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CURING FOLK PSYCHOLOGY OF 'ARTHRITIS'

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Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.¹ But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial thought experiment nor a second type of example that Burge describes supports either of these conclusions. Second, I will identify the proper conclusion to draw from Burge's discussion and show that this conclusion does not really pose a serious problem for individualism about the mental. And finally, I will argue that Burge's discussion does not in fact provide a conclusive reason for believing its proper conclusion.

1. THE ISSUES AT STAKE

Providing an adequate evaluation of Burge's argument is a matter of some importance, since if this argument did have the consequences commonly claimed for it, then it would be impossible to consistently endorse an internalist, or individualist, point of view about the mental without abandoning the ordinary folk psychological concepts of belief and content. Let me explain.

I think it is undeniable that there are *de dicto*, or opaque, belief predicates that express wide psychological properties. The belief predicates I have in mind are those which contain small-scope proper names, indexical pronouns, and natural kind terms, predicates such as 'believes that London is pretty', 'believes that you are rich', and 'believes that water is wet'. The properties expressed by such predicates are "wide" in

Putnam's (1975) sense: possession of any of these properties by a person logically implies the existence of objects that are external relative to the person in question.²

The internalist holds that beliefs and other cognitive attitudes are necessarily individuated by narrow psychological properties.³ It is commonly thought that this internalist thesis, which I endorse, is inconsistent with the fact that some *de dicto* belief predicates express wide psychological properties. But as Loar (1985) has pointed out, this appearance of inconsistency is based on the assumption that every *de dicto* belief predicate expresses a property that individuates with respect to belief, and this assumption is arguably false.⁴ Of course, if this assumption is false, then the defender of internalism need not be at all perturbed by the fact that some *de dicto* belief predicates express wide psychological properties.

But then the question arises, What are these narrow psychological properties that we are supposed to be able to use to individuate beliefs? My own view, simply stated, is that the properties in question are typically expressible by *de dicto* belief predicates that have narrow content. Such predicates in turn are typically formed by prefixing the operator 'believes that' to sentences all of whose words have narrow meanings. In other words, on my view, some *de dicto* belief predicates express properties that individuate with respect to belief, and some don't. The ones that do are formed from sentences with narrow meanings; the ones that don't are formed from sentences with wide meanings.⁵

But here of course is where Burge's 'arthritis'-argument comes in. For if this argument has the consequences commonly claimed for it, then contrary to my view, there will simply be *no* belief predicates that have narrow content or that express narrow psychological properties. This fact has led many internalists who have been convinced by Burge's argument, such as Loar (1985) and Fodor (1987), to maintain that the cognitive attitudes can only be individuated by use of *revised* concepts of belief or content (or both).

Now in my view, casting ourselves loose from the foundations provided by the ordinary conceptions of belief and content, in hopes of eventually producing clear and workable alternative conceptions from

scratch, is a desperate and implausible move that is unlikely to succeed.⁶ In the circumstances, I suggest, the wiser course is to take a closer look at Burge's argument. For if I am right, the argument does not really come close to showing what its proponents — both internalists and externalists alike — have claimed for it.

2. THE ARGUMENT'S PURPORTED CONSEQUENCES

Burge's well known example concerns a person, Oscar say, who has a less than perfect grasp of the concept expressed by the word 'arthritis'. Thinking correctly that he has long had arthritis in his ankles, Oscar becomes convinced that he now has arthritis in his thigh. Upon informing his doctor of his new ailment, however, Oscar is told that it is impossible for him to have arthritis in his thigh, since arthritis is, by medical definition, an inflammation specifically of the joints. Oscar stands corrected and defers to his doctor's linguistic authority. Burge asks us to compare this actual situation with another counterfactual situation in which Oscar's entire personal history is exactly the same as in the actual world; the only difference between this situation and the actual one is that the word 'arthritis' is used differently in Oscar's linguistic community, so that it means any of a wide class of rheumatoid ailments that can occur in joints, tendons, muscles, and bones. Thus, Oscar's grasp of the concept that 'arthritis' expresses in this counterfactual situation is perfectly adequate. As Burge points out, it seems true in the actual situation that up to the time his doctor corrects him, Oscar believes that he has arthritis in his thigh. But in the counterfactual situation, Oscar seems to have no beliefs about arthritis at all; the beliefs he expresses using the word seem to all concern a general class of rheumatoid ailments and not arthritis. Since prior to correction by his doctor Oscar is internally the same in both the actual and counterfactual situations, and since the only difference in the two situations up to that point is in Oscar's social and linguistic environment, Burge concludes that the contents of Oscar's beliefs are dependent upon his social and linguistic environment. (Burge, 1979, pp. 77–79.)

Now does this argument really show, as is commonly claimed, that the contents of one's beliefs are dependent upon one's social and

linguistic environment? And does the argument really show, as is also commonly claimed, that 'arthritis' and other similar terms have wide meanings?

Consider Arthur, an M.D. who specializes in diseases of the joints and who actively engages in research on the various forms of arthritis. Arthur's grasp of the concept of arthritis is of course perfect. But in fact, let us suppose, no word for arthritis occurs in the language of Arthur's community; perhaps he has come up with the concept on his own, and prior to the publication of his research, he has not yet found an appropriate technical term to use for the condition. (Maybe, he thinks, he should call it 'arthrititis'!)⁷

Arthur of course has many beliefs about arthritis, but let us just consider his simple belief that arthritis is painful. It seems quite clear that this belief would in no way be logically dependent upon Arthur's social or linguistic environment. But then, since my description of Arthur is clearly consistent with Burge's description of his example, there seems to be nothing about the features of Burge's example which justifies the claim that the contents of one's beliefs are *in general* dependent upon one's social and linguistic environment.

Moreover, there is a simple reason why Burge's example *cannot* be used to justify this claim. For it is a crucial feature of the example that its hero Oscar has an inadequate grasp of the concept of arthritis. Thus Burge's example shows at most that a person's having a belief involving a given concept will depend upon his membership in a linguistic community, *precisely when his grasp of the concept is inadequate*. Perhaps in Burge's example, it is true of Oscar in the actual situation that had 'arthritis' not meant arthritis in his language, he would not have had a belief involving the concept of arthritis. But in my example, a corresponding claim is not true of Arthur. And in general such a claim will not follow merely from the fact that a person has a belief involving the concept of arthritis; to derive the claim, we have to *at least* add the premise that the person's understanding of this concept is inadequate.

So Burge's example does not show that the contents of one's beliefs are *in general* or *always* dependent on one's social and linguistic environment. Rather, the example shows at most that *sometimes*, in *some* special circumstances (such as when one inadequately under-

stands the concepts involved in one's belief), the contents of one's beliefs will depend on one's social and linguistic environment.

Now what about the claim that Burge's case shows that the word 'arthritis' has a wide meaning? If the term 'arthritis' had a wide meaning, essentially involving external objects, then the *de dicto* belief predicate 'believes that arthritis is painful' would itself express a wide property whose possession logically implies the existence of external objects. But it surely seems that Arthur could have his belief that arthritis is painful even while he inhabits a solipsistic universe. For there seems to be nothing about the concept of arthritis or about Burge's example that would justify us in assuming that either Arthur or anyone else could deduce the existence of any objects external to Arthur, merely from the fact that Arthur believes that arthritis is painful. Again, it is clear that Arthur's belief does not at all depend on his social or linguistic environment. Moreover, 'arthritis' is by assumption not a natural kind term, since according to Burge it is supposed to just mean 'inflammation of the joints'. But if Burge's example does not show that Arthur's having his belief logically implies the existence of external objects, then the example also cannot show that the word 'arthritis' has a wide meaning.

So far, then, we have seen that Burge's thought experiment has neither of the two consequences it is most commonly claimed to have. The example does not show that the contents of one's beliefs are in general dependent upon one's social and linguistic environment. Nor does the example show that 'arthritis' and other similar terms have wide meanings. Thus, the common view that Burge's argument shows for all general terms what Putnam's argument showed for natural kind terms is quite mistaken.

3. BURGE'S SECOND THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

It should be noted that Burge, unlike his many followers, does not make the mistake of claiming that his initial thought experiment proves that the contents of beliefs are in general dependent upon social and linguistic factors. Instead, apparently with the goal of establishing this general result, Burge gives *another* argument, based upon a *second* thought experiment, in which he purports to show that even when a

person completely understands the concepts involved in his belief, the belief's content may be dependent on social and linguistic factors. Given the existence of this second argument, it in fact seems strange that Burge's first thought experiment, with its quite limited consequences, should be the only argument ever cited as justifying Burge's general view.

Burge bases his second argument on the claim that his original thought experiment can be run in reverse order (Burge, 1979, pp. 84–85). But Burge's attempt to justify this claim is extremely dubious and unconvincing. He asks us to begin with a person (Oscar say) who is assumed to properly understand the meaning of 'arthritis' and who believes that he has arthritis. In the counterfactual situation, Oscar is internally just the same, but his understanding of 'arthritis' is imperfect, since there the term is applied by doctors to any rheumatoid ailment. Since he had thought that 'arthritis' means a condition that can only occur in joints, Oscar expresses surprise and stands corrected when told by his doctor that he "has arthritis in his thigh." Now Burge does not tell us how this example is supposed to prove his desired result. Instead he cryptically remarks: "The notion that the doctor and patient would be operating with in such a case would not be that of arthritis" (p. 84).

It is certainly hard to see what point Burge is trying to make with this cryptic remark. In order for his example to have the desired result, the example must make it intuitively clear that at least one belief involving the concept of arthritis that Oscar has in the actual situation is a belief that Oscar *lacks* in the counterfactual situation prior to the time of correction by the doctor. But if Burge's cryptic remark is meant to imply this, then Burge is making a claim about his example that is quite plainly false.

Consider Oscar's belief that he has arthritis, for example. This belief involves the concept of arthritis, a concept of which Oscar, by assumption, has perfect understanding in the actual situation. There seems no reason to suppose that Oscar would *lose* this concept or his understanding of it in the counterfactual situation. Why, then, should we suppose that in the counterfactual situation Oscar would cease to believe that he has arthritis? Certainly, the fact that other people in Oscar's linguistic community would express a different concept by the

word 'arthritis' seems to have no bearing at all on whether Oscar would retain either the concept of arthritis or his belief that he has arthritis.

In fact, it seems quite absurd to suppose that it even *could* have a bearing, since it seems quite absurd to suppose that changes in other peoples' linguistic dispositions could automatically effect changes in one's perfectly understood concepts or beliefs. Thus, suppose that I go to bed one night in firm possession of the concept of arthritis, having ever so many beliefs involving that concept. During the night, suppose, the linguistic dispositions regarding the word 'arthritis' of everyone else in my linguistic community undergo a drastic change. This might be due to the fact, say, that the Society of Rheumatologists has that very day overwhelmingly voted at their annual convention that 'arthritis' shall henceforth apply to any rheumatoid ailment. I go to sleep early in complete ignorance of the rheumatologists' decision, but everyone else stays up late, hears the news on TV, and changes what they mean by 'arthritis' accordingly.

It is of course quite absurd to suppose that when I innocently awake in the morning, I have lost the concept of arthritis and all my beliefs involving that concept, or that this concept has been everywhere miraculously replaced in my cognitive states by the concept of a general rheumatoid ailment. But it seems just as absurd to suppose that in Burge's example, Oscar would lose the concept of arthritis and all of his beliefs involving that concept in the counterfactual situation, just because the members of his linguistic community happen to express a different concept by 'arthritis'. Thus Burge's implicit claim that this would happen to Oscar in the counterfactual situation is exceedingly implausible. It is much more plausible to say that in the counterfactual situation, Oscar would retain his concept of arthritis and all his beliefs involving that concept, at least prior to the time of correction by the doctor.

Moreover, and what is most important to the present discussion, Burge's description of his second example does nothing to *motivate* his implausible claim that the contents of Oscar's beliefs involving the concept of arthritis would change from the actual to the counterfactual situation. There is simply nothing about the example that makes it at all plausible to say that in the counterfactual situation Oscar would cease to believe, say, that he has arthritis. Thus, far from showing that the

contents of one's completely understood beliefs are in general dependent upon social factors, Burge's second example fails to provide even the *slightest* reason for believing this claim.⁸ And so we may conclude that nowhere in his article does Burge give us a good reason to think that the contents of one's beliefs in general depend on one's social and linguistic environment.

4. THE FIRST ARGUMENT'S PROPER CONCLUSION

Now let us return to Burge's initial thought experiment. Although Burge's discussion of this example does not imply the general results that are usually thought to follow from it, the discussion, if correct, does have an interesting and important consequence. Philosophers have noticed the generality of the argument: it doesn't seem to matter which kind of term we consider, it seems possible for a person with inadequate understanding of the term's meaning to nevertheless have a belief ascribable by a belief predicate that contains the term, just as in Burge's case concerning 'arthritis', and in the other cases he describes concerning such words as 'sofa', 'brisket', and 'contract'. But this very generality should suggest that what makes the examples work has nothing to do with any particular features of the meanings of the specific words used in the examples. In fact, if the examples do work, it is not because of the meanings of the words 'arthritis', 'sofa', etc. at all, but rather because of the meaning of the word '*believes*'.

For if Burge is right, then there are two radically different sorts of conditions under which a person can satisfy *any* (*de dicto*) belief predicate, even a predicate that has entirely narrow content. On the one hand, the person can be like Arthur in my example and satisfy the belief predicate by having complete understanding of the concepts involved. On the other hand, the person can be like Oscar in Burge's first example and fail to understand the concepts involved; in this case, if Burge is right, the believer's lack of understanding can be made up for by membership in a linguistic community whose language contains a word that expresses the relevant concept. Thus, Burge's discussion implies that for each belief predicate there will be two distinct conditions each of which is *sufficient* for satisfaction of the belief predicate, and *one* of these conditions will require membership in a linguistic

community for its satisfaction. Again, Burge's description of his example does not show that satisfaction of a belief predicate depends in general upon membership in a linguistic community. Rather, Burge's discussion shows at most that membership in a linguistic community is a necessary part of one condition that is sufficient for satisfaction of a belief predicate. That is why the conclusion supported by Burge's argument is in fact so different from the conclusions about meaning and belief contents that are supported by Putnam's Twin Earth case.

We might say that on Burge's account, the properties expressed by *de dicto* belief predicates are *disjunctive* in form, since a person can satisfy such a property by satisfying either of two distinct conditions. Since whenever the belief's content is narrow, one of these conditions (the condition implying full understanding of the concepts involved) is always narrow in the sense of not implying the existence of external objects, the whole disjunctive property will also be narrow in this sense, as long as the sentence in the scope of 'believes that' has a narrow meaning.

Still, these disjunctive belief properties pose a problem for the defender of narrow belief. For one thing, as Burge points out, the properties are not supervenient on the believer's internal states: in both possible situations described in Burge's case, Oscar is the same internally; yet in one situation Oscar believes that he has arthritis in his thigh and in the other situation he doesn't. But the problem that is most serious from my perspective is that these disjunctive properties, narrow in a sense as they are, cannot be used to *individuate* any belief. For instance, as Loar persuasively argues, while Oscar and his doctor might both believe (in Burge's sense) that arthritis is painful, the beliefs of Oscar and his doctor that would make this ascription true of each would certainly seem to be quite different. (Loar, 1985, p. 105.)

But even for an internalist like Loar who is entirely convinced by Burge's argument, this difficulty is easily overcome. Suppose the sentence S has a completely narrow meaning, and we want to use the belief predicate 'believes that S' to ascribe an individuating belief property to Oscar. We can do this simply by qualifying the predication so as to rule out the irrelevant disjunct. We can, for instance, say something like 'Oscar believes that S, *with complete understanding of all the concepts involved*'. Or we can say, 'Oscar believes that S, *and he would believe*

that S even if the sentence(s) he uses to express this belief meant something else in his language'. By explicitly ruling out the irrelevant wide disjunct in Burge's belief properties, these formulations can ascribe properties that are not only narrow in Putnam's sense, but that also are supervenient on internal states and that individuate the beliefs ascribed.

5. AN ALTERNATIVE TO BURGE'S HYPOTHESIS

To be on the safe side, a defender of narrow content could adopt a set of new definitions for the whole range of cognitive attitude operators. For instance, we might define 'x believes_N that S' as an abbreviation of 'x believes that S, with complete understanding of the concepts involved'. Adoption of such a definition is harmless, since if Burge is right, it provides us with the narrow belief predicates we need for purposes of individuation, and if Burge is wrong, the definition is just redundant and we end up with the same operator that we started with.

My own view is that the definition would in fact be redundant. For there is another explanation of our intuitions about Burge's case. This alternative explanation is, I believe, better than Burge's because it accounts for a wider range of intuitions, it is clear, and it requires no further account of how a person's belief contents could be determined by social or linguistic factors.

Burge's own view of his case is motivated by his claim that the only difference between the actual and counterfactual situations in his example is a difference in what 'arthritis' means in Oscar's linguistic community. But there are other related differences, one of which is that in the actual world, Oscar has *access* to arthritis, by virtue of the fact that this type of condition is meant by the word 'arthritis' in his language. In the counterfactual situation, Oscar is denied this access, since the type is not meant by any word in his language.

Imagine that Oscar cohabits the world of Arthur, our arthritis expert described above. Again, assume that no word of Arthur's and Oscar's common language expresses the concept of arthritis. Oscar is a friend of Arthur's, although Oscar is largely ignorant of medical matters. Arthur tells Oscar of his latest research on a painful condition of the joints, and Oscar, being a highly suggestible hypochondriac, says to

Arthur, "I'll bet that condition is what I've got in my thigh." At this point, Arthur patiently explains that the condition he's studying is specifically a condition of the joints only, and Oscar stands corrected.

It seems clear that we could accurately describe Oscar's mental state just before Arthur corrected him by saying "Oscar believes that he has arthritis in his thigh." But in this case, not only does Oscar not adequately grasp the concept of arthritis, but this deficiency is not compensated for by his membership in a linguistic community one of whose words expresses the concept. Thus Burge's view apparently cannot account for Arthur's belief. How then can we explain it?

I suggest that there is something peculiar about the beliefs we are ascribing in all of Burge's examples as well as in the example just described. The beliefs in all these cases seem in some sense "external" relative to the concept involved. Thus Oscar's belief that he has arthritis in his thigh seems not to involve any *exercise* or *application* of the concept of arthritis, since Oscar clearly does not believe (absurdly) that he has inflammation of the joints in his thigh. I suggest that instead, Oscar's belief involves mere *reference* to the type of condition meant by 'arthritis'.

If this is correct, then the belief property ascribed to Oscar when we say (truly) that he believes he has arthritis in his thigh is *de re* with respect to the type of condition that is meant by 'arthritis'. That is, the occurrence of 'arthritis' in our belief ascription has large scope, and what we are saying is equivalent to: 'As regards arthritis, Oscar believes that he has it in his thigh'. This hypothesis explains why it seems false to say in the counterfactual situation that Oscar believes he has arthritis in his thigh. For, in this situation, Oscar not only fails to have the concept of arthritis, but he also has no *access* to the concept. In the actual world, he can refer to arthritis as "what doctors mean by 'arthritis'." But in the counterfactual situation, this mode of reference would pick out not arthritis, but a general type of rheumatoid ailment. Thus my hypothesis explains the same intuitions as Burge's.⁹

Moreover, my hypothesis explains *more* than Burge's, since it also explains how it can be true in my example concerning Arthur and Oscar that Oscar believes he has arthritis in his thigh, even though Oscar both lacks the concept and lacks a word that expresses the concept in his language. For in my example Oscar does have access to

arthritis. He can refer to it as, say, “the type of condition that my friend Arthur is studying in his research.”

On the view I am proposing, belief predicates containing general terms are ambiguous between *de re* and *de dicto* readings. On the structurally *de re* reading, the general term is given large scope and the believer is said to have a belief that is referentially about the type meant by the general term. In this case, the belief ascription can be true even though the believer does not have an adequate understanding of the concept expressed by the term, and it is in this sense that it is true in Burge’s case that Oscar believes that he has arthritis in his thigh. On the structurally *de dicto* reading, the general term is given small scope, and as a result the person is said to have a belief one of whose elements is semantically analogous to the general term in question. In this case, the general term’s meaning is invoked to characterize the believer’s way of thinking of the type meant by the term, and thus full understanding of the concept expressed is presupposed.¹⁰ Thus in this sense, it is false to say in Burge’s case that Oscar believes that he has arthritis in his thigh, because understood *de dicto*, this would mean that Oscar believes that he has inflammation of the joints in his thigh.

My hypothesis that the belief predicate in Burge’s case should be interpreted as structurally *de re* explains the same intuitions, is more general in application, and is considerably clearer than Burge’s own hypothesis that *de dicto* belief predicates have an unexplained and problematic analysis that somehow makes essential reference to the believer’s social and linguistic environment. Thus I offer my hypothesis as a preferable alternative to Burge’s. Burge does briefly consider my hypothesis and rejects it (1979, pp. 86–87, 92). But his reasons for rejecting the possibility that the predicate is *de re* are unpersuasive. He *claims* that ‘arthritis’ has oblique occurrence in the original ascription, but of course this is just the question at issue. He also claims that the occurrence of ‘arthritis’ would characterize the subject’s viewpoint, so that we could truly say, for instance, that Oscar thinks of the condition in his thigh that it is arthritis. But this point is inconclusive, since we can interpret the ascription as just meaning: Oscar thinks of the condition in his thigh and of arthritis that the former is the latter. Certainly, if this is a problem with my proposal at all, it is extremely minor compared with the problem of providing the further explanation and clarification that are needed to even make sense of Burge’s hypothesis.

Of course if I am right that the belief predicates in Burge's cases are not *de dicto* in structure, then no explanation in terms of external social or linguistic conditions is necessary to account for how a belief's narrow content could involve concepts not fully grasped by the believer. For if I am right, then we have no reason to suppose that beliefs ever do involve such concepts. On the other hand, if I am wrong, the problem is not really too serious: again, we can individuate beliefs using sentences with narrow meanings plus the proviso that the belief is held with complete understanding of the concepts involved. In either case, my strategy of individuating beliefs by using the ordinary concepts of belief and content remains viable. Contrary to what is commonly assumed nowadays, we can be individualists regarding the mental without abandoning folk psychology.¹¹

NOTES

¹ For instance, Stalnaker (1989) describes Burge's conclusions with approval, saying "he emphasized that the dependence on external conditions was a pervasive phenomenon, one not restricted to some narrow range of concepts and expressions. It applies not just to *de re* attitudes or to attitudes expressed with proper names, indexical expressions and natural kind terms, but to *de dicto* attitudes and to all kinds of concepts and expressions" (p. 287). Fodor (1987) is also quite explicit about this. He says: ". . . I will assume that the Burge story shows that whatever exactly the moral of the Putnam story is, it isn't specific to terms (/concepts) that denote 'natural kinds.'" (p. 29). Similarly, LePore and Loewer (1986) say, "Tyler Burge pushes a variant of the Twin Earth parables that also shows that the meanings of certain expressions are determined by factors external to the speaker . . . Burge's argument can apparently be applied to any expression, even to adjectives, adverbs, and logical connectives." (p. 603.)

One notable exception to this general tendency is Colin McGinn (1989), who persuasively defends the view that there are several important classes of general term to which Putnam's twin earth argument cannot be successfully applied (see especially pp. 30–58). McGinn takes his arguments to show that (contrary to Burge's view) the contents of many cognitive states are not individuated by their relations to the agent's environment. Unfortunately, however, McGinn does not explicitly discuss Burge's 'arthritis'-argument.

² I defend this claim and provide explanations of why these predicates express wide properties in McKinsey (1994).

³ When I say that a person *x*'s belief is "individuated" by a given property *F*, I mean that another person *y* will have the same belief in any other possible world if and only if *y* has *F* in that world.

⁴ Loar (1985) gives persuasive arguments against the assumption, and I give additional arguments to the same effect in my (1994).

⁵ In a number of papers, I have explained how this strategy can be carried out by using a form of cognitive attitude ascription that I call "mental anaphora." See McKinsey (1986), (1987), (1991) and (1994).

⁶ Stalnaker (1989) raises convincing criticisms of two attempts by Dennett (1982) and Fodor (1987) to carry out the revisionist program.

⁷ My thanks to Pamela McKinsey for this joke.

⁸ It is important to note also that even if Burge's claims for his second example were correct, he would *still* not have shown his desired general result. For neither of Burge's thought experiments covers my case of Arthur, in which the concept involved in the person's belief is not expressed by any word of the believer's language.

⁹ I heard John Perry suggest that the occurrence of 'arthritis' in Burge's example should be interpreted as being *de re*, in his comments on a paper by Keith Donnellan at the 1990 meeting of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association (New Orleans, April, 1990). However, I am not sure that Perry's suggestion was the same as mine, since I believe he drew different conclusions from his suggestion than I draw from mine.

¹⁰ I state and defend this point of view regarding the meaning of *de dicto* belief-predicates in more detail in McKinsey (1994).

¹¹ This paper was written while I was on sabbatical leave from Wayne State University and serving as a Fulbright Scholar in Russia during the academic year 1991–92. I am most grateful to Wayne State University, the Fulbright Program, and Moscow M. V. Lomonosov State University for their support of this research. Parts of the paper were read to the University of Stockholm Philosophy Department (Stockholm, February, 1992) and to the Faculty of Philosophy of Urals State University (Ekaterinburg, March, 1992). A shorter version of the paper was presented to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (Washington, D.C., December, 1992). I am grateful for the useful suggestions of a referee for *Philosophical Studies*.

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