand, *II Sent.* [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.12-13, p.30). To be clear, none of this is to say that Durand rejects *species in medio* and in the organ, in some regard, though they do not function as intermediary objects or sufficient causes of cognition.

⁴²⁷ Nor is Solère right to imply that this exact interpretation, where the soul only attends directly to impressions in the body, is definitive for other “Augustinians”, such as Olivi. As I’ve mentioned above, Olivi, in particular, takes on another view, that the soul attends to external objects rather than merely internal impressions, even though he doesn’t find this view to be clearly in Augustine’s own words. So, to be clear, this isn’t to say that Durand isn’t following these later “Augustinians” on this matter, whether intentionally or not. The next issue, on the other hand, does seem to put Durand more clearly in resistance with Olivi and company, stretching even further from the source text (*De musica* VI).

Augustine himself, and prior interpreters, mean here seems to differ significantly from Durand’s ultimate view. In the rest of *De musica* VI, one can see that Augustine comes to his oft-discussed conclusion that, since the soul does not undergo its cognitive operations from external objects or their corporeal impressions, it undergoes them “from itself”; i.e., the soul, in some sense, is a *self-mover* in cognition (see, e.g., *De musica*, 6.5.12)⁴²⁸. Although open to interpretation, Augustine says here that the soul acts through a sort of “counter-motion”, in reaction to the impressions received more strictly in the body, which the soul is nevertheless in union with; this “counter-motion”/reaction is said to be an “adhering” or “repelling”, depending on the type of impression (Ibid., 6.5.12; see also, 6.5.15)⁴²⁹. As we’ve discussed before, “Augustinians” prior to Durand, such as Scotus, interpret similar remarks in *De Trinitate*, such that what the soul is doing here is that it is producing a properly “spiritual” act of (sensitive) cognition, in the

⁴²⁸ “*Hae autem operationes, vel praecedentibus corporum passionibus adhibentur; ut sunt cum illae oculorum nostrorum lucem formae interpellant, aut in aures influit sonus, aut naribus exhalationes, palato sapor, caetero corpori quaelibet solida et corpulenta admoventur extrinsecus, vel in ipso corpore de loco in locum migrat aliquid sive transit, vel totum ipsum corpus suo alienove pondere movetur: hae sunt operationes quas adhibet anima praecedentibus passionibus corporis; quae delectant eam associantem, offendunt resistentem. Cum autem ab eisdem suis operationibus aliquid patitur, a seipsa patitur, non a corpore; sed plane cum se accommodat corpori: et ideo apud seipsam minus est, quia corpus semper minus quam ipsa est.*” (Augustine, *De musica*, 6.5.12).

⁴²⁹ For another interpretation, see King (2007), who puts stress on the idea that the soul’s “counter-motion” is back on the body, in resistance to its bodily motion from outside, leaving it ambiguous where to locate cognition (in some sense, in the soul’s moving the body, in another sense, in the body being moved by the soul, the two “intermingled”) (King 2007, pp.202-203 ; citing, Augustine, *De musica*, 6.5.15). As I’ll get to, Durand’s own “Aristotelian” view seems to fit better with this interpretation of Augustine, though Durand shows no explicit awareness of this interpretive option, barely discussing the bodily side of cognition at all.

For the relevant passage from Augustine: “*Cum igitur ipsum sentire movere sit corpus adversus illum motum qui in eo factus est, nonne existimas ideo nos non sentire cum ossa et ungues et capilli secantur, non quia ista in nobis omnino non vivunt, non enim aliter aut continerentur aut nutrirentur aut crescerent, aut etiam vim suam in serenda prole monstrarent; sed quia minus libero aere penetrantur, mobili scilicet elemento, quam ut motus ibi possit ab anima fieri tam celer, quam est ille adversus quem fit cum sentire dicitur. Talis quaedam vita cum in arboribus atque stirpibus caeteris esse intellegatur, nullo modo eam non solum nostrae quae ratione etiam praepollet, sed ne ipsi quidem belluinae decet praeponere. Aliud est enim summa stoliditate, aliud summa sanitate corporis nihil sentire. Nam in altero instrumenta desunt, quae adversus passiones corporis moveantur, in altero ipsae passiones.*” (Augustine, *De musica*, 6.5.15). I’ve included the full passage here, given that Augustine adds some interesting remarks here about why things like bones and trees, even though they are not “wholly non-living/vital” (and they “resist” motion, to some extent and in some sense (given their toughness)), do not sense; they are too tough to receive the relevant motions and they do not resist motion through soul. For similar remarks about plants from Aristotle, see *De anima* II.12.

soul/spirit proper, based on the impressions received in the bodily organs (*qua* corporeal); the “*intentio*” of the soul, as a sort of standing desire or general attention to cognize (appropriate objects), in some sense, “brings together” the object behind the impression and the soul, such that the soul is now cognizing that determinate object by way of some new qualitative change in the soul (what Augustine calls an “image” or we can simply call “sensation” proper) (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.300; see, e.g., *De Trinitate* 11.2.2). According to this reading, by “adhering”/“repelling”, Augustine seems to mean that the soul cognizes that object with delight, if it’s an appropriate object for the cognitive power (e.g., a mild sensation of a pretty colour), or with aversion, if it’s a harmful/noxious object (e.g., an intense sensation, that might damage the organ, or sensation of some potentially harmful object, as in the smell of death) (*De Trinitate* 11.2.2). So, on this reading, it’s not obvious that the soul is doing anything to the body’s initial impressions here, in it’s “counter-motions”, so much as forming acts of cognition of a certain (appetitive) sort (with a positive or negative valence).

Note, moreover, that although the soul’s attention/“*intentio*”, in the above sense, functions autonomously, Scotus and company also argue that one can witness the soul’s activity insofar as the soul’s attention is open to voluntary variation; see, e.g., Scotus’s *experiential argument* above, that with greater attention, one cognizes more intensely and, through effort, as Augustine also says in *De Trinitate*, one can even briefly hold onto a sort of after-image when an object, perceived intensely, goes away (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.294; *De Trinitate* 11.2.3).

In contrast, as I’ve been getting at in the previous sections, focused on Durand’s own view and his appeal to Aristotle, Durand’s view does not seem to involve this sort of “self-motion”. First off, as Durand repeatedly makes clear, he does not think that the soul “superadds”


any new absolute form in cognition, such as if the soul were to self-move and bring about a (“spiritual”) qualitative change in itself, properly speaking. Rather, for Durand, the “change” (very broadly speaking) which the soul undergoes from not-cognizing to cognizing is merely relational, requiring only a cognitive power and the appropriate presence of some object.

Moreover, as Durand clarifies with his reference to *Physics VIII*, the only *per se* cause of cognition in this scenario is that which initially generated the cognitive power, i.e., not the cognitive power itself (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.20-21). So, like a heavy piece of earth, by its very nature, falls, needing only to be generated with its essential form of heaviness and to lack any impediment to fall, so too the cognitive power, by nature/default, cognizes, needing only to be generated with such a cognitive nature and to lack any impediment to cognize. Lacking an object to cognize is one such impediment, and so the presence of an object is a mere *accidental/sine qua non* cause of cognition in this scenario (Ibid. pp.21-23). For an object to become present to the soul, the object might need to make an absolute change in the medium/sense organ, of course, but this is not to bring about cognition itself or any new absolute form in the soul proper⁴³⁰. In this way, as I just said, cognition is a mere relation between the cognitive power and object, rooted in the cognitive power but directed towards whatever object presents itself to the power.

See Figure 3 below for a depiction of these differences.

⁴³⁰ Similarly, for imagination or intellectual cognition, the will might bring about some change in the internal sense organs, such that a phantasm would appear to the soul, but this is not to bring about an absolute change in the sensitive or intellectual soul itself, for Durand.

Figure 3: The Fully Active Views of Durand and Prior “Augustinians” in Comparison



Of course, despite these differences, as Durand initially intends with his reference to *De musica* VI, Durand’s view can still retain some points of similarity with prior Augustinians: most clearly, (i) there is no “upwards” causation from below; moreover, though less clear, (ii) there exists some sort of “attention” from the soul to reach downwards, whether or not this “attention” is exactly what Augustine, or Olivi and company beforehand, mean. Nevertheless, on the whole, we can see that Durand’s view attempts to make do with less (viz. no absolute “motion” at all in the soul).

On this last point of detail, I take my interpretation of Durand to be in line with that of Hartman (2012), who also denies that Durand’s view requires the same sort of “self-motion” held by prior “Augustinians”, such as Olivi and Scotus; as Hartman puts it, Durand is not a “self-affectionist”, in contrast with what Solère says (in an earlier article) (Hartman 2012, pp.47-48,

fn.71; cf. Solère 2013)⁴³¹. Interestingly, Solère (2014) has an explicit response to Hartman (2012) on this matter, which, for full disclosure, I cite in full:

“Hartman [2012] pp. 47-48, thinks that I misrepresent Durand as being a “self-affectionist.” I am afraid that he has misread me. Given that Hartman defines “self-affectionism” as the theory according to which “the mind is the efficient cause of the mental act and affects itself in the mere presence of the object, *impressing upon and receiving into itself the ‘form’ of an object*” (ibid., p. 47, emphasis mine), it is clear that Durand is not a self-affectionist. If I place Durand amongst Augustinian-Franciscans other than Olivi (namely, Marston, Peckham, and some others), it is only with respect to the DOC principle (see Solère [2013] pp.193, 206, 206, 207). However, if one retains only the first part of Hartman’s definition (namely, that the mind is the efficient cause of the mental act), then I would probably say that Durand is a self-affectionist. The mental act is a certain event that appears at a certain moment; no event is without an efficient cause; if the object is not that efficient cause, it has to be the mind (leaving aside another mind, angel or devil, or God). As we have seen, Durand (*Super Sent.* [A], II, d. 3, q. 5; [p.13, p.23]) adheres to Augustine’s conception, for which sensation is nothing but the soul paying attention to bodily affections (“*in eius passionibus attentius agere*” — AUGUSTINE, *De musica*, VI, 5, 10 [...].” (Solère 2014, p.223, fn.127).

So, in short, Solère is willing to introduce some interesting grey-area here wherein Durand might not strictly follow prior “Augustinian” “self-affectionists”, insofar as Durand does not claim that the cognitive soul self-moves in the strict sense (effectively producing its acts of cognition in itself *qua* absolute forms), though, nevertheless, Durand might still admit that the soul self-moves in a broader sense (effectively producing its acts of cognition in itself *qua* relations rooted in the soul).

However, while there’s something to this response, Solère (2014) makes a few questionable claims here. First off, as I’ve been getting at above, Durand does not seem to “adhere[...] to Augustine’s conception, for which sensation is nothing but the soul paying

⁴³¹ Hartman (2012) is responding here to an earlier draft of Solère (2013), which itself Solère (2014) acknowledges as the basis for his later article.

attention to bodily affections”; if anything, Durand puts this part of Augustine’s account of cognition to the side and extracts a different sort of “attention” here (to external things). Nor does Durand make any appeal to Augustine’s explicit remarks, also found in *De musica* VI, that the soul produces its acts in itself.

Moreover, Solère’s (2014) argument that “no event is without an efficient cause; if the object is not that efficient cause, it has to be the mind” (barring higher interference), seems to miss the thrust of Hartman’s (2012) interpretation of Durand, which I would agree with: cognition has no need for a *per se* efficient cause once the cognitive soul has been generated and so long as the object can serve as a *per accidens/sine qua non* cause (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; pp.20-23). As I was just saying, for Durand, like a heavy piece of earth, by its very nature, falls, needing only to be generated with its essential form of heaviness and to lack any impediment to fall, so too the cognitive power, by nature/default, cognizes, needing only to be generated with such a cognitive nature and to lack any impediment to cognize. Given this, that the cognitive power cognizes does not call for an effective explanation in itself. An object might need to do something effectively to the medium and sense organs, e.g., to present itself to a cognitive power, but this isn’t to effectively cause cognition on Durand’s account. In this way, it might be true that the event of cognition has an effective cause, in some sense, but only in this indirect and accidental way, and by way of the object, not the power; this would be similar to how a heavy object’s falling might require something external to push an impediment out of the way, but that wouldn’t be for something external to directly or substantially move the heavy object downwards.

Or, to use another analogy, Durand seems to think that the event of seeing green, e.g., is like Aristotle’s account of the chance event of two acquaintances meeting in the market (*Physics*

II.4-6). That each friend arrived in his/her location has an effective cause, like the creation of the sense power and the movement of a green thing into its location each has an effective cause, but the combination is accidental and does not require an additional effective cause. Hence, Durand says the presence of an object to a cognitive power is only a *per accidens* cause of cognition.

So, overall, one can question both claims in Solère's (2014) above argument that (i) every event has an efficient cause and (ii) if the object is not the efficient cause, then it must be the cognitive power. Against (i), chance events, e.g., do not have a proper, *per se*, efficient cause. Against (ii), plausibly, the giver of the cognitive essence makes it such that no additional proper effective cause is needed for the natural act of cognition to follow since it is only contingent that such a thing, once created, is ever not cognizing (the object can, nevertheless, serve as a *per accidens* cause) (Solère 2014, p.223). Perhaps, as we shall explore further below, there is still some extended sense in which Durand is picking up, and transforming, the idea that a cognitive power is capable of "self-motion", as with prior Augustinians, but these strict differences remain.

§5.3. General Framing: Getting in the Middle of Solère and Hartman on Durand's Context

To recap, so far we've gotten in the middle of Solère (2014) and Hartman (2012) on the issue of Durand's "Augustinianism", especially with respect to whether Durand's account of cognition takes on the sort of "self-motion" of prior "Augustinian" accounts. Above, I've argued that Durand's account of cognition is significantly different, not requiring the sort of "self-motion" of prior "Augustinians", in line with the interpretation of Hartman (2012). However, behind this specific debate stands a general point of contention between Solère (2014) and Hartman (2012) as to whether there's nevertheless some meaningful connection between Durand

and prior figures, especially “Augustinians”, in general terms. As briefly touched on in the introduction to this chapter above (in the footnotes), Hartman (2012, pp.2-3, p.40, pp.47-48, fn.71) questions whether Durand follows any intellectual “authorities” on this topic and prefers to think of Durand as “a party unto himself”, whereas Solère (2014, pp.189-190, fn.14, p.223, fn.127), as we’ve seen, places Durand firmly in the same “camp” as prior “Augustinians”, such as Olivi. In this section, I’ll clarify why I think Solère (2014) and Hartman (2012) are, in some sense, both right, but in another sense, both wrong, in terms of how they place Durand in his prior context. Thus, I can finally conclude on the extent of Durand’s “Augustinianism” and “Aristotelianism”, in general, as I set off to do from the start of this chapter.

First off, it should be noted that one reason why Solère (2014) goes so hard against Hartman (2012) is that Hartman (2012) has a somewhat dubious argument, which frames his entire dissertation, meant to establish that Durand is a singular thinker of his time, one who argues entirely by reason, “but never based upon appeal to authority” (Hartman 2012, pp.2-3, p.40, pp.47-48, fn.71). To justify this claim, Hartman (2012) cites some early remarks from Durand, in the prologue of his *Sent.* commentaries, on the limits of human authority, even for the greats, such as Augustine and Aristotle (Ibid.); e.g., Hartman (2012) quotes Durand as saying:

“However, the way we should talk and write about other matters, which do not touch upon matters of faith, is to depend upon reason and not the authority of any given doctor, no matter how famous or solemn, and to pay little attention to all human authority when, through reason, the contrary truth shines forth. [...] And also Augustine, the most celebrated among the doctors [as readers of sacred scripture], speaks about himself in *De Trinitate* III, around the beginning: ‘Don’t slavishly follow (*inservire*) my writings as if they were the canonical scriptures! Rather, in those [scriptures], including when you have found what/that you were not believing, believe unhesitatingly! In these [my writings], however, what/that you were not holding [to be] certain, unless you

will have understood it [to be] certain, don't hold it as firm!" (Sent. [C], Prol. n.12; cf. *De Trinitate* 3.1.2)⁴³².

"Also, [...] natural philosophy is not to know what Aristotle or other philosophers thought (*senserunt*) but [to know] what the truth of things holds. Hence, where the mind of Aristotle deviates from the truth of things, it is not knowledge to know what Aristotle thought (*senserit*), but rather [it is] error." (Sent. [C], Prol. Q.1, n.6)⁴³³.

Moreover, as Hartman (2012) takes it, this is part and parcel with Durand's general attitude and personality, which got him censured, twice, by his Dominican order, along with the originality of Durand's views, which one can measure by how widely these views were criticized in his times (Hartman 2012, pp.2-3).

In contrast, Solère (2014), quite rightfully, doubts that Durand is so entirely divorced from prior thinkers and "never" appeals to authority. As we've seen above, back in II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5, Durand explicitly says his account is "clear from reason *and authority*" (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.20-23, *my emphasis*). As we've touched on above, Solère (2014) puts particular

⁴³² "Modus autem loquendi ac scribendi in caeteris, que fidem non tangunt, est ut magis innitatur rationi quam auctoritati cuiuscumque doctoris, quantumcumque celebris uel solemnus, et paruipendatur omnis humana auctoritas, quando per rationem elucescit contraria ueritas. [...] [O]mnis homo dimittens rationem propter auctoritatem humanam incidit in insipientiam bestialem ut comparatus sit iumentis insipientibus et similis factus sit illis. Quis enim nisi temerarius existens audeat dicere quod magis sit acquiescendum auctoritati cuiuscumque doctoris quam auctoritati sanctorum doctorum Sacrae Scripturae, Augustini, Gregorii, Ambrosii, et Ieronimi, quos celebritate condigna sancta Romana Ecclesia sublimauit? Et tamen Augustinus, inter doctores celeberrimus, dicit de se ipso III De Trinitate circa principium: 'Noli meis literis quasi scripturis canonicis inseruire, sed in illis et quod non credebas, cum inueneris, incunctanter crede, in istis autem quod certum non habebas, nisi certum intellexeris, noli firmum retinere.'" (Durand, Sent. [C], n.6).

For the original passage from Augustine: "Sane cum in omnibus litteris meis non solum pium lectorem sed etiam liberum correctorem desiderem, multo maxime in his ubi ipsa magnitudo quaestionis utinam tam multos inventores habere posset quam multos contradictores habet. Verumtamen sicut lectorem meum nolo esse mihi deditum, ita correctorem nolo sibi. Ille me non amet amplius quam catholicam fidem; ille se non amet amplius quam catholicam veritatem. Sicut illi dico: Noli meis litteris quasi Scripturis canonicis inseruire, sed in illis et quod non credebas cum inueneris incunctanter crede, in istis autem quod certum non habebas nisi certum intellexeris noli firme retinere; ita illi dico: Noli meas litteras ex tua opinione vel contentione, sed ex divina lectione vel inconcussa ratione corrigere; si quid in eis veri comprehenderit, existendo non est meum at intellegendo et amando et tuum sit et meum; si quid autem falsi conviceris, errando fuerit meum sed iam cavendo nec tuum sit nec meum." (Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 3.1.2).

⁴³³ "[...] quia naturalis philosophia non est scire quid Aristoteles uel alii philosophi senserunt, sed quid habeat ueritas rerum. Vnde ubi deuiat mens Aristotelis a ueritate rerum, non est scientia scire quid Aristoteles senserit sed potius error." (Durand, Sent. [C], Q.1, n.12).

stress on Durand's references to the passages from *De musica* VI which get used by prior "Augustinians", such as Olivi, who also argue for the impassivity of the soul in cognition (Solère 2014, fn.14). In general terms, Solère (2014) says:

"One cannot imagine that Durand is unaware of these debates, and quoting the *De musica* is tantamount to choosing one's camp and making a statement. This is all the more true if nothing obliged him to quote Augustine, given his disclaimer in the prologue. [...] When such references, which are the marker of a well-defined trend of thought, are discounted, Durand may be rendered fashionable and seen out of context [...]." (Ibid.)⁴³⁴.

As I take it, Solère (2014) is at least right here insofar as Durand is hardly an insular genius. By reading Durand in his context, one can see, in particular, that Durand is at least picking up certain significant elements from prior "Augustinians", such as the *DOC principle*, as used in prior *nobility arguments*, as we've seen above. Perhaps Hartman (2012) is right to point out that Durand, as Olivi beforehand, is critical of the *mere* use of authority, or going to great pains to fit one's theory with the statements of prior figures, "no matter how famous or solemn", when reason is sufficient; nevertheless, I would add, this doesn't mean Durand is unwilling to find useful reasons in prior figures or to use an appeal to authority for rhetorical purposes. Indeed, on this latter point, given the very fact that authorities like Augustine are given such (perhaps extreme) credence, it makes sense for Durand to provide a path for the many medieval followers of Augustine to come to Durand's own view as well⁴³⁵.

⁴³⁴ Solère (2014) continues by criticizing Hartman's (2012) attempts, near the end of his dissertation, to read Durand as a "physiological functionalist", but this goes beyond the chapters we've been covering, so I'll leave this aside (Hartman 2012, p.227). Through conversation with Hartman, I know that he's willing to recant some of these later details. That being said, even if Hartman happened to have been wrong, I'm a bit suspicious of Solère's (2014) tone which seems to suggest that such a "modern" approach is inherently at odds with reading a historical figure in their more immediate context.

⁴³⁵ This strikes me as a better way to make sense of Durand's above appeals to authority than Hartman's (2012) approach, which, in a footnote, makes the rather weak response that Durand's use of authority is only a "little", but nevertheless, "ironic", given Hartman's extreme "anti-authoritarian" interpretation of Durand: "There is, of course, not a little irony in the fact that Durand goes on to cite Augustine to support his anti-authoritarian attitude. But he did say little weight, after all!" (Hartman 2012, fn.58).

Moreover, given that one can find similar remarks on the measured use of human authority in many medieval figures, one can also doubt whether Durand is exactly being radically “anti-authoritarian”, compared to his peers, as Hartman (2012) puts it, (even if there is an admitted difference in degree between, e.g., Durand and Aquinas)⁴³⁶. Overall, I think Hartman (2012) is a bit loose in what he covers under the umbrella of an “appeal to authority” (or more proximate influence) and Solère (2014) is right to point out that Durand is not unwilling to make measured use of such appeals, even if, as I would add, Durand, as with many other medieval figures (at least in principle), would question the *mere* use of “authority”.

Nevertheless, all that being said, I think that Solère (2014) goes a bit too far here in practice, in how much he puts Durand in the prior “Augustinian camp”, and that Hartman (2012) still has a point in his reservations. As I’ve been getting at in the last few sections, although Solère is perfectly right that Durand is strategically showing some allegiance with prior “Augustinians”, such as Olivi and company, in his references to *De musica* VI, Durand is quite clear to distance himself from Augustine’s full remarks (e.g., that the cognitive power’s activity is constituted by a sort of “attention” to bodily impressions alone) (II Sent. [A], D.3., Q.5; p.23). Moreover, perhaps even more importantly, Durand makes no attempt to adopt Augustine’s nearby remarks, conspicuously left out of Durand’s references *De musica* VI, that the cognitive

⁴³⁶ E.g., in a parallel text to Durand’s Sent. [C], Prol. & Q.1, also on the topic of the science of theology, Aquinas similarly claims that prior philosophers (such as Aristotle and Plato), and even the doctors of the Church, should only be taken as “probable” authorities, unlike sacred scripture, which provides necessary principles, and he gives a similar citation to Augustine as Durand (Aquinas, ST, I, Q.1, a.8, ad.2); moreover, elsewhere, Aquinas approvingly says of Augustine’s use of Plato’s authority that, “whenever he found in his teaching anything consistent with the faith, he adopted it; and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended” (cited by Hyman & Walsh 1973, p.504).

soul produces its cognitive acts in itself (i.e., in the “spiritual” soul proper), which Olivi and company understand as a perfectly “real” sort of self-motion.

In fairness to Hartman (2012), in practice, he hardly ignores Durand’s context, including Olivi and Scotus; rather, Hartman is skeptical of reading too much into Durand’s references to Augustine, and implicit use of prior “Augustinians” such as Olivi and Scotus, for the very reason that Hartman is aware of the differences in the details between Durand and these prior figures⁴³⁷.

Moreover, as Hartman (2012) also points out, one can question how helpful it is that Solère (2014) frames Durand, more specifically, as an “Augustinian”, in direct contrast to being an “Aristotelian” (Hartman 2012, p.40). Despite the fact that, as we’ve seen, Durand appeals to both Aristotle (most clearly, *Physics* VIII) and Augustine, Solère (2014) deflates the former appeal alone; e.g., as Solère (2014) puts it at one point: “Notwithstanding these Aristotelian references, Durand is being — it is hardly necessary to underline it — un-Aristotelian” (Solère 2014, p.193; cf. pp.185-198, pp.203-204).

However, as I see it, it’s not obvious that Durand’s appeal to Aristotle is any less genuine than his appeal to Augustine. If anything, as I’ve argued at length above (§4.4), Durand’s arguments are based on some perfectly plausible Aristotelian principles (even if Durand here diverges from the typical medieval “Aristotelian” views in this debate, which are more genuinely passive).

⁴³⁷ I should also add that, despite his deflationary remarks on Durand’s overall Aristotelian influence, Hartman (2012) still, in practice, keeps track of Durand’s references to Aristotle, especially from the *Physics* on first and second act; in this regard, *contra* Solère’s (2014) more dismissive remarks, Hartman (2012) hardly ignores Durand’s “Aristotelian” context, as with his “Augustinian” context, even if Hartman ultimately makes light of this context.

§6. Pushback Against Durand

So far in this chapter, my most direct goal has been to distinguish Durand's active view of cognition from that of Olivi and company beforehand, simply for the purpose of clarifying each view by comparison and contrast. In this last section, I wish to add a more explicitly critical comparison of these two views; in particular, below I will present some reasons to, in fact, prefer the view of Olivi and company, in the face of competition from Durand's alternate active account. As we'll see, despite the fact that Durand's view might appear more elegant, trying to do more with less, Durand's view historically faced some rather tough objections concerning whether it can, in fact, explain everything it must. By the end of this section, this debate will get us into one more resource in Durand's overall account of cognition, that of merely "intentional" inherence in a cognitive power, which Durand at least briefly touches on at the end of II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5, even if this addition does not ultimately satisfy Durand's objectors.

§6.1. *On the Need for Change "Inside"*

In broad terms, the most pertinent objection to Durand's view is the same central objection we considered in Chapter 2 against the *Fully Active View* of prior "Augustinians": if the object is not, strictly speaking, an efficient cause of cognition (either in itself or through a *species* first received in the cognitive power), then it seems the given (sensitive or intellective) cognitive power would be of "infinite perfection" in itself, either (i) always in act with respect to every cognizable object, which is clearly false, or, at least, (ii) innately disposed to every act of cognition independent of the given object (e.g., one could, at any moment, just choose to see

orange or cognize some alien species one has no knowledge of), which also seems false⁴³⁸. As we'll see, this objection is even more troublesome for Durand's view, compared to prior *Fully Active Views*, insofar as a cognitive power, strictly speaking, cannot even self-move, for Durand, to bring on some further perfection in the cognitive power (e.g., a perfection in cognition itself or in a habit to cognize some object more perfectly in the future).

Durand himself considers this objection, especially on this last point, in the following terms (in this case, for intellectual cognition):

“But someone will say: if to intelligize is not something added, making a [real] composition with the intellect, then to intelligize does not indicate any perfection of the intellect; for a perfection is something absolute. Therefore, the intellect will be just as perfect before it intelligizes as when it actually intelligizes, which is absurd [*inconueniens*]. Therefore, to intelligize indicates something added to the intellect, making with it a [real] composition.” (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.19)⁴³⁹.

As Durand clarifies, this isn't to say that every perfection really differs from that which is perfected, making a real composition, as otherwise God's perfections would be separable from His essence; that is, in God's case, His perfections are absolute, but identical with God, as God is, e.g., eternally and perfectly cognizant of everything, by His essence. Nevertheless, Durand admits that this wouldn't appear to make for a sufficient response to the above objection, since, unlike God (and, e.g., His divine, essential cognition), a creaturely cognitive power goes from

⁴³⁸ For some variant of this objection, either for the cognitive or volitive power, see, e.g., Olivi, II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.38-39, Gonsalvus, I *Quaestiones*, Q.3, arg.2; p.28, and, Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.298 (all discussed in Chapter 2).

⁴³⁹ “*Sed dicet aliquis: si intelligere non est aliquid additum faciens compositionem cum intellectu, tunc intelligere non dicit perfectionem aliquam intellectus; perfectio enim est de absolutis. Igitur intellectus eque erit perfectus ante intelligere sicut cum actu intelligit, quod est inconueniens. Ergo intelligere dicit aliquid additum intellectui faciens cum eo compositionem.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.19).

not cognizing to cognizing, and, thus, cognition cannot be so essential for such a creaturely power (Ibid.; pp.19-20)⁴⁴⁰.

Instead, Durand's response to this objection is to admit that the intellect "is not more perfect when it actually intelligizes than before it intelligizes *per se*" (and similarly, we can extend, for sensitive cognition); nevertheless, the intellect (or sense power) is at least more perfect "*per accidens*, in the way that a heavy thing is more perfect when it is below than when it is impeded, which perfection is not through a composition" (Ibid. p.20)⁴⁴¹. As Durand explains, referring to his full account of cognition, as we've seen above: a creaturely cognitive power is inherently cognitive, but nevertheless it can be impeded from cognition when it lacks a present object to cognize. The presence of some object to a cognitive power, thus, serves as a *per accidens/sine qua non* cause, making a relation between the power and object, but without producing a real composition or *per se* perfection. Something might need to move the object into view, and the object might need to make an absolute impression on one's sense organs (*qua corporeal*), but, for Durand, as we've seen, this is not to make an absolute impression on the cognitive power/soul proper, especially in the intellect. As Durand explains, this is similar to how a heavy object need not take on any absolute change (i.e., as to produce a real composition)

⁴⁴⁰ "Et dicendum ad hoc quod non est de ratione perfectionis: quod faciat compositionem cum perfectibili. Alioquin Deus, qui habet omnem perfectionem, haberet ad omnem compositionem. Immo omnis compositio in quantum huiusmodi pertinet ad imperfectionem; propter quod relegatur a Deo. Et ideo posset statim dici, quod non oportet, quod intelligere, licet dicat perfectionem, quod propter hoc faciat cum intellectu compositionem. Sed absque dubio istud non sufficit, quia, licet non oporteat perfectionem realiter differre a perfectibili universaliter loquendo, oportet tamen perfectionem separabilem a perfectibili realiter differre ab ipso et facere cum ipso compositionem; perfectiones etiam a se invicem separabiles faciunt compositionem, si ad invicem uniantur. Cum igitur intellectus sit quandoque sine intelligere, videtur, quod intelligere faciat compositionem cum intellectu, aut quod intelligere non sit perfectio intellectus, quod videtur inconueniens." (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.19-20).

⁴⁴¹ "Et ideo aliter est dicendum, quod intellectus non est perfectior, cum actu intelligit quam ante intelligere per se, sed solum per accidens eo modo, quo grave perfectius est, cum est deorsum quam impeditum. Que tamen perfectio non est per compositionem; sicut enim grave simul cum gravitate acquirit locum, nisi prohibeatur, sic habens intellectum statim per ipsum intelligit, nisi sit defectus obiecti intelligibilis, ut magis patebit infra." (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.20).

in order to move downward; for the heavy object to be in its natural place, at the centre of the earth, the heavy object just needs to be unimpeded (e.g., have any obstacle between it and the downwards location removed) and be “present” where it’s naturally meant to be; this is nevertheless, Durand takes it, a perfection of sorts (“*per accidens*” or relatively speaking), even though it is not a *per se* or absolute perfection.

Historically, this response doesn’t seem to have been deemed sufficient by Durand’s peers, as a wide range of them still objected to Durand’s view on the above grounds. See, e.g., the more typical Dominican Thomist, Hervaeus, and the, oft-labelled “Augustinian Franciscan”⁴⁴², Auriol, two quite different figures who nevertheless both continued to object to Durand on the grounds that, in general, (creaturely) cognition must involve some sort of absolute change/perfection in the given cognitive power. Indeed, as we’ll see, Auriol seems to have borrowed many of the same exact arguments from Hervaeus here.

For one particular sort of argument, using a common medieval Christian example, both Hervaeus and Auriol object that, if, according to Durand’s view, the “nude” intellect (i.e., by itself) takes on no absolute changes prior to or in intellection (as light does not either for it to

⁴⁴² See, e.g., Friedman (2015a & 2015b), Tachau (1988, p.90 & p.93), and, though perhaps with some further reservations, Lička (2016), who all place Auriol somewhere alongside prior “Augustinian Franciscans”. As Friedman, e.g., puts it: “Auriol is part of one pronounced strain of medieval thought (deriving from Augustine and ultimately from Plato) that rejects that the soul and its powers are passively affected by extra-mental objects. [...] Cognitive powers are, for Auriol, active.” (Friedman, 2015b). In a somewhat more carefully expressed claim on this issue, Lička says: “Although Auriol shares some convictions and strategies with these [Augustinian Franciscan] thinkers (e.g., the claim that perception is a vital operation, emphasis on the first-person perspective in theory of perception, etc.), his intellectual foundation is more Aristotelian or Scotistic”; chiefly, Lička has in mind Auriol’s use of Scotus’s terminology of “intentional”/“objective”/“cognitive being”, which doesn’t, according to Lička, have as central a place for prior “Augustinians” on this topic (though I would question calling Scotus’s account of cognition exactly “un-Augustinian”/“Aristotelian” in this regard) (Lička 2016, pp.49-50). Overall, this is a bit of a complicated topic, which I’ve saved for a future project, though I think Friedman, Tachau, and Lička are all broadly on the right path here.

act), then the blessed, the wayfarer, and even the damned should all be equally perfect so as to go into act and intelligize any object, even God in His essence. Moreover, they would all be equally “perfected” when intelligizing God, at least relatively speaking, in their intellections of God, since all three intellects would equally stand in relation to God; i.e., all three intellects would have thoughts referring to the same object, which seems to be all that individuates acts of cognition for Durand, if indeed an act of cognition is simply a relation between a cognitive power and an object. Absolutely speaking, even a normal intellect not intelligizing God, in actuality, would be equally perfect compared to the blessed intellect in the beatific vision of God, Durand must admit, if there is no absolute difference between an intellect intelligizing and an intellect not intelligizing. However, this is all absurd, according to Hervaeus and Auriol, for (i) only the blessed soul is meritorious of (i.e. perfect enough for) the beatific vision; moreover, (ii), only the blessed soul actually has direct beatific vision of God (which should more fully perfect the intellect); and (iii), certainly, at least, an intellect not intelligizing anything at all should be even less perfect, in any relevant sense, since it lacks its final good, an intelligible object, in actuality (in the case of God, the best intelligible object) (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; p.50, Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 449-454, 471-474)⁴⁴³.

⁴⁴³ “Secundo sic: quia si intelligere non addit aliquid absolutum super potentiam, sed dicit tantum respectum nullam compositionem facientem cum ea, tunc intelligens non est perfectior quam non intelligens. Sed hoc est similiter absurdum et impossibile. Primo probo consequentiam et secundum eos et secundum veritatem. Secundum eos, quia, ut ipsi dicunt respectus nullam perfectionem dicit preter ipsammet perfectionem, que est fundamentum. Sed fundamentum equaliter est in intelligente et non intelligente. Ergo si intelligere nihil dicit nisi talem respectum, eque perfectus erit non intelligens sicut intelligens. Hoc etiam patet secundum veritatem: quia perfectio videtur dicere formam alicuius perfectibilis differentem re a perfectibili. Sed secundum istam positionem intelligere non dicit aliquam perfectionem differentem re ab intellectu. Ergo etc. Falsitas autem consequentis manifesta est, sc. quod non intelligens sit eque perfectus sicut intelligens. Primo quia ad hoc sequitur, quod eque perfectus esset beatus et non beatus, sive ponatur beatitudo in visione sive in dilectione, quia idem iudicium est de utroque. Secundo quia sequitur, quod omnia intelligere eiusdem intelligentis essent eque perfecta, quia fundamentum ipsius intelligere, qui ponitur respectus, est commune omnibus. Et sic patet falsitas consequentis.” (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; p.50).

In other words, beyond these special cases of blessed intellection, Hervaeus and Auriol contend that, in terms of occurrent acts of cognition, cognition should require an absolute ground/change properly “in” a cognitive power to explain why one soul cognizing is in a more perfect state than another soul not cognizing. As Hervaeus, for one, seems to touch on, this perfection cannot be merely relational, like the heavy object in a certain location, for one is properly delighted, internally speaking, when one, e.g., intelligizes some true object (and more so delighted the more perfectly one intelligizes/understands) (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; p.50)⁴⁴⁴. Moreover, in terms of cognitive habits, in the natural order, at least for certain, more advanced, acts of cognition, one cognitive power requires a prior perfection “in” it in order to explain how that power, in comparison to another, can more perfectly go into that more advanced act of cognition; e.g., one person, through the perfection of dispositional knowledge inhering in their intellect (i.e. an absolute accident, acquired through prior learning), will be able to more easily and perfectly understand some theoretical notion, rather than another person who lacks said knowledge, even if their two intellects are, in substance, the same in absolute being⁴⁴⁵. Overall, it is argued that Durand’s view does not have the resources to sufficiently distinguish

“Praeterea, si intelligere esset id ipsum quod intellectus, sicut lucere est realiter idem quod lux, sequeretur quod creatura per essentiam esset beata, et quod viator, immo damnatus, haberet in actu totam realitatem beatificae intellectionis, et quod habens meliorem intellectum magis videret Deum in patria, quantumcumque esset meritis impar, et quod creatura ex puris naturalibus Deum videret. Haec autem omnia absona sunt. Ergo non potest dici quod intellectus et intelligere realiter sint idem respectu omnis intelligibilis. [...]

Praeterea, si intelligere et intellectus realiter sint idem, sequetur quod omne intelligere erit aequè nobile et eque perfectum, cum sit idem quod substantia intellectus. Sed hoc est falsum, quia intelligere beatificum habet rationem finis omnium intellectionum et ita est quid perfectissimum. Igitur id quod prius.” (Auriol, I Sent., D.35, pars 1, a.1; lines 449-454, 471-474).

⁴⁴⁴ See also, Hervaeus’s argument, a bit below, that cognition cannot be a relation because a relation cannot be an effective principle of acting, but, as I would add, in this case it seems the cognition of God leads to delight: *“Nullus respectus est principium agendi. Sed intelligere et velle sunt principium agendi. Ergo non sunt respectus.”* (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; p.51).

⁴⁴⁵ This is analogous to the above case of the blessed intellect which needs to be “perfected” in some respect, prior to the beatific vision. Although above Auriol seems to have in mind a sort of moral perfection, to deserve the beatific vision, elsewhere Auriol speaks of the need for an intellect to receive a “real” similitude in intellection, even in the beatific vision, so as to represent any new object, which seems to be a cognitive perfection closer in sorts to such cognitive habits (see, e.g., Auriol, *Quodlibet*, Q.8, aa.1-3).

these different cognitive/non-cognitive states, without allowing for different (gradable) absolute changes/perfections in a cognitive power proper.

In addition, Hervaeus explicitly objects to Durand's above response, with its analogy with a heavy object:

“But to this they [i.e., Durand] say that, although one intelligizing and one not intelligizing are equally perfect, speaking *per se*, nevertheless one intelligizing is more perfect *per accidens*, just as the heavy object located below is more perfect than the heavy object located above.

Contra: Insofar as whatever itself stands (*se habet*) to be perfected, so [it stands] to have a perfection (*ad perfectionem habere*). But according to them, one intelligizing has no more perfection than one not intelligizing, since it does not have anything except for a relation, which is not a perfection, at least, not a perfection distinct from the ground [of said relation], both according to them [i.e., Durand] and according to truth. Therefore, et cetera. Also, what is said of the heavy thing is false, in whatever location/place it should be. If it is equally heavy, it is equally perfected, although in one location it is more conserved than in another.” (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; p.51)⁴⁴⁶

Hervaeus's first point, although not entirely clear, seems to start with the claim that for something to be disposed for some perfection, strictly speaking, that thing itself must be able to take on that corresponding perfection (i.e., as some sort of absolute accident); so, e.g., for an intellect to be itself perfected with respect to intelligizing cats, it must take on some intellection in itself about cats (i.e., this intellect would acquire some form which an intellect ignorant of cats would lack). At the very least, as said above, Hervaeus re-iterates here that even Durand admits that intellection is not a perfection of the intellect itself (i.e., *per se*), which is the only real

⁴⁴⁶ “*Sed ad hoc dicunt quod, licet intelligens et non intelligens sint eque perfecti per se loquendo, tamen per accidens intelligens est magis perfectus, sicut grave deorsum est magis perfectum quam sursum. Contra: Sicut unumquodque se habet ad perfectum esse, ita ad perfectionem habere. Sed intelligens secundum eos nullam habet perfectionem plus quam non intelligens, quia non habet nisi respectum, qui non est perfectio saltem alia a fundamento, et secundum eos et secundum veritatem. Ergo etc. Quod autem dicitur de gravi, falsum est, in quocumque loco sit. Si est equaliter grave, est equaliter perfectum, licet in uno loco magis conservetur quam in alio.*” (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; p.51).

ground for the relation of intellection⁴⁴⁷. Of further interest, Hervaeus makes a second point here to block Durand's above analogy with a heavy thing (supposedly "perfected" *per accidens*, by way of being in its natural place): According to Hervaeus, the heavy object is not more perfect in its natural place, at least, just in terms of its location/place, since it is not any heavier, which should be the relevant measure of perfection. In contrast, Hervaeus contends that the heavy object can be, nevertheless, more "conserved" depending on its location (below or above); by this, Hervaeus likely means that the heavy object is merely more secure in its proper place, below, as, e.g., a stone at the very centre of the universe/earth does not have any further to move, nor does it have as many competing stones nearby to compete with for said spot.⁴⁴⁸ So, overall, Hervaeus presents another possible way to read this case such that a natural perfection of the heavy object cannot be merely induced through a change in location, though, relationally, it can at least be "better off", more consistently in some location, if it is in its proper place (even if that isn't a real "perfection"); so, analogously, we should not take it that a mere change in "presence" of an external cognitive object (i.e., a change in location) is itself a proper perfection in a cognitive power⁴⁴⁹.

⁴⁴⁷ Perhaps, furthermore, Hervaeus wonders here where else, but the intellect, to even put a so-called "*per accidens*" perfection, if the only real thing that grounds a relation (with respect to a purported "*per accidens*" perfection of intellection) is the intellect itself; the perfection, after all, seems not to be had by the thing intelligized, nor does the "space" between the intellect and the thing take on any form itself (a form, in other words, cannot have a "foot" in each subject, in-between the two).

⁴⁴⁸ I owe this interpretation to Stephen Menn. Alternatively, though I think less likely, perhaps Hervaeus's point about "conservation" is that the heavy thing is in a better state insofar as its heaviness is fully actualized in the downwards location (a sufficiently "inner" change), though it is not "perfected" simply in virtue of a relational change in location.

⁴⁴⁹ At best, for Hervaeus, through a mere change in location, the cognitive power is only "better off" in the presence of some object in the sense that the cognitive power is in a better spot to be acted on by the object and take on some real perfection of intellection (and consistently so, with the object consistently present).

In line with the above objection, Hervaeus and Auriol also say a bit more to push on Durand’s alternate view that cognitive “perfections” are not to be explained through some absolute change, but rather through something relational/accidental; i.e., Durand insists, the object’s presence, as a mere *sine qua non/per accidens* cause, is sufficient for cognitive change, without some new absolute form coming to inhere in the cognitive power as well. First off, both Hervaeus and Auriol ask what is meant by this “presence” of an object to a power: it seems to mean either (i) simply the co-existence of two real things, the power and an object, or something more, i.e., (ii) the proximity of an active principle/power to a passive principle/power (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; pp.47-48; Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 460-470, lines 502-506)⁴⁵⁰. As Hervaeus and Auriol continue, Durand cannot mean (i), for God is always co-existent with one’s cognitive power; if this co-existence were sufficient, one would always be cognizing God, but clearly, as we can experience, this is false. Moreover, somewhat more contentiously, Auriol

⁴⁵⁰ *“Praeterea, nulli dubium est quin praesentia obiectorum sit necessaria ad omnem comprehensionem, et si non in esse saltem in fieri. Sed non esset necessaria nisi imprimeretur aliquid absolutum ab obiecto in intellectum et ceteras comprehensivas potentias. Non enim potest fingi quod hoc sit ut oriatur respectus actualis inter potentiam et obiectum. Tum quia respectus non potest oriri nisi acquiratur absolutum aliquod, vel in termino vel in fundamento; constat autem quod in obiecto non acquiratur aliquid absolutum, et ita necesse est quod acquiratur in intellectu. Tum quia obiecta requiruntur in fieri, ex tunc autem in conservari non, immo potest manere visio, visibili abscedente, ut supra dictum fuit dum ageretur de intuitiva notitia; constat autem quod si requirerentur tantum propter respectum, exigerentur ad continuationem ipsius, quia transeunte termino transiret respectus. Ergo fingi non potest quod propter aliud requirantur nisi quia obiecta agunt in intellectum aliquid absolutum. [...] Non valet quoque modus ponendi, quia praesentia obiecti, quae exigitur ad intelligere, non potest esse coexistentia realis, alioquin deberet Deus intelligi continue, cum semper realiter coexistat. Et ideo necesse est quod sit praesentia activi in passivum, ut scilicet obiectum agat in intellectum inducendo absolutum aliquod.”* (Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 460-470, lines 502-506).

“Qualis est illa presentialitas? Aut secundum coexistentiam tantum; et sic, cum Deus semper coexistat cuilibet intellectui, semper intelligeretur a quolibet intellectu, quod falsum est. Aut secundum dispositionem moventis et mobilis. Et tunc quero: Aut hoc est per hoc, quod intellectus movet obiectum, et hoc dicere esset absurdum, aut hoc est per hoc, quod obiectum movet potentiam, et tunc queratur ad quid, sicut prius. Secundo sic (et est confirmatio precedentis): quia ipsi dicunt, quod ista novitas provenit propter novitatem presentie obiecti non latentis. Quero: Quid intelligunt per non latentiam presentie aut per presentiam non latentie? Aut puram negationem aut aliquid positivum. Si puram negationem, ergo intelligere formaliter non dicit nisi puram negationem. Si aliquid positivum, hoc non est nisi manifestationem. Ergo manifestatio sive cognitio est aliquid preter potentiam et obiectum et preter presentiam sive co-existentiam utriusque; et quero, quid sit illud, utrum aliquid creatum in potentia vel in obiecto; et sequitur idem quod prius.” (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; pp.47-48)

adds, this real co-existence cannot be necessary (if not in coming to be, at least in conserving an act of cognition), as, e.g., one can see an object, in a sort of after-image, after the real object disappears; but a relation of co-existence cannot be conserved if one of the relata goes away⁴⁵¹. So, rather, Hervaeus and Auriol argue, this “presence” must mean something more, i.e. (ii), the proximity of a corresponding active and passive principle. But, given that the cognitive power clearly doesn’t act on the object, this must mean that the object is, instead, the transitive active principle, which acts on the cognitive power, as the corresponding passive principle. Thus, Hervaeus and Auriol conclude, even granting that cognition requires the “presence” of an object, to go from not cognizing to cognizing, an absolute change in the cognitive power must still be caused (at least in part)⁴⁵² by the object, against Durand’s strictly impassive/relational account.

Put otherwise, in what amounts to largely the same argument, Hervaeus (following an earlier argument made by Godfrey) explicitly objects to Durand’s contention that cognition comes about merely through the object’s presence as a *sine qua non* cause, in the sense that cognition only requires the “removal of an impediment”, with the lack of an object’s presence as said impediment (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; pp.48-49; cf. Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; pp.151-152)⁴⁵³. As Hervaeus puts it, when something new comes about, in the natural order, this

⁴⁵¹ As one can see in the full passage, in the footnote above, Auriol here refers to his account of intuitive cognition, wherein an act of vision, e.g., is not necessarily veridical, against the old Aristotelian adage, at least for basic acts of sensation, that sensation is always veridical (error only lies in our consequent judgements) (cf. Auriol, I Sent. Prol.; *Roma* ed., pp.28-31)

⁴⁵² This qualification isn’t made by Hervaeus explicitly, but I take it Scotus, at least, would wish to add this qualification (as I’ll get back to below).

⁴⁵³ “*Tertio sic: qui a ubicumque aliquid fit de novo, quod prius non fiebat, oportet, quod hoc fiat aut per remotionem prohibentis, sicut grave movetur deorsum remoto detinente; vel per hoc, quod passum approximatur agenti vel e converso. Tunc ergo, quando de non intelligente fit intelligens, quero, quid istorum sit ibi de novo. Si dicatur, quod remotio prohibentis, quero, quid est illud prohibens, quod removetur, et quid removet. Si dicatur, quod est remotio prohibentis negativi, quia sc. absentia obiecti prohibebat, sicut absentia aeris prohibet corpus luminosum, ne illuminet, hoc est ignorare propriam vocem, quia hoc non est remove prohibens proprie loquendo, sed est applicare ipsum passivum ad agens. Si secundo modo, tunc se habebunt obiectum et potentia sicut movens et*

is either to be explained through the removal of an impediment, as when a heavy object moves downwards when something in the way is removed, or through an active power coming into proximity with a corresponding passive power; but, Hervaeus asks, what impediment is removed and what removes it in the case of cognition coming about?

“If it were said that the removal is of a negative prohibition, namely, that the absence of an object prohibits, as the absence of air prohibits a luminous body from illuminating, this is to be ignorant of the proper voice/meaning [of “remove”]⁴⁵⁴, since this is not to remove an impediment properly speaking, but to apply that which is passive to an agent.” (*Quodlibet* III, Q.8; pp.48-49).

That is, although it might be true that the luminous body acts so long as it does not lack some air, or whatever else, to illuminate, illumination itself is still more properly an action of the luminous body on some passive subject (the air); so, illumination does not *merely* require the absence of some (positive) impediment so much as it, rather, requires the presence of a passive subject to an active agent. So, analogously, if the lack of an absent object similarly amounts to the positive

motum, et tunc quero, ut prius, quid movet et quid movetur et iterum, quid facit movens in moto.”
(Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; pp.48-49).

As discussed in Chapter 2, this argument was made famous by Godfrey, beforehand, as his so-called “Achilles” argument: “*Praeterea, quando activum per se est praesens passivo per se sequitur actio et in hoc est exclusum omne impeditivum, ut patet per Philosophum, nono Metaphysicae. Si ergo in voluntate ponatur activum et passivum quae semper sibi sunt praesentia quia sunt id ipsum, ut dicit ista positio, vel sunt unum subiecto, ut dicit alia, sequitur actio et huic non potest praestari impedimentum. Quid enim potest impedire quod idem non sit praesens sibi ipsi? et cetera.*

Dicere autem quod potest intervenire impedimentum negativum, scilicet absentia obiecti, hoc nihil aliud videtur quam dicere quod absentia activi a passivo vel e converso sit impedimentum ne procedat actio. Igne enim existente alicubi est calefactivum, sed impeditur ne calefaciat, quia deest aqua calefactibilis, vel aqua existente alicubi est calefactibile, sed impeditur ne calefiat quia impeditur ab hoc propter absentiam ignis calefactivi. In proposito enim dicitur quod, voluntate existente et absente obiecto, voluntas non producit actum impedita propter absentiam volibilis. Aut ergo dicitur quod voluntas et volibile se habent sicut per se activum et per se passivum, sicut dicitur in aliis ubi invenitur actio, nisi sit tale impedimentum scilicet negativum quale ponitur circa voluntatem, aut, sicut frequenter dictum est, dicitur quod unumquodque agens agit in se ipsum amoto tamen tali impedimento; et cetera.” (Godfrey, *Quodlibet* VI, Q.7; pp.151-152).

⁴⁵⁴ I take it by “proper” Hervaeus means how one commonly/ought to use the given word; this would match up well with Hervaeus’s following point about what the given word means, “properly speaking”. Another translation choice would be that “this is to be ignorant of what one says”, where “proper” would refer back to the one “voicing” the given word (as in the Latin expression “*propria manu*”, “by one’s own hands”); I’ve found at least one example of someone translating a similar passage from Aquinas this way, but I’ve yet to find any technical discussion concerning the expression (“*propria vox*”) by any Latin medieval author which would push for either translation over the other. Thankfully, in this case, either way, one gets at the same idea regardless of how it is expressed exactly.

presence of an object (i.e., the double negative amounts to something positive), this is not so much to name an impediment as much as it is to name the required conditions for an action (i.e., the proximity of an active power to a corresponding passive power). In this case, most plausibly, as above, this to name the object as the (at least partial) agent and the cognitive power as patient. Alternatively, one might posit an actual impediment, as in the case of, e.g., something blocking a heavy body from falling, but then the original question remains, what this impediment could be and what removes it in the case of cognition.

§6.2. Applying Prior Experiential Arguments Against Durand's Account

Although, as I'll get to in the next section, I think that Olivi and company beforehand, with their own *Fully Active View*, would have some qualms with certain details in the above arguments, especially in this last argument from Hervaeus (and Godfrey, by proxy), nevertheless, I take it that Olivi and company would agree with the overall thrust of the arguments against Durand above. In particular, as I'll explain in this section, I take it that the above arguments that, in general, Durand's relational theory of cognition doesn't do justice to the differences in *occurrent cognition*, without positing absolute, and variable, perfections of the cognitive soul, is anticipated by the prior *experiential arguments* of Olivi and Scotus, which, in contrast with Durand's view, are used to justify the view that our cognitive powers are active as proper "self-movers".

Recall, e.g., Olivi's *contrast arguments*, wherein everything is held constant on the side of the object and corporeal world (e.g., the same object is present, the lighting is held constant, the impressions in the organs are the same), and yet cognition may or may not take place, so this

must be explained on the side of the cognitive power; for one example, when one's sense powers are insufficiently active or attentive to the world, as, e.g., in dreamless sleep, there is no sensitive cognition of the present object impinging on the sense organs; or, for another example, even while awake, when one "vehemently" turns one's attention to some other object, say, in memory, similarly, there is no determinate sensation (e.g. no vision) of the present object physically before one's senses (II Sent. Q.73; III, pp.89-90). Moreover, as discussed in the last chapter, in the following question, Olivi goes on to explicitly call this sort of change in one's cognitive attention/*aspectus* (going into a veridical occurrent act of cognition), one sort of "perfection" that comes to inhere in a cognitive power (along with the perfections gained in one's cognitive habits); thus, in this sense, Olivi finds room so that a creaturely cognitive power can coherently perfect itself, in reality, unlike, e.g., the inherently perfect divine intellect (II Sent. Q.74; III, pp.134-135).

Similarly, as seen above, Scotus argues that changes in the degree of "perfection" of an occurrent cognitive act can differ according to the active attention of the cognitive power:

"As much in the sense as in the intellect, with the same representation posited, a greater attention makes an act more perfect. For having the same intelligible *species* or phantasm, one more perfectly intelligizes/understands (*intelligit*) that of which one puts a greater effort to understand, and less [understands], when less [the effort]. So much also in sense, with the same object present and in the same light, something is more perfectly seen on account of a greater attention in seeing." (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.294).

As Scotus clarifies, a bit earlier, one might try to explain the difference, e.g., in greater, or more abstract, intellection through some change in one's phantasms, outside of the intellect, rather than through the intellect's activity itself, but Scotus finds this response lacking (see, e.g., *Ibid.* pp.291-292; cf. pp.288-290). Scotus contends that, as one can experience, even with just one phantasm, one can intelligize an object in many different ways, so this must be due to the activity

of the intellect instead; e.g., holding constant an image of a rose, I might intelligize rose-ness, planthood, life, etc., and for any of those intelligible objects, I might understand it more or less clearly. Even if one had a multitude of images flash before one's mind (e.g., of different plants), this still doesn't seem sufficient to explain why one is having one determinate act of intellection (e.g., about planthood); consider e.g., what it's like when still semi-asleep in the morning and not intellectually alert, having many sensory experiences but no clear thoughts.

Even though these arguments were initially formulated by Olivi and Scotus against prior passive views, especially the *Fully Passive View* of Godfrey, it's clear that these same contrast arguments hold against Durand's view, insofar as he conceives of cognition as the result of a mere relation coming to hold between a "nude" cognitive power and a present object. Even if a present object doesn't impress some absolute change on a cognitive power, for Durand, cognition still comes about so long as an object is sufficiently present to a cognitive power, as with Godfrey's view. Moreover, for Durand, strictly speaking, a cognitive power, especially the intellect, cannot alter itself, or be altered, in any other way, as with Godfrey's view, indeed even more so, as well. Recall that for Godfrey the potential intellect takes on no pre-cognitive or post-cognitive change (through inherent intelligible *species*), it can only change with respect to cognition itself; Durand's view is even more strict insofar as the (potential) intellect does not even undergo an absolute change with respect to cognition itself.

So, given these common points, the above arguments are at least as potent against Durand's view, insofar as he cannot seem to distinguish two different acts of cognition with respect to the same present object, unlike Olivi and Scotus, who posit proper "self-motion" in the soul's activity. More damning, it's not even clear Durand can distinguish an act of cognizing from an act of not cognizing at all, as in the case where an object is physically present, and

everything in the body seems to be held constant, but the cognitive power is not alert to experience said object⁴⁵⁵. This latter concern seems to lay behind Hervaeus's above argument that it would be ill-fitting if cognition were a mere relation, as one's soul is clearly "internally" perfected in cognition, as one can tell by the greater and lesser delight experienced alongside a more or less perfect act of cognition.

Even Hartman, with his generous treatment of Durand, admits that Durand's view is not so far from the *Fully Passive View* of Godfrey, in practice, here, at least with respect to the lack of direct control in cognition that follows for both views (Hartman 2012, pp.113-115). However, Hartman does not find this to be ultimately all that problematic for Durand. For one thing, correctly enough, Hartman points out that Durand's view is at least not "passive" in the sense of Godfrey's view, so these two views can still be meaningfully distinguished; for Durand, it's still the case that (i) no absolute change/passion is brought about from the object on the cognitive power and (ii) the cognitive power still maintains a "thin sense of agency" insofar as cognition is an (immanent) action which follows from one's cognitive nature, akin to how heating is attributed to fire, given its hot nature⁴⁵⁶ (without any absolute change coming about with respect to the hot agent), as we've seen, e.g., from Durand's own *attribution arguments* (Ibid.). Indeed, this is one of the many places where, as discussed at length above, Hartman (2012) rightfully criticizes Solère (2014) for running together Durand's account with prior "Augustinian" active

⁴⁵⁵ At least Godfrey can posit one absolute change in the cognitive power, when cognition comes about, but missing in this case.

⁴⁵⁶ The only structural difference being that heating is a transitive action but cognition an immanent action.

accounts of cognition, from Olivi and company, at least insofar as only the former posit strict “self-motion” in the cognitive soul.

However, more contentiously, Hartman also defends Durand’s relational account here, with respect to said lack of proper “self-motion” and practical passivity; as Hartman puts it, though Durand’s account may share some common arguments and traits with prior “Augustinian” active accounts:

“[...] the problem with viewing the mind as radically active is that, while delivering on the intuition that the mind is spontaneous, it fails to deliver on the intuition that the mind must meet up with a certain amount of resistance with the world. [...] The will, of course, can be taken to be the total cause but such a view makes little sense in the case of, say, sensory perception. [...] [For Durand,] it is not up to me to see the rock when it is presented to me. The sense in which we are agents is thin (and so too the sense in which we are patients): it has nothing to do with productivity and it has nothing to do with spontaneity, in the sense of *freedom of choice*.” (Hartman 2012, pp.113-115)⁴⁵⁷.

There are, I contend, at least two major problems with this response: in short, on one hand, I think that Hartman oversells the difference between Durand and prior “Augustinians” here given the basic sort of “activity” common to both accounts; on the other hand, in the cases where cognition is indeed more “radically active” for prior “Augustinians”, I think Hartman undersells the problem with the competing passivity in Durand’s account, especially in light of the above *experiential arguments* from prior “Augustinians”.

First off, Hartman here seems to present a rather misleading characterization of just how “radically active” the *Fully Active View* of prior “Augustinians”, such as Olivi, is: most importantly, as I’ve tried to make clear above and in the previous chapters, (i), for Olivi and

⁴⁵⁷ In a footnote here (fn.52), Hartman (2012) adds some helpful citations and comments on Durand’s theory of the freedom of the will which, at least Hartman contends, does not require any strong activity/*contra*-causal freedom either (“control” has more to do with the soul’s rationality in action, as with common medieval intellectualist views).

company, although a cognitive power is the proper and more principal efficient cause of cognition, external objects do still “offer some resistance” as secondary or “terminative”, “broadly efficient”, causes; moreover, (ii), although the will can intervene in different ways, to voluntarily vary the “attention” of a cognitive power, this doesn’t seem to happen all of the time according to Olivi and company, nor is the activity of a cognitive power identical to such explicit voluntary control. E.g., Olivi is quite explicit that, whenever one doesn’t actively will to cognize, cognition effectively comes about through the cognitive power, in particular, thanks to its natural connection (*colligantia*) with the body (and lower powers of the soul) and changes therein (II Sent. Q.73; III, p.66; cf. II Sent. Q.72; III, pp.38-39; Martin 2019, pp.326-331)⁴⁵⁸. This seems to include cases where, with multiple objects present to the senses, all else being equal, that which leaves the strongest impression on the body will catch one’s attention, without any need for the voluntary turning of one’s attention; e.g., with multiple voices talking in a room, all else being equal, one is likely to hear, most determinately, by default, the loudest voice pointed in one’s direction.

So, in these sorts of cases, the cognitive power itself, as much for Durand as for Olivi and company, indeed only requires a “thin sense of agency”, as a natural power gives rise to its proper action; this much is clear in the *attribution arguments* we’ve seen from Olivi and company above. However, the difference, nevertheless, remains that for Olivi and company, unlike Durand, some real change occurs in cognition itself, hence calling this “self-motion”; this much explains the sense in which we experience a change in cognition coming about “from the inside”. Moreover, for Olivi and company, changes can occur in a cognitive power before and

⁴⁵⁸ “*Si autem quaeras a quo sit tanquam a causa efficiente: patet quod vel a voluntate potentias movente vel aliquando per naturalem colligantiam fit ab aliquo motu vel mutatione sui organi vel totius corporis.*” (Olivi, II Sent. Q.73; III, p.66).

after cognition as well; e.g., through the will, to turn a cognitive power to a quieter voice, or through bodily changes, *via* one's connection to the body, waking up a power in the first place⁴⁵⁹.

The second major issue with Hartman's (2012) above response is that, although it might be plausible that cognition, especially sensation, is not "radically active" and must meet some resistance from the world, this doesn't negate the empirical claim from Olivi and company that cognition, even sensation, is "active" in the sense that it is up to voluntary control in principle; i.e., in contrast to the complete passivity of Durand's view (in practice), cognition is at least partially active, in some cases, to some degree, so as to explain the contrast cases given in the above *experiential arguments*. Hartman claims that "is not up to me to see the rock when it is presented to me", which sounds plausible enough in isolation, but Olivi and Scotus present some plausible counter-examples where, even in the presence of the rock, my sensation might well differ, even not come to be at all, depending on how strongly I attend to the rock, especially if I don't attend to the rock in any determinate degree at all (e.g., I might remain focused on some "inner" objects in memory or intellection instead). Nevertheless, Olivi and company can still admit that the rock will constrain my cognition to some degree; e.g., if the rock is white I can't just choose to see it as green; but this is to be explained by the rock's role as a "terminative"/secondary cause, constraining cognition, as mentioned above⁴⁶⁰. Thus, in this way, Olivi and company can still extract the root of what sounds so plausible in Hartman's above

⁴⁵⁹ Based on what Olivi says in II Sent. Q.72 (III, pp.38-39), one might also add that such "variation" in a cognitive/appetitive power's "*aspectus*" is also unique, in general, compared with natural changes, given that natural agents seem to be locked into one invariable "*aspectus*" towards its corresponding patient and, clearly enough, does not consciously "look upon" or "want" its proper objects (in a single *or* variable manner).

⁴⁶⁰ Moreover, Olivi and Scotus can agree that sensation, more so than intellection, is tied to the body, in this life, such that one's sense powers are more immediately in a *colligantia* with one's bodily organs and changes therein.

claim that sensation, and cognition in general, is not “up to us”, i.e., it isn’t entirely up to voluntary control, while still holding that sensation admits of some voluntary control.

Outside of direct voluntary control, one might also consider the different “real” habits which one can acquire and augment over time (i.e., in “self-motion” brought about in the soul, not just in the body), which Olivi, e.g., discusses at length in II Sent. Q.74; e.g., one intellect, having gained more scientific knowledge about geology through prior acts of voluntary intellection, will be more disposed to intellectually cognize the rock more perfectly (e.g., as according to its proper type), than another intellect⁴⁶¹. Thus, one can reasonably say one’s intellection is “up to us” in this extended sense as well. Even our senses seem open to this sort of augmentation, at least to some degree, as in the case of someone who trains their sense of taste over time so as, e.g., to attend to wine differently and pick up different flavours.

However, Durand’s bare cognitive power is not capable of such real variation, open to such voluntary change; rather, at best, it simply “attends” to what is presented to the power. Moreover, as argued further above, it’s not even clear a mere relation can account for this much, in general, given that a cognitive power is as bare as it is “inside” before and after it stands in relation to an object, which is all “cognition” is said to be for Durand. So, a real problem remains for Durand’s alternate account of cognition to respond to the above *experiential arguments*. Overall, Hartman’s (2012) contention that cognition has no need for active “self-motion” (whether autonomous or voluntary), and that sensation, e.g., invariably comes about in the

⁴⁶¹ Perhaps more so in line with the above cases of “automatic” cognition, in this text Olivi also admits of certain innate dispositions in the intellect, not in the sense of innate knowledge, but in the sense of indefinite innate inclinations (e.g., of one intellect to be born more inclined towards, or better at, more abstract areas of study, such as math or theology, in comparison to others) (II Sent. Q.74; III, pp.117-118). At best, Durand would have to explain such differences in terms of the body/matter of two individuals alone (e.g., to work better with images as aids to mathematical understanding); however, given the agreed upon immaterial nature of the intellect, one might reasonably question whether this is sufficient.

presence of some object, fails to address the, at least apparent, counter-examples considered above.

§6.3. Room to Respond? Real Changes Outside the Power and Intentional Changes Inside

Before concluding, let's consider what room might remain for Durand to respond to the above objections. For starters, one might wonder whether the earlier arguments from Hervaeus and Auriol, in particular, exactly exhaust the options for what sort of "change" or "perfection" might underlie cognition for Durand. Recall that when Hervaeus and Auriol ask what is meant by the "presence" of an object to a power, they only consider two main options: it seems to mean either (1) simply the co-existence of two real things (viz. the power and an object), or something more, i.e., (2) the proximity of an active principle/power to a passive principle/power (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; pp.47-48; Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 460-470, lines 502-506). As Hervaeus, in particular, continues, he thinks (2) is the only viable option; of this second option, moreover, Hervaeus assumes that either (2.1) the cognitive power is the relevant active principle/power, with the object the relevant passive principle/power, or (2.2) vice versa; but clearly not (2.1), since the cognitive power doesn't act on the object; so, Hervaeus concludes that, conversely, (2.2) the object is the active power which acts on the cognitive power, as the corresponding passive power (at the very least, to cause a cognitive *species*, if not cognition itself). However, as we'll explore below, Durand might well consider two more aspects to such "presence" of an object to a power, at least partially considered by prior "Augustinians" such as Olivi and Scotus beforehand, to find a space somewhere between options (1) and (2) above: (i) at least in the case of sensation, there might well be a real change/passion, from the object, on the medium and sense organ, before the sensitive soul, without strictly impressing upon the sensitive

soul proper; moreover, (ii), most importantly, with or without such bodily change, with some object sufficiently “proximate” in space, cognition might merely “change” or “perfect” the given cognitive power/soul “intentionally” or “objectively”, outside of the domain of typical natural “subjective” change.

On point (i), recall that Durand indeed, as discussed above, agrees this much with Augustine, from *De musica* VI, that the soul “senses in the body” and that corporeal objects “make something in the body” without any impression strictly coming about in the soul from the body; sensation comes about so long as the sensible object is “present”, somehow or other, through said bodily impression; as Durand puts it, quoted above:

“[...] the sensible [thing] does not act on the sensitive power, but on the organ, by means of qualities disposing that; [...] nor is it otherwise to sense, except that the sensible thing present is not hidden to being sensed; this in itself is to cognize in some way, and in a similar way it was said of the intellect” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; p.23; cf. Augustine, *De musica*, 6.5.9-10)

Of the intellect, Durand seems to have in mind the role for bodily impressions to conjure up “phantasms” for the intellect to think with; so, e.g., the object I am intelligizing can be present in some manner in a “phantasm”, just outside the intellect, there by way of some bodily changes in the “inner” sense organs.

Moreover, bringing together points (i) and (ii) above, and the aforementioned “presence” of some object to a power, Durand says more near the very end of II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5, in a passage that might easily be missed. Here, Durand has returned to the initial topic of his text (angelic intellection) and wishes to break the traditional dichotomy that angelic cognition must either come about through the angelic essence itself or through some distinct intelligible *species* super-added to the angelic intellect, in either case, “subjectively” containing the form of its objects; as Durand puts it, in contrast:

“That the intellect intelligizes, it is sufficient that an intelligible thing should be present *objectively* to the intellect either through itself or through something representing it. It is accidental that it [the intelligible thing] should be in the intellect *subjectively*, as in our soul it happens, especially in the sense powers, whatever should be the case for the intellect. But a distant thing, like colour in a wall, is effectively made present to vision through that which it causes in the organ, although an accident is that which is in a thing [e.g., sense] as in a subject. For, it is necessary for vision that it [e.g., colour] should be present to the visive power; however, that it should be in it as in a subject is accidental for vision. But it has been said that things, either in themselves or through their mediating causes, are present *objectively* to an angelic intellect, nor is it necessary that they should be in an angel *subjectively*, neither through themselves nor through their *species*.” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.31-32, *my emphasis*)⁴⁶².

In other words, as Durand would have it, cognition in general does not require the presence of an object “subjectively” in a cognitive power, as, e.g., some absolute accident inhering *in a subject* (hence the name “subjective”), so long as the object is present “objectively”, i.e., as a cognitive *object* under the power’s gaze (either the object itself or through some mediating object as, e.g., one might think of God through thinking of His effects). As Durand argues, with an example, the visive power does not need to “subjectively” take on the colour of its sensible object in order to see said colour/object (i.e., the visive power merely receives the colour “objectively”); e.g., one can see blue, even though the sensitive power/soul does not need to actually (subjectively) receive the absolute/real quality of blue. Durand admits some subjective/absolute change in a bodily organ, through the medium, brought about from an object, at least for sensation, but any

⁴⁶² “*Ad primum argumentum dicendum, quod ad hoc, quod intellectus intelligat, sufficit, quod res intelligibilis sit presens obiective intellectui secundum se vel secundum aliquid eam representans. Quod autem sit in intellectu subiective, accidit, sicut in anima nostra contingit, maxime in potentiis sensitivis, quidquid sit de intellectu. Res autem distans, ut color parietis, efficitur presens visui per illud, quod causat in organo, quod cum sit accidens, est in eo ut in subiecto. Quod enim sit presens visui, necessarium est ad visionem; quod autem sit in eo ut in subiecto, accidit visioni. Dictum autem est, quod res se ipsis vel mediantibus causis suis sunt presentes obiective intellectui angeli nec oportet, quod sint in angelo subiective, nec secundum se nec secundum suas species.*” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.31-32).

For the first argument this response is in reference to: “*Et videtur quod per species, quia necesse est hoc, quod intellectus intelligat quod in ipso sint res vel rerum species, ut patet ex tertio De anima. Sed in intellectu angelico non sunt res per essentiam suam. Ergo sunt ibi per suas species.*” (Ibid. p.7; cf. Aristotle, *De anima*, III.8, 431b27).

such change is not itself of the essence of cognition (thus, he calls it “accidental”, since such “subjective” change is in distinction to “objective” change)⁴⁶³. In the case of an angelic intellect, any real corporeal change would, at best, be external to such an incorporeal intellect (e.g., in the medium), so Durand takes it to be all the more obvious that any object (indeed, anything distinct from the angelic essence) could only be “objectively” present in an angelic intellect.

Durand makes a similar argument a bit above this cited passage, arguing that an angelic intellect, e.g., cannot subjectively take on absolute “representations” (such as *species*/similitudes) of material quiddities, if they are to represent by way of formal likeness/similarity, as is traditionally held. On this view, the very same form of the object represented comes to inhere subjectively in the intellect, only differing in ‘mode of being’ according to its subject, similar to how colour subjectively inheres in a coloured body and in the medium, but less perfectly in one case than the other, given the subject. However, any subjective change in an angelic intellect would differ in kind/form from these material quiddities in form, so they cannot represent in this way; these quiddities, after all, are substantial forms of material beings while any subjective change in an intellect would be immaterial and, Durand stresses, merely accidental (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.27-28)⁴⁶⁴. Durand considers that one might respond that there are such absolute

⁴⁶³ One might wonder whether Durand is committed to any “real” change in the medium/organ given that, for one reason, neither seem to become visibly coloured (even if he admits of some sort of change in the organ here). However, elsewhere Durand explicitly admits of such real change (as light/*species*) in the medium/translucent eye; specifically, Durand says such change is “intentional”, not in the sense of objective being in a cognitive power, but in the sense of “weak or diminished being” (see, e.g., Durand, II Sent. [C], D.13, Q.2; pp.155-156). More specifically, Durand says such “*intentions*” of colour are same in type as sensible colour in a body but “imperfect” insofar as they are insensible in themselves and require the aid of external natures (requiring, e.g., external light and the continued presence of the external sensible body, present at a particular angle with the light). For more on Durand on *species* in the medium, see also the cited passage in the footnote below.

⁴⁶⁴ *“Item species non potest esse solum ratio cognoscendi, quia omnis talis species aliquid representans et forma per ipsam immediate representata sunt eiusdem rationis secundum speciem, licet differant in modo essendi. Sed nichil existens in mente angei potest esse eiusdem rationis specificum cum quidditatibus rerum nec secundum genus, cum ille sint substantie, hec autem quedam accidentia. Ergo etc. Minor patet de se, sed maior declaratur exemplo et ratione. Exemplo, quia sicut lux in corpore luminoso et lumen in aere sunt eiusdem speciei, licet differant in modo*

species/similitudes in the intellect/cognitive power to serve as representations, but, instead of by any formal likeness/similarity, they represent in some other way, e.g., by some basic “mode of representing”; but Durand retorts that “this would be to speak in vain” (Ibid.)⁴⁶⁵.

So, overall, getting back to the above arguments, on point (i) above, at the very least, even if not exactly sufficient for the sort of “attentive” control considered above, as with Olivi and other “Augustinians”, Durand can at least admit some role for bodily impressions, given the soul’s natural “connection” with the body, such that what object is “present” to the senses/intellect can be so limited by what impresses on the body; so, e.g., what one senses will be at least partially explained by what sensible object is impressing itself on one’s sense organs and, at least for humans in this life, what one intelligizes will at least be partially explained by what one is sensing/imagining by way of some bodily changes. Moreover, and most importantly, on points (i) and (ii), the specific object can be present “objectively” to a cognitive power without any “subjective” impression made in the cognitive power/soul proper, so long as it (or

essendi propter diversitatem subiecti recipientis, sic color et species eius in medio vel oculo sunt eiusdem rationis specificae, licet differunt in modo essendi propter diversitatem subiecti. Sicut enim proprium subiectum lucis secundum suum perfectum esse est densum – unde et stella dicitur esse densior pars sphere sic proprium subiectum coloris, qui aliquo modo vergit ad naturam lucis, est perspicuum terminatum per opacum; subiectum autem utriusque secundum esse imperfectum est perspicuum non densum nec terminatum. Et sicut est de luce et lumine, colore et specie, sic est de qualibet forma et specie ipsam immediate representante, quod sc. sunt eiusdem rationis specificae. Quod apparet per rationem sic: Illud, quod est solum ratio cognoscendi et non proprie medium cognitum, non ducit in cognitionem alterius nisi ratione perfecte similitudinis; unde et similitudo dicitur per quandam expressionem. Medium autem cognitum potest ducere in alterius cognitionem ratione cuiuscumque habitudinis, sc. ut causa vel ut effectus, ut simile vel ut oppositum et qualitercumque aliter, sed species ratione solius similitudinis, ut dictum est; perfecta autem similitudo non est differentium secundum speciem. Ergo etc. Patet ergo maior; minor etiam de se clara est. Ergo sequitur conclusio, sc. quod in angelo non sunt species quidditates rerum ei representantes.

Si quis autem dicat, quod species representans est eiusdem rationis cum re representata non in essendo, sed in representando, vane loquitur [...].” (Durand, II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.27-28).

⁴⁶⁵ Here, Durand also goes on to argue against another common view, that such *species/similitudes* represent by way of being caused by their object, but he considers this to be as much “in vain”, since then every effect would be a “representation” of its cause(s), diluting the term to include just about everything.

some representation) is located just outside of the cognitive power (on point (i), perhaps, at least for some creatures, by way of some bodily impression); the object merely needs to be close enough to be in said power's cognitive gaze. So, in response to the above argument from Hervaeus and Auriol, in this way, Durand at least seems to find a spot between the two options offered by Hervaeus and Auriol (i.e., that an object must either be "present" or "proximate" as (1) simply co-existent with a power or (2.2) as the proper cause acting on the cognitive power/soul itself); an object can be "proximate" as through an impression in the body, though not the soul, at least for cognitive creatures tied to a body in this life, and, more simply, an object can be "present" in "objective being", whether proximate through an impression or just through being located nearby, under the potential gaze of some cognitive power/soul⁴⁶⁶.

Moreover, at least in partial response to the above *experiential arguments* from prior "Augustinians", Durand can claim that there is indeed a difference "inside" a cognitive power, depending on whether it is cognizing or not and what in particular it is cognizing, albeit a merely "objective" difference. So, e.g., a sleeping sense power, with an object present in space, impressing itself on the organ, might still differ insofar as it lacks any object in "objective" being, under its cognitive gaze, as prior "Augustinians" would seem to (at least partially) agree with. Similarly, even with a single phantasm of some white rock, Durand can agree with the "experiential claims" of prior "Augustinians", that the intellect differs if it grasps the rock as, e.g., salt, or as simply a corporeal thing, though Durand would contend that the difference is

⁴⁶⁶ To be precise, it appears that Durand's position is that the presence of the object in "objective being" to a cognitive power amounts to cognition itself, of said object. This is interesting as one might otherwise, plausibly enough, think that an object is "objectively" present to a power insofar as that object is merely able to be cognized, readily enough, through said "presence" (i.e., "objective" presence would only be a pre-condition to cognition, a sort of "being at hand" to the mind). For another example of Durand's position, see Peter Auriol's view of "objective being" as "apparent" to a cognitive power, which, as we'll touch on briefly below, Auriol takes to be in the very definition of cognition (see, e.g., Auriol, *I Sent.*, D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 320-336).

merely “objective” for the intellect; in this case, the intellect will have different intelligible objects, more specifically speaking. Why, Durand might even reverse the question, should the cognitive power need any subjective change in itself, if, on point (i) the body, cojoined to the power, can take on any change instead, if needed, and, on point (ii), the cognitive power doesn’t even seem to regularly “subjectively” take on (most of) its objects in cognition (e.g., as the sense power doesn’t visibly take on the form of whiteness found in the rock)?

Although they might ultimately diverge in their full accounts of cognition, one can find some precedent to Durand’s points above from prior “Augustinians”. As mentioned above, on point (i), Olivi, e.g., regularly makes use of the connection held between the cognitive soul and body to explain why our power of sensation, in particular, is limited in this corporeal life. Moreover, on point (ii), Scotus, in particular, is most often presented as one of the earliest figures (along with Henry of Ghent, even earlier) to popularize the terminology of “intentional”, “objective”, or “cognitive being”, as Durand uses it above (see, e.g., Cross 2015, pp.32-39, Friedman 1999, Lička 2016, pp.49-50, pp.63-69, Perler 1994, Perler 2001, Tachau 1988, pp.62-68, pp.95-97). Without getting too far afield into this vast topic, consider that even within this dissertation we’ve already seen the following passage from Scotus, alluding to Olivi as well, where Scotus brings up the objective “in-existence” of a form in a cognitive power, as essential to cognition, in contrast with the subjective inherence of the very same form of the object, or some similar *species*, which is, rather, “accidental” to cognition:

“It is accidental to the *species*, insofar as it is a partial cause with respect to intellection, concurring with the intellect as another partial cause, that it [*ipsa (species)*] would perfect the intellect, since even if it perfects it, nevertheless it does not give to the intellect any activity, pertaining to the causality of the intellect. Example: the motive power in a hand is able to use a knife insofar as it [i.e., the knife] is sharp, for dividing some body. That sharpness, if it were in

the hand as in a subject, the hand would be able to use it for the same operation, and nevertheless it would be accidental to the hand – insofar as a motive power is in it – that [such] sharpness would be in it; and conversely, since the sharpness would give no perfection to the hand pertaining to its motive power [i.e., for grasping (the knife)]. That is clear since the [hand’s] motive power is equally perfect without such sharpness, and it uses that [i.e., the sharpness] when it is in another thing conjoined to the hand (for instance, a knife), just as [the hand] would use that [sharpness] if it were in the hand.

And such [is the case] in the matter at hand, if a *species* were to be something ‘existent in’ (*inexistens*) the intellect, without inhering in the way of a form; if, in that way, the *species*, by being in-existent, should be or could be sufficiently conjoined to the intellect, those two things would be capable to be partial causes – the intellect and the *species* – one conjoined to the other into the same operation, into which they would now be able [to bring about], when (*quando*) the *species* informs the intellect. This is also clear by positing that something intelligible is present without a *species*: for that object is a partial cause, and it does not inform the intellect, which [intellect] is another partial cause; but just by those two partial causes being brought appropriately close, they cause one common effect, without one being informed by the other, with only the approximation [of the two] being required.” (*Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.299)⁴⁶⁷.

In short, as I explain more in Chapter 2, here Scotus wishes to explain how a cognitive power can coherently work with an object or impression/*species*, strictly external to the cognitive

⁴⁶⁷ In full, Scotus says: “*Responsio ad primum: Accidit speciei in quantum est causa partialis resepectu actus intelligendi, concurrans cum intellectu ut alia causa partiali, quod ipsa perficiat intellectum, quia etsi perficiat eum, non tamen dat intellectui aliquam activitatem, pertinentem ad causalitatem intellectus. Exemplum: potentia motiva in manu potest uti cultello in quantum acutus est, ad dividendum aliquod corpus. Ista acuties si esset in manu ut in subiecto, posset manus uti ea ad eandem operationem, et tamen accideret – in quantum est in ea potentia motiva – quod acuties in ea esset, et e converso, quia acuties nullam perfectionem daret manui pertinentem ad potentiam motivam. Quod apparet, quia aequae perfecta est potentia motiva sine tali acutie, et eodem modo utitur ea quando est in alio, coniuncto manui (ut cultello), sicut uteretur ea si esset in manu. Ita in proposito. Si species posset esse inexistens intellectui absque inhaerentia per modum formae, si illo modo inexistens esset vel posset esse sufficienter coniuncta intellectui, possent istae duae causae partiales – intellectus et species – coniunctae sibi invicem, in eandem operationem in quam modo possunt quando species informat intellectum. Quod etiam apparet ponendo* aliquod intelligibile praesens sine specie: illud enim obiectum est causa partialis, et non informat intellectum, qui est altera causa partialis; sed istae duae causae partiales approximatae, absque informatione alterius ab altera, per solam approximationem debitam causant unum effectum communem. * [Adnotatio Scoti: ‘ponendo’: nota quod non oportet obiectum, vel supplens vicem obiecti, necessario fare [better: fore] principium actionis immanentis illi in quo est obiectum, vel supplens].” (Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, D.3, *pars* 3, Q.2; *Opera Theologica* III/1, p.299). [As Scotus adds later, “note that it is not necessary that an object, or something supplying the place for the object, necessarily will be the principle of the immanent action to that thing for which it is the object or supplying thing”, in reference to those holding a *Fully Active View*, like Olivi.]*

power, in order to actively bring about cognition, while remaining (at least initially) unmoved by the object/*species*; the cognitive power can use the object/*species*, as a “quasi-instrument”, at the boundary where the two meet, without either informing the other, similar, in some respect, to a hand using a knife’s sharpness without the hand needing to become sharp itself (“subjectively”). Most notably, this is similar to Durand’s description of cognition insofar as a cognitive power is said to have an object “present” so long as it is in some sense “conjoined”/meets up with the object (in itself or through an impression/*species*) and falls under the power’s intentional/objective gaze, with it accidental that the power should take on the form of the object (itself or in some distinct *species*) in any literal/subjective manner.

However, even granting these points of similarity, a significant distance remains between the account(s) of Scotus and company and that of Durand. First, one can see in the above passage that, unlike Durand, Scotus is still willing to call the object (in itself or through a *species*) an efficient cause in cognition, though in co-operation with the cognitive power as the primary cause; indeed, as I discuss more in Chapter 2, Scotus’s end goal for this passage is to argue that even someone like Olivi, who more widely holds that an object of cognition can be “present” without an intermediary *species*, must still admit that the object functions broadly as an efficient cause, in this sort of *quasi-instrumental/secondary* manner, even if the cognitive power is the primary and ordering efficient cause. So, in this way, Scotus and company come closer to Hervaeus and Auriol, such that an object is indeed “proximate” as an active effective principle, with the cognitive power a passive principle; Scotus and company, however, qualify that the cognitive power, while in one way passive, is also a (primary) active effective principle in this scenario, along with the object (as we’ve seen, the cognitive power acts on itself so long as it has

the necessary aid of the object as a secondary/sub-ordinate cause). Durand, on the other hand, as we've seen, seems content to hold that the object of cognition is a mere *sine qua non* cause in this scenario, as in the case of the removal of an obstacle to let a heavy body fall, with no proper/absolute motion coming about in the cognitive power from either the object or the cognitive power.

Second, perhaps most importantly, although Scotus and company might agree with Durand that a cognitive power begins to act while “unmoved” from the object (or itself), and that an “objective” change in the cognitive power should be distinguished from a “subjective” change in the cognitive power, nevertheless, Scotus and company contend that some proper/absolute/“subjective” change/motion must still come about in the cognitive power, as a sort of “self-motion”, to serve as the absolute foundation behind any act of cognition and its “objective” determination. In other words, an essential theoretical disagreement remains where, for Scotus and company, in order to explain any “objective” change in a cognitive power, there must still be some absolute change in reality for the given cognitive power. After all, an “objective” change in a cognitive power simply names that a cognitive power is cognizing (some object), so it seems Durand simply begs the question against the above objections when Durand says he can admit some difference in cognition, though merely in terms of a difference in “objective” being. As Scotus and company would have it, e.g. in the above *experiential arguments*, there must be some kind of “subjective” difference in a cognitive power to *explain* the different contrast cases we experience in cognition; e.g., to explain the difference between an intellection of this or that intelligible object, with one phantasm present, there must be some real change in the intellect, some new qualification, to underlie which intelligible object in fact comes to be present in “objective being” for that intellect.

While it might be true that, as Scotus says in the above citation, it is “accidental” that a cognitive power should literally and subjectively take on the exact form of its object in order to have that object in “objective being” (as if, e.g., a sense power would need to become visibly coloured to see that colour or an intellective power would need to take on the substantial form of some corporeal being in order to intelligize such an object), there are other sorts of ways in which a cognitive power can subjectively change in order to ground an act of cognition. Hervaeus seems to have this thought in mind when he gives his response to Durand’s argument, discussed above, that, e.g., an incorporeal intellect couldn’t even literally take on some corporeal form in order to represent/be a *similitudo* of said form: as Hervaeus puts it, Durand’s argument misunderstands how “we” speak of such real “similitudes”/“representations” in a cognitive power; Durand’s argument “proceeds by using ‘similar’”, as, e.g., we say that a painting of a red boat is a mediate “similitudo” of an actual red boat, by way of some shared sensible qualities; “however, we speak of a ‘similitudo’ which is a *ratio* of cognizing, not as a mediate thing cognized” (*Quodlibet* III, Q.8; pp.67-68)⁴⁶⁸. That is, for Hervaeus, as with Scotus and company, a cognitive power must take on some sort of real “similitudo”, whether, e.g., that is some quality

⁴⁶⁸ “*Ad tertium dicendum, quod species requiritur ut similitudo informans intellectum et movens ipsum ad cognoscendum, et non ut medium cognitum, prout una res cognita ducit in cognitionem alterius. Ad probationem, que adducitur in contrarium, dicendum, quod illa ratio peccat in duobus. Primo, quia procedit de similitudine in esse, nos autem loquimur de similitudine, que est secundum esse representativum, prout similitudo existens in intellectu representat intelligibile. - Secundo deficit, quia procedit utendo simili ut medio cognito ad probandum alterum, sicut si probaretur aliquid de nive alba in eo, quod alba, et ex hoc concluderetur, quod conveniret lapidi albo. Nos autem loquimur de similitudine, que est ratio cognoscendi, non ut medium cognitum.*” (Hervaeus, *Quodlibet* III, Q.8; pp.67-68).

[Durand’s ‘third’ argument here, which Hervaeus is responding to, is earlier summarized as follows: “*Tertio sic: quia species aut requiritur ut medium cognoscendi, quod est cognitum, aut ut similitudo sola cogniti. Non primo modo, ut auctores illius positionis de speciebus dicunt. Probatio, quod nec secundo modo. Primo, quia talis similitudo, ut dicunt, est eiusdem speciei cum eo, cuius est similitudo, sicut albedo et similitudo eius in aere, ut dicunt, est eiusdem speciei, licet habeant diversum modum essendi. Sed species in intellectu non potest esse eiusdem speciei cum re materiali cognita. Ergo etc. - Secundo, quia quando aliquid ducit in cognitionem alterius ut similitudo, non ducit in cognitionem eius, nisi prout assimilatur sibi. Sed res extra non potest assimilari speciei in intellectu. Ergo etc.*” (Ibid. p.60; cf. Durand, II Sent. [A] D.3, Q.5; pp.27-32).]

lying behind the act of cognition itself or some habit/*species* in said cognitive power, just in the sense that this similitude explains (as a ground/*ratio* of cognition) (at least in part) why the cognitive power tends toward some particular object and not another; such a subjective “similitude” in a cognitive power need not function as a sort of literal “internal image” mediating cognition.

Now, to be fair to Durand, as mentioned above, Durand does consider this other way of referring to real “similitudes” in a cognitive power, as mere “modes of representing”, but, he retorts that this would be to “speak in vain” (II Sent. [A], D.3, Q.5; pp.27-28). That is, Durand understands how one thing might serve as a representation of some object by way of one thing having some similar attributes/forms in reality as the object, as, e.g., a painting functions (at least in part), but Durand doesn’t see how else something could be “similar” to serve as a representation; if this is just some basic feature of “similitudes” in a cognitive power, lacking any literal similarity to their objects, then this seems to remove all sense in calling such entities “similar”. Moreover, this wouldn’t seem to explain much either, so we can ask why posit such basic “representations” (at least, as entities over and above the act of cognition itself)?

However, on the other hand, Durand isn’t exactly being fair to his peers insofar as there is a lot more that is commonly said on this topic. At least one detail, e.g., which Durand seems to muddy up here is that the question, ‘how does an act of cognition (or anything else) represent?’ can be broken up into two distinct questions, as I brought up earlier in the introduction to this dissertation:

Question 2a: In virtue of what do acts of cognition have their representationality, intentionality, etc., in general? That is, in virtue of what does this mental act or state represent anything at all, as opposed to being no representation of anything?

Question 2b: In virtue of what is any given act of cognition fixed/determined to the (intentional) object which it represents, in particular? In virtue of what, e.g., am I seeing (this) orange (in this cat), as opposed to some other object?

In response to the first question, 2a, it would make sense to hope for a proper “outside” explanation such that one thing could represent something else by way of some real similarity relation; however, given that Durand, as with others before him, agree that a cognitive power does not literally receive all the same forms as in its external objects, and even if, this would be accidental to cognition, it can be agreed that there is no such “outside” explanation to be found here; rather, it’s basic to a cognitive power that it can represent any other object (i.e. receive some object in “objective being”). However, in response the second question, 2b, there might yet be an explanatory role for a basic “similitude” in a cognitive power to play, distinct from the power itself, even if it doesn’t literally share the same/similar form(s) with its objects. See, e.g., the so-called “internalist” “descriptive theory of reference”, where a token mental item represents some particular object in virtue of having a sufficiently satisfactory set of (verbal or non-verbal) mental “descriptions” associated with that token to match said object (in the case of sensation, that “description” might just be the non-verbal “look” of orange, round, etc., to match said orange, round, etc. object in front of one). In contrast, on the face of it, Durand seems to have a sort of bare “externalist” “causal theory of reference”, of sorts, such that no “internal” similitudes/mental associations are necessary to fix the representation of a mental act; the act is simply fixed to whatever particular object is “present” at the end of that cognitive relation, the *sine qua non* cause of that act, external to the bare cognitive power⁴⁶⁹. Note, moreover, that

⁴⁶⁹ See Hartman (2012, pp.178-199) for more on this interpretation of Durand. To be clear, as mentioned in the footnotes above, Durand wouldn’t take bare causation to satisfy question 2a, but that doesn’t mean he isn’t committed to a causal theory with respect to question 2b.

“hybrid” theories are also possible here which require both “internal” similitudes and “external” causal factors; e.g., as I explain elsewhere, I take it that Olivi’s answer to question 2b is that an act of cognition is fixed to the particular object it is in virtue of that object being that act’s “terminative cause”, which is to say that said object is both (i) “broadly” an efficient cause, external to the power, but also (ii) that object which the power is internally “assimilated” to most determinately (given that, for one thing, the exact object in one’s cognitive gaze is indeterminate from (i) or (ii) alone)⁴⁷⁰. In general, there is a vast body of secondary literature on this medieval debate, where quite often medieval figures posit some internal “similitudes” to play an explanatory role, to answer question 2b, even if the nature of such “similitudes”, in a cognitive power, to represent anything at all, is basic to their existence as mental qualities/attributes and cannot be explained further (e.g., through a literal sameness/similarity in form)⁴⁷¹.

Along similar lines to the “internalist” answers to question 2b, there are also all the reasons we’ve seen above to posit internal “similitudes”, distinct from the cognitive power itself, to explain, e.g., how a given cognitive power can come to represent some new object or become habituated to more readily and perfectly cognize some object over time. This, indeed, seems to lay at the core of Auriol’s explicit objections to Durand’s relational view of cognition: To be clear, without getting too deep into the details of Auriol’s own view, let it first be stated that Auriol agrees this much with Scotus and Durand before him, that it is “essential” to cognition that an object is present “objectively”, or, as Auriol prefers to put it, that an object is present in “apparent being” to a cognitive subject; indeed, Auriol quite famously emphasizes this to the

⁴⁷⁰ See, in part, what I say against Adriaenssen’s (2011) “internalist” view of “terminative causation” in Chapter 2.

⁴⁷¹ To the extent that “sameness in form” might still be informative to question 2a or 2b, there’s also the common medieval view, associated with Avicenna, that forms just can exist in either extra or intra mental reality; so, in this sense, a cognitive power truly does have the same form “inside” it, in reality and not just “objective” being, though not in the normal manner of inherence, thanks to some basic power of the mind to take on forms in this way (*contra* Durand’s simplification of this view).

point that he treats it as “definitive” of cognition, saying, e.g., that “it is manifestly clear that there is nothing else to the formal definition of intellection, or cognition in general, other than to have something present in the way of an apparent thing” (I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 320-336)⁴⁷². However, against Durand, in particular, Auriol objects that, e.g., for intellection:

“This sort of having of a present thing by way of appearance is not founded upon the bare power of the intellect, against the opinion [of Durand, that an act of intelligizing is nothing absolute added to the intellect, but only a relation towards an object (*respectus ad obiectum*)]; rather, this requires something absolute upon which it should be founded.” (I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 415-448)⁴⁷³.

⁴⁷² For the full passage, where Auriol initially presents his own view in this text: “*Prima siquidem est quod intelligere formaliter non includit determinate aliquid in recto, sed solum connotat aliquid ut apparens illi quod dicitur intelligere. Illud enim videtur constituere formalem rationem intellectionis, quo dempto ab aliquo illud non dicitur intellectio, et quo posito dicitur intellectio. Formalis enim differentia convertitur cum definito, ut patet II Posteriorum et VII Metaphysicae; unde ultima differentia per quam definitum est ens, quae largitur definitionem essentialiter, est aequalis definito, ut patet ex dictis Commentatoris, VII Metaphysicae, commento 43. Sed manifestum est quod a quacumque re tollitur ne sit quoddam habere aliquid praesens per modum apparentis, ab illa tollitur ne sit formaliter intelligere; cuicumque vero hoc competit, illud dicitur quoddam comprehendere. Si enim menti nostrae nihil appareat obiective, nullus dicet se aliquid intelligere, immo erit in dispositione simili dormienti, ut Philosophus dicit XII Metaphysicae. Similiter etiam si per picturam in pariete existentem, Caesar pictus appareret parieti, paries diceretur cognoscere Caesarem pictum. Ergo manifeste apparet quod non est plus de formali ratione ipsius intelligere, aut cognoscere in universalis, nisi habere aliquid praesens per modum apparentis. Est enim sciendum quod hic inquiritur formalis ratio comprehensionis in communi, prout extendit se ad omnem actum cognitivum, quia postmodum apparebit in quo differt comprehensio intellectiva a sensitiva.*” (Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 320-336).

⁴⁷³ “*Quod huiusmodi habitio rei praesentis per modum apparentiae non fundatur super nuda potentia intellectus, contra quartam opinionem [quod actus intelligendi nihil est absolutum additum ad potentiam, sed tantum respectus ad obiectum], quamvis exigat aliquod absolutum in quo fundetur. Secunda vero propositio est quod ista formalis ratio, quae non dicit in recto, ut dictum est, determinatum aliquod absolutum, sed connotat determinatum aliquid, oportet quod fundetur, vel potius quod coincidat et determinatur per aliquod absolutum in creatura, quod quidem non potest esse nuda potentia intellectus respectu intelligibilium omnium. Quod enim necessario coincidat in aliquid determinatum et absolutum apparet, quia nullum indeterminatum in recto potest poni in rerum existentia, quicquid sit de apprehensione, et hoc supra apparuit dum ageretur de attributis et de conceptu entis. Sed formalis ratio intellectionis nullam rationem determinatam dicit in recto. Non enim est aliud intellectio quam id quo alicui res apparent, totum autem hoc est conceptus entis, quod importatur per ‘id quo alicui’; conceptus vero entis indeterminatissimus est, et ita quod importatur per intellectionem in recto est indeterminatum. Ergo necesse est, dum intellectio ponitur existere in rerum natura, quod coincidat ille conceptus indeterminatus in aliquam realitatem determinatae rationis. Non potest autem illa realitas esse relatio, quia oportet quod sit simillima rei apparenti, ex quo virtute ipsius res habetur praesens in esse apparenti; unde quodam modo est res illa quam facit apparere – vel eminenter, sicut supra dictum fuit de deitate quod est omnis res eminenter, vel deminute, sicut species rerum in intellectu vel sensu sunt rebus illis simillimae quae apparent. Cum igitur nulla relatio possit esse simillima rebus quae apparent, manifestum est quod conceptus indeterminatus importatus per intellectionem nullo modo coincidit, cum determinatur in aliquam relationem, sed potius in aliquid absolutum.*”

As Auriol explains, cognition (i.e., that something appears) must be founded on something “most similar” (*simillima*) to the object which appears; something can be “most similar” either, (i) “eminently”, as, e.g., God virtually contains all other objects in His essence in virtue of being more perfect than all other objects, or (ii), “diminutively”, as, e.g., a *species*/similitude, in a sensitive or intellective power, contains something less perfect than but still “similar to” its objects (Ibid.)⁴⁷⁴. However, Auriol takes it for granted that a relation itself cannot be “most similar”, in either sense, to the things which appear in cognition; I take it that, if in any sense a relation can be “similar” to anything (in reality or in apparent being), it would have to be through one of the relata (Ibid.).

So, if not through the relation itself, Auriol considers what seems to be Durand’s proper view, that the bare intellect (upon which a relation of cognition would be founded) is what is meant to be “most similar” to its objects. However, Auriol objects that any creaturely power cannot be so “similar”, since “it is impossible that any created substance should singularly (*unitive*) contain infinite perfections” (Ibid.). Perhaps God can innately cognize infinite objects, though being “eminently” most similar to all objects in his single essence, virtually containing all of creation, but clearly we are not as perfect as God. Nor can we be “diminutively” most similar

Quod autem illud absolutum non sit nuda potentia intellectus, sic patet. Impossibile est enim quod aliqua creata substantia contineat unitive infinitas perfectiones. Sed si substantia intellectus creati, angelici vel humani, esset id in quod coincidit indeterminatus conceptus intellectionis, sequeretur quod substantia illa creata contineret unitive perfectiones infinitas. Omne enim quod facit lapidem apparere, quodam modo est lapis; quod vero florere, quodammodo est flos; et ita quod facit omnes creaturas apparere, est quodam modo omnes creaturae. Et per consequens substantia intellectus, si est id ipsum quod intelligere et intelligere est id quo res intellecta praesens est per modum apparentis, sequitur quod substantia intellectus creati est id quo res omnes creatae praesentes sunt in esse apparenti, et sic erit perfectiones creaturarum omnium unitive, quod impossibile est. Igitur poni non potest quod intelligere sit realiter idem quod intellectus, saltem respectu omnis intelligibilis quicquid sit respectu sui ipsius.” (Auriol, I Sent., D.35, pars 1, a.1; lines 415-448).

⁴⁷⁴ Although Auriol does not explicitly say this, between these two levels of perfection, presumably two things can also simply be equal in being, e.g., as two humans are equally human in kind by sharing the same substantial form and so they at least have the power to produce other humans, specifically, in reality. This suggests that that the “diminutive” way of being “similar” to some object cannot be to literally have the same form as an object, against Durand’s simplified understanding of such “similitudes” mentioned above.

to all possible objects of cognition through one similitude (the nude power), since by definition a “diminutive” similitude is less perfect. Auriol’s thought seems to be that a “diminutive” similitude is limited in what it can represent (i.e., what it can produce in apparent being), as, e.g., the similitude of humanity can, at best, only be used to represent humans and less perfect beings which contain some part of the definition of humanity (e.g., animals and plants, in general).

From here on, Auriol goes on to consider further objections to Durand’s view along these lines, many of which we touched on above. In particular, as we’ve seen, for both theological and philosophical reasons, Auriol argues that the cognitive powers, especially the intellect, require absolute changes/similitudes to ground both occurrent acts of cognition and more retentive cognitive states (acquired knowledge, memory, etc.); in this way, the human intellect, e.g., can be distinguished from either a blank or divine intellect, with either no or innate knowledge, and the “blessed” intellects can be said to be more “perfect” than the rest in absolute terms. This argument is particularly pointed on the topic of intellection since, at least as a matter of Catholic faith, Durand must admit that the “blessed” (and “damned”) intellective souls can continue to exist without the body, and so Durand cannot appeal to any subjective “perfections” more properly located in the body alone. Moreover, even if a bare intellect could take on an “objective” change in the presence of its object, for an occurrent act of cognition, one must at least admit “subjective” perfections to explain retentive states (e.g., intellective memory); historically, this was probably one of the most common and damning objections to Durand, which kept his exact view from gaining much favour during the rest of the medieval ages.

§6.4. Conclusion

So, overall, in the face of the above objections, Durand's appeal to (i) "subjective"/absolute changes strictly in the corporeal organs (*qua* corporeal) and (ii) merely "objective" changes in the cognitive powers does provide some interesting room for further discussion. Moreover, *contra* Hartman (2012), this is one place where Durand, as with prior "Augustinians", does seem to put our cognitive powers in a special place, above the lower "corporeal" realm. Nevertheless, as one can see with Hervaeus and Auriol, for just two examples, the idea that the cognitive powers must still take on some sort of "subjective" change/motion, even to underlie a strictly "objective" change, remained theoretically appealing. Thus, even if Durand's strictly "impassive" view of cognition has its elegance in its simplicity, and I'm sure more could be said in its favour, the idea from prior "Augustinians", such as Olivi and Scotus, that cognition involves a sort of active "self-motion", subjectively in the cognitive power, turns out to not be so easily replaceable; such subjective changes still have their explanatory role.

Final Conclusion

§1. The Dissertation in Summary

As alluded to in the title of this dissertation, the central view of cognition we've been considering throughout this dissertation has been that of cognition as an *active* “gaze” or *attention*. Peter John Olivi, Gonsalvus of Spain, and John Duns Scotus, I've argued (see **Chapter 2**, throughout, and **Chapter 3, Part I**), broadly agree in this essentially active view of cognition: even our most basic acts of cognition require no initial passive impression from external objects in the cognitive power itself; instead, cognition is brought about by the cognitive power “in itself and through itself”, following the words of Augustine, when an object is sufficiently present to the cognitive power's “gaze”. That is, in *metaphysical* terms, this active view characterizes cognition as a sort of *self-motion* by the cognitive power. In more *experiential* terms, we've also seen Olivi, e.g., characterize this view in terms of cognition's active *attention*:

“insofar as it [cognition] comes from an internal cognitive principle, we sense that that it is our action and it is a certain acting of ours that goes out from us and, as it were, stretches out (*tendens*) to the object and attends (*intendens*) to it.” (II Sent Q.72; III, p.38)

So, that is, although, *metaphysically*, a cognitive power actively shapes itself to conform with some object, bringing about some absolute accident of cognition *in* the power, *experientially*, the cognitive power still metaphorically goes *outside* itself, *gazing upon* and determinately *attending to* the object beyond itself, by means of this act of attentive cognition.

In **Chapter 2**, we largely focused on the *metaphysics* of this active view of cognition by defending the coherency of cognitive *self-motion*, both internally (see, especially, §3.5) and with respect to the intuitive need for some sort of “broad” efficient causation from the external object of cognition, to co-assist with the cognitive power in the production of its act (see, especially, §2

and §3.3). As I argued, despite some, at least, nominal differences, Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus all generally agree that cognition involves this sort of causal asymmetry, with the cognitive power as the primary, most proper, efficient cause, while the object is still broadly an efficient cause (most properly, a “terminative”, “aiding”, or “secondary essentially ordered cause”).

In **Chapter 3**, in even more comprehensive fashion, we explored what binds together Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus in this active view of cognition: e.g., we detailed their major common opposition, the *Fully Passive View* (e.g., of Godfrey of Fontaines) and the *Middle View* (e.g., of Thomas Aquinas) (see §1.1), and their major common arguments, what I’ve called *experiential arguments* (§2.1), *nobility arguments* (§2.2), and *attribution arguments* (§2.4). In this chapter, I also brought in the competing view of Durand of St. Pourçain to further highlight what binds together the active view of Olivi and company, through comparison and contrast. As I explain, although Durand has some common opposition (see §1.2) and makes use of some similar *nobility* and *attribution arguments* (see §2.5), Durand does not seem to have the same sort of *experiential* view of attentive cognition (see, especially, §2.5.4, §5.1, and §6), nor does he follow the *metaphysics* of Olivi and company insofar as Durand’s view requires no strict *self-motion* (see §§3-5, especially §5.2). Durand might agree with Olivi and company that the cognitive power is strictly “unmoved” by the external object, but this is because cognition is a mere *relation* between the power and its object, according to Durand, rather than something absolute, actively brought about by and in the power (rather than by the object). By the end of this chapter, I’ve also offered some explanation as to why Durand’s competing view didn’t exactly catch on, given some reasonable advantages of the view of Olivi and company (see, especially, §6).

Returning to the broad, intuitive terms of **Chapter 1**, we can characterize the active view of Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus as following an *Active Spotlight Model* of cognition, in opposition to a *Passive Container Model*; our most basic acts of cognition involve a sort of active attention to the world rather than a mere passive input of external information (see §1.3). While the passive views of Godfrey and Aquinas perhaps provide the best contrast point to the active view of Olivi and company, Durand's view also provides a helpful point of contrast. In one sense, Durand goes too far to fit his view with some of the intuitions behind the *Active Spotlight Model*, while in another sense he doesn't go far enough. In this first sense, Durand's view arguably goes too far: if cognition is a mere relation, "between" the power and object, then we lose out on the differences which changes within the cognitive power can help explain (i.e., there are advantages to the *metaphysics* of self-motion) (see **Chapter 3**, §6). In a second sense, Durand's view doesn't go far enough: Durand's view retains a sort of practical passivity, in common with the *Passive Container Model*, and in this sense his view fails to capture the exact character of our "outward" attention, insofar as it can actively vary how we cognize an otherwise static scene based on its force and direction (see, especially, **Chapter 3**, §6.2). Overall, although Durand's mere relational view of cognition gestures at some sense in which cognition intuitively goes "outside", it doesn't capture the sort of distinctly cognitive and active attention which we find in *experience*, following the view of Olivi and company.

§2. Some General Payoff for the History of Philosophy

Although I have not dwelt for long on this point above, allow me, at the end of this dissertation, to state the obvious: many of the figures I have discussed in this dissertation are not house-hold names in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, many of these lesser-known figures

(e.g., Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Durand) are adjacent to the relatively more well-known (e.g., Aquinas and Scotus), or are working in the legacy of ever bigger names (especially, Aristotle and Augustine). Thus, this dissertation helps fill in the typical “canon” of historical philosophers deemed worth studying, and in a way which ties in neatly with the typical canon nevertheless.

For example, in **Chapter 2**, I present the opinions and arguments of Olivi and Gonsalvus, fellow Franciscans, as part of the appropriate context to read Scotus’s active view of cognition. Reading Scotus in isolation, or only in light of his major opponents (e.g., Aquinas or Godfrey), can leave one with a skewed perception of Scotus as a lone genius, but much of his opinions and arguments are found in the works of Olivi and Gonsalvus (and, likely, other Franciscans as well), who also share the same major opponents.⁴⁷⁵ Arguably, Scotus’s “genius” is more precisely found in how he makes use of these resources (e.g., with a more systematic underlying account of “ordered” concurrent causes) and how he sells his active view (e.g., by trying to appeal in part to all sides of the debate). Gonsalvus has served as an important linking figure in my more complete narrative given his own interests in unifying a common Franciscan front in this debate, against their common opponents (especially, Godfrey).

Another advantage of presenting Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus together, in this way, is that it speaks to how Franciscan philosophers of this era generally made use of the authorities of Aristotle and Augustine. Olivi, e.g., very explicitly appeals to the authority of Augustine, but works against the authority of Aristotle. Scotus and Gonsalvus, however, pick up the “Augustinian” view of Olivi, without the same hostility to Aristotle. Thus, looking at Olivi, we get a clear sense of what is “Augustinian” about the active view of cognition, common to these

⁴⁷⁵ I’m not exactly the first one to point out how much of Scotus’s psychology is in debt to prior Franciscans; see, e.g., Bérubé (1964) for a classic account of Scotus’s debt to prior Franciscans, including Olivi, for the account of “intuitive” cognition which Scotus, nonetheless, popularized.

Franciscans, but by looking at Scotus and Gonsalvus, we see what can nevertheless fit within an “Aristotelian” view of cognition and causation.

Chapter 3 offers even wider insight into the “Augustinian” and “Aristotelian” labels and influence in this debate. Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus make particular use of Augustine’s authority in this debate and find influence in Augustine’s own *metaphysical (nobility)* and *experiential* arguments (in, e.g., *De Musica* and *De Trinitate*) to come to the view that cognition is essentially active (involving both *self-motion* and *attention*) (see, especially, §2.3 and §5). As I touch on, although other medieval figures in this debate also appeal to Augustine, and Durand is no exception, Olivi and company come to a notably distinct interpretation. Although Durand appeals to Augustine for a common *DOC Principle*, against passivity, he does not take on the same sort of view as Olivi and company when it comes to *self-motion* and *attention*.

Interestingly, Durand derives his *DOC Principle*, against passivity, at least as much from the works of Aristotle (see, especially, §4.4). Unlike many other medieval figures of his time (e.g., Aquinas and Godfrey), Durand takes Aristotle seriously on his claim that the soul is not strictly “changed”/“moved” in cognition and so Durand comes to the view that cognition is a mere relation. Durand’s view might easily be mistaken as “un-Aristotelian” relative to the passive views of cognition of more popular medieval readers of Aristotle, but, as I argue, Durand simply has a different take on Aristotle for this debate.

Overall, I take my dissertation to offer a substantial corrective to the secondary literature on this issue. Contemporary medievalists have tended to either frame Durand as “Augustinian”, and thus “un-Aristotelian” (Solère 2014), or as neither “Augustinian” or “Aristotelian”, a solitary thinker in this debate (Hartman 2012) (see, especially, §5.3). While Hartman (2012) is right to distinguish Durand’s view from the exact “Augustinian” view of Olivi and company, I take it

that Durand still makes some genuine appeal to the words and authority of Augustine and, even more substantially, makes thorough use of Aristotle's works. Moreover, while Solère (2014) is right to identify a common "Augustinian" camp with Olivi and company, I take it that they are not exactly unique in appealing to Augustine in this debate, nor are they without their own "Aristotelian" influence (e.g., in the space of overlap between their views and that of Durand). As with much in life, it turns out things are complicated.

§3. Avenues for Future Research

As I explain in some detail in **Chapter 1**, the central topic of this dissertation crosses over with many other core questions in medieval psychology and metaphysics. Moreover, given limitations of time and space, I've mostly focused on the "Augustinian Franciscans", Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus, with the aim to present their views as charitably as possible, against their passive opponents and even the "rival" active account of Durand. Thus, it should be clear that this dissertation offers many other avenues for future research, outside of this current focus: e.g., one could look at the active view of cognition (or appetite) of other "Augustinian Franciscans", or those nearby (e.g., Henry of Ghent), examine nearby questions concerning the general nature of cognition underlying these debates⁴⁷⁶, or look more closely at competing views of cognition to provide some defense (e.g., for Godfrey, Aquinas, or Durand) against the arguments of Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus.

⁴⁷⁶ See what I label as "**Question 4**" in Chapter 1, §1.2.

One avenue of particular interest for future research (given that it would, in part, touch on the above three points) would be to examine the (in some sense) active account of cognition of Peter Auriol (1280-1322). Auriol himself characterizes cognition as “active” at least insofar as it essentially involves the production of some object in “intentional” or “apparent” being⁴⁷⁷. As briefly mentioned above (fn.442), the secondary literature has typically placed Auriol somewhere alongside prior “Augustinian Franciscans” in this debate⁴⁷⁸. However, if we want to be as precise as we have been in this dissertation, there are some reasons to doubt that Auriol’s view exactly fits in with prior “Augustinian Franciscans” such as Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus: e.g., there are passages where Auriol seems to be fine with the passive reception of what he calls “impressions”, “*species*”, or “similitudes” in the cognizer from external objects, seemingly against the *DOC Principle* of prior “Augustinians”⁴⁷⁹; Auriol denies the sort of strict *self-motion* which, as discussed above, is essential to the active accounts of Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus⁴⁸⁰; moreover, Auriol seems to be at least in partial agreement with Durand, against Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus, that the “activity” of cognition is not entirely a matter of producing “absolute” being (in the cognitive power), but more essentially of producing “intentional”

⁴⁷⁷ See, e.g., Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1; lines 320-336.

⁴⁷⁸ See Friedman (2015a & 2015b), Tachau (1988, p.90 & p.93), and, though perhaps with some further reservations, Lička (2016).

⁴⁷⁹ See, e.g., just to name a few cases, I Sent., D. 9, *pars* 1, a. 1, throughout, where Auriol gives a role for “impressed similitudes” and “species” in cognition; I Sent., D.27, *pars* 2, a.2 (lines 538-540), where Auriol says something really (*realiter*) is received (*pati*) in vision and intellection; and *Ibid.*, (lines 702-708), where Auriol utilizes Aristotle’s claim that the action from the sensible object on the sense is the same thing as the reception of vision in the sense. Lička (2019, pp.56-61) is, to my knowledge, fairly unique in addressing some of these passages, and I would broadly agree with his main response (that this only speaks to the absolute “ground” to cognition, but not its “intentional” activity), although I think he moves too quickly over certain difficulties and generally underplays Auriol’s influence from prior “Augustinian” active accounts. To be clear, I’m not entirely sure that Auriol means to say that these “impressions” are made in the cognitive power, *qua* cognitive, given that he does seem to hold onto some sort of *DOC Principle*, as in the *nobility arguments* of Olivi and company.

⁴⁸⁰ See, e.g., Auriol, II Sent., D.25, Q.1, a.1, devoted to the topic of self-motion.

being⁴⁸¹. Although, I believe, there is still plenty of significant overlap between Auriol and prior “Augustinian Franciscans” left to explore here, it’s interesting that Auriol seems to vindicate certain elements of the typical opposition. For example, as I just mentioned, Auriol is, in part, picking up on the notion of “intentional being” also utilized by Durand. Moreover, Auriol seems open to some sort of “impression”/similitude in cognition, as found in the passive views of Godfrey and Aquinas⁴⁸². Overall, in light of the details we’ve explored in this dissertation, I take it that Auriol’s account of cognition lies at an interesting juncture point between the accounts of Olivi and company, Durand, and even Godfrey and later Thomists⁴⁸³.

The above is, of course, just one example of how to proceed, informed by my own wider research. Historians of philosophy working in adjacent areas can, I’m sure, find many more points of detail in this dissertation to expand upon in their own research projects⁴⁸⁴.

⁴⁸¹ See, e.g., Auriol, I Sent. D.35, *pars* 1, a.1 (lines 542-549), I Sent., D.27, *pars* 2, a.1 (lines 538-541), and II Sent. D.11, Q.3, a.2 (p.135).

⁴⁸² See, e.g., Auriol, I Sent., D.35, *pars* 1, a.1 (lines 538-540), where Auriol even partially vindicates the passive view of Godfrey, saying that it is “in some way true” insofar as it identifies acts of cognition (in some sense) with impressed *species* in the cognitive power.

⁴⁸³ At one point this dissertation even included another chapter (written in draft) on Auriol, with Durand as an important bridge figure. However, I’ve since put that research to the side for a future project given how much there is to discuss here. For those wondering, this is another reason why I ended up saying so much about Durand in this dissertation, otherwise focused on the cognitive theories of Olivi, Gonsalvus, and Scotus.

⁴⁸⁴ This is to say nothing of the potential lessons for contemporary philosophy of mind as well, with its current interests in theories of attention and active cognition, as I briefly discuss in Chapter 1 (pp.26-27).

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