8 Reactive Attitudes and Second-Personal Address

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1 Introduction

Resenting a colleague’s unfair treatment of you, feeling hurt by a lover’s oversight or guilty about shirking an obligation, experiencing indignation at an official’s abuse of office, contempt for another’s egregious cruelty, or shame at one’s own – these attitudes respond to the wrong and the bad in human action and character. They are joined by a more attractive group of sentiments attentive to the right and the good: pride in a sacrifice one makes for another, gratitude for a favor granted, and certain forms of love. Arguably, all of these sentiments belong to the class that P. F. Strawson famously dubbed the “reactive attitudes”: attitudes that register “...how much we actually mind, how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other people – and particularly some other people – reflect attitudes towards us of good will, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other.”

Subsequent philosophers have found it notoriously difficult to offer a plausible account of the reactive attitudes as a unified class, and despite Strawson’s suggestion that the term moral sentiments “would be quite a good name” for the attitudes that concerned him, even his most prominent admirers reject an account that would include them all as genuinely moral.

1 In what follows, I speak interchangeably of sentiments and (reactive) attitudes. For reasons to prefer the latter term, see my 2003: 239. I read Strawson as himself taking the reactive attitudes to be a subclass of sentiments, a subclass whose significance he defended in part as a corrective to a state of affairs where, he lamented, “talk of the moral sentiments [had] fallen out of favor” (Strawson 1962: 79).

2 Strawson (1962: 63). I say that “arguably” all of these sentiments belong to the class as Strawson understands it to mark the fact that Strawson includes all of the preceding except for contempt and pride in his lists of reactive attitudes. For reasons I discuss below, I believe a strong case can be made for including among them a form of pride as a self-reactive attitude and of contempt as a reactive attitude toward others. Other attitudes Strawson cites as reactive attitudes include forgiveness (ibid.: 62), a “sense of compunction” and remorse (ibid.: 72).
sentiments. R. Jay Wallace, for example, explicitly rejects what he calls an “inclusive interpretation of the reactive attitudes” that would embrace the full range of attitudes I cite as moral attitudes. He does so on the grounds that the inclusive interpretation precludes an informative account of the reactive attitudes as a unified class of responsibility-constituting attitudes. Bona fide reactive attitudes, on Wallace’s view, are inextricably tied to a stance from which we hold each other responsible to normative expectations and demands. Embracing resentment, indignation, and guilt as paradigmatic reactive attitudes, Wallace proceeds to develop an account of distinctively moral resentment, indignation, and guilt according to which the particular normative expectation to which they hold people responsible is that of compliance with their moral obligations.

More recently, Stephen Darwall has argued that the reactive attitudes of blame, reproach, resentment, and indignation are distinctively moral attitudes in virtue of holding their targets accountable to “[obligations] those to whom we are morally responsible have the authority to demand that we do.” For Darwall, these obligations “just are the standards to which we can warrantly hold each other as members of the moral community.” The way in which the distinctively moral reactive attitudes hold their targets accountable, on Darwall’s view, is by addressing (perhaps only implicitly) demands for compliance with moral obligations to those targets.

Given that Strawson includes among reactive attitudes not only resentment, indignation, feeling bound or obliged, feeling guilty or remorseful, but also gratitude, forgiveness, love, hurt feelings, feeling compunction, and “the more complicated phenomenon of shame,” the moral reactive attitudes are for Wallace and Darwall a proper subset of Strawson’s original class. It is, moreover, a subclass that modern moral philosophers purportedly have reason to privilege because of their role in constituting deontic

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3 Strawson (1962: 79). Strawson himself offered a failed attempt to distinguish a distinctively moral subclass of reactive attitudes in his original article, an attempt he later rejected in Strawson (1980). The difficulties in understanding the reactive attitudes as a unified class were earlier noted in Bennett (1980).


5 Wallace (1996: 36). Not only are not all reactive attitudes moral reactive attitudes on Wallace’s view, neither are all moral sentiments moral reactive attitudes, since there are on Wallace’s view nonreactive moral sentiments. Among the latter Wallace includes shame and contempt, which on his view need have no connection with the kind of requirements and prohibitions associated with moral obligations (see, e.g., Wallace 1996: 38).

6 Darwall (2006a: 14, 17). More precisely, blame, reproach, resentment are for Darwall distinctively modern moral attitudes. This reflects Darwall’s view that modern moral philosophy is distinguished by an interest in morality in the admittedly “narrow” sense that interprets it in terms of moral requirements and obligations. I treat this qualification as understood in what follows.

7 The relevant notion of address traces its origins to Nagel (1972); see, too, Watson (1994).

8 Strawson (1962: 72).
relations between persons as such, holding them mutually accountable to what is morally required, prohibited, or permitted. The negative moral reactive sentiments on such accounts are responses to wrongs understood as violations of moral requirements or performances of the morally prohibited. Positive moral reactive sentiments, to the extent they are discussed at all, presumably will include a form of respect. Call this the deontic, imperative view of the reactive moral sentiments. In calling the view deontic, I mean to mark the modality of the normative expectations whose flouting, compliance, or exceeding the relevant attitudes register: these prescriptions are of standing moral necessities or requirements that entail conclusive reasons for action. These expectations concern what the target, as member of the moral community, owes, is prohibited from doing, or is permitted to do to another qua member of the moral community. In calling the view imperative, I mean to mark the mood of the expectations whose flouting, compliance, or exceeding the relevant attitudes register: these expectations are addressed as commands to or demands of their targets.

I find much to admire in both Wallace’s and Darwall’s work on the reactive attitudes, I appreciate the precedents for conceptualizing the domain of modern moral philosophy as the narrowly deontic domain, and I do not wish to deny that reactive attitudes such as resentment, guilt, and indignation have a significant role to play in a compelling meta-ethics of moral obligation. However, I aim here to recover for the Strawsonian reactive attitudes a unifying thread that risks being lost in the shadow cast by the deontic, imperative view of the reactive moral sentiments. Heeding Strawson’s claim that “there is a whole continuum of reactive attitude and feeling stretching on both sides of [resentment and gratitude] and – the most comfortable area – between them,” I argue that although the reactive attitudes are properly conceptualized as forms of address, their modality is not invariably deontic nor their mood invariably imperative. For reasons that will emerge, I dub the latter reactive attitudes aretaic, appellative sentiments. In calling the sentiments aretaic, I mean to mark the modality of the

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9 Deontic relations obtain between persons as such, or, as Darwall puts it, between “members of the moral community.”

10 What are the positive correlates of guilt and resentment? One anticipates a richer vocabulary here, to supplement – if not supplant – the focus on generic moral praise. On my view, forms of reactive love and pride are subordinate instances of the superordinate moral praise, just as resentment, guilt, and indignation are subordinate instances of the superordinate moral blame.

11 Understanding here by “standing” moral necessities those moral obligations, if any, that are in force for each and every member of the moral community, simply as generic persons. The intended contrast is not just with special obligations but with the kind of non-deontic normative expectation I discuss further below.

12 Strawson (1962: 64).
normative expectations whose flouting or compliance the relevant attitudes register: these prescriptions are of non-jural ideals of conduct or character. In calling the sentiments appellative, I mean to mark the mood of the expectations which the relevant attitudes manifest: these expectations are offered as appeals to comport oneself in the manner befitting the ideals at issue.13

The resulting, inclusive conception of the reactive attitudes accommodates Strawson’s original cast of reactive attitudes and others, among them reactive forms of contempt and pride. It is not so expansive, however, to fall victim to the charge of failing to distinguish reactive sentiments from “disengaged aesthetic reactions” to the beautiful and ugly in human action and character.14

After investigating how best to understand the affective element central to the reactive attitudes’ status as sentiments, I consider a challenge to distinguishing reactive moral sentiments from nonreactive aesthetic sentiments. I then take up Darwall’s influential claim that the reactive attitudes presuppose what he dubs a “second-person standpoint” from which they address demands to others and ourselves.15 On Darwall’s account, reactive attitudes such as resentment, guilt, and indignation relate persons as claimants or obligees issuing imperatives to persons as obligors, thus constituting deontic accountability relations between persons.

On the inclusive conception of the reactive attitudes that I proceed to defend, members of the class do not in every instance implicate persons as claimants or obligors addressing imperatives to obligees in deontic accountability relations. Instead, the reactive attitudes as a generic class comprise a continuum of sentiments whose unifying thread is this: a reactive attitude, as such, relates persons in reciprocal prescription and recognition of legitimate expectations of conduct or character regulation, accordance with which is necessary for aspiring to relationships of value to beings like us.16 It is, as a whole, a class of sentiments that values and disvalues persons by regarding them as answerable for their suitability (or not) to commune with us in not only the generic relationship of person to person

13 Both Colleen Macnamara and Adrienne Martin have likewise challenged the view that the reactive attitudes are best conceptualized as addressing deontic demands. Macnamara (2013b), for example, questions both the purportedly demand-like and deontic character of the reactive attitudes as philosophers such as Darwall and Wallace understand them. Martin (2014) defends an account of normative hope that underwrites an understanding of forms of gratitude and disappointment as reactive attitudes. Indeed, in a pair of forthcoming articles, Darwall has begun to carve out conceptual space for a set of second-personal non-deontic attitudes, among which he includes forms of trust and love. It remains to be seen just how Darwall will eventually place these attitudes with respect to the deontic moral attitudes on which he had previously focused.
14 The objection is one that, e.g., Darwall raises against Hume in Darwall (2013).
15 Darwall (2006a).
but the more specific relationships of sibling, lover, spouse, tinker, tailor, soldier, spy. This, I conclude, might suffice to earn them the title of moral reactive sentiments.17

2 The Reactive Attitudes as a Class of Sentiments

I take as common ground that sentiments are, whatever else they are, affective phenomena.18 We feel gratitude, resentment, hurt feelings, indignation, guilt, remorse, contempt, shame, pride, and love. If it is appropriate to speak of the reactive attitudes as sentiments, however, they are at most a proper subset of sentiments. I follow Strawson in understanding them to be that proper subset of sentiments whose necessary conditions of warrant include their target’s manifestation of certain attitudes toward us or those of concern to us: namely goodwill, affection, or esteem (on the one hand) or contempt, indifference, and malevolence (on the other).19

The reactive attitudes are also a proper subset of attitudes.20 Consider, for example, another subset of attitudes: the propositional attitudes. One respect in which the reactive attitudes resemble propositional attitudes is that both take intentional objects. According to a standard view, propositional attitudes (such as, beliefs and desires) are object-directed states that

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17 Unless, as previously noted, we stipulate from the start that morality, as we propose to treat it, concerns only the domain of obligations owed by one to another, where both are understood as generic persons or members of the moral community. It is one thing to stipulate as much in order to limit one’s theoretical ambitions and another to suggest that morality, properly understood, concerns only this much. The latter substantive claim demands defense.

18 In so saying, I mean to leave open the possibility that sentiments have cognitive content and are amenable to modification in response to rational control. Ruled out, however, are views according to which sentiments or emotions just are cognitive judgments, a view suggested in, e.g. Solomon (1980) and Nussbaum (2001). For a recent argument that normative judgments are neither part of the content of, nor implied by, the reactive attitudes, see Deigh (2012). For an argument that the cognitive-noncognitive distinction is itself confused in much of the relevant debate, see Debes (2009). For an account of the fraught history of the terms in play here, see Dixon (2012).

19 Strawson (1962: 63). Hume, in contrast, takes what we might call the standing normative expectations presupposed by the warrant of a moral sentiment to concern whether the conduct or character is useful or agreeable to ourselves or others, as assessed from his common point of view. (Hume 1978, Book III, Part iii, Section 3). Darwall takes the reciprocal recognition of the authority to make demands as central on his account of the reactive attitudes’ conditions of warrant (Darwall 2006a: 58, 60).

20 Understanding by “attitude” here, as Darwall suggests, “any [mental state] that can be regulated by a norm” (Darwall 2006a: 157). “Attitudes are states of subjects that subjects can have for reasons, that is, where not only is there some non-rationalizing, say causal, explanation (explaining reason) of their having the attitude, but there is also something that is the subject’s reason for having it, namely, some consideration or considerations the subject herself takes as a normative reason or reason and acts on” (Ibid. 157–158).
relate those persons in the relevant states to propositions. Reactive attitudes, in contrast, place persons in relation not to propositions but to persons as their intentional objects, or targets. The relation thus established between the subject and intentional object of the reactive attitudes necessarily is interpersonal (or, in the case of the self-regarding reactive attitudes, intrapersonal). This is not so in the case of propositional attitudes such as belief and desire.

Second, when one resents a colleague’s unfair treatment of oneself, feels hurt by a lover’s oversight or guilty about shirking an obligation, experiences indignation at an official’s abuse of office, contempt for another’s egregious cruelty, or shame at one’s own, one thereby experiences an attitude toward a person that cannot be reductively identified with affectless propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, or their conjunction. Of course, it might be that a specific set of beliefs about oneself or another reliably causes a person to experience a particular reactive attitude insofar as the person is typical or rational. It might be that, for example, the belief that you’ve wronged me reliably causes resentment in me. Alternatively, it might be that such a belief when conjoined with a desire that you recognize the moral reasons against doing so reliably causes resentment insofar as a person is typical or rational. Even allowing that such causal antecedents can give rise to resentment, resentment is a distinct, negative-affect laden attitude. Although I cannot undertake the task here, one could likewise show for each candidate reactive attitude that it resists reductive identification with propositional attitudes such as belief or desire (or conjunctions thereof), however plausible the view that such propositional attitudes are among their causal antecedents. The class of reactive attitudes thus is a set of attitudes distinct from that of the propositional attitudes.

21 Or to the constituents of propositions. On the latter view, individuals may be among the constituents of propositions (for example, in the case of my belief that John went to the store for cigarettes).

22 I now believe I was not sufficiently clear on this point in Mason (2003). Writing there about resentment, e.g., I suggested that it was not person-focused in the way that contempt can be. I am now of the view that resentment can be no less person-focused but that the grounds for resentment and reactive contempt diverge – with the grounds for the former typically referring to a state of affairs picked out by the that-clause in reports such as “I resent that ______.” For an argument that love is not a propositional attitude, see Velleman (1999). As will become apparent, the reactive attitudes do not, on my view, relate persons merely as such – that is, we should not understand the reactive attitudes to relate persons qua persons as opposed to persons qua friends, lovers, countrymen, or parties to any of a variety of interpersonal relationships.

23 For a defense of a belief-desire theory of blame, see Sher (2006).

24 That beliefs, as such, can be affectless I take here as common ground. As for desires: Even understood as motivational (or conative) states, desires do not necessarily share the affective quality I here regard as a necessary constituent of the reactive attitudes. For an argument against the reductive identification of emotional attitudes with beliefs and desires, see Goldie (2000).
Finally, I follow those theorists of emotion who take emotions to appraise their target’s significance for the subject, in light of the subject’s concerns. On my view, the reactive attitudes are emotions that appraise the significance of persons’ conduct and character for the subject’s concern with the quality of regard that the others manifest toward her or those of concern to her. Just as fear, for example, appraises its target as a threat, resentment appraises its target as having violated a particular standard of conduct or character.25 In virtue of this person-appraising feature of the reactive attitudes, I call them *person-focused*.26 This feature suggests a schema that the reactive attitudes, as such, share:

x [a subject] bears reactive attitude R toward y [R’s intentional object, or target] in response to – and only insofar as – y’s conduct or character manifests goodwill, affection, or esteem (on the one hand) or ill will, indifference, and malevolence (on the other) [R’s possible formal objects] toward x or those of concern to x

According to this schema, resentment and gratitude are no less person-focused than are reactive forms of contempt and love.27

Thus far, the reactive attitudes are sentimental attitudes that take persons as their intentional objects and are warranted responses to those persons only if – and to the extent that – they have manifest, in their conduct or character, goodwill, affection, or esteem (on the one hand) or ill will, indifference, and malevolence (on the other) toward us or those of concern to us.

Are these conditions sufficient, however, to carve out a class of moral sentiments? Do they distinguish, for example, disengaged distaste at another’s conduct from reactive resentment for the same?

### 3 Nonreactive Moral Sentiments and “Third-Personal Sentimentalism”

To appreciate the worry, consider Darwall’s criticism of what he calls Hume’s “third-personal sentimentalism” about moral evaluation. Subsequently, we can ask whether Hume’s third-personal sentimentalism and Darwall’s “second-personal” alternative exhaust the possibilities for carving out a class of moral sentiments in a compelling way.

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25 For candidate appraisal theories, see, e.g., Scherer (2005) and Roseman (2013).
26 Mason (2003).
27 Again, I was insufficiently clear on this point in Mason (2003). One way of glossing this feature concerning the intentional objects of contempt, shame, pride, and love – a feature I previously referred to as their person-focus – is by way of contrast with the arguably act-focus of resentment, guilt, and indignation, that is, the latter’s feature of taking as intentional objects discrete actions. I’ve come to think that this gloss on the intentional objects of contempt, shame, pride, and love as opposed to so-called act-focused reactive attitudes engenders confusion. It is worth noting here that Strawson, albeit indirectly, eventually endorsed Bennett’s view that “reactive attitudes are directed towards people viewed as ‘morally expressive’ and thus taken as wholes.” See Bennett (1980: 33).
What Darwall dubs the second-person standpoint is “the perspective you and I take up when we make and acknowledge claims on each others’ conduct and will.” Darwall contrasts this with a third-person standpoint from which I view another, not in their relation to myself, but only as how they are “objectively.” We should resist the inclination to assimilate Darwall’s contrast to the linguistic distinction between the grammatical first (“I”), second (“you”), and third person (“he/she/it”). Suppose a (grammatical) third person observes conduct between an agent and patient and experiences a reactive attitude toward the agent in virtue of that conduct (as, for example, when Alice experiences indignation at Ben’s wronging Caroline); in doing so, the third person occupies the second-person standpoint toward the agent (in this case, as Alice does toward Ben) because Alice thereby presumes an authority to demand Ben’s compliance with his moral obligations concerning his treatment of Caroline.

Occupying the third-person standpoint does not, then, correspond to the grammatical third person; it instead corresponds to viewing the agent “objectively.” One might suppose that this occurs when person A presupposes no authority to demand of person B that B recognize an expectation to comply with a moral obligation. For example, such is my situation with respect to my neighbor’s boyfriend and the expectation that he bathe regularly. Suppose I react with disgust to my neighbor’s boyfriend for his failure to bathe regularly. In doing so, I presume no authority to demand of her boyfriend that he bathe – whether for my sake or my neighbor’s. Now, disgust is the kind of attitude that Darwall has in mind as a third-personal sentiment. However, by speaking of the third-person standpoint as one from which I view another objectively, he draws attention to a different feature of such a case: namely the failure of my disgust (like other nonreactive, third-personal sentiments) “to presuppose any capacities in [its object] to relate back in some way that might reciprocate the response.” Darwall refers to such a capacity as second-personal competence. Now, as I imagine the case, my neighbor’s boyfriend in fact possesses such a capacity but Darwall’s point is that the conditions on my disgust’s intelligibility and warrant do not require that he do so. In this respect, my disgust for him is akin to my disgust for the maggot-ridden garbage at the bottom of the trash bin. Conversely, my awe of his brute physical beauty (underneath all that grime!) no more presupposes his capacity to reciprocate my response than does my awe of a particular Rothko painting.

29 Darwall (2013: 11), quoting Strawson.
30 Darwall (2013: 10).
Hume’s understanding of the moral sentiments, as Darwall interprets it, is distinctively third personal in the sense just canvassed: the sentiment one experiences when considering whether the mental qualities or traits of another are useful or agreeable – a form of esteem or love – presupposes for its warrant neither any authority on my part to demand you express those qualities or traits in certain ways rather than others nor any capacity that you be able to reciprocate my love by complying in recognition of my authority. On Darwall’s reading, Hume thus lacks the resources to distinguish reactive moral sentiments from nonreactive aesthetic responses.

Having identified the worry, we can take a closer look now at how the deontic imperative view of the moral sentiments purports to avoid it.

4 The Deontic Imperative Conception of the Reactive Moral Sentiments

On the deontic imperative conception, moral reactive attitudes relate persons not simply in virtue of being responses to a person’s quality of will but, moreover, in addressing their targets. That which is addressed is a conclusive-reason-entailing imperative or demand that any generic person, as member of the moral community, has authority to make of any other person who has second-personal competence. This is the nature of the I-thou relationship that we occupy when we regard each other from the second-person standpoint.

It is only from this second-personal standpoint that the reactive attitudes come into play, on Darwall’s view, because it is only from this standpoint that reasons of the right kind to warrant the reactive attitudes issue. How so? Appealing to a point Strawson raises against utilitarian justifications of blame, Darwall argues that the desirability of an outcome (such as the desirability of getting lazy Tommy to do his homework, say) is a reason of the wrong kind to warrant reactive attitudes (in this case, it is a reason of the wrong kind to warrant blaming Tommy). It is the wrong kind of reason to warrant a particular reactive attitude because to be a reason of the right kind, on Darwall’s view,

a consideration must justify the relevant attitude in its own terms. It must be a fact about or feature of some object, appropriate consideration of which could provide someone’s reason for a warranted attitude of that kind toward it.

Recall the preceding schema for the reactive attitudes. According to that schema, a reactive attitude targets a person (its intentional object) in virtue

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of the fact that the person’s conduct or character manifests goodwill, affection, or esteem (on the one hand) or ill will, indifference, and malevolence (on the other). Darwall’s view of the conditions of warrant of a particular reactive attitude requires that its object’s conduct or character is such that appropriate consideration of it – not of the desirability of the subject’s taking up the attitude itself – provides the subject’s reason for the attitude.

Consider Strawson’s hand-treading example: When I occupy the second-person standpoint toward you, the consideration that you have manifest ill will in violating a demand that I have authority to press simply in virtue of being a member of the moral community (that is, a moral obligation) – which demand entails the existence of a conclusive reason (which you have the competence to recognize) for you not to tread on my hand – provides me a reason of the right kind for resenting you. Moreover, my warranted resentment does not merely represent you as a wrongdoer, as might a belief that you have violated a right I have authority to press. My resentment has, according to Darwall, something akin to an Austinian illocutionary force: namely, the imperative force of (perhaps only implicitly) addressing a demand to you and thereby calling on you to recognize a (second-personal) reason to not tread on my hand.

Assuming the illocutionary force of reactive attitudes as (quasi) speech acts, Darwall suggests, metaphorically, that they come with “an implicit RSVP.” The demands addressed by the reactive attitudes thus call for a response from their target. In the case of my resenting your treading on my hand, the reciprocating response is that you refrain from treading on my hand and do so for the reason that you are obligated to me.

34 The “felicity conditions” on reactive attitudes as forms of address require the presuppositions of second-personal authority and competence if they are to succeed in providing the addressee with a reason for complying with the demand as opposed to, for example, arationally goading or coercing her. See, e.g., Darwall (2006a: 75).

35 Coleen Macnamara takes issue with Darwall’s (admittedly orthodox) view that what are addressed by the reactive attitudes as such are demands and, in the process, distinguishes three uses of “demand” in the relevant literature: one that understands them as “models or metaphors” of the standing requirements of morality; a second that understands them as speech acts; and a third figurative use that marks the fact that negative reactive attitudes seek a response. (See Macnamara 2013b). I agree that not only are these uses present in the literature, they are often present in the case of a single author, as in the case of Darwall. Here my emphasis is on the nature of the interpersonal relationship secured by the emphasis on understanding the reactive attitudes as (quasi) speech acts. Macnamara pursues the speech act analogy elsewhere, arguing that the expressed reactive attitudes have recogitative illocutionary force, i.e., they recognize their target as having done something wrong or bad. See Macnamara (2013a).

36 Darwall (2006a: 145; see also 40, 42, and 256).
to do so. This second-personal reason is importantly different from other reasons you might have to not tread on my hand. For example, Darwall contrasts a case where I appeal to your sympathy in order to give you a reason to stop causing me pain. In appealing to your sympathy, I might succeed in getting you to want to stop causing my pain; here, your desire would represent this cessation as a good state of affairs. You would thereby accept (or not) a state-of-the-world-regarding, agent-neutral reason to ameliorate my pain – as opposed to an agent-relative reason that you not cause me pain. The reason at issue when I regard you with a warranted reactive attitude, in contrast, is the agent-relative one. The reciprocating response that my resentment seeks thus requires second-personal competence in the target in the form of a capacity to recognize that my authority provides sufficient reason to comply with my demand. In contrast, I do not manifest my second-personal competence when I recognize the all-things-considered undesirability of your being in pain nor when my (third-personal) recognition of the badness of your pain motivates me to remove my foot from your hand out of sympathy.

These features of the deontic imperative view of the moral reactive attitudes – i.e., that they address accountability-seeking demands to their target, which address is warranted by the target’s violation of a moral obligation that the subject has authority to press as a representative person – ensure that they constitute paradigmatically deontic relations between persons related as claimants or obligees to persons as obligors. In this way, the view equips its proponents to avoid the objection Darwall levels against Hume’s third-personal moral sentimentalism: that it is unable to sustain a contrast between reactive moral sentiments and nonreactive aesthetic reactions.

Hume’s view is not the only option available to a sentimentalist, however. More to the point, the objection does not extend to Strawson’s own conception of the reactive attitudes. Accepting the deontic, imperative interpretation of the reactive attitudes comes at the cost of obscuring a more unified account of them as a class, an account that does not sustain privileging the generic relationship of claimant/obligee to obligor. Moreover, it is a cost one need not bear in order to defend an account of the reactive attitudes that distinguishes them from disengaged aesthetic reactions. I propose, then, to offer an interpretation of the reactive attitudes that heeds Strawson’s advice to consider the variety of particular relationships that provide contexts for their warrant. Considering those contexts will show

that the conditions for second-personal address sufficient to distinguish reactive from nonreactive attitudes does not require that what is addressed implicate the parties in deontic relations that each enjoys simply as one stranger among others.

5 Toward a More Inclusive View of the Reactive Attitudes

Suppose we accept that it is correct to conceptualize reactive attitudes so that, like literal forms of address, their felicity conditions include a possibility of uptake and answer. Just as one does not issue written invitations among the illiterate, one does not sustain reactive attitudes toward the second-personally incompetent. So far, so good. The aretaic, appellative conception of the reactive attitudes likewise accepts these as felicity conditions on the reactive attitudes. I have doubts, however, about the requirements the deontic imperative view imposes on how and what the moral reactive attitudes thereby address their targets.

Darwall’s appeal to the metaphor of the address coming with an RSVP is telling here. First, an RSVP – “Répondez, s’il vous plaît” or “Please reply” – in fact addresses a polite request or appeal to its addressee. It is in the appellative, not the imperative, mood. Indeed, this form of address would completely misfire were it to be made in the form of an imperative demand. Second, if the addressee cares about etiquette and about you, she will regard you as providing her an agent-relative reason to respond politely. However, this differs from how the deontic imperative view understands what moral reactive attitudes address: namely, conclusive agent-relative reasons. Even granting a conception of reactive attitudes as (quasi) speech acts that come “with an implicit RSVP,” then, does not force one to grant that they must have imperative, as opposed to appellative, illocutionary force (or mood) and deontic content.

In spelling out a conception of the appellative mood, one does well to proceed by recalling the direct interpersonal relationships that serve as Strawson’s prime contexts in introducing what he called the non-detached reactive attitudes (among them gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt feelings). Strawson includes among the relevant relationships those of sharers of a common interest, members of the same family, colleagues, friends, lovers, as well as “chance parties to an enormous range of transactions and encounters.”38 In order to appreciate both the variety and the unity in the phenomena of concern, consider each of the direct interpersonal relationships Strawson cites in turn.

38 Strawson (1962: 63).
Consider, first, the relationship of sharers of a common interest and reactive attitudes of resentment, hurt feelings, and gratitude. Imagine you and I each enjoy gardening. Meeting at a community garden, we fall into cultivating a common plot. If we are to bring our fruits and vegetables to harvest, we will prepare our soil by a certain date, plant and fertilize our seeds or seedlings, and regularly water and weed. If, each day as I arrive at the field, I find that you have under- or overwatered, or carelessly allowed the weeds to overtake the seedlings – all while I am doing my share – it is quite reasonable for me to judge that you have fallen short of the standards of good gardening that should inform the pursuit of our common endeavor. Moreover, barring excuses, it is reasonable to take that failure to manifest toward me an attitude of indifference or disregard. This is true, moreover, despite the fact that you never promised your help. Indeed, to attempt to excuse yourself by insisting that you never made any promises would only reveal you to be more indifferent or disregarding of me. If the relationship is one I value, I’m warranted in responding with resentment or hurt feelings. If it is one you value, you will respond. An unexpected cold front has set in and I arrive at the field one morning anticipating that our seedlings will have been desiccated by the frost. Unbeknownst to me, you received word of the impending cold snap and arrived sometime in the night to cover the garden. As I peek at our seedlings thriving under your blankets, I am overcome with gratitude for your stewardship.

Familial relationships are also a misfit for understanding in terms of deontic relations of obligation and right. Consider, for example, how siblings can foment resentment and hurt feelings or earn gratitude. It is my birthday and, as usual, you have failed to acknowledge it with a card or phone call. A common theme in our relationship, I’m able to predict as much. Still, I’m always ready with flowers for your birthday and you are, after all, my only sister; even our otherwise absent-minded brother can be counted on for a card. To you, I respond with resentment or hurt feelings; to him, I respond with gratitude.

Colleen Macnamara offers a compelling example of the operation of resentment in the relationship of friends. She describes a friend who refuses to release you from a promise. You are to meet for dinner but unexpectedly someone you’ve been anxious to date has asked you out on the same night. You ask your friend to release you from your promise but, for no good reason, she refuses to release you from the obligation. You respond with resentment. If such resentment strikes you as warranted, as it does me, then we have another case where warranted resentment does not require of its subject authority as individual or representative person to demand another’s compliance as a matter of right, in this case that your friend release you from your promise. We can find further support
considering the colleague who betrays a lack of solidarity in your common cause,\textsuperscript{39} or the associate who refuses, for no good reason, to perform a simple favor, or the close friend whom you resent for failing to do something that is morally supererogatory.\textsuperscript{40}

Finally, in the relationship of lovers, Strawson suggests we can find a reactive form of love. Perhaps you once had a homely admirer. You met him or her at a friend’s party or a book club or a bar and were, at first meeting, decidedly unimpressed. Events conspire, however, to send him or her into your path again. And again. And again. Over time, he reveals to you his wicked wit, a gentle manner with shelter dogs and young children, intellectual curiosity, and inability to tell a lie. He reveals to you, in short, that he is a great person. Before long a transformation is in progress. Eventually you find yourselves basking in a warm glow and planning a life together. Your esteem has reciprocated his and you are, alas, in love.

In each of the vignettes introduced here, we have more or less determinate normative expectations of manifest goodwill, regard, or esteem in play.\textsuperscript{41} These normative expectations derive from an ideal of the special relationship; hence just which normative expectations are operative depends on the relationship in question. The relationship likewise determines what counts as goodwill, affection, or esteem (on the one hand) or ill will, indifference, or malevolence (on the other) in the context. Our proneness to responding to these manifestations of good- or ill-will partly constitutes our valuing the other as an accountable party to the relationship, a partner who in reciprocally valuing us both recognizes the normative expectations constitutive of the specific relationship and a more general ideal of mutual answerability for succeeding or failing to comply with legitimate normative expectations.

Note, however, that in none of these vignettes is the relevant normative expectation plausibly regarded as a demand as understood on the deontic imperative view of the reactive attitudes. To be sure, the expectations in question prescribe (rather than predict) manifestations of goodwill, regard or esteem and, thus, appear to underwrite a corresponding claim (on my

\textsuperscript{39} I thank Peter Railton and Simon Blackburn for the example.
\textsuperscript{40} I thank Remy Debes for discussion of the relevance of the supererogatory in this context.
\textsuperscript{41} R. Jay Wallace (1996) writes of “holding a person to an expectation (or demand),” apparently not intending to mark a distinction between normative expectations and demands (and taking both to concern standing moral requirements). Coleen Macnamara introduces a use of “normative expectation” according to which it refers to “the stance that leaves us susceptible to the reactive attitudes” (Macnamara 2013b: 149 n. 11). On my proposed use, a normative expectation is, pace Wallace, contrasted with a demand. Non-deontic normative expectation is a stance that leaves us susceptible to certain reactive attitudes that respond to failures to conform to legitimately imposed interpersonal ideals.
part) and obligation (on yours). These are not, however, the kinds of claims or obligations that characterize deontic relations. The demands of concern on the deontic, imperative view, recall, entail conclusive reasons for compliance and presume an authority that any generic person, simply as member of the moral community, has authority to exercise over any generic second-personally competent target. These are not at issue in the vignettes, however. What does emerge from the vignettes is a conception of reactive attitudes that address accountability-seeking appeals to their target, which address is warranted by the target’s violation of an ideal that the subject has authority to press as a party to some special relationship.

Admittedly, Strawson himself speaks variously of the reactive attitudes resting on or reflecting a demand, involving or expressing a demand, and as correlating with a demand. However, all that is required to maintain the prediction-prescription distinction is that a normative expectation of goodwill, affection, or esteem and absence of ill will or indifference be operative. One need not appeal, that is, to the particular normative expectation that one comply with moral obligations. A reactive attitude thus can be an intelligible and, indeed, warranted, response to conduct or character that recognizes, flouts, or exceeds a legitimate normative expectation without a demand for compliance with a moral obligation being at issue.

If we nonetheless insist on calling what the attitudes cited in my vignettes address “demands,” then, we must at the same time caution that these are demands only in an attenuated (as opposed to robust) sense. This is because the demands common to the reactive attitudes as such need impose no deontic burdens on their targets. They at most call on another to comply with whichever first-order normative expectations constitute the normative ideal of the relationship in which you stand to her, that is, the relationship toward whose ideal the relevant parties aspire. This attenuates the demand-like feature common to all reactive attitudes by making whatever force the demand might have derivative of the first-order prescriptions that constitute the normative ideal of the relevant relationships: first-order prescriptions that need not themselves be deontic.

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42 The expectation does not describe an anticipated course of action (in that sense of expectation, one’s expectation may well be that another, given their past conduct, will manifest goodwill toward you).
43 Strawson (1962: 71, 72, and 77).
44 For further discussion of the more robust understanding of demands prevalent in the literature, including that according to which they do impose deontic burdens, see Macnamara (2013b: 144).
45 In Mason (2003), for example, I argue that the conditions of warrant for reactive contempt included the legitimacy of one’s expectation that another live up to a legitimately imposed ideal of character.
To return to the previous examples, insofar as we value our common horticultural interest, we will have certain normative expectations regarding how we should tend our garden. Moreover, in valuing each other as participants in this relationship, we’ll be susceptible to resentment and hurt feelings should we find one another flouting those expectations. The warrant for these attitudes requires no presumption that you or I have a generic authority, as representative person, to address a demand (in any robust sense) that the other tend to the garden as one believes it should be tended and neither of us violates an obligation simply for failing to do so. My resentment or hurt feelings presuppose only our valuing each other as persons responsive to – and appropriately held responsible to – the standards of conduct and character necessary for maintaining our shared interest as a common pursuit. The reactive attitudes here address not demands that entail agent-relative conclusive reasons but appeals that entail agent-relative pro-tanto reasons to comport oneself as befits a companion in gardening.

Neither does it seem plausible to construe the consideration one sibling pays another in remembering her birthday as an obligation, far less as something that is owed a sibling as her right. And, however beautiful a soul my homely beloved possesses, even reactive love is not a response to how he fares with respect to what I in any case have authority to demand of him as a person.\footnote{For an insightful treatment of reactive love, see Abramson and Leite (2011).}

In short, once we recognize that conceptualizing the reactive attitudes so that they are distinct from third-personal sentiments does not require that we understand them in exclusively deontic imperative terms, we can appreciate that the continuum of reactive attitudes is continuous not in virtue of its every element implicating persons as claimants or obligors addressing imperatives to obligees in deontic accountability relations. Instead, the reactive attitudes as a unified class comprise a continuum of sentiments whose every element relates persons in reciprocal prescription and recognition of legitimate expectations of conduct or character, regulation in accordance with which is necessary for aspiring to community in a wide range of relationships of value to beings like us.

6 Conclusion

I want to close with a few words concerning how what I have presented as a reclamation of sorts of Strawson’s conception of the reactive attitudes is nonetheless likely to prove revisionary. Among those attitudes that emerge on the aretaic appellative view as candidates for bona fide reactive attitudes...
are Strawson’s own candidates of shame and love. But so, too, in my view, do what I take to be their correlates: reactive contempt and pride.

Reactive shame is self-reactive. On the appellative aretaic interpretation, it involves a person reflecting on his own conduct and character, and self-addressing an appeal to recognize the reasons one has for aspiring to a better self, holds oneself accountable to that better self. A correlate attitude to reactive shame, reactive contempt, responds to the conduct and character of another, and addressing an appeal to recognize that one gives the other reason to aspire to a better self, holds the other accountable to oneself for realizing their better self. Reactive love, like gratitude, is a form of esteem. Whereas gratitude responds to manifestations of goodwill that go above and beyond that which one can legitimately demand of another as a matter of obligation or right, however, reactive love responds to another as, among other things, manifesting a self one takes to be above and beyond that which anyone can reasonably demand. Reactive pride, finally, just is self-reactive love.

A full account of the quartet of reactive shame, contempt, love, and pride – a topic for another day – will acknowledge they are forms of disesteem and esteem for persons. If esteem were an “essentially third-personal observer’s response,” as Darwall interprets Hume’s conception, then this quartet would correctly be denied the status of reactive attitudes. They would be so on the grounds that they do not presuppose the capacity for uptake or reciprocal recognition characteristic of the reactive attitudes as such. If my sketch of an appellative aretaic conception of reactive attitudes is on the right track, however, it opens the door to allowing such esteem to manifest itself in forms of second-personal address. Once that door is open, on what grounds would the moral philosopher presume to continue to privilege resentment, guilt, and indignation as moral sentiments? Why continue to accept a conception of the moral domain according to which it is simply the domain of deontic relations and imperative prescriptions? Does a focus on what each of us, simply as a person, owes to, is prohibited from doing to, or is permitted to do to others home in on our most significant responsibilities or most egregious faults? It is one thing to stipulate such a focus in order to limit one’s theoretical ambitions and another to suggest that morality, properly understood, concerns only this much.

Those skeptical of the latter suggestion should, with Strawson, remain suspicious of “claiming as essential features of the concept of morality in general, forms of these attitudes which may have a local and temporary prominence.”47 In so doing, we may find our way toward defending

47 Strawson (1962: 80).
a conception of all reactive attitudes as moral sentiments, sentiments that address us not only as conscripts in the army of duty but as sharers of a common interest, family members, colleagues, lovers, and friends called on, and presumed capable of, fashioning better selves in response to legitimate expectations of as much.