Between Sense and Thought: Synthesis in Kant's Transcendental Deductions

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Abstract: Focusing on the account of synthesis in Kant's Transcendental Deduction allows us to see a greater degree of compatibility between the two editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* than is sometimes thought. The first Deduction shows that while it emphasizes an account of empirical synthesis it also includes a more properly transcendental account of the synthetic unity required for cognition. The second edition simply focuses on this feature of synthesis to the exclusion of the empirical. The result: a complete account of synthesis with the A-edition starting "bottom up" from sense and the B-edition working "top-down" from thought.

Immanuel Kant's "Copernican Revolution in Philosophy" famously demands that we reverse the structure of our orbit: objects, no longer considered to be that sun around which the knowing subject's claims must spin, should now be regarded only so far as they conform to our own possibilities for experiencing them. This change in authority, this creation of a constellation of meaning meant only for the subject, lies at the heart of Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism. The linchpin, however, is Kant's account of synthesis. No transcendental turn can be made without the work of combination, for experience demands not only that discrete impressions be assembled into a whole, independent faculties too must find unity in their tasks. But while synthesis thus takes on the central role that it has in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, there has been a tendency in contemporary Anglo-American Kant scholarship to ignore the account of synthesis in Kant's first, 1781, edition of the *Critique*, privileging, instead, the analytic presentation offered for his 1787 revision. My thesis is that this is a mistake and that only once one sees an essential complementarity between the two editions does Kant's fullest position on synthesis become clear.

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Now one problem that must be immediately faced when considering synthesis in the *Critique* is the fact that while the Transcendental Aesthetic argues that a spatio-temporal synthesis of sense impressions into appearances occurs prior to the influence of the categories, this claim is subsequently overturned. Kant tells us in the Aesthetic that, "[T]here are two conditions under which alone the knowledge of an object is possible, first *intuition*, through which it is given, though only as an appearance; secondly, *concept* through which an object is thought according to this intuition."[1] This distinction between the respective synthetic "work" required of sensibility and the understanding is emphasized by Kant's repeated assertion that sensibility gives rise only to the a priori manifold of "appearances"; for "experience" of determinate objects we need the organizational influence of "thought." As Kant puts this later, "[S]ensibility and understanding must stand in necessary connection with each other . . . because otherwise the former, though indeed yielding appearances, would supply no objects of empirical knowledge, and consequently no experience" (A124).[2] This role played by sensibility with respect to a first synthesis of appearances appears to be overturned by Kant in his second, 1787, edition of the *Critique*. With what amounts to a redefinition of the role played by the imagination, newly identified as belonging to sensibility (B151), it becomes necessary in 1787 that no synthesis take place apart from the unity of apperception: its involvement alone grounds synthesis (B164). Kant's conclusion, finally, being that "all synthesis . . . even that which renders perception possible, is subject to the categories" (B161).

This supposed tension between the two accounts of synthesis, with synthesis ascribed to sensibility's production of appearances on the one hand and allocated singly to thought's categories on the other, is sometimes understood simply to be a problem posed by the manner of exposition. This sort of attempt at mediation argues that only *following* an account of the transcendental unity of apperception can we return to the Transcendental Aesthetic and recognize that synthesis cannot occur without the influence of the categories, and that the portrait of sensibility's synthetic work at producing appearances therefore presupposes and is undergirded by the more properly transcendental account of the categories found in the Transcendental Deduction, specifically, in its 1787 version. This retrospective re-reading resolves the seeming tension between the Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic and it furthermore allows the reader to "start over" with the B-Deduction.

It is, of course, not the case that some seeming tension in Kant's account of synthesis serves as the main explanation for the current, predominating interest in the B-Deduction. Indeed, Kant himself re-wrote the Deduction in its entirety for the 1787 B-edition and described the prior account as contributing "nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge," and that consequently any attention to the A-Deduction must be limited insofar as its central concern

with "[r]eproductive synthesis falls within the domain, not of transcendental philosophy, but of psychology" (B152, cf. A121 note). The description of synthesis as it appeared in 1781, in other words, was deemed too empirical in its presentation to manage a proper distinction between what should have been its own transcendental a priori deduction of the categories and the very similar account of synthesis already on hand in the Transcendental Aesthetic.[3] The rewritten Deduction for the 1787 edition of the *Critique* thus self-consciously appeals to an analyticity thesis whereby a discursive understanding, guided by the table of judgements and independent of any empirical synthesis, is analytically shown to achieve categorial application to intuitions.

One need not be specifically interested in denying the force of either of these promotions for the B-Deduction, however, to see that at least one consequence of the first mentioned appeal to expositional difficulty is that the account of synthesis in the A-Deduction thereby remains largely ignored. It is important to note here the geographic preference, though, in saying this. While Kant scholarship in Europe has long taken each of the editions seriously, often even preferring the 1781 account as the more philosophically suggestive, there has been, with some notable exceptions, a striking lack of interest in the American and contemporary British Kant communities.[4] Insofar as the account of temporal synthesis in the A-deduction is one of Kant's richest, however, I want to suggest a way for these analyses to reenter the English-speaking discussion.

One way to achieve this is to argue that the respective differences between the two editions on synthesis in general do not represent a complete shift but rather a change in perspective. So understood, the accounts of synthesis can be seen to complement each other. To be specific, what we find in the A-Deduction is a semi-phenomenological account of the activity by which an object comes to be synthesized.[5] Elaborating the specifics of this "threefold synthesis of experience" will be the focus of section one in what follows. This kind of proto-Husserlian or constitutive account stands in contrast to the B-Deduction from whose perspective such a "reproductive" or "associative" synthesis could only be retrospectively reconstructed via reflection on the already conditioned appearance. The two accounts denote a change of perspective, then, with the former beginning its narration "bottom up" with the receptivity of sense and moving towards the synthesized object; the latter moving "top down" by taking synthetic unity as its starting point followed by an analytic consideration of the synthetic activity that must be logically presupposed. Developing this point will take up the second section of the paper. If my claim regarding the essential complementarity between the two deductions is right, then any full-blooded account of Kantian synthesis will need to consider both editions of the Transcendental Deduction and the analyses of 1781 can be rightfully taken up into discussion again.

I.

Turning now to the 1781 account, we see that synthesis in the A-Deduction is specifically assigned as a task for the transcendental imagination. The "threefold synthesis of experience" there describes the manner in which empirical intuitions are synthetically molded by the imagination from the initial moments of their apprehension to their ultimate subsumption under concepts. Reflecting that individual sense impressions must be synthetically "combined," Kant explains that "[t]here must therefore exist in us an active faculty for the synthesis of this manifold. To this faculty I give the title, imagination. Its action, when directed upon perceptions, I entitle apprehension" (A120). As the imagination directs its action towards impressions or "perceptions" it seeks to organize those perceptions according to one of the forms of time. For Kant, temporal organization can take the forms of succession, co-existence, or endurance. The first moment of the imagination's synthesis—the synthesis of "apprehension"—synthesizes sensible impressions according to the most basic form of time, "succession" (A31/B47). What is important to see here is that the apprehension of impressions is successive because it is in and through apprehension that time is first generated, a time whose original "dimension" *is* succession. This means that there is at one and the same time an empirical synthesis of the manifold of intuition and a pure a priori synthesis of the manifold of space and time. In Kant's words, "without [the synthesis of apprehension] we should never have a priori the representations either of space or time. They can be reproduced only through the synthesis of the manifold which sensibility presents in its original receptivity" (A99–100). Given that "sensible intuitions allow for the realization of the understanding" (A147/B186), it must be recognized that time too can only be "realized" upon the formative reception of sensible impressions. Because apprehension is itself an act of synthesis, the unification of incoming sense impressions such that they appear successively—"one after the other"—is thus "due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of an intuition" (A143/B182). The key here is to recognise that the successive serialization of the incoming impressions is an imposed order—there is no temporal order prior to the synthesis of apprehension—and this synthesis is itself responsible for the co-constitution of our representation of time. Without this, according to Kant, we are left with a mere "synopsis" of the manifold of sense (A97).

This first moment of successive apprehension is "inseparably bound up" with the second moment of synthesis, the synthesis of "reproduction in imagination." Although the transcendental imagination is the faculty overseeing each moment of synthesis, Kant specifically designates the "empirical" or "reproductive" imagination as the faculty responsible for the reproductive synthesis of the successively apprehended intuitions (A121). Imagination is here described as "reproductive"

because its synthesis follows from the reproduction of just-past impressions alongside those that are present. Kant explains:

> [O]bviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations . . . a complete representation would never be obtained. (A102)

Later, he adds,

> even [the] apprehension of the manifold would not by itself produce an image and a connection of the impressions, were it not that there exists a subjective ground which leads the mind to reinstate a preceding perception alongside the subsequent perception to which it has passed, and so to form whole series of perceptions. This is the reproductive faculty of the imagination, which is merely empirical. (A121)

The mind's reinstatement of preceding perceptions alongside those that are current describes a "holding" of the incoming impressions. That this holding is regulated by the laws of association is evident in the production of "series of perceptions." The reproductive imagination regulates the impressions according to the successive order in which they were first organized by the synthesis of apprehension: identifying successive impressions within the series as "past," "just-past-past," etc., by means of associative recall. If the impressions were not so regulated, association would not result in a coherent appearance. Kant writes, "When I seek . . . to represent to myself some particular number . . . if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the units *in the order represented*), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation [of the number] would never be obtained" (A121, my emphasis). Without the regulation of the impressions the mind would simply find itself filled with a jumble of contents, contents held together in such a random fashion that a recognizable representation could never arise.

The sense in which this regulated holding of preceding impressions is similar to memory introduces the specific temporal form according to which synthesis, at this stage, takes place. While the mind's receptive apprehension generates an order according to temporal "succession," the reproduction of intuitions depends upon their "co-existence." For the immediate construction of an appearance what is required is the "remembering" of just-past impressions in order that they may be reproduced alongside those freshly arrived. Thus, upon the apprehension of an intuition, the mind is dynamically referred by the new impression to those that have already been received. The continuous synthesis of new impressions with those that are reproduced alongside the new guarantees a seamless experience, indeed, without this continual synthesis experience could conceivably be interrupted by periods when one's perceptual screen would be blank. Within

this continuous production of experience it is probable that new sensible intuitions will also suggest to the mind their relation to past impressions that have not been so recently received. In this case association would have to depend upon "long-term" memory, but its uniformity would be equally guaranteed by the initial regulation of impressions according to the laws of association. Kant writes, "If cinnabar were sometimes red, sometimes black, sometimes light, ... my empirical imagination would never find opportunity when representing red color to *bring to mind* heavy cinnabar" (A100–1, my emphasis). Co-existence is thus not to be understood as simply the "co-presence" of intuitions, it is rather a manner of dynamical relation via reciprocity between old and new impressions. This dynamical feature of empirical association is grounded upon the mind's a priori laws of reproductive synthesis. It is these laws that condition experience such that "appearances are themselves actually subject to such a rule, and that in the manifold of these representations a co-existence or [successive] sequence takes place in conformity with certain rules" (A100). In other words, the a priori rule for reciprocal relation is made evident by the empirical fact that incoming impressions "bring about a transition of the mind" to other impressions. The temporal organization of the successively apprehended intuitions, according to the rule for reciprocal "co-existence," commences once the present impression suggests to the mind intuitions that arrived earlier within the series of perceptions. This referral to the past intuitions reinstates them alongside the current impression. The co-presence of intuitions is thus made possible via reproduction, a reproduction initiated by the reciprocal reference of sense impressions, and whose result, then, is their associative synthesis with the present impression (cf. A213/B260).

The synthesis of intuitions that takes place via successive apprehension and reproduction in the imagination is a synthesis according to the laws of empirical association. While this association is accordingly regulated, it is only the association of the subjective contents of experience. Without their subsequent connection according to the logical rules that the concepts represent, the contents remain particular: they cannot support an intersubjective experience. A final moment of synthesis is therefore required, one that can take up the synthesis of appearances and unify them under universal concepts. The sensible intuitions require this transcendental unification, "Otherwise," Kant writes, "it would be possible for appearances to crowd in upon the soul, and yet to be such as would never allow of experience ... the appearances might, indeed, constitute intuition without thought, but not knowledge; and consequently would be for us as good as nothing" (A111). Under the title "Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept," the third moment of the threefold synthesis describes this subsumption of the empirical intuitions under the categories, the consequences of which being, then, the possibility of making objective statements whose truth can be intersubjectively checked.

Although the unification of intuitions under concepts is the result of the synthetic activity of the transcendental or productive imagination, this activity itself requires a transcendental ground in order for synthesis to be objectively necessary. This requirement follows from Kant's reflection that while the object would itself seem to ground our corresponding representations of it, i.e., to demand that our knowledge necessarily reflect the truth about it, our ignorance concerning the object apart from our representation of it is insuperable. Since knowledge thus depends upon the object only as it has been conditioned by the mind, what the object makes "necessary" is the synthetic activity that is itself the transcendental condition for the object's phenomenal appearance (A105). But this transcendental synthesis does not by itself ground objective knowledge. Objectivity equally depends upon the imagination's connection of representations according to the concepts or "rules" of the understanding. The relation between the unity of apperception underlying the concepts and the imagination's formative unification of representations according to those concepts are thus what together ground objective knowledge. In Kant's words, "[The] unity of apperception underlies the possibility of all knowledge, the transcendental unity of the synthesis of imagination is the pure form of all knowledge.... *The unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination* is the *understanding*" (A118–9).

With respect to the synthesis of "recognition in a concept," this moment of synthesis specifically describes the process whereby the mind becomes conscious that the representations reinstated by the reproductive imagination require a synthesis that will unify them under a concept. As Kant explains this, "If we were not conscious that what we think is the same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless," the unification of these representations under concepts, therefore, "is nothing but the consciousness of this unity of synthesis" (A103). The mind's recognition of the subsumption of representations under concepts defined here as a "unity of synthesis" simultaneously brings to the mind a recognition of its own activity in the synthesis of representations. That is, there is constitution of the unity of representation, as intuition is subsumed under concept, just as there is unity achieved in consciousness, as the mind recognizes that what it thinks is the same as what was thought 'a moment before.' Kant writes,

> The original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to concepts.... For the mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations ... if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity, thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules. (A108)

In keeping with the attempt to locate a specific temporal form for each moment of synthesis—apprehension is successive, reproduction relies on dynamical co-existence—its tempting here to name the reciprocal identity of self and synthetic act as representing the third form of time: endurance. The problem with such attribution, of course, is that once transcendental consciousness is identified as an enduring self we become involved in a paralogism (cf. esp. A350, A363, B422).

What we can gather from Kant's distinction between the transcendental unity of apperception as the "bare I think" which accompanies all temporal syntheses, and the individual temporal schemata according to which representations are synthesized under concepts, is that a distinction is being made between the order of synthesis and the order of knowledge. As it is explained in the Transcendental Aesthetic, space and time as forms of intuition enjoy a different status than the individual concepts with regard to the synthesis of appearances. Whereas space and time are universally required as synthetic conditions for all appearances, the individual concepts do not themselves each apply to every representation. Within the order of synthesis it is therefore necessary that synthesis progress from the successive apprehension of intuitions to their imaginative reproduction in series of perceptions, and only then to a synthesis that is particularized with regard to the temporal schemata that the individual concepts require. This progression from synthesis according to sensibility to a conceptual synthesis within thought suggests that we consider the threefold synthesis to be cumulative.[6] What the account of transcendental consciousness in the synthesis of recognition in a concept demonstrates, however, is that within the order of knowledge or meaning the unity of apperception stands as the necessary ground for all imaginative synthesis. From this perspective, the third moment of synthesis can be identified as the ground of all synthetic activity taking place in the first and second moments. It is reflection on this point that allows us to see the difficulty in assigning a specific temporal form for this moment of synthesis: as transcendental ground, the synthesis of recognition in a concept logically precedes the empirical syntheses of apprehension and reproduction; since it is only with successive apprehension that we "generate time," we must consider the third moment of the threefold synthesis to be atemporal. Further, once we recognize the third moment of synthesis as the transcendental ground for the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction, we can understand better the potential for confusion between empirical and transcendental syntheses in these sections.

II.

One move made in the B-Deduction is the shift of emphasis from the constructive role played by the temporal or associative syntheses of apprehension and reproduction to a renewed focus on the reciprocal unity of transcendental apperception

and its intended object as grounding the synthetic act. In the 1781 version the synthetic process by which the object is constituted takes on a genetic cast such that this process can be phenomenologically reconstructed; the B edition avoids any such psychologism as argumentatively insecure. Consequently, distinctions must be made between the reproductive imagination's synthesis according to empirical laws of association—now deemed to fall within the domain of psychology—and the understanding's "intellectual" synthesis which, "without the aid of the imagination," is responsible for the ultimate combination of intuitions according to the categories (B151–2).[7] What follows from these distinctions is an argument that can base synthesis upon the "analytic unity" of apperception thereby avoiding any appeal to a Humean-like association of impressions. Kant writes, "If the synthesis [of the understanding] be viewed by itself alone, [it] is nothing but the unity of the act, of which, as an act, it is conscious to itself even without (the aid of) sensibility" (B153). So considered, this act is thus a logically formal structure abstracted from all content or "sensibility." The conscious awareness of the unity of this act speaks not only to an awareness of the synthetically unified "Objekt" "in the concept of which the manifold of a given object is united" (B137), but to the presence of the "bare I think" whose formal unity accompanies all synthesis. The unity of this act thus accomplishes both a consciousness of the object as the product of synthesis and a consciousness of the synthetic act itself insofar as this act can be analytically known to ground apperception or "the bare I think." Kant identifies this principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception as "the first pure knowledge of the understanding" (B137), explaining that,

> To know anything in space (for instance, a line), I must *draw* it and thus bring into being a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (as in the concept of a line); and it is through this unity of consciousness that an object (a determinate space) is first known. . . . Although this proposition makes synthetic unity a condition of all thought, it is, as already stated, itself analytic. For it says no more than that all *my* representations in any given intuition must be subject to that condition under which alone I can ascribe them to the identical self as *my* representations, and so can comprehend them as synthetically combined in one apperception through the general expression '*I think*.' (B138)

It is this co-constitution of the unity of consciousness as synthetic ground and the unity of representation as the object of thought that is responsible, according to Kant, not only for having representations that belong to me, but for my remaining the same even as my representations will change.

III.

I want to close this essay with two points that argue for a greater degree of compatibility between the A- and B-Deductions than is sometimes thought. First, I suggest that we consider the B-Deduction's emphasis on objective unity to be a more elaborate treatment of the synthesis that was ascribed to the moment of "Recognition in a Concept." With this in mind, we see that the overall difference with respect to synthesis in the two editions is thus one reflecting merely a difference in perspective. If we are interested in a genetic account of the synthetic process from the first reception of impressions to their final subsumption under concepts then we begin with sensibility and progress to conceptuality as in the A-Deduction. This genetic account is of course only artificially reconstructed since one's phenomenal experience is seamless: things only appear to us once they have been synthesized; only after "bracketing" this fact, could one attempt to portray the specifics of temporal synthesis as Kant has. The version of synthesis found in the "Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept" in the A-Deduction and emphasized in the B-Deduction, by contrast, avoids any psychologism accompanying a genetic account by beginning from the point of view of the unity of apperception. From this perspective we start with the unified object and deductively reconstruct what must be the logical preconditions of its synthesis. In this case we recognize both in the third moment of synthesis in the A-Deduction and throughout the second edition that all synthesis depends upon the unity of apperception itself. To cite Kant again on this point, "all synthesis ... even that which renders perception possible, is subject to the categories" (B161). This change in emphasis, however, does not overturn the perspective that starts from sense since Kant is always clear regarding the requirement for material content: sense provides the content that realizes the transcendental faculties of the understanding (A147/B186). As Kant puts it, "Without some empirical representation to supply the material for thought, the *actus*, 'I think,' would not, indeed, take place" (B423). To deny this fact is to move from transcendental to dogmatic idealism.

This leads, then, to the second point that I want to make for a degree of compatibility between the two editions. Despite the change in focus that we find in the 1787 account of synthesis, i.e., to the specifically analytic proposition that the transcendental unity of apperception be the grounding condition of all thought, we still must presuppose the reception of sensible impressions as an equally necessary condition for the possibility of experience. The A-Deduction is centrally concerned with providing an account of the means by which these impressions are received and temporally organized. If the B-Deduction avoids the description of such an account as "psychologistic" or contributing "nothing to the explanation of the possibility of a priori knowledge," it nonetheless cannot deny the role of sensible content in transcendental idealism. As Kant puts it in §21 of

the B-Deduction, "[In] the above proof there is one feature from which I could not abstract, the feature, namely, that the manifold to be intuited must be given prior to the synthesis of understanding, and independently of it. How this takes place," he self-consciously adds, "remains here undetermined" (B145).

Given this second point, it is perhaps most productive to understand the relationship between the two Deductions to be one of complementarity. Each offers an account of synthesis—the one starting from sense, the other from thought—and each are concerned with conditions that are necessary for the possibility of experience. The accounts are complementary, then, insofar as each provides a picture of an ineliminable feature of synthesis—be it intuition or concept—and a complete understanding of Kantian synthesis requires that we consider them both. The effect of this argument should be a renewed Anglo-American interest in the temporal analyses provided by Kant in his account of the threefold synthesis of experience. Indeed, just as it is the case that empirical realism marks the *achievement* of transcendental idealism, it is also true that transcendental idealism itself relies on its position between sense and thought, with the account of synthesis bridging the gap.

Notes

I would like to thank Daniel Sutherland for his comments on an earlier version of this paper read at the Central Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association.

1. A92–3/B125, Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (Bedford: St Martin's Press, 1965), cited with German Academy pagination and "A" corresponding to Kant's 1781 and "B" to the 1787 edition. All further Kant citations will follow this format and remain in-text where possible.
2. See also A111, B140, B147. A division between the first synthetic yield of appearances and the experience of a determinate appearance or *Objekt* goes back, for Kant, at least to 1770. In the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770 Kant draws a similar distinction between the products of sense and those of intellect but there the Latin facilitates an easier sense of the differences between sensibility's *Apparentia* and the production of *Phenomena* as a result of logical subordination. In 1781 Kant is writing in German with only context to help distinguish between his uses of *Erscheinung*. See *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World* (*Inaugural Dissertation*), in *Kant's Latin Writings*, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Peter Lang, 1992), 129, German Academy edition vol. 2, p. 394. The potential for confusion regarding *Erscheinungen* touches on a deeper problem, namely, the relationship between appearance and representation—famously held to be isomorphic in some places, clearly distinct in others.
3. Kant's near uniform adaptation of the account of space and time from the *Dissertation* for the first *Critique* suggests that this underlies part of the difficulty in harmonizing

some of the tensions between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Analytic's Deduction.

4. Michael Barker makes a similar point, identifying Dieter Henrich's influential discussion of the proof structure in Kant's B-deduction as the starting point for that edition's prefence when dealing with the Deduction. See Michael Barker, "The Proof-Structure of Kant's A-Deduction," *Kant-Studien* 92:3 (2001): 259–89. For contemporary European commentators concerned to include a discussion of the 1781 Deduction, see especially Aron Gurwitsch, *Kants Theorie des Verstandes* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990); Gerold Prauss, *Die Welt und Wir* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1990); Wolfgang Carl, *Die Transzendentale Deduktion der Kategorien in der ersten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Frankfurt a. M.: V. Klosterman, 1992); and Béatrice Longuenesse, *Kant et le pouvoir de juger* (Presses Universitaires, 1993). Two scholars standing in contrast to the American trend are Richard Aquila, *Representational Mind: A Study Of Kant's Theory of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), and especially *Matter in Mind: A Study of Kant's Transcendental Deduction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); and Rudolf Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
5. One of the features frequently cited in reference to Kant's 1781 Deduction is the nascent phenomenology to be found in the "threefold synthesis of experience." Apart from Heidegger's reconstruction, however, few authors have undertaken the project of presenting this material as a phenomenological account of temporal synthesis. See Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. James Churchill (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1962), and *Phenomenological Interpretation of "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,"* trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997). For an account of the relationship between Edmund Husserl and Kant's "inchoative phenomenology" of time, see Paul Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. 3, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 47ff. Aron Gurwitsch, by contrast, concludes his discussion of the compatibility of Husserl with Kant with the judgment that "[t]he result [of these reflections] is certainly not a rapprochement between Husserlian and Kantian thought. Fundamentally, only the divergences have appeared" ("The Kantian and Husserlian Conceptions of Consciousness," *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology*, ed. Richard Zaner [Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966], 148–74, esp. 159). For a well-argued account more sympathetic to the possibility of rapprochement, see Henry Allison, "The *Critique of Pure Reason* as Transcendental Phenomenology," in *Dialogues in Phenomenology*, ed. Don Ihde and Richard Zaner (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 136–53. For a more recent, generally phenomenological approach to the first *Critique*, see Aquila, *Representational Mind* and *Matter in Mind*.
6. This is not an obvious point within Kant scholarship. Both H. J. Paton and A. C. Ewing understand the threefold synthesis to be only one piece of an overarching synthesis. See H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1965), vol. 1, p. 376; and A. C. Ewing, *A Short Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason"* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 75. Norman Kemp Smith argues that, insofar as "[r]eproduction conditions apprehension and both rest on recognition," the threefold synthesis should more rightly be considered as reversing

the order of synthesis, Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason,"* 2nd ed. (New York: Humanities Press, 1962), 246. By contrast, in his commentary on Kant and the imagination, Rudolf Makkreel argues that a cumulative thesis can be maintained if we consider the progress of synthesis to be one that is "gathering," "associative," and then "unifying": "Each synthesis would then be slightly more specific than its predecessor." Rudolf Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, 27. My claim that the structure is cumulative is different since it is based on an (albeit artificial) distinction between the three moments of the threefold synthesis according to the specific temporal form employed by the imagination. Insofar as this temporal reconstruction ascribes a genetic quality to associative synthesis, the claim that the threefold synthesis is cumulative becomes axiomatic.

7. The "figurative" synthesis of the productive imagination belongs to sensibility but is still considered transcendental insofar as it determines form a priori in accord with the unity of apperception.