which would result in the decider-plus becoming conscious. But satisfaction of the condition cannot involve any functional differences relevant to phenomenal consciousness since the decider-plus already has all functional conditions necessary for consciousness. And so, he points out, this leads to the same problems with epistemic intimacy that he used to expose the incoherency of the idea of a zombie in the first place.

Certainly I think that Kirk's theory of what is required for a system to be phenomenally conscious succeeds in having 'intuitive impact', as indeed does much of what he proposes and argues in his book. His approach of trying to account for the occurrence of phenomenal consciousness at its most basic level – '*what it is* for a creature to have conscious perceptual experiences' (p. 64), even minimally – seems to be on the right track. More importantly, he does not rely on intuition alone in an area that is frequently seen as offering little else – especially on the subject of zombies, where intuitions often rule the day and balls are quickly bounced back into opponents' courts. Kirk plays hardball, with intuitive appeal but with well-argued lines of reasoning.

University College Dublin *Ruth Egan*

Pyrrhonian Scepticism
Edited by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. viii + 237. ISBN 0–19–516972–7. $25.00 (hbk).

Unlike other collections of papers on scepticism, the present volume deals exclusively with Pyrrhonism. This kind of scepticism differs from others in that it does not deny the existence of certain entities or the possibility of knowing anything or of rationally justifying our beliefs, but is rather characterized by the adoption of suspension of judgment (*epochē*) about whether or not certain entities exist, knowledge is possible, and our beliefs are rationally justified. This difference is worth mentioning because some present-day epistemologists assimilate Pyrrhonism to the view that knowledge is impossible or our beliefs cannot be rationally justified – a view commonly labelled 'Academic' or 'Cartesian' scepticism. In the Introduction to the collection, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong emphasizes that Pyrrhonian scepticism does not deny the possibility of knowledge. He also points out that, while almost no one has espoused Cartesian scepticism and those who have did not do so for long, there have been several actual Pyrrhonists: besides the ancient adherents, Montaigne, Hume, and Wittgenstein may be interpreted as Pyrrhonian, and Robert J. Fogelin is a confessed neo-Pyrrhonist. To this list must be added Sinnott-Armstrong himself, since he too adopts a neo-Pyrrhonian stance.

The book contains eleven essays grouped in two parts. The five essays which make up the first part are historical, while the six which form the second are systematic. Although the editor does not say so, the book has its origin in a conference in honour of Fogelin held at Dartmouth College in 2001, as is made clear by the references in some of the chapters. This explains why the first five essays either compare Fogelin's kind of Pyrrhonism with its ancient ancestor or refer to his interpretation of certain modern and contemporary philosophers, while the six remaining chapters offer a critical examination of his neo-Pyrrhonian scepticism as expounded in *Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification* (Oxford University Press, 1994). Hence, although being acquainted with Fogelin's œuvre is not a necessary condition for appreciating the questions addressed in the essays, it does allow the reader to have a fuller understanding of them. In what follows, I will summarize the content of the eleven papers and discuss some of the issues they raise.

The first essay, 'Historical Reflections on Classical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism', by Gisela Striker, points out the differences between the Pyrrhonism expounded by Sextus Empiricus and the neo-Pyrrhonism proposed by Fogelin. One of these differences has to do with the way in which suspension of judgment is reached. The neo-Pyrrhonist's *epochē* is the logical consequence of the consideration of certain epistemological arguments, namely three of the so-called Five Modes of Agrippa: any attempt at justifying a claim ends in circular reasoning, leads to an infinite regress, or is based upon an arbitrary assumption. On the contrary, the ancient Pyrrhonist's *epochē* is 'an experience forced upon' him by his inability to resolve the disagreements he has encountered (p. 16). Striker rightly points out that the Pyrrhonist is not committed to the Agrippan arguments, but uses them only to show to his dogmatic rivals that, given their own standards of justification, they must suspend judgment. The inclusion of Striker's essay in the collection is most welcome because it is the only one that examines in more detail the original Pyrrhonian stance and, unlike the other contributors, she is a specialist in this field.

Janet Broughton, in 'Cartesian Skeptics', compares the meditator in Descartes's *Meditations* to the sceptics Fogelin calls 'Cartesian' and 'Pyrrhonian', the latter actually including, in her view, two different types of Pyrrhonist which she labels 'Doubting' and 'Agrippan'. Broughton argues that, although the meditator shares some traits with those three kinds of sceptic, he differs from them in fundamental respects. Understanding the distinctive way in which the meditator conceives the sceptical challenge allows us to see how he can hope to meet it.

Kenneth Winkler's 'Berkeley, Pyrrhonism, and the *Theaetetus*' examines Berkeley's response to the 'relativity considerations' presented in that Platonic dialogue, considerations that can be described as Pyrrhonian.

However, Winkler cautiously observes that there is no evidence in Berkeley's published and unpublished writings that he was directly concerned with Pyrrhonism, and that the view that the *Theaetetus* influenced the Pyrrhonist's Relativity Mode is only 'an uneducated guess' (p. 42). The originality of Winkler's essay lies in the affirmation that, although Berkeley was a so-called empiricist, his response depends upon a commitment to the sovereignty of reason over the senses.

In his '"A Small Tincture of Pyrrhonism": Scepticism and Naturalism in Hume's Science of Man', Don Garrett utilizes a taxonomy of several varieties of scepticism in order to identify the kind of scepticism adopted by Hume, which turns out to be different from the one Fogelin ascribes to him. Garrett also examines the relation between Hume's scepticism and naturalism, concluding that the two are mutually supporting, although in a way different from the one suggested by Fogelin.

Hans Sluga, in 'Wittgenstein and Pyrrhonism', agrees with Fogelin that Wittgenstein was a neo-Pyrrhonist, but goes a step further by claiming that his neo-Pyrrhonism is already present in the *Tractatus*. A key thesis of the essay is that, if we wish to understand the nature and extent of Wittgenstein's neo-Pyrrhonian stance, we must track its roots to *Beiträge zu einer Kritik der Sprache*, a three-volume work by the self-declared sceptic Fritz Mauthner. There is a minor remark to be made: on p. 101, Sluga inadvertently quotes *Tractatus* 5.64 twice, omitting the word 'pure' in the first quotation.

In his essay 'The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Scepticism', Michael Williams maintains that there are two ways of dealing with the challenge posed by the Modes of Agrippa. One is the 'direct' approach, which takes this set of modes 'more or less at face value, accepting the skeptic's options while trying to put a better face on one of them' (p. 124). The problem with this approach is that, once the challenge is accepted, it cannot be met. The other way is the 'diagnostic' approach, which holds that the set of Agrippan Modes 'does not fall naturally out of everyday ideas about knowledge and justification, but rather trades on unacknowledged and problematic theoretical preconceptions' (p. 125). The advantage of this approach is that, once we give up the theoretical presuppositions of the Agrippan Modes, the Pyrrhonian challenge may be declined. Those presuppositions constitute what Williams calls the 'Prior Grounding' conception of knowledge and justification, which should be abandoned in favour of a 'Default and Challenge/Contextualist' conception, since the latter is in accord with everyday epistemic practices. A couple of comments are in order.

First, it is important to make it clear that the alleged fact that the Agrippan Modes work only within a certain conception of knowledge and justification does not represent a fatal objection to the Pyrrhonist. For his arguments are parasitic on the dogmatic philosophers' theories, in the

sense that they are essentially *ad hominem*. In the case of the Modes of Agrippa, the Pyrrhonist can argue that he does not use them because he is committed to certain criteria of knowledge and justification, but only because the dogmatists themselves adopt those criteria for conducting their reasoning and grounding their doctrines. Sextus explicitly says that he makes no affirmation about the power of the modes by which he seeks to induce suspension of judgment, since they may be unsound (*Pyrrōneioi Hypotypōseis* (*PH*) I 35). Hence, as long as there continue to be people who are committed to the standards of knowledge and justification underlying the Agrippan Modes (as is the case with quite a few present-day epistemologists), the Pyrrhonist will have a reason to use these weapons against them.

Second, even if one accepted Williams' claim that the epistemological ideas underlying the Agrippan Modes are not natural or intuitive because they exaggerate or distort some aspects of our ordinary epistemic procedures, it would still be necessary (or so it seems to me) to prove that this by itself is sufficient reason for rejecting those ideas. That is to say, it would still be necessary to show that our everyday epistemic practices are to be taken as a touchstone for assessing whether an epistemological theory should be accepted or rejected. For we are faced with two conflicting conceptions of knowledge and justification (philosophical and ordinary), and, in a Pyrrhonian spirit, we may ask how such a conflict could be rationally resolved.

In 'Two False Dichotomies: Foundationalism/Coherentism and Internalism/Externalism', Ernest Sosa claims that the Cartesian distinction between *cognitio* and *scientia* (which is analogous to the distinction between what he elsewhere calls 'animal knowledge' and 'reflective knowledge') allows us to resolve the 'Pyrrhonian problematic' raised by the three Agrippan modes mentioned above. Those wishing to understand more fully Sosa's position should read his 'How to Resolve the Pyrrhonian Problematic: A Lesson from Descartes' (*Philosophical Studies*, 85 (1997), pp. 229–49), upon which the present essay is in fact based.

In his contribution 'The Sceptics Are Coming! The Sceptics Are Coming!', Robert Fogelin convincingly argues that, in trying to respond to the challenges to knowledge raised by the sceptical scenarios characteristic of Cartesian scepticism, both externalists and contextualists back up into Pyrrhonism. It is worth noting that, following Michael Frede, Fogelin claims that the ancient Pyrrhonist did not call into question everyday beliefs, but only philosophical doctrines. This is the so-called 'urbane' interpretation of the scope of Pyrrhonian *epochē*. Apart from the fact that, like Striker, I do not agree with Fogelin's claim, I have the impression that the real reason for his adoption of that interpretation is not so much that his own analysis of Sextus' texts supports it as that urbane Pyrrhonism corresponds to the kind of scepticism he finds in Hume and Wittgenstein and that he himself espouses.

In 'Contemporary Pyrrhonism', Barry Stroud claims to be in general agreement with Fogelin's Pyrrhonism, but thinks that sometimes Fogelin is not consistent in his adoption of this stance. Stroud argues that the target of the Agrippan Modes is only the traditional epistemologist's attempt 'to show that and how our beliefs about the world in general are justified or warranted or well supported on the basis of the grounds we have for holding them' (p. 175). According to Stroud, the neo-Pyrrhonist makes a conditional claim: if to know something we must meet the standards set by the traditional epistemologist, then we do not know anything. The neo-Pyrrhonist therefore leaves our ordinary knowledge-claims untouched. However, despite adopting that view, Fogelin argues that reflecting on eliminable but uneliminated possibilities raises the level of scrutiny, which may lead us to give up our everyday knowledge-claims.

It must be noted that, contrary to what Stroud believes, the position he argues for differs from the original Pyrrhonian stance in crucial respects. First, in accord with his universal suspension of judgment, the Pyrrhonist would refrain from asserting that the justificatory project of traditional epistemology is for ever doomed to failure. Second, when explaining the Mode of Disagreement (which is one of the Five Modes of Agrippa), Sextus points out that both in ordinary life and among philosophers there are unresolvable disputes about any given subject, and that because of this one ends up with suspension of judgment (*PH* I 165). Therefore, the Pyrrhonist would not hold everyday beliefs even if traditional epistemology were set aside, since ordinary disputes would still be there in need of resolution.

In 'Classy Pyrrhonism', Sinnott-Armstrong contends that the use of the notion of 'contrast classes' to interpret neo-Pyrrhonism makes it possible to solve some puzzles about this stance. According to his interpretation, the neo-Pyrrhonist can consistently make claims provided that they are relativized to particular contrast classes and provided that he does not affirm, normatively, that one of these classes is really appropriate or relevant. There is a brief remark I wish to make. Although Sextus regards the position we label Cartesian scepticism as dogmatic, he never calls it 'dogmatic scepticism' (p. 206, n. 1). In fact, he would consider such an expression to be a contradiction in terms, since the person who is dogmatic about even one subject cannot be deemed a sceptic (see *PH* I 223).

Finally, in his amusing 'Commercial Applications of Scepticism', Roy Sorensen claims that, when knowledge is unwelcome and ignorance advantageous, reflecting on sceptical scenarios or uneliminated but eliminable possibilities does not have the desired effect of undermining one's knowledge. This is because we 'can raise the standard of scrutiny for claiming that we possess a good thing. But when this good thing is ignorance, raising the level of scrutiny *increases* how much knowledge we attribute to ourselves' (p. 221). Sorensen also contends that Pyrrhonists are 'conditional sceptics', and hence not real sceptics. Indeed, even if they 'assume that they can make

internal criticisms without committing to anything' and thus maintain the 'nonassertive aspect' of their Pyrrhonism, they are committed to the 'assertion of a conditional: If such and such a position is correct, then this and that absurd consequence follows' (p. 229). Therefore, 'the hypothetical nature of the Pyrrhonian's remarks does not save him from the charge of being "dogmatic"' (p. 229).

In my view, Sorensen does not fully understand the dialectical character of the Pyrrhonist's argumentation. As noted before in connection with his use of the Modes of Agrippa, the Pyrrhonist does not accept *in propria persona* the arguments he puts forward in his discussion with the dogmatists, but only employs them in order to show to his dogmatic opponents that, given the doctrines they themselves endorse, they must accept conclusions which are at odds with their most important tenets. Now, the key point is that, in the Pyrrhonist's *ad hominem* arguments, not only the premises but also the argument schemes and inference rules are taken from the dogmatic theories. Hence, contrary to what Sorensen claims, the Pyrrhonist is not committed to the logical validity of the conditionals he utters. However, one might object that it is hard to believe that in his daily life the Pyrrhonist's thinking does not follow the logical principles of reasoning. He could respond to this objection by distinguishing between logical validity and psychological necessity: even if he suspends judgment about what the dogmatists call 'logic', his thinking involuntarily follows the logical principles of reasoning. In this regard, one must bear in mind that the appearances (*ta phainomena*) are the Pyrrhonist's criterion of action (*PH* I 21–2) and induce his assent involuntarily (*PH* I 19). This criterion is fourfold, one of its parts being the 'guidance of nature', which is that by virtue of which the Pyrrhonist is naturally capable of perceiving and thinking (*PH* I 23–4). One may reasonably suppose that this natural capability of thinking includes logical reasoning. But this does not in any way imply that the Pyrrhonist endorses logic, since he follows the appearances without holding opinions (i.e., without believing or disbelieving that things are as they appear to him to be) and for the sole reason that he cannot remain utterly inactive (*PH* I 23–4).

This collection of essays is a valuable contribution to understanding the history and philosophical import of Pyrrhonism. It is to be hoped that it will motivate epistemologists dealing with scepticism to take into account, or to examine more carefully, the Pyrrhonist's *sui generis* way of thinking.

Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones
Científicas y Técnicas, Argentina *Diego E. Machuca*