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Has Oppy Done Away with the Aristotelian Proof?

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In this essay, we engage with Graham Oppy’s work on Thomas Aquinas’s First Way. We argue that Oppy’s objections shouldn’t be seen as successful. In order to establish this thesis, we first analyze Oppy’s exegesis of Aquinas’s First Way, as well as the counter-arguments he puts forth (including the charge that Aquinas’s argument is invalid or, if deemed valid, forces one to adopt determinism). Next, we address Oppy’s handling of the contemporary scholarship covering the First Way. Specifically, we lay out Edward Feser’s most recent formulation of the argument and analyze Oppy’s main objection to it.

In Graham Oppy’s volume, *Arguing About Gods*, Oppy goes through traditional arguments for the existence of God, and argues in turn, that each argument fails. His work has quickly become the definitive work on opposing natural theology. Frequently in the volume, Oppy engages with the most technical glossing of each argument as he attempts to bring in all of the relevant literature from the analytic tradition into focus. However, there is a glaring exception to this. Oppy dedicates a mere one and a half pages to engaging Thomas Aquinas’ Aristotelian Proof (the First Way). Overall, Oppy quickly gives three objections. He argues that, (1) the Aristotelian Proof is an invalid argument, (2) the argument lacks motivation to be taken seriously by a naturalist, and (3) the argument entails determinism. Unfortunately, Oppy does not engage any contemporary analytic defenses; nor does he seek to engage modern Thomistic scholarship.[[1]](#endnote-1) Instead, Aquinas is quickly brushed aside in what has become an unfortunate, but not too surprising, common practice in analytic circles. Fortunately, very recently, Oppy has somewhat made penance for his brevity by way of publishing a short response to Edward Feser’s recent defense of the Aristotelian Proof. Here, Oppy argues that like Aquinas’ version of the argument, Feser’s glossing of the Aristotelian Proof lacks motivation. Specifically, he argues that a naturalist could easily substitute premises (4) and (7) of his argument for alternative premises that lack Feser’s theistic conclusion.

Surprisingly, Thomists have not been quick to develop responses to Oppy’s work. In this paper, we plan to rectify the situation by arguing that Oppy’s main criticisms of the argument should be seen as unsuccessful. Before we do this however, we now turn to explicating Oppy’s initial objections to the Aristotelian Proof.

Oppy’s Thomistic Take

Oppy argues that the following is a faithful representation of Aquinas’ Aristotelian Proof:

1. Some things are in a process of change.
2. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.
3. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.
4. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.[[2]](#endnote-2)

Oppy, right off the bat, argues that the proof is ‘plainly invalid.’ Specifically, Oppy argues that, ‘There is nothing in the premises of this argument that justifies drawing the conclusion that there is a unique first cause of change that is not itself in a process of change.’[[3]](#endnote-3) But Oppy’s articulation of the argument is questionable. Oppy doesn’t actually quote from Aquinas’ work; we can only guess that he is drawing from either the *Summa Theologica* or the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. We now move to discuss the argument as it is laid out in both volumes. The Aristotelian Proof according to the *Summa Theologica* goes as such:

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality…*Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover*; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.[[4]](#endnote-4)

While, Oppy is right, in that the Su*mma Theologica* lacks a phrase which explicitly addresses that the first cause must itself be changeless, Aquinas clearly implies it. For Aquinas, ‘whatever is in motion must be put in by another,’ and since postulating an infinite amount of instrumental causes does little to help us understand the ultimate grounding of hierarchical causation (see Aquinas’ stick example), what are we left with? Given that there is motion, we seem to be left with the need for postulating a cause that has not been put into motion by another.

It’s not clear to us that Aquinas’ intention here is to develop a deductive styled syllogism, especially one that would meet the satisfaction of 21st century analytic philosophers. Nonetheless, it seems that if Oppy were to be charitable, he would make explicit Aquinas’ clear implicit assumption. In fact, Aquinas does make this assumption explicit in his earlier work, the *Summa Contra Gentiles*:

Of these ways the first is as follows. Everything that is moved is moved by another. That some things are in motion—for example, the sun—is evident from sense. Therefore, it is moved by something else that moves it. *This mover is itself either moved or not moved. If it is not, we have reached our conclusion—namely, that we must posit some unmoved mover.* This we call God. If it is moved, it is moved by another mover. We must, consequently, either proceed to infinity, or we must arrive at some unmoved mover. Now, it is not possible to proceed to infinity. Hence, we must posit some prime unmoved mover.[[5]](#endnote-5)

Notice the italicized statement. Aquinas reasoning contains an exclusive disjunctive: The mover is itself moved or it is not moved at all. Aquinas then goes on to postulate that you can’t proceed to postulate an infinite amount of instrumental causes, but instead, we must eventually arrive at an unmoved mover. It’s not clear to us that Oppy even attempted to look at more charitable interpretations of Aquinas’ argument. Take for example Brian Davies articulation:

1. Everything that is moved is moved by another.
2. Some things are obviously in motion (are moved) and are therefore moved by something else.
3. What moves something else is either moved or not moved.
4. If what moves something else is not moved, then there is an unmoved mover, which is what God is supposed to be.
5. If what moves something else is moved, it is moved by another mover.
6. There cannot be an infinite number of things moving other things while themselves being moved by other things.
7. So we must posit “some prime unmoved mover.”[[6]](#endnote-6)

As Davies rightly points out, the argument is formally valid. We think Davies – one of the foremost Thomist scholars alive – gets Thomas right. We should prefer a schematic glossing that contains the important phrase, ‘What moves something else is either moved or not moved.’ Once the relevant assumption is made explicit, the argument becomes obviously valid:

1. Some things are in a process of change.
2. Whatever is in a process of change is being changed by something else.
3. What moves something else is either moved or not moved.
4. An infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, is impossible.
5. (Hence) There is a first cause of change, not itself in a process of change.

The most controversial premise of this new argument would be (4). Oppy however, doesn’t think there is anything in Aquinas’ work that can motivate the thesis that an infinite regress of changers is impossible. But, has Oppy even rightly understood Aquinas’ argument? Here, Davies summarizes Aquinas’ justification for it as follows:

(I) In ‘an ordered’ series of movers and things moved, if the first mover is “removed or ceases to move” no other mover will move or be moved.

(II) If movers and things moved went on infinitely, there would be no first mover and none of the others would be able to be moved and there would be nothing moved.[[7]](#endnote-7)

Unfortunately, Oppy doesn’t seem to address (II). Instead, he seems to interpret Aquinas as stating that there can’t be an infinite regress of causes simpliciter. Oppy doesn’t mention anything about *per se* ordered causation or about hierarchy more general. Instead, briefly mentioning that one can account for an infinite regress of causation by way of appealing to the initial singularity in Big Bang Universes,[[8]](#endnote-8) Oppy states that, ‘it is hard to see that there is anything in Big Bang cosmology that rules out the existence of an infinite regress of changers, each changed by another, even though it is true in Big Bang Cosmology that the physical universe has a merely finite age.’ While, this all very interesting, it unfortunately has little to do with *per se* ordered causality, which is what is clearly being addressed by Aquinas. We think Oppy has misunderstood Aquinas and therefore, isn’t in the position to judge whether his argument is well motivated.

As mentioned, Oppy levels one other objection in his *Arguing about Gods*. Specifically, he argues that, ‘If there are objectively chancy processes, then there are processes of change that are not “brought about” by anything else. Hence, in particular, if there are libertarian free choices, then there are processes of change that are not “brought about” by anything else.’[[9]](#endnote-9) Oppy then states that, the soundness of the Aristotelian Proof would entail a rejection of both free will defenses and theodicies.[[10]](#endnote-10) There is no room for libertarian free will for the Thomist.

But Oppy moves too quickly. Why can’t a Thomist be a libertarian? For example, agent causal theories postulate that actions don’t come about from nothing or even a chancy process, but rather, they are intentionally brought about by an agent.[[11]](#endnote-11) How is this in conflict with the view that change is ‘brought about’ by something in motion? Unfortunately, Oppy doesn’t develop his objection in any thorough way.

Perhaps we have misinterpreted Oppy here, or, perhaps we can give a more charitable interpretation to his argument. Maybe what Oppy is really getting at is that if God causes everything, then he causes our choices too. This would then make God causally responsible for all of our actions, including our evil actions. William Abraham’s work puts the objection like this:

… given the way in which Neo-Thomists unpack the language of causality and dependence as applied to human action, there is an obvious problem in understanding what it is for God to directly bring about all human actions and how this generalization is to be squared with the reality of sinful human actions … The claim sounds familiar. It appears to be a theological version of the compatibilism common among those who attempt to reconcile a supposedly scientific view of the universe where everything is determined including human actions, with the intuitively attractive claim that human actions are free because they are done voluntarily. Free actions are those that are caused in a certain way, that is, not by coercion, but inwardly by the dispositions, beliefs, motives, reasons, and desires of an agent. Thus understood, determinism and free will are compatible … there is, of course, an immediate problem. What are we to make of the evil actions of human agents? If all human actions are directly brought about by God, then the “all” here, if it means anything, means that the evil acts of human agents are also brought about by God. It is hard to think of a more disastrous theological consequence for the vision of divine agency and divine action offered by the Neo-Thomist.[[12]](#endnote-12)

Must one committed to the Aristotelian Proof also be committed to compatibilism? We think not. W. Matthews Grant argues that the view that God causes all things is consistent with a libertarian view of the will. Explicating the doctrine of universal causality, Grant states:

According to the doctrine of divine universal causality, God is the source and cause of all being other than himself. The doctrine does not hold that God is the only cause. Still, it maintains that whatever is going on, including the genuine causal activities of things besides God, is an effect of God, the First Cause. Since human actions are beings and goings-on distinct from God, it follows according to this doctrine that they too are caused by God.[[13]](#endnote-13)

Following Robert Kane, Grant states that, ‘A “libertarian” view is one that affirms free will and that sees freedom as requiring that there be indeterminism at some relevant point in the process that produces a free act.’[[14]](#endnote-14) In contrast with defining libertarianism, again, following Kane, Grant argues that determinism is the thesis that, ‘An event . . . is determined when there are conditions obtaining earlier (such as the decrees of fate or the foreordaining acts of God or antecedent causes plus laws of nature) whose occurrence is a sufficient condition for the occurrence of the event. In other words, it must be the case that, if these earlier determining conditions obtain, then the determined event will occur.’[[15]](#endnote-15) Grant concludes that, ‘An act is free in the libertarian sense if and only if the act is performed by its agent without there being any logically sufficient condition or cause of the action prior to the action itself.’[[16]](#endnote-16)

Replicating O’Connor’s work, Grant gives the following two models for Divine Action:

Intrinsic model:

(a) God.

(b) A.

(c) Some real, intrinsic property, feature, or state of God in virtue of which God causes A, and which state would be different were God not causing A.

(d) The cause-effect relation between God and A.[[17]](#endnote-17)

Extrinsic model:

(a) God.

(b) E.

(d) The cause-effect relation between God and E.[[18]](#endnote-18)

If we endorse the extrinsic model, it’s unclear why we can’t endorse libertarian freedom. Grant puts it this way: ‘There might have been any number of different contingent orders, and in each such case, the contingent reality would have causally depended on God. Yet God Himself would have been intrinsically the same.’[[19]](#endnote-19) While it is true that God causes a subject to perform an evil action, there’s nothing within God that is malicious or evil. God’s is exactly same in the world where subject S murders S\* as in another world where S refrains from murdering S\*.

With this stated, we are not sure how the Thomistic conception of God rules out human freedom. But, perhaps this is all unnecessary. Couldn’t the Thomist just embrace compatibilism? There are plenty of Calvinist and Christian compatibilist philosophers who have developed technical theodicies which Classical Theists can employ.[[20]](#endnote-20) Oppy doesn’t take the time to argue that compatibilist friendly theodicies do not work. He seems to merely assume that they don’t work. Until Oppy develops this objection further, we think we can safely move past it.

Feser’s Aristotelian Proof and Oppy’s Red Chair

But, for the sake of argument, let’s grant that Aquinas’ proof is indeed invalid, and, let’s assume that he failed to support various premises of his argument. Why not engage the best version of the Aristotelian Proof? Perhaps Oppy, like most analytic philosophers, is under the impression that there really hasn’t been much done on the argument, at least, in the contemporary analytic literature. Nonetheless, we appreciate his recent short reply to Feser which engages a more developed version of the argument. Feser’s novel structuring of Aquinas’s first-way proceeds as follows:

1. Change is a real feature of the world.
2. But change is actualization of potential.
3. So actualization of potential is a real feature of the world.
4. No potential can be actualized unless something already actual actualizes it.
5. So any change is caused by something already actual.
6. The occurrence of any change C presupposes some thing or substance S which changes.
7. The existence of S at any given moment itself presupposes the concurrent actualization of S’s potential for existence.
8. So any substance S has at any moment some actualizer A of its existence.
9. A’s own existence at the moment it actualizes S itself presupposes either (a) the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence or (b) A’s being purely actual.
10. If A’s existence at the moment it actualizes S presupposes the concurrent actualization of its own potential for existence, then there exists a regress of concurrent actualizers that is either infinite or terminates in a purely actual actualizer.
11. But such a regress of concurrent actualizers would constitute a hierarchical causal series and such a series cannot regress infinitely.
12. So either A itself is a purely actual actualizer or there is a purely actual actualizer which terminates the regress that begins with the actualization of A.
13. So the occurrence of C and the existence of S at any given moment presupposes the existence of a purely actual actualizer.
14. So there is a purely actual actualizer.[[21]](#endnote-21)

Feser’s argument can be summarized more informally. First, Feser begins by pointing out that change (the actualizing of a potential), contra Parmenides, is an obvious and real feature of reality. Change is unavoidable. Furthermore, ‘Change requires a changer’[[22]](#endnote-22) (a potential needs to be actualized by something actual). To demonstrate this, Feser points out that the potential of a cup of coffee to cool down is simply that; it is a potential (coldness) that cannot be actualized unless acted upon (by the cool air from an air-conditioner, for example). A changer can also be going through a change; this would of course though, further require another changer. This is what is often referred to as a series of causes or a series of potentials being actualized.

Feser then proceeds to distinguish between two types of series of causes that result in change: a linear series of causes and a hierarchical series of causes. On a linear series of causes, once a potential is actualized within a substance, that substance’s causal power is no longer dependent upon the power of prior substances. For example, the Big Bang produced the conditions necessary for gravity and other forces to structure chemicals which would eventually evolve into stars, planets and galaxies. At least one planet would be the right distance away from its home star – along with a number of other necessary conditions – to allow for the emergence of intelligent life. At some point, this intelligent life acquired the ability to cool coffee by turning on an air-conditioner. Thus, our cosmological history, dating all the way back to the Big Bang (and possibly before that), can be understood as a chain of actualizing potentials. That said, the actualized potential of the Earth orbiting around the Sun or the actualized potential of a cup of coffee possessing the property of being cold, is not currently dependent upon the Big Bang. It is for this reason that a linear series of causes need not have a first cause (our universe, for example, could be the result of a multiverse, which could be the result of some other cause, *ad infinitem*).

On a hierarchical series of causes, causal power is understood in a derivative sense. At each step of the causal chain, the causal power actualizing a potential, is dependent upon (derivative of) the causal power of each prior substance in the series. Feser uses the example of a cup of coffee being held off the ground by a desk, which, in turn, is being supported by the floor, which in turn, is being supported by the earth. At any given moment, the potential of the cup to be stationed off the ground is being actualized by the desk, and the desk’s potential to hold the cup is being actualized by the floor, and so forth. Feser writes, ‘There is an essential connection between the members of the series qua members insofar as the members lower down in the series have their causal power, for as long as the series exists, only insofar as they derive it from a member higher up.’[[23]](#endnote-23) Because each member of a hierarchical series of cause receives its power in a derivative sense, there must exist a first member, which is understood as ‘a cause that has the power to produce its effects in a nonderivative…way.’[[24]](#endnote-24)

To draw this point out, Feser asks us to imagine a paint brush with an infinitely long handle. If there isn’t a hand to lift the handle, the potential of the paintbrush to move can never be actualized, regardless of its infinite length. Feser explains that the same would be true for an infinite number of desks supporting the desk holding the cup of coffee. In each case, the instrumental nature (derivative or secondary dependence)[[25]](#endnote-25) of each substance highlights the need for a first cause. In other words, a first cause with the ‘built-in’ or inherent power to actualize potentials (including a substances potential to exist) is necessary in order for a series of hierarchical causes to exist. This first caused is understood as ‘pure actuality’ having no cause of its own, but rather an uncaused first cause, or, as Feser puts it, ‘an unactualized actualizer.’[[26]](#endnote-26)

What’s exactly wrong with this version of the argument? It’s clearly valid. And Feser spends a significant amount of time trying to motivate his argument with various thought experiments. Feser’s version of the Aristotelian Proof then, seems to minimize the force of Oppy’s original objections to the argument. Oppy however, does develop a new criticism. At the heart of Oppy’s paper, ‘On Stage One of Feser’s Aristotelian Proof,’ is the denial of (4), namely that no potential can be actualized unless something already actual actualizes it. This denial of course entails a denial of (7).

He formulates the counterexample as follows:

Yesterday, throughout the entire day, there was a red chair in my room. Pick some time t around noon yesterday. At t, the chair existed, and the chair was red. Moreover, at t, the chair had the potential to exist, and to be red, at t + ε, where ε is some relatively short time interval (say, a millionth of second). Do we need to postulate the existence of some distinct thing that exists through (t, t + ε) that actualizes at t+ε the potential that the chair had at t to both exist and be red at t+ε? I do not think so. Given that, at t, the chair has the potential to exist and to be red at t + ε, all that is required for the realization of this potential is that nothing intervenes to bring it about, either that the chair does not exist, or that the chair is not red, at t + ε. Potentials to remain unchanged do not require distinct actualizers; all they require is the absence of any preventers of the actualization of those potentials. In particular, things that have the potential to go on existing go on existing unless there are preventers – internal or external – that cause those things to cease to exist.

As Feser mentions in a recent discussion with Oppy, in order for the chair to remain red at t + ε, the chemical microstructure of the chair will have to continue being in a certain way. [[27]](#endnote-27) If the microchemical structure of the chair were different, the chair would no longer be red. So, it isn’t the case that the red chair can remain red at t + ε as long as nothing intervenes. Rather, as Feser notes, in order to retain ‘the redness,’ something outside of ‘the redness’ needs to be in place.[[28]](#endnote-28) In Aristotelian terms, there still has to be something which confers the potential of being red into act. Oppy doesn’t seem to take this into account. His counterexample then seems to be unsuccessful.

But that’s not all. We think there is another important point to make. Before we can explain it however, it would help to explain a standard objection to the Aristotelian Proof. It is sometimes stated that the Aristotelian Proof relies on outdated science. Usually the objector brings up Law of Inertia, which states that, ‘Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon.’[[29]](#endnote-29) The objector can appeal to this law and argue that once an external force brings about an object’s movement, we no longer need the external force to explain why the object moves in the way that it does. Thus, after one can explain why motion began (which it isn’t clear one could do without appealing to a first cause), one doesn’t need to explain why the object continues to move in the way that it does. There is no need to appeal to an uncaused cause which grounds all instrumental causes.

After Feser points out that the Law of Inertia only applies to local change and not change simpliciter, Feser argues that even if the objector were right, there would still be ‘the question of what actualizes the potential existence of things having natures of the sort described by the principle of inertia…’[[30]](#endnote-30) In a similar way, even if Oppy is right in that (4) is false – namely because a chair can remain red without being acted upon – there is still a fundamental question that Oppy would have to engage. What is it that actualizes the potential of chair to possess such a nature that it can continue being red from T1 to T2 without any external interference? Oppy will be hard pressed to find an explanation that doesn’t bottom out in an uncaused cause. In other words, at best, Oppy has avoided (possibly) one series of causes only to be confronted with another. For this reason, even if Oppy’s counterexample is successful, it’s far from clear if Oppy can still avoid Aquinas’ conclusion that there exists an unmoved mover.

Conclusion

Oppy is typically a more than formidable opponent of theism and his scholarship has greatly advanced the field of philosophy of religion. That said, his handling of Aquinas’s First Way is uncharacteristically lacking. As we have argued, Oppy has uncharitably (and incorrectly) interpreted Aquinas’s own argument. Furthermore, Oppy’s initial engagement with the argument failed to address any contemporary work, and when he does eventually address Feser’s recent formulation of the argument, his counterarguments are (at best) unsuccessful. As a result, Oppy has provided the advocate of Aquinas’s First Way no reason to doubt its soundness.

1. Notes

   For examples see: Edward Feser, *Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction* (NJ: editiones scholasticae, 2014); Eleonore Stump, *The God of the Bible and the God of the Philosophers*. (Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 2016); Brian Davies, *Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary* (UK: Oxford University Press, 2016); Norman Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I*. (NY: Oxford University Press, 2002). [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Graham Oppy, *Arguing About Gods*. (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 103. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. *Summa Theogica*, 1.2.3, trl. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, 1. 13.3, trl. Pegis. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Brian Davies, *Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary* (UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 37. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Ibid. 41. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Oppy, *Arguing About Gods,* 101. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Ibid., 103 [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. For example, according to Timothy O’Connor, on agent causation ‘at the core of every free action is an ontologically irreducible causal relation between a person and some appropriate internal event that triggers later elements of the action.’ See, Timothy O’Connor, *Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will* (UK: Oxford University Press, 2002), 43. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. William Abraham, *Divine Agency and Divine Action: Exploring and Evaluating the Debate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 179-180. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. W. Matthews Grant, ‘Can a Libertarian Hold That Our Free Actions Are Caused by God?’ *Faith and Philosophy* 27/1 (2010): 22. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid., 25. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid., 25. cf. Robert Kane, *A Contemporary Introduction to Free Will* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. W. Matthews Grant, ‘Can a Libertarian Hold That Our Free Actions Are Caused by God?’ *Faith and Philosophy* 27/1 (2010): 26. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid., 31. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid., 31. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. W. Matthews Grant, ‘Can a Libertarian Hold That Our Free Actions Are Caused by God?’ Faith and Philosophy 27/1 (2010): 31; Timothy O’Connor, ‘Simplicity and Creation,’ *Faith and Philosophy* 16/3 (1999): 408. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. See *Calvinism and the Problem of Evil,* eds. David E. Alexander and Daniel M. Johnson (Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Edward Feser, *Five Proofs of the Existence of God* (California: Ignatius Press, 2017), 35-36. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Ibid., 19. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Edward Feser, *Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction* (NJ: editiones scholasticae, 2014), 149. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Feser, *Five Proofs of the Existence of God*, 23. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid., 22. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid., 27. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. *Capturing Christianity*, ‘Are There Any Good Arguments for the Existence of God? Ed Feser v. Graham Oppy,’ February 6, 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-80lQOlNOs [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Isaac Newton, *The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*, trans. Andrew Motte (New York: Daniel Adee, 1846), 83. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Edward Feser, *Aquinas: A Beginner’s Guide* (Oxford: One World Publications, 2009), 78. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)