

# WHY THE RESURRECTION IS INITIALLY IMPROBABLE

*Michael Martin*

**Abstract:** A strong case can be made that the initial probability of the Resurrection is very low even if one accepts the existence of a theistic God. Even sophisticated theists who maintain that God performs miracles believe that these are rare initially improbable events. Consequently, strong evidence is needed to overcome this initial improbability. In the case of the Resurrection there is no plausible theory why this event should have occurred; moreover, even if there is, it is unlikely that it would have happened at the particular time and place it did.

## INTRODUCTION

One argument against the existence of the Resurrection<sup>1</sup> is the following:

1. A miracle claim is initially improbable relative to our background knowledge.
  2. If a claim is initially improbable relative to our background knowledge and the evidence for it is not strong, then it should be disbelieved.
  3. The Resurrection of Jesus is a miracle claim.
  4. The evidence for the Resurrection is not strong.
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5. Therefore, the Resurrection of Jesus should be disbelieved.

Elsewhere I have argued for premise 4 in detail.<sup>2</sup> However, Christian apologists might maintain that the argument fails because of the implausibility of premise 1. Premise 1, it could be claimed, presumes Hume's allegedly faulty

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attack on miracles, and is based on an atheistic worldview.<sup>3</sup> Alternately, it could be argued that although premise 1 is true, the Resurrection is a miracle claim of a special kind such that, given a theistic worldview, it has an initially high probability.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the truth of premise 1. I will first show that whatever validity Hume's argument may or may not have, premise 1 does not presume Hume's argument. I will argue next that there are general reasons why any particular miracle claim is initially incredible *even* in a theistic worldview. I will then maintain that the Resurrection is no exception to this for there is no plausible theory of why the Son of God would have been incarnated and would have then died and been resurrected. In addition, I will argue that even if it is probable that the Son of God would have become incarnated and then have died for our sins, the Resurrection as portrayed by Scripture is still initially improbable. Finally, I will consider the way in which problems relating to the initial improbability of the Resurrection affect the work of Christian apologist Stephen T. Davis.

## HUME'S VIEW CONTRASTED

Let me consider here just two of the many ways in which Hume's argument against miracles has been interpreted. According to an incorrect but still popular interpretation, Hume argued that any hypothesis that a miracle occurred is *a priori* impossible. According to a more plausible interpretation, he argued that the evidence offered for the hypothesis that a miracle occurred is always much more likely relative to some alternative hypothesis.<sup>4</sup>

Now according to one standard way of understanding the probability of a hypothesis, the probability of hypothesis H relative to new evidence E and background knowledge K is a function of three factors: the initial probability of H relative to K, the probability of E relative to the truth of H and K, and the probability of E relative to the falsehood of H and the truth of K. If the initial probability of H is low relative to K, then the probability of E relative to the falsehood of H and the truth of K will have to be very low to raise the probability of H relative to E and K to a respectable level. The lower limit is reached when the initial probability of H relative to K is 0. In this case no evidence E could raise the probability of H. However, even if the initial probability of H is not very low, it could not be raised by E if E was more probable relative to the falsehood of H and the truth of K than relative to the truth of H and K.

For example, suppose H is that a woman turned into a swan. Suppose the evidence for H is that several witnesses claimed to see a woman turn into a swan. Presumably, the background knowledge K for H consists in the various well-supported theories of science, including biological theories and theories of perception. Now suppose that  $\sim H$  is equivalent to a disjunction of mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternative hypotheses such as the witnesses lied or else misperceived what happened. If the probability of the woman turning into a swan is low relative to our background knowledge, then the probability of the

witness reports relative to  $\sim H$  would have to be extremely low to raise the probability of  $H$  to a respectable level.

This standard way of understanding the probability of a hypothesis can be directly related to the two interpretations of Hume's argument. On the popular but clearly mistaken interpretation of Hume, he was claiming that the initial probability of a hypothesis that a miracle occurred relative to our background knowledge is always 0. Consequently, miracle claims are *a priori* impossible. On the more plausible interpretation of Hume, he was maintaining that the probability of the evidence for miracle claims is always much higher relative to alternative hypotheses and our background knowledge than relative to the hypothesis that the miracle occurred and our background knowledge. Consequently, belief in a miracle, although not *a priori* impossible, is always irrational.

My own view of miracles is different in important respects from these interpretations of Hume. According to premise 1, miracles are not impossible and it is not impossible that the evidence for a miracle, for example, witness reports, would be very low relative the alternative hypotheses and the background knowledge. Premise 1 says only that the initial probability of a miracle claim is low. It does not assert that miracles are impossible. Moreover, unlike Hume I consider it possible that the probability of the evidence for a miracle claim could be extremely low relative to alternative theories. According to premise 1, miracle claims simply create an evidential burden that must be overcome; in other words, they are *initially* or *prima facie* incredible. Such a position is obviously considerably weaker than Hume's on the interpretations discussed here. I maintain that, until the evidential burden is overcome, miracle claims should be disbelieved. However, I assume no *a priori* reason why such a burden cannot be overcome.

## THE INITIAL IMPROBABILITY OF ANY GIVEN MIRACLE CLAIM

Why should premise 1 be accepted? Traditionally a miracle is defined as a violation of a law of nature caused by the intervention of God. However, there is also a nonintervention sense of miracles. In this sense God sets up the world in such a way that an unusual event serves as a sign or message to human beings without violating a law of nature. This nonintervention sense of miracle is meant to cover the following sort of case. Suppose that God arranges the world so that at a certain time in history the Red Sea parts because of a freak wind. Although no violation of a law of nature has occurred, this event conveys a message to religious believers; for example, that the Jews are God's chosen people and that God takes a special interest in them.

The improbability of miracle claims in the traditional sense can be understood in the following way. Let us suppose that theism is true. Can we then expect God to intervene in the natural course of events and violate a natural law? We cannot. If theism is true, then miracles in the intervention sense are *possible* since there is a supernatural being who *could* bring them about, but it does not

follow that such miracles are more likely than not to occur.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, God would have good reasons for never using miracles to achieve His purposes. Consider that this kind of a miracle cannot be explained by science and, indeed, is an impediment to a scientific understanding of the world. Consider also that great difficulties and controversies arise in identifying miracles. Whatever good effects miracles might have, then, they also impede, mislead, and confuse. Since an all-powerful God would seem to be able to achieve His purposes in ways that do not have unfortunate effects, I conclude that there is actually reason to suppose that the existence of miracles is initially improbable even on a religious worldview.

However, for the sake of the argument let us assume with Christian apologists like Richard Swinburne that miracles in the intervention sense are probable given God's existence. This assumption is perfectly compatible with the thesis that in any particular case a miracle is unlikely. Consider the following analogy. It is overwhelmingly probable that in a billion tosses of ten coins all ten coins will turn up heads at least once, but it is extremely unlikely that in any given case all ten coins will come up heads. In the same way, even if Swinburne is correct that, given the existence of God, some miracles are probable, it might be extremely unlikely that in any given case a miracle has occurred.

I say "might be" rather than "would be" because the occurrence of miracles, unlike the occurrence of ten heads in ten tosses of a coin, might not be rare. If miracles were as plentiful as dry days in the Sahara Desert, my analogy would be misleading. However, as far as religious believers are concerned, violations of the laws of nature are relatively rare. Even if ten thousand violations of natural laws were to occur every day, in relation to the total number of events that occur their relative frequency would be very low. So given the background belief that miracles are rare—a belief that is held even by theists—it follows that a claim that a particular event is a miracle is initially improbable.

Of course, there is a way of interpreting a miracle claim in the nonintervention sense so that it is not improbable but extremely probable. If a theist maintains that *most* events which are governed by the laws of nature are arranged by God to serve as signs or to communicate messages to human beings, then miracle claims would be initially probable. But this way of understanding miracles tends to trivialize the notion. Nonintervention miraculous events are usually *contrasted* with the great majority of other events. For the typical believer in nonintervention miracles, most events are not arranged by God to convey some message. Thus, the initial probability of nonintervention miracles is low in terms of the background theories of the typical religious believer.

So far I have argued that miracle claims are initially improbable. Relative to our background beliefs shared by atheists and believers alike, miracles are rare events. In addition, from a historical point of view, miracle claims understood as violations of laws of nature have often been rejected by religious believers themselves. Even thoughtful believers in miracles admit that *most* miracle claims turn out to be bogus on examination; that in most cases of alleged miracles no law of nature has been violated and no action of God need be postulated. Even they say that relatively few claims ultimately with-

stand critical scrutiny. Thus, for example, although the Catholic Church has investigated thousands of claims of miracle cures at Lourdes, it has rejected most of these as unproven.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the number of officially designated miracles at Lourdes is less than seventy. Inductively, therefore, any new claim made at Lourdes is initially likely to be spurious as well. The same is true of other miracle claims: sophisticated religious believers consider most to be invalid. Thus, for example, even Stephen T. Davis, a well-known Christian philosopher and apologist and believer in miracles, argues that “naturalistic explanations of phenomena ought to be preferred by rational people in the vast majority of cases.”<sup>7</sup> His position is perfectly compatible with both the existence of miracles and the possibility of obtaining strong evidence for them. It does imply, however, that even on the assumption of theism *initially* any given miracle claim is incredible and that to overcome this initial improbability strong evidence must be produced.

## **THE RESURRECTION AND GOD’S PURPOSE**

So far I have shown that, in general, particular miracle claims are initially unlikely. Is the claim that Jesus arose from the dead an exception to this rule? Could God have had special purposes that made it necessary to cause the Resurrection? Could it be the case that, although any ordinary given miracle claim is initially unlikely, the claim that the Resurrection occurred is initially likely? What special purpose of God would make the Resurrection initially likely?

According to Swinburne, it is likely that God who created human beings would make it possible for them to atone for their sins and, consequently, it is likely that God’s Son would become incarnated as a human and would die in order to do this.<sup>8</sup> I have argued in detail elsewhere that all the historically important theories of the Atonement either fail to explain why God sacrificed His Son for the salvation of sinners or else make the sacrifice seem arbitrary.<sup>9</sup> Here, let me consider just one of these positions, the Ransom Theory.

For approximately the first thousand years of Christianity’s history the ransom theory was the most popular theory of the Atonement. In the crude version held by early Christian thinkers such as Origen (185–254 C.E.), the theory assumes that the devil is in possession of humanity and that his rights of possession cannot be ignored. God consents to pay a price, the death of His own son, for the release of humanity. The devil accepts the bargain because he believes that he will have the Son of God as his prize. However, the devil is tricked by God. God knows when He offers the devil the bargain that the devil will be unable to keep the Son of God as a prize. Consequently, the son escapes the devil’s powers and is reconciled with his father. In later more sophisticated versions of the theory, for example, Augustine’s, the devil is deceived not by God but by his own inordinate pride. Thus, the devil is defeated because of his own wickedness and not through God’s deception. Consequently, God’s justice and righteousness are preserved.<sup>10</sup>

There are obviously many problems with the ransom theory. The crude

versions explicitly attribute to God qualities of character that are unworthy of a divine being. If God is morally perfect, He does not deceive anyone, not even the devil. But even the more sophisticated versions make implausible assumptions, for example, that the devil would be so blinded by pride that he would believe that he is more powerful than the son of God. Moreover, the very idea of a devil, especially one that has gained a right of possession to human beings because of their sins, one that God must acknowledge and honor, strikes many modern readers as bizarre and implausible. Why would God believe that the devil has any moral claim on God's creatures? After all, the devil is one of his creatures, one that has disobeyed him and sinned against him. Furthermore, it is unjust of God to sacrifice his son for this ransom especially when it is unclear that other alternatives were not available. Since God is all-powerful and can do anything that is not logically impossible, God could surely have found other ways to achieve his ends. Finally, it is not clear on this theory why human beings must have faith in Jesus in order to be saved. Since, on the ransom theory, after Jesus' death and resurrection human beings were out of the devil's clutches, it would seem that the way to salvation would simply have been to follow a life free from sin so as not to fall under the devil's control. What has faith in Jesus got to do with this? The ransom theory supplies no answer.

Other theories of the Atonement—the Satisfaction Theory, the Acceptance Theory, the Penal Theory, the Government Theory, the Moral Theory, the Christus Victor Theory, and the Mystic Theory—are also extremely implausible and give no support to Swinburne's contention. Consequently, there is no good reason to believe that, on a theistic worldview, God would become incarnate and die for sinners.

But for the sake of the argument let us suppose that it is likely. Still it would not follow that the Incarnation and the Resurrection are themselves likely, for these are *particular* historical events that occurred at *particular* times and places. However, God could have become incarnated and have died for sinners on an indefinite number of other occasions. There does not seem to be any *a priori* reason to suppose that He would have been incarnated and died at one particular time and place rather than at many others. Consequently, even if *some* incarnation and resurrection or other is likely, there is no *a priori* reason to suppose that He would have become incarnated and died as Jesus in first-century Palestine. Indeed, given the innumerable alternatives at God's disposal it would seem *a priori* unlikely that the Incarnation and the Resurrection would have taken place where and when they allegedly did.

Consider the following analogy which I adapt from one used by Swinburne. Suppose a parent has decided to pay her child's debts.<sup>11</sup> Suppose that this parent can do this in an enormous number of different ways and that there is a wide time span in which the parent can act. Suppose we know of no reason why the parent might use one of these ways rather than another or act at one time rather than another. Although it is likely that, given the parent's decision, she will pay her child's debt in some way at some future time, it is unlikely that she will settle her child's debt by a cash payment on July 8 of this year. Indeed, it is initially improbable that she will do so. Similarly, given all of

God's options, it is initially unlikely that His Son would have become flesh and then have died in the way He is portrayed to have done in the Scriptures.

## STEPHEN DAVIS'S WEAK APOLOGETIC

Interestingly enough, the initial improbability of the Resurrection is accepted by some Christian apologists. Consider, for example, the position of Davis. He maintains that it is rational for supernaturalists to believe in the Resurrection *and* rational for naturalists not to believe in the Resurrection. Davis calls his position "soft apologetics" to distinguish it from the hard apologetics of traditional Christianity which maintains that it is irrational for naturalists to reject the Resurrection.

Davis understands the Resurrection of Jesus to be a historical event which should be interpreted literally, not symbolically or metaphorically. He also understands it to involve more than simply the resuscitation of Jesus' dead body. He alleges that it involves the transformation of Jesus' dead body into a live body having supernatural properties that ordinary bodies do not have such as the ability to walk through walls. Although Professor Davis says that the exact nature of Jesus' body is little more than educated guesswork, he apparently does not rule out the possibility it might have supernatural properties such as the ability to live without food and water for an indefinite period of time.<sup>12</sup>

Given these beliefs it is perhaps not surprising that Davis thinks that the Resurrection of Jesus is initially very unlikely even for a supernaturalist. Indeed, he says that "Christians need to recover a sense of the shocking absurdity of the resurrection."<sup>13</sup> Now it would seem to follow from this absurdity that the probability of the Resurrection on the basis of the historical evidence alone would have to be so *overwhelmingly* strong and have such *prodigious* force that no rational person who believed in God could deny that the Resurrection occurred. The evidence would not, of course, have to be so strong that it would be logically inconsistent to affirm the evidence and deny that the Resurrection occurred. No historical evidence is ever this strong. How strong, then, would it have to be?

Bayes's theorem of the probability calculus is helpful in estimating how strong the historical case would have to be.<sup>14</sup> Let us assume arbitrarily that the initial probability of the Resurrection R is about .0001 purely on the basis of a supernatural worldview K. Is this too low an estimate? I doubt it. Indeed, this seems like a rather conservative estimate given Davis's idea that initially the Resurrection is shockingly absurd. For example, there is nothing absurd about a pedestrian being killed by an automobile. Yet the probability of a person picked at random dying from a pedestrian accident in 1991 is much less than .0001.<sup>15</sup> Recall that we are not just talking about bringing a dead body back to life but bringing a dead body with amazing supernatural powers back to life. Let us assume for the sake of the argument that, given R and K, the probability of the historical evidence HE is 1; that is, HE logically follows from R and K. On this very generous assumption in order for the probability of the Resurrection to be

believable at all on the basis of HE and K—that is, to have a probability above .5—it would be necessary to show that the available historical evidence is less than .0001 probable on the basis of K and the falsehood of R.

Another way to approach our problem is to consider some paradigm historical statements that are extremely well supported, so well supported that it would be irrational to doubt them, and to see how the Resurrection measures up. Consider the following historical statements:

1. George Washington was the first president of the United States.
2. Augustus was an emperor of the Roman Empire.
3. Abraham Lincoln was assassinated at Ford's Theatre in 1865.

The historical evidence for these statements is overwhelming. Evidence of at least this strength is needed to overcome the initial absurdity of the Resurrection.

The question is, of course, whether the evidence for the Resurrection measures up to this. Notice that the the evidence cannot just be good. For example, consider two other historical examples:

4. Lee Harvey Oswald acting alone shot and killed President Kennedy in Dallas in 1963.
5. William Shakespeare wrote *Hamlet*.

Most scholars would judge (4) and (5) to be rather well-established, but in neither instance is the historical case overwhelming. Indeed, critics maintain that there are good grounds for being skeptical concerning the truth of (4) and (5).

The question is whether the probability of

6. Jesus was resurrected

based on just the historical evidence—that is, exclusive of its initial probability—resembles more closely that of (1), (2), and (3) or of (4) and (5). I believe that arguments can be provided to indicate that the probability of (6) is considerably less than that of (4) and (5), but it is, strictly speaking, only necessary to show that the probability of (6) is no higher than that of (4) or (5).

The preceding lines of argument indicate that the historical case for the Resurrection must be overwhelmingly strong to overcome its initial improbability. Davis apparently thinks that it is although, oddly enough, he seems to be keenly aware of at least some of the problems with the evidence. For example, Davis admits that biblical testimony is unreliable: “It was written years after the event by unsophisticated, myth prone people who were more interested in formulating statements of faith and in furthering Christian ends than writing accurate history. Further the evidence they present is contradictory.”<sup>16</sup> Much more than this can be said about the weakness of the evidential case<sup>17</sup>: (1) There were no eyewitnesses to the Resurrection. (2) There were no contemporary eyewitness reports to the postresurrection appearance of Jesus other

than Paul's. (3) Besides being inconsistent, the empty-tomb stories are at best second- or perhaps thirdhand reports of what eyewitnesses claimed to have seen recorded several decades after the Crucifixion. (4) New Testament scholars differ on when the stories of the empty tomb entered the Christian tradition. (5) We do not have any good reason to suppose that the alleged eyewitnesses to the postresurrection of Jesus and to the empty tomb were reliable and trustworthy. Furthermore, even if the eyewitnesses were reliable we do not have any good reason to suppose that the people who reported the eyewitness accounts were reliable and trustworthy and we do not have any good reason to suppose that those who wrote the stories down were reliable and trustworthy. Given all these uncertainties we need independent confirmation, yet that is lacking both from Jewish and pagan sources.

One would have thought that these problems would be sufficient to show that the historical case for the Resurrection is not overwhelming; that its strength is closer, for example, to the strength of the case for Oswald being the only assassin of Kennedy than for the case of Washington being the first president of the United States. Indeed, unlike the question of whether Washington was the first United States president and like the question of whether Oswald was the only assassin, scholars debate the question of whether Jesus arose from the dead. This debate is not just between scholars who are naturalists and those who are supernaturalists. It takes place also between scholars who are supernaturalists. It seems to me that the existence of such intrasupernaturalist debates creates a strong presumption that the historical case for the Resurrection is not overwhelming. In order to suppose otherwise one would have to suppose that a New Testament scholar working *within* the Christian tradition of the caliber of John Dominic Crossan is being irrational in denying that the Resurrection occurred.<sup>18</sup>

Why does Davis suppose that despite the problems with the historical case for the Resurrection and despite the existence of apparently rational debate among Christian New Testament scholars the case for the Resurrection is so overwhelming that the evidence swamps the initial absurdity on a supernaturalistic worldview? I am not sure, but I think his reasoning runs as follows. Critics of the Resurrection story who deny Jesus' resurrection have never been able to give a likely account of historical evidence such as the empty tomb, the growth of Christianity, the inability of critics to produce Jesus' body. However, given the supposition that the Resurrection occurred, apologists are able to give an excellent account of this evidence. The failure of critics to give a good account of the facts and the ability of Christians to do so is enough to overcome the initial improbability of the Resurrection and the faults with the historical evidence for the Resurrection.

But Davis is mistaken. It not necessary for a supernaturalist to give a likely alternative in order to reject the Resurrection. Bayes's theorem indicates why. If the initial probability of hypothesis H is extremely low on the basis of background knowledge K, then the evidence E does not have to be very probable on the basis of the falsehood of H and the truth of K to indicate that the probability of H is below .5 given E and K. The biblical evidence need not be highly probable in terms of alternative hypotheses to show that the probability of the Resurrection is below .5. A very modest probability, indeed, will do.<sup>19</sup>

## CONCLUSION

A strong case can be made that the initial probability of the Resurrection is very low even if one accepts the existence of a theistic God. There is good reason for God not to appeal to miracles. Even sophisticated theists who maintain that God performs miracles believe that these are rare initially improbable events. Consequently, strong evidence is needed to overcome this initial improbability. In the case of the Resurrection there is no plausible theory why this event should have occurred; moreover, even if there is, it is unlikely that it would have happened at the particular time and place it did. Although Stephen Davis admits that from a theistic perspective the Resurrection is shockingly absurd and that the biblical testimony is unreliable, he nevertheless believes that the evidence for the Resurrection is strong enough to overcome its initial improbability. His reason seems to be that critics cannot provide a likely account of the historical evidence for the Resurrection. However, it is not necessary for a critic to do this, for an account with only modest probability is enough to show that belief in the Resurrection is not rational.

## REFERENCES

1. See Michael Martin, *The Case Against Christianity* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), chap. 3.
2. Ibid.
3. See Stephen Parrish's reply to my critique of his review of *The Case Against Christianity* in "The Case Against Christianity Revisited," *The Christian Research Journal* 17 (Fall 1994): 50
4. As I understand William Rowe this is the interpretation he uses. See William Rowe, *Philosophy of Religion*, 2d ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1993), chap. 9.
5. Antony Flew makes a similar point when he says that "the defining characteristic of the theistic God preclude all possibility of inferring with benefit of particular revelation, what a God might be reasonably be expected to do." See Antony Flew, *God: A Critical Inquiry* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1984), p. 145.
6. Michael Martin, *Atheism: A Philosophical Justification* (Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1990), pp. 202–207.
7. Stephen T. Davis, *Risen Indeed* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993), p. 13.
8. See Richard Swinburne, *Revelation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 71–72.
9. Martin, *The Case Against Christianity*.
10. L. W. Grensted, *A Short History of the Doctrine of Atonement* (London: Manchester University Press, 1920), chapter 3. Some commentators argue that Augustine did not hold a ransom theory, not even a sophisticated one. See Joseph M. Colleran's Introduction to Anselm, *Why God Became Man and The Virgin Conception and Original Sin*, translated, introduction, and notes by Joseph M. Colleran (Albany, N.Y.: Magi Books, 1969), p. 44.

- 12. Davis, *Risen Indeed*, pp. 58, 94.
- 13. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
- 14. Let:

R = The Resurrection  
 EH = Historical Evidence  
 T = Supernatural Background Theory

Then:

$$\text{Prob}(R/EH\&T) = \text{Prob}(R/T) \times \text{Prob}(EH/R\&T)$$

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$$[\text{Prob}(R/T) \times \text{Prob}(EH/R\&T)] + [\text{Prob}(\sim R/T) \times \text{Prob}(EH/\sim R\&T)]$$

- 15. See *The World Almanac*, 1993, p. 946.
- 16. Stephen T. Davis, "Is It Possible to Know that Jesus Was Raised from the Dead?" *Faith and Philosophy* 1 (1984): 153.
- 17. For more details see Martin, *The Case Against Christianity*, chap. 3.
- 18. See for example, John Dominic Crossan, *Who Killed Jesus?* (HarperSanFrancisco, 1995), p. 214.
- 19. For example, suppose that  $\text{Prob}(R/K)=.01$ ,  $\text{Prob}(EH/R\&K)=1$ ,  $\text{Prob}(EH/\sim R\&K)=.02$ , then  $\text{Prob}(\sim R/K)=.09$ , and  $\text{Prob}(R/EH\&K)=.36$ . In this case, it is not rational to believe that the Resurrection occurred even if historical evidence is only 20 percent probable on the falsehood of the Resurrection and the truth of theism.

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