Gregor) in at least two further particulars. First, Gregor’s often-helpful editorial notes (those indicated by Arabic numerals), which were collected at the end of the Works edition, have been left out of this edition (the numbers are there, the notes aren’t). Second, there are far too many (even allowing for the lax standards of our day) typographical and editing errors. This book needs a good proofreading and further editing before the next printing.

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Knud Ejler Logstrup (1905–81) was a Danish theologian and professor of ethics and philosophy of religion at the University of Aarhus. The Ethical Demand, his major ethical work, has attracted broad interest in Denmark and Scandinavia since its publication in 1956. For the first time, it is available in English in its entirety (including a chapter omitted in its first English translation, published in 1971) and includes an introduction by Hans Fink and Alasdair MacIntyre.

The ethical demand of Logstrup’s title is the biblical injunction to love one’s neighbor as oneself. As a theologian, Logstrup is concerned with the religious nature of Jesus of Nazareth’s proclamation. However, he intends this work as a philosophical investigation of the attitude toward others required by the demand, taking as his primary aim “a definition in strictly human terms” of this attitude (pp. 2–3). Although, as I shall argue, Logstrup ultimately fails to extricate his account of the demand from theological premises, his work nonetheless offers something of value for contemporary work in ethics.

Positing a distinction between the attitude prescribed by the ethical demand and the demand’s religious nature, Logstrup proceeds to suggest that the demand can serve as the basis of a human, rather than an exclusively Christian, ethics. Logstrup holds Christians and non-Christians alike to the same standards of argumentation, regarding as a nuisance “the idea that there are laws governing people’s lives which only Christians understand, and that there are reasons which are intelligible only to Christians” (p. 111).

Logstrup nonetheless has difficulty defending an interpretation of the demand’s prescribed attitude, let alone an understanding of the demand’s authority, that does not depend on theological premises. Insofar as one can isolate a secular argument of the book, it proceeds from what Logstrup regards as an undeniable fact of human existence: to be human is to be susceptible to trust. Logstrup argues that human life would be insupportable if our natural attitude to others were one of distrust rather than trust. Moreover, the fact that we must rely on trust in our relations with others makes us vulnerable to them. “To trust,” explains Logstrup, “is to lay oneself open” (p. 9). Such self-exposure makes possible moral evaluation. Logstrup’s insight here is that trust makes us vulnerable to others in a way that mere dependence does not, because trust gives rise to the expectation that another will respond to us in certain ways. We, in turn, respond
to the disappointment of such expectations with moral evaluation (pp. 9–11).

Whether the breach of trust is intentional is irrelevant to such moral evaluation. Logstrup argues that, despite the common belief that “it is only when a person accidentally breaks into another person’s world with good or bad intentions that anything important is at stake,” we inevitably “constitute one another’s world and destiny,” whether we intend to or not (p. 16). Logstrup illustrates this point, as he does many others throughout the book, with a sensitive reading of a literary example: Leonard Bast’s disappointment with a perceived disregard by the Schlegel sisters, as presented in E. M. Forster’s *Howards End* (pp. 11–12).

Facts about the centrality of trust in human lives, Logstrup argues, entail the ethical demand that we take care of the lives of persons who have placed their trust in us. In this way, the phenomenon of trust is said to imply the ethical demand to love one’s neighbor as oneself (see, e.g., pp. 17, 53). Logstrup’s determination to ground the demand in facts about trust is highlighted by his insistence that the demand is not based on any real or implied agreement or in considerations of mutual benefit or reciprocity (pp. 18, 123–29). Whatever his favored fact, however, Logstrup here faces the charge that he runs afoul of the is-ought distinction. Anticipating the objection, he explains his concern is “only to point out the intimate connection between the fact and the demand, to point out that to a great extent, the demand grows out of the fact. . . . To accept the fact without listening to the demand is to be indifferent to the question whether life is to be promoted or ruined” (p. 18, n. 6). One needn’t object to deriving ought’s from is’s, however, to find Logstrup’s treatment here wanting. One difficulty with the reply is that once Logstrup has denied (without providing an alternative) any number of plausible candidates which might provide an agent with reasons to avoid indifference to the demand, it is only natural to wonder what accounts for the demand’s authority. Logstrup never defends his original claim that human life “would be impaired and wither away if we were in advance to distrust one another” (p. 8) as a justification for heeding the demand and he explicitly denies the suggestions that compliance is otherwise mutually beneficial, required by the virtue of reciprocity, or a matter of Kantian autonomy (p. 23).

One might attempt to defend Logstrup against this complaint by suggesting that he wants to insulate questions about the justification of the demand’s authority from questions regarding the nature of its prescribed attitude precisely because he believes this justification rests on theological premises whose discussion he wishes to bypass. This response neglects, however, a second problem with Logstrup’s approach. However much he may want to avoid elaboration on the demand’s authority, his thoughts about such authority nonetheless intrude on his examination of the content of the demand’s prescription. This intrusion is most obvious in his denial that the attitude required by the demand is that of reciprocal respect for our mutual vulnerability (chap. 6). To adopt this “viewpoint of reciprocity” is to assert a right to make counterdemands of others. Logstrup argues that the demand mutes claims made from such a viewpoint because “the demand makes sense only on the presupposition that the person to whom the demand is addressed possesses nothing which he or she has not received as a gift” (p. 116). Logstrup suggests that if we deny the presupposition that our life is a gift, then we correctly regard ourselves as sovereign over our life and as having the power to make counterdemands on those who demand something of our life.
If, on the contrary, we are indebted for the gift of our life, we are not justified in making counterdemands of others. He ascribes this "one-sidedness" to the demand as its second component, second to the content (i.e., to take care of the other person's life for his or her own sake) it receives from the fact of trust (p. 123). Insofar as granting the demand a one-sided character requires that one acknowledge one's life as a gift, however, one's understanding of the content of the attitude inevitably rests on what appears on its face to be a religious belief.

One could try to block this second objection by noting that Logstrup here avoids explicit mention of God. Perhaps there is room to read the "givenness" of our life in some other manner, and Fink and MacIntyre suggest so in their introduction. However, it isn't clear what such interpretive charity accomplishes. First, how is the "givenness" of our life understood in any other sense supposed to advance the argument against understanding the demand to require the viewpoint of reciprocity? Second, this response is in tension with what Logstrup eventually does say, once he has completed his "purely human manner" of investigation, about the demand's authority. There Logstrup suggests the authority of the demand derives from the fact that it is God's demand (chap. 12).

Despite Logstrup's failure to achieve his primary goal, his treatment of trust has value in its own right, independent of the larger argument. Also valuable are his insightful illustrations of ethical points with sensitive readings of, among others, Forster and Joseph Conrad on moral perception and D. H. Lawrence on love. There is also a historically acute discussion in chapter 4 of the cultural embeddedness of social norms. Impressive here is the attention that Logstrup devotes to the importance of tradition in shaping both social norms and personal dispositions, such as those of marriage and love, while at the same time arguing that we should not regard the historical relativity of norms as a threat to our morality. (Logstrup has disappointingly little to say, however, about what constitutes progress in the changing of such norms.)

Finally, those readers most at home in the Anglo-American tradition of moral philosophy would do well to begin by reading Fink and MacIntyre's introduction and the appendix ("Ethics and Ontology"), so better to place Logstrup on the map of contemporary ethics. Fink and MacIntyre emphasize, for example, Logstrup's opposition to Kantian and Utilitarian views of moral motivation and to moral expressivist views that would deny the objectivity of the ethical demand. In the appendix, Logstrup himself distinguishes his ethics from the so-called teleological and deontological traditions and discusses topics of current ethical debate, such as the supposed exaggeration of the role of moral rules in ethical life.

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Written with panache and vigor, boldly confident in laying out its argumentative strategy, and full of colorful examples, this book gives us a good time while plying