LOTZE’S CONCEPT OF STATE OF AFFAIRS AND ITS CRITICS

Abstract
State of affairs (Sachverhalt) is one of the few terms in philosophy, which only came into use for the first time in the twentieth century, mainly via the works of Husserl and Wittgenstein. This makes the task of finding out who introduced this concept into philosophy, and in exactly what sense, of considerable interest. Our thesis is that Lotze introduced the term in 1874 in the sense of the objective content of judgments, which is ipso facto the minimal structured ontological unit. We would argue against authors such as Michael Dummett and Barry Smith, who have tried to prove that Lotze’s theory of judgment, and so of states of affairs, was advanced in the wake of psychologism.

1. HUNTING STATES OF AFFAIRS

State of affairs (Sachverhalt) is one of the few terms in philosophy which only began to be widely used in this century, mainly through the works of Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Husserl extensively employed the term in Logical Investigations (1900–1), as well as in Formale und Transzendentale Logik (1929), and Wittgenstein in Tractatus logico-philosophicus (Wittgenstein 1922). This made the task to find who introduced that concept in philosophy, and in what exactly meaning, of considerable interest. As a matter of fact, many attempts were made so far to clear up this point.

The first hunter of the term’s beginning was Carl Stumpf. In 1924 he suggested that the term state of affairs was introduced by Franz Brentano (see Stumpf 1924, p. 240). Some two decades later Paul Likne set out that this was Carl Stumpf himself (see Linke 1946, p. 46). As we just have seen, Stumpf himself knew nothing about this—he did not remembered that he had introduced the term state of affairs...

In recent years, the term’s history has been further investigated by Barry Smith. He made this with much persistency, but also frequently changing his view. At first he accepted that the

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1 Usually so is translated the German term in English. See on the problems with this translation § 7.
concept was introduced by Stumpf in lectures from 1888, “and its first appearance in philosophical print has been in 1900 in Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*” (Smith 1978, p. 33). A dozen of years later he set out that the term was introduced by Julius Bergmann in his *Allgemeine Logik* published in 1879 (Smith 1990, p. 128). Next Smith discovered that as a philosophical term, state of affairs was mentioned for the first time in Rudolf Hermann Lotze’s *Logic* (1874). However, so Smith, only in Bergmann’s *Allgemeine Logik* (1879) it became a central concept, meaning the objective element which corresponds to the judging intellect (Smith 1992, column 1104). In 1996 Smith got convinced that “the term is introduced by Stumpf to designate the immanent content of a judgement. . . . The earlier use of state of affairs by Lotze and the German logician Julius Bergmann did not, it seems, have any influence.” (Smith 1994, p. 87 n.; see also Smith 1996, pp. 324–7)

In what follows, we shall try to demonstrate that the concept of state of affairs was only introduced by Lotze in his *Logic* (1874) and by nobody else. We shall also show that Lotze used this term in meaning which was foundational for the later use of the term by Stumpf, Husserl and also by Wittgenstein. It is true that Stumpf, Alexius Meinong, Husserl and other phenomenologists put an additional requirement to it: it came to denote the specific ontology of judgements as different from facts. However, as we are going to see in § 5.2, this modification was not essential to the authentic meaning of the concept of state of affairs as introduced by Lotze. What is more, the phenomenologist notion of state of affairs has a meaning logically reducible to that of Lotze’s notion.

2. **STATES OF AFFAIRS AS THE OBJECTIVE CONTENT OF JUDGEMENTS**

But what was Lotze’s concept of state of affairs? In order to answer this question, we should first track down its history.

From the very beginning of his career as a philosopher, Lotze’s task was that of Plato in *Theaetetus*: to secure knowledge which is to be extracted, and separated, from perception. He

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3 The same is also accepted in Mulligan 1985, p. 145.
4 Barry Smith mistakenly claimed (Smith 1996, pp. 326–7) that, under the influence of Bergmann, “in the second edition of *Logic* of 1880” Lotze allegedly made some changes in his understanding of states of affairs. In fact, where he spoke of states of affairs (e.g. p. 57 n.) the two editions are identical.
accepted that the main characteristic of knowledge is that it is valid and so is true. This means that only it presents the things as they really are—and, in fact, that is what is expected from thinking as a result. The difference between perception and knowledge (thinking) can be set out this way. Whereas knowledge asserts different ideas that belong together (zusammen-gehören), by perception, as well as by imagining, daydreaming, etc., ideas are added to one another by accident.

Let us put this point in other terms. The perceiving mind presents “kaleidoscopically” a multiplicity of contingent pictures (Bilder) (Lotze 1843, p. 72). Only then comes thinking, which consists in going through the ideas which perception finds together for a second time, producing in this way Nebengedanken, or secondary thoughts. The latter connect only those ideas which they find to intrinsically belong together: that means, which are connected this way in reality.

But how it can be that the judgement connects the ideas in the same way in which objects are connected in reality? At this point we should have in mind that Lotze’s judgement does not express an interrelation of ideas (Vorstellungen) in the conventional sense of the world, but rather interrelation of things. So his state of affairs is nothing but the objective (sachliche) interrelations (Verhalten) of real things as presented in the judgement (Df.1). In turn, the minimal (atomic) objective interrelations of things are nothing but a possible content of judgements.

To sum up: For Lotze, thinking consists of producing justifiable thoughts which are Nebengedanken—secondary thoughts. These are satellite thoughts which accompany the kaleidoscope of the stream of consciousness, making part of it knowledge. Knowledge is nothing but presenting the things, as they are in reality, in our judgements.

3. STATES OF AFFAIRS’ FORMAL STRUCTURE

3.1 Substances

Trying to specify the nature of states of affairs in Lotze’s philosophy, we must, above all, have in mind that for him the forms of logic and epistemology have only a secondary meaning which is dependent on the ontological forms.
According to Lotze’s ontology, the world consists of relations and substances. The elements of a substance (or a whole) stay to one another in a reciprocal relation C, and in certain order [Folge] F, which excludes all other orders. The same is also the structure of the minimal composite unity: the state of affairs—and this is the second definition of state of affairs (Df.2). If we call the whole of the state of affairs (the substance) M, and its elements A, B, and R, we can denote the substance with the formula M=N[A B R], where N stands for the connection between the elements. A and B are determinate elements, and R is an endless element (see Lotze 1879, § 70).

The elements of the substance (the whole; the state of affairs) effect themselves reciprocally. They stay to one another in a reciproca tantum relation. Lotze expressed this point with the words that the elements of the whole mutually exercise to one another effectus transeunt, which is the opposite to the effectus immanens. In other words, all the elements of the whole exercise on one another a kind of cursory effect.

In introducing the terms effectus transeunt and effectus immanens, Lotze follows Ammonius 28,1,14. Lotze’s terms in German here are transeuntes Wirken and immanentes Wirken. Now transeuntes Wirken is usually translated (for example, in Lotze 1885) as “transeuter action”. Russell, in turn, calls effectus immanens and effectus transeunt “immediate” and “mediate action” (see Russell 1903, p. 452). Yet, “action” in German is Handlung. What Lotze has in mind here, however, is neither Handlung, nor Verursachung (causing), but rather effecting, which, however, do not lead to physical changes in the objects of the substance but to some kind of minimal internal changes which, nevertheless, are essential for the substance. They, more precisely, produce the ontological glue that keeps the elements of the states of affairs together in it. In short, effectus transeunt (or “action in passing”, “cursorily action”) is the minimal cursory effect A exercises on B in the substance M, and vice versa, thanks to which they stay in M. Through it, the isolated, autonomous elements of the substance became inter-dependent.

### 3.2 Relations: states of affairs as particular case of states-of

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5 This concept of being in reciproca tantum is often used in constructivist ontologies (e.g. in Smith 1998, pp. 524, 533, 539), but never explicitly and theoretically developed in full. This is a realm of ontology which still waits appropriate elaboration.

The systems of relations in the world are of miscellaneous kinds, everyone of which has its idiosyncratic co-ordinates. Here are two of them:

- the system of geometrical relations;
- the system of colours.

These two nets of relations are necessary to the world of the real, but not to the world of art, or to the spiritual world of men, or to other forms of life (lion’s form of life, etc.). Of course, there are also other kinds of relation-nets (see Lotze 1856/64, iii, pp. 461–2; Lotze 1885, ii, p. 575). Thus, merely from the perspective of the subject, Lotze’s universe has at least two further relation-nets:

- that of perception; this net is the universe of what he calls Localzeichen;
- that of judgements and concepts; this net is the universe of the sachliche Verhalten.

Here we see that states of affairs (Sachverhalte) are only elements in a particular net of relations—that of judgements and concepts (Df.3).

The sachliche Verhalten are of different types too. There are:

i. relations of extension (Raumverhältnisse, Lotze 1879, §§ 114, 132);
ii. Lotze often speaks of Lagenverhältnisse—relations of places (§ 77); of relations of weight.
iii. We can add to them “Wunschverhalt” (Mulligan 1985, 145). Etc.

4. NON-STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS IF LOTZE’S STATES OF AFFAIRS

Besides their extensional characteristics, Lotze’s states of affairs also have typical intensional traits. Which are these?
4.1 Judgement as examining its content

Lotze’s secondary thoughts, to turn now back to them, are nothing but taking “a critical stand towards an idea” (Df.4). They were understood that way also in J. Bergmann’s Allgemeine Logik. The same is the interpretation of Lotze’s pupil Windelband who used to underline that the secondary thought “is not merely an expression of a relation of presentations, but rather a critical attitude of the consciousness to such [a relation]” (Windelband 1884, p. 170).

Some German authors have noted that this idea is nothing but a further transformation of Hegel’s method of dialectical self-development (Selbstentwicklung) of the truth (see Misch 1912, p. xxvii). Perhaps it would be more correct to say that Lotze’s secondary thoughts are an incorporation into logic of the old idea of Plato–Aristotle of peirastic (examining) of the subject or the fact under scrutiny.

To be sure, the kernel of Lotze’s method of examining lies in the conviction that we somehow have in mind, in a vague form, what we intend to find in our analysis. He, more precisely, accepts that “this inner regularity of the content sought-after, being unknown yet, is not open to us in specific realistic definitions of thought. However, being present in the form of opinion, it really has [ ... ] the defensive force to negotiate what is not suitable to her.” (Lotze 1841, p. 33) Thanks to this ability, we can say, in our secondary thoughts, is the connection of ideas that lie before us—in our perception—true, or false.

4.2 Two other intensional characteristics of Lotze’s states of affairs

Lotze’s concept of content of judgement (Urteilsinhalt) has two other dimensions which have nothing to do with their structural characteristics.

(i) It is identical with affirmation of judgements. Lotze used to say that the being of judgement consists in its affirmation (Bejahung), or positioning (Setzung) (Df.5). This understanding was connected with a variant of the context principle: “The affirmation of a single notion has no meaning which we can specify; we can affirm nothing but a judgement in which the content of one notion is brought into relation with that of another.” (Lotze 1856/64, iii, p. 469; Lotze 1885 ii, p. 582)

Later, this point was articulated by Frege so. The judgement acknowledges the truth of its content; only this acknowledgement makes the combination of ideas a judgement. In other
words, the judgement is an acceptance, or assumption of a content as true, or rejecting it as false.

(ii) Lotze’s concept of content of judgement can be also defined correlative— as the counterpart of the concept of value (Df.6)— another term introduced by this philosopher in logic. He accepted, more precisely, that whereas the idea (Vorstellung) happens, the content of judgement is valid (Lotze 1874, § 316). (Other things that happen are changes: events, actions, processes.) Concepts have meaning (Bedeutung), but not value. They can have a value only through the proposition in which they occur (ibid., § 321). Further, the given is; it is opposed to both what happens (e.g. changes), and to the validities (propositions, judgements). The transition between these three is impossible. Lotze thus made a radical distinction between genesis and being; between happen and is.

Following Herbart, and developing further the idea of content of judgement, Lotze also explored the idea of the given (Gegebene) in philosophy, understood as an “experienced content of perception”—as different from the content of judgement.

The understanding that judgement has value was also embraced by Frege. In contrast to Lotze, however, and also to Wittgenstein, this logician threw aside the extensional understanding that the content of the atomic judgements are also combinations (Verkettungen) of objects. This explains why Frege never made use of the concept of states of affairs.

5. TWO CRITICS OF LOTZE’S JUDGEMENT

5.1 States of affairs as objective content of judgement

In the preceding sections we have already seen that Lotze’s judgements secure knowledge and so are of an order that superstructures the world of perception. Some authors as if try to deliberately neglect this point. Thus Barry Smith sets out that Lotze stuck to the old Cartesian “combinatory theory” of ideas.

The fact, however, is that this theory was abandoned not only by Lotze but even by Kant. Lotze, of course, knew this. He wrote in his Logic (1843): “Already Kant has noticed that judgement is a such only when its segments pertain together, thanks to the necessary unity of apperception by the synthesis of multiplicity.” (Lotze 1843, p. 87) Starting up from Johann
Friedrich Herbart, and passing further to Adolf Trendelenburg, this idea was a standard argument in anti-naturalistic theories of knowledge. The latter was also accepted by Christoph Sigwart and Wilhelm Wundt, among others. All of them “accuse empiricism of a genetic fallacy, of trying to substitute a historical account of the origin of some belief for a reasoned justification or proof of it.” (Sluga 1980, pp. 55, 56)

The difference between ideas which we “meet at random” (zusammengeraten) and ideas which “belong together”, or “tie together” (Zusammenknüpfen) is so radical in Lotze that it is difficult to understand why Smith refuses to acknowledge it. We shall try to rightly guess his motives for doing so, calling to mind that there is another philosopher who tries to prove that Lotze was not the man who invented the “logic of knowledge”—Michael Dummett. To be sure, in a sense, Smith and Dummett try to demonstrate the same: that philosophers who, in fact, have their roots in Lotze, started from scratch. Barry Smith was anxious to demonstrate this in regard to Brentano and his pupils, and Michael Dummett in regard to Frege.

Dummett, more specifically, is convinced that Lotze failed “to make any distinction between what occurs in a stream of consciousness and what occurs in thinking” (Dummett 1991, p. 71). Lotze, allegedly, did not realise that thoughts are neither ideas nor combinations of ideas.

In fact, nothing can be further away from the truth. Lotze introduced the term state of affairs in his second Logic (1874) precisely in order to denote the objective content of thought. According to him, a judgement expresses a relation (Verhältnis) between the content of two presentations; i.e. a relation between two objective chunks of reality. To understand a sentence is to understand an “objective relation of presented content” (sachliche Verhältnis der vorgestellten Inhalte). Apparently, the content of Lotze’s judgement is at least as objective as the Fregean Thoughts are.

Perhaps Dummett is misled in treating this point of Lotze by Bernard Bosanquet’s translation in the English edition of Logic (1874) of Lotze’s Nebengedanke as “auxiliary notion”, which Dummett ameliorates to “auxiliary thought”. In truth, Nebengedanke are not thoughts which are “auxiliary”, i.e. helping the ideas. Rather, they are “second wave” ideas which check are the first ones real or not. They are “secondary thoughts” which convert ideas into knowledge.

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7 Incidentally, the same idea of presenting good as a natural object was also criticised by George Edward Moore in Principia Ethica as “naturalistic fallacy” (see Moore 1903, pp. 13–14).
Dummett insists that in the first of his “Seventeen Key Sentences on Logic”—“The tyings up [of ideas] which make out the nature of thinking are in fact different from the associations of ideas”—Frege tries to rectify Lotze on this point (Dummett 1981, p. 523). In truth, here Frege just echoes Lotze. Apparently, this interpretation of Dummett is again due to incorrect translation: this time of Zusammenknüpfen of ideas into “combination of ideas”. In truth, this German term means “tying ideas up”.

Our claim can be supported by the fact that to Lotze, ideas which are only connected together—not tied up together—pertain to the “psychological Tatbestand” and so are radically different from the objective states of affairs. Indeed, for him there was nothing worse than using psychological concepts in logic. From the very beginning, Lotze exercised a “logical critique over the psychological” (Lotze 1843, p. 85). Later on he used to say: “Psychology can not be a foundation of metaphysics, but the latter can be only a foundation of the former.” (Lotze 1879, § ix)

Incidentally, what Barry Smith and Michael Dummett failed to see—that it was Lotze who introduced the objective content of judgement in logic—was a commonplace among German philosophers of the 1910s. Thus Bruno Bauch—a professor in Jena at the beginning of the century, who taught Rudolf Carnap there and was a colleague of Frege and one of his first admirers—was strongly convinced that it was Lotze who introduced the concept of objective (sachliche) “content” in logic (see Bauch 1918, p. 48).8 Another philosopher from this period well acquainted with Lotze was Georg Misch. He too held the belief that Brentano followed Lotze in accepting that the judgement refers—through the objects (Sachlichkeit)—to reality (see Misch 1912, p. xvii).

5.2 The motives of Smith’s misunderstanding: his theory of truth-makers

Apparently, the motive of Smith to assume that the term state of affairs was not introduced by Lotze, neither even by Julius Bergmann, but by all those phenomenologists—Stumpf, Meinong, Husserl—who some 100 years ago tried to substantiate a specific ontology of judgements as different from that of the facts, seems to be this. The phenomenologists em-

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8 It is of interest to mention here that despite Bauch’s sympathy with Frege, and in spite of his good knowledge of Frege’s logic, he was convinced that “in the realm of logic since Hegel, nothing has surpassed in value Lotze’s contributions” (see Bauch 1918, p. 45).
braced the understanding that to all different judgements over one and the same fact there correspond different entities (essesences); precisely and exclusively these entities are to be called states of affairs (Df.7). Some authors accept further that states of affairs thus understood are nothing but the verifiers—the “truth-makers”—of the judgements. This conception found an especially clear formulation in some works of Husserl’s student Adolf Reinach. Now Smith is among those who adopted Reinach’s theory, and exactly this is his motive to knock Lotze’s theory of judgement.

In contrast to Reinach–Smith, according to Lotze’s authentic conception of state of affairs, there is no need to accept a special ontology of judgement as different in kind from the ontology of facts. It is true that the same factual material can be apprehended differently; so that about one and the same fact different judgements can be made. Thus the following three judgements: “this rose is red”, “redness inheres in this rose”, “this rose forms the substrate of this redness” are based on one and the same fact. These judgements, however, have not specific ontologies different from the ontology of the fact about which they are made. This is the case since: (i) The possibility the individuals of the factual material to make up different ensembles (complexes, states of affairs) lies in the individuals themselves. (ii) In the judgements, on the one hand, and in the factual material, on the other hand, one and the same set of individuals (objects) are concatenated with one another but in different arrangements (relations, Verhältnisse).

The gist of our argument against the theory of Reinach–Smith is that the very possibility of different ontologies of the judgements is already contained in the factual material on which the judgements are based. The latter can be called a complex state of affairs, which contains in itself the ontology of the all possible atomic states of affairs (the ontology of judgements), that can be build on its bases. This means that the acceptance of two types of states of affairs—complex, and simple—as different entities is theoretically ungrounded.

Now since the elements of the judgement reciprocally relate to one another into the whole (the complex state of affairs), the whole is every time different. This explains why the same factual material appears in different judgements differently. Despite these changes, however, the underlying ontology is one. It consists of the elements of the complex state of affairs—

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10 This example is suggested in Smith 1987, p. 201, from which he, indeed, made the contrary conclusion.
11 Arguments for that the complexes and states of affairs are not different in type were advanced in Simons 1985.
individuals and atomic states of affairs—which already possess in themselves the possibility to reciprocally relate this or that way: i.e. to make up this or that complex state of affairs. In this sense are to be understood the words of Lotze: “The existence of everything [individual] presupposes the existence of some other [thing] to which [it] must be related.”\(^\text{12}\) (Lotze 1856/64, iii, p. 471; Lotze 1885, ii, p. 584)

6. **LOTZE ABANDONS THE TERM STATE OF AFFAIRS: INSCRUTABILITY OF LOGICAL FORMS**

A difficulty in investigating the real meaning of Lotze’s concept of state of affairs is the fact that after its introduction in the *Logic* (1874), he used it only once—in his *Metaphysics* (1879), § 107. In *Logic* (1874) itself he used the term only twice: in § 138 and in § 327. (In another two places of the book, § 36 and § 345, it is spoken about “sachliches Verhalten” (objects’ relation) as content of judgements. In *Metaphysics*, in turn, he spoke of “sachliches Verhalten” in §§ 75, 181, and of “Verhältnisse der Dinge” (relations of things) in §§ 101, 131.) Why is this?

The answer to this question lies in the fact that Lotze productively used the method of eclecticism.\(^\text{13}\) Following the methodology of eclecticism, he adopted a policy “to use the [old] terminology of different systems, after we gave to their foundations a common meaning” (ibid., p. 25). New terms are hardly ever to be introduced in philosophy. The only excuse for doing so could be that we have found a totally new concept. Now, for reasons set out above, Lotze was sure that he had found a concept which deserved to be connoted with a new name—with the name of state of affairs—only in *Logic* (1874) and in *Metaphysics* (1879).

Soon, however, he realised that the “reciprocal relation” (*Verhältnis*) between the contents of a judgement can be only defined negatively; we cannot articulate anything positive about what keeps the contents together: this relation is ineffable. The problem is that the *composition* of the whole has no multiplicity (see Lotze 1879, § 73). Consequently, this relation can-

\(^{12}\) cf. with Wittgenstein from the *Tractatus*: “Objects contain the possibility of all situations” that they make up (Wittgenstein 1922, 2.014).

not be put into words; we can only grasp it via intuition. This means that the “mutual reci-
procity” of the elements in space, time, and in a causal relation is inscrutable.

This argument makes any attempt to express what is meant, for example, by “copula”
doomed to failure. “Since, what in fact we want to say when we put together two content of
presentation [Vorstellungsinhalte] S and P as subject and predicate ... cannot be expressed or
constructed” intuitively (§ 75). We can never express the way in which the Verhältnisse ad-
here (haftien)\textsuperscript{14} to the individuals. In all events, the copula must not be apprehended as the
“bald copula” of the logical schemata used widely in the textbooks on formal logic. In fact,
the relation of copula is different every time.

Following these considerations, after he briefly mentioning it in 1874 and in 1879, Lotze
stopped using the term state of affairs altogether. In Grundzüge der Logik (Lotze 1883, for
example, on p. 115) he put the expression “Verhältnis” in quotation marks since it neither
refers to things, nor to properties, nor to events.

Today it is well-known that the problem of logical inscrutability has a central place in
Wittgenstein’s logic. The latter namely assumed that “a proposition shows its sense” (Witt-
genstein 1922, 4.022); it cannot be expressed. It is also well-known that on this point Witt-
genstein followed Frege. In the literature it was justly noticed that “the Frege–Wittgenstein
notion of what comes on out but cannot be asserted is almost irresistible, in spite of its para-
doxical nature, when we reflect upon logic” (Geach 1976, p. 56). What was left unnoticed,
however, was that the first to realise this principle was Lotze. He also kept to it till the end of
his days. The task remains to find out in what extend did Frege follow Lotze on this point.
Unfortunately, this goes beyond the setting of the present chapter.

7. CONSIDERATIONS ON HOW TO TRANSLATE SACHVERHALTE IN
ENGLISH?

Philosophers feel characteristically uncertain about how to translate the German term Sach-
verhalt into English. Thus in The Principles of Mathematics (§ 429) Russell translate Lotze’s
Sachverhalte as “states of things”. In Ogden’s translation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-
philosophicus (1922)—approved by the author himself—Sachverhalte are rendered as “atom-
ic facts” and Sachlage as “states of affairs”. In the translation of the Tractatus of McGuin-

\textsuperscript{14} An expression often used by Frege.
ness—Pears (1961) *Sachverhalte* are rendered as “states of affairs” and *Sachlagen* as “situations”. At that, at the only place where Wittgenstein suggested a definition of states of affairs (2.01), they add a second translation: “states of things”. Conversely, in 1979 Elisabeth Anscombe translates Wittgenstein’s *Sachverhalte* as “situations” and *Sachlage* as “states of affairs” (see Wittgenstein 1979).

Perhaps we can better understand how to translate Wittgenstein’s, and also Husserl’s *Sachverhalte* into English if we review the context in which the term was introduced by Lotze. Above all, Lotze understood the “things” (*Sachen*) as something alive, something that have sensitivity, something that can be influenced, etc. This explains why George Santayana translated Lotze’s *Verhältnisse*—an element of the states of affairs—with “behaviour” (Santayana 1971, p. 182). These *Verhältnisse* are the result of “immediate inner interaction that the things ceaselessly interchange” (Lotze 1879, § 82). Indeed, as already seen in § 3.1, the things exercise to one another a transient, minimal effect; they stay in *reciproca tantum* relation all the time. The concept *state of affairs* denotes precisely the “relation and behaviour” (*Verhalten und Benehmen*) (Lotze 1856/64, iii, p. 465; Lotze 1885, ii, p. 578) which the things exhibit in certain situations in the whole which they make up.

Apparently, the literal translation of Lotze’s state of affairs is a *minimal intercourse-of-things*, or a *minimal reciprocal relation of things*. Above all, it sets out that this concept is a product of an elementary judgement in which two simple contents are tied up together. Unfortunately, the phrase “a minimal reciprocal relation of things” is so baroque that is simply impractical—it can scarcely used in a technical discourse.

This be as it may, it is sure that *Sachverhalt* does not mean *status rerum*, as some authors have suggested (see Smith 1992, pp. 1002–4). Indeed, the term *status rerum* is translated in German as *Tatbestand* and, as already mentioned, that latter concept has no place in Lotze’s logic—it is rather a concept of his psychology. That *Sachverhalt* does not mean *status rerum* is also clear from Lotze’s insistence that things have content, state (*Zustand*), quality, and nature (Lotze 1856/64, iii, p. 479; Lotze 1885, ii, p. 592). Thus *status* (state, *Zustand*) have not the whole (the substance, the *Sachverhalt*), but the individual. This is plain when considering such individuals like institutions, persons, etc., which have characteristically a *status*. In
contrast, the substance has form, *Verhältnis*, and order (Lotze 1856/64, iii, p. 493; Lotze 1885, ii, p. 606).

Another fact showing that Lotze’s *Sachverhalte* are neither *status rerum*, nor situations is that he differentiates between *Relationen*, *Beziehungen*, and *Verhältnisse*. We can easily find that whereas his *Relationen* are formally logical, *Beziehungen* are ontological and epistemological, while *Verhältnisse* are rather a panpsychical notion.

All these reasons support the claim that Charles K. Ogden’s translation of the Tractarian *Sachverhalte* as *atomis facts* is more appropriate than their Pears–McGuinness’s translation as *states of affairs* (see Nelson 1999). Above all, the atomic fact is exactly that minimal objective element that serves as the content of the elementary judgement. Secondly, we already have seen that in the general case, there is no intrinsic difference between facts (factual material) and contents of judgements. Thus there is no reason to introduce a new term for denoting the latter. And third, the term *states of affairs* scarcely communicates the sense of mutual interrelatedness of the objects of judgement’s content that the German term *Sachverhalt* does, and so is no enrichment also from stylistic point of view.

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15 Incidentally, Wittgenstein himself considered the introduction of *status rerum* in the translation of the *Tractus* in English. He, however, pondered on to translate thus *Sachlage*, not state of affairs—despite the fact that he was unsure about the correctness of this translation (see Wittgenstein 1973, p. 21).


