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Confucianism and African Philosophy

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INTRODUCTION: THE EMERGENCE OF SOUTH–SOUTH ENGAGEMENTS

Although worldviews indigenous to sub-Saharan Africa have been compared and contrasted with Western philosophy and monotheistic religions such as Christianity, rigorous "South–South" engagements have been lacking. Philosophers representative of the majority of the world's population have not spoken to one another directly anywhere near to the extent they have with the "West" (or "North"). In fact, it is literally only in the past five years or so that nascent dialogues have emerged between those working in the African philosophical tradition and philosophers from, for instance, Latin America, India, and China. So far, the most conversation with an African pedigree, or at least the most visible in terms of the literature, has taken place with philosophers working within China's most influential worldview, Confucianism.[1] This chapter provides an overview of this research as it has been published, and it also makes recommendations about additional Sino–African philosophical exchanges that merit being undertaken.

This chapter presumes that the reader is reasonably familiar with African philosophies but not with Confucian ones, and so uses more space and citations to articulate the latter than the former. In addition, it focuses largely on moral and political ideas from the Confucian tradition, as they have been the overwhelming focus of the exchanges that have taken place so far. However, the concluding section does briefly note some epistemological and metaphysical issues that have been alluded to on occasion and that deserve more reflection.

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The next section of this chapter provides some historical and philosophical background to Confucian ethics and politics and also briefly discusses some methodological concerns about how to interpret these ideas (Sect. The Confucian Tradition in Context). Then, the chapter recounts some of the foundational normative concepts that are salient in the Confucian philosophical tradition, and notes many similarities between them and what is common to find in the African one (Sect. Key Similarities Between Confucian and African Values). Broadly speaking, it points out that both moral–political perspectives are aptly characterized as "relational," in contrast to the individualism that is more common in modern Western philosophy. Then, the chapter highlights certain key differences between the two traditions, many of which are shown to follow from competing interpretations of the appropriate relationships to honor (Sect. Key Differences Between Confucian and African Values). The last, concluding section makes some additional suggestions for further research on topics that should be explored in a world in which the South is on the rise (Sect. Conclusion: Some Neglected Topics).

THE CONFUCIAN TRADITION IN CONTEXT

The Confucian tradition is a literate one spanning more than 2500 years, making it a challenge to obtain focus in a short chapter such as this one. There is a large variety of authors, texts, and ideas from which to choose, and then also shifts in thought over the centuries, with influences coming from other worldviews, especially Buddhism and Daoism from Chinese culture and, more recently, Western perspectives such as Marxism.

Although a fine-grained comparison of various strands of Confucianism with different instances of African philosophy would be welcome, this chapter must remain content with providing much more sweeping characterizations. Its strategy is to address particularly salient and fairly constant features of Confucianism, with some concentration on the ideas of its two most influential exponents, namely, Confucius (551–479 BC) as his ideas have been compiled in *The Analects*, and Mencius (372–289 BC) as per the book titled *The Mencius.* And, despite the diversity of the sub-Saharan tradition, this chapter likewise appeals to some major recurrent themes, ones that have been shared by many different indigenous African peoples over a wide array of space and over a long amount of time. In short, this chapter considers broad continuities in the two traditions, leaving more particular, fine-grained comparisons to be undertaken elsewhere.

Before focusing on Confucian values, consider how Confucianism is part of a larger Chinese religio-philosophical tradition and how the latter compares with the African one.[2] In fairly stark contrast to precolonial sub-Saharans, whose worldviews invariably include reference to a personal God, those indigenous to China do not. Neither Confucianism nor Daoism nor Buddhism, the three best candidates for something called "religions" in China, is typically understood to be theistic in the sense of focusing on a spiritual person

deemed to have been the creator of the visible or physical world. Instead of transcendence being thought to come from engaging with a self-conscious deity, "it is the wisdom of the sages, Confucius, Lao Zi and the Buddha, that leads the people to their salvation."[3] This is not to say that Chinese philosophy is utterly free of spiritual elements. It is characteristic of Buddhists to maintain that an aspect of oneself is a non-physical entity that is repeatedly reborn upon the death of one's body, with one's proper aim in life being to obtain a state of enlightenment (*nirvana*) in which the cycle of rebirth (*karma*) is ended and one's consciousness is freed from attachment to the physical world. In addition, there have been large strains of Confucianism that prescribe seeking guidance from an impersonal Heaven[4] and worshipping ancestral deities.[5] Finally, a richly metaphysical picture of the world as composed of various forces, which are thoroughly interconnected and in constant flux, underwrites not merely Daoism but much Chinese thought besides (see Sect. Conclusion: Some Neglected Topics).

Even so, when considering Confucianism, the lack of reference to God and even to an afterlife is what stands out, in comparison to African worldviews. Daniel A. Bell, the philosopher who has probably done the most to relate Confucianism to English-speaking audiences, remarks that "Confucianism prizes social ways of life in the physical world above all else.... [T]he good life is thought to lie in the here and now; it does not get better after we die."[6] Such an orientation differs radically from the hope of becoming an ancestor in an invisible realm and thereby coming closer to God than human beings can, ideas that are well-known to be common amongst sub-Saharan peoples.

Despite the different metaphysics, the Confucian and African traditions share much when it comes to ethics and politics, at least in comparison to the modern West. As this chapter now explores, there is a real kernel of truth in the claim that the latter is characteristically individualist, and the former are instead typically relational or communitarian.

Key Similarities Between Confucian and African Values

To begin to understand the moral and political ideas central to the Confucian tradition, consider some quotations about what it is that people should ultimately seek out:

[T]he potentiality within individuals that enables them to be finally differentiated from birds and beasts is yet to be developed and cultivated as actual qualities of their character.... [The goal of self-cultivation] is to fully develop original moral senses, is to become fully human, while to abandon or neglect it is to have a deficient character which is not far from that of an animal.[7]

One *becomes* human by cultivating those thick, intrinsic relations that constitute one's initial conditions and that locate the trajectory of one's life force within family, community, and cosmos. 'Cultivate your person' [is] the signature exhortation.... If there is only one person, there are no persons.[8]

> Relationships…make people human…. [I]f one can develop his or her distinctively human nature [compassion and wisdom that helps to apply his or her compassion to all] more fully than others, he or she is more human, or a greater human being than others.[9]

If the authors of these statements had not been indicated, readers might well have thought that they were composed by African thinkers. These remarks are from important contemporary scholars of Confucianism about its ethical core, but the similarities with sub-Saharan views of how to live are palpable. In particular, the ubiquitous African maxim, "A person is a person through other persons," readily comes to mind, as does the familiar criticism of the wicked that they are not (really) persons or that they are (like) animals.[10]

As per the quotations above, for mainstream Confucianism there is a distinctively human and higher part of our nature, and a lower, animal self, where both can be realized to various degrees. That is, one can be more or less of a human or person, and one's basic aim in life should be to develop one's humanness or to cultivate one's personhood as much as one can. The same broad ethical framework is what one most often finds in the African tradition (and also in the Aristotelian one). The saying that a person is a person through other persons is not merely a descriptive account of our existence or identity, but is also frequently used to convey a prescription, an exhortation to become a real person and to avoid becoming a non-person.

The parallels between the two traditions hardly end there. For both Confucian and African ethics, the principal way that one can develop one's personhood or humanness is "through other persons," that is, by relating to other human beings in certain ways. This does not merely mean that if one were a Robinson Crusoe alone on a deserted island, then one could not become a genuine human being. It is not just that relating to others is a necessary condition of cultivating personhood, but, more strongly, that relationships are what *constitute* one's higher self. To be in relation with others *is*, at least in large part, to be a real person. Hence, the relatively few philosophers who have compared Confucian and indigenous African values have called them characteristically "communitarian"[11] or have said they are both focused on "mutuality"[12] or "relationality."[13] Placing relationships with others at the heart of self-realization differs from characteristically Western values of being autonomous, in control, confident, authentic, creative, unique, or able to express oneself, which are individualist in the sense of making no essential reference to others.

In addition, for both Confucianism and indigenous African philosophy, the relevant ways to relate to others are through virtues, dispositions to exemplify certain attitudes and to act consequent to them. To develop personhood, it is not enough to conform to a certain principle of right action in one's other-regarding behaviour. In addition, and probably instead, one must be the sort of individual who exhibits particular feelings, emotions, and motivations in respect of others, i.e., who exhibits the right state of mind, and whose behaviour is a function of it. As Confucius says in *The Analects*,

If a superior man abandons virtue, how can he fulfill the requirements of that name? The superior man does not, even for the space of a single meal, act contrary to virtue. In moments of haste, he cleaves to it. In seasons of danger, he cleaves to it (part 4).

Compare this remark with Kwame Gyekye's characterization of the perspective of the Ghanaian Akan, whom he takes to be representative of sub-Saharan peoples in his essay "African Ethics":

When the Akan moralist maintains, for instance, that 'To possess virtue is better than gold', or 'When virtue founds a town, the town thrives and abides', he strongly believes that he is making a moral statement…that transcends his own community and applies…to all *human* societies.[14]

Still more, both Confucian and African philosophers conceive of the virtues in much the same way. Salient in both are exaltations of sympathy, compassion, beneficence, generosity, altruism, and tolerance. Again let us compare Confucius, who remarks in *The Analects*, "To be able to practice five things everywhere under heaven constitutes perfect virtue…. Gravity, generosity of soul, sincerity, earnestness, and kindness" (part 17),[15] with Gyekye:

When a person is known to be honest or generous or compassionate, he would be judged by the Akan as a good person…. Used normatively, the judgment, 'he is a person,' means 'he has a good character', 'he is generous', 'he is peaceful', 'he is humble', 'he has respect for others'.[16]

Or, as Desmond Tutu says of those described as having *ubuntu*, the Nguni word for humanness or virtue, "This means they are generous, hospitable, friendly, caring and compassionate."[17] Conversely, animality or vice for both traditions is largely a matter of insensitivity, hard-heartedness, cruelty, stinginess, selfishness, and intolerance.

There is, further, a recurrent tendency in both Confucianism and sub-Saharan philosophy to unify the various other-regarding virtues under the heading of "harmony." Harmony (*he*) is variously labelled as "the highest virtue" for Confucians,[18] "the most cherished ideal in Chinese culture,"[19] and the Confucian "grand ideal."[20] As the influential scholar Wei-Ming Tu remarks, "If someone is able to uphold the harmony in family relations, neighborly relations and in the relations between the upper and the lower ranks…then we can call him a Confucian."[21]

Similarly, it is common for those in the African tradition to encapsulate a virtuous life as one that prizes harmonious relationships. For example, Tutu says of characteristic traditional Africans, "Harmony, friendliness, community are great goods. Social harmony is for us the *summum bonum*—the greatest good."[22]

Finally, for both ethical traditions, the most important instance of harmony should be present in the family. "For Confucius, the paramount example of

harmonious social order seems to be *xiao* (filial piety)."[23] Filial piety is the disposition of children to support their parents not merely with money and other material support, but also with compassionate and respectful attitudes.

That is not to say that Confucianism utterly rejects impartiality and concern for strangers. Mencius' parable of the young child at risk of falling into a well, revealing that one is human in virtue of being inclined to rescue those unrelated to oneself and for their sake, has been enormously influential in the Confucian tradition. Here is the influential passage from *The Mencius*:

> When I say that all men have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others, my meaning may be illustrated thus: even now-a-days, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel so, not as a ground on which they may gain the favour of the child's parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbours and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of having been unmoved by such a thing. From this case we may perceive that the feeling of commiseration is essential to man....[24]

Acknowledging the humanness of being concerned for potentially anyone, as well as the idea that everyone has a moral status insofar as she is capable of virtue,[25] Confucianism nonetheless deems the central part of flourishing to consist of familial relationships, not only for their own sake, but also as a springboard for other relationships in one's life. According to Bell's reading of Confucianism, "The family was not seen as a necessary condition for the good life, it was the good life."[26]

Similar remarks apply to the African tradition in which the

> extended family is probably the most common, and also the most fundamental, expression of the African idea of community.... The importance of this idea for ethics is that the family is something that is valued for its own sake....a microcosm of the community persons create as they develop and in which they find fulfilment.[27]

Self-realization in the context of one's most intense harmonious relations matters most for typical African approaches to morality. "Family first" and "charity begins at home" are commonly expressed maxims, indicating a principled priority going either to kin[28] or to those with whom one has strong ties.[29]

However, as with Confucianism, sub-Saharan thinking about morality also includes an important impartial dimension, often deeming all human beings to be part of a human family with whom to harmonize or to have a dignity that warrants respect. Indeed, Nelson Mandela suggests that a defining feature of an African ethic is the inclination to be hospitable towards those who are not part of one's family.[30] The well-known parable of welcoming a visitor to a village with food and a place to stay (though perhaps giving him a hoe on the third day) neatly parallels Mencius' parable of the child falling into a well.

These striking ethical similarities between the two philosophical traditions from the Global South have only recently come to light. Philosophers in China and in Africa (and, needless to say, those in the West) have been unaware for several centuries of the substantial common ground between their most influential indigenous ethics. Despite its well-known downsides, globalization, which includes the spread of English, has usefully facilitated cross-cultural awareness.

Before turning to discussion of major differences between the two moral philosophies, I briefly note some additional similarities with regard to political philosophy. At least in comparison to the West, Confucianism arguably shares more in common with African theoretical approaches to power and coercion, and precisely in virtue of their common focus on harmonious relationships.[31] For example, theorists from these traditions usually maintain the point of a state is to improve citizens' quality of life. A government that was strictly liberal, i.e., that was neutral amongst conceptions of the good life and merely enabled people to live as they see fit, would be failing to harmonize with them, as such prescribes enhancing the public's ability to live objectively well.[32]

For another example, consider the way that Confucians and indigenous African philosophers have conceived of freedom. Although talk of "freedom" or "autonomy" rarely appears in Confucianism, there have been recent philosophical works advancing Confucian conceptions of them.[33] Basically, freedom here is understood as self-governance, with one's highest, distinctively human self being in charge of one's life. From this perspective, one is freer the more one is virtuous and relates to others appropriately. That is also the dominant view amongst African philosophers, and it contrasts with the common Western view that one is freer, the less interference with one's ability to act as one pleases.

For a third example, thinkers from both traditions tend to reject competitive, majoritarian democracy of the sort found in the West as being incompatible with harmony. Confucians usually favour meritocracy as what would facilitate a politics that foster's people well-being,[34] while Africans often defend consensus as a way to advance the common good.

Fourth, and finally, Confucian and African philosophers tend to reject retribution and deterrence as primary justifications of legal punishment, instead emphasizing a need for reform on the part of the offender and reintegration into the moral community. Confucians typically prescribe setting a good example and appealing to an offender's shame,[35] while Africans characteristically prefer restorative justice.

Key Differences Between Confucian and African Values

A broad point of view has revealed important similarities between Confucian and indigenous sub-Saharan values, ones that have come to light only recently and that should give pause to adherents of the individualism salient

in the Western tradition. However, a closer look reveals differences between them, too, ones that should prompt interesting Sino–African debate about how best to understand virtue, harmony, and a politics grounded on them.

Probably the most important respect in which Confucianism differs from the African tradition concerns the precise way in which harmony is conceived in them. For both, harmony is mainly a feature of ways of relating between people, and involves virtues such as sympathy, beneficence, and respectfulness. However, these common elements are set in the context of fairly divergent overall conceptions of the nature of harmony.[36] Confucian harmony is neither mere peace, nor sameness, nor agreement. Although Confucian harmony often includes peace, it is not reducible to it and includes more integration than mere détente. It is also by definition not sameness, as it necessarily includes differential elements; indeed, one of the most commonly quoted sayings of Confucius is: "The gentleman seeks harmony not sameness, the petty person seeks sameness not harmony."[37] Harmony is also not simply agreement, for those who have different opinions and perspectives can harmonize, and, more strongly, if they had identical views, then there would be mere sameness.

Instead, Confucian harmony is essentially a matter of different elements coming together, where differences are not merely respected, but also integrated in such a way that the best of them is brought out and something new is created. "Harmony is an active process in which heterogeneous elements are brought into a mutually balancing, cooperatively enhancing, and often commonly benefiting relationship."[38] Aesthetic analogies are often used to illustrate this concept of "creative tension" between disparate properties; think of different instruments that make music together, or diverse moves that form the unity of a dance, or a variety of ingredients that constitute a tasty soup.

One key kind of difference for the Confucian tradition is position in a hierarchy. That is, a desirable kind of harmony can come in the form of there being superiors who are educated and virtuous and who guide the lives of inferiors who are not to the same degree. Traditionally speaking, harmony is to be realized within, and by means of, hierarchical roles between parents and children, rulers and citizens, elders and youth, and men and women, though the last manifestation is not as popular these days (largely due to the influence of Western ideals on contemporary Confucian thought). Harmony exists when those in the lower position are respectful and deferential towards those in the higher one *and* when those in the higher position work for the benefit of those in the lower one. Then, differences are brought together such that a productive relationship is realized.

Such a comprehensive conception of harmony is not what one tends to find advanced by African thinkers. For example, a former Constitutional Court justice from South Africa remarks of *ubuntu*, "Harmony is achieved through close and sympathetic social relations within the group."[39] In addition, Gyekye

advocates "a life lived in harmony and cooperation with others, a life of mutual consideration and aid and of interdependence, a life in which one shares in the fate of the other."[40]

These and many other construals of harmony, and of related ideals of community and cohesion, suggest two distinct themes.[41] On the one hand, there is the concept of being close and interdependent, or what one might sum up as sharing a way of life. On the other, there is the notion of being sympathetic towards others and aiding them, a matter of caring for others' quality of life. The combination of sharing and caring captures much African reflection on the nature of harmony as an all-inclusive account of virtue.

Notice there is nothing inherently hierarchical about this sub-Saharan conception of harmony. If anything, it is well known for tending towards political egalitarianism, in which power is shared. Whereas autocratic meritocracy has been much more salient than democracy in the works of Confucians, African political philosophers have often highlighted the importance of democratic deliberation in the form of seeking consensus when resolving political disputes, a second important difference between these traditions. These differential accounts of political power are plausibly a function of competing conceptions of how to live harmoniously.

Another implication of the divergent theories of what counts as harmony concerns whether virtue or self-realization is entirely other-regarding or not. A natural interpretation of the African tradition is that living well is exclusively a matter of relating to others in certain ways. For instance, values of hard work and prudence are often deemed to be of mere instrumental worth for enabling one to share with and care for others, where the latter are alone harmonious ends in themselves.[42] In contrast, although Confucian harmony is largely other-regarding, it also includes an independent self-regarding dimension. That is, self-realization or virtue can also be obtained to some degree simply in virtue of non-relational properties, those intrinsic to a person. In particular, it is part of this tradition to maintain, in a manner akin to Plato in *The Republic*, that a given person's mental states can and should be harmonized for their own sake.[43] This sort of view is the exception, rather than the rule, amongst sub-Saharan thinkers.

These kinds of contrasts beg a variety of questions that have yet to receive systematic answers and that call for interesting cross-cultural reflection. Most basically, which conception of harmony is more attractive, the Confucian or the African? What leverage might there be for an adherent to one conception to give an adherent of the other reason to change her mind? Notice that it would not do for an African philosopher to appeal to the intuition that some kind of democracy is just, for that intuition will be rejected by most Confucians. A given theorist is going to have to work hard to find relatively uncontroversial common ground between the two traditions and then to consider whether her conception of harmony captures it better. For example, might one conception do a better job of capturing what is finally valuable about

friendship or love, or about how family members intuitively ought to interact? These kinds of South–South debates would be revealing and important to undertake, and notice that they could safely, perhaps even most usefully, proceed by setting aside variables from the West (North).

Conclusion: Some Neglected Topics

Previous sections compared and contrasted Confucian and indigenous African moral and political philosophies, and noted that there has yet to be real argumentation about which of them is to be preferred. This last section raises some additional important philosophical topics that are even more under explored in the literature. These concern metaphysics and epistemology.

Epistemology is particularly poorly developed in the literature bringing Confucian and African philosophies into conversation. About all that currently exists are brief suggestions that they are similar in that they both largely eschew the search for knowledge for its own sake, usually conceiving of the value of knowledge in pragmatic terms, and that they are different in that the literate culture of Confucianism (think of the famous written civil service examinations) has fostered more mathematical and scientific enquiry than usually found amongst indigenous African cultures, a very large majority of which were oral.[44]

Ontological analysis and argumentation is also sorely lacking, with only two texts that engage with the two Southern ontologies apparently available.[45] These texts indicate some broad similarities between Confucian and African thought about the nature of reality as ultimately composed of various forces in motion, which is naturally contrasted with the characteristically modern Western analysis of reality in terms of things, bits of matter. One could also add that both ontologies are characteristically relational or dialectical. That is, they by and large conceive of a given thing in terms of how it changes in relation to other things, and especially to the whole, which differs from analyzing something's nature in terms of its static, intrinsic properties. Specifically, according to an influential chunk of the African tradition, everything that exists is composed of varying degrees of vital forces that have come from God and that are thoroughly interconnected. A given force can and often does influence any other force, regardless of whether they are in the visible or invisible realms. An analogy with a spider's web is common; if one thread is touched, the rest of the web tends to vibrate, and if one thread is weakened, so is the rest of the web.

For much of Confucian, and more generally Chinese, metaphysics, reality ultimately consists of two basic kinds of force, the *yin* and the *yang*.[46] These are alternately conceived in terms of dualities such as dark and light, negative and positive, contracting and expanding, female and male. The dualities are usually understood to be complementary, and not antipodal, such that anything that exists is comprised of both features, even if one is more dominant.

And then a change to one force will inevitably have an effect on the quantity or quality of the other.

Putting these two broad metaphysical pictures into dialogue with each other (upon much more detailed and sophisticated analyses of them than are presented here) would be worthwhile simply for the purpose of comparative philosophy. However, many Confucian and African thinkers maintain that the values explored in the previous sections of this chapter are grounded on a metaphysics.[47] Very roughly, harmony *qua* sharing and caring is a matter of getting vital forces to relate in the right way, and harmony *qua* fulfilling hierarchical roles is a function of *yin* and *yang*, here conceived as inferior and superior.

Does choosing between the two ethics and politics truly require choosing between these metaphysical pictures? Or are the former fields instead "autonomous" in relation to the latter one (so that appeals to intuitions about value would be most apt to choose between them)? If not, and there is instead a relation of dependency, which metaphysics is more attractive? These are enormous, but inescapable, questions for those interested in getting to the bottom of Confucianism as it bears on African philosophy, two great relational worldviews from the Global South.[48]

NOTES

1. However, for additional South–South comparative philosophy see: Edwards (2014) for discussion of African metaphysics and ethics in relation to Chinese Daoism, Kuusipalo (2014), Ziai (2014), and Graness (unpublished) for discussion of the southern African ethic of *ubuntu* in relation to the Latin American ideal of *buen vivir*; and Gianan (unpublished) for comparison of *ubuntu* with the Filipino ethic of *loob*. Note how recent all these discussions are, and that none has yet appeared in an academic journal, indicating that they are far from mainstream at present.
2. The next few paragraphs borrow from Metz (2015: 86–87).
3. Yao (2000: 43), referring to the work of Hans Küng and Julia Ching.
4. Yao (2000).
5. Emphasized in Wang (2011).
6. Bell and Metz (2011: 82).
7. Yao (2000: 154).
8. Ames (2010: 143).
9. Bai (2013: 13, 16).
10. For an overview of these sayings as they appear in several different African cultures, see Nkulu-N'Sengha (2009).
11. Bell and Metz (2011).
12. Unah (2014).
13. Metz and Miller (2016). For some cross-cultural exploration of values by social scientists, see Anedo (2012), Matondo (2012), Ampiah (2014).
14. Gyekye (2010: Sect. 1). See also Paris (1995: 130–136).

15. A fuller characterization would consider the Golden Rule, which is found in *The Analects* (part 15) and which Kwasi Wiredu (1992) deems to be typical of African moral thought, as well as the "five constant virtues" (or "regulations") salient in Confucianism, viz., benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom, and fidelity (Yao 2000: 34, 215, 232).
16. Gyekye (2010: Sects. 3, 4).
17. Tutu (1999: 34). See also Paris (1995: 130–152).
18. Yao (2000: 172).
19. Li (2006: 583, 593).
20. Chan (2014: 2). See also Wei and Li (2013).
21. Tu (2010: 254).
22. Tutu (1999: 35).
23. Richey (n.d).
24. Mencius (1895: Book 2, part 1, Chap. 6, Sects. 3–4).
25. For instance, Li (2014a: 160–161).
26. Bell (2006: 145).
27. Shutte (2001: 29).
28. Appiah (1998).
29. Ramose (2003: 385–386).
30. Mandela (2006).
31. For fuller expositions of these ideas, see Metz (2014, 2015: 103–105, 107–110).
32. See, for example, Chan (2014).
33. For example, Johnson (2009: 57), Li (2014b).
34. Representative essays are in Bell and Li (2013).
35. For a direct quote of Confucius on this, for example, see Little and Reed (1989: 5).
36. The next two paragraphs borrow from Metz (2016).
37. Translation from Chan (2014: 91).
38. Li (2014a: 1). For additional definitional statements, see (9, 47–48, 109–110, 113, 126). See also Ihara (2004).
39. Mokgoro (1998: 17).
40. Gyekye (1997: 76). However, Gyekye often suggests that the value of harmony, while essential to an African perspective, derives from a more basic prescription to promote the common good, i.e., the well-being of all (e.g., 1997: 50, 2010: Sect. 5).
41. Initially analyzed in Metz (2007).
42. See Paris (1995: 141–148) and Ntibagirirwa (2001).
43. See Li (2014a: 89–100).
44. Metz (2015: 96–99).
45. Edwards (2014), Unah (2014).
46. See Yao (2000).
47. See several contributions to Imafidon and Bewaji (2014).
48. This chapter is an English version of an article that initially appeared in Chinese in the *International Social Science Journal (Chinese Edition)* 33 (2016): 159–170. It appears here with permission of this journal.

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