

## Investigating Emotions Philosophically<sup>1</sup>

Michael McEachrane, *Åbo Academy University, Finland and Baruch College/City University of New York*

How are emotions to be investigated philosophically? Among philosophers of emotion of the past decades you will find mainly two answers to this question. On the one hand, there are those who are committed to some form of conceptual analysis (e.g. Kenny 1963; Lyons 1980; Nussbaum 2001; Roberts 2003; Solomon 1976). (By “conceptual analysis” I mean investigations into the meanings of words by reflecting on their use.) On the other hand, there are those who think that conceptual analysis is short of empirical grounding and at best reflect current “common-sense beliefs.” What should be of essence to us as philosophers, they think, is not how we currently conceptualise emotions, but how we conceptualise emotional phenomena themselves (e.g. DeLancy 2002; Griffiths 1997; Prinz 2004).

This latter stance harks back to Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction, his idea that all language is theory dependent and the subsequent critique of “linguistic philosophy” as sanctifying our ordinary use of words, as empirically naïve, unscientific and founded on outmoded theories of meaning (cf. Hacker 1996b).

This paper is an attempt to show why this critique is misplaced. Conceptual analysis, properly construed, need not depend on empirical considerations. On the contrary, conceptual analysis of emotions is often a prerequisite to empirical investigations. Furthermore, conceptual analysis need not make ordinary language sacred and need not rely on a theory of meaning or on an analytic/synthetic distinction.

The first part of the paper is a critique of Robert C. Roberts’s recent “semi-empiricist” account of conceptual analysis. The second part attempts to show why “empiricists” got it the wrong way round

---

1. I want to thank Lars Hertzberg and John V. Canfield for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. The paper was written as part of the research project “Emotions & Understanding” at Åbo Academy University, Finland and was made possible by funding from the Academy of Finland (project number: 54701).

in thinking that conceptual analyses are epistemically secondary to empirical investigations. The third part is a rebuttal of the beliefs that conceptual analysis depends on a theory of meaning, an analytic/synthetic distinction, or that conceptual analysis is merely about words, not reality. The fourth part shows why it is wrong to assume that conceptual analysis inevitably falls back on empirical claims about language or claims about the correct uses of a language. The fifth and final part criticises the view that reflecting on our use of words cannot capture the experiential aspects of emotion and that something like phenomenology or introspection is more suited to understanding emotion.

## I

Recently, Robert C. Roberts has attempted to outline a conceptual analysis of emotions that concedes to being empirical in a broad sense in that it relies on examples of how words are used in a language (Roberts 2003: 3). Roberts also thinks that a limitation of conceptual analysis (as he and many of today's philosophers present it) is that in principle, our emotion concepts may be at variance with the real nature of emotions themselves. But, he goes on, our emotions and our concepts of them are so much a part of ordinary human experience that the likelihood of such distortions are minimal (Roberts 2003: 58).

As he does not address the issue, Roberts seems to think that distinguishing between emotion concepts and emotions themselves is uncontroversial. He presupposes that emotion concepts are not analogous to the concept of "a foot" as being "12 inches" – where it would be nonsense to speak of the length of a foot as separate from the concept; to ask for the *reality* of a foot; to say that our belief about what a foot is is in conflict with the true nature of a foot and so on (more on this in the second and fourth part).<sup>2</sup>

But, more troubling, Roberts's account of conceptual analysis manifests the same flaws as Ordinary Language Philosophy (cf. Part IV). As long as we claim to describe how words are used in a language, we will have a hard time justifying why we need not leave our armchairs and do some interrogative fieldwork. Moreover, if we, as Roberts does (2003: 4–5), also claim that conceptual analysis of

---

2. I owe this analogy to Lars Hertzberg.

emotion involves normative decisions about which uses of words in a language are correct, then we are faced with the problem of how to justify these normative decisions (cf. Bates and Cohen 1972; Cavell 2002; Friedman 1969; Hanfling 2000; Lyas 1971).

Roberts clearly wants to distance himself from the sort of conceptual analysis that has “been construed as a purely linguistic exercise that asks how words (like ‘emotion’ and ‘regret’) are used” and in some cases “even eschew any pretension to investigate to what the words in question refer” (Roberts 2003: 37). In contrast, he takes the

investigation of linguistic usage to be just one among several strategies of conceptual analysis. Other strategies are (2) paying careful imaginative attention to the narrative contexts in which emotions or the emotion in question occur; (3) consulting the analyst’s own experience (introspection, if you will); (4) careful comparison with neighboring phenomena (e.g., an analysis of jealousy would likely be conducted in conjunction with an analysis of envy; and somewhat differently, an analysis of an emotion in our cultural context might be carried on in comparison with a somewhat similar emotion in an exotic culture); (5) investigating connections to related phenomena such as actions, judgements, moods, desires, and other kinds of concerns; (6) concerted use of examples, especially narrative examples, and counterexamples (Roberts 2003: 37–38).

Roberts’s supposedly expanded conception of conceptual analysis beyond linguistic usage is somewhat puzzling as it is hard to see how his purported alternatives go beyond asking how words are used. In what sense is paying attention to narrative contexts not paying attention to how *words are used*? And if consulting our own experiences in analysing emotions conceptually is not a matter of understanding how *words are used* about experiences, then how can paying attention to our experiences help us understand our concepts? And how is comparing neighbouring emotional or other phenomena not a matter of comparing how *words are used* in speaking of these phenomena? And how does understanding related phenomena such as actions, judgements, moods, etc. go beyond understanding how emotion *words are used* in various contexts – for instance, understanding how “being afraid” of something may imply judgements of danger? And how is a concerted use of examples of how we, e.g. narrate emotions not examples of how emotion *words are used*?

It seems fair to say, as Roberts does, that conceptual analysis is no substitute for, say, evolutionary biology or neurophysiology, although “it is a discipline capable of supplying a set of insights and information

about emotions that no other discipline can supply, or supply so well” (Roberts 2003: 38). However, he offers no rationale as to the sort of knowledge conceptual investigations of emotions can give us and how this knowledge differs from empirical knowledge.

## II

In the wake of Quine, philosophers of emotion like Paul Griffiths and Jesse Prinz seem to assume that conceptual analysis is epistemically secondary to empirical science in that the truth of the former depends on the truth of the latter (cf. Griffiths 1997; Prinz 2004). To the contrary, however, it seems more accurate to say that it is empirical science that is secondary as it is dependent on conceptual analysis to clarify the meaning of its statements.

One may think that what emotions are, what they involve and what they are caused by are questions for empirical science. At the end of the day, the nature of emotions can only be figured out by observing emotional phenomena (cf. Griffiths 1997). Some of the problems of such an approach are that it presupposes that there are emotional phenomena to observe irrespective of our concepts. The empirically minded might attempt to deny this by stating that an empirical study of emotions may be guided by conceptual intuitions, preliminary definitions and theoretical constructs (much the same way the study of, say, electrons has) that will be corroborated, abandoned or adjusted in the course of the investigation. But again, this merely presupposes that emotion is some phenomena or entity that we can observe independently of what we count as “emotions.” On the whole, we should not think of emotion concepts as “intuitions” about emotional phenomena (e.g. Griffiths 1997; Prinz, 2004) if we cannot show that there in fact are emotional phenomena independently of our emotion concepts. Moreover, in the case of, say, electrons, the concept is a scientific construct brought about to explain certain phenomena, and it is far from obvious that emotions fill a similar purpose. In addition, if we say that science, irrespective of our ordinary emotion concepts, creates its own definitions, then the question is what justifies such definitions and why such investigations may be said to be about “emotions” and not something entirely different (cf. Hacker 1996a: 403).

On another account, we do not take for granted that questions about the nature of emotions are empirical. On this account, we

inquire into the *meaning* of a question to figure out what sort of a question it is. In asking, for example, “Is fear caused by judgments of threat?” (cf. e.g. Jung 1971; Lazarus 1991; Nussbaum 2001; Solomon 1976) we begin by inquiring what the meaning of the question amounts to. For instance, how, in what contexts and so on, does it at all *make sense* to speak of fear as caused by judgements of threat? How are the terms “cause” and “judgement of threat” to be understood in such contexts? Would it not be more accurate, at least in some instances, to speak of a “sense of threat” rather than a “judgement of threat?” Are there instances – e.g. phobic reactions to spiders known to be harmless, a shell-shocked person indiscriminately terrified by sudden noises, an infant reacting with fear to strange faces – where it seems hard or impossible to make sense of fear as caused by judgements of threat?

Such questions are about the possibilities of making sense of emotions – in this case, fear. Setting aside for now the question of whether or not conceptual analysis as such is in need of an empirical method (cf. Part IV), it should be clear, for the following reasons, that inquiring into the meanings of words is not equivalent to inquiring into the truth of words, and that inquiring into the meanings of words is epistemically primary.

- The mere fact that a statement makes sense does not mean that it is necessarily true – or else there would be no untrue thoughts. For instance, it clearly makes sense to think that “Jupiter has moons,” but that alone does not settle whether or not it is true.
- Whether a question is to be addressed by conceptual analysis or by empirical inquiry (or by other means for that matter) depends on the question. It may be that clarifying the meanings of the words involved is all that is needed. For instance, if we ask whether or not fear is caused by judgements of threat and assume that the “judgements” consist of things we tell ourselves, then this may be put into question by examining whether or not it (literally speaking) makes sense (e.g. Beck 1979). And for a statement that fear in general is caused by judgements to make sense depends on whether or not it, generally speaking (i.e. in any case we can imagine where fear may be spoken of), makes sense to speak of “fear” as “caused by judgements of threat.” If, on the other hand, we ask how high the frequency of emotional disorders are among marines that served in Iraq as compared to marines that did not serve in Iraq, then the question is clearly empirical.

- To be able to empirically test a statement, we must know what the meaning of the statement is in order to know what to test (i.e. know what the truth-conditions are, where and how to look, etc.). If the meaning of a statement is not perfectly clear to us, we must first inquire into its meaning and then, depending on the meaning of the statement, inquire into its truth. For the truth or falsity of a statement to come into question, it must first make sense.

These points are critical in addressing the view that to figure out what emotions are, what they involve or what they are caused by, we must ultimately turn to the reality of emotional phenomena – a reality on which science has the last word (cf. Griffiths 1997; Prinz 2004; Roberts 2003: 58). As I have mentioned, this view presupposes that what emotions are, what they involve and what they are caused by can be observed and decided upon independently of how emotions are spoken of. In other words, it presupposes that whatever we claim that emotions are, what they involve or what they are caused by stands in an *external* relation to the meanings of emotional terms in that they are not implied by them. For instance, if we assume that the truth of “Fear is caused by a sense of threat” ultimately is to be settled by empirical science, this presupposes that there is some way of pinpointing “fear” without reference to “a sense of threat.” Contrast this to, say, “Jupiter has moons” where the relation between the claim (“X has moons”) and what the claim is about (“Jupiter”) is clearly an external one in that Jupiter can be identified, made sense of and observed independently of its moons. That is to say, even if we found out through observation that Jupiter (for some extraordinary reason no doubt) has no moons, we could still make sense of “Jupiter” as being a certain planet, in orbit around the sun, as part of our solar system and so on.

### III

Does conceptual analysis depend on a theory of meaning? Paul Griffiths has argued that the conceptual analysis of emotion of the past decades depends on an outmoded theory of meaning according to which “the meaning of words is given by the rules which competent speakers use to apply those terms” (Griffiths 1997: 4). However, it seems false to assume that conceptual analysis is dependent on any “theory of meaning” if we by that mean an account of what “meaning” is, what constitutes it, or how it is given (cf. Witherspoon 2000, Part IV below).

The only commitment of conceptual analysis that comes anywhere near a “theory of meaning” is that we investigate the sense of a word, claim, sentence, etc. by reflecting on our use of words (cf. Suter 1989: 10). However, this commitment is merely methodological, not a theory about the nature of “sense.” Some would perhaps argue that this methodological approach at least amounts to claiming that “meaning is use.” But this is not true. We need not assume that meaning is use because we claim that in order to examine the meaning of an expression, we should reflect on how it is used. It may very well be, as Wittgenstein puts it, that for “a *large* class of cases – though not all – in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (Wittgenstein 1953: §43). However, the approach itself does not presuppose the extent to which meaning is a matter of use.

What we are claiming, though, is that reflecting on our use of words will mean reflecting on how words are used in concrete contexts. For instance, in what sense if any fear may be said to be caused by judgements of threat, depends on how it literally speaking makes sense to speak of fear in terms of judgement of threat. And to figure that out, we will have to turn to tangible contexts in which someone, say, fears romantic relationships, is afraid to fail, feels fear at a scene in a horror movie and so on.

This is an acknowledgement of the point that words are made sense of in contexts (cf. Finkelstein 2003: 107–8; Wittgenstein 1953: §§49, 525). For example, the meaning of one and the same phrase may be different in different contexts – e.g. in one context “That lawsuit hurt her for life” may mean that someone’s business was irreparably damaged and in another that a lawsuit caused someone to have some emotional affliction for the rest of her life.

Appreciating the point that emotion terms are to be understood in contexts will also mean appreciating how our uses of words are tied up with the actualities of human life (cf. Malcolm 1977: 149). In trying to make sense of the statement “fear is caused by judgements of threat” we will have to put it to work in concrete contexts. Attaining clarity about how any emotion may or may not be understood will mean attaining clarity about concrete forms of human life.

This feature also runs against the belief that because our focus is on the meaning of words, our investigations must somehow be divorced from reality or introverted. It is not so that our philosophical interest in language is the opposite of being interested in something suppos-

edly “extra-linguistic” such as facts about the world, how people live or how they act and react in various circumstances. On the contrary, our interest in language will necessarily be wrapped up in facts about the world, how people live, how they act and react, etc. It is in real-life contexts that our use of words makes sense (Stenlund 2000: 224).

For instance, in clarifying if and how fear may be induced by judgements of threat, we must turn to *possible real-life contexts* in which a person, say, just lost a job and the different ways in which such a person may react with fear to such a situation. The person may, for instance, be afraid of how his or her partner will react, of what people are going to think, of running up a debt, of not being able to get a new job, of losing a sense of identity, of an uncertain future and so on. These are possible, real-life instances. It might be highly misleading to describe such an inquiry as a “purely linguistic exercise” (cf. Roberts 2003: 38). Contrary to being “purely linguistic,” conceptual analysis is about whatever language is about.

Similarly, it would be wrong to assume that conceptual analysis presupposes an a priori categorical difference between conceptual and empirical questions. What it does presuppose, however, is that it, in some instances, makes sense to differentiate between empirical and conceptual questions. It would also be wrong to assume that conceptual analysis is about “conceptual facts,” “conceptual truths” or anything of the kind. As I will try to show in the following, it is misleading to think that conceptual analysis is about some objective Language about which we are entitled to make general and normative assertions.

#### IV

Is not the methodology of conceptual analysis itself dependent on empirical evidence? And does not conceptual analysis need objective normative standards for which statements are to count as meaningful?

These questions are misguided. I hope to show why by considering two related objections that have been raised against Ordinary Language Philosophy:

- Acknowledging ways in which we would express ourselves in various contexts, as a way of evaluating the meaningfulness of statements (about emotions), seems to suggest that “it is somehow wrong or inadvisable, or at least dangerous, to use ordinary words in



ways different from those in which the ordinary man uses them” (Mates 1971: 124).

- Acknowledging ways in which we would express ourselves in various contexts, as a way of evaluating the meaningfulness of statements (about emotions), seems to suggest that we are making empirical claims about how things are said in a language. As regards Ordinary Language Philosophy, it has been said that “when support is offered for an assertion that the ordinary use of a given term is thus and so, this support takes the form of an attempt to remind or convince us that the use in question is indeed quite frequent among ordinary folk, magistrates, parents and teachers. In other words, the statement is taken as having a factual basis and presumably as refutable by observation of the ordinary folk, magistrates, parents and teachers” (Mates 1971: 124–125).

I think these objections correctly touch on the mistake of objectifying language and thinking that the examples of word uses that we, as philosophers, appeal to are statements about some observed object – a third-person *Language* (or *Ordinary Language*) independent of or external to us as individual speakers. From such a third-person account of the relation between philosophy and language, it follows that Ordinary Language Philosophers will have a hard time justifying why language must legislate what may be said and what not. And they will have an even harder time justifying why they, as philosophers, need not leave their armchairs and do some honest, empirical work.

These sorts of difficulties can be avoided, though, with a different outlook on philosophy’s involvement with language. If we treat the relation between philosophy and language as internal (first person) rather than external (third person), these difficulties would not be what they are. Such a shift is not tactical as much as it is truthful. The clarity of thought that may be attained by reflecting on sense is not the clarity of some abstract Community or Subject, but *our* clarity. The understanding at stake is not the understanding of some abstract Community or Subject, but *our* understanding. The uses of words that we acknowledge in doing philosophy are not the word uses of some abstract Community, but *our* uses. And appealing to how words are used is not about what makes sense in some abstract Language but about what makes sense to *us*.

This is not to say that the fruits of conceptual analysis must be “private” or “personal” – no more than language must be “private” or

“personal” – but to clarify whose understanding is at stake. Neither is it to say that conceptual analysis merely is “subjective,” but that the empirical framework of “subjective” versus “objective” is beside the point. Conceptual analysis is not “subjective” as opposed to “objective” – as a way of saying that it needs or lacks empirical support. Rather, empirical support is irrelevant. Its being a first-person approach is not an inherent flaw or a trait that somehow makes it secondary to the empirical sciences, but a condition for approaching certain topics.

To flesh this out, let us begin by addressing the notion that what may be said in some objective, third-person Language (or Ordinary Language) serves as the standard for what makes sense. Stanley Cavell writes that when an Ordinary Language Philosopher marks an expression as a “misuse” of language, he or she is really just saying that it breaks our understanding, that it does not make sense. And so the “normativity of language” (a description he rightly is suspicious of) does not lie in “assertions *about* ordinary use; what is normative is exactly ordinary use itself” (Cavell 1971: 147–148).

Such an assessment seems fair. However, there are also reasons to be wary of any reference to a (legislative) *Language* or *Ordinary Use* – as if what is at stake is complying with some standard (perhaps one that lies outside oneself as it were). What is at stake is rather making sense of a thought, expression, word, etc. *by trying it out in concrete contexts*. It is true that if one believes, say, that “emotions are judgements” and then finds out that in many contexts, emotions cannot be understood in terms of judgements, one may have to adjust one’s understanding (and perhaps one’s desire) to what such contexts show. Nonetheless, this will not be a matter of complying oneself to some standard, but of figuring out what – in the light of how *we* use and understand words – makes sense to *us*.

The backbone of this sort of approach to emotions is acknowledging how we actually use words in various contexts. This will mean considering ordinary uses of “sadness,” “anger,” “guilt,” etc. in as far as we make sense of and understand these words in ordinary contexts. So, it is not a matter of complying with or subjecting oneself to *Ordinary Uses* but a matter of acknowledging one’s own *actual use* and understanding of emotional terms. Suppose one said, “regardless of how I ordinarily use and understand emotional terms, I will understand emotions as caused by judgments.” Such an attitude will not give any clarity into if and how emotions may be understood as caused by judgements. In this sense, attaining clarity by acknowledging our use

of words often demands a degree of integrity, honesty or truthfulness (cf. Hertzberg 2005). It is not that we must, should or ought to think or express ourselves in certain ways – as if it was a matter of ethics – but that our understanding and our clarity depends on how we *actually* use and understand words. As Wittgenstein recognised, this approach is not only a matter of working on one’s understanding of things but, often enough, also of working on one’s *will* or *desire* to understand things in certain ways.

This point is relevant to the notion that giving examples of how words are used seems to suggest that we are making empirical claims about how things are said in a language. If we take an external view – as opposed to the internal view that I have just sketched – the question arises how we can justify our knowledge of what is and what is not said in a language. As Bernard Mates points out, it is hard to see how this issue can be evaded by arguing that the “average adult has already amassed such a tremendous amount of empirical information about the use of his native language that he can depend upon his own intuition or memory (. . .)” (Mates 1971: 125). For one thing, because this is itself a contingent, empirical statement; and so the question remains whose knowledge we can depend on and why.

However, from an internal viewpoint, the situation is different. It would be misguided to suggest that giving examples of how *we* use words in various contexts is in need of empirical methodology. Giving examples of how we use words is not a matter of figuring out whether or not something is the case or about learning anything new. It is a matter of reminding ourselves of what we already know (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: §§89, 109, 127).

This is not to say that we cannot have learnt to use a word the wrong way. For instance, someone can make us aware that we are not using a word in a way that is, say, “proper English,” and this may change our understanding of it. But that would only mean that the conditions – how we use and understand words – for making sense would have changed. The point is getting clear about how *we* use words, about what makes sense to *us*. Others can only *recognise* the examples we give of how words are used as making sense or not making sense to *them*. If an example does not make sense to someone else, then it may be relevant to figure out why that is so. Maybe one person uses a word in an incorrect way or perhaps we just belong to different sub-communities within the English language where some words are used differently. But given how deeply embedded words

such as “anger,” “shame,” “joy,” etc. are in daily life and interaction, it should come as a great surprise if we do not recognise each others’ use of such words as making sense.

Similarly, if we treat the relation between philosophy and the significance of language in an external (as opposed to internal) way, then Jerry Fodor’s and Jerrold Katz’s so-called “natural language fallacy” would have some bearing. Showing that we *ought to* think in a certain way, they argue, cannot be done merely by appealing to the way speakers *in fact* talk (Fodor and Katz 1971: 201–202). However, once we realise that how we, in fact, use words is internal to figuring out if and how a thought makes sense, then the point is off the mark. Contemplating one’s use of words and attaining clarity are two sides of the same coin, so to speak.

The notion that what may be said in some objectified language serves as the standard for what makes sense is closely related to the notion that we are not merely interested in how we use words, but in the *correct* use of words (cf. Hutto 2003: 192–194). Again, if we were to take an external view on the philosophical import of language, correctness would be a methodological issue. If clearing up our thoughts depends on our knowledge of some objective Language, then our clarity of thought will depend on knowing the correct uses of that Language. But if, on the other hand, clearing up our thoughts merely depends on what makes sense to *us* – so that what is at stake is *our* understanding and use of words – then methodological issues of correctness is beside the point.

This is not to say, though, that issues of correctness cannot have a bearing on our understanding and use of words. As I have said, someone could point out to us that how we use a word is not “correct English,” and this may change our understanding of a word. But again, that would only mean that the conditions for making sense would have changed. On the whole, there are various ways in which we can recognise our own and others’ use and understanding of words as correct or incorrect, but such talk does not pose any methodological problem.

## V

Is not reflecting on our use of words too disconnected from the experiential aspects of emotions to be able to convey their nature? Are not emotions so intimately connected to feelings that they escape

mere reflections on our use of words? Is not something like introspection or phenomenology needed instead of, or in addition to, conceptual analysis?

It is easy to see how reflecting on our use of words can be understood as opposed to paying attention to experience. The mere phrase “reflections on our use of words” can be misunderstood as excluding reflections on experiences. The phrase may conjure an image of “language” as opposed to “reality” or an image of “use” as opposed to “experience.”

Also, the fervent criticism by what went as “conceptual analysis” during the last century against the notion that the meanings of psychological terms such as “emotion,” “thinking” and “understanding” are given by *inner phenomena* (e.g. mental processes, representations or sensations) have sometimes led to a misguided association of “conceptual analysis” with “behaviourism.”

As I have mentioned, it seems wrong to view our use of words as isolated from actual lived experience or conceptual analysis as the opposite of being interested in something supposedly “extra-linguistic” such as facts about the world, how people live, how they act and react in various circumstances and so on. I see no reason why, say, feelings, sensations and moods should be excluded from this picture.

In presenting a research programme called *Neurophenomenology*, Francisco J. Varela writes that “any science of cognition and mind must, sooner or later, come to grips with the basic condition that we have no idea what the mental or the cognitive could possibly be apart from our own experience of it” (Varela 1996: 331). I am inclined to agree, but from the perspective of conceptual analysis, that our experience of what the mental and cognitive is is to be understood by understanding our concepts rather than experience as such. Varela thinks that although neuroscientists have turned up some impressive discoveries about the neurological underpinnings of emotions,

these studies are entirely based on verbal protocols, and the questions of the competence for emotional distinction and the patterns of relations between mood, emotion and reasons need to be addressed explicitly at this stage of research (Varela 1996: 343).

Again, I am inclined to agree although it seems more reasonable to claim that it is by understanding our *concepts* (rather than bare experience) that we can understand how to distinguish between different emotional states or “patterns of relations between mood, emotion and reasons.”

However, although conceptual analysis does not seek to understand feelings by paying attention to how we feel in the moment – at least not if it is not in relation to our use of words – it certainly acknowledges feelings in as far as they are expressed in language and serves as the background against which talk of feelings makes sense. That post-Wittgensteinian conceptual analysis somehow denies or excludes feelings and other subjective experiences is a common misconception (cf. Hacker 1996b: 253–255). For example, when Wittgenstein questions whether or not “joy” denotes an inner state, he is not denying that when we feel joy, we really *feel* it, or that talk of joy makes sense only in the context of feelings of pleasure, well-being, etc., but that “joy” refers to an inner (or outer) *something* (cf. Wittgenstein 1967: §487; 1980b: §§322–325, 498–499; 1982: §§406–408, 412–413). On the whole, conceptual analysis may very well acknowledge our individual feelings and sensations – say, that physical well-being typically goes along with a sense of joy (cf. Wittgenstein 1980a: §132; 1980b: §322) – but then as part of the meanings and use of emotional terms.

#### References

- Bates, S. and T. Cohen (1972). “More on What We Say.” *Metaphilosophy* 3 (1): 1–24.
- Beck, A. T. (1979). *Cognitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders*. New York, London, Victoria, Australia, Auckland, New Zealand: A Meridian Book.
- Cavell, S. (1971). “Must We Mean What We Say?” In C. Lyas (ed.), *Philosophy and Linguistics*. London: Macmillan.
- . (2002). *Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays*, updated edition. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town: Cambridge University Press.
- Crary, A. and R. Read, eds. (2000). *The New Wittgenstein*. London and New York: Routledge.
- DeLancy, C. (2002). *Passionate Engines. What Emotions Reveal About Mind and Artificial Intelligence*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Finkelstein, D. H. (2003). *Expression and the Inner*. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press.
- Fodor, J. and Katz, J. J. (1971). “The Availability of What We Say.” In C. Lyas (ed.), *Philosophy and Linguistics*, London: Macmillan, pp. 190–203.

- Friedman, P. L. (1969). "The Availability of Ordinary-Language Philosophy." *Man and World* 2 (3): 410–422.
- Griffiths, P. E. (1997). *What Emotions Really Are. The Problem of Psychological Categories*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press
- Hacker, P. M. S. (1996a). *Wittgenstein: Mind and Will*. Oxford, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.
- . (1996b). *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- Hanfling, O. (2000). *Philosophy and Ordinary Language. The Bent Genius of Our Tongue*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hertzberg, L. (2005). "Trying to Keep Philosophy Honest." In A. Pichler and S. Säätelä (eds.), *Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works*, Bergen, Norway: Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen Norway.
- Hutto, D. H. (2003). *Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy. Neither Theory nor Therapy*. Houndmills, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Jung, C. G. (1971). *Psychological Types. Collected Works* vol. 6. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1921)
- Kenny, A. (1963). *Action, Emotion and Will*. London: Routledge and K. Paul.
- Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and Adaption*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lyas, C., ed. (1971). *Philosophy and Linguistics*. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan St. Martin's Press.
- Lyons, W. (1980). *Emotion*. Cambridge, New Rochelle, NY, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press.
- Malcolm, N. (1977). *Thought and Knowledge*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.
- Mates, B. (1971). "On the Verification of Statements About Ordinary Language." In C. Lyas (ed.) *Philosophy and Linguistics*. London: Macmillan, pp. 121–130.
- Nussbaum, M. C. (2001). *Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pichler, A. and Säätelä, S., eds. (2005). *Wittgenstein: The Philosopher and His Works*. Bergen, Norway: Working Papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen Norway.
- Prinz, J. (2004). *Gut Reactions. A Perceptual Theory of Emotions*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Roberts, R. C. (2003). *Emotions. An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology*. Cambridge, New York, Port Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town: Cambridge University Press.
- Solomon, R. C. (1976). *The Passions. Emotions and the Meaning of Life*. New York: Doubleday.
- Stenlund, S. (2000). *Filosofiska uppsatser*. Skellefteå: Norman Bokförlag.
- Suter, R. (1989). *Interpreting Wittgenstein. A Cloud of Philosophy, a Drop of Grammar*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Varela, F. J. (1996). "Neurophenomenology. A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem." *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 3 (4): 330–349.
- Witherspoon, E. (2000). "Conceptions of Nonsense in Carnap and Wittgenstein." In A. Crary and R. Read (eds.), *The New Wittgenstein*. London: Routledge, pp. 315–379.
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- . (1967). *Zettel*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- . (1980a). *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* vol. I. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- . (1980b). *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* vol. II. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- . (1982). *Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology* vol. 1. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Baruch College/City University of New York  
Department of Philosophy  
17 Lexington Avenue  
Box B5/295  
New York, N.Y. 10010