

ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Historically described as the "Vanishing point of jurisprudence," and, despite globalization, still lacking the teeth for enforcement.

<sup>2</sup> Howard K. Smith; *The State of Europe* (New York, 1949).

<sup>3</sup> See for details; David Horowitz; *From Yalta to Vietnam* (England, 1971).

<sup>4</sup> I have discussed it in Aswini K Ray; *Western Realism and International Relations. A Non-Western View* (New Delhi, 2004).

<sup>5</sup> See Aswini K. Ray. *Domestic Compulsions and Foreign Policy* (New Delhi, 1975).

<sup>6</sup> See David Horowitz; *op.cit.*

<sup>7</sup> See *Western Realism and International Relations, op.cit.*

<sup>8</sup> See Charles Krauthamer; "The Unipolar Moment" in *Foreign Affairs* January 1991.

<sup>9</sup> Francis Fukuyama; *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, 1993).

<sup>10</sup> Samuel Huntington's well-known article in *Foreign Affairs* January, 1991.

## *Morality and Politics in Kant's Philosophy of History*

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A good place to start thinking about the theme for this conference, "Toward Greater Human Solidarity: Options for a Plural World," is Immanuel Kant's work on history and, in particular, his thoughts concerning the possibility of "perpetual peace." I say this even though there are extremely troubling aspects to Kant's thoughts on history, and despite the fact that Kant would seem to be offering us little more than 'an abstract and homogenized unity' when it comes to talk of world peace. For questions about human solidarity, and of course of race, progress, politics, and war, these questions need to begin with the philosophers of the Western Enlightenment, with Voltaire and Herder, with Kant, Schiller, and Hegel, since these are the thinkers who in taking up this series of questions managed also to create a framework within which all subsequent discussions seem to have taken place. And it is Kant to whom we must turn first since among all these philosophers it is Kant's work that seems to be most present in the way at least some of us appear to be thinking about freedom and peace today. It is with this in mind, therefore, that I propose we take up Kant's texts as we consider our "options for a plural world."

While there is a constellation of concepts that need to be addressed in any discussion of Kant's views on history: concepts of nature, providence, progress, culture and morality, as well as of race, inequality, antagonism and war, this configuration is clustered most tightly around what would seem to be a central antinomy animating Kant's entire discussion. Kant understood that striving for perpetual peace was a moral task and duty set for each of us by practical reason even as he argued that antagonism and war were nature's necessary tools for the attainment of that peace. The moral injunction that the individual

abhor war and seek peace at all costs, in other words, goes against nature's own plans for achieving peace in history's relentless and bloody march from one battlefield to the next. One question for us as we begin our consideration of Kant, then, will be to see whether the demands of morality can be achieved within a political sphere that is itself originally established for the purposes of national aggression and defense. A separate question, and one to be asked only at the end of our discussion, is whether Kant's account of morality will be strong enough to distinguish his philosophy of history from a position such as that held by Hegel, but again, that is a matter to which we can only turn later in our discussion.

With this somewhat loose agenda before us, then, I propose that we start by looking carefully at two early essays by Kant—the 1784 response to Herder entitled, "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," and the 1786 "Speculative Beginning of Human History,"—essays that are suitable enough as companion pieces that our enquiry can move freely between them. But perhaps it will be helpful first to say a word or two about Kant's philosophy, particularly with respect to his position on nature and freedom, in order that we might better orient ourselves to the discussion at hand.

For Kant, resolving the paradox set by competing claims for freedom and determinism—claims, for example, both that the human must be free if he is to be moral and that he must be determined so long as he remains subject to natural laws—resolving these claims takes place only once we see that there is a necessary distinction at work in the ways that we can be said to know either nature or freedom. Nature, according to Kant, makes up the "phenomenal" or appearing world, it is the world of mathematics and mechanization, of science and the predictable uniformity of natural laws. And of this series of appearances the subject is said to have "determinate knowledge"; she understands

the world as a mechanism, she can grasp it as a series of parts. It is at just this point, however, that a necessary limitation is imposed upon the subject. It is because the Understanding is limited to a representation of nature as a series of parts that it cannot satisfy the demands of Reason which seek to know the whole. We can understand, for example, the mechanical make-up of an organism but we can never achieve determinate knowledge of the reasons for that organism's being. Thus Reason seeks to bridge the gaps left by Understanding and, in this case, proposes a principle of purposivity, that is, a teleological concept of nature that can provide a sense of a systematic whole within which all discrete mechanism can not only operate but find its meaning and purpose. This proposal, this speculative suggestion offered us by Reason, however, has a special different status, for Kant, within the order of knowing. Only the Understanding can provide determinate cognition or what we might today call scientific truth; Reason's offerings, by contrast, have the status of "Ideas" though these Ideas are no less determining when it comes to our interpretation of the world. The Ideas of Reason regulate and guide our actions and our thoughts just as fully as any constitutive cognition determined by the understanding. The difference is that whereas we can be said to achieve certainty in our determination of natural laws, there can be no such certainty when we approach questions concerning purpose and meaning in nature or history. The critical role played by the Ideas of Reason is nowhere so evident, for Kant, as in the case of our idea of freedom. Like the teleological conception of nature, freedom is not part of the series of appearances making up the phenomenal world, and yet, Kant tells us, while human beings are physically bound to the natural laws of phenomena, we must nonetheless consider them to be "noumenally" free. We cannot know, in the sense of determinate cognition, that we are free, and yet, for Kant, Reason demands that we act as if we are free; that we thereby choose to obey the moral law within us, a law taking on the guise of a categorical imperative for all action: treat

others as ends in themselves, never as means to some end. This is the basic moral principle for Kant and it is central enough to his thinking that, as we shall see shortly, he locates it in the first moments of his "Speculative Beginning of Human History."

Now the question facing Kant as he turns his thoughts to history, is how we are to understand the fact that whereas nature appears to us as a necessary series of events connected by natural laws, there appears to be neither rhyme nor reason to the chaos and disorganization that are the hallmarks of human affairs. Kant concludes that a philosophical approach to history requires that we discover a framework for the "history of freedom" much as was done in the case of nature, that is, that we determine a principle of purposivity to be operative throughout history but effecting humanity only as a whole, that is, as a species, rather than any one particular individual. And just as the teleological principle of nature seeks to rationally recognize the meaning and purpose of particular organisms, the philosophical approach to history will seek to discover man's purpose as the singular rational animal. In Kant's words,

[S]ince the philosopher cannot assume that in the great human drama mankind has a rational *end of its own*, his only point of departure is to try to discover whether there is some *natural objective* in this senseless course of human affairs, from which it may be possible to produce a history of creatures who proceed without a plan of their own but in conformity with some definite plan of nature's. We want to see if we can find a guiding thread for such a history, and we will leave it to nature to produce the man who is in a position to write it.<sup>1</sup>

It is of course not clear whether Kant took himself to be nature's chosen author, but Kant is clear on what he takes to be the guiding thread for a philosophical approach to history. Man's special vocation, Kant argues, is to seek perfection through the complete development of his natural capacities, and the "supreme end" of this vocation will be the achievement of a true "sociability" among men and thereby peace.

Kant provides us with nine theses in his "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent"; propositions that will serve as the bases upon which a philosophy of history—that is, an account of history that rejects its random appearance in favor of a claim to its systematic progression according to a guiding thread—can be built. We have already anticipated the spirit of many of them but we can now list them in the order Kant presents. Kant's first proposition reminds us that the teleological conception of nature requires that all natural beings have a purpose, that it is of a piece with one's natural destiny that all native capacities be developed completely in pursuit of their end, and indeed that without this Idea of Reason nature could not be grasped as a systematic whole but only as a random collection of discrete parts (8:18). His second proposition takes up the case of mankind. As the only rational animal, man offers a special problem with respect to the demand that all native capacities be developed completely; a special problem since the human lifespan can hardly be thought long enough to accomplish this task. As a result, Kant argues, we must assume that it is part of nature's plan that a complete development of man's capacities, that is, man's perfectability, must take place only in the species as a whole, and not the individual (8:19). The rational animal, as Kant continues in the next proposition, is guided neither by instinct nor innate wisdom and so must seek happiness and perfection only where she has produced it through the use of her own reason. Since progress toward perfection occurs only for the species as a whole, however, this means that any individual striving for

happiness in fact serves only the purpose of enhancing later generations of mankind. Kant admits this is odd, "But no matter how puzzling this is," he tells us, "it is nonetheless equally as necessary once one assumes that one species of animal should have reason and that as a class of rational beings—each member of which dies, while the species is immortal—it is destined to develop its capacities to perfection" (8:20). We operate, in other words, at the service of nature's drive for perfection of the species. And the mechanism by which nature will ensure mankind's perfection, as Kant outlines in the fourth proposition, is via a native antagonism between men. "By antagonism," Kant explains, "I mean in this context the *unsocial sociability* of men, that is, their tendency to come together in society, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly threatens to break this society up" (8:20). Nature has planted the seed of antagonism in man's breast and as a result he ignores his desire for an indolent tranquility and seeks instead to accumulate riches and honor, to compete, to fight, and to take from others what he feels is rightly his own. And it is this behaviour, Kant tells us, that marks mankind's "first true steps from barbarism to culture," it is via the history of man's antagonism that culture will slowly progress from what is at first only a "*pathologically* enforced agreement into a society and, finally, in a *moral whole*" (8:21). The achievement of this moral whole consists in mankind's successful organization of itself into a cosmopolitan society and the remaining of Kant's nine propositions are concerned with just this. Here too nature guides man's way, setting the formation of a civil society, of a society capable of administering justice universally, as the task for man and helping him to achieve it by means of his unsocial sociability (8:22). As man is pathologically forced into civil relationships he submits what Kant calls his "wild freedom" to the external freedom that constitutes the rule of law and right; he accepts the fact that civil society requires him to have a master over himself (8:23). And as it is with the formation of civil right, so too is it for international right since a civil constitution can only

be as strong as it is capable of establishing law-governed relationships with other nations. Here nature both demands that these relationships be established and forces a solution by means of man's antagonism. As Kant describes this,

Wars, tense and unremitting military preparations, and the resultant distress which every state must eventually feel within itself, even in the midst of peace—these are the means by which nature drives nations to make initially imperfect attempts, but finally, after many devastations, upheavals and even complete inner exhaustion of their powers, to take the step which reason could have suggested to them even without so many sad experiences—that of abandoning a lawless state of savagery and entering a federation of peoples in which every state, even the smallest, could expect to derive its security and rights not from its own power or its own legal judgement, but solely from this great federation of peoples (*Foedus Amphictyonum*), from a united power, and from the law-governed decisions of a united will (8:24).

This federation of peoples, first imagined by Kant here in 1784 is of course the focus of one his final philosophical projects some ten years later, since the achievement of such a cosmopolitan state is just what it means to have perpetual peace. Although mankind, as Kant is quick to remind us, remains in a state of moral immaturity and is thus far from such peace, nature is hard at work, pushing us into conflict and struggle that we might yet bring about a perfect political constitution within which man's cultural and moral capacities might finally be perfected. And this is Kant's answer to that first question that I asked us to keep in mind as we began our discussion: the demands of morality can

be reconciled with those of nature only once nature's work has been completed since the formation of a moral character can only follow upon or develop within a state governed by a perfect constitution. As Kant puts it, "... a good national constitution cannot be expected to arise from morality, but, rather, quite the opposite, a people's good moral condition is to be expected only under a good constitution" (8:366).<sup>2</sup>

This, then, is Kant's first attempt to think history philosophically; to make sense of what would seem otherwise to be an unbroken string of random aggression and setback. Nature has made mankind antagonistic in order to achieve a particular end: perfection in man's complete development of his natural capacities and thereby the overcoming of any tension between morality and nature once morality can appear as a kind of second nature (8:117).<sup>3</sup> That war is a necessary mechanism for this achievement, in other words, that war is ethically necessary, for Kant, is clear once we see that the perfection of the moral individual can only take place under a perfect constitution. Nature's circuitous route towards the morally good thus requires much in the way of the morally bad since it is only in reaction to aggression and war that the state will be finally forced to adopt and perfect civil and international right. Thus Kant will write that,

Nature should thus be thanked for fostering social incompatibility, enviously competitive vanity, and insatiable desires for possession or even power. Without these desires, all man's excellent natural capacities would never be roused to develop. Man wishes concord, but nature, knowing better what is good for his species, wishes discord (8:21).

Which all leads to Kant's ninth and final proposition, the thesis concerning the role of the philosopher. For the philosopher can

aid the purposes of nature by providing a philosophical justification, by demonstrating how a planless aggregate of human actions in fact conforms as a whole to a system following something of an a priori rule (8:30).

We need to keep this last point in mind since it will bear directly on questions concerning the responsibilities of the philosopher, and particularly of Kant's attempt to justify a history of violence, once we turn to his efforts to write a "Speculative Beginning of Human History." This essay again takes up the question of the history of freedom but now from the point of its inception. Kant argues that we can speculate on this beginning since it must find itself in man's own original capacities, capacities with which of course we have an everyday familiarity. Since the foil for this discussion is Kant's attempt to provide a philosophical reading of man's Fall as described in the Bible's book of Genesis, he must begin with Adam and Eve. What is important for us to notice about this starting point is how it allows a particularly troubling argument to develop in Kant's essay even as it will remain consistent with Kant's larger project of describing our fateful path toward harmony and moral perfection. Now some of us may perhaps have already started feeling uncomfortable with Kant's justification for a rhetoric that is all too familiar today, a rhetoric claiming that we must "wage war for peace," for example, but it is precisely the fact that we do find ourselves under the sway of this political narrative that we must return to the eighteenth-century's philosophers in order that we might trace the lineage of something that we have in some real sense inherited. This, of course, should be held in mind for the following as well. Kant's essay on the beginning of human history will present us with an argument justifying inequality among men even as he will argue that each of us is necessarily equal in the eyes of nature. This argument in some sense takes us to the crux of Kant's antinomy between the demands of nature and morality so we must take some time to develop it carefully.

We can begin by recalling the centrality of Kant's notion regarding man's perfectability in his "Idea for a Universal History." The teleological conception of nature demands that man's natural capacities achieve their complete development, if not in the individual, then in the species as a whole. While these capacities attain their final end in the development of morality as a kind of second nature for mankind, Kant is also concerned with the development and advance of culture and learning, with antagonism playing a determinate role in the perfectability of these as well. Without our asocial qualities, Kant tells us,

... man would live an Arcadian, pastoral existence of perfect concord, self-sufficiency and mutual love. But all human talents would remain hidden forever in a dormant state, and men, as good-natured as the sheep they tended, would scarcely render their existence more valuable than that of their animals. The end for which they were created, their rational nature, would be an unfulfilled void (8:21).

The perfection of man's talents thus requires that we relinquish any peace constituted by a "pastoral existence of perfect concord, self-sufficiency and mutual love" in order that the human species may finally and at great cost achieve a peace wherein all of man's rational capacities for culture and morality have been perfected.

Although Kant effectively repeats this point in the "Speculative Beginning of Human History," it unfolds in an oddly dramatic fashion, following, as it does, the story of man's genesis. Arguing that it is philosophically necessary that history begin with a single pair, Kant writes,

... one must begin with only a single pair, so that war does not arise, as it would if men lived close to one another and were yet strangers, and also in order that nature might not be accused of having erred regarding the most appropriate organization for bringing about the supreme end of man's vocation, sociability, by allowing differences in lines of descent; for the unity of the family from which all men should descend was without doubt the best arrangement for attaining that end (8:110).

Progress toward perfection being man's vocation, from this first pair nature in her economy has devised "the most appropriate organization" for achieving sociability, namely, the allowance for "differences in lines of descent." Now while Kant may well have been interested, as in fact he was, in speculating upon the origin of the different races, it is by no means logically required for his argument that antagonism work between people of different descent. We might have a hint at Kant's motivation, however, further on in the essay. Although it is true that nature regards all humans as equal in their endowments of freedom and reason, and thus in their right to demand that they be treated only as ends in themselves and never as means (8:114), inequality in men's rights as humans, Kant tells us, "is an inequality that cannot be separated from culture as long as it proceeds, as it were, without a plan (which is, in any case, inevitable throughout much of time)" (8:118). This condition appears first with the colonists; in Kant's words, "*Inequality* among men—that source of so many evils, but also of everything good—began during this period and increased later on" (8:119). Nothing further is said regarding nature's organization of mankind into different races, and nothing more from Kant than these two comments regarding the role played by inequality—"that source of so many evils, but also of everything good." And yet Kant's position seems as clear as it is

unnecessary for his argument to hold: just as the philosopher can justify the mechanism of war as an ultimate force for good, so too must we accept and understand that inequality among the races is inseparable from the progress of culture and thus serves nature's purposes, that is, has the force of a natural necessity, in moving the species forward in ever greater perfection.

Now while we might not be able to save Kant from himself, and this particular argument certainly needs rejecting, we can still see whether Kant's larger project has anything left to be said for it as a philosophy of history. Indeed, we must do so since philosophical responsibility requires just as much that we understand the history of our contemporary intellectual and political narratives as that we avoid a simple pointing of fingers in favour of a reflective and serious response. With *this* as our goal, it might be good now to focus on Kant's account of morality in these same essays of his on history.

We have already mentioned what Kant takes to be the basic moral principle, the demand that the entirety of mankind be treated as ends in themselves, never merely as the means for some other's project. In the "Speculative Beginning of Human History" Kant locates the inception of this principle in the last stage of man's movement from the state of nature to civil society. There are four stages to this 'deliverance from nature's womb': first, there must be a refusal of sensual pleasure in favor of "more idealistic attractions," second, we must acquire good manners that we might win the respect of others—Kant sees this development of "decency" as the first hint of man's formation into a moral creature—third, we can discover man's emergence from immediacy as he develops the capacity to anticipate the future, fourth, and finally, we must develop a sense for mankind as the true end of nature. This step is critical for Kant since it is here that we find the basis for the moral law. As the true end of nature we see that the whole of nature offers itself up as a means to our

ends and thus that we stand alone in the natural order as ends in ourselves. We also realize, Kant tells us, that man "must regard all men as equal recipients of nature's gifts" (8:114), which leads to the injunction that we regard all persons as ends rather than means. In her gifts of freedom and reason, nature herself provides that all should be treated as autonomous agents, as subjects capable of rational choice and action, and as subject to only the lawful externalization of freedom that is civil right (8:118). Man's equality in the eyes of nature "was early preparation," as Kant puts it, "for the limitations that reason would in the future place upon him in regard to his fellow man and which is far more necessary to establishing society than inclination and love" (8:114). Man's natural equality, in other words, is the only ground upon which a society founded on rational principles of Right can be convened. The formation of a civil government, the creation of a perfect constitution, and the appearances of civil, international, and cosmopolitan right, are each, according to Kant, part of nature's task for us as members of a moral species. And each is possible only upon the assumption of the universal equality of freedom and reason in mankind.

Just as nature pushes the human species towards the formation of a moral whole, in his 1795 essay on "Perpetual Peace," Kant will argue that the individual too stands under a moral imperative and duty to seek a state of perpetual peace as the final achievement of a moral whole (8:356). While theoretically this notion of peace serves, as all Ideas of Reason, merely as a regulative ideal or guide for thought, from the practical, that is, the moral point of view, we must take this notion as a dogmatic demand for action; a duty to which every individual must feel herself enjoined (8:362). "How," Kant asks,

does nature further this purpose that man's own reason sets out as a duty for him, i.e., how does she foster his *moral objective*, and how has it

been guaranteed that what man ought to do through the laws of freedom, but does not, he shall, notwithstanding his freedom, do through nature's constraint? This question arises with respect to all three aspects of public right, *civil, international, and cosmopolitan right* (8:365).

Kant's answer to the question will be familiar to us by now: duty notwithstanding, man's perfection as a moral species is only and finally secured by nature's circuitous and bloody route. It is the fear of aggression that drives people to society and the subsequent creation of civil right (8:366), it is the constancy of war that forces nations into agreements securing international right (8:367), and it will be the financial success of a global economy that is the direct consequence of international right, and the concomitant fear of its disruption due to war, that will finally drive humanity from a state of international right to a great cosmopolitan federation of peoples, that is, to a state of perpetual peace (8:368). Perpetual peace remains, of course, an Idea of Reason; a heuristic fiction or ideal, but one towards which we must nonetheless seek constant approximation. "Perpetual peace," Kant writes elsewhere, "the ultimate goal of the whole Right of Nations, is indeed an unachievable Idea" (6:350).<sup>4</sup> And yet for the sake of our duty towards the creation of peace, we must act in conformity with the Idea of this end even in the face of its theoretical impossibility (6:354).

How, then, are we to fit Kant's views on individual morality within his larger portrait of history? Is Kant finally pessimistic regarding our chances for peace, leaving everything, as he does, in the ruthless hands of nature? Or is he an optimist, hopeful for the possibilities of the individual even if the species as a whole should prove morally weak? Since these do not present opposing theses it makes sense that our discussion so far should support each. The history of freedom is indeed bleak: by threat of violence

nature alone has the capacity to push us to develop our talents, to create pathologically enforced social organizations, and finally to develop a political constitution under which morality can develop and grow into something like a second nature. Culture and learning will progress towards their ultimate completion but only at the long-running cost of man's natural equality. None of this, however, not one of these grand epochal determinations at the hands of nature, spares us from our individual moral duty. We must obey the moral law in our treatment of all people as ends in themselves. We must avoid "political moralism," seeking peace as merely a prudential measure and a technical task, and choose instead to be "moral politicians," people acting out of duty and respect for the moral law, knowing only the intentions of our actions in so far as they seek ever to approximate the Idea of peace (8:377).

Does Kant provide us with a philosophical justification for the bloodshed and violence that he calls the history of freedom?—yes, and self-consciously so. Is Kant's racism to be explained away by appeal to the necessary work of nature?—no, on the contrary, Kant stands condemned by his own hand. Inequality in human rights may well be part of some great natural mechanism, according to Kant, but Kant as a moral individual, indeed all of us as moral individuals, are required to treat all people with the humanity and respect they are originally afforded by nature herself. And it is this check, though I mention this only in passing as we near the end of our discussion, it is this check that morality places on the individual and even on history so far as morality serves as the ultimate end of freedom's development, that marks Kant's distinction from Hegel. For Hegel, politics has a responsibility only to the pursuit of its own interests while the claims of both the individual and morality stand subordinate to that pursuit. While this is not so different from the ruthlessness ascribed to nature, whereas nature still works to the end of morality in Kant's account, in Hegel it is only the cunning of reason which leads us



to the idea of freedom, an end arriving long after morality has been sublated.

What can we learn, finally, from Kant as we seek to answer the call for human solidarity within a pluralistic world? For Kant, of course, nature is pushing us even now towards human solidarity though the claims of morality simultaneously demand that each individual work to develop and perfect her own moral character in the face of nature's ways. While the very notion of a perpetual peace might seem to call for a hopelessly 'abstract and homogenized unity,' Kant in fact argues against such homogeneity, believing that it can lead to only a despotic peace. Here nature comes again to man's aid since differences in language and religion, Kant argues, are nature's way to ensure that any federation of peoples remain permanently set in a state of competitive equilibrium, homogeneous solely in their shared desire for peace (8:367). But regardless of whether or not we can see Kant's vision of a great federation of peoples as a workable model for today's world, we can, surely, be inspired by his call to the moral individual; the individual who heeds Reason's demand and seeks perpetual peace as a fundamental moral task.

In his speech upon winning the Nobel prize for literature in 1982, Gabriel Garcia Marquez wrote against Europe's hegemonic determination of Latin America, lamenting that "The interpretation of our reality through patterns not our own serves only to make us ever more unknown, ever less free, ever more solitary." Do we, then, necessarily work against some greater human solidarity once we seek to interpret nations "through patterns that are not their own"? What possible escape, however, can there ever be from interpretation; to know Latin America or Africa or India through their own lived experience would only be to take on a new set of interpretations, of interpretations as idiomatic and untranslatable as those that European colonists once sought to impose. Human solidarity as a goal, as a moral task, Kant might

say, requires indeed that we accept the limitations of interpretation, of both self-knowledge and knowledge of the other, but we can see, with Kant, that it also calls us to think beyond the limits of our Understanding, to heed Reason's demand for something greater than our mere physical existence would seem to allow. Like the Idea of Freedom, we must also believe in the possibility of hope, for without hope there can be neither place for the free individual, nor platform for the moral politician. We must have hope, in other words, for without it there can be no work for peace.

#### ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent," in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, translated by Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1992), p. 30; corresponding to volume 8, p. 18 of *Kantsgesammelte Schriften* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1904-). All further citations from Kant will be in-text using the German academy pagination, e.g., 8:18.

<sup>2</sup> "To Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch," in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*.

<sup>3</sup> "Speculative Beginning of Human History," in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*.

<sup>4</sup> *The Metaphysics of Morals* [1797], translated by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

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