

Dimensions of Emotional Fit

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Emotions are open to various kinds of normative assessment. For example, we can assess emotions for their prudential or moral value. Recently, philosophers have increasingly attended to a distinct form of normative assessment of emotions – fittingness assessment. An emotion is fitting when it is merited by its object. For example, admiration is fitting when it is felt towards the admirable, and shame towards the shameful. This paper defends a hybrid account of emotional fittingness. Emotions are complex, and typically involve various elements. As well as involving representations that can be assessed for accuracy, emotions typically motivate their subjects in characteristically urgent ways. The fittingness of an emotion as a whole is a function of the fittingness of both its representational and motivational aspects.

Keywords: Emotions, Fittingness, Emotional Motivation, Normativity

1 Introduction

What is it for an emotion to be fitting? Many argue that for it to be fitting for an agent to feel an emotion, E, is for E to involve an accurate representation of its object (cf. De Sousa 2002: 249-51; Graham 2014: 392-3; Rosen 2015: 70-1; Tappolet 2016: 87). Call this view ‘Emotional Fittingness as Accurate Representation’ (EFAR). I argue that EFAR gives us only part of the story about emotional fittingness. Emotions are complex, and typically involve more than just a representation that can be assessed for accuracy. In particular, emotions typically motivate their subjects in characteristically urgent ways. The fittingness of an emotion as a whole is a function of the fittingness of both its representational and motivational components. This paper clarifies and defends this claim.

Section 2 introduces the fittingness relation, draws some pertinent distinctions in the philosophy of emotion, and argues that fitting emotions are subject to a proportionality condition. Roughly, this condition holds that, to be fitting, the strength of an emotion must be proportional to the value of its object.

Sections 3 and 4 explore the prospects of two ‘monistic’ accounts of emotional fittingness. Monistic accounts aim to explain what it is for an emotion to be fitting in terms of the fittingness of just one element of emotions. I argue that the proportionality condition poses problems for monistic accounts, because various aspects of an emotion are relevant to whether it is proportional. Section 3 criticises EFAR. Section 4 develops and criticises a different monistic account of fittingness – ‘Emotional Fittingness as Reason-Supported Motivation’ (EFSM) – that focusses on the motivational aspect of emotions. According to EFSM, for it to be fitting for an agent to feel an emotion, E, is for E’s motivational component to be supported by the balance of reasons (of the ‘right kind’).

Finally, Section 5 defends a hybrid account of emotional fittingness that draws on both EFAR and EFSM. According to this hybrid account, for it to be fitting for an agent to feel an emotion, E, is for E to involve an accurate representation of its object, *and* for E's motivational component to be supported by the balance of reasons of the right kind. Call this 'A Hybrid Model of Emotional Fittingness' (HEF). I argue that HEF provides a compelling interpretation of the proportionality condition.

2 Preliminaries

The fittingness relation is the relation that holds between an object, an agent, and a response when the object merits – or, equivalently, is worthy of – that response from that agent. Many terms for responses have associated normative terms formed by suffixation, such that the fittingness of the relevant response is closely linked to the instantiation of the normative property picked out by the associated normative term. In the case of emotion terms, examples of such associated normative terms include 'shameful', 'admirable', 'amusing', and 'contemptible'. Call the properties that are picked out by these terms 'E-worthy properties'.¹ Not all emotion terms have such associated normative terms – for instance, 'resentment' does not. But we might invent them using the suffix '-worthy' and stipulate their meaning by claiming that, for example, 'resentment-worthy' stands in the same relation to 'resentment' as, for example, 'shameful', 'admirable', and 'amusing' stand in to, respectively, 'shame', 'admiration', and 'amusement'.

Fitting emotions are subject to a proportionality condition (cf. D'Arms & Jacobson 2000: 73-4). An agent's emotion, E, of strength, S, is fitting only if its object is E-worthy, and

¹ There is dispute concerning just *how* close the link is between fitting emotions and E-worthy properties (see, e.g. Achs and Na'aman 2023), but it is widely agreed that this link is one characteristic mark of fittingness assessment that helps to distinguish it from other forms of normative assessment.

the degree to which its object is E-worthy is proportional to the degree of S.² For example, suppose that Josephine feels only slightly ashamed of something that is very shameful. While Josephine's shame gets something right – it is directed towards something that really is shameful – it is not fitting, because the strength of her shame is disproportional to the degree of shamefulness of its object. To give a different example, suppose that Mike feels strong admiration towards someone who is only a little admirable. Mike's admiration is not fitting, because it is an overreaction given the degree of admirableness of its object.

'Strength' in the proportionality condition is a term of art. It is pre-theoretically plausible that fitting emotions are subject to some kind of proportionality condition. We regularly criticise emotional reactions by saying things like, 'it wasn't *that* embarrassing', or 'come on, it was more amusing than that!'. Moreover, as we will see in later sections, we have some intuitions about the aspects of emotions that are relevant to whether this proportionality condition is met. But we should not take for granted that everything we might reasonably call an aspect of the 'strength' of an emotion is relevant to its fittingness. For example, the felt intensity of an emotion is partly a function of the feelings of bodily changes it involves, but it is an open question how, if at all, such feelings contribute to emotional fittingness. So, 'strength' should be understood as meaning 'aspects of an emotion that bear on its proportionality'. Plugging this back into the statement of the proportionality condition above, we get: an agent's emotion, E, is fitting only if its object is E-worthy, and the degree to which its object is E-worthy is proportional to the relevant aspects of E. (I defend an answer to the question of what are the relevant aspects over the course of the paper).

Assessing emotions for fit is not the only way of normatively assessing emotions (D'Arms & Jacobson 2000). For example, an emotion may be prudentially good even though

² It may be that there is often a range of strengths of emotional responses that would be proportional (cf. Maguire 2018: 792; Achs and Na'aman 2023: 2537).

it is not fitting, or prudentially bad even though it is fitting. If an evil demon credibly threatens to torture you unless you admire something that is not admirable, feel ashamed of something that is not shameful, or feel amused by something that is not amusing, then while it would be prudentially good to feel these emotions they would not be fitting (cf. Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004: 407-8). (I leave to one side for now the controversial question of whether the demon's credible threat is a *reason* for these emotions). Another form of normative assessment of emotions that is different from fittingness assessment is moral assessment. For example, it may be morally bad for a recently widowed parent to feel all the grief it would be fitting for them to feel, because this would risk further harm to their children (cf. D'Arms & Jacobson 2000: 77). Note that the claim here is that moral and prudential assessment *of emotions* is different from fittingness assessment of emotions. This is consistent with thinking that moral and prudential assessment of the *objects* of emotions is relevant to fittingness assessment of emotions. For example, someone may be admirable partly in virtue of their moral characteristics.

Statements ascribing emotions, such as 'Beth feels guilty about hurting Sue', typically admit of two different readings (cf. Deonna & Teroni 2012: 8). On the first reading, this statement says that Beth is right now in the thrall of guilt. So understood, the statement ascribes an emotional episode to Beth. But we might also read the statement as saying that Beth is disposed to feel episodes of guilt about hurting Sue, for example when she thinks about Sue. Understood this way, the statement ascribes an emotional disposition to Beth. In providing an account of emotional fittingness, my aim is to provide an account of the fittingness of emotional episodes. I leave open whether this account might be extended to give an account of the fittingness of emotional dispositions. In what follows, by 'emotion' I mean 'emotional episode' unless otherwise indicated.

It is widely thought that, in typical cases, emotional episodes involve various components (Goldie 2000: 4-5; Ben-Ze'ev 2010; Tappolet 2016: 8; Robinson 2017; Scarantino & De Sousa 2021: §2). Christine Tappolet provides a helpful list: 'a) a sensory experience or more generally an informational component, b) a kind of appraisal, c) physiological changes, d) facial expressions, e) characteristic feelings, f) cognitive and attentional processes, and g) an action-tendency or some other kind of motivational component' (2016: 8). Now, we will see later that the claim that emotions involve different components can be misleading, insofar as it might lead us to overlook the important ways in which these components are integrated with one another. Moreover, it may be that some of the components mentioned above, properly understood, are fully explicable in terms of the others (for example, perhaps the phenomenal character of emotions can be fully explained in terms of the other elements). Nonetheless, the claim that emotions are complex phenomena will be important in what follows, and I will return to it at various points in the argument.

A final clarification: by the 'goal' of an emotion, I mean the satisfaction conditions of its motivational component. For instance, just as a desire to eat an apple is satisfied by eating an apple, the motivational component of fear of a snake is satisfied by becoming safe from the snake. Insofar as fear involves a motivational component, its goal is to become safe from its object (Scarantino 2014: 169). Some further examples: the motivational goal of guilt is to make amends, and the motivational goals of resentment and indignation are to make offenders hold themselves accountable by feeling guilty (for the right reasons) and making amends (Tangney & Dearing 2002: 19; Dill & Darwall 2014: 46-54).

3 Emotional Fittingness as Accurate Representation

This is the first of two sections in which I explore the prospects of monistic accounts of emotional fittingness. Monistic accounts aim to explain what it is for an emotion to be fitting in terms of the fittingness of just one element of emotions. In this section, I discuss the following monistic account:

Emotional Fittingness as Accurate Representation (EFAR): For it to be fitting for an agent to feel an emotion, E, is for E to involve an accurate representation of its object.

I argue that EFAR cannot provide a plausible interpretation of the proportionality condition on emotional fittingness.³

EFAR is compatible with a wide range of views about the nature of the representations involved in emotions. For example, a defender of EFAR might hold that emotions involve normative judgments (Nussbaum 2001), or perceptual experiences of normative properties (Tappolet 2016), or *sui generis* normative representations (Goldie 2000; Mitchell 2020). EFAR's flexibility in this respect is one source of its appeal. A further strength is that by reducing fittingness to accurate representation, EFAR reduces something that is often found somewhat obscure (fittingness) to a comparatively clearer and better understood category (representational accuracy).

To account for the proportionality condition in terms of representational accuracy, defenders of EFAR must argue that the 'strength' of an emotion, in the sense relevant to its proportionality, concerns the degree of a certain property (such as admirableness) that it represents its object as possessing. According to EFAR, emotions are unfitting *overreactions*

³ A further, separate argument against EFAR is that it is undermined by the intuition that unfitting emotions involve a different kind of mistake than merely inaccurate representation (Svavarsdóttir 2014: 89-90, 101; Howard 2018: 6, 11; Naar 2021: 13609-10; D'Arms 2022: 122). The hybrid account of emotional fittingness I defend in Section 5 identifies a further mistake involved in unfitting emotions: *viz.*, a motivational component that is inadequately supported by the balance of reasons of the right kind.

when they represent their objects as possessing a greater degree of the relevant property than they in fact possess, and they are unfitting *underreactions* when they represent their objects as possessing a smaller degree of the relevant property than they in fact possess. The problem with this is that other aspects of emotions besides their representational component are intuitively relevant to whether emotions are proportional. For example, imagine that Tony's fear accurately represents its object as being mildly dangerous, but also involves intense, exclusive attention on its object and very strong motivation to become safe from it. Even though this fear episode involves an accurate representation of its object, Tony's emotional response as a whole seems disproportional and hence unfitting. To give a different example, suppose that Beatrice's guilt accurately represents its object as a very grave, culpable offence, but involves only weak motivation to make amends for it. Again, although this episode of guilt accurately represents its object, Beatrice's emotional response as a whole seems disproportional and hence unfitting. When we criticise someone's emotion by saying that its object is not *that* embarrassing, amusing, admirable, and so on, it seems plausible that typically a large part of what is targeted by this criticism is strength of attentional focus and motivation. To give a final example, imagine that Sophie commits a minor *faux pas*, but is absolutely mortified: 'I keep thinking about it', she says, 'I can never show my face there again'. If we reply to her, 'it really wasn't *that* embarrassing', it seems very plausible that part of what we are targeting in characterising her degree of embarrassment as an unfitting overreaction is its attentional and motivational aspects. EFAR, then, cannot give a plausible interpretation of the proportionality condition on fitting emotions.⁴ I now consider and reject two replies to this objection.

⁴ Clarke & Rawling (2023) argue similarly that accounts of the fittingness of blaming emotions in terms of representational accuracy have problems accounting for proportionality. Their arguments are more complex than mine, concerning changes in the fittingness of blaming emotions over time.

3.1 Emotions and Components

The first reply is to argue that emotions, rightly understood, *just are* certain kinds of representations – for example, certain kinds of normative judgments, or perceptual experiences of normative properties, or *sui generis* normative representations. On this kind of view, the attentional and motivational phenomena I have mentioned are not *components* of emotions, but are rather caused by, or associated with, emotions. Someone who defended this kind of view could argue that, in the cases I described involving Tony’s fear and Beatrice’s guilt, the agents experience fitting emotions, but the attentional patterns and motivations the agents subsequently have are unfitting.

This raises an important methodological issue, concerning the extent to which it is possible to theorise about the nature of emotional fittingness independently of theorising about the nature of emotions. I intend my discussion of emotional fittingness to be relatively, but not entirely, neutral with respect to competing views concerning the nature of emotions – including some representationalist views (more on this presently). By ‘representationalist views’, I mean views that privilege the representational aspect of emotions in giving an account of their nature. The claim that emotions just are certain kinds of representations can be contrasted with another kind of representationalist view. The kind of view I have in mind claims that the representational component of emotions is their essential component, but that emotions can have other, non-essential components, such as attentional and motivational components. We

might call the first kind of representationalist view ‘the Identity Model’ and the second ‘the Essential Component Model’.⁵ Both models have defenders.⁶

Of these two models, the Essential Component Model is more plausible. In making this claim, I do not mean to commit myself to a representationalist account of the nature of emotions – the claim only concerns the relative plausibility of the two models. There are a number of considerations that favour the Essential Component Model over the Identity Model. One consideration concerns emotional intensity. Emotions can be more or less intense: for example, one might feel mildly intense fear towards a hissing goose, or very intense fear towards an angry bear. It is very plausible that factors other than the representational component of an emotion can contribute to its intensity. As Tappolet writes: ‘it is likely that in general the intensity of emotions involves phenomenological salience, physiological arousal as well as motivational force, a more intense fear coming with a stronger pang, a higher arousal, and a stronger motivation’ (2016: 24). This observation favours the Essential Component Model over the Identity Model. A defender of the Essential Component Model can argue that attentional focus, physiological changes, and motivation can all be (non-essential) components of emotions that contribute to emotional intensity, but that the essential component of emotions is a kind of representation. (On this view, if we were to subtract these non-essential components, we would still be left with an emotion, albeit not a very intense one).

There is a further consideration favouring the Essential Component Model over the Identity Model that flows from my earlier discussion of EFAR’s problems with proportionality.

⁵ Although I focus here on accounts of the nature of emotions that privilege the representational aspect of emotions, the models generalise: we can also distinguish, for example, between views according to which emotions just are certain kinds of motivations (or feelings), and views that claim that motivations (or feelings) are the essential components of emotions. Although I lack space to argue the point fully here, I take the Essential Component Model to be more plausible than the Identity Model across the board. My discussion of emotional fittingness is neutral with respect to any theory of emotions that takes the form of the Essential Component Model (it is also neutral with respect to accounts of emotions that maintain that emotions have multiple components but do not privilege any of them, such as Ben-Ze’ev 2010 and Robinson 2017).

⁶ For an example of the Identity Model, see Nussbaum (2001). Goldie (2000) and Tappolet (2016) contain strands that strongly suggest the Essential Component Model.

Theorising about the nature of emotional fittingness can play a legitimate role in aiding our theorising about the nature of emotions. Terms such as ‘amusing’, ‘embarrassing’, and ‘shameful’ are used to endorse and criticise emotional responses. We can reasonably appeal to our intuitions about the nature and target of this endorsement and criticism as one source of evidence concerning the nature of emotions.⁷ We saw earlier that, when we criticise someone’s emotion by saying that its object is not *that* embarrassing, amusing, admirable, and so on, typically a large part of what is targeted by this criticism is strength of attentional focus and motivation. This observation favours the Essential Component Model over the Identity Model. If criticising e.g. someone’s embarrassment by saying that its object is not *that* embarrassing targets, among other things, the strength of attentional focus and motivation their embarrassment involves, attentional focus and motivation are best understood as components of embarrassment (even if non-essential components) rather than phenomena that are caused by, or associated with, embarrassment.

3.2 Emotional Representation and Motivation

Let me now consider a different reply to the objection to EFAR under consideration. (The objection, recall, is that EFAR cannot successfully account for the proportionality condition on emotional fittingness insofar as other aspects of emotions besides their representational component, such as their attentional and motivational aspects, are intuitively relevant to whether emotions are proportional). The reply is to urge that emotional representation cannot cleanly be separated from these other aspects of emotions, and as a result defenders of EFAR

⁷ Naar (2021) similarly claims that theorising about the nature of emotional fittingness can legitimately inform theorising about the nature of emotions.

are well-positioned to acknowledge the relevance of these other aspects of emotions to emotional fittingness.⁸

Justin D'Arms has recently defended a reply along these lines on behalf of EFAR (2022).⁹ He argues that defenders of EFAR might address the kinds of concerns I have raised about proportionality by adopting an account of how emotions normatively represent their objects that he has developed in joint work with Daniel Jacobson (D'Arms & Jacobson 2023). On this account, emotions do not normatively appraise their objects in the sense of involving, as a component, a normative belief, perceptual experience, or the like. Rather, emotions themselves, understood as syndromes including feelings, patterns of attention, and motivations, as a whole normatively appraise their objects (2023: 136-52). For example, on their view fear represents its objects as dangerous insofar as fear as a whole, understood as a syndrome including among other things feelings of dread and motivation to avoid threats, appraises its objects as dangerous.

D'Arms argues that defenders of EFAR might draw on this account of emotional appraisal to capture the relevance of such things as attentional focus and strength of motivation to the proportionality of emotional responses (2022: 121). The central idea is that the degrees of certain normative properties that emotions represent their objects as possessing is partly a function of the attentional focus and strength of motivation they involve (*Ibid.*). For example, on this approach, how dangerous an episode of fear represents its object as being depends partly

⁸ In addition to the proposal by D'Arms discussed below, Gideon Rosen (2015: 83, fn.27) has developed a view on which emotional representation cannot cleanly be separated from other aspects of emotions. I lack space to discuss Rosen's view in detail, but the gist of his proposal is that some emotions – his examples are resentment and indignation – are such that the belief-like thoughts implicit in them make reference to the *contents* of the motivations involved in them. However, this does not give a large enough role to the motivational component of emotions in explaining emotional fittingness. Rosen's view focusses only on the content of the motivations involved in emotions, but the strength of such motivations and the degree to which they capture attention are also relevant to emotional fittingness. See Clarke and Rawling (2023: 745, 747) for further discussion of Rosen's view.

⁹ Although D'Arms argues that defenders of EFAR may be able to handle concerns around proportionality, he ultimately rejects EFAR on the basis of the objection mentioned in fn. 3. I discuss D'Arms and Jacobson's influential views on emotional fittingness further in Section 4.2.

on how tightly it focusses its subject's attention and how strongly it motivates them. In this way, defenders of EFAR might try to hold on to the claim that the 'strength' of an emotion, in the sense relevant to its proportionality, is a matter of the degree of certain properties (such as dangerousness) that it represents its object as possessing.

However, there is a good reason for rejecting D'Arms and Jacobson's account of emotional appraisal. It seems common for strength of attentional focus and motivation involved in emotional episodes to fade as they become more distant in time from their objects (cf. Clarke & Rawling 2023: 743-6). For example, compare the resentment someone might feel for a minor offence done to them shortly after the incident took place, with the resentment they might feel upon remembering the incident ten years later (*Ibid.*). It seems probable that, insofar as they feel any resentment at all at the later time, the strength of attentional focus and motivation involved in the later episode of resentment will be milder than that involved in the earlier episode. But this need not correspond to a difference in how serious these episodes of resentment represent the offence as being (*Ibid.*). The subject's resentment might well involve a clear-eyed view of the seriousness of this offence in both cases; what has changed in the intervening years is that the offence no longer exercises them as much.¹⁰ So, we should reject the claim that the degrees of certain normative properties that emotions represent their objects as possessing is a matter of such things as the strength of attentional focus and motivation they involve, and with it the holistic account of emotional appraisal that D'Arms and Jacobson defend. To make sense of how the representational content of an emotion can vary somewhat

¹⁰ In support of this, we can note that in this and similar cases it need not *seem* to the subject as though their later emotion, despite its diminished strength of attentional focus and motivation, represents its object as possessing a smaller degree of the relevant normative property. If it seems to a subject that an emotion they are currently experiencing represents its object in a certain way, this is evidence that their emotion does in fact represent its object in this way.

independently of its attentional and motivational aspects, we must understand emotional appraisal as a component of emotions in its own right.¹¹

4 Emotional Fittingness as Reason-Supported Motivation

The aim of this section is to develop a different monistic account of emotional fittingness that focuses on the motivational aspect of emotions. I argue that this view also cannot account adequately for proportionality, and that it may face further problems arising from the possibility of non-motivating emotion-types and episodes.

4.1 Emotional Motivation

Emotional motivation is distinctive in having the property of ‘control precedence’.¹² A motivational state has control precedence insofar as it tends to assume precedence in the control of action, attention, and information-processing. Control precedence involves various elements, which I distinguish under the headings of ‘bodily preparation’, ‘effects on attention and information-processing’, and ‘interruption’. Although these elements are distinguishable, they form a unified phenomenon insofar as they all contribute to the prioritisation of the motivational state to which they belong.

At this point, it will help to return briefly to Tappolet’s list of the components typically involved in emotional episodes: ‘a) a sensory experience or more generally an informational

¹¹ This objection to D’Arms and Jacobson’s account of emotional appraisal runs independently of the issue of whether it is *fitting* for emotions to diminish over time. For general discussion of this issue, see especially Na’aman (2021) and Howard (2023). Whatever we say about the fittingness of changes in emotions over time, it is independently implausible that changes in the attentional and motivational strength of an emotion over time always correspond to changes in its representational content.

¹² The term ‘control precedence’ was coined by the psychologist Nico Frijda (1986, 2007). My presentation of control precedence largely follows Scarantino (2014).

component, b) a kind of appraisal, c) physiological changes, d) facial expressions, e) characteristic feelings, f) cognitive and attentional processes, and g) an action-tendency or some other kind of motivational component' (2016: 8). I said earlier that the claim that emotions involve different components can be misleading. Although we can analytically distinguish the various components typically involved in emotional episodes, these components are integrated in significant ways. In particular, insofar as emotional motivation involves control precedence, the motivational component – element (g) – serves as a kind of focal point or organising principle in terms of which many of the other elements typically involved in emotional episodes can be understood. 'Bodily preparation' encompasses both (c) (physiological changes) and (d) (facial expressions). 'Effects on attention and information-processing' covers (f) (cognitive and attentional processes).

Although I will continue to talk about the 'motivational component' of emotions, from now on I intend this to refer to the distinctive motivational states typically involved in emotions. Insofar as these motivational states are distinctive in having the property of control precedence, it is misleading to *contrast* the motivational component of emotions with (c) (physiological changes), (d) (facial expressions), and (f) (cognitive and attentional processes). All of these things contribute to control precedence and hence to the distinctive character of emotional motivation. Let me now explain control precedence in more detail.

Bodily preparation: Motivational states with control precedence prepare the body for action in service of their goals. This can involve changes in muscular tension, including changes in facial expressions, and changes in the autonomic nervous system, such as changes in heartrate and blood flow. In fear, for example, heartrate tends to increase and blood tends to flow to large muscles; fear also tends to involve changes in facial expressions, such as raised eyelids (Scarantino 2014: 159). In this way, fear prepares us to become safe from its objects

by preparing our body for quick action (such as running away from a physical threat) and increasing our field of vision.

Effects on attention and information-processing: Motivational states with control precedence affect the attention and information-processing of their subjects in service of their goals (Frijda 2007: 41; Scarantino 2014: 168-71). In guilt, for instance, our attention is typically directed towards an action we have performed or omitted, and also on actions that we could perform to make amends for it, such as apology or compensation (Tangney & Dearing 2002: 18-20).

Interruption: Motivational states with control precedence tend to interrupt ongoing pursuits and not to be interrupted themselves (Frijda 1986: 78; 2007: 28-9; Scarantino 2014: 168-71). For instance, an episode of fear may distract its subject from her absorption in a book when she becomes aware of a large dog bounding towards her and her fear will tend not to be interrupted itself.

4.2 Emotional Motivation and Reasons of the Right Kind

There are various ways in which we might develop the claim that the fittingness of an emotion is a matter of whether its motivational component is normatively supported in the right way. For example, we might claim that the relevant normative support is a *sui generis* fittingness relation, that it is to be understood in terms of values, or that it is a matter of being supported by normative reasons in the right way. I will focus on the last of these proposals. As we will see, understanding emotional fittingness in terms of reasons for emotional motivation promises a nuanced account of the proportionality condition on emotional fittingness – although one that ultimately proves unsuccessful (moreover, for reasons that would apply equally to the other proposals).

It is common in discussions of fittingness to distinguish two kinds of normative reasons: reasons of the ‘right kind’ and reasons of the ‘wrong kind’ (Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen 2004). I will consider this distinction specifically as it applies to reasons for and against emotions, and will understand it as follows:

Reasons of the Right Kind: The fact that p is a reason of the right kind for (against) E if and only if (a) p is a reason for (against) E , and (b) p counts towards (against) E ’s object being E -worthy.

Reasons of the Wrong Kind: The fact that p is a reason of the wrong kind for (against) E if and only if (a) p is a reason for (against) E , and (b) p does not count towards (against) E ’s object being E -worthy.

Some examples: the fact that Sara is kind is a reason of the right kind for admiring her, since it is a reason for admiring her and it counts towards her being admirable. In contrast, the fact that a demon will torture you unless you admire him is a reason of the wrong kind for admiring him since, although it is a reason for admiring the demon, it does not count towards the demon being admirable.¹³ (I will say something about weights of reasons of the right kind and how these reasons combine to determine fittingness facts shortly).

If a monistic account of emotional fittingness that focusses on reasons for emotional motivation is to respect the close link between emotional fittingness and E -worthy properties, it will have to be formulated in terms of reasons of the right kind. We can formulate an analysis on these lines as follows:

¹³ It is controversial whether there are any reasons of the wrong kind. Some philosophers hold that putative reasons of the wrong kind are in fact reasons for wanting to have certain responses, or trying to have them, rather than reasons for the responses themselves (see e.g. Skorupski 2010; Rowland 2019; but see also Howard 2019 for criticism). If there are no reasons of the wrong kind, then EFMS might perhaps be formulated more simply as claiming that for it to be fitting for an agent to feel an emotion is for the emotion’s motivational component to be supported by the balance of reasons.

Emotional Fittingness as Reason-Supported Motivation (EFSM): For it to be fitting for an agent to feel an emotion, E, is for E's motivational component to be supported by the balance of reasons of the right kind.

Some clarifications: first, the motivational component of an emotion is supported by the balance of reasons of the right kind just in case the set of all of the right kind of reasons for it is weightier than the set of all of the right kind of reasons against it. Now, this might be thought too simple. Given the tight link between emotional fittingness and E-worthy properties, this implies that, if the set of all of the right kind of reasons for e.g. admiring someone is even slightly weightier than the set of all of the right kind of reasons against admiring them, then that person is admirable. But this might be found implausible, by setting the bar for being admirable too low (cf. Howard & Leary 2022: 235, fn.36). Readers who are sympathetic to this concern are welcome to modify the above clarification such that, for an emotion to be fitting, the set of all of the right kind of reasons for it must be *significantly* weightier than the set of all of the right kind of reasons against it, but this modification strikes me as unnecessary. In general, it seems possible for the objects of emotions to instantiate their associated E-worthy properties to a very small degree. A situation might be only slightly embarrassing, a decision only slightly regrettable, a joke only slightly amusing, and so on. If the set of all of the right kind of reasons for an emotion is only slightly weightier than the set of all of the right kind of reasons against it, then its object is E-worthy, but only to a very small degree.

Second, there is a sense in which reasons for being motivated to fulfil the goals of emotions are primary among reasons supporting the motivational components of emotions. We have seen that emotional motivation is characteristically urgent, insofar as it has control precedence. Emotional motivation directs our attention, prepares our body for action, and interrupts ongoing mental processes, all in the service of achieving the goals of emotions. It seems plausible that, insofar as we have reasons for these elements of control precedence, these

reasons are derivative from the reasons we have for being motivated to fulfil the goals of emotions.¹⁴ For example, it is because we have reasons for being motivated to become safe from fearsome things that we have reasons for devoting our attentional resources to becoming safe from them.

Third, let me say something about how reasons of the right kind interact.¹⁵ I will focus on guilt. The E-worthy property associated with this emotion is the property of being an offence for which you are guilty (more simply, a ‘culpable offence’). Hence, the fact that p is a reason of the right kind for (against) guilt if and only if p is a reason for (against) feeling guilty and p counts towards (against) guilt’s object being a culpable offence. Now, suppose that an agent broke an important promise in order to bring about a small amount of good. Call this action ‘A’. The fact that the agent broke an important promise is a reason of the right kind for feeling guilty about A – that is, it is a reason for feeling guilty about A and it counts towards A being a culpable offence. At the same time, this fact is a reason for being motivated to make amends for A. The fact that the agent intentionally brought about a small amount of good is a reason against feeling guilty about A and it counts against A being a culpable offence; moreover, it is a reason against being motivated to make amends for A. To simplify matters, suppose that these are the only reasons of the right kind in play, and that there are no further factors (such as diminished responsibility) that modify the weights of these reasons. Then, whether it is fitting for the agent to be motivated to make amends for A depends on the comparative weights of these reasons. If the fact that the agent broke an important promise is a weightier reason, then

¹⁴ It is possible that not all of the elements of control precedence are assessable in terms of reasons. It might be thought that physiological changes, such as changes in heartrate and blood flow, are not the kinds of things for which we can have reasons. If this is right, then we should not see physiological changes as relevant to EFSM. (However, see Na’aman (2022) for an argument that physiological changes are assessable in terms of reasons insofar as they are components of emotional episodes).

¹⁵ Maguire (2018) argues that there are no reasons of the right kind for emotions and other affective attitudes, on the basis that facts that make affective attitudes fitting do not combine or compete (i.e. they are not contributory), and do not have weights (i.e. they are not gradable). Insofar as the model I sketch is plausible, this casts doubt on Maguire’s arguments. For detailed critical discussion of Maguire’s arguments, see Faraci (2020) and Howard & Leary (2022).

the agent is guilty of an offence and it is fitting for them to be motivated to make amends for A. How much weightier this reason is determines the seriousness of the offence for which they are guilty, and correspondingly the strength of guilt-feelings that would be proportional. In general, facts about what strengths of emotions would be proportional to the value of their objects, according to EFSM, are explained by facts about the comparative weights of reasons of the right kind for and against feeling emotions.

This naturally leads to the fourth and final clarification I will make to EFSM, concerning the resources it has for explaining what it is for an emotion to be ‘strong’ in the relevant sense. EFSM can draw on all of the following factors in explaining emotional strength: first, strength of motivation, where this is a matter of its causal power to produce action; second, content of motivation (e.g. whether an agent in feeling guilty is motivated to make amends in an insufficient/excessive way); third, the tendency of the emotion to focus attention and prepare the body in service of its goal;¹⁶ and fourth, the tendency of the emotion to interrupt other mental states and not be interrupted itself. An emotion is fitting, according to EFSM, only if all of these factors are proportional to the value of its object.

Before moving on, it is worth comparing EFSM with D’Arms and Jacobson’s account of emotional fittingness, which is laid out most fully in their recent monograph *Rational Sentimentalism* (2023). This is worthwhile for two reasons. First, D’Arms and Jacobson’s views on emotional fittingness have been highly influential, but they are often misinterpreted as defending EFAR. Second, setting out their views on emotional fittingness will allow me to differentiate their position clearly from the account of emotional fittingness I will eventually defend, HEF.

¹⁶ With the qualification noted in fn.14 that it is possible that at least some aspects of bodily preparation are not the kinds of things for which we can have reasons.

In some passages, it might seem as though D’Arms and Jacobson accept EFAR: for instance, when they claim that ‘emotions are fitting when their appraisal is correct’ (2023: 137). However, on closer inspection it is clear that they do not accept EFAR. As we saw earlier, D’Arms and Jacobson understand emotional appraisal holistically: emotions themselves, understood as syndromes including feelings, patterns of attention, and (especially) motivations, as a whole appraise their objects (2023: 136-52). They argue further that the content of emotional appraisals is ‘response-dependent’: the content of such appraisals cannot ultimately be spelled out without making essential reference to (the fittingness of) emotional syndromes themselves (cf. especially 2023: 36, 184). Thus, fear, on their view, appraises its objects as dangerous, but they understand dangerousness in response-dependent terms: ‘the dangerous is whatever counts as sufficiently likely and sufficiently bad that it *merits* one’s complete and immediate attention on avoiding the threat – in other words, to be dangerous is to *merit* fear’ [emphasis added] (2023: 36). So, D’Arms and Jacobson do not explain what it is for an emotion to be fitting in terms of accurate representation: on the contrary, in their view the content of emotional appraisals itself makes essential reference to emotional fittingness. On this interpretation of their views, D’Arms and Jacobson’s account of emotional fittingness is close to EFSM. At least, EFSM is one way of developing their views – one which understands the talk of ‘merit’ in the passage quoted above in terms of reasons. A key difference between D’Arms and Jacobson’s account of emotional fittingness and the account I will eventually defend, HEF, is that HEF presupposes the rejection of D’Arms and Jacobson’s holistic account of emotional appraisal in favour of the view that emotional appraisal is a component of emotions in its own right. I argued for this view of emotional appraisal in Section 3.2. I lay out HEF fully and defend it in Section 5.

4.3 EFSM, Proportionality, and Non-Motivating Emotions

At first blush, EFSM appears to be an attractive view. Our discussion of guilt suggested that facts that count towards (against) ϕ -ing being a culpable offence are reasons for (against) being motivated to make amends for ϕ -ing. Next, consider fear. The fact that a dog is large, aggressive, and in easy reach of you counts towards the dog being fearsome. Moreover, this fact is a reason for being motivated to become safe from the dog. Generally, facts that count towards X being fearsome are reasons for being motivated to become safe from X. Moreover, facts that count *against* X being fearsome are reasons *against* being motivated to become safe from X. For example, the fact that a dog is a harmless Golden Retriever is a reason against being motivated to become safe from it. So, EFSM seems well-positioned to respect the tight link between fitting emotions and E-worthy properties.

It may be that some emotion-types are associated with multiple motivational goals. For example, empirical work on admiration suggests that it is associated both with being motivated to praise and honour admired others, and with being motivated to emulate them in respect of their admired qualities (Schindler et al. 2013: 100-6). It might be wondered whether this poses difficulties for EFSM – for example, it might be thought that defenders of EFSM need to find some basis for privileging one of these motivational goals with respect to fittingness assessment. However, this is not so. Insofar as there are many ways in which people can be admirable, and many different relations in which admiring agents can stand to those whom they admire, it should not come as a surprise that different forms of motivational engagement are fitting for different agents with respect to different kinds of admired persons or objects. I might admire a sportsperson's athleticism, but it would not be fitting for me to be motivated to emulate it. But it might well be fitting for me to be motivated to praise and honour the sportsperson on account of their athleticism.

Despite its attractions, EFSM faces some serious difficulties. One problem is that it is open to an objection concerning proportionality that exactly parallels the objection made to EFAR in Section 3. Just as we can imagine cases in which an emotion involves an accurate representation but disproportional motivation, so too we can imagine cases in which everything that EFSM takes to be relevant to fittingness is in place, but the emotion as a whole is disproportional because it involves an inaccurate representation. For example, imagine that Peter feels guilty about betraying Sonia, and everything that EFSM takes to be relevant to fittingness matches the seriousness of his offence. However, Peter's guilt also involves a representation that inaccurately depicts his offence as less serious than it was. Peter's guilt as a whole is disproportional and hence unfitting. To give a different example, suppose that Daniel resents James for lying to him, and the relevant features of the motivational component of Daniel's resentment match the seriousness of James's offence. However, his resentment involves a representation that depicts James's offence as much more serious than it was. Again, it seems that Daniel's resentment as a whole is disproportional and hence unfitting. EFSM, no less than EFAR, runs into problems with proportionality.

EFSM is open to two further objections, each of which concerns the possibility of non-motivating emotions. The first may not be decisive, but it is worth mentioning all the same. It begins from the claim that some emotion-types do not, or at least do not typically, have a motivational component (Roberts 2003: 63; Tappolet 2016: 75-6). Admiration, happiness/joy, relief, awe, and grief have been cited as examples of this (*Ibid.*). EFSM implies that episodes of non-motivating emotion-types cannot be assessed for fit, but this seems false – episodes of admiration, happiness, relief, awe, and grief can surely be assessed as fitting or unfitting. This is a serious objection, but it is not clearly decisive. Examples of non-motivating emotion-types are controversial, and defenders of EFSM might argue that on closer inspection putative examples of non-motivating emotion-types in fact have motivational components. We have

already seen that admiration is associated with motivations to praise and honour admired others, and also to emulate them in respect of their admired qualities (Schindler et al. 2013: 100-6). Psychological work on happiness/joy supports the claim that it also has a motivational component. It has been linked with being motivated to celebrate and savour the object of happiness/joy (Smith et al. 2014: 18; Watkins et al. 2018: 524). However, whether all emotion-types typically have motivational components remains to be seen.

Even if all emotion-types typically involve motivational components, there may well be particular episodes of them that do not. For example, perhaps emotions felt towards fictions typically lack a motivational component, and perhaps emotions felt towards events in the distant past often lack such a component as well (Tappolet 2016: 64-6, 73-4). A second objection to EFSM is that it cannot account for why such emotional episodes are assessable for fit. For example, suppose that Tony's admiration of some long dead figure does not involve a motivational component. It seems that Tony's admiration might still be fitting – after all, the figure could still be admirable. Emotional responses to fiction also seem to be assessable for fit. For example, it seems fitting to feel indignation towards Severus Snape for his cruel treatment of Harry Potter (moreover, it is not uncommon to use terms for E-worthy properties such as 'admirable' when discussing fictions).

This is another serious objection to EFSM, and the resources available for responding to it do not look promising. Perhaps the best approach for defenders of EFSM is to revise their view as follows. They might claim that, when it comes to non-motivating emotional episodes, we are to assess their fittingness by appealing to the fittingness of the motivational components that *would* be involved *if* the relevant inhibiting factors were absent – e.g. if the objects of the emotions were real rather than fictional, or present rather than past. More precisely, on this approach, a token non-motivating emotional episode, E_1 , of a given emotion-type is fitting if and only if, were the relevant inhibiting factors absent, the agent would feel a token motivating

emotional episode, E_2 , of that emotion-type such that E_2 's motivational component would be supported by the balance of reasons of the right kind.

Although I lack space to develop detailed criticisms of this proposal, there are some serious concerns with it. One is that it seems entirely possible for people to have patterns of emotional reactions such that they are far more prone to experience emotions in the kinds of cases that inhibit motivation (such as, perhaps, towards fictions and events in the distant past) than in the kinds of cases that do not inhibit motivation. But having these odd patterns of emotional reactions would not automatically prevent such people from experiencing fitting emotions in cases where the motivational component of emotions is inhibited. Perhaps the proposal might be revised to avoid this difficulty – maybe by appealing to the emotional responses of an idealised counterpart of the actual agent in cases where the relevant inhibiting factors are absent. But there is a more fundamental problem with the whole proposal, which is that it is *ad hoc*. When we ask whether a token emotional episode is fitting to its object, we are asking about whether *that* token emotional episode matches its object in a certain way. It is just not clear why appealing to different emotional episodes that (perhaps an idealised version of) the agent would feel under different circumstances is relevant to answering that question. Finally, a further problem with the proposal is that it may commit the conditional fallacy, insofar as the satisfaction of the antecedents of the relevant conditionals may itself change the fittingness facts. For example, perhaps fictional violence can be amusing even though relevantly similar real violence would not be.¹⁷

¹⁷ For discussion, see Gilmore (2011) and Song (2020).

5 A Hybrid Model of Emotional Fittingness

Sections 3 and 4 examined the shortcomings of two monistic accounts of emotional fit: EFAR and EFSM. Monistic accounts attempt to explain what it is for an emotion to be fitting in terms of the fittingness of just one element of emotions, but they fall afoul of the proportionality condition on fitting emotions. Once we reject monistic accounts of emotional fittingness, we have two options. Either we accept a *pluralist* account, or a *hybrid* account. Pluralist accounts hold that emotions can get to be fitting in different ways, through being fitting in respect of one or another of their components (for example, their representational *or* motivational components). In contrast, hybrid accounts explain emotional fittingness in terms of a single, complex condition combining two or more elements of emotions.

If monistic accounts cannot provide a plausible interpretation of the proportionality condition on fitting emotions for the reasons given in Sections 3 and 4, then neither can pluralist accounts. It does not suffice for an emotion to be fitting that either its representational or motivational component is fitting, since proportionality requires the fittingness of both. This suggests that we should accept a hybrid account instead.¹⁸ This section defends the following hybrid account of emotional fittingness that draws on both EFAR and EFSM:

A Hybrid Model of Emotional Fittingness (HEF): For it to be fitting for an agent to feel an emotion, E, is for E to involve an accurate representation of its object, and for E's motivational component to be supported by the balance of reasons of the right kind.

We saw in the last section that there may be non-motivating emotion-types, and non-motivating emotional episodes of types that are usually motivating. I start by considering how HEF would

¹⁸ Rosen's (2015) version of EFAR, which was mentioned briefly in fn. 8, complicates the taxonomy I have given. There is a sense in which this could be classified as a hybrid view, since it allows the motivational component of an emotion to contribute to its fittingness conditions through its representational content. I have no objection to this way of classifying Rosen's view, but my objection to the view itself still stands: it does not give a large enough role to the motivational component of emotions in explaining emotional fittingness. Properly acknowledging this role requires moving away from EFAR.

need to be supplemented to account for emotional fittingness in these cases. I then argue that, unlike EFAR and EFSM, HEF provides a compelling interpretation of the proportionality condition on fitting emotions. Finally, I consider and reject an objection to HEF, *viz.*, that it is insufficiently hybrid, because other parts of emotions besides their representational and motivational components are relevant to the fittingness of emotions as a whole.

We need to begin by distinguishing cases in which it would be a defect in an emotion that it lacked a motivational component, and cases in which this would not be a defect. If there are emotion-types that in general lack a motivational component, it would not be a defect of episodes of such types to fail to be motivating. Moreover, we saw in the last section that there may be various factors that can inhibit the motivational aspect of an emotional episode of a type that is usually motivating. For example, perhaps an emotional episode may not be motivating because it is directed at a fictional event, or an event in the distant past. In these cases, it may in no way be a defect of the emotional episode that it fails to motivate its subject. It is not a defect of my indignation at Snape that it fails to motivate me to make Snape hold himself accountable, because Snape is not a real person. The fittingness of emotions that non-defectively lack a motivational component seems to depend solely on their representational accuracy. But perhaps there could be non-motivating emotional episodes that are defective in not including a motivational component. For example, perhaps there could be episodes of guilt that are non-motivating even though the agent committed an actual offence and it is within their power to make amends for it. In this sort of case, although the motivational component of the emotion would be inhibited, it would not be *properly* inhibited (as it is in the case of indignation towards Snape). To be fitting, such an episode of guilt would surely need to be motivating.

Putting these points together suggests the following way of supplementing HEF should there prove to be non-motivating emotion-types, and non-motivating emotional episodes of types that are usually motivating:

Supplement to HEF: If an emotion, E, non-defectively lacks a motivational component, then E's fittingness depends only on its representational accuracy. However, if it is a defect of E that it lacks a motivational component, then E is not fitting – to be fitting, E would need to involve a reason-supported motivation.

This supplement relies on us having an intuitive grasp of when it is a defect in an emotion that it lacks a motivational component. The examples in the previous paragraph suggest that this is not an unreasonable assumption.

HEF avoids the problems facing EFAR and EFSM. Both EFAR and EFSM face difficulties with proportionality. It seems that there could be emotions that involve accurate representations of their objects, but which are disproportional insofar as their motivational components are too strong, or not strong enough. And it seems that there could be emotions such that everything that EFSM takes to be relevant to fittingness is in place, but which are disproportional insofar as they involve inaccurate representations. By drawing on the resources of both EFAR and EFSM in explaining the fittingness of emotions, HEF accounts successfully for the relevance of proportionality to emotional fit.

EFSM potentially faces two further objections, concerning the possibility of non-motivating emotion-types, and non-motivating emotional episodes of types that are usually motivating. EFSM, it might be thought, is unable to account successfully for the possibility of fittingness assessment of emotions in such cases. By appealing to *Supplement to HEF*, defenders of HEF can avoid these problems. Because HEF acknowledges the contribution that the representational aspect of emotions makes to emotional fittingness, it can explain the

fittingness of emotions that non-defectively lack a motivational component in terms of their representational accuracy.

It might be worried that HEF is not sufficiently hybrid. Perhaps the fittingness of an emotion as a whole is determined by more elements than its representational and motivational components. In particular, we might think that when an emotion is fitting this is partly because of how it *feels*. For example, surely part of what makes guilt a fitting response to culpable offences is that it is painful. However, this plausible thought does not stand in tension with HEF. Much, if not all, of the phenomenal character of emotions can be explained in terms of elements of emotions that, according to HEF, contribute towards emotional fittingness. Many philosophers hold that the representational component of emotions contributes significantly to their phenomenal character. This is common among philosophers who take emotional representation to be strongly analogous to, or even a kind of, perceptual experience (Tappolet 2016). Moreover, some philosophers hold that emotional appraisals involve *sui generis* feelings towards values that account for the distinctive phenomenal character of emotional experiences (Goldie 2000; Mitchell 2020). The motivational component of emotions also contributes significantly to their phenomenal character. (As explained earlier, I am using ‘the motivational component’ of emotions to refer to the distinctive motivational states typically involved in emotions, which have the property of control precedence, involving bodily preparation and effects on attention and information-processing). Much of the phenomenal character of fear, for example, can be explained in terms of feelings associated with the bodily changes involved in fear, such as feeling your heartrate and breathing quicken, and your hairs stand on end.¹⁹ Finally, it seems that another factor that can contribute to the phenomenal character of emotions is satisfaction or non-satisfaction of their motivational goals. For

¹⁹ For detailed discussion of how bodily feelings contribute to the phenomenal character of emotional experience, see Deonna & Teroni (2017).

example, guilt is sometimes claimed to involve painful feelings of estrangement from victims (e.g. Morris 1971), and this can surely partly be explained in terms of non-satisfaction of its goal of making amends.

6 Conclusion

This paper defended a hybrid account of emotional fit, HEF. I started by examining two monistic accounts of emotional fit – EFAR and EFSM. I argued that the proportionality condition on fitting emotions poses problems for these accounts, because various aspects of an emotion are relevant to whether it is proportional. To give a plausible interpretation of the proportionality condition, we need to acknowledge that emotions are complex, and various components of an emotion contribute towards its fittingness. In light of this, I developed a hybrid account of emotional fit, HEF, and argued that it provides a compelling interpretation of the proportionality condition.²⁰

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