

While the meaning of these terms is subject to some interpretive dispute, “objective sufficiency” can be understood as an epistemic notion akin to “objective” certainty – i.e., a holding-to-be-true with grounds sufficient to guarantee truth. “Subjective sufficiency,” by contrast, refers to a psychological state of maximal confidence, or certainty in its subjective sense.

Hence, when one opines, the assent is neither objectively nor subjectively certain. Yet this assent is still governed by objective standards, such that opinion still involves having *some* grounds favoring the proposition and so *some* degree of commitment to its truth. Opinion for Kant is thus quite akin to Locke’s well-known characterization of belief as an assent proportioned to one’s epistemic grounds. As described in the *Jäsche Logic* and other logic lectures, opinion occurs when one is cognizant of grounds both for and against truth, though with a balance such that “one has more grounds for the cognition than against it” (LB, 24:241 [early 1770s]/CELL:192). That is, opinion for Kant is the mode of assent proper to propositions that one takes to have a probability of truth of between .5 and 1.0 (CPJ, 5:465–6 [1790]/CECPJ:329; LJ, 9:66 [1800]/CELL:571; LB, 24:219/CELL:173–4; LBU, 24:638 [1789–90]; LV, 24:825 [1780s]/CELL:282; etc.).

It is also important to understand that for Kant opinion and belief are not interchangeable terms. Although the German *Glaube* can mean either “religious faith” or “belief” in its more pedestrian sense, Kant uses the term primarily in its former manner, as a mode of assent grounded in our practical and moral interests. *Glaube* is thus used primarily in relation to the practical postulates and other supersensible objects of religious or moral significance. Opinion, by contrast, is limited in the same way that knowledge is for Kant, both restricted to the scope of possible experience.

Opinion, however, takes on one further restriction beyond the limits that transcendental idealism imposes on knowledge. As explained in the *Jäsche Logic*, it is “absurd to opine a priori,” and so opinion has no role “in mathematics nor in metaphysics nor in morals, but merely in *empirical cognitions*” (LJ, 9:67/CELL:571). Yet, because nearly all that we hold-to-be-true involves the empirical, Kant still takes opinion as our most abundant form of assent (LV, 24:850/CELL:303).

Related terms: Belief, Knowledge, Truth

Lawrence Pasternack

Organism (*Organism, Organismus, organische Wesen, organische Körper, Naturzweck*) Kant’s references to organic life are most readily captured by the English term “organism.” Kant did in fact use both *Organism* (twelve times) and *Organismus* (five times) in his works, but he more often chose to use *organische Körper* (fourteen times) or its variants, *organische Wesen* (five times) and *organisierte Wesen* (seven times). All of these terms were conceptually connected, moreover, to Kant’s most common way of referring to an organism – as a *Naturzweck* (twenty-two times) – since, as he understood it, “Things, as natural ends [*Naturzweck*], are organized beings [*organisierte Wesen*]” (CPJ, 5:372 [1790]/CECPJ:244). Organisms, in other words, are defined in the first instance by their being *organized*. How they are organized is a matter for reflective judgment to consider (CPJ, 5:193/CECPJ:78), but in general, Kant is clear that we must view such organization to be somehow oriented by an organism’s need to defend itself against the various ill effects of disorganization or entropy (CPJ, 5:371/CECPJ:243).

For most of the history of the term, the Latin *organismus* and its modern language equivalents referred generically to a state of organization or ordering that could be applied to virtually anything. It was only at the end of the eighteenth century that “organism” became a unique term

for beings who, until then, would have required extra-delineation as “living bodies,” “organized bodies,” or “organic bodies.” It was because of this, no doubt, that in 1802 in his *Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der Kritischen Philosophie* Georg Mellin discussed Kant’s account of the organism under the heading of “Organized Being, Organized or Organic Body” (*Organisirtes Wesen, organisirter oder organischer Körper*) (vol. IV.2, pp. 487–94). The shift toward “organism” as the preferred term is reflected not just in Kant’s account being newly listed under “Organism” in Rudolf Eisler’s 1930 *Kant-Lexicon* (pp. 404–6), for example, but also in Kant’s works themselves, so far as the terms *Organismus* and *Organism* appear only in the very late texts collected together as the *Opus postumum* (OP, 21:185–7, 189, 198, 213 [1796–1803]; OP, 22:78, 272, 307, 398, 457, 534, 547).

Kant was well versed in many of the debates taking place in the life sciences during his day. One of the more central areas of contention concerned the proper means for discriminating between material bodies composed of organized parts (like clocks or automats) and living material bodies composed of organized parts (like plants and animals). For many theorists, it seemed clear that the physically organized structure of a body was distinct from any vital forces responsible for the life processes or metabolism at work within it. This was the approach taken by the chemist Georg Stahl (1659–1734), for example, who resisted attempts to provide a mechanical account of metabolism, arguing instead that only something like a *physis* or *anima* could explain a living body’s capacity for the movement of otherwise inert material parts. This was a position which Kant appears to have appreciated when, in discussing the issue in 1766, he exclaimed, “I am convinced that Stahl, who is disposed to explain animal processes in organic terms, was frequently closer to the truth than [the mechanists] Hofmann or Boerhaave, to name but a few” (DSS, 2:331 [1766]/CETP70:319). And indeed, by 1790 Kant would reach conclusions similar to Stahl’s regarding the manner by which we must reflectively judge animal processes to be operating, given that for Stahl the biological body was best taken to be a complex, self-organizing system of material parts and a purposive force or *physis* responsible for their ongoing interrelation.

Turning now to Kant’s specific remarks, one notes that with few exceptions (A, 7:178n. [1798]/CEAHE:287n.; PG, 9:251 [1802]/CENS:522–3; R1546, 15:968–9 [summer 1798–1804]; R4211, 17:458 [1769–70]; R5995, 18:419 [1783–4]/CENF:324; R6818, 19:171 [1776–8? 1770–1? 1771–6?]; R7688, 19:491 [1771–6? 1769? 1773–5?]), Kant’s discussion of the organism takes place in either the 1790 *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (twenty-two times) or in the *Opus postumum* (thirty-two times). Of these, the account given by Kant in §§63–6 of the third *Critique* is by far the better known. Kant’s argument covers a lot of ground in these sections, but four general points can be summarized in brief. First, Kant is interested in providing his readers with a precise account of the organism viewed as an end in itself, as a *Naturzweck*. This notion turns, for Kant, on an account of causality: on the special kind of causality that seems to be at work in organic life, and on the remote analogy that can be drawn by us between human freedom and the organism’s seeming capacity for intentional activity (CPJ, 5:370–1, 375–6/CECPJ:242–3, 247). Second, Kant takes the organism to be organized by itself, by its own “self-organizing” capacity as opposed to by some external source, and he sees this process of self-organization as occurring so far as the organism serves as both “the cause and effect of itself” or, as he explains it, as demonstrating in its goal-directed, entropy-resistant activities, both final and efficient causality: “only if a product meets that condition will it be both an organized and a self-organizing being, which therefore can be called a natural end” (CPJ,

5:373–4/CECPJ:244–6). Third, Kant is concerned to emphasize throughout that such a conclusion is the product of reflection; it is a teleological judgment that is reached in view of our experience of organic life, but it in no way constitutes a set of knowable truths regarding nature. Although we are ineluctably led to thinking about plants and animals in this way, we cannot have any certainty regarding such pronouncements, given that we have gone beyond mechanical explanations in our account. It was for this reason that there could be no “Newton of the blade of grass” (CPJ, 5:398–400/CECPJ:268–71). Fourth, Kant is at pains to distinguish even speculative reflective judgments regarding organic life from anything that might be seen as supporting theories of living matter or “hylozoism.” Kant admits that it is hard to know what to make of the many inscrutable properties of nature, especially when it comes to its containing “a formative force that propagates itself,” but adding a soul to it as artificer, or asserting that matter is alive or is itself an organism, leads only to unintelligibility. It is at this point that we must recognize that while we might import a sense of our own free causality into nature when considering the spectacle of life, these natural ends, if taken on their own terms, will simply resist our every attempt at explanation (CPJ, 5:374–6/CECPJ:245–8).

Kant's discussion in the *Opus postumum* repeats some of these conclusions (e.g., OP, 2 I:185–6/CEOP:60–1), but its focus concerns the place of organisms within an account of the moving forces of matter: “The division into organic and inorganic cannot be lacking from the division of the moving forces of matter which belongs to the transition from the metaphysical foundation of the natural science to physics; and, indeed, it must be thought a priori in it, without previously being instructed, by experience, of such bodies” (OP, 2 I:210–11/CEOP:64–5). How can such a thing be thought a priori? Here Kant resorts to analogy, in this case between the experience of our body – as itself a set of moving forces, as something both responsive to external stimuli and a source of them – and our view of organisms. As he puts it, “Because man is conscious of himself as a self-moving machine, without being able to further understand such a possibility, he can, and is entitled to, introduce organic-moving forces of bodies into the classification of bodies in general” (OP, 2 I:212–13/CEOP:65–6; see also OP, 22:373/CEOP:118). While this sounds like the “remote analogy” described in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, such cautionary language is missing from the *Opus postumum*, as Kant seems concerned to develop instead an account of an embodied, self-aware I in the *Selbstsetzungslehre*.

Related terms: End, Hylozoism, Life, Purposiveness, Reflective judgment *Jennifer Mensch*

Outer sense (*äusserer Sinn*) In *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant distinguishes inner and outer sense in causal terms: “in outer sense, the human body is affected by physical things,” whereas in inner sense, the body is affected “by the mind” (A, 7:153 [1798]/CEAHE:263). Correspondingly, the object of inner sense is the soul, whereas the objects of outer sense are bodies (A342/B400 [1781/7] = CECPR:412; see also ID, 2:397 [1770]/CETP70:390; MNS, 4:467 [1786]/CETP81:183; and RP, 20:281 [1793/1804]/CETP81:372). Up to this point, this is a reasonably traditional way of characterizing outer and inner sense.

But in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant considers outer sense in the context of a “science of all principles of a priori sensibility” in order to uncover whatever sensibility can “make available a priori” (A21–2/B36 = CECPR:173–4). The first claim in this argument is that “by means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space” (A22/B37 = CECPR:174). Kant goes on to argue that