

A) what the hard problems are

Consider the two questions:

1. why is my red r?
2. why is my red ■?

The first point to make is that there are (what could be argued to be) solutions to (1) that are nevertheless not solutions to (2). The surplus solutions to (1) do not answer a hard problem. The issue is the subtle but important one that (1) elicits an *idea about* red, whereas (2) elicits *red*. (But note it is possible to make the mistake—often habitual—of having (2) elicit merely an *idea about* also.)

So now suppose we define red' as 'that unambiguous phenomenal red which is in (2)'. Ask

3. why is my red red'?

The point is now that there are *also* (what could be argued to be) solutions to (3) that are not solutions to (2). And, as in the first case, these surplus solutions do not answer a hard problem. I can think of (purported) materialist/physicalist solutions to (1) and (3) that are nevertheless clearly not solutions to (2).

This also shows (demonstrates) there are only instances of the hard problem. There is neither just one hard problem nor is there an abstract set of hard problems that is itself a hard problem.

For (2) we cannot merely give an *argument* in black words on a white background (for the case of red qualia) for what the answer to a hard problem is. Once again, I can think of materialist/physicalist *arguments* for answers to (1) and (2). But they cannot give me a *demonstration*. In (2), but not (1) or (3), we have empirical and experimental and falsifiable and reproducible data. Indeed the reader has surely already reproduced the demonstration of the data in some sense for themselves (modulo *ideas about*).

Note a copyright on this paper would require the reproduction of the actual red. That cannot be said of any of the philosophy papers in any academic journals.

In other papers I have called (2) an example of a *qualation*, whereas (1) and (3) are not. Such a qualation can be generalized to operations and equalities or inequalities on multiple qualia.

B) how we'll get the hard problems' solutions, when possible

How do we get an answer to a hard problem, when possible? We want to combine two brain processes. The first brain process is that correlated to experiencing this-or-that qualia, as in (2). The second brain process(es) are those that have been found to be correlated to the subjective experience of getting an answer to a 'why?' question. If these two processes can be induced simultaneously, then it is reasonable

to suppose we will have a brain process that is correlated to the subjective experience of getting an answer to the 'why?' question when it comes to (an example of) qualia.

Note that surely the answer to a hard problem must contain the quale in the question, since there is no other way to specify *which* quale it is that we've answered the 'why?' question to.

C) tangential note: consciousness and the possible *non-causal-closure* of quantum mechanics

As of this writing, I'm puzzled by something (though perhaps others are not). If subjective experience is irrelevant to evolutionary survival, then it's not clear why a cohesive physical body that operates and survives in a particular environment should be correlated to a cohesive subjective experience when that body operates. It is perfectly possible that a human brain be correlated to an incohesive and, for all intents and purposes, random, subjective experience, as the body would still fulfill the evolutionary requirements for survival and promulgation. Thus 'what it's like' to be a human should make no more sense than 'what it's like' to be a physical system chosen at random.

Is that an argument for the causal efficaciousness of subjective experiences over-and-above their physical correlates? I don't know.

Maybe the immediacy of consciousness has something to do with it. That is, consciousness seems to happen in, and only in, the *present* (of McTaggart's A-series). And it could be this is one place causality surpasses mere mechanical causation, which is plausibly based on the B-series. The generalization to QM: collapse happens in and only in the present of a reference system (Merriam); probabilistic or collapse behavior could be an opening for where mental causation comes in (Chalmers); at collapse the (physical) conservation of Energy is violated (Carroll). (In fact, because of the violation of the conservation of energy at collapse, something odd has to be going on with time, as they are related by Noether's theorem.)

Alice's choice of experimental arrangement of her own free will 'over here' can affect the outcome of Bob's experiment 'over there'. Free will will mean at least that the state is not a function of states that are only in her past (and future?) light-cone. Funny how philosophers of consciousness generally assume the 'causal closure' of the physical, while philosophers of quantum mechanics generally assume free will, in the above sense, to choose the orientation of an experimental apparatus for a given experiment (given no super-determinism).

Maybe consciousness is such that it tries to increase its capacity (at collapses), regardless of what physical semi-correlates are doing. Thus, at collapse, the 'next' state is not determined only (if at all) by the physical laws governing the previous states, but by the consciousness of the system, which is to be somewhat independent of the physical states/processes and perhaps functions of the brain (which means at least that you can vary one without changing the other in some cases, or at least (or only?) that part of consciousness that has to do with intentionality).