APPROACHING
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL AND EXISTENTIAL
THERAPY
THROUGH NEO-CONFUCIANISM

A Thesis

by

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ABSTRACT

Approaching Cognitive-Behavioral and Existential Therapy Through Neo-Confucianism (December 1984).

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The thesis is an effort to bring Neo-Confucian insights to modern cognitive-behavioral and existential therapy. The adaptability of Neo-Confucianism is illustrated through the growth-system inherent in its concepts. Frequently, Neo-Confucian sages and modern psychologists used virtually identical statements. Moreover, humanity faces the same basic issues while the particularizations vary. The importance of reason, manners, appropriate behavior and self-actualization remains constant. However, the methods of their attainment change with time. The history of the Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition is filled with such conceptual modifications.

Neo-Confucianism is a syncretic philosophy that utilized elements of Zen, Taoism, and Legalism within Confucian teachings. This adaptation increased the sages' ability to communicate with a wider range of people. In effect, the Neo-Confucian movement was perhaps the earliest practice of eclectic counseling. Neo-Confucianism itself has undergone development from

its eleventh-century origins to the present-day scholarly journals.

The researcher does not believe the key issue in interdisciplinary studies is whether psychology is being applied to philosophy or vice-versa. Neo-Confucianism pragmatically asserts that the true test of a philosophy rests in its ability to help the individual. Mere intellectual exercise contradicts the unity of knowledge and action.

The thesis has five chapters. The existential therapy chapter uses a predominantly Western psychology format while the cognitive-behavioral therapy chapter uses Wang Yang-ming's Four Axiom Teaching as an outline.

The thesis also includes Neo-Confucian cognitive-moral development observations reminescent of Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theories. Neo-Confucianism could be described as an education in evolving from preconventional to principled reasoning. Occasional parallels are drawn between process philosophy and Neo-Confucianism as well.

There is also a chapter in which Confucian commentaries are provided to actual case studies faced by Albert Ellis and Maxie Maultsby. A Chinese glossary is provided at the end of the introduction. There are five figures in the text, two of which are summarizing models in the conclusion.

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I give thanks to my parents, Joff and LaVerne Meyer for their love, patience and support. I am looking forward to seeing my thesis next to my father's thesis on the shelf of the Texas A&M library.

Lastly, I wish to express my pride and fond memories

in being a graduate of Texas A&M University. Individualism flourishes where there are professors who serve as mentors.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the realm of ideas, the world has always been a small place. Ancience Greek and Roman merchants returned home to tell stories about "The Silk People", inhabitants of a mysterious but respectable land in the East. Several centuries later, Christian missionaries developed mixed emotions toward these same Chinese. Some clergymen saw Confucian texts as inspired by God, a type of universalism through a shared Law-Giver. This moverment was called Figuratism, and included among its ranks, the Catholic, Joseph de Premare, S.J. (Mungello, 1976). Other clerics cursed the books as purveyors of subtle agnosticism and abstruse metaphysics (Ching, 1977). Philosophers of the European Enlightenment hailed the Orient for developing an ethical system, with minimal religious overtones.

Hoever, Europeans of the Nineteenth-Century snubbed the Oriental mind for not starting the industrial revolution. Cheng (1984) sees the Western philosophies as the leading edge of a desire to "impress and conquer the Orient" in a quest for politico-economic power. A trickle of Eastern thought began seeping into America in the

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This thesis follows the style of the Journal of Counseling Psychology.

1960s, but only Zen and Taoism. This condition seems to reflect the weakness and tension of modern Western social structures. Few professional philosophers or psychologists heed its presence (Cheng, 1984).

Yet, a turning point may be nearing. Japan gives credit to its Confucian background for modern success (Halberstam, 1983). How can the West continue to study Japanese management, electronics, and auto-making while ignoring its philosophy? The thought of a society is logically prior to its material products. This thesis is an effort to integrate Neo-Confucianism with Cognitive-Behavioral and Existential Therapy, yet the researcher sees that his research can only be an introduction to such a vast undertaking. It is realized that Oriental thought faces a blend of complacency and criticism from Western scientists and philosophers, who claim that it is merely a cultural phenomenon. Such a premature closure degrades the potential of communicating an integrated human experience (Cheng, 1984).

A prime tenet of the journal, Philosophy East and West, is that true philosophy is comparative. Cheng (1984) believes understanding is dependent upon comparison. In this manner, the strengths and weaknesses of each tradition can be assessed from an objective third stance. The issue concerning whether human nature is good or bad did not occur in ancient Greece. Also, will

as a faculty was not discussed by Plato (Chang, 1963). The Chinese saw a very close connection between willing and knowing, a common outlook in cognitive psychology. In fact, the word yi means both intention and thought (Ching, 1973).

Whereas some gaps in language remain unavoidable, an interpenetration of philosophical vocabulary can serve to enrich human awareness (Cheng, 1974a). A critical look needs to be taken at Neo-Confucianism as well (Cheng, 1984). The discriminatory practices of males toward females were commonplace in ancient times, both East and West. Such biases were reflective of folk traditions and not the Confucian philosophical system itself. Obviously, some aspects of Chinese philosophy need to be ignored as relics of a bygone era (Ching, 1977). It is doubtful that any Chinese philosopher would subscribe to such an outlook today.

Defining Neo-Confucianism

The task of defining Neo-Confucianism will take the form of a description. Neo-Confucianism can be conceived as a "metaphysical humanism," a "philosophical anthropology," an "existential phenomenology," or a "cognitive-behaviorism."

Its concern with man in the world in relation to others makes it a humanism or a philosophical anthropology

(Jung, 1966). The Buddhist ideal of the monastic life is abhorrent to the Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition. The interest in finding the principle of Heaven (t'ien-li), and sincerity (ch'eng) as a means for participating in the transcendent creative (sheng) force of the cosmos, reflects its metaphysical bent (Liu, 1972a).

The observation that intentionality (yi) is a reaction to objects in consciousness (hsin) is phenomenological (Jung, 1965). Neo-Confucianism and existential therapy share a concern for the dilemma of freedom and will, together with its possible resolution through self-actualization (ch'ien-hsing) (Nivison, 1973). The focus upon inner cognitions (yi-nien), appropriateness (i) as meaning and applicability, and conscience (liang-chih) are some of its cognitive psychological aspects. The emphasis upon manners (li[b]) the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i), and setting goals (li-chih) reveal a strong behaviorist trend.

Historical Development of Neo-Confucianism

Neo-Confucianism differs from Confucianism in its addition of metaphysical and epistemological theories to antiquated Confucian doctrines. These changes reflect influence from Taoism, Buddhism (particularly Zen and Hua-yen) and to a lesser extent, Legalism. A whole new range of potential was opened to the Neo-Confucian

philosophy, while keeping the same terminology (Chan, 1967b).

Li[a] (principle) was developed late in Neo-Confucianism. It had appeared in anti-Confucian texts originally. Ch'eng I (1033-1107) was chiefly responsible for the new outlook on li[a] (principle). This view considers principle to be an ordering pattern, an ultimate transcendent source, a type of form or reason (Chan, 1967b). Li is the potential for new things to appear, through logical priority (Tong, 1982).

The name "Neo-Confucianism" itself is something of a misconception perpetrated by well-meaning Europeans. De Bary (1981) writes that the Chinese preferred not to reflect a debt to any single philosopher. Neo-Confucianism was generally called, "The School of Human Nature and Principle" (hsing-li-hsueh). Nevertheless, Confucius is considered to be the greatest teacher/philosopher in Chinese history (Chen, 1976). The most influential sages lived 1500 to 1900 years after Confucius (6th cent. BC). Yet they endeavored to express the spirit of Confucius and Mencius (3rd cent. BC) through frequent quotations within a syncretic structure.

These philosophers included Chang Tsai (1020-1077), Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085), Ch'eng I (1033-1107), Chu Hsi (1130-1200), Lu Hsiang-hsan (1139-1193) and Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529). The two major Neo-Confucian schools were

the Ch'eng-Chu and the Lu-Wang. The investigator regrets not having the chance to discuss many of the later sages. However, there is a discussion of the merchant class ethic in Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868).

The reader may ask, "Why should anyone try to apply philosophy? Is not philosophy a task for medieval monks or gentile game for vain pedantic obscurantists?" The answer emphatically, "No!"

Neo-Confucianism was not a game but the state philosophy six and one-half centuries (de Bary, 1981). Most sages served in government. Wang Yang-ming was an outstanding general (Chan, 1972). The commentaries to the Classics was the basis for civil service examinations. No other religious or philosophical tradition in the history of the world stressed scholarship as much as Neo-Confucianism (de Bary, 1983).

Key Concepts

Neo-Confucianism is a philosophy that staunchly opposes "philosophizing." The starting point is conscience (liang-chih) and its extension (chih[b]). Cheng (1974) describes the three facets of liang-chih: "(1) the ability to know what are the first moral principles, (2) the ability to identify relevant information for moral evaluation, and (3) the ability to correctly relate moral principles to particular facts for correct moral judgements" (p. 82).

Liang-chih combines reason and intuition in its decision-making. Carsun Chang (1963) defines intuition as kind of knowing by direct apprehension and not by inference or experimentation" (p. 102). Chang also stated that intuition includes every cognitive process except reason, a wider range than the European understanding of intuition. It can be developed through control of desires, singleness of purpose and going beyond habitual world outlooks.

The inborn nature of man is assumed to be the grounds for certain positive behaviors. The classic example given by Mencius (4th Cent. BC) persuades us to imagine what they will feel immediately, when a child is seen suddenly about to fall in a well (Cheng, 1974a). This feeling is sympathy or commiseration, an instinctive readiness to help. Mencius called sympathy the beginning (tuan) of benevolence (jen), the first virtue to develop (Chan, 1967a).

Part of the beauty of Confucianism/Neo-Confucianism as a philosophy, is its disdain for the overly abstract tools of Western logic (Cheng, 1984). The simple wisdom of Mencius is at once intuitive and empirical. Western logic can be so removed from everyday experience that it seems to be intended for the intellectual amusement of the select few.

Self-actualization (ch'ien-hsing), or sagehood, is possible for all people who try to correct their errors and fulfill potentialities (Ching, 1973). In fact the Chinese word, ch'ien-hsing, literally means "fulfilling form," or "actualization the human design" (Tu, 1978). The views of Wang Yang-ming and Carl Rogers (1961) are nearly identical in this regard.

Goal of the Thesis

The objective of this project is not as complicated as it may appear at first glance. The goal of the thesis is to show the similarities between Neo-Confucianism and current psychological thought; both cognitive-behavioral and existential. Once initial correlations are established, a wealth of information can be contributed to contemporary psychology in the East and West. Neo-Confucianism can be applied through proving its theoretical compatibility with previously empirically validated concepts and methods in psychology. The next stage for incorporating Neo-Confucianism into psychology is testing the former discipline's unique contributions that go beyond the initial correspondence with psychology.

The "initial correlation" stage is finding essentially identical passages in both Confucian and psychology texts. The researcher is happy to admit that the task is like "fishing in a bucket" that is well-stocked. The

following example pertains to cognitive therapy. Aaron T. Beck (1976) wrote, "Whenever you experience an unpleasant feeling or sensation, try to recall what thought you had been having prior to this feeling." (p. 33) Chang Tsai wrote, "Whenever in our effort at thinking we come to some thing that cannot be expressed in words, we must think it over carefully and sift it again and again" (de Bary, 1983, p. 61).

The "unique contribution" stage is a study of Neo-Confucian concepts that are related to one's initial perception. Examining the Neo-Confucian creed of pairing thought/will (yi) with discernment (chih[a]) through content and semantic analysis yields fruitful results (Cheng, 1979a). A thought with minimal awareness or faulty discernment is expressed as an "automatic thought" in Beck's (1976) cognitive therapy.

Furthermore, the thesis invites the reader to experience the teachings for oneself. Bugental (1965) viewed his own book as raw material for another therapist to ingest, assuming that some aspects would be rejected and other positions assimilated. He holds a mistrust for the counselor who is a complete disciple of any other one.

The colloquial-sounding term "getting it oneself" (tzu-te[b]) is a key factor in understanding Neo-Confucianism (de Bary, 1983). Understanding of a philosophy or

counseling method comes with the internalization and practice of theories, not by the memorization or recitation of sentences. Tzu-te is both an educational and a philosophical concept; a frequent occurrence in Neo-Confucianism (de Bary, 1983). Tzu-te has also been described as self-realizing through appropriate (i) conduct; a bestowing or deriving of meaning from a situation (Hall & Ames, 1984).

Cheng (1984) proclaims that Chinese philosophy is not to be copied from the past, but should be the product of a "creative and self-reflective spirit" and a "critical and innovative mind" (p. 3). Study without discovery renders a text as a "dry, expository skeleton" where the symbol replaces reality (Weisman, 1965). Neither this thesis nor any psychology or philosophy book should be viewed as a static entity. If the nature of reality and the self is change, then so is written learning.

The Twelfth-Century Neo-Confucian anthology, Reflections on Things at Hand, is more about the example and personal experiences of contemporary Sung masters, than the ancients upon whom they were writing commentaries (de Bary, 1983). It should be noted that we are far less separated in time with the Sung (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) sages than they were from Confucius (5th cent. BC) and Mencius (3rd cent. BC). The Sung and Ming

philosophers illustrated the relevance of sagehood through characteristics of the times. People could identify with present-day philosophers and still keep their individuality. The reality of principle is in each person, a foundation of self-actualization and a drive for its attainment (de Bary, 1983).

A book marks a step along the way of an infinite learning process, engaged by the academic. Bugental (1965) mentions that "any statement made must be the statement of what was thought rather than current thinking" (p. 6). The researcher's outlook on Neo-Conficianism has evolved through his studies. Gradually, the investigator has noticed the behavioristic tendencies in Neo-Confucianism and existentialism. Originally, the researcher was more inclined to see the cognitive and metaphysical aspects. A strong interest developed in the relationship between chih[a] (learning), an epistemological concept, and chih[aa] (wisdom), one of the ethics.

Approach of Thesis

Finally, the investigator arrives at the list of chapters in his thesis, following this introductory chapter. The second chapter covers existentialism - both the philosophy and the therapy, and Neo-Confucianism.

The third chapter attempts to apply Neo-Confucianism to the cognitive/rational-emotive therapies of the emotional disorders. The fourth chapter is two case studies and includes Neo-Confucian commentaries by the researcher on sample case studies faced by two cognitive-behavioral counselors: Albert Ellis (1971) and Maxie Maultsby in Goodman and Maultsby (1978).

Validation of Neo-Confucianism will be partly evidenced by its utilization in counseling at present. In other words, proven techniques under different titles should show clear similarities to Neo-Confucianism. The discussion of the "initial correlation" stage in research alluded to this theory.

The author believes the greatest challenge of his project will be using English that does not read like a stilted translation of Chinese. The author will use different English synonyms for a given Chinese concept in order to better reflect its meaning in a specific context. The reader will need to pay attention to the Chinese word in parenthensis. When a Chinese concept has been used repeatedly in a specific section, the English translation will no longer be given. Hopefully this procedure will be conducive to an interpenetration of philosophical vocabulary and interesting reading.

Definition of Terms

The following list of terms and definitions form a "Chinese Glossary" for the thesis. Most sources are the glossary sections of large books, although attention has been given to explanations appearing in journal articles, whether through specific or contextual delineations (Chan, 1967a, 1967b; Chang, 1955; Cheng, 1972b, 1979a; Ching, 1973, 1976; Cua, 1971a, 1971b; deBary, 1981; Hall & Ames, 1984; Jung, 1966; Tu, 1972,1978). The concepts are listed in the order of their presentation in the thesis. The superscripts are used for concepts with identical transliterations, but different meanings and characters in Chinese. The more important concepts are labelled "a" regardless of their order in the thesis.

yi[b]	thoughts, intentionality as a reaction to objects, will
t'ien-li[a]	principle of Heaven
ch'eng	sincerity
sheng	creativity, life force
hsin[a]	mind, consciousness, mind-and-heart
ch'ien-hsing[a]	self-actualization, fulfilling the human design
yi[b]-nien	intention-thoughts
i (yi)[a]	appropriateness, fitness, rightness, justice, righteousness; one of the Five Virtues principle
liang-chih[a]	conscience, knowing-the-good, conscientious consciousness

li[b]	decorum, manners, etiquette, propriety; one of the Five Virtues; politeness, customs, ritual
chih[a] hsing[a] ho-i	unity of knowledge and action
li[c]-chih[c]	fixing the determination, making a resolution
li[a]	principle, reason
hsing[b]-li[a]-hsueh	The School of Human Nature & Principle; Neo-Confucianism
chih[b]	extension, development, pursuing
tuan	beginning, seed
jen	benevolence, love, good will, "the first virtue," humanity, human-heartedness
chih[aa]	wisdom, discernment, knowledge
tzu-te[b]	getting it oneself, (learning/philosophy), self-realizing (ethics)
chih[a]	perception, learning, discernment, "common sense"
li[a]-i-fen-shu	principle is one but its manifestations are many
hsin[b]	faithfulness, "the fifth virtue"
chung[b]	loyalty
shu	reciprocity
te[a]	virtue, power, strength
pen-t'i	original substance (of the mind), original condition, foundation, human essence, (see hsing[b])
yi[c]-tuan	heresy, what differs from the learning of ordinary people
hsueh	learning (in Chinese)

ssu-tuan	Four Beginnings (includes jen, i, li, chih) of virtues
chih[b] liang-chih[a]	extending conscience
ti-yi[d] yi[a]	The First Principle: liang-chih
ti-erh yi[a]	The Second Principle: experience
ko-wu	rectifying affairs, investigating things (or events)
ching	reverence, self-control, concentration
satori	enlightenment - a Zen term
ch'eng-yi[b]	making sincere the will, almost identical to chih liang-chih
tao	The Way
wei-[b]chi-[b]chih-[e]hsueh	Learning for the sake of one's self
shingaku	Confucian/Shinto schools in Tokugawa, Japan
chung[a]-ho	equilibrium before arousal and harmony after arousal
t'ai-chi[a]	The Great Ultimate (combination of li[a] and chi)
ch'i	vital force, matter-energy, vital nature, material substance
fa[b]	law, punishment, discipline, model
hsing[a]	action, completion of knowledge
hsin[a]-chi-[c]li[a]	mind is principle
shih hsueh	practical learning
hsiang-yuan	passive conformist, good villager, thief of virtue, Pharisaic, hyperhonest
giri	duty, righteousness, moral obligations, ethical principles
ninjo	feelings, see ch'ing

gi	justice, morality, loyalty, relationship (see i)
ri	principle, reason, logic (see li[a])
jitsugaku	practical learning
giri no gaku	human ethical concerns
shen-tu	watching over the self when alone, self-vigilance
k'uang	wild, eccentric, wild ardour
chun-tzu	gentleman, inspirational model
hao-jan-chih[e]-ch'i	self-determining principle
kung-fu[a]	effort, completion of knowledge
chung[b]-shu	empathy
siao-jen[b]	inferior man, small man
sheng-yi[b]	creative will
nirvana	nothingness, Buddhist goal
sheng-li[a]	creative principle (see t'ien-li)
lebenswelt	room for life (German), phenomenal field
seken	room-for-life reinforced by shame and obligation (Japanese)
tsung-chih[d]	central purpose
wei-fa[a]	before arousal (mind), a description of chung, the condition of pen-t'i
tzu-jan	spontaneity
chung[a]	equilibrium, tranquility, central
wu	thing, affair, event
hsing[b]	essential nature, (see pen-t'i)
ch'ing	emotions, function of the mind

su	reciprocity
yi[d]-fa[a]	after arousal (mind), a description of hsin
t'ien-ming	Heavenly mandate (ming is defined as the determined, necessity, fate)
ho	harmony
chih[b]-chih[a]	extending knowledge
k'e-chi[b]	overcoming the fixed perspective of the ego
k'e-chi[b]-fu[b]-li[b]	subdue one's self and return to propriety

Note: The following terms are Japanese, not Chinese: satori, shingaku, giri, ninjo, gi, ri, jitsugaku, giri no gaku, and seken. Nirvana is the only Sanskrit term. Lebenswelt is the only German term. The glossary offers the complete range of superscripts. The thesis body gives a condensed version of the superscripts to avoid tedium.

CHAPTER TWO

EXISTENTIAL THERAPY AND NEO-CONFUCIANISM

Introduction

This is a chapter focusing on the self as actual and potential, as well as an entity in interaction with others. The bulk of it is divided into three major parts. Liang-chih (conscience) is the fundamental starting point. Philosophers should use their major proposition as the basis for further development. Liang-chih will be examined as a self-theory in psychology. The study was inspired by the research of Seymour Epstein (1973). The next section shows that Neo-Confucianism is a growth system. Its concepts are designed to change in accordance with societal realities. A sincere will is necessary for maintaining ritual or etiquette.

The middle part will look at authenticity and sociality. A distinguishing feature in Neo-Confucianism is the insistence upon self-actualization only through authenticity displayed in a social context. Kindred spirits encourage each other in the pursuit of common goals (Ching, 1973). Sociality is justified on the grounds of human improvement (Tu, 1972). Furthermore, spontaneity is the result of following objective principles that bear a multitude of manifestations

(li-i-fen-shu) (Liu, 1972b). Such freedom is cherished as a joy for the optimistic Confucians who take a different stance to the questions raised by European existentialists (Nivison, 1973).

The final part will discuss various aspects of Neo-Confucian structure. Neo-Confucianism and existential therapy share the self-actualization goal. The Neo-Confucian structure section starts with insight since it is the beginning of the actualizing process. It includes the theory of opposition between the conscious and unconscious by Carl Jung. Neo-Confucian metaphysics of will is discussed with attention to concrete manifestations . . . and colorful analogies. Finally, the chapter ends with a Neo-Confucian motivation theory based on imagination filling in form to provide meaning.

Attempts to relate Neo-Confucianism to process philosophy and phenomenology are made at various points in the chapter. An effort has been made to arrange the subtopics within each section in an order compatible with the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i).

Humanistic and Existential Psychology

A survey of the basic postulates of humanistic psychology and existential therapy provides a good point of entry for readers of a psychological or Western orientation. Humanistic psychology will be considered first,

since existential therapy is one of its branches. Humanistic psychology asserts that man is a whole that exceeds the sum of his parts (Bugental, 1965). Humans can not be reduced to drives, unconscious determinants or need satisfactions (Shaffer, 1978). Man as an intentional being chooses variety and disequilibrium too (Bugental, 1965). Freedom and the here-and-how are stressed heavily, albeit with biological and environmental limitations (Shaffer, 1978). Man is a participant and not a bystander in life. Being is in a human context, for we are always in relationships with others (Bugental, 1965). Thus, humans are not fixed products, but are continually in the process of self-definition (Shaffer, 1978). Bugental (1965) asserts that awareness and its continuity at many levels is a defining trait of man. He admits that humanistic psychology is more certain about what it opposes, than what it supports. Counseling faces a "double criticism" since it is between objective science and subjective values. It is a rare discipline that attempts to possess experimental rigor and a human concern (Weisman, 1965).

Existential therapy agrees with the basic postulates of humanistic psychology, while choosing to emphasize certain tenets more than others. Freedom to choose attitudes and actions are stressed in both. Existential

therapy adds that our confrontation with an uncertain world, and potentially meaningless situations are factors stimulating to our abilities for choice (Corey, 1983). Our own finiteness adds to the uncertainty, but gives meaning to life. Corey (1983) believes most therapeutic approaches share the goal of helping individuals, "to act and accept the awesome freedom and responsibility for action" (p. 64). Existential therapy aims at expanding awareness in order to increase our potential for free choice.

Brief Description of Jen

Jen (benevolence) is a potential starting point for a study of Chinese philosophy. Yet is is one of the most difficult concepts to express adequately, because of its global nature. The researcher will use liang-chih as the focal point of his studies partly for that reason. Jung (1966) notes that love is "the most persistent tradition" in the analysis of jen. "Reasonable kindness in action" is one way to describe jen. Jen can be viewed as the perfect virtue because it synthesizes the other four "constant virtues": i (appropriateness), li[b] (propriety), chih (wisdom) and hsin[b] (faithfulness). Confucius was the first Eastern philosopher to make jen (benevolence) an important concept (Jung, 1966). He was also one of the most prolific and scholarly researchers of all time (Chen, 1976).

Jen not only synthesizes the other virtues but is actually their beginning (tuan). Mencius was the first sage to discuss the beginnings of virtue (ssu-tuan). Sympathy is the beginning of jen and the prerequisite for the other four virtues. Mencius offered the example of a natural feeling of sympathy for a child falling into a well (Chan, 1967a). Perhaps "survival wish for others" is a succinct description of jen's beginning. Faithfulness (hsin[b]) is the only virtue that "does not have a beginning," but is achieved through the consistent performance of the other four virtues (jen, i, li[b] and chih[aa]) (Chan, 1967a).

Tseng Tsu described jen as the unity of conscientiousness (chung) and altruism (shu) (Jung, 1966). Jen gives substance to virtue by extending one's concern (Cheng, 1972b). Tu (1972) sees reciprocity as the principle underlying human relations; a need to help others. Chu Hsi stated that return is knowing when to stop, or a balancing of reciprocity (Chan, 1967a). An ability to relate to others meaningfully, reflects one's own level of self cultivation. In these cases, the researcher believes jen (benevolence) approaches liang-chih (conscience), due to the emphasis upon extending the self.

While jen is the ultimate virtue, sincerity (cheng) is the principle and motive for existence. The Doctrine of the Mean states: "Sincerity is the way of Heaven.

The attainment of sincerity is the way of men" (Chen, 1976, p. 19). Whitehead (1926/1954) considered sincerity to be the primary religious virtue. Change is seen as a constant process, thus necessitating personal adjustment to the Mean or equilibrium. All things are relative and interdependent. If a component of the two relativities becomes too strong, it usually leads to its opposite reaction (Chen, 1976). The dynamic nature of the self will be discussed in the following major section; together with the other three virtues (te) with beginnings (tuan): i (fitness), li[b] (decorum) and chih[aa] (wisdom).

Part One: Conscience and Change

Liang-chih as a Self-Theory in Psychology

A frequently quoted article in the study of personality is "The self-concept revisited: or a theory of a theory," by Seymour Epstein (1973). The study focuses upon the self-concept as a theory about the self, hence it can be empirically verified since it is a theory. The self-concept has two basic functions. It organizes data of experience, especially social interaction, in order to make sequences of action predictable. The self-concept tries to fulfill one's needs, maintain self-esteem and avoid social disapproval or emotional disturbance (Epstein, 1973).

Chung-ying Cheng (1974b) defines liang-chih (conscience) as being "three things in one: the ability to know what are first moral principles, the ability to identify relevant individual facts for moral evaluation, and the ability to correctly relate moral principles to particular facts for correct moral judgments" (p. 82).

Likewise, liang-chih (conscience) involves immediate application to a situation through experience and reflective knowledge (Cheng, 1974b). Liang-chih provides an inner base of self esteem through a belief in the goodness of the original condition (pen-t'i) of the mind (hsin). A lack of self-esteem is actually heretical (yi-tuan) because it differs from what is present in ordinary people (Ching, 1976). Since liang-chih is believed to express a commonality of thought, social acceptance is a natural result for its practice (Nivison, 1973). Understanding liang-chih means the ability to distinguish between impulses and an ethical decision. The goal of the researcher is to relate the self-theory of Epstein (1973) to theory and practice in Confucianism, as described by Chung-ying Cheng (1974b). Confucian virtues will also be discussed to clarify the three-partite system of knowledge and ethics (normative/descriptive-situational and social).

Both Epstein (1973) and the Neo-Confucians see a growth principle in the self-theory and liang-chih. The dynamic organization manifests this ability through the increasing assimilation of data, and the accommodation of existing concepts. Cheng (1974b) states that personality growth is the result of interaction between dispositional attainment and social achievement. Together with its dynamic organization, the self-theory maintains a system of priorities among its concepts concerning information regarding the world, self and their interaction (Epstein, 1973).

Neo-Confucian views on the intrinsic or immanent harmony between man and nature add to the internal consistency of liang-chih as a self-theory (Cheng, 1971). Neo-Confucians believed in the organismic development of jen (benevolence), as well as the need for descriptive/normative knowledge (chih[aa]) through learning (hsueh).

Epstein (1973) states that "the most fundamental purpose of the self-theory is to optimize the pleasure/pain balance over the course of a lifetime" (p. 407). Neo-Confucian doctrines of mankind's essential goodness includes the capability to unite knowledge with action (chih hsing ho-i). Furthermore, Neo-Confucians were basically happy individuals. Wang Yang-ming compared existential anxiety or anxiety about anxiety to "looking for a donkey while riding it" (Nivison, 1973). Wang's

well-known personal life was full of tragedy yet he did not choose depression (Ching, 1976).

The Self-Concept as Viewed by Others

Seymour Epstein (1973) discusses the theories of several psychologists who have studied the self-concept in the past. This study will focus on the psychologists cited by Epstein, whose theories are most compatible with Neo-Confucianism. Phenomenological psychologists consider the self-concept to be the most essential concept in psychology, since it offers the only means for understanding the individual's behavior.

Epstein cites George Mead (1934) whose model is like Neo-Confucian views on propriety in one's life-style (li[b]). Mead believed the self-concept arises through social interaction from a concern for the reactions of others to the individual. Mead notes that learning to perceive the world as other people already do is the way to anticipate the reactions of others. People learn to incorporate an estimation of the "generalized other," as a source of internal regulation that guides behavior through a variety of social roles.

The development of concern for proper social functioning was discussed by Mencius in the Four Beginnings (ssu-tuan) of virtue (Chan, 1967a). Feelings of deference and compliance are the beginning of propriety (li[b]). An

attitude of deference is implied in Mead's theory. Moreover, the feeling of shame is the beginning of rightness as appropriate action (i). Confucius said that a man with a sense of shame is very close to being brave. Appropriateness is the foundation of courage (Chang, 1955).

Epstein cites Lecky's self-concept theory as a nucleus of personality; a dynamic system involving continuous assimilation of new information and modification of old theories. Lecky (1945) seems to capture the spirit of chih liang-chih (extending conscience), particularly since he believes the prime motivation is a striving for unity. Wang Yang-ming wrote that liang-chih is the First Principle (ti-yi yi) and experience is the Second Principle (ti-erh yi) (Ching, 1973). The section on empirical validity for a theory will develop this viewpoint further.

Epstein cites Rogers' (1951) self-concept view as having only the characteristics of which the individual is aware and has control over. Rogers' theories may represent the ultimate development of the subjective phenomenological standpoint. Wang Yang-ming's interpretation of ko-wu as "rectifying affairs" is helpful to Rogers' view of the self. Ko-wu seeks to examine thoughts (yi) which give rise to faulty perceptions (chih); factors in a faulty belief system that are unknown to the client.

Structure of the Self-Theory: Attributes in Common With All Theories

Epstein (1973) lists six methods for evaluating any theory, not necessarily psychology or even the social sciences: (1) extensivity, (2) parsimony, (3) empirical validity, (4) internal consistency, (5) testability and (6) usefulness (p. 408). The first three theoretical evaluations of Epstein can be related directly to the three facets of theory and practice in Confucianism, presented by Cheng (1974b). These components are practical flexibility in application, normative/descriptive knowledge and understanding the background of action, or the social context. (See Figure One.) Internal consistency is defended through a brief Neo-Confucian critique of Zen. Testability is analyzed through the use of Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang interpretations of ko-wu (investigating things, rectifying affairs) which serve to augment liang-chih. Usefulness is demonstrated through the unity of the intellectual, pragmatic, emotional and volitional in Neo-Confucian theories on reason.

Extensivity.

The extensivity of a coping self-concept is related to liang-chih through a common emphasis upon practical flexibility. In fact, the development of liang-chih[a] is called "extension" (chih[b]). The application of



Figure I

Interaction of Confucian Virtues

normative knowledge to concrete events can be found in discussions of the virtue, fitness (i) (Cheng, 1972b). It can be viewed as a mediating variable between ideals and realities. Appropriateness (i) is not to be confused with passivity, since ideals are made more congruent and realities reflect our impact through its use. Thus, extensivity as fitness (i) can be illustrated through the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i). Knowledge begins with thought and is incomplete without practical action. Flexibility is derived through applying a principle to various particular cases (li-i-fen-shu). Rightness (i) stresses the relativity of actions, due to the uniqueness of situations. Creativity is needed on the part of the individual to utilize insights of the good (Cheng, 1974b).

Parsimony.

Parsimony in the self-concept is correlated to liang-chih, through a shared focus on normative and descriptive knowledge (chih[aa]) together with benevolence (jen). Parsimony is reflected in a hierarchial structure of postulates from higher importance to lesser importance (Epstein, 1973). Jen in particular is the ultimate unifying virtue, as well as the first to develop in childhood (Tu, 1968). Reflective knowledge must be supported by a continuous learning from experience. Knowing the

good requires a conscious awareness to allow for goals, and the motivation to reach for goals (Cheng, 1974b).

The differentiation in extensivity and the integration in parsimony are complementary qualities, reflecting a dialectics of harmonization in Confucianism. Parsimony is essential to prevent a self-theory from becoming situationally determined. Extensivity is needed to keep a self-theory growing and free of arbitrary restrictions (Epstein, 1973).

Empirical validity.

Empirical validity is reminescent of the Confucian concern for the background of action. Social situations are the arena for self-actualizing (Tu, 1972). Epstein (1973) states that the most a theory can be is self-correcting. Wang insists, "The man who falls once acquires one more experience. There is no reason why the failure of today cannot very well become the success of the day after" (Ching, 1973, p. 48). Virtues cannot be known without consciously participating in their development (Cheng, 1974b). A requirement of liang-chih is a shift to induction when deductive reasoning is not applicable to the situation. Liang-chih and its extension is directly connected to sociality and propriety (li[b]).

Importantly, learning in Neo-Confucianism is a gradual process, not an all-or-nothing proposition. Epstein (1973) has observed that effective defense

systems allow awareness of reality to progress at the rate at which it can be assimilated. Both the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools emphasize personal understanding of the Classics through study and practice. Philosophy can be internalized only in this manner as it is the quest for self-improvement (Tu, 1978).

Internal consistency.

Testing of liang-chih with the method prescribed by Epstein (1973) will change to a topical approach for the last three categories. Internal consistency preserves the validity of a theory. Epstein (1973) mentions the awareness of inconsistencies is more harmful than the inconsistency itself. A defense of internal consistency in liang-chih or Neo-Confucianism would be most practical through comparison to another philosophy. The researcher will give a brief description of a Neo-Confucian critique of Zen Buddhism. The critique itself is a citation from Ch'eng Hao in a letter from Wang Yang-ming, thus illustrating the unity of Neo-Confucianism.

The Neo-Confucians studied Buddhism with the desire to assimilate some of their theories on the mind, which had been neglected by early Confucianism. The Buddhist monastic ideal was considered to be a threat to the family and a functioning society as well. Ch'eng Hao complimented the serious reverent (ching) attitude of Zen Buddhists (Ching, 1973). However, he noted their

neglect of appropriate (i) conduct, through an overemphasis on the enlightenment experience (satori). In the end, they "do not even succeed in straightening their interior disposition by reverence" (Ching, 1973, p. 9). Ch'eng Hao observed the reciprocal effect of attitudes and behavior, nearly nine centuries before Albert Ellis (1971) popularized its occurrence through rational-emotive therapy (RET).

Testability.

The testability of liang-chih is helped by its extension and the use of auxiliary methods, chiefly ko-wu (rectifying affairs, investigating things). Principle (li^a) is inherent in all things, an Eastern phrasing of cause-and-effect. Thus an increase in experience improves the validity of liang-chih, both in its testability and empirical value. Recall that experience is absorbed into liang-chih. The task of ko-wu is to find principle (li^a) unknown to liang-chih. The divergence between the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools is where principle is found.

The Ch'eng-Chu school believed in the exhaustive investigation of events and things (ko-wu), in order to make the will sincere (ch'eng-yi). Cheng (1979a) writes that Wang's version of ko-wu is to "realize the principles (li^a) in one's intention (yi) activity and consequently realize li^a in things we focus on in the yi

activities" (p. 290). Wang Yang-ming's interpretation of ko-wu was "rectifying affairs". Wang stressed the immediacy of intentionality (yi), as a reaction to objects in consciousness (Jung, 1965). Importantly, T'ang (1973b) stressed that the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools could not supplant the other because they represent different philosophical approaches. The researcher agrees with T'ang and feels that an intermediate position is probably the best.

The difference between the Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools is very similar to the debate between behaviorism and cognitive therapy today. The Ch'eng-Chu school focused upon the acquisition of objective principles (li[a]) in order to promote behavioral change. The stimulus-response model is principle (li[a]) leading to a sincerity of will (ch'eng-yi). Wang Yang-ming's theory of ko-wu is essentially identical to the cognitive theory of learning, as cited by D. B. Wolman (1973) in the Dictionary of Behavioral Science.

> Cognitive theory of learning = "postulates existence of intervening central processes in learning which are cognitive in nature and which states that learning involves new ways of perceiving rather than of incorporating new responses into the behavior repertoire" (p. 67).

Usefulness.

Liang-chih is useful because problem-solving is the essence of reason and a goal in Neo-Confucianism. In the next major section, the investigator will examine three cases of Neo-Confucianism changing with the needs of society. At present, let us look at how liang-chih incorporates the intellectual, pragmatic, emotional and volitional (Cheng, 1974b).

Knowledge is the foundation for developing potential and self-actualization. The intellect recognizes and provides the goals. Such knowledge inclines one to practicality, since it is directive, restrictive and evaluative (Cheng, 1974b). An increase in knowledge creates a readiness and lessens the possibility for arbitrariness or hesitation. Emotional drive is based upon the urgency, that is due to the perceived relevance of action toward a goal (Cheng, 1974b). A counselor could motivate a depressive by helping the client find relevant goals. The counselor may explain that goals not only provide direction but stimulate pleasant feelings.

Maslow (1968) reports that self-actualizing people are able to derive pleasure from their work to the point that work becomes pleasure. Beck (1976) observes that severely depressed individuals feel like "losers" that lack a trait needed for competence and happiness. The

medical model of depression points to chemical imbalance as the cause for mental illness, a view which damages self-esteem even further, while exonerating the individual from making conscious efforts to improve through learning.

Mencius wrote that learning is nothing more than utilizing potential, a recovery of what could be (Ching, 1973). The investigator would like to add a commentary to Mencius. People lose their minds because they do not think they are worth keeping. The volitional component is a determination to unify the intellectual, pragmatic and emotional considerations of liang-chih through action. Perhaps the most inspiring support for the Neo-Confucian way of life was written by Ch'eng I, "I hope you will seek the Way through the Classics. If you make more and more effort, some day you will see something lofty before you. Unconsciously you will start dancing with your hands and feet. Then even without further effort you will not be able to keep yourself from going on" (de Bary, 1983, p. 60).

The Nature of the Postulates

Epstein (1973) states that if self-theories contain behavior directing postulates, then it is necessary to reconstruct another's postulates in order to understand their behavior. Some domains have postulates which are

common to all people, while other domains are more specialized. Epstein (1973) believes overall self-esteem is the highest postulate and includes "general competence, moral self-approval, power and love worthiness . . . The lowest order postulates under competence include assessments of specific abilities" (p. 411).

It is safe to surmise that accomplishment in learning was closely related to self-esteem in Confucian China. Yet this fact is no more alien than viewing Western psychology as an educational process. Most importantly, Confucian learning is not restricted to scholarly activities for the sake of esoteric knowledge. Confucian learning is primarily directed toward moral improvement manifested by authentic behavior and sociality (Tu, 1972). Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition showed a deep respect for the average person. Wang Yang-ming wrote "what the commoners do daily without realizing it, is tao (the Way" (Ching, 1976, p. 102). Moreover, both Neo-Confucianism and Zen stressed manual labor as a necessary component of education (Ching, 1973).

It seems particularly relevant to examine the rules of learning developed by Chu Hsi and commented upon by Wang Yang-ming. Chu Hsi developed a five-step learning theory known as the Rules for Instruction of White Deer Academy. The five steps are study, inquiry, thinking,

sifting and practice. A direct passage from Chu Hsi explains the procedure completely and succinctly:

> "After one has studied extensively, he can have the principles of all things before him. He can therefore examine them and compare them to get the right questions to ask. Then, as he inquires carefully, his teachers and friends will wholeheartedly engage in give-and-take with him, and he will begin to think. As he thinks carefully his thoughts will be refined and free from impurities. Thus there is something he can get for himself (yu so tzu-te). He can now sift what he has acquired. As he sifts clearly, he can therefor be free from doubts and put his thoughts into action. As he practices earnestly, all that he has achieved will become concrete demonstrations and will no longer remain empty words"(de Bary, 1983, p. 60).

Note that Chu Hsi discussed putting thoughts into action. History has tended to give full credit to Wang Yang-ming for developing the theory of the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i). Additionally, Chu Hsi stressed "learning for the sake of one's self" (wei-chi chih hsueh) (de Bary, 1983). The rigid examination system was a selective borrowing from Chu Hsi's commentaries on the classics, revealing the legalist tone of Confucian application in government.

Wang Yang-ming believed Chu Hsi's procedure was sound but risked becoming fragmentary, through an emphasis upon principle (li[a]) as apart from mind (hsin) (Ching, 1976). Wang believed in cultivating the mind through a concentration on the virtues. The four beginnings (ssu-tuan) start developing in childhood. The beginning of

jen (benevolence)--the first virtue--is a feeling of sympathy for a child who has fallen into a well (Chan, 1967). Wang's interpretation of ko-wu (rectifying affairs) explicitly emphasizes making the will sincere (ch'eng-yi) before the investigation of events, which is ko-wu according to Chu Hsi. The first step in Chu's "Rules" includes the investigation of events as a part of study. Wang chose to develop the attainment of principles (li[a]) by starting from the mind (hsin), an extension from the root to the branches (Ching, 1976). Wang may have developed a system of teaching which could reach a wider range of students than Chu Hsi. All three scholars emphasized tzu-te (getting it oneself).

Neo-Confucianism Changing with the Needs of Society

A proof that Neo-Confucianism is a system that can change with the needs of the time, could be the most substantial and important aspect of this thesis. Neo-Confucian concepts themselves must show an ability to change and develop. The previous major section of this chapter demonstrated that the Neo-Confucian view of the conscience (liang-chih) is a growth system, which can be validated as a theory.

Extensivity in a coping self-concept was correlated with the Confucian/Neo-Confucian virtue of appropriateness (i). Extensivity can be seen as the ability to

assimilate new information into a philosophy as well as a self-concept. On the other hand, an explanation of the capacity for Neo-Confucianism to change must be limited by its own tenets. A researcher can not stretch a philosophy to the extent that its original meaning is distorted. The task is to revise the letter of the law but not its spirit.

Developing this section has been a challenge for the investigator. There are various ways to prove the ability of Neo-Confucianism as a philosophy to change. However, it could be difficult to relate these components to each other. Fortunately, a philosopher has recourse to a central methodological theory which serves as a foundation for drawing comparisons.

This concept is li-i-fen-shu, principle is one but its manifestations are many. Since individuals and situations are different, the application of jen (humanity) must vary in order to preserve the principle (Liu, 1972b). Humanity or benevolence (jen) has a creative drive (sheng) together with sincerity (ch'eng) that enables practice of the virtues. Otherwise ethics would be tedious and depressing without the spirit underlying the virtues (Liu, 1972b). A utilization of this theory will be discussed in the Case Studies chapter. Furthermore, propriety (li[b]) requires a sincere intention (ch'eng-yi) in order to be "true" propriety.

The areas which will be covered in this section include the efficacy of written language and educational theory. In addition, the researcher will provide Neo-Confucian answers to two questions raised by Abraham Maslow (1968); namely, sorrow inspite of religious indoctrination and joylessness despite economic freedom. A Neo-Confucian outlook of ethics and science also will be examined.

Neo-Confucianism as a Part of Eastern Culture

Abraham Maslow (1968) and the Neo-Confucians independently arrived at the decision that an inner source of values is the only viable alternative for mankind. Part of the strength of Neo-Confucianism as a philosophy is that it was not considered as a separate discipline but the "wisdom penetrating all aspects of life" (Chan, 1959, p. 114). Maslow (1968) felt that the failure of an externally derived set of beliefs led to the anguish of European existentialists, a condition he described as "high I.Q. whimpering on a cosmic scale" (p. 16). Tu (1972) strongly criticizes the Kierkegaard leap of faith from an ethical social life to a religious reclusive life, as degrading the human potential for building a good society.

The Confucian/Neo-Confucian penetration of Far Eastern life is manifested in education and politics.

Neo-Confucian philosophy was expressed commonly as a method of learning (de Bary, 1983). The previous section, "Liang-chih as a self-theory in psychology," discussed Chu Hsi's "Rules for Instruction" and Wang Yang-ming's comments concerning them. All levels of schooling included Confucian/Neo-Confucian philosophy as part of the curriculum in pre-Communist China (Wu, 1971). The divisions between education, philosophy, psychology and religion were not distinct. This cultural phenomena makes Neo-Confucianism an ideal subject for interdisciplinary research, in the opinion of the researcher.

It could be argued that the Confucian system was a subtle form of indoctrination, but all societies need to impart shared cultural values to its members. The predominant themes included "learning for the sake of one's self" (wei-chi chih hsueh), sincerity and social harmony (de Bary, 1983). Such assertions are clearly the antithesis of Marxist degradation of the individual and virtues, together with its deification of class conflict (Cheng, 1977).

Sung (960-1279) Neo-Confucianism flourished in the capital and in regions that "led in agricultural production, trade and population growth" (de Bary, 1983, p. 58). The Neo-Confucian lecture/discussion methods spread to less educated citizens in villages and towns by the middle to late Ming (Sixteenth century-first half

Seventeenth century), and to Eighteenth-century Tokugawa Japan through the shingaku schools (de Bary, 1983).

Neo-Confucians held government offices throughout the Far East. Scholar-sages were granted the opportunity to pursue cultural interests, while performing political and bureaucratic functions. Ch'eng I (1033-1107) was a lecturer from the classics mat; the personal mentor to the Emperor. Chu Hsi (1130-1200) passed the civil service examinations and became subprefectural registrar at the age of 18 (de Bary, 1983).

Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) was the Grand Co-ordinator of the southeast China border regions of Kiangsi, Kwangtung and Fukien. Wang not only reorganized the government but pacified bandits and surpressed rebellions as a general (Ching, 1976). Yoshida Shoin was regarded as the moving spirit behind the Meiji Restoration (1868-1912) in Japan (Chang, 1955). However, all of the aforementioned sages frequently were ignored or faced persecution by self-seeking rulers. Even Confucius himself, who at one time held a cabinet post, lived with complacency and danger during the disintegration of the Chou dynasty (Chen, 1976).

Efficacy of Written Language

The efficacy of written language is stressed in Neo-Confucianism to provide concrete maxims for specific

actions. Such a goal does not assume that it is possible to give a complete definition for the ultimate good (jen) (Liu, 1972b). Neo-Confucianism absorbed the Zen warning of not letting words become the masters of our minds (Ching, 1973). The ultimate good is understandable in principle, but not completely definable. All the virtues may be seen as aspects of jen in the unitary system of Confucianism (Liu, 1972b). Once again, the concept li-i fen-shu (principle is one but its manifestations are many) describes Neo-Confucian world views.

Wang Yang-ming considered chung-ho (equilibrium/harmony) and t'ai-chi (great ultimate) to be equivalent concepts, but he preferred to use the former term (Cheng, 1972a). The investigator feels that Wang Yang-ming's preference for chung-ho is an example of a Neo-Confucian's drive for clarity in expression. Moreover, it was a trend begun by Chu Hsi, showing the continuity of development in Neo-Confucianism (Tu, 1979). The great ultimate (t'ai-chi) is a Taoist-influenced metaphysical term, used by early Neo-Confucians, that combines li[a] (principle) and ch'i (vital force). Chung-ho (equilibrium/harmony) is a more relevant term that describes states of mind and behaviors, before and after arousal (fa) by a stimulus (Cheng, 1972a).

Taoism was noted for its rejection of written language and conceptual knowledge. Direct experience was seen as the only source for true knowledge. Chuang Tzu, a leading Taoist, did not think it was possible to transmit the knack of knowledge through writings. However, he admitted that words can lead to a higher level of understanding and meaning, but then the words can be forgotten once their purpose as "skillful means" has been fulfilled (Vervoorn, 1981). Such beliefs cast doubts on the objective validity of Taoism. Furthermore, Taoism is usually interpreted as advocating total relativism, according to Herbert (1950), Welch (1965) and Cheng (1977).

Ideas begin as flashes of insight but they need to be expressed and defended in propositional form so we may understand them. Writing is the fundamental ingredient in transforming insight into substantial ideas. Otherwise, thought is vague without the channeling through written expression (Pletcher, 1983). Chang Tsai (1020-1077) urged sifting through our thought until it can be expressed in words (de Bary, 1983). Pletcher (1983) believes there was little reflective argumentation in philosophy before the development of written language, citing Lao Tzu's Tao Te Ching as an example of recording oral teaching.

Some Taoist writings urge people to reflect wisdom without making plans, grasping knowledge or being absorbed by activities. Taoism is inclined to forgetting preferences and distinctions, partly because of the futility in perfection (Feng & English, 1974). Clearly, such concepts are contrary to Neo-Confucian li-chih (forming a resolution), chih hsing ho-i (unity of knowledge and action), chih liang-chih (extending conscience) and ko-wu (investigating things). Words are viewed as the cause of distinction. Chuang Tzu even quotes madmen who see the settling of a good example as subverting virtue and inviting disaster (Feng & English, 1974).

Taoism promotes complete flexibility in thought and action. Chuang Tzu believed one "who has been transformed has no more constancy . . ." (because) "the understanding of the sage matches the fluidity of reality" (Vervoorn, 1971, p. 313).

Taoism seems to exhibit "extensivity" (chih[b]) without "parsimony." These are terms borrowed from Epstein (1973) which were discussed in the previous section, "Liang-chih as a self-theory in psychology." Such a creed is dangerous as it leads to a situational determination of behavior, or an external locus of control. The disdain for reason and written language in Taoism leads to detrimental effects in its philosophy. Moreover, the

relationship between the development of reason and writing skills appears to be interactionary.

In showing the adaptability of Neo-Confucianism, a clear trend toward parsimony should be manifested in its comparison with Taoism. At the same time, a growth-system ought to be revealed through an examination of Neo-Confucian structure and applications. A respect for reason (li[a]) and efforts at written expression are components of Neo-Confucianism, which are shared by the majority of civilized humanity today. The close ties between composition and rational/ethical philosophy may be a significant contribution of the Confucian educational system.

Education Theory

Education theory displays a historical similarity between the unquestioned acceptance of Bloom's Cognitive Taxonomy of Educational Objectives and the elevation of Chu Hsi's interpretations of Neo-Confucianism to a state orthodoxy. When theory becomes dogma, creativity and scholarship are stifled. Moreover, Neo-Confucianism will not be exempt from constructive criticism, particularly if the dissent comes from within the philosophy and related fields, such as psychology. The scholarship of Wang Yang-ming was partly a reaction toward deficiencies

in established Neo-Confucianism. Cheng (1984) encourages innovation and constructive criticism in order to create a modern Neo-Confucianism for both East and West.

Application preceding comprehension.

Bloom's Cognitive Taxonomy of Objectives and its critique by David S. Moore (1982) seems at least partly analogous to the Neo-Confucian schism. Moore (1982) questions Benjamin Bloom's rating of application (Stage 3) as a higher-order skill than comprehension (Stage 2). Comprehension is defined as the giving of descriptions, stating main ideas and comparison. Application is defined as utilizing techniques and rules to solve problems that have a single correct answer (Gall, Dunning & Weathersby, 1971, p. 261). A Neo-Confucian may question the inclusion of "single correct answer" in a definition of application, preferring "one or more correct answers bounded by propriety or rules (li[b]).".

Moore (1982) states that a child's mind seems to naturally generalize on the grounds of inductive inference. He cites examples of trial-and-error learning in arithmetic and English grammar to prove his assertion. Furthermore, Aaron T. Beck (1976) views the beginning of language development in children as application through direct observation.

The research of Beck (1976) and Moore (1982) suggests the possibility of application with the grasp of

basic knowledge (Stage 1). Moreover, certain aspects of comprehension: comparison and stating main ideas seem to rely on skills in application. Wang Yang-ming seems to be vindicated by this research, because he stressed the fundamental inseparability of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i).

Wang stated that knowledge is incomplete and without substantiality or concreteness in the absence of action. He viewed intentionality (yi) as the beginning of action (hsing), hence knowledge (chih) itself is practical before it becomes theoretical (Jung, 1966). In other words, one should finish what one starts, and the effects of this choice is exhibited through behavior.

Wang repeatedly offered the examples of archery and filial piety, as cases where action is clearly required for knowledge. Additionally, athletic ability and kind feelings are principles (li[a]) that exist in the mind (hsin); an example of hsin chi li (mind is principle) (Ching, 1976). The extension of inner capacity or innate knowledge through learning and self-cultivation is chih liang-chih (Cheng, 1972a). The balancing of the descriptive-phenomenological view (hsin chi li) and the normative-practical view (chih liang-chih) is the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i) (Cheng, 1972a). In the Case Studies chapter, we will look at how Beck's

(1976) Graded Task Assignment utilizes action leading to knowledge in order to treat depression.

Inseparability of action from knowledge.

Returning to education theory, Moore (1982) views Bloom's method of separating question-types as artificial. Moore shows that the narrative structure of history combines knowledge (Stage 1) and synthesis (Stage 5). The structure does not lend itself to bifurcation, since they are learned simultaneously. This example represents the ultimate instance of the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i), because the two components are actually aspects of the same reality. Liking a good aroma or color is another example of simultaneous unification, although these are facets of the cognitively primitive ssu-tuan (four beginnings).

Wang was wary of Chu's Five-Step Rules for Instruction, mainly because of its separation of action from the other steps and placement at the end. The student should be made aware that action is transpiring throughout the learning process. Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695) saw the "separation of knowing faculty and thing known" leading to a lack of self-assurance, and the root of "two great flaws in Chinese culture: perpetual suspension of decisive (moral) action, and reliance on authoritarian formulas" (Struve, 1982, p. 108). Both

Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) and David S. Moore (1982) view problem-solving as an ongoing process that combines different levels.

In concluding, Moore (1982) asserts that evaluation (Stage 6) occurs at all levels and a complete evaluation is impossible. Bloom believes evaluation is the highest level of learning, and as such, it must be preceded by the other five levels. Once again, the researcher is reminded of the schism between Wang Yang-ming and Chu Hsi.

Chu Hsi believed in the exhaustive investigation of events (ko-wu) to rectify the will (ch'eng-yi). Betty (1980) states "Chu spoke often of progress, seldom of fulfillment or enlightenment" (p. 122). Betty (1980) cites Chu, "Just investigate one item after another somehow untill the utmost is reached. As more and more is done, one will naturally achieve a far and wide penetration" (p. 122).

Like Moore (1982), Wang believed continuous evaluation occurs at all levels. Since thought (yi) is a reaction to an object in consciousness (hsin), our very awareness of external reality predisposes us to evaluation. Thought (yi) begins the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i) (Jung, 1966). If mind and things compose one body, one can be sure that things are investigated by rectifying one's own mind (Betty, 1980).

Treating things as outward causes conflict, since the belief we have of the event is literally one with the mind (Betty, 1980). Here is a clear case of Neo-Confucianism sounding like the rational-emotive therapy of Albert Ellis. Ellis (1971) insists the belief we have about an event determines our reaction, apart from the event's objective reality.

The spirit of reason and scholarship is seen through the research of Moore, Bloom, Wang and Chu. Their differences in approach serve to complement rather than negate each other. How could one react without the existence of another? Much of the problem with the works of Bloom and Chu was due to exaggerations and errors by their followers, as admitted by Moore (1982) and discussed by Liu (1984). Moreover, Liu (1984) saw some conflict as arising from partly faulty interpretations of Chu by Wang, especially when the latter was young and despondent. The desire to update theories is an effort to restore appropriateness to a new situation. The effect is cumulative rather than substitutive, and an example of li-i-fen-shu (principle is one but its manifestations are many).

Applied Neo-Confucianism in History

Three topics will be examined, "(1) Modernizing the law for its own sake, (2) Righteous profit: a

merchants' class ethic, and (3) Ethics and science." All of these cases illustrate Cheng's (1979b) contention that learning has to be practical to protect society from being overthrown by anti-intellectual forces. The first example shows that decorum (li[b]) is form with movement, a virtue that must change to remain authentic. The second case shows philosophy changing to remain congruent with existing realities out of empathy and respect for its society. The third case illustrates the incorporation of benevolence (jen) into practical learning (shih hsueh).

Heinemann (1953) proclaims the necessity of "existential theologians" in their defense of humanity with regulative instead of constitutive principles. Existential theologicans' "chief interest does not lie in dogmatics and in the external observance of rituals, but in the souls of men, in their predicament and in the willingness to help them" (Heinemann, 1953, p. 253). Wang Yang-ming's motivations seemed to be focused on helping humanity through reason.

Maslow (1968) observed that much of conventional behavior is not really morality, but the accepted habits of the many. Maslow's (1968, 1970) studies of successful people, self-actualization and enlightenment experiences was an attempt to broaden psychology's horizons

to include the "brighter side" of humanity. Maslow's (1968) critique of the "psychopathology of the masses" is reminescent of the Confucian disdain for the passive conformist (hsiang-yuan). Aside from its violent elements, the greatest danger to a society is when its members do not know why or how something is good. Chang (1963) states that arbitrary ways of viewing matters blunts the achievement of a harmonious society.

Neither the unexamined lives of the "good villagers" (hsiang-yuan), nor the "psychopathology of the masses" should be seen as a pessimistic indictment against the good nature of humanity. Actually, the necessity of learning as a process involving both attitude and behavior increases in its importance for fulfilling potential. Learning can be defined in its broadest sense to include anything that requires the mastery of technique, not just "bookish" endeavors.

Modernizing the law for its own sake.

Wang Yang-ming faced the problem of outdated rituals (li[b]) conflicting with the personal values of the intelligentsia. These rituals concerned honoring of ancestors and the positioning of tablets in temples (Ching, 1973). The reader may feel that the researcher is discussing an irrelevant issue. However, the issue was extremely relevant to Sixteenth-century Chinese, just as local

customs are important to Americans. The understanding of the rationale leading to the change is the important consideration, and an example of li-i-fen-shu (principle is one but its manifestations are many).

The difficulty in changing the rituals was compounded by its passive acceptance by the masses and literal identification with decorum (li[b]) (Ching, 1973). Chinese concept, li[b], can mean both rituals in a narrow sense, and propriety or etiquette in a wider sense (Cua, 1971b). However, many ancient rules of propriety (li[b]) were too complicated to be fully understood and consequently ignored. Wang accepted the wisdom of the ancients, as leading them to create rituals that were relevant to their times (Ching, 1973).

Importantly, acting according to real propriety (li[b]) requires an understanding, as opposed to a blind following of routine. Wang wrote when "man lost his genuine feelings (he) now finds it hard to speak about real propriety" (Ching, 1973, p. 98). The passive conformist (hsiang-yuan) was a subject of severe criticism in Confucian China, to the point of being called a "thief of virtue" (Tu, 1968).

Neo-Confucianism clearly exhibits the conceptual structure required of a growth-system in this case. Tu (1972) insists that li[b] is a movement and the most

observable virtue. Li[b] serves as a boundary for what can be considered appropriate (i) action (Cua, 1971a). Additionally, li[b] is described as the repository for past appropriateness (i); the content of virtue (Hall & Ames, 1984). Wang encourages his readers with an amusing quote from Mencius, "Even if, without knowing the size of the foot, one tries to make sandals, we know he will not end up making a basket" (Ching, 1973, pp. 98-99).

The reasoning content of Wang Yang-ming in this case seems to be Kohlberg's (1981) Stage 4, the "law-and-order" mentality. Wang effectively persuades the reader to believe new rules are needed. One can disagree with existing laws, and still possess Stage 4 reasoning, if the suggested remedy is developing new rules (Haan, 1975). The typical level of moral reasoning is used 67% of the time, and one includes the less advanced forms in their behavioral repetoire (Kohlberg, 1981). Typically, Neo-Confucians such as Wang utilized post-conventional reasoning (Stages 5 and 6), as evidenced by their emphasis upon the objective, universal nature of principle or reason (li[a]).

Righteous profit: a capitalist ethic.

The other contemporary problem Maslow (1968) mentions is joylessness in spite of economic prosperity. Once again, Neo-Confucianism faced a problem and modified

the philosophy, while preserving its basic structure. Tokugawa Japan (1603-1868) faced the issue of how to combine righteousness as appropriateness (i) to economic profit (Gluck, 1984). Like Renaissance Europe, established traditions frowned upon the merchant and considered that class to be the lowest. Nevertheless, merchants became quite wealthy and were an important component of a functioning society. When reality conflicts with philosophy, it is time to revise philosophy. Tokugawa Neo-Confucians developed a merchants' class ethic.

The dual concepts, giri (duty) and ninjo (feelings) formed the basis of the Japanese merchant ethic (Gluck, 1984). Duty is a compound word that combines the characters, gi (rightness as fitness) and ri (reason) (de Bary, 1979). Duty extends the idea of personal righteousness of action to the economic good of the nation and ultimately the world. The development of merchant class ethic was a resistance of outdated biases through the application of universal Confucian principles. The Lord of Mitsui stated the merchants' goal should be to make "great profit honorably" (Gluck, 1984). It might be a rare example of Stage 6 morality, the highest level in the cognitive-moral scale of Kohlberg, who has observed that duty and references to principles abound in post-conventional morality (Kohlberg, 1981).

The concepts, giri and ninjo interacted to produce harmony in the individual and society. Yamaga Soko (1622-1685) did not believe in surpressing natural desires, because they are powerful creative forces. The sage's duty was to nurture and satisfy desires as a participant in Nature's immanence (de Bary, 1979). Tu (1968) perceives the relation to jen (benevolence) to li[b] (propriety) as fulfilling desires in an ethical context.

Ethics and science.

Kaibara Ekken (1630-1714) was a prolific writer in science and technology (jitsugaku), but he always emphasized human ethical concerns (giri no gaku). A physician must be proficient in humaneness through moral obligation and empathy, or else one becomes like the Taoist immortality seekers, according to Ekken (Takehiko, 1979). The reverent Neo-Confucian proclaimed the study of horticulture should not be purely out of love for beauty or profit. One must keep regard for the "proclivity of nature to give birth to living things," or risk "trifling with things and losing one's sense of purpose" (Takehiko, 1979, p. 279).

Part Two: Authenticity and Sociality

Authenticity

Self-actualization or sagehood is the primary concern in Neo-Confucianism. Wei-ming Tu (1972) defines sagehood as becoming fully realized and authentic. The central concern of psychotherapy is authenticity, according to Bugental (1965). The process consists of helping the patient to (1) overcome distortions of awareness and (2) accepting the responsibilities and opportunities of being authentic. Bugental defines neuroses as the denial of distortion of authenticity.

The next chapter discusses the neuroses more fully in section II-D, "Appropriate discernment of thought: a personality model." The emphasis upon authenticity is probably one of the clearest similarities between existential therapy and Neo-Confucianism. Sincerity and genuineness are frequently used synonyms for authenticity.

Authenticity is acting in accordance with one's nature. A lack of authenticity is exposed by conflict with the givenness of being (Bugental, 1965). Bugental (1965) lists three attributes of authenticity: (1) Being as fully aware as possible, (2) choosing the possibility with actuality at the moment and (3) taking responsibility for choices while recognizing basic imperfection.

Confucius described the inauthentic expressions of the self as arbitrariness of opinion, dogmatism, obstinancy, and egotism (Tu, 1972).

The therapeutic situation calls for counselors that are authentic with themselves and others. Genuine therapists do not need to be blunt with their directness. A blend of diplomacy and honesty is required for dealing with selectively attentive clients (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). It is essential for the therapist to have the skill to communicate authenticity to the client.

Cua (1971a) citing Whitehead observes that each language systematizes expression and includes a historic tradition. A Taoist or Zen disdain for language would be absurd in the counseling situation; aside from well-timed moments of silence for reflection and the like (Hackney & Cormier, 1979). Promising the patient a quick recovery is also a mistake. Demonstrating that painful emotions are reversable by correcting faulty beliefs and self-defeating behaviors can be effective (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979).

Neo-Confucianism views self-actualization as an issue of effort, attitude and behavior more than actual scholarship; a theory shared with existential therapy. Wang Yang-ming particularly emphasized the possibility of sagehood in all people. Wang considered learning to

include the crafts of the commoners, since he wondered if the Sung (960-1279) masters' insistance on booklearning revealed the limited applications of a bougeoise world-view (Ching, 1976). No other society, philosopy or religion emphasized scholarship as much as Neo-Confucianism (de Bary, 1983). Yet Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085) saw "mopping floors and answering basic questions" as a prerequisite for higher learning and reason itself (Chan, 1967a). The natural humility of Neo-Confucian philosophers is illustrated by these examples. The counseling situation can be seen as an "education in becoming authentic" in both East and West.

Authenticity Described in the Letters of Wang Yang-ming

The researcher will focus on three aspects of authenticity as discussed in original letters by Wang Yang-ming, translated by Julia Ching (1973): (1) sincerity, (2) watching over the self when alone (shen-tu) and (3) patience under criticism.

Sincerity (ch'eng).

Neo-Confucian literature is rich in its understanding of sincerity. The practice of making the will sincere (ch'eng-yi) is practically identical to the extension of conscience (chih liang-chih), the keynote concept of Neo-Confucianism. Wang Yang-ming prescribed self-examination for one who loves others but is not loved

in return. Wang warned of the dangers in being a stickler for details. It is a tendency that leads to excessive comparisons, ostentation and conscious error without learning (Ching, 1973). Since the researcher is learning and becoming more conscious, he feels a sense of compatibility with Wang's teachings, despite the admittedly lengthy detail!

Rightness (i) is defined as "adapting oneself properly to objects, it refers to my mind having done what is appropriate. For rightness is not an external object, which one can seize and take over" (Ching, 1973, p. 29-30). "The understanding of the good is itself the effort of attaining sincerity . . . The goal of the understanding of the good is to become sincere" (Ching, 1973, p. 30). Lu Hsiang-hsan (1139-1193) stated, "there is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity when reflecting upon ourselves" (Ching, 1973, p. 73). Evil itself is viewed as insincerity because our nature is good.

Wang believed shame is often due to insincerity. Shame can be felt when one is unable to win an argument, subdue others in temperment or follow their impulses. Recall that shame is one of the Four Beginnings (ssu-tuan), specifically the beginning of appropriateness (i) (Chan, 1967). Wang observed straightforward and generous minds are capable of holding much information as well as building a sense of confidence, T'ang (1973a) offers a

unique observation of self-confidence as the ultimate concern of Confucianism.

Carl Rogers (1961) lists two of his most significant learnings as directly related to authenticity or sincerity: "(1) In my relationships with persons I have found that it does not help in the long run, to act as though I were something that I am not. (2) I find I am more effective when I can listen acceptantly to myself and be myself" (p. 16-17). Maslow (1968) has observed an unusual ability for self-actualizing people to detect the fake in personality. Self-actualizing people are better judges of character partly due to a greater sense of security.

Watching over the self when alone (shen-tu).

Authenticity depends upon an orderly private life. Wang Yang ming discussed shen-tu (watching over self when alone) as the key to self-cultivation. Shen-tu is "practicing vigilance without being seen" and "apprehension without being heard" (Ching, 1973, p. 79). The practice of shen-tu serves as an important reminder that we must remain calm and happy when we are alone. It is relatively simple to be content when our friends arrive.

Respect and reverence is the function of spontaneity and principle. A respectful reverent attitude allows one to act without doubt over actions. The investigator

believes shen-tu could be considered an aspect of li[b] (decorum), despite the fact that the "other" is not present. Through shen-tu, the self is objectified by a respectful attitude towards one's self. Moreover, respect and deference is the beginning (tuan) of propriety (li[b]).

Our only task should be learning from experience constantly, and its essence is watching over ourselves when we are alone (Ching, 1973). This procedure is reminescent of cognitive change methods in cognitive-behavior therapy (Hackney & Cormier, 1979).

A gentleman's only fear should be the neglect of study in its broadest sense. The requirement for self-quest is not to overreact to praise or criticism, because one who becomes fearful cannot become a gentleman. Through such practice, the gentleman "finds himself in no situation when he is not himself," a citation Wang Yang-ming borrowed from Tsu Ssu, the author of the Doctrine of the Mean (Ching, 1973).

It should be noted that the term, "gentleman", is not meant to be sexist, but the proper translation of chun-tzu. The investigator asks the reader to consider "gentleman" to be of neuter gender. The increasingly negative connotations of the word, "lady", makes its use grossly inappropriate for this study.

Maslow (1970) has noted the tendency of self-actualizing people to enjoy privacy and solitude more than average, without becoming antisocial. It is not clear in Maslow's thought whether solitude precedes self-actualization or visa-versa. A self-actualizing individual necessarily enjoys solitude and sociality more than an unsatisfied individual. Maslow (1970) adds that self-actualizing people have fewer but deeper friendships, yet may attract syncophantic admirers.

Patience under criticism.

Wang Yang-ming received harsh treatment from enemies in government; including public flogging, exile, and attempted assassination (Tu, 1978). Wang received criticism from Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucians who regarded him as a ku'ang (wild) Zen Buddhist (Ching, 1976). Wang's letters on patience under criticism are particularly inspiring to the researcher because of the profound sense of empathy and responsiblity, without a desire to blame others.

Criticism can occur in social or professional circles. One should ask if they were lacking in kindness (jen) and manners (li[b]) to a critic. If self-examination reveals that one was polite and friendly, then the case is closed. The gentleman (chun-tzu) has a life-long concern but no temporary worries (Fu, 1983).

In a professional situation, criticism rarely has much to do with personal grudges. One's opponents feel they are defenders of the truth. Wang admits that a new theory can look like "forced interpretation and things invented by the imagination" (Ching, 1973, p. 67). Arguments about learning reflect a desire to learn that goes beyond differences of opinion. It is possible that the critics decided not to believe nor investigate with humility. However, we, the theoreticians could have been carried away by a desire to excel and bear the responsibility for their alarm (Ching, 1973).

Fitness as a Niche

Cheng (1972b) emphasizes the development of appropriateness (i) as transforming the world into a world of self. Tu (1972) also describes the extention of propriety (li[b]) in the same manner.

When fitness is discovered and one can become firm in it, the self can be strengthened through its extension. Cheng (1972a) sees appropriateness (i) as a self-determining principle (hao-jan-chih-chi). A knowledge of the structure of propriety (li[b]) provides the means to transcendent (Tu, 1972). Extension of the self is simply chih liang-chih (extending conscience). The researcher feels that Cheng (1972b) and Tu (1972) have

expressed the importance of finding one's niche with philosophical rigor.

Decorum ($\underline{li}^b$) seems to have priority in maturation and historical record, as it is the limiting framework for acceptable behavior. Appropriateness ($\underline{i}$) appears to be the means for working within the framework of decorum ($\underline{li}^b$), reflecting a concern for the content of actions. Appropriateness ($\underline{i}$) is discussed further in the next chapter in Section II-E, "Axiom three: conscience and appropriateness."

Inauthenticity as Incomplete Socialization

A key difference between Confucian and Western concepts of self-actualization is the heavier importance placed on society in the former culture. Perhaps the discussions of authenticity and sociality will flow together because of the likeness seen in the East. Jung (1966) states the necessity of social existence as a means of improvement to achieve authenticity. Tu (1972) goes as far as to say the distinction between the authentic and inauthentic self is a case of complete versus incomplete socialization. Tu believes the conflict between an inner sense of personal morality and an outer expression of social responsibility is an overrated issue.

Chang (1954) states that our first moral obligation is to transcend our biases, prejudices and other

egotistical habits. Rogers (1961) has observed insincerity and false fronts in almost every failure in communication. The dysfunctional behavior is due to a fear of being judged and not understood. Hopefully, the Confucian approach can develop confidence in one's authenticity, as opposed to reacting fearfully to society.

Sociality

Nature of Man

Neo-Confucianism is noted for its emphasis upon social harmony supported by principled post-conventional morality. The belief in the goodness of human nature (pen-t'i) is a driving force to pairing theory with practice (chih hsing ho-i). Effort (kung-fu) or motivation appears to become stronger when one has cherished beliefs and traditions to uphold. The goodness of human nature and a "heaven-saturated world," leads to a perception of reality that is "friendly to right (really right) decision, if one learns not to obstruct or resist it" (Nivison, 1973, p. 135). Popular Western existentialists (philosophers and psychologists) believe mankind lives in an "outer world (that) is utterly indifferent to the rightness of his decisions and an inner world which just is those decisions" (Nivison, 1973, p. 135).

Yet Neo-Confucianism does not solidify into a set of dogmas or foggy speculations despite its metaphysical

leanings. A general injunction is recognized as being difficult to understand in its raw sense. The individual-in-action "tells" the conscience about circumstances. Goodman and Maultsby (1978) stresses, "The way a rationally-thinking person acts depends on the circumstances, because he thinks first, then acts. Sometimes he responds one way, other times different ways to very similar situations. That's the rationally creative approach to life" (pp. 112-113). The rectifying act is not necessarily a sinner's rebellion nor a puppet's indecisiveness. It simply reflects a need to know-the-good, a discernment of stimuli, an attitude of reverance toward society, and a goal of increased spontaneity. Li[b] (manners) gives form to jen (benevolence) and "as jen is preserved, the self and the other are then identified," according to Ch'eng Hao (Chan, 1963).

Situation Ethics

Liu (1972b) views moral principles as universally applicable absolutes while "moral maxims are relative and confined to particular situations" (p. 421). Principles only point to general directions. Chang Tsai wrote "principle is one and its manifestations are many" (li-i-fen-shu). The situation ethics perspective of Neo-Confucianism has been noted repeatedly by several authors such as Tu (1968), Cheng (1972b), Liu (1972b),

Nivison (1973) and Hall and Ames (1984). Unfortunately, the Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition has been frequently misperceived as rigid and legalistic by Western outsiders.

Cheng (1972b) and Hall and Ames (1984) view much of the misunderstanding as resting with incomplete translations of i, or "righteousness as appropriateness". Moreover, righteousness has the connotation of narrow and dogmatic in the West, which is radically different from the Confucian concept. Unfortunately, typical brief translations of i seen by the researcher are simply "righteousness." The researcher believes "appropriateness" or "fitness" would be far better single-word translations of i. These definitions for i were found in the Doctrine of Mean (Cheng, 1972b).

Cua (1971a) states, "one of the most valuable functions of li[b] is the establishment of harmony" (p. 133). Furthermore, Confucius states "respectfulness without li[b] becomes tiresome, carefulness without li[b] becomes timidity, daring without li[b] becomes turbulence and straightforwardness without li[b] becomes rudeness" (Analects I. 12). Normative force is maintained only through a sincere intention (ch'eng-yi) toward the ritual. Li[b] (propriety) comprise the background of action or social arena for behavior (Cheng, 1974b). The rules are needed to prevent behavior from degenerating into acts

without moral significance (Cua, 1971a). The subsection dealing with past applications of Neo-Confucianism focused primarily on the creative tension between i and li. Chapter Three also discusses situation ethics in Neo-Confucianism.

Relationality and Communication

The very etymology of jen (benevolence) suggests relationality and communication. Jen is a simple four-stroke character composed of two ideograms: "man" and "two" (Jung, 1966). Tu (1972) sees the etymological meaning of jen as "man in society." Streng (1982) cites T'ang Chun-i's (1973a) contention that an entity is defined by its position in relation to the other things, because of fundamental inseparability. Since jen incorporates reciprocity (shu), responsibility is stressed as much as freedom.

Cheng (1984) cited the "humanity/relationality" tradition of Chinese philosophy, as bearing the potential to complement the Western philosophical orientation toward "objectivity/individuality." Moreover, the researcher believes Chinese philosophy is more compatible with psychology than Western philosophy in this instance.

Communication is held as a vehicle of truth, a recognition of a shared world. Spoken and written language are important because they enable jen to be

understood (Jung, 1966). Such a contention frankly seems to belabor the obvious. However, Buddhism viewed language as empty symbols, skilled means to a goal and passing phantoms (Cheng, 1982). The Neo-Confucians were forced to deal with issues in a philosophical manner that Westerners accept as undisputable truths.

Recall the beginning of the authenticity section, in its discussion of genuineness in the counseling situation. Beck and his colleagues (1979) emphasize the need to communicate one's authenticity, as opposed to merely possessing it. Wang Yang-ming lamented that too many people discuss conscience (liang-chih) but neglect its extension (chih[b]) (Ching, 1973). The blend of honesty and diplomacy Beck and his colleagues (1979) see in counseling is part of propriety (li[b]); a virtue that encompasses all social contacts.

Spontaneity and Nothingness

David S. Nivison (1973) shows the diametric opposition of Neo-Confucian and Western existentialist beliefs on freedom and nothingness. Clearly, the Neo-Confucians have a far happier philosophy. The researcher believes Neo-Confucian views on spontaneity are some of their most progressive contributions to philosophy, partly because they strove to unite reflection with immediacy.

Spontaneity is the result of following principle and is shown in a reverent attitude. Freedom is desirable to the Neo-Confucian and the result of adjusting our self-understanding by removing anxieties. Western existentialists believe freedom is an awful burden from which we try to hide (Nivison, 1973). In effect, these Europeans constructed a philosophy of neurotic avoidance (Coleman, Butcher & Carson, 1980). Authenticity is seen by the European existentialists as accepting a world without principles and the resulting anguish of groundless responsibility.

In all fairness to the West, existential therapy has moved toward a more positive outlook through the work of psychologists like Rollo May and Abraham Maslow. Once again, we see a case where Western psychological thought is more compatible with Neo-Confucianism than Western philosophy. To the researcher, psychology also appears to be directed toward "relationality/becomingness" like Neo-Confucianism but unlike Western philosophy. The final section of this chapter, "A Metaphysics of Will" discusses spontaneity further.

"Nothing" for the Neo-Confucians is an "absence of preconception or selfish interest that could bind us to things" (Nivison, 1973, p. 125). The Western existentialists feel consciousness is nothing because it is different from the object, yet we are hurled into the world and

forced to deal with such things. Neo-Confucianism sees the mind as nothing more than the principles it is thinking of at any one point. In other words, the goal is realizing principle in consciousness, or hsin chi li (Nivison, 1973).

Confucius sounds like a behaviorist when he stated that people practice goodness (jen) because either they are motivated to take the next step or they are not so motivated (Nivison, 1973). The objectivity of rationality and a predisposition in humanity for striving toward reason as a goal allows Confucian tradition to be principled in Kohlberg's terms. Neo-Confucianism is a vehicle for leading people from their first spontaneous reactions and moral sentiments (ssu-tuan) to post-conventional reasoning.

Alienation

An effective way to delineate sociality could be to include a discussion of its opposite: alienation. Psychologist Rollo May attended the 1969 East/West Philosophers' Conference (Manley, 1970). He delivered a lecture on a clinically alienated individual. It was conceived by the conference members that a society could be clinically alienated as well. Exalting law (fa) above principle (li[a]) leads to social mores (li[b]) without kindness (jen).

S. E. Lee introduced the concept of chung shu (loyalty/intensive empathy) as a way of combatting alienation. Thome Fang amplified chung shu in stating that it is "the attempt to enter into the heart of the matter with intensive empathy" (Manley, 1970, p. 393). A conflict was conceived by Fang as the result of independently derived situations and causes in the subject and object. Importantly, Western existentialism stresses throwness into independently derived situations as the root of a tormented reality (Nivison, 1973). Cheng (1977) states that Chinese philosophy does not view conflict as having a basis in reality, unlike Marxism.

Fang sees the Western transcendence of the Divine as a cause for alienation, a theological concept not found in the East. However, it is completely uncertain if alienation is less common in the Far East than the West. The researcher believes agnostics, atheists, or those who are indifferent to theological concerns, also create a transcendent image of God through His absence in the person's conscience and life-view. "Indifferent transcendence" is common in secular societies throughout the world.

The investigator agrees with Fang's call for immanence as a cure for alienation. A complete transcendence" of the Divine could be heretical to Christianity

as it ignores the soul. Immanence retains the soul while recognizing the Divine presence in nature, while uplifting aesthetic appreciation to the status of prayer. Fulfilling our duties to associates also becomes a type of prayer. Reverence is easier in a theology of immanence because the presence of the Creator in the creation is not forgotten. The process theologian/philosopher Alfred North Whitehead believed God is the spark of every creative act (Whitehead, 1954).

Types of alienation.

During the conference, alienation was originally divided into three categories: (1) clinical, (2) social or political and (3) essential or cut off from God. It is possible to be socio-politically or essentially alienated but not feel alienated and visa-versa (Manley, 1970).

James C. Manley (1970) reports that the discussion session chaired by Shu-hsien Liu was probably the most successful in grappling with the different senses of alienation. Slightly new categories were utilized. The clinically alienated and the socially alienated due to socioeconomic class were lumped into one category. The second form of alienation involved moral alienation from society. A curious combination of sociopaths and enlightened ethical leaders, such as Bertrand Russell and Gautama Buddha, were included in the category.

People like Wang Yang-ming or the Buddha embraced the cause of alienated people after solving their own alienation through an enlightenment experience.

The third type of alienation was a self-alienation stemming from "an inability to identify with the present self together with the desire to reach a higher self" (Manley, 1970, p. 394). True alienation was seen as an apathy that reveals overall indifference and despair. The investigator adds that depression can show similar symptoms to alienation. The logotherapy of Frankl (1962) recognizes the presence of philosophical dilemmas contributing to mental illness.

Dealing with alienation.

A holistic counselor pays attention to an introspective client's philosophical concerns. To dismiss somewhat esoteric beliefs as irrelevant story-telling or symptoms of chemical imbalance demeans the client and reduces the possibility of treatment. A cluster of irrational beliefs can be revealed through a neurotic's personal philosophy. Such information increases the counselor's power for disputation. An effective cognitive approach traces stimulus-response patterns back through ideations, an extension of behaviorism. Interestingly, the Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition saw greater potential in the k'uang personality (wild, eccentric, "mad ardour") than

the hsiang-yuan type (passive conformist, "good villager"). The k'uang are energetic aspirants for greatness who only need to find their niche in order to "settle down" (Ching, 1976).

The Paradigmatic Gentleman: Self-Perfection Through Sociality

A good way to end two chapters on authenticity and sociality is to describe a "reachable ideal"---the chun-tzu, or gentleman. Once again, we see a behaviorist tone to Neo-Confucianism through the chun-tzu. The chun-tzu is a readily observable criterion of social success through principled ethics. Antonio Cua (1971a) recalls that Confucian high schools transmitted the appeal of the chun-tzu to the students. The gentleman was compared to the inferior man (siao-jen) in particular cases of conduct.

Enjoy the world.

One of the most acceptable Neo-Confucian practices for the West is a shared joy in socializing with people. Tu (1968) insists that the major purpose of cultivating jen (benevolence) is to be of great use to others, without being a utensil. Worldly activities are seen as valuable and self-fulfilling. Jen's inner demand for self-actualization gives meaning to li[b] as a principle of particularization in etiquette (Tu, 1972).

Neo-Confucianism is existential in its belief that we need other people, an element Bochenski (1954) sees in all European existentialisms. Unfortunately, European existentialists often dwelled on absurb randomness instead of accepting life with a search for principle (li[a]). Gabriel Marcel, however, perceived our task as creating the self and helping another to create his own freedom (Bochenski, 1954). An often quoted passage from Confucius is nearly a exact duplicate of Marcel's statement (Ching, 1973).

One's ability to relate to others in a meaningful way reflects one's level of self-cultivation (Tu, 1972). Good performance in a social situation is a creative act. Torrance (1979) attained a new meaning of Maslow's (1970) statement that a good soup could be as creative as a symphony, after observing veteran tempura chefs in action. Recall Chang Tsai's classic statement, "Principle is one but its functions are many (li-i-fen-shu)" (Chan, 1967a). The Neo-Confucian model of self-realization is human relatedness. Accordingly, sociality is a desirable and definable trait of the ultimate human attainment (Tu, 1972). The improvement of humanity is a justification for sociality. The rules of li[b] (etiquette) point to a movement toward authentic relationships.

Appropriateness (*i*) is the way for an individual to achieve self-realization (*tzu-te*) through bestowing or deriving meaning from a situation (Hall & Ames, 1984). To a certain extent, appropriateness (*i*) and decorum (*li*^{b}) are overlapping virtues. The researcher feels appropriateness (*i*) is a more advanced skill that occurs later in development than propriety (*li*^{b}). Socialization clearly occurs through the "generalized other" explicity described in *li*^{b} (decorum).

Appropriateness (*i*) entails a concrete rationalism that differs from the immediacy in good manners (*li*^{b}) as it is a higher cognitive level of development. *Li*^{b} (manners) itself has been described as "the repository of past *i*" (appropriateness) (Hall & Ames, 1984). The Confucian concern is for good growing out of a concrete situation as opposed to generalities independent of action. The three virtues can be related in the following way: *jen* as substance, *i* as mediation and *li*^{b} as form (Cheng, 1972b). All of the virtues are growth-oriented through providing a structure and the means to go beyond. See Figure One.

An ethics of role.

Antonio S. Cua (1971b) describes Confucianism as an "ethics of role." Equal emphasis is given to the inner life of self-cultivation and the outer life of relevant well-mannered expression to the circumstances

of society. The interdependence of jen (benevolence) and li[b] (propriety) embodies an "ethics of character" and an "ethics of ritual rules" respectively (Cua, 1971b). The investigator believes Confucianism shows a greater concern for social skills and their development than any other Eastern philosophy.

Cua (1971b) defines li[b] (propriety) as "the tie or contact of an individual agent's actions with the cultural form of life which gives them the locus of identification and the possibility of moral achievement" (p. 44). Tu (1972) sees li[b] as the externalization of jen and the principle of particularization. Li[b] is a concern for the background of action, thereby exerting a moderating force on the individual's beliefs. In other words, li is the ability to relate oneself to another and a cherishing of harmony (Tu, 1972).

Knowing the roots.

Part of being a gentleman (chun-tzu) is being kind to one's parents and spouse. Only the individuals who are good to their "roots" can be expected to be good to their "branches," that is, friends and acquaintances (Tu, 1968). In today's mobile society, close friends are part of one's roots as well. Problems in learning are frequently related to an inability to distinguish the roots from the branches, or major from minor points.

Early Confucians had ideological disputes with the Mohists over the nature of love. The Mohists advocacy of universal love degenerated into universal apathy (Tu, 1968). A philosophical theory is invalid if it cannot be put into practice. A knowledge of norms (li[b]) is involved in appropriate (i) action.

The gentleman.

According to Cua (1971a) Confucius viewed the status of gentleman as a reachable goal, while sagehood was perceived as an abstract standard of inspiration rather than aspiration. The investigator likes to see the chun-tzu (gentleman) as the embodiment of sheng-yi (creative will); an actuating force in a commitment to ethics. Wang Yang-ming preferred to state that sagehood was within everyone's reach, although it is likely that "sagehood" for Wang was the equivalent of "gentleman" for Confucius (Ching, 1976). Perhaps the most faulty component of existentialism is a lofty view of self-actualizing. A goal of perfection can become an illness in itself, as well as a heracy to most theistic traditions.

A gentleman (chun-tzu) incorporates the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i), the virtues (te) and a spirit of catholicity and neutrality. One can see the continuity of Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition from the Analects to Wang Yang-ming (Chan, 1967a)

Confucius states in the Analects that the gentleman is one in whom words and actions are in harmony (II. 13). Wang Yang-ming wrote that thought (yi) begins action (hsing) and action is the completion of knowledge (chih) (Ching, 1973). Confucians view sincere wishes as insufficient for deeds to be considered meritorious. For example, "respectfulness without propriety (li[b]) becomes laborious bustle" (Cua, 1971a, p. 133). Wang Yang-ming quoted Confucius stating, "Learning without thinking is labour lost" (Ching, 1973, p. 106).

Catholicity and harmony refer to the situation ethics perspective of Neo-Confucianism incorporated in the concepts of chung-ho (tranquility/harmony) and li-i-fen-shu (principle is one but its manifestations are many). The gentleman applies these concepts by recognizing the limits of one's knowledge. Paying attention to the social surroundings can lead one to the underlying principle. The application of liang-chih is a concrete rationalism which utilizes empirical data. Japanese society still reflects the Confucian empiricism with tranquility (Kishimoto, 1959).

Part Three: Neo-Confucian Structure

Insight and the Theory of Opposition

Rollo May (1975) defines self-actualization as bringing something new into reality. Carl Rogers (1961) sees the good life as a process of movement in a direction which the person selects when free to move in any direction. Rogers emphasizes that it is a process or direction, not a state or destination. Abraham Maslow (1968) described self-actualization as the fulfillment, use and exploitation of talents, capacities and potentialities. The characteristics of the process according to Rogers (1961) are (1) increased openness to experience, (2) increased existential living, (3) increased trust in self, and (4) process of functioning more fully. Alfred North Whitehead (1929/1958) based process philosophy on occasions of actualization. Every occasion is a combination of diverse element into a unity. The derivate is a fusion of the particular ground and its consequent.

Novelty and Reason

Rollo May (1975) sees self-actualization as beginning with an insight, but requiring determination to produce concrete results. The essential factor is the degree of absorption, or intensity level (May, 1975).

I. M. Bochenski (1954) believes the existential experience as starting point is the commonest characteristic among existential philosophies. Whitehead (1929/1958) considered reason to be the judgment of novelty. Reason allows novelty to be realized in purpose and finally in fact. Ideal novelty is an analytic force against the synthesized ground of reason. Hwa Yol Jung (1966) explains that the goal is simply to put knowledge into action (chih hsing ho-i). The realization of knowledge depends on the benevolence (jen) and actions of the subject.

Intensity level, as discussed by May, is best translated in Chinese by li-chih, which means "fixing the determination," or "forming a resolution" (Ching, 1973). The author would like to introduce a new synonym for li-chih: "goal-setting."

Breakthrough of Insight

In discussing insight, Rollo May (1975) cites the theory of opposition by Carl Jung. Jung stated that the opposition between the conscious and unconscious mind is a system of self-regulation (Jung, 1953). May (1975) observes that insight has to break through the conscious efforts at rational thinking by an individual. The more dogmatically an argument is fought for consciously, the more likely unconscious doubts are held.

May (1975) defines the unconscious as the potentialities for awareness or action which the individual can not or will not actualize. This view is strikingly similar to the Neo-Confucian concept, pen-t'i, meaning "original condition of the minds" (Cheng, 1979a). He adds that the areas in which we are most intensively committed are most likely to lead to insight. Recall that "intensive commitment" is summarized in Chinese as li-chih (Ching, 1973). The processes of forming go on all the time, which is why insights frequently occur during relaxation after hard work (May, 1975).

Insight Accepting the Past

Ignoring these unconscious doubts leads to symptoms that thwart conscious intentions. These forces tied up in the neuroses can extend the scope of life when released through insight (Jung, 1953).

True insight does not condemn the past, or else the "former life will suffer repression and produce just as unbalanced a state as existed before (Jung, 1953, p. 74). The Confucian dialectics of harmonization sees opposing views as ultimately complimentary because conflict is considered to be a contradiction of reality (Cheng, 1977). Jung (1953) sees everything as a phenomenon of energy, much as Neo-Confucians relate ch'i (matter-energy) to yi (intentionality) (Cheng, 1979a).

Without its opposite, a truth or value would have very little meaning (Jung, 1953). The opposite of the Buddhist aspired value, nothingness (nirvana) as a state, appears quite meaningful to the researcher. A conversion needs to conserve some of the previous values of the adherent, together with a recognition of their opposites (Jung, 1953). Otherwise, appropriateness (i) of action vanishes and the new believer will find difficulty fitting into a cultural life-style (li[b]) (Cua, 1971b). The views of Whitehead on actualization or concretion are especially helpful. Each occasion is a unification of antecedent and consequent; the desirable present was made possible by the less admirable past (Whitehead, 1958). A key disagreement between existentialism and Neo-Confucianism is the former's disregard for man as the manifestation of a broader life process. Bochenski (1954) views autonomous subjectivity in a creative sense to be one of existentialism's defining characteristics.

The sudden insight, or enlightenment of Wang Yang-ming was true to the theory of opposition by Carl Jung, in that the experience of Wang did not lead him to doubt his Confucian heritage. Instead he chose to emphasize some Confucian concepts that had been neglected by more current scholars. Wang developed a minor concept used by Mencius, liang-chih (conscience), into the focal point

of his philosophy (Tu, 1978). Wang also tried to resolve the differences between his viewpoints and those of Chu Hsi; perhaps too much. Wang never felt comfortable in disagreeing with Chu, due to his deep admiration for the character and scholarship of the Sung master (Liu, 1984).

A Metaphysics of Will

Understanding of form or principle (li[a]) takes a metaphysical turn in both Neo-Confucianism and existential therapy. May (1975) explains the ecstasy of finding form as an experience of "this-is-the-way-things-are-meant-to-be." Liu (1972a) concludes that transcendence of personal problems allows one to participate in the immanent creativity of the universe (sheng-li). Such an outlook is similar to Beck's use of decentering in the treatment of the emotional disorders (Beck, 1976). Sincerity (ch'eng) is the means for reaching this goal; the primary religious virtue according to Whitehead (1926/1954).

Principle, Vital Force and Will

First of all, the ultimate inseparability of principle (li[a]) and vital force (ch'i) must be emphasized (Takehiko, 1979). The following analysis is meant to show conceptual interdependence rather than separation. The researcher's interpretation probably shows more

influence from Chu Hsi than Wang Yang-ming, unlike the rest of the thesis.

The issue of will enters the picture when creativity-as-principle (sheng-li) is explored. Some Neo-Confucian metaphysical theories exalt the creative will (sheng-yi) to the same level as principle (li[a]) and vital force (ch'i). Creative will can be viewed as the moving force for ch'i as it travels through the framework of principle (li[a]), or as an aspect of vital force (ch'i) itself (Tong, 1982). Vital force has ontological priority since it provides a place for principle to adhere, just as thought (yi-nien) is a prerequisite for reasoning (Cheng, 1979a). An element of inference after the action is explicit. Behavior modification programs, the graded task assignment designed by Aaron T. Beck (1976) for depressives and the advocacy of manual labor by Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085) contend that we derive our attitudes from our behavior. All three theories point to the need for action to make knowledge real and to the ontological and existential priority of vital force (ch'i).

Principle has locigal priority and directive power vital force (Takehiko, 1979). Recall the previous comparison of principle (li[a]) to hopes, dreams and ideals. Logical priority is like cognitive therapy in its assertion that attitudes have behavioral consequences

(Beck, 1976). Chang Tsai stated "principle is one but its function is differentiated into the many" (li-i-fen-shu) (Liu, 1972b). The diversity of function creates the need for rightness as appropriateness (i). There is no room in Confucian/Neo-Confucian tradition for righteousness as dogmatic inflexibility.

Analogy of the Filled Ice Tray

Metaphysics runs the risk of becoming the definitive esoteric abstract topic. The researcher will provide an example of metaphysics in everyday life: the filled ice-tray. The plastic ice-tray is an example of li[a] (principle, form), while the cooling water represents ch'i (matter-energy). The action of pouring the water into the tray exhibits creative will (sheng-yi). The continuous freezing of the water also shows creative will. The actual process eliminates all indeterminateness from the idea of the ice cube as a possibility.

Without the water, the ice tray would be useless. Wang Yang-ming considered people with little substance to be boring (Ching, 1973). Without the ice-tray, the water would be an undifferentiated mess. Wang Yang-ming wrote that people with little framework to their thought were rude (Ching, 1973). When the ice hardens into cubes, we can see a unity of principle (li[a]) and vital-force (ch'i); a harmonious state of affairs like liang-chih

(conscience). When the ice melts, we watch principle dissolving and matter-energy free-flowing. The disintegration is analogous to a mental breakdown.

The li-ch'i paradigm was also used to explain the differences between adult and child education respectively (Chan, 1967a). Rollo May (1975) uses an argument similar to the li-ch'i paradigm in discussing the contrast of the Appolonian to the Dionysian, and limits to spontaneity. May appears to show Neo-Confucian influence in these writings, as a result of the five-week East/West Philosophers' Convention he attended in 1969 (Manley, 1970).

The Four Qualities and the Five Virtues

The Neo-Confucian theories of metaphysics are an effort to conceptualize change in actuality. Neo-Confucianism also reveals a growth-system through descriptions of the extension of conscience (chih liang-chih), appropriateness (i), and propriety (li[b]). The virtues show change in moving from the Four Beginnings (ssu-tuan) to faithfulness (hsin[b]) the fifth and final virtue. The Five Virtues also reveal the Four Qualities which describes the process of changes in the universe.

The Four Qualities are as follows: (1) origination is the beginning of things, (2) flourishing is their development, (3) advantage is the result of the harmony of all things, giving each of them their own strong

points, and (4) firmness, the completion of all things, "in which they are firm, strong and correct to the end" (Chan, 1967a, p. 9). The Four Qualities reflect the dialectics of harmonization in Neo-Confucianism (Cheng, 1977).

The quality, origination, is comparable to the virtues humanity (jen) when the virtues are discussed separately. Collectively speaking, humanity (jen) embraces the other four virtues. All virtues participate in the growth process of the qualities. In other words, jen is "The Origination" and the other virtues possess originations.

Spontaneity and Principle: A Critique of Western Existentialism

Spontaneity (tzu-jan) is the result of conforming to principle (li[a]). Delaying decision-making often means the calculating of selfish gains (Nivison, 1973). Neo-Confucianism provides an education in post-conventional, principled reasoning. We can experience gains in confidence through the extension of conscience (chih liang-chih), since it is based upon objective principle (li[a]). Importantly, Neo-Confucian teachings on the Four Beginnings (ssu-tuan) are designed for the preconventional child. Developing the virtues (te) guides the adolescent into conventional, Stage 3, "nice guy" morality.

Cheng (1971) astutely points out that the overemphasis on personal subjectivity in Western existentialism is humiliating. Bochenski (1954) perceives existentialism as a "therapeutic device" lacking the objective scientific attitude of the Greeks. Existentialism is more comparable to Indian philosophy in its obsession with death, suffering and failure (Bochenski, 1954). Moreover, existentialism disregards immanence. The quest for universal principles shared by Neo-Confucianism and Lawrence Kohlberg's (1981) revival of Greek Platonism enables individuals to develop greater ethical decision-making skills. The stress on subjectivity and the impermanence or non-existence of principle severely limits ethical potential in all relativistic philosophies; such as existentialism, Buddhism, Taoism and anthropology.

Platonism and Neo-Confucianism

Kohlberg (1981) believes justice is the highest Platonic virtue. Platonic virtue includes personal authenticity, preserving harmony and proper actions that are due to each thing and class (Chang, 1963). Whereas wisdom (chih[aa]) wisdom is the fundamental Chinese virtue, its application through appropriateness (i) seems to add credence to Kohlberg's theory on the universality of justice. Wisdom is both intellectual and practical or moral. The researcher disagrees with Chang's (1963)

belief in the dissimilarity between Platonic justice and Confucian righteousness (i).

Chang (1963) feels that "justice . . . is a much wider concept than righteousness (i)" (p. 300). The investigator believes the idea of equilibrium/harmony (chung-ho) permeates Confucian i. Chang's (1963) description of "righteousness as the right thing to do in a particular case," and justice as "what is due to each thing and class" appear to be quite similar to the researcher, aside from the more empirical approach taken by the Chinese (p. 300). The a priori stance in Platonic justice seems to make the concept more narrow than Confucian righteousness.

The researcher agrees with Chang's (1963) assertion that wisdom is the most fundamental Chinese virtue. However, wisdom (chih[aa]) is somewhat raw and unrefined without its application through appropriateness as rightness (i). The next chapter, "Applying Neo-Confucianism to the cognitive/rational-emotive therapy of the emotional disorders," develops fitness (i) within the context of therapy. Cheng (1972b) states that appropriateness (i) is the only Chinese virtue that cannot go to an excess, an assertion firmly grounded in the philosophy of Mencius.

Motivation Theory: A Passion for Form

Developing a Neo-Confucian motivation theory is an ambitious project, because the researcher is molding the more implicit aspects of philosophical concepts into a psychological theory. The proposed motivation theory is somewhat like a theory of problem-solving or creativity. It is apparent that a researcher must formulate similar models for motivation theory and personality theory for the sake of inner consistency. A Neo-Confucian personality theory is provided in Figure Three.

The investigator was inspired by Rollo May's (1975) discussion on "the passion for form," a method involving imagination filling in gaps to provide meaning. Several Neo-Confucian concepts are inadvertently implicated in May's (1975) theory. Recall the investigator's assertion in the introduction that part of the proof for Neo-Confucianism's applicability rests in the present existence of similar theories and methods in psychology. The concepts related to May's (1975) "passion for form" are as follows: (1) yi with somewhat faulty chih[a] (imagination), (2) i (meaning through fitness), (3) li[a] (form, principle), and a combination of (4) chih liang-chih (extending conscience) and (5) ko-wu (rectifying affairs).

The first two concepts compose the basic belief system as discussed in Figure Three. The third concept, li[a], is the goal of the individual. The last two concepts are the methods by which the belief system reaches its goal.

Constructive Memory

Rollo May's (1975) concept of the imagination providing meaning is related to constructive memory as discussed by Frederick C. Bartlett (1932). Several factors can be attributed to a lack of literal accuracy in recall: (1) visual imagery, (2) familiarity with a particular element, (3) personal interests and (4) rationalization. Rationalization was defined as "an attempt to make the material more understandable, comfortable and satisfying" (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982, p. 301). Memory is built out of our attitude toward an active mass of organized past reactions. May's (1975) "imagination providing meaning" appears closest to "rationalization" in Bartlett's (1932) memory research. An interaction between one's knowledge and the text is constructive when inferences and elaboration of the material-to-be-remembered is present.

The Confucian virtue i (fitness as meaning) appears to be the most relevant Chinese concept to rationalization in Bartlett's memory research. In this case,

liang-chih (conscience) and i (appropriateness) seem to show some dissimilarity. The flexibility of i might go beyond the penetrating correctness of liang-chih as the two serve to balance each other. Chapter Three examines the occasions when liang-chih and i are essentially identical; a far more frequent condition.

Immediacy and Phenomenology

The concept of intentionality (yi) in phenomenology can become rather complicated. In this instance, the researcher is looking at immediacy as a quality that removes humans from a vacuum, but forces us to live through a world of phantoms and facts. Psychology and philosophy enable humanity to deal with inevitable fallibility. Intentionality becomes synonymous with existence itself, because thought requires an object (Jung, 1965). Even the Buddhist seeking enlightenment has to think about nothingness, even though it is neither a place nor a thing (Cheng, 1982).

The phenomenal world, or Lebenswelt, is composed of things which occupy the forefront of our attention (Jung, 1965). We may see things that are not really there, but ought to be there for the sake of coherence and meaning (Zechmeister & Nyberg, 1982). Seken is a syncretic Japanese concept describing a social reality; a Lebenswelt laden with a fear of social disapproval and a sense of

obligation. The interaction between perception and attention explains why Japanese are motivated to apologize (Tohru, 1983).

Moreover, the immediacy of imagination and the process of constructive memory, point to the fallibility of the belief system. Paradoxically, these operations are necessary for normal functioning. Perhaps psychopathology is partly the result of an inherently deviation-amplifying system.

The Function of Principle

Neo-Confucian li[a] has a two-tiered function: antecedent cause of events and overall regulation; a combination of the existential and metaphysical. The concepts i (fitness) and yi (intentionality) are purely existential, although yi is seen as the manifestation of ch'i (vital force), a metaphysical concept (Cheng, 1979a).

The investigator proposes an extension to the meaning of li[a] (principle). The investigation of events (ko-wu) necessarily reveals a principle (li[a]) behind all things; an Eastern way of phrasing cause-and-effect. However, not all principles of events are good, even though the understanding of good-and-bad events is good. To dismiss bad habits and faulty thinking as simply extraneous yi (thought) or ch'i (vital force) is to

disregard classification schemes in psychopathology. "False li[a]" (principle) channels erroneous attitudes and behaviors according to a structure; albeit, a fragile one, but a structure nonetheless. Cua (1971a) believes Confucius and Aristotle would agree that moral virtues are habits for cultivating appropriate attitudes for conduct in life.

The search for principles has to distinguish between that which facilitates harmonious relations, and vehicles promoting strife and disintegrated functioning. Wang Yang-ming held seriousness (ching) as his central purpose (tsung-chih) for extending conscience (chih liang-chih) to find "true principle" (li[a]) (Jung, 1965). Furthermore, the researcher believes his contention is justifiable on the Neo-Confucian observation that mental activity (yi-nien) is associated with the rise of both good and evil. Perpetual mental inactivity (wei-fa), like (yi) with neither proper nor faulty perception (chih) are as impossible as completely unique, non-classifiable mental illness.

Search for Meaning

May's (1975) "passion for form" is similar to Viktor Frankl's "search for meaning" (Frankl, 1962). The usage of meaning for Frankl is more reflective than May's

(1975) description of meaning. Frankl (1962) believes the search for meaning is a primary force in life. Therapy is directed toward the future, instead of reinforcing the neurotic's dwelling on the past. McDowell and Stewart's (1982) analysis of Kierkegaard views commitment to an absolute, and the subsequent ordering of life around that goal as the beginning of the ethical stage. The absolute is li[a] (principle) and the belief system seeks its incorporation and realization. Selfhood is achieved through commitment, or fixing the determination (li-chih) in Neo-Confucian terminology. McDowell and Stewart (1982) cite Frankl as a description of the ethical man envisioned by Kierkegaard.

The investigator believes serious goal-setting is the hallmark of reason as well as ethics. Choices can be made with assertion for emotions are granted a framework. Satisfaction depends upon the ability to generalize an intuition to events; according to Whitehead (1929/1958). A correlary to imagination filling in form could be form critiquing imagination. Simple reflection or the gathering of new information can provide the test. Extending conscience (chih liang-chih) and rectifying affairs (ko-wu) is the Neo-Confucian way for utilizing stored knowledge or gathering new understanding. Attention is always given to the specific context.

Creativity in Existentialism

Freudian psychoanalysis degrades creativity as being projective of desires rather than principles and a manifestation of past conflicts (May, 1975). The creative process is seen as "regression in service of the ego;" a mere symptom that can be reduced to a neurotic cause. External evaluation poses a threat and a need for defensiveness (Rogers, 1961). The Freudian attitude toward creativity may represent a self-fulfilling, particularly if an individual is somewhat familiar with the basic suppositions of Freud.

Hopes, dreams and expectations play the role of principles (li[a]) before actual manifestation (ch'i) in Neo-Confucianism and existential therapy. T'ang (1973b) calls ch'i, the existential process. May (1975) compares the creating of one's self to concrescence in the process philosophy of Whitehead. A Neo-Confucian stance can unify the importance of the future and past, which is the focus of existential therapy and Freudian psychoanalysis respectively. While personal experience makes liang-chih (conscience) somewhat different in each individual, Carl Rogers has found that his most personal experiences were the most generally felt by others (Rogers, 1961). Nivison (1973) reports that Wang Yang-ming considered liang-chih to be a basis for commonality

than individuality. A new experience that leads to a creative venture, or more complete understanding can be viewed in two ways through ko-wu (rectifying affairs, investigating events).

The "missing piece of the puzzle" may be found in the new experience. It can lead to a better understanding of faulty beliefs (yi without chih[a]) and inapplicable knowledge (chih[aa] without i). A greater flexibility or refinement may be all that is necessary. The completion of a search for form successfully resolves the will (ch'eng-yi) and provides meaning. The beginning of an irrational thought sequence can be traced.

Existential Therapy and Cognitive Therapy: Some Shared Goals

The insight theories of May (1975) appear to be related to the cognitive therapy of Beck (1976). Both are concerned with finding activating cognitions in the unconscious or preconscious mind. The conscious mind can lose awareness due to its dogmatism, which is often irrational. It could be said that a break in the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i) occurs, when conscioius effort degenerates into static rationalization. The only observable action is emotional eruption due to the inapplicability of poorly discerned beliefs. The

most important aspect of Wang's thesis on the unity of knowledge and action is the inseparability of thought and practice (Cheng, 1979a). Thus, a negative belief must command emotional consequences in the same manner as their positive counterparts. Insight can provide a goal that pulls a client toward rational thinking. Please refer to the next chapter "Applying Neo-Confucianism to the Cognitive/Rational-Emotive Therapy of the Emotional Disorders."

Summary/Conclusion

"Existential therapy and Neo-Confucianism" is an effort to introduce traditional Eastern views on the conscience (liang-chih), the social self, and self-actualization (ch'ien-hsing) to Western psychology.

"Liang-chih as a self-theory in psychology," evaluates Wang Yang-ming's theory of conscience according to the six methods for verifying any theory: (1) extensivity, (2) parsimony, (3) empirical validity, (4) internal consistency, (5) testability, and (6) usefulness. "Neo-Confucianism changing with the needs of society" shows how its growth-system orientation solved problems that still affect mankind today. Sincerity of will is a neccessary attitude toward a ritual. Revision is demanded to remain in accordance with propriety. This framework can be used to change personal habits, too.

Part Two examines authenticity and sociality; the self in relation to others. Authenticity is described in three different ways in Wang Yang-ming's letters: sincerity, vigilance in solitude and patience under criticism. Fitness (i) as finding a niche is discussed before inauthenticity as incomplete socialization leads into the sociality section. The sociality section is composed of six major parts: (1) nature of man, (2) situation ethics, (3) relationality/communication, (4) spontaneity and nothingness, (5) alienation, and (6) the paradigmatic gentleman: self-improvement through sociality.

Part Three is probably the most technical portions of the chapter. "Insight and the theory of opposition" looks at the relation of enlightenment to Carl Jung's theory of opposition. "A metaphysics of will" is a study of principle (li[a]), vital force (ch'i) and creative will (sheng-yi). This section endeavors to overcome an esoteric label through analogies between the three metaphysical categories and a filled ice-tray, together with comparisons to psychology. The existential chapter culminates with a Neo-Confucian based motivation theory. The motivation theory is closely related to the researcher's personality theory, which is discussed in Chapter Three. See Figure Three. The function of

constructive memory includes imagination, a factor which leads the investigator to see an inherent warp in the belief system. Imagination with a lack of supporting facts is a type of false principle (*li*[a]). Psychopathology may be the result of a deviation-amplifying system. The following chapter is an attempt to combat emotional disorders through cognitive/rational-emotive therapy and Neo-Confucianism. Rather than dismissing human goodness, these observations stress the need for education.

CHAPTER THREE

APPLYING NEO-CONFUCIANISM TO COGNITIVE/RATIONAL-EMOTIVE THERAPY

Introduction

The goal of this study is to show the relationship between Neo-Confucianism and the cognitive and rational-emotive therapies of the emotional disorders, particularly depression. The researcher will attempt to prove that Neo-Confucianism can actually amplify current techniques in therapy. This study endeavors to go beyond simply making esoteric comparisons.

The researcher shares the same basic purpose as Ellis and Harper (1975), namely, to transmit "the best wisdom about human nature from the past and present--and particularly from the somewhat neglected philosophic writings . . . and to make it widely available, with suitable revisions and additions, to present day troubled people" (p. ix).

The chapter will have three major parts: the introduction, the Four-Axiom Teaching, and the summary. The introduction will answer some basic questions. The Four-Axiom Teaching begins with a theoretical expression of the nature of man in Sentence One. The Second Axiom shows the phenomenological

orientation of Neo-Confucianism. The link between Axioms Two and Three expresses a personality theory and model of problem behavior. The counseling process is discussed primarily in Axioms Three and Four. To a certain extent, the unitary structure of Neo-Confucianism allows for a discussion of all the aspects of counseling theory and practice throughout the article.

Two figures that relate psychology to the Four-Axiom Teaching are provided in the paper. Figure Two is entitled, "The beginning and end of emotional disturbance." It focuses on the research of Aaron T. Beck (1976), concerning automatic thoughts and primitive thinking. Figure Three is called, "Applying Ellis' ABC Personality Theory to the Unity of Knowledge and Action," and it uses the research of Albert Ellis, while differentiating the belief system and adding a resolving intervention. The summary is an expression of Neo-Confucian concepts in language that is more familiar to psychologists.

Wang Yang-ming and His Potential for Today

Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) was one of the greatest Neo-Confucian philosophers. Later scholars considered him to be a co-founder of the Lu-Wang School of the Mind within Neo-Confucianism. Actually Wang received far more influence from Chu Hsi (1130-1200) than Lu Hsiang-hsan (1139-1193). The scholarship of Chu was superior to that

of Lu (Liu, 1984). Nevertheless, Wang's philosophical thought grew to resemble the works of Lu, thus developing the earlier scholar's groundwork.

Wang was also a government official and an outstanding general. In fact, he wrote the Four-Sentence Teaching right before he was called back to active service (Chan, 1972). The Four-Sentence Teaching is important because it serves as an excellent outline, summary and guide to Neo-Confucian thought. Most concepts in Neo-Confucianism can be related to the Four-Axiom Teaching.

This article will attempt to show the relevance of Neo-Confucianism to cognitive/rational-emotive therapy.

(1) The emphasis upon the client's conscious ability to think rationally, despite some tendencies toward "crooked thinking" is found in Wang's doctrine of liang-chih (conscience, innate knowledge of the good). (Refer to the Chinese Glossary if additional assistance with the Chinese terminology is necessary).

(2) Both Beck's (1976) cognitive therapy and the cognitive theory of learning see correcting perception as the key, rather than incorporating new responses; a view shared by Wang's version of ko-wu (rectifying affairs).

(3) Ellis' (1971) ABC personality model of activating event + belief = emotional consequence is found in

Wang's doctrine of chih hsing ho-i (unity of knowledge and action). The Second through Fourth Sentences show the same sequence. The unity of knowledge and action also reveals the cognitive/rational-emotive therapy warning against overgeneralization, since it implies absolutes.

(4) Beck (1976) and Ellis (1971) use a reeducational, disputational approach in counseling. Wang's philosophical letters reveal the same attitude. Julia Ching (1973) states that the Chinese do not separate the operations of intellect and will. The word "yi", encompasses both aspects in its definition.

(5) Both cognitive therapy and Neo-Confucianism believe thought precedes emotion. Thus a reaction "can be dissected rationally into its thought components" (Goodman & Maultsby, 1978, p. 65). Neo-Confucianism urges expressing our understanding in words so as to clarify thinking (de Bary, 1983).

(6) Both cognitive/rational-emotive therapy and Neo-Confucianism are fairly easy systems for a client to understand. Beck (1976) endeavors to relate cognitive therapy to everyday experience; entitling some of the chapters in his books with references to common sense. Wang Yang-ming proclaims experience to be the Second Principle and liang-chih (conscience) to be the First Principle (Ching, 1973). Neo-Confucian writings usually

take the format of personal letters, as opposed to the lengthy abstract texts found in Western philosophy (Wu, 1971).

The current use of many psychological concepts and methods compatible with Neo-Confucianism seems to justify its revival today. This research is not empirical but it is hoped that the theoretical system can inspire empirical research. Predictive validity is essential for a theory, if it is to offer a unique contribution to science. The author believes that the maxim, "Spontaneity (tzu-jan) is the result of conforming to principle (li[a])," may be tested empirically by means of a questionnaire.

Nevertheless, humanistic psychology is opposed to the long-standing belief that empiricism is the only valid method for gathering behavioral information (Corey, 1983). Among other things, Neo-Confucianism endeavors to give a metaphysical foundation to cognitive processes. The researcher believes such labeling could facilitate the counseling process. A depressed, cynical client may be a discouraged idealist who would like to philosophize successfully!

Applying Neo-Confucianism to Memory Research

Alfred North Whitehead (1926/1954) listed the tests of accuracy for a metaphysical description: (1) logical

coherency, (2) adequacy, (3) exemplification in other fields than the one it receives its origin. The very body of the thesis is an effort to prove the logical coherency and adequacy of Neo-Confucianism. Exemplification of Neo-Confucian metaphysics in other fields is evident in memory research.

Henry Ellis' (1983) resource allocation model points to the effects of mood upon the availability of cognitive processes. Additional research has shown that depression harms both the encoding and retrieval processes. The cognitive effort effect is established, as subjects were more were more likely to remember information, if they were in a neutral (non-depressed) state (Thomas, MacFarland, Lane & Ellis, 1984). These results seem to confirm Wang's theory of the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i), especially the view of action as the completion, effort and substantial aspect of knowledge.

The Four-Axiom Teaching

Here is a translation of the Four-Axiom Teaching by Chung-ying Cheng (1979a),

"(1) Devoid of good and evil is the substance (pen-t'i of hsin). (2) Involved with good and evil movement of intention (yi). (3) Knowing good and evil (function of) good-knowing (liang-chih). (4) To do good

and remove evil is the act of rectifying affairs (ko-wu)." (p. 278).

The doctrine of innate rationality is Sentence Three. The style in which the Four-Axiom Teaching is presented reflects that Neo-Confucianism is a moral philosophy, which sometimes are exhortations that are inappropriate for psychology.

Axiom One: Human Nature

Within Neo-Confucianism, the First Axiom has caused the most controversy, due to its esoteric nature and problems in translation (Cheng, 1979a). Pen-t'i (original condition) is practically synonymous with hsing[b], which means human "essential nature." It is a discussion of the mind before phenomena. "Devoid of good and evil" more precisely means "beyond good and evil," according to (Cheng, 1979a). The original substance of the mind appears to perform some of the same functions as the unconscious in psychology.

Sometimes the original substance (pen-t'i) is simply described as being good, without regard as to whether principle can be duplicated in the phenomenal world (Fu, 1983). In either case, the major argumentation is viewing the effort (kung-fu) for rationality (liang-chih) as the fondation (pen-t'i) of the mind (hsin[a]). T'ang Chun-i (1973b) views the stage "beyond good and evil" as not gloating over one's good works.

Cheng (1979a) observes that this notion was used for enlightening the average. Rationality as the foundation of the mind lends itself to a goal-directed counseling approach, because it is a theory of effort. The goal-directed counselor practices the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i).

Summary.

The original condition (pen-t'i) of the mind (hsin) can be summarized in the following manner:

(1) Humans have intrinsic worth because we possess reason (li^a) which is granted by Heaven. Neo-Confucianism stresses immanence more than transcendence, much like the Anglican bishop, George Berkeley (1865-1753) (Harris, 1969). Li^a, is used to describe heavenly reason and the cause of events.

(2) Good and evil are not opposite values, rather "nothing" and "something" are opposites.

(3) Mind is in a state of potential energy which is based upon the metaphysical value of li^a (principle, form). Pen-t'i and li^b (decorum) are closely related etymologically.

(4) Things (wu) have an inherent principle (li^a), just as the human mind (hsin) has an original substance (pen-t'i) or essence (hsing).

Neo-Confucianism stresses the unity of mankind and nature.

Axiom Two: Intentionality

The Second Axiom refers to intention (yi), which in Chinese is defined as a reaction to an object. Chang (1955) considers the key to Wang's system to be the viewing of things as objects of consciousness. Thought requires something to be thought about. Wang's theory is unique philosophically, for seeing a close connection between willing and knowing. Such an outlook is common in cognitive psychology.

Wang Yang-ming went beyond this theory in surmizing that seeing and thinking are similar processes, which could be a key philosophical basis for the use of imagery. Wang's theory of intentionality is the most clearly phenomenological aspect of his system (Jung, 1965). The researcher prefers the intentionality interpretation of yi because it preserves the cognitive-behavior stance on the precedence of cognition to emotion. Furthermore, intentionality is very similar to attention. Yi should not be confused with ch'ing, or emotions. Simply, consciousness (hsin) is characterized by thought (yi) (Jung, 1965).

Automatic thoughts.

The "automatic thought" is described by Beck (1976) as discrete, specific, self-defeating thoughts which originate spontaneously from the pre-conscious. In Neo-Confucian terminology, an automatic thought is yi (thought) without chih[a] (perception) or with faulty chih. See Figure Two.

The Neo-Confucian concept, ch'eng-yi (making will sincere) is particularly meaningful when viewed in light of the need to make a proper unity of thought (yi) and discernment (chih). Keep in mind a related principle, namely the unity of knowledge to action (chih hsing ho-i).

Automatic thoughts are part of the function of the cognitive triad in depression: (1) negative self-concept, (2) negative world-view, and (3) pessimistic outlook on future (Beck, 1976). The cognitive approach attempts to fill the gap between the event and unpleasant emotional reaction. Cognitive methods bring the activating thought into awareness and employ rational methods for coping purposes.

The Neo-Confucian goal is to unite thought (yi), perceptual knowledge (chih) and appropriate application (i). Both Chang (1955) and Jung (1965) believe the failure to realize the unity of mind and the principles of things (hsin "ought to be" li[a]) is a major cause of problem behavior.

Level of Awareness	Unconscious	Preconscious		Conscious		
A. T. Beck's Cognitive Therapy Model	Unclassified	Automatic Thought	Depressive Emotions	Inductive Reasoning	Deductive Reasoning	Normal Emotions
Wang Yang-ming's Idealistic Neo-Confucian Model	Pen-t'i (original substance)	Negative Yi (thought)		Ko-wu (rectify affairs)	Liang-chih (conscience)	Positive Yi & Chih (knowing)
Sentence Number	One	Two		Four	Three	

Figure II

The Beginning and End of Emotional Disturbance

Note: In this table the pairing of chih and i (appropriateness) is assumed for the sake of brevity, in the section on positive emotions. Also, "negative yi" is really yi with faulty or minimal chih (discernment). Liang-chih and ko-wu are similar to their Western counterparts.

The discussion of ko-wu (rectifying affairs), later in this thesis, should clarify any misconceptions about yi (intentions). Ko-wu is the correcting of intentions that give rise to faulty perceptions: a cognitive theory of learning (Wolman, 1973). Intention is both desirable and unavoidable, a point that was hotly contested with the Buddhists (Cheng, 1979a).

Interaction of thought and discernment

The Russian novelist, Fyodor Dostoyevsky (1864/1980) explored psychopathology through fiction. Dostoyevsky believed depressives search for an "incontrovertible" reason for failure. Beck and Shaw (1977) have concluded that depressives see themselves as "losers." The negative belief system creates selective attention, changes accessibility, or perception (chih) reciprocally (su) influencing thought (yi). Depressives are more inclined to remember sad events (Riskind & Rholes, 1984). The third phase can affect the second stage, a factor to be examined further in the next section. Also, the sequential nature of thinking exhibits that the perception, correct or incorrect, precedes a later thought.

Summary.

Intention may be described as the following:

(1) The beginning of intention (yi) is either in accordance with liang-chih (knowing the good,

conscientious consciousness, concrete rationalism), or it is an automatic thought. Chang Tsai stated, "Whenever in our effort at thinking we come to something that cannot be expressed in words, we must think it over carefully and sift it again and again (Chan, 1967a, p. 97).

(2) Intention is the motivation and beginning of knowledge. Action is the effort and completion of knowledge (Ching, 1973). Since knowledge is the beginning of action, intention is practical before it becomes theoretical. Intention serves as the original substance of the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i) (Jung, 1965). Recall the need to make the will sincere (ch'eng).

(3) Mind is in a state of kinetic energy which is based upon the metaphysical value of ch'i (matter-energy, vital force) (Cheng, 1979a) Jung (1965) observes that ontology is only possible as intentionality. Mind (hsin) and thought (yi) are etymologically related as well.

The Link Between Axioms Two and Three

The link between the Second and Third Axioms is very important, because it emphasizes the need to pair intention (yi) with perception (chih[2]) (Cheng, 1979a). Wang called thought a reaction to an object, while conscience

(liang-chih) synthesizes its stable component (chih) and the ever-moving intention (yi) activity. Metaphysically, principle (li[a]) and vital force (ch'i) are also unified (Cheng, 1979a). The pairing of intention (yi) and perception (chih) is a moral epistemological view, as expounded in the Four-Axiom Teaching.

The Ming dynasty Neo-Confucians assumed that the pairing of intention (yi) with perception (chih) led to appropriateness (i) and manners (li[b]). Albert Ellis' (1971) rational-emotive therapy instructs clients to be "discriminatingly emotional." In other words, if "you know what is gonig on, mellow-out about it!" Chih[aa] (wisdom) is considered part of ethics. Principle (li[a]) encompasses all of the virutes and governs the changes from pre-arousal to arousal.

Benevolence (jen), appropriateness (i), manners (li[b]), and faithfulness (hsin[b]) are the other virtues (Chan, 1967a). Benevolence (jen) is an overly global term to use in a personality model, since technically jen encompasses all virtues (Tu, 1968). Jen is particularly implicit in chih[aa] (wisdom, learning) as a normative type of knowledge. Faithfulness (hsin[b]) is the presence of the other four virtues in a developed state. Faithfulness is the only virtue not included in the Four Beginnings (ssu-tuan) (Chan, 1967a).

In the case of yi (thought) and chih (discernment) with i, Neo-Confucian epistemology describes the movement of mental activity through the link from Axioms Two to Three. Its ethics are elaborated in Axiom Three. The Ming Neo-Confucians assumed that the pairing of intention (yi) with discernment (chih[a]) led to appropriateness (i) and manners (li[b]).

Appropriate Discernment of Thought: A Personality Model

A model of neurotic and psychotic behavior can be made with Neo-Confucian concepts. Discernment may exist without appropriateness but the opposite can not be true. The original automatic thought could be viewed as an intention without discernment. The severity of the ensuing disorder is indicated by whether a predominance of incoherent or inappropriate behavior is evident.

Psychoses may be seen as a chronic inability to pair intention with discernment. Neuroses would be considered as intention with discernment, but with an absence of appropriateness. This model is consistent with the cognitive and behavioral skepticism toward dividing the psychoses into bipolar affective and schizophrenia. Thus, a lack of discernment is a thought disorder and a lack of appropriateness is a mood disorder. See Figure Three.

Neuroses may be analyzed further with the application of Neo-Confucianism. An abnormal psychology textbook



Figure III

Applying Ellis' ABC Personality Theory to

the Unity of Knowledge and Action (chih hsing ho-i)

defines neuroses as an avoidance of problems and a high level of anxiety (Coleman, Butcher & Carson, 1980). The virtue of appropriateness (i) can reveal a correlary to the definition of neuroses, that is, when appropriateness is lacking. The inability to apply one's knowledge to a concrete situation may be mistaken as an avoidance of problems (Cheng, 1972b).

Appropriateness (i) and manners (li[b]) have a dialectical relationship. Appropriateness refers to the application of normative knowledge (chih[aa]) to a concrete situation (Cheng, 1974b). Manners (li[b]) pertain to the individual's tie to the social background (Cua, 1971b). Flexibility that retains an inner locus of control is the ideal. Awareness of concrete thought about a special case is dependent on the circumstances. There is a need to strengthen awareness of the conclusions (Beck, 1976).

The investigator believes Confucian i (fitness) is akin to the situation ethics of Joseph Fletcher. Goodman and Maultsby (1978) cite a passage from Fletcher's (1966) Situation Ethics - The New Morality. Fletcher describes situation ethics as "contextual appropriateness . . . the fitting . . . empiricism . . . antilegalism . . . and the personal particular" (p. 205). Fletcher (1966) quotes the Apostle Paul stating, "The written code kills, but the spirit gives life." Tu (1968) uses the analogy of

the Gospel and the law to describe the relation between jen (benevolence) and li[b] (propriety).

Manners of propriety (li[b]) refers to the life-style in which one finds oneself (Cua, 1971b). Accepted conventions are part of the background of action. Neo-Confucianism presents a three-part analysis of ethical decision-making: (1) normative knowledge, (2) application to a situation, and (3) knowledge of the background of action (Cheng, 1974b). (See Figure One.) Beck (1976) describes decorum (li[b]) as "rules (that) serve as standards to evaluate, steer, or inhibit behaviors; they are applied to judge the propriety, justification, and reasonableness of behavior" (p. 44). Inadvertently, Beck (1976) links three essential Confucian concepts; "propriety (li[b]), justification (i), and reasonableness (li[a]).

Axiom Three: Conscience and Appropriateness

Chung-ying Cheng (1972b) writes that the virtue i (fitness, rightness) is identical to liang-chih (conscience) at times when becoming aware of i preserves one's dignity and individual independence. Awareness may occur in certain situations or by nature. Although the virtues are equally important in their own right, the researcher believes appropriateness (i) is the key to motivation. This hypothesis was discussed previously

at the end of the existential chapter. Satisfaction and acceptability from others are derived from the action that fitness (i) produces in a situation. Appropriateness (i) is the only virtue that cannot lead to an excess when considered by itself (Cheng, 1972b). We can be displeased withut being horrified (Ellis & Harper, 1975).

Fitness (i) in its application appears to be the virtue which is most reflective of the individual's pesonality, due to its mediating function. However, appropriateness (i) is a demanding virtue for it requires comprehension of norms and social conventions, together with creative action (Cheng, 1974b).

Fitness is the Confucian concept most closely related to logotherapy, Viktor Frankl's (1962) psychology of meaning. Fu (1983) compares Frankl's "life as an assignment" to the Neo-Confucian "heavenly mandate" (t'ien ming). The ethical life provides goals which pull the individual forward.

Returning to liang-chih (conscience) one of its functions is distinguishing good from bad in our thoughts (yi) and actions (hsing). Our conscience in liang-chih commands us to see correct information and become more open-minded, but still quite aware (Cheng, 1979a). All people possess the potential to reach liang-chih and i, since they are obtained by personal cultivation and experience, rather than formal learning. The centrifugal

character of the mind through the extension of conscience (chih[b] liang-chih[a]) shows the emphasis on action and life in the world (Jung, 1965).

Thinking styles in the healthy and depressed.

Maultsby provides four clear guidelines in a healthy belief system, or mind in liang-chih:

"(1) Are my thoughts based on objective facts?

(2) Are they likely to lead me to life-preserving activities?

(3) Are they likely to lead me to actions that will get me what I want?

(4) Are they likely to lead to actions that will tend to minimize significant psycho-emotional and/or environmental conflict?" (Goodman & Maultsby, 1978, p. 20).

Maultsby utilizes this questioning procedure at Stage C (emotional consequences) in Ellis' ABC personality model and in his own method: rational self-analysis (RSA). The value of principle (li[a]), appropriateness (i), and harmony (ho), should be clearly shown by the questioning procedure.

Beck and Shaw (1977) list the three major types of depressive thought: (1) arbitrary inference, usually in the style of personalization, (2) overgeneralization, based on limited experience, and (3) magnification, exaggerating the significance of negatively perceived events.

Recall that Confucius listed arbitrariness and dogmatism as inauthentic expressions of the self (Tu, 1972).

Relating liang-chih to other facets of psychology.

Liang-chih can be related to other topics in cognitive psychology.

(1) Beck's (1976) procedure, decentering, involves the use of objective reason, so the client no longer feels like the center of all events (Beck, 1976). After all, creative principle (sheng-li), or Heaven's principle (t'ien-li), is ultimately transcendent and encompassing, not the counselor or the client. The conscience "ought" to be our best guide. Transcendent reason actually has a rather mundane definition in Neo-Confucianism. It simply means that only through not giving up can one participate in the continuous creativity of the universe. We must avoid dwelling on mistakes; a transcendence of what has past (Liu, 1972a).

(2) Carl Rogers and Wang Yang-ming share nearly identical views on self-actualization. Both see the journey as bridging the gap between actual and desired behavior (Rogers, 1961). Metaphysical truth is desired behavior in Wang's

model (Tu, 1978). Both consider self-actualization to be a continuous process, instead of a fixed state, because the nature of reality itself is change (Tu, 1978). In fact, the Neo-Confucian term, ch'ien-hsing means "actualizing the human design" or fulfilling form.

(3) Neo-Confucian liang-chih should not be confused with the uncompromising Freudian superego. In liang-chih, we can still admit to liking things we know are really bad (Cheng, 1979a). Liang-chih is a less scattered doctrine because ego-strength and authenticity are allowed. The superego is "scattered" because its lack of applicability (i) fails the Confucian test for reason. The superego was never even intended to be united with action.

(4) The central task of Neo-Confucian education is to combat problems, not avoid them (Tu, 1978). Its ethical structure is designed for application and building conscience (liang-chih) through experience. A counselor may prod a client toward encouraging his associates, rather than avoiding them or displaying neurotic behavior in public.

Axiom Four: Rectifying Affairs

Moving to the Fourth Axiom, ko-wu (rectifying affairs) is an increase in observable action (hsing) for a sequentially, ordered epistemology, as depicted in the Four-Sentence Teaching (Cheng, 1979a). Wang redefined ko-wu to mean the realization of principles (li[a]) in one's intention (yi)-activity. This definition is identical to the Dictionary of Behavioral Science definition for the cognitive theory of learning (Wolman, 1973). Both see the key to learning as correcting the intentions that give rise to faulty perceptions, instead of adding new responses to the behavioral repertoire (Wolman, 1973).

Cognitive treatment centers around making patients aware of what they are thinking and how their thought is going astray (Beck, 1976). The client needs to substitute accurate judgements and receive feedback for information on the correctness of the change. A neurotic may need help in applying rules or in developing coping techniques since they may be too fragile (Beck, 1976).

Internalizing principle.

Proper evaluation is based on the advantage or disadvantage to one's goals, as discussed in the previous section (Ellis & Harper, 1975). Wang Yang-ming believed developing a valid belief system requires the existence of principles within the mind, before we can

extend them out of ourselves. Wang's maxim Hsin-chi-li (Mind is principle) expresses the procedure (Cheng, 1972a).

Wang provided the example of filial piety and loyalty. He rhetorically asked if the principle exists in the people to whom the virtue is directed. If the answer is "yes", then what happens when our parents and employers move away or die? Do the feelings of filial piety and loyalty vanish too? Wang did not think so (de Bary, 1983). The researcher utilizes the concept Hsin-chi-li in an analysis of Maultsby's treatment of a depressive in the second case study.

The emphasis on internalizing principle discourages passive conformity in rational-emotive therapy and Neo-Confucianism. Rational self-management is the goal of rational-emotive therapy (Goodman & Maultsby, 1978). Wang Yang-ming wrote, "rightness (i) is not an external object which one can seize and take over" (Ching, 1973, p. 30). Tu (1968) observes that the passive conformist (hsiang-yuan) was scorned as a "thief of virtue," for a lack of conscious decision-making.

Distancing and putting knowledge into action.

Beck's (1976) theory of distancing is similar to both Wang's interpretation of rectifying affairs (ko-wu) and the cognitive theory of learning. Distancing means the regarding of immediate reactions as hypotheses not

facts (Beck, 1976). The key is to correct the inner belief system, as opposed to adding new responses to a faulty core. Cognitive-behavioral homework assignments are used to reinforce new ways of perception, a unity of knowledge and action (Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979).

Ellis and Harper (1975) maintain that improvement occurs only when we begin to live our philosophies. Irrational thoughts need to be disputed as soon as they arise to the surface. A negative thought can become part of the scheme and the original cause is easily lost in antiquity, according to Beck (1976) and Goodman and Maultsby (1978). Neo-Confucian, shen-tu (watching over the self when alone) calls for prudence apart from the watchful eyes and ears of friends (Ching, 1973). Through rectifying affairs (ko-wu), we can preserve the equilibrium (chung) of the unactivated (wei-fa) mind. Activation by thought (yi-fa) in accordance with principle (li[a]) is directed towards harmony (ho). Attaining harmony is the definition of "good" in Neo-Confucianism (Cheng, 1971).

The schism in Neo-Confucianism: Ch'eng-Chu and Lu-Wang schools.

Wang's new interpretation of ko-wu (rectifying affairs) was a major part of his enlightenment experience (Tu, 1978). Neo-Confucianism equated the extension of

liang-chih with making sincere the will (ch'eng-yi) (Cheng, 1979a). Previously, Chu Hsi saw ko-wu as exhaustively studying the principles of events in order to make the will sincere (ch'eng-yi). This view overlooks the potential of intentionality (yi) leading to faulty perception (chih). Now Wang realized that the Ch'eng-Chu Neo-Confucians had been "pulling the cart before the horse" for centuries. Today, a typical Neo-Confucian may lean toward Wang's view of ko-wu, while realizing the interaction between investigating events and sincerity of will. Please refer back to "Liang-chih as a self-theory in psychology" in the existential chapter.

Chu's epistemological sequence is a reverse of Wang's Four-Sentence Teaching. Chu believed ko-wu, the investigation of events in his system, had to precede chih^{b}-chih^{a} the extension of knowledge (Gardner, 1983). Meanwhile, the individual suspends conscious evaluations until more facts are gathered, not realizing the ongoing subconscious collecting of faulty beliefs. The researcher proposed in Figure Two that such an order of thinking is found in a depressive episode. However, through keeping a spirit of chung-ho (equilibrium/harmony), the procedure of investigating events is simply gaining new experience. The key point to remember is that both Wang Yang-ming and Chu Hsi insisted on liang-chih (conscience) with extension

(chih[b]). Otherwise, Neo-Confucianism would have degenerated into a "disguised Buddhism" through a dwelling on the mind's nature (T'ang, 1973b).

Nevertheless, the investigator's purpose is not to discredit Chu Hsi any more than it was Wang Yang-ming's desire either (Chan, 1972). In fact, some authorities (Liu, 1984) believed Wang misinterpreted Chu Hsi's views on ko-wu (investigating events) altogether. It is necessary to study the strong points of the Ch'eng-Chu orthodoxy. The observation that events contain principles (li[a]) or an effect requires a cause is not debatable. Moreover, "the prerequisites for any existing reality have been fulfilled in order for that reality to exist," according to Goodman and Maultsby (1978, p. 36). Everything is exactly the way it should be.

The researcher believes the Chinese outlook of man and nature in harmony could prove most beneficial to Western man. Irrationally assuming external causes for behavior might be traced to the Western dichotomizing of man and nature. The West believes man is supposed to try to dominate an unfriendly world (Cheng, 1971).

Liang-chih as a "Resolving Intervention"

The researcher proposes the addition of liang-chih to Ellis' (1971) ABC personality theory as a "resolving intervention." The new stage would follow the "disputing intervention." Greater empathy for the client would be

shown through the new method. It is based upon the dialectics of harmonization, which considers opposing viewpoints as mutually complementary for strength and productivity (Cheng, 1977).

The self-accepting gentleman (chun-tzu).

The researcher will begin his proposal for the resolving intervention with a comparison of strikingly similar passages from Ellis and Grieger (1971) and the Confucian, Mencius (Fourth Century B.C.).

The key variable is that Ellis' methods suggest the addition of a concept in order to better categorize his approach.

Albert Ellis not only disputes faulty logic, but urges his clients not to dispute themselves as individuals. One can be right and believe that one is wrong. Ellis (1971) shows the reason why people view events as "awful, horrible and catastrophic" is because they "think, decide, and feel" they cannot stand it.

Rejection by another person does not make an individual worthless or of no value (Ellis, 1971). Once again, we see the tendency toward overgeneralization and magnification in emotional disturbance (Beck & Shaw, 1977). A Confucian can believe in obligation but accept the fact that many people are indifferent. Ellis instructs clients to substitute "It's terrible" with "Too bad, Tough shit, and Tough luck." Ellis lists three methods for

counteracting absolutism.

> (1) Too bad that I fail to do some important tasks well or that significant others do not always approve of me! But that's the way I am and will in all probability always will be: fallible and partially unlovable. (2) Tough shit when you fail to treat me fairly or to give me the kind of favors I strongly desire from you! But that's the way you are: often unfair and ungiving. (3) Tough luck when the world is rough and things around me are quite difficult! But even though I may never like it, that's the way it is, and I can definitely stand it if I can't change it for the better (Ellis, 1971, p. 10).

Ellis sincerely believes internalizing such a philosophy of life would minimize at least 90 percent of serious emotional disturbances (Ellis & Grieger, 1977). Ellis' technique is an application of situation ethics philosophy (Goodman & Maultsby, 1978). It is a view shared by Neo-Confucianism. Both are opposed to imposing simplistic dogmas to complex situations.

Obtaining knowledge of the circumstances can be seen as both good psychology and a religious instruction. A situation is approached as a whole or Gestalt with an underlying principle (li[a]). The following section "Liang-chih as ethical concrete deduction" analyzes this issue further.

Arguments for not worrying about the opinion of others can be easy to understand but difficult to apply. Teachings on the nature of liang-chih (conscience) and and the chun-tzu (gentlemen) emphasize self-reliance in

self-evaluation. The gripping fear in paranoia illustrates the need for focusing on the ultimate concern instead of worldly worries. Fu (1983) cites a passage from Mencius stating:

> What distinguishes the chun-tzu from other men lies in his preservation of the [original mind . . . Suppose there is a man who treats him in a perverse and outrageous manner. The chun-tzu in this situation will engage in the following self-reflection: I must have been lacking in jen (benevolence); I must have been lacking in li[b] (propriety). Otherwise, how should this have happened to me? . . . If the perversity and outrageousness of the other man is repeated after the chun-tzu finds that he has done nothing wrong], he will conclude: This man is utterly lost indeed. Such a man is no different from a brute. Why should I be bothered by such a life-long [ultimate] concern, he has no temporary [worldly] worries." (Fu, 1983, p. 400).

Thus, Mencius persuades his client to see an ethical rationale for not worrying and developing self-confidence. Recall T'ang's (1973a) assertion that self-confidence is the ultimate religious concern in Confucianism. The Confucian model is a simple goal-direction of achieving in life.

Neo-Confucianism and cognitive/rational-emotive therapy are not primarily geared to disputing a client's logic. The main goal is breaking through the "loser" self-image, so one can be more rational and satisfied (Beck & Shaw, 1977). This breakthrough involves viewing the conscience (liang-chih) as the final arbiter.

One can choose to view the world as ultimately friendly to "right decision" and internalize principle (Nivison, 1973). Accepting another's criticism as the "final word" leads to a fragile self-theory that lacks parsimony. The Neo-Confucian theory that "mind forms a unity with all things" is particularly supported through these observations.

Cognitive restructuring: the situational nature of the self's actions

The use of liang-chih as a resolving intervention would be similar to cognitive restructuring. Self-defeating thoughts are not only found and stopped, but are substituted with positive coping thoughts (Hackney & Cormier, 1979). First, clients are trained in becoming aware of their automatic thoughts. Then, the counselor can help the client identify positive coping thoughts suitable for combatting their dysfunctional ideation (Hackney & Cormier, 1979). Cognitive restructuring can be conceived as an element of shen-tu (self-vigilance), as the client learns to focus on the mind's function (hsin[a]) and not its nature (pen-t'i)

"Partial credit" would be given to the client through liang-chih as a resolving intervention. The counselor could show the clients that they are utilizing rational beliefs, in certain conditions. Perhaps

some of these situations are similar to the ones in which they are having difficulty. The approach is based on the flexible nature of appropriateness (*i*) in applying ethics to concrete situations. Restricted awareness or coping limitations appear to be related to an underdeveloped virtue of fitness (*i*). Causes and conditions of harmony and conflict cannot be specified without attention to the context of the relationships in which harmony and conflict arise (Cheng, 1974b).

Lazarus (1977) focuses treatment on showing the situational nature of the self's actions. In this manner, Lazarus decenters the client from putting one's ego on the line. The case study by Lazarus (1977) reveals that anxiety as well as depression are related to overgeneralization and absolutism.

Conflict does not have ontological ultimacy in itself, but serves to complete a state of harmony and bring forth a multitude of life. Mankind can overcome conflict through developing his understanding and accomodating his action. Conflict disappears through adjustment (Cheng, 1977).

Rational-emotive imagery (REI) as developed by Maxie Maultsby would be an excellent component of the resolving intervention. REI is designed to help clients

accelerate learning new habits of thinking (Maultsby, 1977). Beck (1976) and Ellis and Grieger (1977) have also used imagery with success. Neo-Confucianism utilizes the "mind as mirror" image in showing that spontaneity (tzu-jan) results from following principle (li[a]) (Ching, 1973).

Counseling the gifted and average.

The Neo-Confucian explanation of how to enlighten the gifted and average can amplify current cognitive/rational-emotive therapy. The researcher believes these explanations are "resolving interventions" of liang-chih because the counselor begins the procedure with information already used by the client. Curiously the modern cognitive approach is more similar to enlightening the gifted (Beck, 1976). Recall the discussion of automatic thoughts and their relation to the activation of yi (intention), with minimal or faulty chih (discernment). Either method can direct a client back to the point where the negative emotions started. Such techniques increase the ability of the client for discernment (chih) and its appropriate application (i) (Cheng, 1979a).

Wang wrote that the gifted can realize the equilibrium of the mind before activation. A thought which is in

accordance with liang-chih is similar to the calmness of the tranquil mind, even thought the mind is active (Cheng, 1979a). Beck (1976) was able to see two sets of irrational beliefs in client's talk (pp. 30-33). The less verbalized or unreported ideation caused the most trouble, because it was the controlling theme and was made with little awareness. Eventually, Beck (1976) pinpointed the irrationality of that belief, by asking the client to remember the thought before the negative feeling. The researcher's contention is that Beck's approach was excellent, but could work best with introspective clients of above average intelligence.

Enlightenment for the average was mentioned in Axiom One. This method concentrated on the effort for liang-chih as the foundation of the mind (kung-fu for liang-chih as pen-t'i of hsin). Such efforts for rationality include both liang-chih and ko-wu to cope with changing reality. The investigator would like to add a new counseling technique. Tell the client, "Trying to be reasonable is the mind's foundation." This can avoid conflict and tension in a helping situation. In other words, it may be easier initially to comprehend a definition of reason than the mind's state prior to activation.

Wang's instruction for the average and gifted are consistent with the unity of knowledge and action. Enlightenment may be viewed as the first step to

self-actualizing. The steps taken after one's insight are not overlooked, since Neo-Confucianism is a process of growth.

Liang-chih as Ethical Concrete Deduction

Western psychology and philosophy traditionally divides reasoning style into deduction and induction. Deductive reasoning starts with a general set of hypotheses and moves to particular circumstances. Inductive reasoning moves in the opposite direction and is generally considered to be more primitive (Ginsburg & Opper, 1979).

It would be a gross oversimplification to classify liang-chih (conscience) or ko-wu (rectifying affairs) as deductive or inductive reasoning (Cheng, personal communication, April 30, 1984). Comparative research can be a complicated task, and one of the most common errors is oversimplification in search of one-to-one correspondence.

Risk of arbitrariness in deduction.

The goal is to show that liang-chih is primarily deductive and introduce "ethical concrete deduction" as a new synonym. However, deduction itself has an undesirable connotation in Chinese, particularly when truths of reason (a priori) are found separately from truths of experience (a posteriori) (Cheng, 1971). The unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i) and the situation

ethics of fitness (i) clearly prohibit arbitrary deduction, yet Western philosophy was noted for abstract deduction until the Eighteenth century.

Cognitive therapy has also demonstrated the pitfalls of premature deduction. Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979) have shown that depressives overgeneralize on the basis of limited experience, and magnify the significance of negatively perceived events. The primitive thinking of emotionally disturbed individuals exhibit striking similarities to adolescent thought (Beck et al., 1979). Aaron T. Beck has utilized the cognitive development theories of Jean Piaget in making these discoveries.

Concreteness in liang-chih.

Liang-chih (conscience) avoids foggy deduction because it is "always located in instances of actual application" (Cheng, 1974a, p. 8). Cheng continues by stating one will not discover all moral principles unless one has been exposed to all possible life situations. Liang-chih has unlimited potential for growth; as a belief system, it can motivate investigation of principles (ko-wu) to extend one's knowledge. Ideally, the extension of liang-chih is sufficient to extend knowledge ($chih^b$-$chih^a$) without the auxiliary investigating of the principles of events (ko-wu).

Liang-chih starts with the Four Beginnings (ssu-tuan) of virtue (te). The researcher discussed the beginning of jen (benevolence) in the introduction. Basically, the earliest moral feeling is sympathy for a person who is in danger. When such spontaneous insights are developed and internalized, virtues have the ability to guide people toward good actions (Cheng, 1974a). Liang-chih becomes deductive on the basis of experience. Liang-chih is an ability to distinguish in concrete situations not a faculty for proclaiming dogmas.

"The Philosophical Letters of Wang Yang-ming" contains a rare description of liang-chih as the First Principle and experience as the Second Principle (Ching, 1973). Wang proclaims "There is no reason why the failure of today cannot very well become the success of the day after" (p. 48). The emphasis upon the application of ethical knowledge to concrete situations and the understanding of gradations makes liang-chih identical to fitness (i) at times.

Liang-chih in florescence.

The researcher is using florescence to describe liang-chih in this section, because, florescence, or "blooming, as in a culture," captures the essence of liang-chih's difference from abstract deduction.

The most inductive aspect of liang-chih is the assurance of correct judgement. The frontier of one's

understanding is where deductive reasoning takes over. The researcher's interpretation of Neo-Confucianism views liang-chih as commanding a shift to ko-wu in such conditions. Cheng (1974a) instructs his readers to discipline, watch, and cultivate the self in all matters of living. In this way liang-chih will be in an ideal state to function, because the mind is alert, sensitive, and self-reflective. The existentialist, Karl Jaspers was fascinated by the boundary of the self's knowledge and action. He believed authenticity is encountered through our decisions in new situations (Wilde & Kimmel, 1962). However, the investigator believes a call for prudence is a deductive principle in itself. A mind in liang-chih is never at the mercy of circumstances without the guidelines of chung-ho (equilibrium/harmony) for reliance.

Liang-chih is objective because it is based upon principles. Cheng (1971) sees the inherent degradation involved in the existentialist insistence upon total subjectivity in man. Spontaneous decision-making is the result of following principle and the elimination of selfish desires. The adaptability in Neo-Confucianism is chiefly due to a focus on principle (li[a]) or reason within the context of the situation. Narrow a priori judgments are alien to Confucian tradition.

Importantly, the Eighteenth-century European philosophers believed conscience was the final basis for decision-making. Western cultivation of conscience developed later than China and was stimulated by the printing press circulating the Bible. Before the printing press, Europeans were at the mercy of the Church's interpretations and elaborations (Harris, 1969).

Summary

The summary will review the main Neo-Confucian concepts by expressing them in the language of cognitive/rational-emotive therapy.

(1) Liang-chih is the innate capacity for rationality which has to compete with out tendencies toward "crooked thinking."

(2) Ko-wu, the cognitive theory of learning, is a disputing intervention. It examines the principles (li[a]) in one's mental activity (yi), that give rise to perceptions or knowledge (chih).

(3) Yi without chih is an automatic though which gives rise to negative emotional sequence. The severity of the disorder is indicated by the client's style or self-disputing attempts. A notable lack of discernment capacity (chih) is worse than the inability to apply (i) one's knowledge. The rudiments of deduction are more noticeable in the latter case. (See Figure Two.)

(4) Chih hsing ho-i (unity of knowledge and action describes the thought sequence. Intention (yi), as the phenomenological reaction to objects of consciousness leads to discernment (chih) and appropriateness (i), within the belief system. Emotional consequences, or action (hsing) is due to the structure of the belief system, not the activating event (wu). See Figure Three.

(5) Liang-chih as a resolving intervention, makes an association between the new lesson from ko-wu and previous learning. Ko-wu differentiates the principles (li[a]) from the intentions (yi) in the individual and finds the cause of events in the environments. Liang-chih is primarily deductive, while ko-wu is mainly inductive. Liang-chih as the central belief system possesses the command to shift to induction, as found in ko-wu. The link between ko-wu and liang-chih serves to extend awareness to a restricted existence.

(6) Liang-chih as "ethical concrete deduction" is rationalism based on experience; a unity of knowledge and action. Prudence and the goal of harmony (ho) provides the mind in liang-chih with guidelines in unfamiliar situations.

CHAPTER FOUR

CASE STUDIES

The following case studies were selected from Albert Ellis' (1971) Growth Through Reason, and David S. Goodman and Maxie C. Maultsby's (1978) Emotional Well-Being Through Rational-Behavior Training. The case study selected from Ellis' text is Chapter 8: "A twenty-three year-old girl guilty about not following her parents' rules," (pp. 227-287). The case study chosen in Goodman and Maultsby's book is Chapter 12: "The Case of Ralph Hanover," (pp. 105-12). Maultsby is the counselor in the case study. For this reason, the citations in this chapter will refer to Maultsby (1978) alone, since he is being quoted and not his colleague.

The first case study takes the form of a general commentary, while the second case study follows the interview with greater specificity.

Albert Ellis' Treatment of Guilt

Conscience and Appropriateness

Albert Ellis' Rational-Emotive therapy utilizes many applications of Neo-Confucian concepts, even though his techniques are characterized by argumentation. The key concept in idealistic Neo-Confucianism is liang-chih, which means "discerning the good" or "conscientious consciousness." Many of Ellis' major assertions can be

related to liang-chih. The case which will be of primary interest, is that of a young woman who feels guilty about not following her parents' rules (Ellis, 1971).

Liang-chih may be seen as a cross between the Freudian ego and superego, even though its translation is more reminescent of the superego. A lack of perfection and certainty can be tolerated when one follows liang-chih. The outlook is rationalistic rather than legalistic. Ellis (1971) taught the young woman to stop telling herself that she must be perfect or her prospects ought to be totally certain. Thinking in terms of "must" and "ought" leads to emotional disturbance, according to Ellis.

A Confucian could offer the observation that many people misuse rightness (i) of action to demand a certain conduct of others (Hall & Ames, 1984). Apparently, the young woman has such individuals for parents. Unfortunately, the young woman has incorporated her overly critical parents, and lacks moderation in the practice of self-cultivation. The trouble with a utopian dream is its lack of applicability to concrete situations.

In this sense, chih (wisdom) is similar to the virtue i, which means "appropriateness" or "fitness." Chih[aa] is reason as related to wisdom, discernment and knowledge. The beginning (tuan) of chih is like

liang-chih since both are innate abilities to distinguish that require extension. Ellis (1971) states that one should learn to accept mistakes instead of feeling unnecessary shame. Even if you never made mistakes, Ellis asserts that some people would never approve of you. The idealistic Neo-Confucian, Wang Yang-ming wrote that learning from mistakes is the Second Principle, while following liang-chih is the First Principle (Ching, 1973). Mencius considered the feeling of shame to be the beginning of appropriateness (i) (Chan, 1967a). Appropriateness does not remain a feeling of shame but develops into courage. Mencius showed how we can change our attitude by looking at an unpleasant situation in a new light.

Discriminatingly Emotional Pairing Knowledge with Action

Ellis (1971) states that RET teaches clients to be "discriminatingly emotional" (p. 9). Neo-Confucianism shares this approach to the human condition. The key is the extension, or practice of liang-chih. Wang's Four Axiom Teaching included a discussion of the value of pairing intention (yi) with perceptual discernment (chih[a] (Cheng, 1979a). Like Ellis, Wang had no desire to banish emotions from the mind. Intention (yi) is mental activity itself, an unavoidable reaction to an object or event. Liang-chih is our reaction to our initial reaction (Ching, 1973). The power of reason (liang-chih) allows us to synthesize our form-giving

ontological (pen-t'i) worth as human being, with the energy of intentions and thoughts (yi-nien) (Cheng, 1979a). Chih (a component of liang-chih) means the normative ability to distinguish between good and bad, or make fine discriminations between "shades of grey." Chih[aa] also means knowledge in the sense of book-learning (Cheng, 1974).

Like Ellis, Wang insisted on putting theory into practice or pairing knowledge with action (chih hsing ho-i). The Neo-Confucian did not contemplate cognitions at the expense of solid behavioral action. Wang's philosophical letters reveal frequent comments on his students' progress, as well as suggestions for improvement (Ching, 1973). The use of homework assignments in RET can be seen as knowledge in its "genuine, concrete and practical aspects" (Ching, 1973, p. 106).

The course of psychotherapy is a process in itself. The rational emotive therapist uses a confrontative approach, in order to find the causes of a patients' symptoms. Ellis points to the need to distinguish between the actual and the possible, as well as the possible from the probable (Ellis, 1971). Ellis' view is reminescent of Neo-Confucian views on the logical priority of principle (li[a]) and the ontological priority of vital-force (ch'i) (Tong, 1982). If the RET therapist makes

an erroneous assumption about the cause of a problem, the symptoms will remain and another hypothesis will have to be formed.

Sincerity and Self-Realization

Both Ellis and Wang urged their clients to be true to themselves. This is what is meant by self-acceptance and making the will sincere (ch'eng-yi); a near synonym for extending the conscience (chih liang-chih). Following one's conscience is contrary to the self-defeating belief of seeking an external source as the ground for the self. Ellis (1971) disputes emotional dependency when he finds there are disturbances in a client's belief system. Such a condition was partly responsible for the young woman's depression in Ellis' (1971) case study; a misuse of jen (benevolence) through self-indulgence (Hall & Ames, 1984). She relied on her parents and boyfriends too heavily. Such individuals may submit themselves to fate and choose a self-definition of worthlessness; a truly external locus of control. Self-assertion bestows meaning to one's own person (Hall & Ames, 1984). Ellis (1971) states that the only organization can come from within. Neo-Confucianism is understood through a personal experiencing of the Classics, not by role memorization. Getting

it oneself (tzu-te) is a prerequisite for putting knowledge or theory into action or practice (de Bary, 1983). Getting it oneself is also defined as self-realizing behavior through the practice of appropriateness (i) (Hall & Ames, 1984).

Importantly, Ellis (1971) reinforces his clients for independent thinking. RET is careful to avoid passive acceptance of the therapist's ideas by the client. The client would simply become more susceptible, instead of becoming a gentleman (chun-tzu). Cheng (1974a) is skeptical about the privileged position enjoyed by a counselor, unless moral autonomy is developed in the client. Tu Wei-ming (1972) discusses the Neo-Confucian disregard for those who follow convention by merely assuming the appearance of virtue (hsiang-yuan). An inner decision is necessary. Confucius showed self-realization occurs through the purification of its inauthentic expressions--like arbitrariness of opinion, dogmatism, obstinancy, and egotism (Tu, 1972).

Both Ellis (1971) and the Neo-Confucians frown at the behaviorist/legalist method of rewarding outward conformity, without seeing the relevance of inner cognitions. Fortunately, the current trend in psychotherapy seems to be toward an integration of cognitive and behavioral perspectives. RET tries to keep a balance between society and the individual. Many schools of

psychotherapy are establishment-centered, as they help clients adjust to society while giving up as an individual (Ellis, 1971).

The goal of objectification through becoming a person-in-context is seen as a rational act rather than submission by the Neo-Confucians. Passive conformists (hsiang-yuan) do not know appropriateness (i) because they are not trying to contribute to society. Appropriateness is a cncern for proper conduct in the performance of social roles (Hall & Ames, 1984). It is an opportunity to be unique without fear of disgrace.

Moderation

Perhaps Ellis' most graphic contribution to psychotherapy is showing that emotional disorders come from believing, "It's awful!" instead of "Tough shit" (Ellis, 1971). Neo-Confucianism would view overreaction as wisdom (chih[aa]) without appropriateness (i) in the ethical sense. A lack of appropriateness is the major problem when one magnifies or minimizes the importance of an event. Moreover, emotions and actions have a reciprocal effect as discussed by Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085). Confucians and Neo-Confucians advised moderation, since proper reactions change with the varied circumstances we find in everyday life (Nivison, 1973).

The interrelatedness of Neo-Confucian concepts allows us to view the same situation from the prospective of Wang's Four Sentence Teaching. "It's awful!" can be seen as thought (yi) without learning (chih[a]). These concepts are part of the Second and Third Sentences in Wang's epistemology. Intention is our reaction to an object while liang-chih is our reaction to that thought. Liang-chih incorporates the framework of chih, the flexibility of i and the fluidity of yi. Intention is metaphysically linked with matter-energy, or life force (chi'i) (Cheng, 1979a). Learning for the sake of one's self is the authentic way to contribute to society (wei chi chih hsueh). Both RET and Neo-Confucianism endeavored to track down any emotional problem. Confused ideology and attitudes create warped feelings.

Fear of Rejection

A fear of rejection by a significant other due to making minor mistakes is a common example of an irrational ideology. The depressed young woman feared rejection from her parents and boyfriends. RET and Neo-Confucianism see crooked thinking and rational thinking as innate tendencies which compete with each other. Neo-Confucianism offers a metaphysical grounding for each of these tendencies (li[a] for pen-t'i and ch'i for yi-nien).

Pragmatic reason involves perceiving the end of a situation, and provides the necessary emotional urgency. Ellis (1971) states that one should "look at the consequences of your act from the point of view of what effect it is going to have on you" (p. 33). Developing one's own goals and self-confidence keeps you from being vulneable. Reason allows the freedom to let yourself go, and think in a clear pattern of thought, since cognitions are directed toward a set of goals (Ellis, 1971). Alfred North Whitehead (1924/1958) once commented that "the ability to analyze seems to vanish under close scrutiny." After a few RET sessions, the depressed woman experienced increased abilities for novel writing. She was able to describe incisively, and not just use metaphors and symbols (Ellis, 1971).

Neo-Confucianism views reason as appropriateness (*i*) to be the virtue which gives meaning to life, and the function of the mind (Cheng, 1972b). The depressed woman feared the loss of her boyfriend, if she became devoted to him (Ellis, 1971). Ellis instructed the woman to get rid of this irrational fear so she could love someone. This irrational fear inhibited her functioning in an intimate relationship. Love and reason are general virtues, while rational maxims are the application of the general to the particular (*li-i-fen-shu*).

particular. Ellis (1971) insists "you know on theoretical grounds that you have an invalid thought, because you don't get negative feelings without first having some silly thought" (p. 271). Once again, we return to the concept of being true to our conscience (liang-chih) as the key to mental health.

Negative Self-Statements (Automatic Thoughts)

Whitehead (1929/1958) viewed fatigue as the antithesis of reason. Fear and depression may be seen as types of fatigue. Fear moves from the general and abstract to the specific and concrete. Fear never remains free-floating. It seeks a situation for application. Ellis and Grieger (1977) believe people get these fears from society and parents or can be genetically predisposed to borderline behavior. We speak to ourselves in language, not in vague feelings. Ellis asks his patients to look for these simple exclamatory sentences which create their fears. Aaron T. Beck (1976) classifies these negative self-directed statements as "automatic thoughts." They are specific, concrete, discrete, and repetitious, as well as reactionary. Automatic thoughts are the antithesis of liang-chih, as they create a false framework which serves to perpetuate the eruption of the mind. Cognition precedes emotion, with the possible exception of enlightenment experiences through the unity of the two.

Ellis (1971) states that the therapist can bring such facts to attention, so the client can act on what she knows. This cognitive-behavioral sequence is summarized eloquently by Wang's Four Sentence Teaching, and his doctrine of the unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i). A fact must be brought to one's attention in order to become part of knowledge (chih). Attention is similar to Neo-Confucian yi (intention), which means a reaction to a thing or event. Yi is mental activity itself, the second of Wang's Four Sentences (Cheng, 1979a). Knowledge or discernment is the Third Sentence. The unity of knowledge and action explains how knowledge serves as the beginning and motivation for concrete action. Action is the ending and completion of knowledge. Knowledge is action in its discerning qualities, and action is knowledge in its real and substantial aspects (Ching, 1973).

Relation of Thought to Time

We have discussed the general nature of automatic thoughts, and the way an RET or Neo-Confucian therapist can help the client overcome their stifling influence. Let us look at the actual tense of the automatic thoughts from a grammatical point of view. Considering the nature of change as an ontological reality, and the

need to separate possible from actual, suggests a model of rationality and emotional disturbance that is directly related to time. The classic automatic thought, "It's awful!" is a statement in the present tense. Also, the depressed client could be seen as living in the "future perfect" tense, a term the researcher is borrowing from the Latin language. The future perfect tense uses the adverbs, "will" and a form of the word "to be," such as "have" before the main verb, which is in the past tense. Examples of the future perfect tense include, "will have achieved," and "will have been lost."

Ellis (1971) does not see the core of the problem as worrying about how things will turn out, but a preoccupation with personal worthlessness if things do not turn out favorably. Ellis explained this common tendency to his depressed client. The outlook blurs possible with actual, and also catastrophizes. Note how two separate events in time are considered. The fear of the future is not the only topic of discussion, but a negative state of being will be caused by the disturbing event. The patient can make a rather complicated self-statement, "I will be destroyed by the sad event." No wonder Mencius instructed his students to be firm in what is small, in order to keep what is great---the mind (Chan, 1967a).

In closing, let us recall Shu-Hsien Liu's (1972) observations concerning the paradox of life, "Only he who can transcend his immediate concerns can fully develop creative potentialities within himself and hence develop his nature" (Liu, 1972a, p. 49).

Maxie Maultsby's (1978) Treatment of a Depressive

The First Two Sessions

In the first session, Maultsby (1978) alludes to the evaluation aspect of liang-chih by stating "This proves that it is his reaction to his own behavior -- and not the behavior in itself -- that constitutes the hard core of neurosis" (p. 107). A negative belief system bears the capacity of evaluation as does a healthy belief system. Liang-chih, consists of a reasonable reaction to thought (Ching, 1973). One of the more explicit applications for Confucian *i* (appropriateness) is found in the similar evolution of client perspectives to rational-behavior therapy. In both Maultsby's (1978) case study of the depressive and a description of Confucian *i* (Hall & Ames, 1984), a trend is seen from shame as an individual toward shame before society. Becoming a person-in-context is a process of objectification.

In the second session, Maultsby observes the patient becoming depressed about depression (p. 108). Wang

Yang-ming once said anxiety about anxiety is like looking for a donkey while riding it (Nivison, 1973). The patient believes feelings are deep-down while thoughts are superficial. Maultsby like a Neo-Confucian soundly disputes the irrational belief. Chang Tsai (1020-1077) wrote, "Whenever in our effort at thinking we come to something that cannot be expressed in words, we must think it over carefully and sift it again and again" (Chan, 1967a, p. 97). Wang Yang-ming's Four Axiom Teaching shows that thought (yi) is a reaction to an object (Cheng, 1979a). The reaction leads to the next stage which is discernment, a capability that is either rational or faulty but alternately never absent.

Dr. Maultsby's method of disputing the client shows the situational nature of appropriately (i) applying ethics to a situation. Maultsby (1978) states, "Even if you may have failed at 25, 50, or even 75 percent of the things you have tried, all that proves is that you were not skilled enough to succeed at specific tasks" (p. 110). Depression seems to be the classic inability to delay closure, an essential trait for creativity (Torrance, 1979). The depressive can not understand that "principle is one but its manifestations are many" (li-i-fen-shu) (Chan, 1967a). A universe governed by principle has the capacity for revealing its functions

through a multitude of manifestations. No one is a failure at everything and no one has tried everything. The feeling of shame is a prerequisite for courage. Recall the researcher's suggestion for liang-chih as a "resolving intervention" which focuses on successes in an emotionally disturbed person.

The Third and Fourth Sessions

In session Three, Maultsby (1978) pleaded that a depressive can "learn how to think straight" (p. 111). Mencius wrote, "There is naught else in learning but the recovery of one's lost mind" (Ching, 1973). Mencius was referring to everyone's potential for self-actualization. The depressive's stealing fantasies and behavior was seen by the counselor as a continuation of past actions, and nothing to be upset about.

Maultsby seems to be trying to help the client become courageous, in alluding to a progression from a "negative" unity of knowledge and action to the rudiments of a "positive" unity of knowledge and action. T'ang (1973b) notes that remembering correct knowledge for later use is not an immediate unity of knowledge and action, but serves as a means to that goal. Such information affects the client's attitude by increasing his ability to control his environment and be effective in everyday situations (Beck, 1976). Liang-chih is viewed as

possessing the ability to stop negative thought from becoming negative action in a robot-like fashion. Eventually a developing liang-chih can stop negative ideas.

In the fourth session, the depressive reveals shame due to actions and non-compliance with society. Such ideation could be regarded as evidence of increased objectivity. A Neo-Confucian might have complimented the client for showing the (tuan) beginnings of fitness (i) and manners (li[b]), before instructing him to strengthen his rationality. One needs to overcome the fixed perspective of the ego (k'e-chi) and become a person-in-context (Tu, 1968). Order and value have to be context-dependent for relevance in an organic system such as society. Through the process of objectification, we experience the joy of realizing integrity. Catastrophizing is an example of an object in one's phenomenal field to which catches the attention of a faulty belief system. A sick fear assumes the structure of principle (li[a]) and actually increases the manifestation (ch'i) of undesirable but not catastrophic events.

Later Sessions

As therapy progressed, Maultsby emphasized the conscience's role as the final arbiter in decision-making. The self is dynamic and it changes with the field or focus of existence. Mencius may have seen this process

as building the "nobler part of one's nature" instead of falling prey to immediate reactions (Liu, 1972b). The therapist can not decide for the client in the long-run. Part of the depressive's problem was inability to distinguish between minor and major things, a lack of appropriateness.

Maultsby (1978) demonstrates that the client is ignoring important aspects of life. Depressives need to develop the flexibility for interacting in new situations and integrating new information into their cognitive schemata. Importantly, the depressive learned a "resolving intervention" of liang-chih; an application of aversive imagery to his kleptomania. Wang Yang-ming showed the similarity of seeing to thinking in his conceptualization of yi, as intentionality. The theory for liang-chih as a "resolving intervention" was discussed in Chapter Three.

The counselor emphasizes the importance of will with the analogy of a rider on a horse (p. 119). Maultsby (1978) exemplifies "mind is principle" (hsin-chi-li[a]) when he states, "You still insist upon thinking of what you are doing as an independent process from yourself? You are refusing to realize that you are it!" (p. 119). Nivison (1973) states that the mind is the principle of what it is thinking about. Maultsby (1978) concludes the case study by discouraging self-punishment

and challenging the client to change undesirable behaviors. Perhaps, the goal of becoming a gentleman behavior (chun-tzu) would inspire a client.

Graded Task Assignment of A. T. Beck

A brief discussion of Beck's (1976) Graded Task Assignment could aid an analysis of Maultsby's (1978) treatment of depression. Beck and his colleagues (1979) report that the more severe instances of depression require predominantly behavioral interventions. Cognitive techniques are used for less disturbed clients.

The goal of Graded Task Assignment is to mobilize a depressed patient into activity. Simple tasks are given at first to the client in order to build their self-confidence. As a result, a client is able to do more things than previously thought possible (Beck, 1976).

Wang Yang-ming's belief that action precedes concrete knowledge is upheld by studies in cognitive-behavioral therapy. Ch'eng Hao stressed menial labor for adolescents as a prerequisite skill in reasoning (Ching, 1973). A. T. Beck (1976) suggests depressed housewives boil eggs as a start toward preparing a dinner. Ch'eng Hao saw mopping floors as a prerequisite to understanding the Classics. The treatment of depression could be viewed as the priority of ontology (being) to logic. The researcher sees depression as a lack of being.

The challenge is not only to make clients active, but also change their accessibility to patterns of thought. In other words, depression can be cured through achievement and acquiring good memories. Depression is frequently due to bad events, that prime memories of similar occurrences (Riskind & Rholes, 1984).

The approach of Ch'eng Hao appears even more relevant, when one recalls the metaphysical grounding of thought (yi) in the vital force of being (ch'i) (Jung, 1966). By keeping depressives successful and busy, a state of concentration is induced and faulty ideations can be alleviated. When clients feel able to do more things, their self-concept becomes more extensive.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS

Methodology

The thesis has been an effort to bring Neo-Confucian wisdom to bear on modern problems through a psychology student's viewpoint. The existential therapy chapter reflected an organization characteristic of psychology. The cognitive/rational-emotive therapy chapter utilized the Four Axiom Teaching of Wang Yang-ming as an outline. The case studies were reviews of Ellis' treatment of guilt and Maultsby's treatment of depression from a Neo-Confucian viewpoint.

The addition of Neo-Confucian concepts increases the precision of cognitive-behavioral theory. The first figure is particularly relevant to existential therapy, while the last two figures are more applicable to cognitive/rational-emotive therapy.

Two more figures are found in the conclusion chapter as part of the summarization. These figures tie together psychological and Confucian theory and practice.

Benefits to Psychology: A Review of the Figures

Figure One - The Interaction of Confucian Virtues

Figure One is an analysis of Confucian/Neo-Confucian

virtues. The virtues are a three-partite system of normative, situational and social ethics (Cheng, 1974b). Normative ethics include jen (benevolence) and chih[aa] (wisdom). Situational ethics through i (appropriateness) is the individual's tie between cognitions and fitting action (Cua, 1971a). Appropriateness (i) is the practical flexibility of applying ethics to a concrete situation. Social ethics can be called understanding the background of action (Cheng, 1974b). Propriety (li[b]) is the individual's tie between cognitions and the social setting, or life-style (Cua, 1971b). A knowledge of propriety precedes appropriateness in cognitive-moral development, as well as the historic record. A higher portion of etiquette is provided to the individual by society.

Figure Two - The Beginning and End of Emotional Disturbance

Figure Two attempts to show the relevance of Wang Yang-ming's (1527), Four Axiom Teaching to Aaron T. Beck's (1976) analysis of automatic thoughts contribution to emotional disturbance. An automatic thought is simply a thought (yi) which is not in accordance with liang-chih (conscience). The thought is assessed with faulty beliefs. Thinking begins in Axiom Two and is judged by beliefs in Axiom Three regardless if they are rational or disturbed. Rectifying affairs (ko-wu). Axiom Four is an attempt to understand the intention-thoughts (yi-nien)

which gave rise to faulty perceptions. Seeing and thinking are closely related in Wang's system. Axiom Three represents a successful resolution that is incorporated into liang-chih as a new lesson.

Figure Three - Applying Ellis' ABC Personality Theory to the Unity of Knowledge and Action

This figure also utilizes Wang Yang-ming's Four Axiom Teaching. Confucian virtues are found in the belief system (B). One may view Figure One as an examination of the belief system. The major contribution of Neo-Confucianism is dividing the belief system into thought (yi), perception (chih), appropriateness (i), and propriety (li[b]). A model of problem behavior is facilitated by the four-partite division of the belief system. Persistent erroneous discernment patterns or chronic unawareness is evidence of psychosis. The inability to apply knowledge, or derive and bestow meaning to social situations, or a misunderstanding of social situations is characteristic of neuroses.

The disputing intervention is related to ko-wu (rectifying affairs) and decentering. The investigator's Neo-Confucian model adds liang-chih as a "resolving intervention" for cognitive-restructing. The unity of knowledge and action (chih hsing ho-i) is displayed by beliefs leading to emotional consequences, in both

rational and irrational thinking.

Neo-Confucianism provides a needed balance to rational-emotive therapy. Ellis (1971) focuses on telling clients that distressing events are not really important, a passive means of improvement. Neo-Confucianism highlights what the subject can do to actively improve their situation, through appropriate (i) ethical action and observing etiquette (li[b]).

Figure Four - Principle is One but its Manifestations are Many

"Principle is one but its manifestations are many" (li[a]-i-fen-shu) is the key methodological concept and the ethical structure in Neo-Confucianism. Li[a] (principle, reason) was the major concept added by the Neo-Confucians to old Confucian doctrine (Chan, 1967a).

Figure Four displays the relationship of ethics to maxims moving from general to particular. The investigator decided to add this figure after realizing the necessity to explain the difference between specific virtues and maxims. Jen (humanity) is the general virtue that precedes all the others. The creative (sheng) drive for jen is sincerity (ch'eng). Sincerity was considered to be the fundamental religious virtue by Alfred North Whitehead (1926/1954). The other ethics (li[b], i, chih[aa], hsin[b]) are

	GENERAL	PARTICULAR
VIRTUES	jen (humanity)	chih[aa] (wisdom) li[b] (propriety) i (etiquette)
MAXIMS	----------	- a manifestation of a virtue - behavioral objective as opposed to a cognitive schemata - specific suggestion instead of a general guideline

Figure IV

Principle is One but its Manifestations are Many

(li[a]-i-fen-shu)

specific, yet technically aspects of jen.

The necessity of ethical conceptual structure was never questioned by the Confucian tradition. Many philosophies, notably Buddhism, seem to question the need and even the reality of such concepts. The Confucian system allows for organization of knowledge in a manner akin to cognitive schemata.

Shu-hsien Liu (1972b) describes principles as giving general directions while maxims give specific suggestions. Maxims change with time and vary from culture to culture. The maxims compose much of the virtues' content and allow for their modification. Furthermore, a maxim is equivalent to a behavioral objective in psychology.

Wang Yang-ming emphasized the importance of a sincere intention (ch'eng-yi) toward the ritual (li[b]) to remain in accordance with true propriety. If sincere intention is not possible for most of the community, then a social rule ought to be revised. Maladaptive habits can be changed in the same way for an individual.

Figure Five - Cognitive-Moral Development in Neo-Confucianism

The similarity between ethical development and moral epistemology is illustrated through their relation to the Four Qualities. The Four Qualities

Four Qualities	Origination	Flourishing	Advantage	Firmness
Ethical Development	ssu-tuan* Four Beginnings		te Virtue	hsin[b] faithfulness the 5th virtue
Moral Epistemology (Wang Yang-ming's 4 Axiom Teaching)	pen-t'i original condition #1	liang-chih* conscience #3 can be identical to i, includes knowledge of li[b]	ko-wu rectifying affairs, investigating things #4 necessary to develop i more inductive than liang-chih	

Figure V

Cognitive-Moral Development in Neo-Confucianism

Notes:

ssu-tuan			liang-chih		
jen sympathy (1st)	chih[aa]	like/dislike	defined as ...	yi	intentionality #2
	li[b]	compliance		+	
	i	shame		chih[a]	perception #3

(origination, flourishing, advantage, firmness) is a description of reality in Reflections on things at hand; a twelfth-century Neo-Confucian anthology compiled chiefly by Chu Hsi (Chan, 1967a). Reality itself is seen as a process of change moving toward completion or firmness through a dialectics of harmonization. The Four Qualities were discussed previously in the "Metaphysics of Will" section of the existential chapter.

It may seem redundant for the researcher to classify concepts as "ethical development" and "moral epistemology." Nevertheless, "moral epistemology" reflects the Confucian observation that knowledge has moral ramifications due to its application to concrete situations.

Originations is clearly defined in both Confucian ethics and Neo-Confucian epistemology. The Four Beginnings (ssu-tuan) are the first signs of virtue. They are manifested through sympathy for someone in immediate danger, compliance with associates, the ability to distinguish and shame (Chan, 1967a). Moral epistemology is expressed through Wang Yang-ming's Four Axiom Teaching. The original condition (pen-t'i) of the mind (hsin[a]) is a storehouse of potential and logical priority (Cheng, 1979a).

The Four Beginnings evolve into virtues (te[a]) and show various stages of development between "flourishing" and "advantage." Appropriateness (i) is probably the most

difficult virtue to embody, as it involves application of wisdom (chih[aa]) within a framework of propriety (li[b]). Liang-chih (conscience), is displayed early in development of the Third Axiom. It consists of yi (intentionality), the Second Axiom and chih (knowing). The ongoing decision to extend conscience (chih[b] liang-chih) is necessary for its full fruition. Liang-chih includes a knowledge of etiquette (li[b]) and may be identical to appropriateness (i) (Cheng, 1972b).

The skilled ability to rectify affairs or investigate things (ko-wu), the Fourth Axiom, exhibits one's wisdom at "Advantage". The "hit-and-miss" use of ko-wu in youth is similar to the cure of a depressive episode through its primarily inductive character. This phenomena was discussed in Figure Two and Chapter Three. Adjusted people use ko-wu through schooling and in new situations, thus building an extensive self-concept. Firmness (hsin[b]) is the final virtue to be manifested, as it is defined as consistently abiding by the other four virtues. Etymologically, firmness is composed of "man" and "word".

Liang-chih: A Contribution to Psychology

Perhaps the ultimate hope of interdisciplinary research is showing the applicability of the key concept, in the relatively unknown field to the familiar discipline. In many respects, this study has attempted to show the

versatility of liang-chih (conscience). The researcher classifies liang-chih as "ethical concrete deduction." Liang-chih may bridge the gap between abstract deduction and trial-by-error learning.

Through the importance placed in authenticity and sociality, liang-chih develops in a context with others. The origins of liang-chih are found in the ssu-tuan (four beginnings). Liang-chih stresses the self's finality in decision-making. Grasping liang-chih as in insight necessarily commands the individual to extend liang-chih, a combining of theory and practice. The paradigmatic gentleman (chun-tzu) embodies liang-chih while remaining a reachable ideal, a coping model seen by society. The three figures described the use of liang-chih as a means of "avoiding, ending, and curing" emotional disturbance.

Extending Neo-Confucian Concepts Through Synthesis with Psychology

At times, the researcher has felt a need to expend the meaning of Neo-Confucian conceptual terminology. A synthesis changes some of the concepts' original meaning. The constructs are not imaginary because they reflect empirical and intuitional observations and an absence of nihilism. An increase in the power of the concepts' explanatory capabilities was the goal of the procedure.

Principle (li[a]) needs to account for more than the true, good, and beautiful. A solid epistemology can not afford idealism. It is more parsimonious to accept the purpose of ko-wu (rectifying affairs) as revealing "true" and "false" li[a], as well as yi (intention) with proper or faulty chih (perception). The understanding of "true" and "false" (li[a]) is in itself true li[a], so the original meaning is preserved through its expansion. A single yi-nien (thought) cannot exist indefinitely in the absence of some form of perception, either proper or faulty.

The investigator has chosen to separate ko-wu (rectifying affairs) from chih[b] liang-chih (extending conscience) more than the Sung-Ming Neo-Confucians did in their writings. Yet, ko-wu (investigating principle) remains under the command of liang-chih (conscience) in the system of the researcher. Ko-wu is necessary when the self is at the boundaries of the known and unknown. Creative tension is seen in the use of reflection with immediacy to insure a principled spontaneity. Technically speaking, ko-wu does serve to extend conscience (chih liang-chih) in the long run. However, the "spirit" of chih liang-chih seems to reflect "business as usual," through a self-confidence regarding situational ethics. Finding principles (li[a]) at the moment of action is a spontaneous unity of knowing, feeling, and willing.

Neo-Confucians Just Want to Have Fun

The bottom line on a theory in psychology or philosophy should be "Does it help me have fun?" "Is it a fun way to look at life?" Neo-Confucians repeatedly wrote about the joy experienced through understanding and applying their philosophy. Who could forget Ch'eng I (1033-1107) stating that "unconsciously you will start dancing with your hands and feet" through an understanding of the Classics. Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-1193) stated "There is no greater delight than when reflecting upon ourselves to be conscious of sincerity," (Ching, 1973, p. 30).

Nivision (1973) quotes a statement Wang Yang-ming made to a young disciple who feared that a gentleman is full of sorrow because he is so serious. Wang replied "your anxiety about anxiety is like looking for a donkey while riding it." Neo-Confucians did not advocate existential anxiety. Tu (1968) sees the fulfillment of desires within an ethical context as the meaning of k'e-chi fu-li[b] (subduing oneself and returning to propriety). Moreover, Neo-Confucian sages believed that somewhat wild eccentric individuals (k'uang) were more likely to become good students than passive conformists (hsiang-yuan). Perhaps restraint is easier to teach than will power. Wang himself was considered to be quite

wild (k'uang) as a young man. He experimented with Taoism and Zen extensively (Ching, 1976).

Part of Wang Yang-ming's ethical fulfillment of desires included preparing large banquets for his students. Wang invited over a hundred people to Pi-hsia Pond to celebrate the night of the Mid-Autumn Festival. Ching (1976) reports, "wine was served after which the guests enjoyed themselves by singing, beating drums, or boating" (p. 49). Self-actualizing requires an authentic active social life, according to Neo-Confucian doctrine. The researcher hopes the reader had fun learning about Neo-Confucianism.

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