Lloyd’s book consists of three parts. Some key aspects of Part One have just been discussed. In Part Two, she defends the view that the complete definition of a law of nature is “a rule found out by reason” on the grounds that Hobbes’s formulation of what others would consider the specific difference of the definitions varies. When Hobbes describes the scope of the laws as being morality or their function to produce peace, he is talking about their scope or function, not giving their definition (101–6). But, one may object, if a law of nature is any rule found out by reason, then the rule that a human being should eat to survive would be a law of nature and not only a physical law (cf. 103). Defining a human being in different places as an animal that speaks, or lives in a polis, or has a sense of humor does not entail that one thinks that the complete definition of a human being is that it is an animal.

Lloyd convincingly argues that the goal of the laws of nature is to achieve the common good, not to guarantee that everyone who follows them will preserve her own life (110–50). She criticizes the most important rival views leading up to her own derivations of the first law of nature, “the Universal Right of Nature,” and “the duty to submit to government,” in thirty-five steps, by using the reciprocity theorem (211–60). These fifty pages are as powerful a sustained argument as I know of in Hobbes scholarship.

In Part Three, Lloyd explains why “the sovereign’s essential function is as supreme judge” rather than his function as a legislator (279). A consequence of this essential function is that natural law dictates that subjects act “as if legal positivism were true.” In this sense, natural law is “self-effacing” (280). Concerning the vexed question of how Hobbes responds to “the Foole” of chapter 15, Lloyd correctly shows that the Foole acts against reason but also shows that he acts against “prudence” (302–10). The last two topics of her book are Hobbes’s belief in the importance of political education and “the unity of practical wisdom,” that is, “the convergence of prudence, morality, and natural religion” in the laws of nature (358).

Lloyd’s book is required reading for all Hobbes scholars and political theorists.

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The occasion that prompted the current study was the discovery of a tiny typo in the text of Spinoza’s *Cogitata Metaphysica*—the appendix to his 1663 book, *Descartes’ Principle of Philosophy*. As it turned out, this typo, a reference to Book XI instead of Book XII of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, was inadvertently reproduced by Spinoza from a contemporary edition of Aristotle’s works, allowing Manzini to identify precisely the edition used by Spinoza as the 1548 edition of Aristotle’s works printed in Basel by Johannes Oporinus. It also led him to conclude that, contrary to the belief of many, Spinoza read Aristotle’s text very closely, and convinced him of the importance of studying the dialogue between the two great philosophers.

The book is comprised of three parts, reversing the order of Spinoza’s presentation of his philosophy in the *Ethics*. The first part discusses Spinoza’s ethical and political theories—where, the author claims, the influence of Aristotle is most manifest—against the background of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics*. Here, much attention is given to the notions of the *summum bonum* and beatitude. The second part discusses Aristotelian and Spinozistic theories of knowledge. In the third and final part, dedicated to metaphysics and first philosophy, the author compares the philosophers’ absolutely impersonal conceptions of God, examines their conceptions of substance, and develops a reading of what he calls Spinoza’s “ousio-theology” (305).

According to Manzini, Aristotle was one of Spinoza’s first major philosophical interlocutors, and there is no doubt he is right about this. This conclusion, however, is unsurprising,
since seventeenth-century philosophers, whether devoted Aristotelians or determined anti-Aristotelians, conversed in an Aristotelian philosophical language. Manzini shows that Spinoza engaged directly with Aristotle’s text, but also tries to substantiate an even stronger claim by stressing the agreements between the two philosophers.

There are two reasons that make it difficult to see Spinoza as being consciously and positively influenced by Aristotle, however. First, Spinoza’s dialogue with his philosophical predecessors is, without exception, highly critical and polemical. He does not usually mention philosophers with whom he agrees (e.g. Crescas and Machiavelli). Secondly, several of Spinoza’s explicit references to Aristotle are highly critical. Consider, for example, Spinoza’s claim, in a letter to Hugo Boxel, that “the authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates carries little weight with me” (Letter 56), or his mockery of the “delusions of the Aristotelians and Platonists” (Theological Political Treatise [TTP], Pref.; cf. ch. 13). Manzini suggests that in these passages Spinoza is not so much addressing Aristotle, but rather using him as a foil to target medieval Aristotelianism (13). Looking closely at the context, my impression is that he is right about the passages in the TTP, but not about the quote from Letter 56. More importantly, the claim that Spinoza uses Aristotle’s name as a foil is a double-edged sword that may also serve to undermine Manzini’s argument. Throughout the book, Manzini points out interesting and significant similarities between Spinoza’s and Aristotle’s texts, but to establish direct positive influence one must consider and rule out mediating agents. In the present case there is plenty of evidence that Spinoza read medieval Hebrew Aristotelians closely. Unfortunately, most of the Hebrew authors mentioned by Spinoza were never translated into modern European languages, and there are very few, if any, good studies of Spinoza’s dialogue with these texts; in the absence of such translations and studies, some of Manzini’s conclusions must remain tentative.

Manzini’s erudition and analysis of the text are impressive. For example, near the end of his celebrated Letter on the Infinite, Spinoza criticizes “recent Peripatetics” for misunderstanding the ancient method of proving God’s existence, citing Crescas’s correct formulation of the ancient proof. Manzini rightly points out that the proof Spinoza ascribes to the “recent Peripatetics” was in fact Aristotle’s, while the alleged “ancient” proof (which allows for actual infinity and relies on Avicennian terminology) can be found only in Crescas (157). Why then did Spinoza ascribe Aristotle’s proof to “recent Peripatetics” and Crescas’s fifteenth-century proof to the ancients? Possibly Spinoza saw Crescas as representing an old anti-Aristotelian line, which can be traced back to Philoponus, supporting the notion of actual infinity. Alternatively, he could have used the same writing technique he employs when presenting his views about the nature of Christ as the original view of Christ’s disciples, while describing common Christian dogma (e.g. the incarnation) as the innovation of certain Churches.

This is a thoughtful, precise, well-structured book, and also an important contribution to a neglected area of Spinoza scholarship.

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The first four chapters of Pippin’s elegant volume on Nietzsche were originally delivered as a series of lectures at the Collège de France in 2004. In a certain respect, the context of these lectures defines the parameters of Pippin’s reading of Nietzsche: he advocates an interpretation very close to Bernard Williams in emphasizing the psychological aspects and motifs of Nietzsche’s thought over and against certain contemporary French appropriations (e.g. Deleuze, Derrida, and Kofman). In over-emphasizing the deconstructive capacity of Nietzsche’s text, Pippin holds, these interpretations conclude that Nietzsche’s thought provides no philosophical insight—that “Nietzsche’s texts always seem to take away with