3  Is Pride a Crown of Virtue?

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The sun is setting and still the child repeats a progression with which she has struggled all afternoon: steady the bicycle, straddle the seat, press down on the high pedal with one foot while pushing off with the other, pedal... fall. A parent, having earlier relinquished the roles of holder-on and spotter, observes from a distance. Later, over dinner, the parent will tell the child that she should be proud for persevering and being so brave. The child, having sat down to the meal crestfallen, will later report being proud of herself, a feeling that motivates the next day’s success: she has learned to ride her new bike.

Among the lessons Rosalind Hursthouse has taught us is to consider the quotidian contexts, such as childrearing, that prove so important – and in philosophical writing, so often neglected – when reflecting on human virtues. In the spirit of heeding her counsel, I offer my child-rearing vignette as an urtext for exploring a role pride appears to play in the acquisition of ethical virtue, an exploration that allows me to bring Hursthouse’s thoughts about virtue into conversation with Philippa Foot’s remarks about the emotion of pride. I do so with the aim, ultimately, of exploring the Aristotelian metaphor of pride (Gk. μεγαλοψυχία or megalopsuchia) as a crown (Gk. κόσμος or kosmos) of the virtues and developing an account of pride that departs from that of Aristotle, whose urtext centers on the megalopsuchos. Whereas for Aristotle pride adorns virtue fully achieved, on my view pride serves the virtues as a tool to be stored away once its use no longer is needed. Or, to return to the crown metaphor, pride resembles the crowns some parents fashion for a child’s birthday, a mood booster whose wearing becomes increasingly unseemly as the candles on subsequent birthday cakes increase in number. In one respect, however, my account of pride hews more closely to Aristotle’s views, specifically those concerning the significance of certain emotions in ethical upbringing. Aristotle famously argued that shame, although not itself a virtue, played an indispensable role in the proper education of the young; I explore a similar role for pride.

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3.1 Learning to be Properly Proud

Suppose the child from our vignette were to report, a following day, how proud she was that the neighbors had painted their house purple. Some clarification, and perhaps a lesson, would be in order. “There are limits,” Philippa Foot reminds us, “to the things a man can be proud of, about which indeed he can feel pride.” These limits invite exploration. Confronted with the child’s purported pride in another’s painting their house purple, the parent might begin by explaining that “pride” connotes some connection with our own doings or things to which we are related. It is, after all, the neighbors’ house and their labor that accomplishes the home improvement. Such a response probes whether the child is correctly identifying a token episodic emotion. If the child replies that she understands all that and reveals it was she who persuaded the neighbors to choose electric purple rather than stately grey, then the parent will have to retreat. Unless, that is, the parent believes that no one should be proud of being in any way related to the defacement of a home by a coat of electric purple paint. Already we note two, what I take to be familiar, points: First, one may misidentify one’s own emotions; second, one may correctly identify an emotion that nonetheless is not a fitting response to its object.

Consider the first point. In the example, it is the child’s clarification that the electric purple house was in some sense her doing that weighs in favor of identifying what she is feeling as, indeed, pride. Had she revealed no beliefs relating her to the result that would provide reason to retract the ascription; whatever she was feeling – joy, glee, ecstasy – her emotion is not properly identified as a token of pride. This is so, that is, on the assumption that pride is at least partly constituted by – and hence correctly individuated in terms of – beliefs about its object.

Philippa Foot defends such an alethic conception of pride, proposing that the relevant beliefs are: (1) That the object is in some sense “one’s own” and (2) that it is an achievement or advantage. For purposes of correctly identifying the emotion, it is not necessary that these beliefs of the subject are true; it suffices for the subjective warrant of the emotion that the relevant beliefs have the noted content. If, in addition, a subject’s pride-constituting beliefs are true, the subject’s pride is not merely correctly identified as such (and, hence, subjectively warranted); the pride also is objectively warranted, or what we might call “fitting.” Such pride “fits” its object in accurately representing certain of the object’s properties, i.e., the property of being in some way related to the subject and the property of being an achievement or advantage.

Thus far, then, we have in hand a distinction among (1) episodic emotion tokens mistakenly identified as pride, (2) episodic emotion tokens correctly identified as pride but unfitting their objects, and (3) tokens of fitting pride.
Such distinctions capture the limits to feeling pride that Foot apparently had in mind. For example, Foot writes, of cases such as that of a man who “happens to feel proud because he has laid one of his hands on the other, three times in an hour”: “[W]ith no special background there can be no pride, not because no one could psychologically speaking feel pride in such a case, but because whatever he did feel could not logically be pride.” Foot introduces the case in order to defend the necessity of pride’s object being believed by its subject to be “some sort of achievement or advantage” and proceeds to supplement it with background information that plausibly renders the hand-laying action pride-worthy (“Perhaps he is ill and it is an achievement even to do this…”). On my reading, Foot takes believing an object to be an achievement or advantage as itself a necessary condition on the correct identification of one’s emotion as a token of pride. That the object in fact has that property likewise is a necessary condition on pride being a fitting emotional response to its object. If this reading is correct, then when Foot proceeds to deny that it is “because no one could psychologically speaking feel pride in such a case” that supports her claim that “with no special background there can be no pride,” we should not take her to be allowing that one may “psychologically speaking” feel pride even in the absence of the kind of special backgrounds she cites. We should not do so because, absent that background, some independent criterion of individuation would be necessary in order to correctly identify whatever the man is feeling as a token of pride. And although Foot considers as candidate criteria “a kind of internal sensation” and behavior such as “smiling and walking with a jaunty air, and holding an object up where other people can see it,” she accepts neither candidate. The first she altogether rejects. Of claims asserting the reasonableness of taking the second as a criterion for ascribing pride, she writes: “In one sense this is true [i.e., the ascription would be reasonable], and in another sense not.” Presumably, it would be reasonable to take such behavior as evidence of pride because such behavior typically indicates one has the partially pride-constituting beliefs about their emotion’s object. Absent the relevant beliefs of the subject, however, I take Foot to remain committed to the ascription of pride here being incorrect, no matter how reasonable. In short, I take Foot not to be allowing that “psychologically speaking” an emotion we properly call “pride” might occur in the absence of her two conditions; her point about “psychologically speaking feel[ing] pride” in such cases is intended to highlight that she is engaged not in a causal but a conceptual investigation.

In the terms I’ve set out, in Foot’s case of the hand-laying man where no “special background” exists, the question of the fittingness of the man’s pride (sic) does not arise because his emotion is not in fact a token of pride at all. Indeed, focused – as her discussion of pride is – on the mistake of supposing that one’s intentional mental states can float free
of the facts, one is hard pressed to find in Foot’s account of pride examples where the emotion is both properly identified as such and fitting. However, we can adopt another of Foot’s examples for the purpose: Consider a man who has accomplished the feat of raising to harvest the largest pumpkin in the state, which he now proudly exhibits at his state fair.\textsuperscript{15} We stipulate that he has the relevant beliefs about his pumpkin and that such beliefs are true. Whereas I have adopted other philosophers’ term of art – “fittingness” – to evaluate such a man’s pride, Foot’s own term of art for capturing the relation of such emotions (and other intentional mental attitudes) to their objects is that of an “internal relation.”\textsuperscript{16} What is it for our pumpkin farmer’s pride and his pumpkin – the presumed relata – to be internally (versus) externally related? It’s not easy to say but we get some help from considering, first, how Foot conceives of external relations between mental states and their objects.

Foot’s paradigmatic example of an external relation is that which she takes philosophers such as Charles Stevenson and R.M. Hare to assume between – on one hand – the pro-attitude of commendation (which they associate with the purported “evaluative meaning” of the term “good”) and – on the other hand – the objects of commendation.\textsuperscript{17} Suppose, for example, that Hare regards my dead cactus to be good. “What a good cactus!” he exclaims upon seeing it. In complaining that for Hare, “good” is only externally related to its objects, Foot is – as I understand her – registering that on Hare’s view there are no non-relational properties intrinsic to the individual relata themselves (i.e., Hare’s commendation and my dead cactus) such that their being related is fixed by, or grounded in, those intrinsic properties. (Hare takes himself to be licensed to exclaim my dead cactus a good cactus, it turns out, because he wishes to use it as a doorstop.) For Foot, in contrast, whether the cactus is good or not is to be settled by whether or not it is a good cactus, which requires determining how it is faring as a cactus. Clearly, being dead, my cactus is not faring well at all! Subsequently, it is not a good cactus. In the case of our pumpkin farmer, his token of pride is internally related to the pumpkin whose production he believes to both be an achievement and in a relevant sense his. Both evaluations of goodness and the evaluations of their objects implicit in emotional responses are for Foot thus internally related to their objects in the following sense: The objects to which the attitudes are properly related are so in virtue of intrinsic, non-relational properties of the relata. What is the relation thereby grounded? If I’m correct, Foot’s internal relation between certain mental states and their objects will obtain if, and only if, the mental state type has conditions of fittingness.\textsuperscript{18} We may as well dub Foot’s internal relation, then, the fittingness relation.

Returning to the practical implications of Foot’s view as it concerns pride: In the purple house case as originally described, the question of the fittingness of the child’s pride is likely one that a parent can safely
ignore. But things could be otherwise. Perhaps the neighbors’ own child has lobbied strongly in favor of yellow and is distraught by the recognition that her parents favored her playmate’s proposal. Suppose, in addition, that a sense of competition with the neighbor’s child fuels our own child’s pride at emerging victorious. Although these facts do not render our child’s pride unfitting, these are considerations that certainly weigh against our child lording it over the other child and perhaps weigh in favor of methods designed to temper our child’s pride in this instance.¹⁹

More stringent measures will be uncontroversial, I take it, in other cases. Suppose our child were to report that she is proud of having strangled the neighbors’ cat or punched her way to the head of the line for the playground slide. Here (if not earlier), our child demands instruction that extends beyond the linguistic to the ethical.

### 3.2 Proper Pride in the Service of Virtue

Foot’s attention to the relation of pride to its objects is in the service of her rejection of the non-naturalism and non-cognitivism of philosophers such as Stevenson and Hare. She never, to my knowledge, put her understanding of pride to greater use, such as in the context of her account of virtues as species of human goodness.²⁰ Indeed, early Foot, influenced by Aquinas, portrays pride as a vice: “[M]oral failings such as pride, vanity, worldliness, and avarice harm both their possessor and others,” she writes.²¹ Her *magnum opus* briefly acknowledges a role for pride in motivating human virtue²² and endorses the Aristotelian view that “[T]here is a way in which a good person must not only see his or her good as bound up with goodness of desire and action, but also feel that it is, with sentiments such as pleasure, pride, and honour.”²³ Nowhere in the work, however, is there any extended discussion of pride. Those remarks we do have need not be inconsistent, of course, given the by now familiar recognition that reference to “pride” is not univocal. Loose talk sometimes conflates pride and arrogance, for example. And pride’s cognate terms, such as “proud,” may refer not to an emotion but an attitude or tendency one expects NOT to find in the virtuous person. Such a negative evaluation of what we might call arrogant pride – or, with the psychologists, hubristic pride – leaves untouched the feelings of pride, such as in our original bicycling example, that appear to motivate in its subject continued striving toward things of value.

Hursthouse’s comments on pride likewise fall short of expanding the role the particular emotion of pride might play in the ethical education of the young. To be sure, both Foot and Hursthouse follow Aristotle in conceiving of the virtues themselves as dispositions not only to act but to feel emotions.²⁴ More precisely, virtues are themselves dispositions to act well and to feel, as Hursthouse reminds us, “on the right occasions, towards the right people or objects, for the right reasons, where ‘right’
Is Pride a Crown of Virtue?

means ‘correct’, as in ‘The right answer to “what is the capital of New Zealand?” is “Wellington”.’

The agent whose action merits praise can take pride in so doing; unhappiness here would be unfitting. In contrast, the racist who feels pride having “succeed[ed] in doing them [a member of the rejected race] down” manifests emotional corruption.

Any account of the relation of pride to virtue, Hursthouse’s examples suggest, should acknowledge that the role of the emotion is two-fold: not only may fitting pride be instrumental, as I suggest, to the acquisition of the virtues, a propensity for feeling fitting pride itself is constitutive of at least some virtue(s).

More so than Foot, Hursthouse attends to the education of those emotions relevant to one’s virtue. Faulting her fellow philosophers who “concentrating on ‘the most general features of... evaluative language’... failed to think about the fact that such language has to be taught, and thereby failed to think about moral education and upbringing,” she writes:

We are taught to use sentences which contain the words (equivalent to) ‘good’ and ‘evil’ and their cognates and species from a very early age, at the same time as we are taught how to conduct ourselves.

And a central aspect of this teaching is a training of the emotions.

Already in the bicycling example, we begin to glimpse an instrumental role for pride in the specifically ethical training of the emotions. I imagined there that the parent encouraged the bicycle-mastering child to be proud of her perseverance in a difficult (for the child) goal and the bravery (again, in the context) of continuing her efforts despite the risk of harm (if only scraped knees). The achievement of learning to ride likely is a small one in the context of most lives and, no doubt, good lives have been lived without mastering two-wheeled transportation. But return, again, to the child proud of having strangled the family cat. No good is to come from raising a child who views this as an accomplishment worthy of pride. Or, recalling Hurshouse’s racist, imagine a white child raised in the southern United States during the Jim Crow era, one who feels pride in enjoying the privileges reserved “for Whites only.” No good is to come from allowing this child’s emotional corruption to go unchallenged. Moreover, on the eudaimonistic view that Hursthouse endorses, no good is to come to the child. Finally, as Hursthouse reminds us in a damning ad hominem intervention that turns the traditional dialectic with the moral skeptic on its head: The emotional cultivation in the first instance will fall to “fairly virtuous parents who are fairly virtuous about their children’s upbringing,” parents entrusted with safeguarding their charges’ good for the child’s own sake. Such parents “see the natural childish impulses to self-gratification and self-indulgence as impulses that need to be modified and redirected, and their
natural impulses to love and generosity and fairness as impulses that need to be developed.”

Now, in teaching a child to be properly proud for the child’s own sake, parents are well advised to note a distinction that goes missing in our previous discussion of pride’s fittingness. It is consistent with the child’s viewing her bicycle-mastering achievement both as related to her and as an achievement – and thus for her pride to be in that sense fitting – that she also believes either that (a) the achievement is attributable to her effort (I succeeded because I worked hard) or (b) the achievement is attributable to some global, stable feature of herself (I succeeded because I’m great, or a genius, or a natural born athlete, or…). Empirical psychologists, who identify (a) with what they dub “authentic” or “achievement-oriented” pride and (b) with “hubristic” pride, cite empirical evidence suggesting that, whereas authentic pride may serve to enhance prosocial behavior, hubristic pride correlates with anti-social tendencies, culminating in narcissism. This is not surprising. If one attributes one’s success to efforts over which one exercises control, then feeling pride in that success serves to reinforce the significance of one’s efforts. On the other hand, if one’s success is determined by features that are beyond one’s control, then feeling pride is irrelevant to one’s strivings, relative to which such success is not responsive (however much expressing such pride might nonetheless serve to signal one’s status).

By definition, the imperfectly virtuous – be they children or adults – lack global character traits to which to ascribe their achievements on the path toward virtue. Hence, when the ethical novice succeeds, it is authentic/achievement-oriented pride that is fitting and which the fairly virtuous parent will strive to inculcate in order that it serve its instrumental role as a prod toward greater virtue. This account begs the question, however, whether Aristotle nonetheless is correct in maintaining that once we have the megalopsuchos (he who possesses all the virtues to the utmost extent) in view, the pride the empirical psychologists call hubristic is indeed an adornment to embrace.

3.3 Pride as the Crown of Virtue?

Thus far eschewing the long-standing debate over whether pride – a propensity to feel proper pride, that is – is itself a virtue or vice, I have explored an instrumental role that proper pride has to play in the ethical education of the young. Turning to Aristotle, I begin by noting that neither did he, as I understand him, regard pride itself as an ordinary virtue (or vice). Indeed, Aristotle’s famous metaphor, translated to render “pride” (megalopsuchia, greatness of soul) “a crown” or “adornment” to virtue, positions pride as a meta-virtue. That is, Aristotelian megalopsuchia is a propensity to, inter alia, take toward oneself an attitude partly constituted by the belief that one is worthy of great things on the grounds that one is virtuous – an attitude aptly translated as
“pride.” It is important here to emphasize that Aristotelian pride, if it is to be fitting, requires of its subject possession of all the ordinary virtues (e.g., justice, courage, temperance, and so on) and these to the highest degree. For such a subject, the proper pride I positioned as a prod to ethical improvement would be an idle wheel – as is the case, according to Aristotle, with shame. Aristotle famously affords shame a role as an important tool of moral improvement, at once denying its status as itself a virtue because it has no place in the lives of those not attracted to the ignoble. By parity of reasoning, were pride aptly conceived of as playing a merely instrumental role in the acquisition of virtue, then the person in possession of all the virtues to the highest degree would have no more use for pride than for shame.

On the other hand, recalling that Aristotelian virtues are themselves dispositions to act well and to feel correctly (on the right occasions, toward the right people or objects, for the right reasons...), having achieved the status of being one who exercises all the ordinary virtues to the highest degree certainly would appear, for an Aristotelian, to make oneself not only a fitting object of one’s pride but arguably the most fitting. After all, it is hard to imagine anything that could, on an Aristotelian view, qualify as a greater achievement. In thinking himself worthy of great things, the megalopsuchos has a correct orientation to his own value; “he values himself at his actual worth” where the little-souled and conceited fail. Finally, although many things that Aristotle says about the megalopsuchos are not only offensive to modern egalitarian sensibilities (probably irretrievably so), some common complaints can be silenced by emphasizing that Aristotle requires not only that Aristotelian pride fits its object in our now familiar sense but that it be felt on the right occasions and for the right reasons. Aristotle’s megalopsuchos is not inclined to lord it over his inferiors for the delight of one-upmanship, for example.

However amenable we might thereby make Aristotelian pride to modern sensibilities, taking the empirical psychologists’ distinction between achievement-oriented and hubristic pride in hand, another problem lurks. If we properly conceive of the megalopsuchos – he who possesses all the ordinary virtues to the highest degree – as possessing global, stable, excellences of character, then by hypothesis he would be beyond the temptations of the ignoble. “[I]t would not at all be consistent for the great-souled person to retreat with his arms pumping, or to treat people unjustly,” Aristotle explains, “for what will motivate him to do shameful things, when nothing impresses him?” He would be so, moreover, due to a global, stable orientation toward the good and any particular virtuous action on his part would spring from this orientation in the relevant domain (i.e., of justice, of courage, and so on). The affective upshot that Aristotle regards as a proper attitude toward such virtue would thus appear to more closely resemble not authentic/achievement-oriented pride but, rather, hubristic pride.
The appearance is further supported by Aristotle’s description of the behavior of the *megalopsuchos* as including, for example, justifiably looking down on people. From the perspective of the hubristically proud, some others are simply inferior for lacking the global, stable virtues one possesses. Moreover, the *megalopsuchos*’s beliefs about his comparative human worth are true: He *is* more worthy of honor than non-fully-virtuous others.\(^{42}\) “People of this sort,” Aristotle continues of the *megalopsuchos*, “also seem to remember any benefit they bestowed, but not those they have received (because the receiver of a benefit is at a disadvantage, and being great-souled means being superior).”\(^{43}\) Neither does the *megalospuchos* feel admiration for others, remember past wrongs, talk about personal things, nor praise nor insult others – except to “insult [his enemies] to their face.”\(^{44}\) If not fully narcissistic, neither does the prideful behavior of the *megalopsuchos* seem pro-social in the way true of authentic/achievement-oriented pride.

To be sure, some of the behaviors Aristotle associates with the *megalopsuchos* are separable from a propensity toward hubristic pride. For example, one could imagine the *megalopsuchos* remembering past benefits and wrongs even if he is not inclined to view them as impacting his worthiness of honor. Likewise, one could imagine a *megalopsuchos* disinclined to insult enemies precisely because he is confident in his own superior worthiness of honor.

Nevertheless, so long as the *megalopsuchos*’s orientation toward his own virtue is that of believing himself worthy of honor in virtue of possessing global, stable traits of ethical character to the greatest extent, his attitude appears insufficiently sensitive to the fragility inherent in the urtext for pride that I’ve urged us to consider. Although, by hypothesis, the *megalopsuchos* has succeeded in the face of that fragility, he has done so through some combination of other’s encouragement, personal effort, and good luck. As I’ve credited Hursthouse’s influence for urging a focus that brings these elements into view, let us return, as reminder of such fragility, to her own example of ethical upbringing – an example of such upbringing gone wrong. Considering the early education of a racist, Hursthouse reminds us, first,

how extreme racism expresses itself in emotion, the way it generates not only hatred and contempt, but fear, anger, reserve, suspicion, grief that one’s offspring is going to marry a member of the rejected race, joy when evil befalls them, pity for members of one’s own race who are bettered by them, pride when one succeeds in doing them down, amusement at their humiliation, surprise when one of them has shown signs of advanced humanity, horror or self-contempt at the discovery one has felt fellow feeling for one—it is hard to think of a single emotion that is immune to its [racism’s] corruption.\(^{45}\)
Second, Hursthouse suggests that no one free of racism will be inclined to think that any of these emotional responses is natural. Although evidence suggests a general human propensity for ingroup favoring biases, it also suggests that children as young as five are influenced by observed social hierarchies – with the results that young children internalize how the culture in which they are raised values different groups.

Finally, Hursthouse urges us to consider that, once ingrained, the corruption of our emotional repertoire is not easily undone. This is not to claim that emotional work late in life is futile; nonetheless, the truth in accounts of the passivity of the emotions is that neither can we change emotional propensities at will nor do changes in belief always loosen the hold of stubborn emotional propensities on us.

The importance of an ethical education of the emotions is not lost on Aristotle, of course. He goes to great lengths to emphasize, after all, that the shaping of human beings by nature receptive to the virtues will prominently include emulation, practice, and honing of their emotional orientation to the world. Yet, we see none of this reflected in the attitudes of the megalopsuchos toward his own virtue. Insofar, then, as the megalopsuchos’s attitude toward his own virtue is an attitude toward global, stable, excellences of character both insensitive to his efforts and about which’s worthiness of honor he is certain, the emotion of pride appears to have no place. No longer in need of the shaping that serves the less-than-virtuous, and not concerned to elicit honor from those unsuited to recognize excellence, no longer in need is he of the prospects of pride.

3.4 Conclusion

It remains a familiar matter of debate just what sort of model – if any – the megalopsuchos is to play for those of us imperfect in virtue, that is, for us all. But if the megalopsuchos is, at least in origin, like us, his achievement results from a fortuitous combination of having been well tended as a child and attended by subsequent good luck. The fully virtuous person, unlike the billionaire, cannot be self-made. Reflection on that fact does not suggest itself as a typical concern of the megalopsuchos, a hesitancy presumably reinforced by the fact that his beliefs in his greatness are true, his pride a crown that, after all, fits. Reflection on the fragility of virtue might nonetheless inform the reflections of the rest of us who, however needy we remain of achievement-oriented pride to sustain us, don Aristotelian pride with caution, if at all.

Notes

Philippa Foot, likewise, considers the parent–child relationship when reflecting on the virtues. For example, she writes, “[H]uman parents are defective if they do not teach their young the skills that they need to survive.” Philippa Foot, *Natural Goodness* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001): 15.


6. In the philosophical literature, the suggestion that proper pride presupposes a relation between the subject who experiences pride and that of which they are proud dates at least to David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book II, Part I, Section II.

7. Philippa Foot. “Moral Beliefs,” 86–87. Foot’s account of pride is alethic in the sense that she claims certain beliefs are (at least partly) constitutive of the emotion, the propriety of which emotion we assess by assessing those beliefs. I favor an alternative emotion theory, according to which emotions such as pride are partly constituted not by beliefs about, but by appraisals of, their intentional objects. For my purposes here, I do not press the point. For some indications of the problems alethic views encounter, see, for example, Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson, “The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or Anti-Quasijudgmentalism),” *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 52 (2003): 127–145.

8. This sense of fittingness corresponds to what D'Arms and Jacobson refer to as an emotion’s “shape.” On their view, “An emotional episode presents its object as having certain evaluative features; it is unfitting on grounds of shape when its object lacks those features.” However, D'Arms and Jacobson
recognize a second feature of an emotional episode, that of “size,” that also is relevant to evaluations of the emotion’s fittingness: “While such criticism [in terms of ‘size’] typically implies that [the emotion] has the right shape, one can nevertheless urge that an emotional response is unfitting because it is an overreaction,” and hence, on their view, is unfitting on grounds of size (“The Moralistic Fallacy: On the ‘Appropriateness’ of Emotions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61.1 (2000): 65–90).

14. Foot elsewhere writes (of Hume): “I do not mean ... that one would be illogical in feeling pride toward something which one did not believe to be in some way splendid and in some way one’s own, but that the concept of pride does not allow us to talk like that” (Philippa Foot, “Hume on Moral Judgement,” Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, 76).
18. Are there mental state types that do not have internal fittingness conditions? Likings, moods, and tastes arguably are candidates.
19. The existence of such considerations demonstrates that conditions of fittingness (whether of shape or size) do not exhaust all-things-considered conditions of appropriateness of an emotion.
20. As defended, for example, in her Natural Goodness.
22. Foot, Natural Goodness, 24.
23. Foot, Natural Goodness, 98.
27. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 114.
28. Hursthouse asks: “Why do those of us who had racism inculcated in us think that we must strive, and continue to strive, to undo the effects of that upbringing? Not because we think it will make it easier for us to do what is charitable and just (though it will), but because we think it will make us better people, more charitable and just than we are at present” (Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 117).
31. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, 175.
33. For a defense of a connection between feeling pride and experiences of increased self-worth, see Gabriele Taylor: “[A] person who experiences pride believes that she stands in the relation of belonging to some object (person, deed, state) which she thinks desirable in some respect. This is the general description of the explanatory beliefs. It is because (in her view) this relation holds between her and the desirable object that she believes her worth to be increased, in the relevant respect. This belief is constitutive of the feeling of pride. The gap between the explanatory and identificatory beliefs is bridged by the belief that her connection to the thing in question is itself of value, or is an achievement of hers” (Gabriele Taylor, *Pride, Shame, and Guilt: Emotions of Self-Assessment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985): 41).

34. The expression of pride might have evolved to signal status, according to Tracy and Robins. They hypothesize that whereas authentic/achievement-oriented pride “might motivate behaviors geared toward long-term status attainment,” hubristic pride serves either to promote status that “is more immediate but fleeting and, in some cases, unwarranted” or evolved as a “‘cheater’” attempt to convince others of one’s success by showing the same expression when no achievement has occurred” (150). I suppose that the expression of felt authentic/achievement-oriented pride might also serve to rally social support for one’s strivings, a function not associated with hubristic pride.

Drawing the contrast between authentic/achievement-oriented pride and hubristic pride as I have done here suggests that those who praise children for global, stable traits in an attempt to encourage their pride are misguided. Adults do, after all, encourage children to take pride in what appear to be global traits: e.g., talents, natural aptitudes, and what Aristotle would call natural virtues. On my view, such practices make sense only on the assumption that a global trait need not be insensitive to one’s control and continued effort (something not true of the global, stable traits empirical psychologists associate with hubristic pride). For example, such practices may prove productive by serving to encourage the child to strive to develop a talent, natural aptitude or natural virtue and by helping to direct the child’s effort to one among many pursuits about which they are equally enthusiastic but not equally equipped to master. I thank Glen Pettigrove for raising this point.

Finally, I complete this chapter during LGBTQ Pride Month. Supposing that one’s gender identity is a global, stable feature of one, the question arises as to whether LGBTQ pride is an instance of hubristic pride. It strikes me as obvious that the pride of oppressed groups, such as those who are LGBTQ, aspires to signal to oppressors that members of the oppressed group are worthy of a status that the oppressors would deny them. Moreover, the oppressed are inviting recognition not for their efforts but, rather, for who they are. This suggests that hubristic pride might function in some circumstances as a warranted assertion of equal status that does not exhibit the problems that, according to Tracy and Robins, plaque other instances of hubristic pride.

35. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* (NE) 1124A1. From NE 1123b15–1123b35, we learn that the megalopsuchos (correctly) believes himself worthy of the greatest of things, specifically, worthy of the external good of honor. From the megalopsuchos’s actual worthiness of honor it follows, according to Aristotle, that he is great “in respect of each of the excellences.” That is, the megalopsuchos is great in possessing each of the other
virtues, believes himself worthy of honor on that account, honors himself and appropriately receives honor from others.

36. As is the translation favored by, for example, Ross.

37. Aristotle writes: “It is, then, honours and dishonours that the great-souled person most has to do with; and in the case of great honours, accorded him by people of excellence, he will be moderately pleased, on the grounds that he is getting what belongs to him, or actually less than that – for there could be no honour worthy of complete excellence,” NE, 1124a5–9.

38. Ibid., 1128b10–1128b35.

39. In terms, that is, not only of “shape” but of “size.”


41. NE IV.3.1123b30–1123b35.

42. NE IV.3.1124b5.

43. NE IV.3.1124b10–1124b15.

44. NE IV.4.1125a1–1125a10.


46. As evident, for example, in Andrew Baron and Mahzarin Banaji, “Evidence of System Justification in Young Children,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 3.6 (2009): 918–926.

47. For Rosalind, whose virtues are many, and with gratitude for Glen, whose patience is, apparently, boundless.

References


