Observations 3 version 3

Some of these observations are not new.

1. Why are we here? The full meaning of this question is an instance of two-dimensional semantics, among several other questions considered by scientists, some of which raise the form of Anthropic principles. Here are the two questions: A. why are we here *given* that there *was* a big bang and things could have been different and then finally we existed? One answer: random chemical reactions. B. Why are we here *given* that *we* exist (indeed solipsisticly in the extreme case)? One answer: God.

2. AIs will find many blind spots.

3. Politics. Theory: there is a spectrum of ways a person can live harmoniously with their surroundings. The two extremes on this spectrum are 1. change the surroundings to suit the person. 2. change the person to suit the surroundings. The former impulse gives rise to conservatism, and the later impulse gives rise to liberalism.

4. I am *not* arguing or asserting the bible is fictitious. However, finding contradictions in the bible is somewhat like finding contradictions in the works of Shakespeare.

5. Feminism. They should take all of the TV shows for one day and switch the men and women: keep the same shows and writing but put women in the men's roles and men in the women's roles. Then they should show all those TV shows for one day (at least).

6. What makes Bach the greatest composer is that he had the most *fun* of any composer in history.

7. Bach should be played on a clavichord tried in Remeau temperament to start with and not too fast and definitely not too slowly. A whole note in one piece does not necessarily equal a whole note in another piece (or even movement). Each voice should project. The player should be in a meditating and/or praying position. I am now convinced that 'well-tempered' does *not* mean 'equal-tempered'.

8. I was as much of a fan of Wittgenstein as anyone. Now I think: 'whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent': well, *duh*.

9. Derrida: language refers only to language. That's stupid. If I was a university student I'd go ask for my money back.

10. Whatever free will is, when does thing X have as much (and same quality of) free will as thing Y? This question could also be addressed in age studies, feminist studies, race studies, international studies, history studies, cultural studies, mental illness studies, addiction studies, nature vs. nurture studies, etc.

11. How much information would it take to specify (i.e. to be) the state of affairs 'the possibility of X exists' and how much information would it take to specify the state of affairs 'the possibility of X does not exist' (that is, whether the *possibility* exists). A default state would be one requiring information of 0, but it's not clear if either of these have that. How much information would it take to specify the state of affairs 'either the possibility exists or does not exist'? This does not necessarily require 0 information either.

12. 'All a cell wants to do is divide.' Then possibly we should look to that process/structure to find the minimal physical correlates to the subjective experience of love (in the context of Dualism).

13. It may be possible to experience G, green qualia. If one subjectively has P(G) then one subjectively experiences the proposition P *and* green qualia. We may specify that if one has P(g) then one subjectively experiences the proposition P but *not* green qualia. If (if) the two P's can be the same for any P then there are problems of verification, as is well-known in the philosophy of consciousness (e.g. humans vs. zombies).

14. It is *repeatable and falsifiable* that sometimes at some stages of awareness after death one gets into the presence of intense unconditional love. A possible mechanism for this was given in previous Observations. The biggest most pressing problem facing humanity is: which people get there (and what properties do they share) and which (if any) do not. This is a bigger more pressing problem than international peace, world hunger, global warming, etc. I stand by that.

15. confelicity

16. Inter-subjective agreement (and consensus reality) is different than objective reality. And the latter requires more assumptions.

17. Is entropy objective or subjective? Both. It is subjective in that a human may chose to measure/calculate the entropy of a system at some decided-upon volume, for example 1 m^3. But it is objective in that if space aliens came down and also measured/calculated the entropy of that system at the same 1 m^3, they would get the same answer. On the other hand, a human may choose to measure at a resolution of 8 m^3 and so (generically) get a different answer. But of course if space aliens chose to measure the same system at the same resolution they would get the same answer as we do.

18. The Lucus-Penrose thesis is that human minds can know things that finite mathematical procedures cannot in spite of the Godel incompleteness theorems. To put my cards on the table, I agree with this (as did Godel, as I understand it). Here is a theory that may or may not hold water. How do we know the truth of the true but unprovable sentence P from the formal system FS of e.g. Godel's paper? Theory: The formal system's terms refer only to numbers and, in a back-handed way, the formal system's propositions. The system of *our* reasoning refers to numbers, propositions, maps between them, changes in all of these, and also other things in back-handed ways. Perhaps one place non-provable truth could come in is in what we (humans) apply a supposed FS to: the terms and objects of the FS, and the arbitrariness and changeability of those applications and FS's and terms and objects. (And surely the maps from the set P(S) of all subsets of S, where S is the (ill-defined) collection of FS's (machines?) to an object in mathematics (in the physical universe?) is non-computable. Indeed some of these maps could refer to other maps and, among many other things, one has the up-rise of non-well-founded maps (sets).)

19. For a simple but interesting example (I'm probably not the first to suggest this example), suppose for formal system FS_1 we get unprovable but true propositions P_1. Then after 1 second adjoin (axiomatically) P_1 to FS_1 to get formal system FS_2, which will have its own unprovable but true propositions P_2. Then after ½ second adjoin P_2 to FS_2 to get FS_3 … and so on, halving the time unprovable but true propositions are adjoined at each step. After 2 seconds do we have a complete formal system? I think so—it's in the literature somewhere. It is not obvious, I claim, if a (quantum) machine could be constructed to do this for physical computability (I am not at all thinking one would

have to rely on micro-tubules as in Penrose's and Hammeroff's early suggestion, but more abstractly—see previous 'Observations' and 'A Mechanism for Life after Death').

20. Turing: non-computability might be introduced by occasional mistakes in computations. Godel: "...for example if the logic depends on the meaning of the terms…" (or whatever). This is exactly the kind of thing that happens in (13) and (24) and in two-dimensional semantics.

21. The idea that we are *finite* computers is absurd to begin with. The idea that consciousness is computations is *self-evidently* wrong—even if not obviously so.

22. Leibniz: it should be that this universe is the most varied one possible. Einstein: we want to know if there are any alternatives to the existence of this universe.

23. With respect to non-locality, 1. Quantum mechanics is incomplete. 2. There can be no hidden variables that complete quantum mechanics. 3. Therefore, a complete theory must have non-hidden variables that quantum mechanics does not have. 4. The 'now' in the context of 'future-'now'-past' (the A-series) fulfills this role precisely, as I explained at length and used in several earlier papers (one of which is currently under review for publication, AGAIN), several of which are on PhilPapers.
    How could it have been overlooked for so long? One reason is that there is a temptation to confuse, for example, *green* with a *thought about* green. The former is given by an experience of *green*. The latter is given by an experience of a *thought about*. These two experiences are not the same experience and thus cannot be equated.
    Thus, the *present* cannot be equated to a *thought about* the present. For example, my *present* should not be confused with a (current) *thought about* a present that is 10 minutes in my future.
    This is explained at length in earlier papers.

24. The answers to the Hard Problems, if there are any, must be experiences, as each question contains at least one quale. Part of the brain-correlates of the experiences will be able to be inferred from looking at the brain-correlates of the subjective experience of 'this is an answer' in such-and-such cases and extrapolating. There is a different Hard Problem for each qualitatively different subjective experience.

25. One of the best attributes of string theory is its parsimoniousness: different particles are different vibrational modes of a *single* kind of thing—and 'vibrational modes' themselves are a *single* kind of thing. Moreover, these single kinds of things are related in a simple, familiar, and natural way. These profound points are often underappreciated.
    Suppose string theory *is* right. Then wouldn't it seem kind of silly to insist on experimental predictions at the current stage of things?
    Is a particular kind of particle that is 'frozen in time'--but that keeps its kind—given by the frozen state of the vibration or by the continuing vibrations in the mode? If the latter, two series of time are needed.

26. Zen koan: what is your original face before your father and mother were born?
    Jesus: before Abraham was, I am.

27. Alan Watts simply didn't know what he was talking about and that's all there is to it. Eckhart Toll knows what he's talking about.

28. As of this writing, whenever physicists talk about time being an increase in entropy, they never address whether this is correlation only or if it is causation (post-McTaggart it is more complicated).

29. 'I went to a restaurant that serves 'breakfast at any time'. So I ordered French Toast during the Renaissance.'
        -Steven Wright
'He asked me if I knew what time it was. I said, 'Yes, but not right now.''
        - Steven Wright