Introduction

It has been suggested that the Knowledge Argument can be applied to McTaggart’s B-series and A-series to argue that the A-series contains information that the B-series does not have [Perry 2001, Merriam 2012, 2022a].¹ When Mary, having all propositional knowledge about color, leaves a black-and-white room and goes out into a colorful world it seems that she ‘learns something new’ (a Knowledge Argument). When Nathan, having all propositional knowledge about time, leaves a B-series room and goes out into an A-series world it seems that he ‘learns something new’ (a Temporal Knowledge Argument).

We give an argument for A-theories based on the calculus of qualia, developed in [Merriam 2022b].

Section 1

Consider

(1) CA is west of NY
(2) CA is west of here
(3) April 2 is later than April 1
(4) April 2 is later than now
(5) April 2 is in my future
(6) when I look at a firetruck I see red
(7) when I look at a firetruck I see [now],

now,

(8) (1) is like (3); these propositions express concepts; the first one about space and the second one about time
(9) (2) is like (4) is like (6); these propositions express indexical concepts
(10) (5) is like (7); these are experiences

One can have a concept about redness; that’s what happens in (6) and (10). In contrast to these, (7) cannot be written without colored ink (or a colored computer screen). The information in (6) and (10) strictly do not contain the information in (7).

Is there is disanalogy here? No: (7) is the analogy to what we mean by (5).

I conclude A-theory is correct.

References

¹ Perry argues for a B-theory. This paper argues for an A-theory.

