

From Opposition to Reciprocity: Karl Jaspers on Science, Philosophy, and What Lies Between Them

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ABSTRACT: This article deals with the relationship between philosophy and science in the writings of Karl Jaspers and with its reception in the wider scholarly literature. The problem discussed is how to characterize the relationship that exists between science—defined on pure Kantian grounds as a universally valid knowledge of phenomenal objects—and philosophy—conceived by Jaspers as the transcending mode of thinking of personal *Existenz* rising towards the totality and unity of Being. Two solutions to that problem arise from Jaspers's writings. The *opponentist* view is based in his earlier philosophy of *Existenz*. It describes the discrepancy between determinateness, bestowed by science to its objects, and freedom of self-determination, which is both a synonym and a condition of possibility for *Existenz*. The *reciprocal* view is based in Jaspers's later works, where he focuses on exploration of his concept of Being (*das Umgreifende*). By contrast with most of Jaspers's commentators, the present interpretation is anchored in a developmental and contextual understanding of Jaspers's thought. Showing the transcendental background of this topic, the proposed interpretation allows us to abstain from viewing the two solutions as incoherent or contradictory and instead to see them as constitutive of a single philosophical course.

A. FOREWORD

SINCE THE TURN of the twentieth century, philosophers have dealt with the question of the boundaries between philosophy and other fields of knowledge. This article deals with the relationship between philosophy and science in the philosophical writings of Karl Jaspers and with its reception in the wider scholarly literature. Actually, his discussion of this subject is not based on a conception of science and philosophy as two differentiated disciplines but focuses on the *view-points* that he grasped as typical of them.¹ Consequently, Jaspers's attitude towards

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¹This article is based on Jaspers's writings published during the years 1932–1947, including: Jaspers books and their abbreviations:

Die Idee der Universität, Schriften der Universität (Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 1946) (hereafter, IdU); *Nietzsche: Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1950) (hereafter Ntz); *Philosophie*, vols. 1–3 (München: Piper, 1994 [1932]); *Philosophische Weltorientierung* [Ph 1]; *Existenz Erhellung* [Ph 2]; *Metaphysik* [Ph 3]; *Philosophie und Welt, Reden und Aufsätze* (München: Piper

science also contains his views regarding objectivity, relativity, method, generality, conscious reason, and even epistemology. On the other hand, philosophy in his thinking also manifests subjectivity and particularity, the absence of method, and openness, as well as the pursuit of unity, perfection, totality, and evident certainty. As will be made clear, the wide range of meanings on which the concepts of "science" and "philosophy" are based in Jaspers's thought also has bearing upon the understanding of his philosophy as a whole. However, the broad understanding of the terms "science" and "philosophy"—on which Jaspers never presented a consistent conception—leads to the great complexity of the issue in his thought. As will be seen, this complexity is well reflected in the reception of the subject in the literature.

Three different scholarly approaches have attempted to resolve what seem to be contradictions in Jaspers's stand on the issue. Most of the scholars who have dealt with the relationship between science and philosophy in Jaspers's thinking have defined it as one of opposition. Sebastian Samay, for instance, contends that philosophy in Jaspers's thought is opposite to science in two basic senses: first, philosophy is not meant to convince others of its rightness, and second, "it does not have a certain object but a comprehensive foundation."² In his view, they first must be presented in their pure form in order to reveal any possible cooperation between the two. This means that, on the one hand, philosophy does not constitute scientific knowledge, but on the other, scientific knowledge does not exhaust the whole truth. In Samay's opinion, Jaspers held that science could be of help to philosophy only if the latter relinquished its scientific pretensions, while philosophy could be of help to science if it abandoned its metaphysical claims.³

Elisabeth Young-Bruehl expresses a similar position on this issue.⁴ She contends that, in contrast to scientific thinking, which strives after conceptualization and objectivity, Jaspers presents a type of thought that searches for a basis, an origin from which antinomies develop. In her opinion, this approach is apparent in the concepts by means of which Jaspers sought to clarify *Existenz* (such as freedom, will, and so on) that are not anchored in the dichotomy of subject and object typical of scientific thought.⁵ In a similar vein Hoffman claimed that Jaspers called for the establishment of total and completely separate sciences because he assumed that it was impossible

& Co., 1958) (hereafter, PuW); *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (München-Zürich: Piper, 1985 [1919]) (hereafter, PW); *Rechenschaft und Ausblick. Reden und Aufsätze* (München: Piper, 1958) (hereafter, RuA); *Vernunft und Existenz. Fünf Vorlesungen* (München: Piper, [1935] 1987) (hereafter, VuE); *Vernunft und Wildervernunft in Unserer Zeit* (München: Piper, 1950) (hereafter, VuW); *Von Der Wahrheit, Philosophische Logik* (München: Piper, [1947] 1991) (hereafter, VdW).

²Sebastian Samay, *Reason Revisited: The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers* (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1971), 108–09 (hereafter, Samay).

³Samay, 111.

⁴Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, *Freedom and Karl Jaspers's Philosophy* (New Haven and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1981) 7–8 (hereafter, Young-Bruehl).

⁵*Ibid.*, 21–22. A similar conclusion to Young-Bruehl's regarding the relationship between science and philosophy can be drawn from other interpretations. See: Fritz Heinemann, *Existenz philosophie—lebendig oder tot?* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1954) 72–74 (hereafter: Heinemann); Fritz-Joachim von Rinteln, *Beyond Existentialism*, trans. H. Graef (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1961) 204f (hereafter, von Rinteln).

to unite all the different types of consciousness that accompany human existence into a universal science or a single systematic and coherent philosophy.⁶

Another interpretation holds that science and philosophy in Jaspers's thought are anchored in a common foundation and therefore mutually interdependent on each other. Hanoch Tennen, for instance, contends that the methodical awareness of basic assumptions, which leads to the recognition of their limits and relative meanings but also fosters a desire to overcome the restrictions and seek out perfection, is common to both science and philosophy in Jaspers's thought. Besides this common foundation, Tennen also emphasizes the contentions by means of which Jaspers depicted science and philosophy as mutually interdependent on each other. In his opinion, this dependency stems from Jaspers's conception, according to which science needs the ideas that originate in philosophy in order to formulate its own questions, goals, and values. However, science, as a mode of critique, has to serve as a prior assumption for philosophy.⁷ Alan Olson presents a similar approach when he concludes that the boundary between science and philosophy in Jaspers's thought is epistemological, i.e., that it reflects an awareness of the different forms of consciousness in human existence.⁸ In the same spirit, James Collins defines the difference between science and philosophy in Jaspers's thought as "a conflict between siblings involved in a competition to expose the truth."⁹

Besides these two paths of interpretation, an additional approach appears in the literature that deliberately abstains from deciding among the different positions expressed by Jaspers on this issue. Thus, for instance, James Bennet contends that Jaspers's philosophy presents a dualistic position stemming from the simultaneous presence of two dimensions: the personal-existential and the impersonal-scientific.¹⁰

⁶Kurt Hoffman, "The Basic Concepts of Jaspers's Philosophy" (hereafter, Hoffman) in *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, ed. P. A. Schilpp (New York: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1957) 95f. Compare also to Charles F. Wallraff, *Karl Jaspers: An Introduction to his Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970) 38–65.

⁷Hanoch Tennen, "Jaspers's Philosophie in kritischer Sicht—Das Verhältnis zwischen Philosophie und Wissenschaft," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 28 (1974) 542–44. It appears that behind Tennen's interpretation lies Jaspers's distinction between two concepts of limit: *Prinzipielle Grenzen* and *Jeweilige Grenzen* (Ph 1: 45). Jaspers's distinction was parallel to Kant's concepts, which differed between *Grenze* and *Schranke*. See Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, ed. Beryl Logan (London and New York: Routledge, 1996) 111. A different formulation of the foundation common to science and philosophy is presented by James Bennet in the framework of what he calls the "inclusive position." See James O. Bennett, "Karl Jaspers and Scientific Philosophy," *Journal of Philosophy*, 31 (1993) 441–42. The understanding that awareness of the limits of science leads to philosophy appeared also in Kurt Rossmann, "Wert und Grenze der Wissenschaft" in *Offener Horizont*, Festschrift für Karl Jaspers, zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. Klaus Piper (München: Piper, 1953) 144; Dietrich Harth, "Grenzen der Wissenschaft" in *Karl Jaspers, Denken zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik und Philosophie*, ed. Dietrich Harth (Stuttgart: Metzlersche, 1989) 207–26.

⁸Alan M. Olson, *Transcendence and Hermeneutics: An Interpretation of the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers* (Boston and London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979) 13–16.

⁹James Collins, "Jaspers on Science and Philosophy" in Schilpp, 136. Additional interpretations that expand upon the dimension of dependency: J. Rudolf, Gerber, "Karl Jaspers and Kantian Reason," *New Scholasticism*, 43 (1969) 400–23; Joseph W. Koterski, "Jaspers on Freedom and Truth in Science" in *Karl Jaspers Today, Philosophy at the Threshold of the Future*, ed. Leonard H. Ehrlich and Richard Wisser (Washington, D.C.: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology and University Press of America, 1988) 133–52.

¹⁰The conception of the polarity between subjectivity and objectivity is widely treated of in Jaspers. See Ph 2: 336–49.

Bennet therefore concludes that there is little room for separating science and philosophy in Jaspers's thought since the subjectivity of *Existenz* requires the objectivity manifested by science, although scientific knowledge itself is grasped as leading to the "non-knowledge" crucial to philosophy.¹¹

Indeed, the fact that Jaspers never presented a coherent and consistent conception in his discussion of science and philosophy provides a reasonable textual basis for each of the above interpretations. However, against the background of the obscurity that characterizes Jaspers's own writing on this issue, it is hard to rest content with any one of them, for each of them gives room to just one of the voices that appears in Jaspers's writings and offers no explanation for the presence of other voices. Furthermore, none of them properly addresses the broader context of the discussion, in the framework of which Jaspers expressed his positions on science and philosophy, or the marks they have left on his conceptions of other issues.

In contrast to these approaches, the interpretation of the issue suggested here will attempt to meet the challenge posed by Jaspers himself when faced with a philosophical text that arouses difficulties in understanding: "To experience contradictions in their vitality. Instead of randomly prodding contradictions, we must look for the source of contrariety [*Widersprüchlichkeit*]" (Ntz, 17). Accordingly, the following discussion will neither strive to determine the centrality of one of the positions expressed by Jaspers on the subject nor avoid this by seeking the haven of contradiction.

The phenomenological approach on which the discussion is based consists of examining the *viewpoints* in which Jaspers's various references to science and philosophy were anchored in their immanent contexts. As in any phenomenological discussion, it is impossible to illuminate the entirety of the subject at once without spreading it out over several stages. Moreover, the suggested interpretation of this issue also reflects an overall understanding of Jaspers's thinking. Hence my attempt to consolidate a thematic understanding of this issue will seek to accomplish what Jaspers himself failed to do: to formulate an explicit and broad understanding of the issue of the relationship between science and philosophy in his thinking.

B. DISCUSSION

In understanding Jaspers's conception of science and philosophy, the importance of context lies in the fact that it was not generally discussed in his writings as part of his discussion of Being and *Existenz*, the two principal objects around which his philosophical writings took shape. The idea that science is opposed to philosophy, which will henceforward be termed "the oppositionist position," appears as part of his philosophical explication of selfhood, which he termed *Existenz*. Additionally, we find in Jaspers the view that the relationship between the respective viewpoints of science and philosophy is one of reciprocity, stemming from their common foundation, from the fact that they complement one another. This idea, which will

¹¹Bennet, 446-49. On the standing of the personality in Jaspers's thinking, see Richard Wisser, "Karl Jaspers: The Person and His Cause, Not the Person or His Cause," *IPQ* 36 (1996) 413-27.

henceforward be termed "the reciprocal position," is more prominent in those contexts where Jaspers discusses "Being." Although Jaspers himself never pointed to any connection between these two positions and the broader contexts of his thinking, such a connection, as will become evident, clearly arises from his conceptions of *Existenz* and Being.

B1. The Typology of the "Oppositionist Position"

The "oppositionist position" appears directly in several contexts wherein Jaspers conducts a typological comparison between "science" and "philosophy." Thus, for instance, he defined modern science as a *methodical* consciousness, the contents of which are *certain* and *universally applicable* [*allgemeingültig*] (IdU 12–13, RuA 241) but which are dependent on its basic assumptions and, therefore, cannot claim to possess an absolute truth (RuA 249–50, 254). In other words, science presents a generally valid truth that is not yet the entire truth because beyond it lies essential truth that cannot be grasped by science (VdW 256). Under the influence of Max Weber, Jaspers determined that modern science bestows knowledge and a framework for the realization of the powers of human reason, but it cannot provide it with a source for determining values and goals—this is not its purpose at all (Ph 1: xxv).¹² In parallel, philosophy was presented as opposite to science in "the lack of the general validity of its persuasions," but at the same time as having the potential to be unconditional and certain for those who see it as an absolute truth (Ph 1: 319).¹³ For the individual, philosophy may become a faith in which one sees the source of directly experiencing Being in its entirety (RuA xxvii, 247).¹⁴ Jaspers contended that philosophy, specifically because it is not directed at a defined object or a particular field that can shape experience (Ph 1: 318–19) but is presented as a universal viewpoint, may consolidate an approach towards human experience as a whole wherein different aspects of Being express themselves (VuE 22).¹⁵ It follows that even if philosophy cannot provide us with knowledge about reality or experience, it does contribute to a broader understanding of human beliefs, aspirations and self-awareness (Ph 1: 323–24; RuA 255). On the basis of these contentions about the uniqueness of science and philosophy, Jaspers also pointed to certain latent drawbacks, drawbacks that are nothing but the converse of these advantages. Thus,

¹²See also IdU 18. On Weber's conception of science and its influence on Jaspers's own, see Max Weber, "Wissenschaft als Beruf [1919]" in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, [1922] 1968) 524–55; Heinemann, 61–66; Ernst Moritz, "Max Weber's Influence on Jaspers" in Schilpp, 369–93.

¹³Compare also to IdU 13; RuA 254–55.

¹⁴The conception of philosophy as a faith was further developed in his thinking in *Der Philosophische Glaube* (München: Piper, 1948) and in *Der Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung* (München: Piper, 1962). On this topic, see also Leonard Ehrlich, *Karl Jaspers: Philosophy as Faith* (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1975).

¹⁵See also VuE 14. Like Kant, Jaspers refers to a perfection that does not constitute an object, and as such it is opposite to science as a field that deals with the particular (Ph 1: 322; RuA 253). Kant's influence on Jaspers is a thing of renown. In this context, see Greber, 406f; Erich Grünert, "Der Einfluss Kants auf Karl Jaspers: Zugang zur Transzendenz bei Kant und Karl Jaspers," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 3 (1956) 21–28.

science is presented as "incomplete" and particularistic in its cumulative advance, while philosophy is depicted as lacking any real assets or knowledge that might serve as a basis for any kind of ontological understanding (Ph 1: 323, 325).

B2. The Context of the "Oppositionist Position"—the Idea of Existenz

The "oppositionist position" is manifested fully in contexts in which Jaspers consolidated his conception of philosophical selfhood as *Existenz*. One of the most prominent characteristics of *Existenz* concerns the discrepancy between the "world" [*Welt*] and "conscious reason" [*Bewußtsein Überhaupt*]. Whereas Jaspers grasped *Existenz* as being that constitutes itself by means of reflexive action, the concepts of "conscious reason" and the "world" were presented as having objective meaning that extends beyond subjective references directed towards them. Therefore, Jaspers sought to establish his conception of philosophical selfhood on the basis of several dichotomous statements that locate *Existenz* on one side, with the world, conscious reason, generality, and objectivity on the other. Thus, he contends that whereas "the world as known Being [*Gewußtsein*] is generally valid for every man . . . *Existenz* in and of itself is *not general*"; it cannot be represented as a private case that is obedient to a general rule of law, but is "the individual of a concrete particularity" (Ph 2: 4). Since the conception of *Existenz* refers to the actuality of a particular entity that *may or may not* be realized in concrete reality, Jaspers frequently uses the expression "possible *Existenz*."¹⁶ However, because conscious reason is grasped by Jaspers as being able to represent only what actually exists [*Dasein*], it cannot provide access to *Existenz* (Ph 1: 14).

The above-described awareness of the limitations of formal conscious reason in representing human phenomena is largely a continuation of Jaspers's earlier views. As a young psychiatrist, Jaspers was confronted with the limitations of the science of psychopathology in representing the subjective dimension of mental disease. He later developed this approach in his book *Psychology of World-Views* (1919) by emphasizing the importance of the world-view in revealing the subjective dimension of a normal personality.¹⁷ The principles of his approach are already evident in these earlier writings, which point to the connection between the limitations of science and those of human conscious reason: just as the *science* of psychopathology cannot provide us with a complete understanding of mental disease, so too any type of thinking that is anchored in objective standards cannot reveal the full and unique Being of man.

These positions are of great importance in understanding the development of Jaspers's conception of selfhood, which lies beyond the scope of this article. For the purpose of this discussion, the important thing is that even though Jaspers grasped *Existenz* as worldly being and assumed that he was committed as a philosopher to discussing concepts of the "world" and modes of objective reason, he

¹⁶Compare this also to the two concepts of the "world" presented by Jaspers in a different context: the "world" as otherness that can be investigated and is of general validity, and the "world" as "not-I" (*Nichtich*) (Ph 1: 63).

¹⁷See *Allgemeine Psychopathologie: Ein Leitfaden Für Studierende, Ärzte und Psychologen* (Berlin: Springer, 1913), 8, 14f; PW 10–11, 14–15.

still distinguished between the philosophical viewpoint and the objective one. His main contention in this context was that "being able to be grasped by conscious reason" [*Erkennbarkeit*] is characteristic of objects (Ph 1: 17–18) and could be applied to everything outside *Existenz*, or in his terms to the "not-I" [*Nichich*],¹⁸ whereas what he termed "being able to be clarified" [*Erhellbarkeit*] was more relevant to the philosophical discussion aimed at explicating *Existenz* as particular being (Ph 1: 17–18).¹⁹

I believe that Jaspers's deliberate choice of the term "elucidation" [*Erhellung*]—rather than "explanation" [*Erklären/Erläutern*] or "enlightenment" [*Erleuchten*], for example—was specifically meant to demonstrate the qualitative stance of philosophy towards the objects of its inquiry, in comparison to the stance of conscious reason towards objects. Whereas the operation of reason expresses one's active regulation, the philosophical viewpoint, which is directed in this context towards *Existenz*, first and foremost reflects a state of mind that is characterized by an ability to allow things to elucidate themselves.²⁰ Yet from a different viewpoint we could contend almost the exact opposite regarding the activity or passivity attributed to these two positions. Whereas reason requires man to limit his observation in accordance to rationality, Jaspers makes the philosophical viewpoint of "elucidation" much more flexible in order to be able to express the dimension of freedom, which is central to the conception of *Existenz* as being that constitutes itself. From this viewpoint, it is "elucidation" that appears to be an active position, which determines both its objects and the modes of approach to them by itself. In any event, the dichotomy between "conscious reason" and "elucidation," as a philosophical viewpoint directed towards *Existenz*, is maintained.

Having established the gap between *Existenz*, "conscious reason," and the "world," and out of a continuing disposition to defend the centrality of *Existenz* to his discussion, Jaspers attempts to take another step by presenting the advantages of the philosophical viewpoint, which is directed towards the *Existenz*, over the objective viewpoint that deals with the "world." In his own words:

In philosophizing the I of possible *Existenz* has the decidedly dominant function of breaking through the circle of objective and subjective Being, towards the being-in-itself

¹⁸This distinction, between "I" or *Existenz* and what he termed "not-I," as well as between their different approaches, is also of great importance in understanding the ontological conception that underlies Jaspers's conception of selfhood. There are different interpretations regarding this issue. See Olson, 10; Werner Schneiders, *Karl Jaspers in der Kritik* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1965) 167; Thomas Räber, *Das Dasein in der "Philosophie" von Karl Jaspers, Eine Untersuchung im Hinblick auf die Einheit und der Realität der Welt im Existentialen Denken* (Bern, Francke, 1955) 33f, 133f.

¹⁹This contention has been variously interpreted. See Samay, 146–47; Olson, 20; Jürgen von Kempster, "Philosophie als Anruf" in *Brechungen, Kritische Versuch zur Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1964) 243; Hans-Rudolf Müller-Schwefe, *Existenz philosophie, Das Verständnis von Existenz in Philosophie und christlichem Glauben* (Zürich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1961) 39; Johannes Reis, "Menschliche Existenz bei Jaspers," *Die Neue Ordnung* 4 (1950) 418–26, 527–31.

²⁰In German, this position could be defined by the phrase *hell werden lassen*. In this matter, see Gabriel Marcel's remark, according to which the use of this verb is not common in philosophical language, in his article, "Grundsituation und Grenzsituationen [1932/1933]" in *Karl Jaspers in der Diskussion*, ed. Hans Saner (München: Piper & Co. 1973) 160.

which in that circle can be only negatively defined. Possible *Existenz* may perhaps open the positive way that is closed to conscious reason in the world of objects. This kind of philosophizing is as nothing for empirical existence, and a groundless figment of imagination for conscious reason. But for possible *Existenz* it is the way to itself and to genuine Being. (Ph 1: 14–15)

What emerges from this remark is that philosophizing, which is directed towards explicating "*Existenz*," may reveal what "conscious reason" is unable to arrive at because of its bondage to the "being of the object." In other words, what is revealed as "Being-in-itself" to philosophizing, which is directed towards *Existenz*, simply does not exist for conscious reason because of the limitations of representation of the tools at its disposal. The tension between the philosophical viewpoint and the objective one is taken to the extreme of presenting the objective viewpoint of reason as verily undermining the possible actuality of the particular being of "*Existenz*" (Ph 2: 5). It appears that Jaspers's commitment to refer to the actual reality revealed by means of conscious reason was at this stage defeated by a contrary inclination, i.e., that which sought to give philosophical expression to the particular being of *Existenz*. The identification of the objective viewpoint with the concept of the "world" led Jaspers to the presentation of *Existenz* as being that desires to separate itself from the world, or, in his words: in "reasoning the world . . . the world is desiderated as a craving of existence"; however, "as an absolute urge this desire will become destructive to me; counter to [this desire] I hear the demand out of my possible *Existenz*: to detach myself from a world, sinking into which puts me in danger."²¹ Objective reason's inability to express the qualitative being of "*Existenz*" and the latter's craving to separate itself from the world do not stem, of course, from a conception of *Existenz* as being that is outside the world, but express conscious reason's inadequacy in helping to perform philosophy's labor of "elucidation." Furthermore, since the determinations of *Existenz* with regard to itself are impossible for conscious reason (Ph 2: 12–14), Jaspers concluded that there is no possibility of establishing the Being of *Existenz* on the basis of objective perceptibility.

Unlike conscious reason, which gives man satisfaction stemming from his ability to organize the world, the self-consciousness of "*Existenz*" rests only upon insights that it itself arrives at in the course of the reflexive process. Only thus can *Existenz*

²¹The philosophical step whereby Jaspers sought ostensibly to "withdraw" *Existenz* from the world is dialectical, since ultimately "possible *Existenz* separates itself from the world in order to truly enter it later." However, in the scholarly literature there is reference mainly to the first part of this maneuver. By extension we may point out prominent examples of an approach, according to which Jaspers's conception of *Existenz* constitutes an irrational position or expresses an idealistic world view: Otto Friedrich Bollnow, "Existenz Erhellung und Philosophische Anthropologie," *Bulletin für Deutsche Philosophie*, 12 (1939) 136–39, 157; F. Imle, "Jaspers als Existenzphilosoph," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft* 4 (1936) 503; Joseph Lenz, *Der moderne deutsche und französische Existentialismus* (Trier: Paulinus-Verlag, 1951), 54; Leo Gabriel, *Existenzphilosophie von Kierkegaard bis Sartre* (Wien: Herold, 1951) 221–22; Wolfgang Stegmüller, *Hauptströmungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie* (Stuttgart: Kroner, 1960) 233f; Marcel Reding, *Die Existenzphilosophie, Heidegger, Sartre, Gabriel Marcel und Jaspers in kritischer-systematischer Sicht* (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1949) 96–109.

meet the ultimate demand "to be from the source of my selfhood" (Ph 2: 6).²² From this aspect, "dissatisfaction" can be seen as expressing the stance of philosophizing that is directed towards the clarification of *Existenz* in the face of the tools, upon which, according to Jaspers, science in general relies, namely, the objective viewpoint or conscious reason.²³ The fact that Jaspers did not move back from the conception of *Existenz* as worldly being allows us to assert that *Existenz* constitutes itself from the space of its existence [*Dasein*], but its self-consciousness takes shape in alienation and disjunction from this world.

As a result of this discussion, we can interpret the philosophical move that was focused on the being of *Existenz* and that emphasized the discrepancy between it and the "world" and "conscious reason" as a comprehensive application of the "opponentist position." The meaning of this position is that there is an opposition between the viewpoint of "philosophy" (or to be more precise the conception of "*Existenz*" with which Jaspers's philosophy dealt) and the objective viewpoint of "conscious reason," which is directed at the world and in which "science" is anchored. In other words, the "opponentist position" realizes its full philosophical potential in Jaspers's conception of *Existenz*. This enables us to conclude that no less than the "opponentist position" testifies to the conception of the relationship between "philosophy" and "science" in Jaspers's thinking; it constitutes the existential part of his philosophy.

B3. The Typology of the "Reciprocal Position"

Alongside the "opponentist position" there appeared in Jaspers's philosophical writings a "reciprocal position." According to this position, there are reciprocal relations between these two viewpoints stemming from a common foundation, the fact that they complement one another. This position sees scientific knowledge as mainly concerned with various aspects of the existence and reality of the individual (VdW 62); these are influenced by countless circumstances, on account of which this knowledge can never be certain. Consequently, Jaspers concluded, we will never be able to formulate a complete theory on the basis of any facts at all nor arrive by means of them at absolute certainty (Ph 1: 91). In this context, Jaspers emphasized the need for a motive, interest, or real desire on the part of scientists (VdW 303), which points to the relevancy of the facts they are dealing with to

²²Many scholars who have studied Jaspers's thinking view this conception of philosophy as the reason for the lack of influence of his work. See Heinemann, 66; Bennet, 246 n45; Tennen, 560–61; Schneiders, 263–64; Hans Saer, *Karl Jaspers, Werk und Wirkung, zum 80. Geburtstag* (München: Piper, 1963); Charles Wallraff, "Jaspers in English: A Failure in Communication," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 37 (1977) 537–48; A. Lichtigfeld, "Jaspers in English: A Failure not in Communication but rather in Interpretation," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 41 (1980) 222. Jaspers himself referred to his commentators in his essay "Reply to my Critics" in Schilpp, 748–869.

²³In Jaspers's discussion of the discrepancy between "*Existenz*" and the limits of expression of formal reason, the influence of Kierkegaard's critique of the Hegelian subject is evident. In this matter, see Olson, 45; Young-Bruehl, 5–9; Heinemann, 61–83. On Kierkegaard's conception and its scholarly interpretation, see Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. D. F. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1974) 545; Avi Sagi, *Kierkegaard, Religion and Existence: The Voyage of the Self*, trans. B. Stein (Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000) 12–13.

science (Ph 1: 124–25).²⁴ From this aspect, the facts upon which science rests do not have a pure meaning of their own, but only as a component in the reflexive process of scientists' reason. In other words, the standing of objectivity in science is dependent on scientists' finding the facts relevant to the goals that they themselves have defined as being of value. Furthermore, since the scientific method itself is a product of the subject's mind, it constitutes an external element with great influence on the meaning given to the data with which science deals. Without theory to guide us, it is no longer possible to talk about knowledge, but only about "a movement of images lacking a goal" (VdW 346).²⁵ Method, then, determines the framework in which certain facts are to be examined, and the meaning given to them is also influenced by it.

However, even though the method is a subjective component in science, at the same time it serves as a brake that prevents subjectivity from totally overwhelming it (Ph 1: 87). Just as the method draws the line between the facts that will be investigated and those that will not be, it limits the framework of discussion in which scientists are free to move about and, in consequence, also the range of meanings they can give to their objects. Furthermore, the restrictions that method imposes upon scientists and upon the scientific discourse in general reflect more extensive processes to which scientists themselves are subject. Jaspers contended that the individual's central standing is not nourished only by the reflexive processes one undergoes in the framework of doing science. Actually, scholarly traditions are founded upon epistemological structures that are diffused within a society in which scientists live (VuE 26), and the science they do manifests their attitude towards a world of which they themselves are a part (Ph 1: 83–84). This understanding makes it impossible, in Jaspers's opinion, to regard modern scientific theories as personal creations,²⁶ obliging us to see them as part of a larger matrix.²⁷ One should add to these restrictions unchanging factors such as concepts and conventions of judgment, the centrality of which to scientific activity Jaspers emphasized on more than one occasion (VdW 274–77). He determined that the meaning of science is the conquest of existence in an independent manner with respect to the reasoner or subjectivity (Ph 1: 85) and that the a-temporality of thinking serves as a "vantage point" or "foothold" for the motion in science (VdW 305). The conception of the viewpoint of science arising from these statements is anchored in objective elements, which are in themselves stable and independent of the particular viewpoint of the reasoner. All the same, their actual realization brings subjective elements into the arena of scientific activity,

²⁴See also VdW 305–06; Ph 1: 86–87, 90–91, 104–05, 121. Samay contends that the term *Denken* that Jaspers uses extensively is a generic term, unlike the terms *Wissen* or *Erkennen*, which are specific. In his opinion, this fact reflects the conception, according to which the will that constitutes the reality of knowledge is not concerned with knowing, but with thinking that does not stop only at objects. From this it follows that beyond the objective goal of knowing there are existential or metaphysical goals connected with thinking itself, see Samay, 287 n54. This approach of Jaspers is opposite to Popper's conception, in which the consciously reasoning subject has no place in science. In this matter, see Koterski, 152 n29.

²⁵For more on this subject, see Walter J. Ong, *The Presence of the World: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967).

²⁶*Die Geistige Situation Der Zeit* (Berlin-Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1931) 160–61.

²⁷See also VdW 26; IdU 23.

the presence of which is unavoidable due to the fact that science is conducted by human beings. From this aspect, the "reciprocal position" constitutes a dialectical position, which is anchored in the complex relations between facts and theories in doing science. This dialectic allocates a real place for subjectivity, but at the same time subjectivity is itself qualified and influenced by external elements.

The undermining of the absolute conception of science, which arises from the study of these contentions, draws attention to the speculative and conditional dimension of doing science. This laid the basis for another conception, in which the respective viewpoints of science and philosophy complement one another. Jaspers contended that in its genuine sense science, as knowledge of the paths that lead to conscious reason and at the same time an acknowledgment of the relative character of its contentions (EP 9; IdU 12, 27), can serve as a prior assumption and condition of philosophy.²⁸ Although scientists may try by means of knowledge and research to liberate themselves from their world, they always find themselves occupying a particular viewpoint from which they can escape only by occupying a different one. In other words, being anchored in a particular subjective viewpoint is the only absolute element in scientific activity (Ph 1: 104–05). All the same, even though science deals with limited objects, it is motivated by a counter-inclination that rebels against the formal restrictions imposed by the framework of object-subject relations, which can only provide relative knowledge. The impulse "to push at the limits" (Ph 1: 145–46) is meant to overcome this relativity, the source of which is at one and the same time both the particularity of the subjective viewpoint and the formality of scientific reason. This clarifies the possible contribution of the scientific viewpoint to obtaining original and unconditional knowledge about "Being" (Ph 1: 323–22), as a totality that contains all relative and particular understandings (IdU 24, 28). This is exactly where the viewpoint of science meets that of philosophy, which was also described as directed towards Being and motivated by an original and unconditional urge to know (IdU 16–17). Furthermore, for both science and philosophy, this common aim towards which they are directed manifests a truth that cannot be arrived at only within their own limits (VuE 26).²⁹ The "reciprocal position," then, is anchored in the view that science and philosophy are directed towards "Being" as a totality extending beyond the relative limits of object-subject relations, but that at the same time harbors the understanding that they are mutually dependent on each other to achieve this goal.

However, the complement required for science differs from the one required for philosophy. No science, contended Jaspers, following Kant and Weber, can be based on itself alone; every science needs ideals to constitute itself as an independent discipline, determine its goals, and define the complete context of its objects (Ph 1: xxv).³⁰ These ideals are provided to science by philosophy (IdU 22), not just by

²⁸*Einführung in die Philosophie, Zwölf Radiovorträge* (München: Piper, 1950), 142. RuA 252. In another place, Jaspers emphasized that this statement applies to modern science as well, despite his well-known critique of it. See RuA 249.

²⁹In another place, Jaspers expanded upon the conception of science as an "open account." See his essay "Wahrheit und Wissenschaft" (1960), in PA 67–72.

³⁰For this contention see also PE 8; IdU 18; VuW 26; Ph 1: xlii; RuA 252.

means of the abstract contents it deals with but by its very exteriority to the various particular sciences (EP 8).³¹ According to Jaspers, the anchor that the scientific viewpoint finds in philosophy makes it possible to identify the source of knowledge with the desire for truth (VuW 25) in the sense of searching for a totality extending beyond any particular achievement. Furthermore, the fact that science itself is directed towards an achievement that is inaccessible to the method, which is applied in the investigation of objects, makes it possible to identify the value of science with the value of truth (Ph 1: 141). On the other hand, philosophy also benefits from its dialogue with science, for it does not deny the reality that can be grasped by reason or the scientific grip on veracity that imposes itself on the human mind (IdU 29). Much as Jaspers grasped philosophy as dealing with ideals and abstractions that are not always amenable to objective consolidation, he emphasized the contrast between it and irrationality, sentimentality, or what he termed "dereliction of thought" (Ph 1: xxv). Hence it was possible to define scientificity itself as a condition for the rationality and veracity of philosophy (Ph 1: xxvi).

B4. The Context of the "Reciprocal Position"

The extension of the limits of the respective viewpoints of science and philosophy was largely accomplished in Jaspers's conception of Being. The objective viewpoint—presented as concealing *Existenz* and as opposed to the possibility of clarifying it—was presented, in those contexts where he discussed Being, as one of the means for attaining philosophical understanding. Thus, for instance, he contended that mere "existence in time" [*Zeitdasein*], with the unmediated experiences it entails, does not anchor man in Being but only in consciousness as an active elucidating attitude (VdW 1, 308f). Furthermore, in contrast to his contentions regarding *Existenz*, in the context of which he dealt with Being, Jaspers contended that the concrete reality in which we live does not constitute an actuality on its own but only when we come to terms with it (VdW 30–31).³² The need to arrive at an understanding of Being, beyond the unmediated and evident experience of it, is what makes the objective viewpoint that is anchored in conscious reason relevant to philosophy. Nevertheless, this requirement does not transform reflexive knowledge as such into an exhaustive expression of Being, especially not its transcendent dimensions, which are central to Jaspers's conception of Being.³³ However, the effort to anchor philosophizing about Being in an awareness of the consciously reasoning aspects involved in it, makes the discussion of conscious reason an inseparable part of the philosophical explication of Being itself.

The change in attitude towards the objective viewpoint of conscious reason is plainly evident in the concepts of "Encompassing" [*Umgreifende*] and "Cipher" [*Chiffer*],

³¹Regarding the ideals that philosophy provides to science, see also IdU 28; Ph 1: 138–39, 322. Regarding philosophy's exteriority to science, see also Ph 1: xxv; IdU 18, 28; VuW 2.

³²The transformation of the unmediated experience to knowledge is conducted by "Philosophical Logic" see VdW 3–6. About this term, see also Ernst Mayer, "Philosophie und Philosophische Logik bei Karl Jaspers" in *Offener Horizont*, 64f; James Collins, "Karl Jaspers's Philosophical Logic," *The New Scholasticism*, 23 (1959) 416f.

³³Jaspers has mainly exposed the transcendental dimension of "Being" in "Metaphysik" [Ph 3].

two pillars of Jaspers's conception of Being. As in his discussion of *Existenz*, so too in his conception of Being Jaspers did not back away from his understanding of conscious reason as relative and limited. Nevertheless, when his thinking was directed towards the philosophical explication of "Being," this conception of conscious reason did not prevent him from assigning to both it and objectivity a role in the philosophical explication of "Being." This change in Jaspers's attitude towards the viewpoint of conscious reason reflects the overcoming of the view that characterized his philosophy of *Existenz*, according to which philosophizing is supposed to arrive at a total understanding of the sole object towards which it is directed. Furthermore, even the object of philosophizing itself—in this context, "Being"—is grasped as accessible to more than one viewpoint. In other words, the change in Jaspers's attitude towards the objectivity of conscious reason reflected at the same time a different understanding of the method as well as the object of philosophizing.

These insights were manifested in the conception of the "Encompassing," which embraces the multiplicity of elements [*Weisen*], including conscious reason.³⁴ This conception was anchored in the understanding that, just as conscious reason acts upon a multiplicity of objects, so too the point of departure for elucidating Being lies in the multiplicity of its discoveries. Here the multiplicity reflects not only the changing face of consciousness with reference to Being (VdW 703), which by its nature as consciousness is nourished by different objects (VdW 36). It also manifests an essential characteristic of Being itself, which he describes as the state of "splitting" [*Zerrissenheit*] (VdW 703) and as a "Being of rupture" [*Aufgebrochensein*] that is unable to "close" itself (VdW 706).³⁵ From this aspect, there is a correspondence between the diversity of consciousness, the multiplicity of sources for the understanding of Being, and the variety of manifestations of "Being" itself in reality. In his discussion of "Being," then, Jaspers expresses a complicated attitude towards conscious reason. He assumes its possible contribution to a philosophical understanding of Being, but insists that Being could not be exhausted by the objective viewpoint of conscious reason. This concept enables Jaspers to avoid constituting an absolute philosophical conception, wherein Being is identified with its reflection.

Furthermore, in the absence of a demand to identify thought with Being, Jaspers's thinking is devoid of any demand to exhaust Being by means of objective thought or philosophizing. Thus he is able to find a place even for the objective viewpoint of conscious reason in the framework of his conception of Being, even though he recognizes its limitations.³⁶ Against this background, it is possible to highlight the essential difference between the attitude towards conscious reason, in the framework of Jaspers's discussion of *Existenz*, and the one in his philosophizing directed towards

³⁴For the discussion of the elements of the "Encompassing" see VuE 38–50; VdW 53–122. The "Encompassing of the conscious reason" is widely explored in VdW 223–49. For the whole concept of the "Encompassing," see Gerhard Knauss, "The Concept of the 'Encompassing' in Jaspers's Philosophy" in Schilpp, 141–75.

³⁵See also VdW 261, 873, 956. Jaspers used the term *Zerrissenheit* also in his discussion on the concepts of *Welt* (Ph 1: 64f, 78f, 104f, 218f) and *Dasein* (Ph 2: 249f).

³⁶For a different interpretation, see Urs Riehli, *Transzendental Reflexion und sittliche Entscheidung, Zum Problem der Selbsterkenntnis der Metaphysik bei Jaspers und Kant* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1967) 134f.

Being. Conscious reason's entrance into the framework of *Existenz* is accompanied by tension, which prompts Jaspers to examine the possibility of separating it from the world. In his conception of Being, on the other hand, he is able to reveal multiplicity as an infrastructure common to both "conscious reason" and "Being."³⁷

Jaspers's positive attitude towards the objective viewpoint is also evident in his conception of "Cipher." At the heart of this conception lies the idea that immanent reality constitutes a symbol or cipher of being itself and of transcendence as well.³⁸ In other words, immanence, as the concrete *reality* of the world and as man's actual *consciousness* regarding this world and himself, contains the possibility of arriving at a clarification of transcendence due to its metaphysical depth (VdW 1031–32). The importance of the objective viewpoint for clarifying the metaphysical depth of immanent reality stems first and foremost from the fact that objectivity is what permits accessibility to human consciousness as worldly being. In his words: "[Since] *Existenz* appears to itself in existence, so what it exists for it only in the forms of consciousness; therefore, for *Existenz* connected with existence, what is transcendent also takes on the form of objectivity" (Ph 3: 6). Beyond that, the conception of immanence as a cipher of transcendence cannot ignore the viewpoint of formal conscious reason towards immanent reality, since this viewpoint is accessible to the objective dimensions of this reality. Even though understanding reality as a cipher of transcendence constitutes a metaphysical conception, it appears that its anchoring in immanent reality obliges us to examine immanence from other viewpoints as well. In truth, the objective understanding of immanence does not merely complement its metaphysical understanding but is depicted by Jaspers as its cornerstone. In his words: "Conscious reason in general with its framework . . . is the chassis of existence, without which there is no understanding and no continuity of certainty" (Ph 3: 185). Thus, the establishment of the status of immanence in Jaspers's conception of being not only permits access to human consciousness in existence, but also prevents any mystification of the philosophical conception of Being:

Immersion in symbols is not the mystical immersion, the entrance into non-objectiveness of transcendence by way of an objectless and thus incommunicable union. Rather, as I hear the symbolic language, the phenomenon of transcendence is articulated for my *Existenz* in the medium of lucid consciousness, with the *subject-object dichotomy maintained*. . . Like the elucidation of consciousness in world orientation, elucidation in the symbol proceeds here by way of objectivity. . . Phenomenal lucidity and communicative depth of possible *Existenz* find their expression in the richly developed, subdivided, and always vanishing world of symbols. (Ph 3: 16–17)

³⁷In the literature a different interpretation appears that claims that Jaspers's concept of Being is opposed to the very idea of Objectivity and includes this concept in his Philosophy of *Existenz*. See Samay, 48f, 58f; Hans Mader, "Das Seindenken bei Karl Jaspers," *Wissenschaft und Weltbild* 10 (1957) 58f.

³⁸Usually Jaspers used the terms *Symbol* and *Chiffer* as synonyms. See Hoffman, 108; Johannes Thyssen, "The Concept of 'Foundering' in Jaspers's Philosophy" in Schilpp, 310; Aloys Klein, *Glaube und Mythos, Eine kritische, religionsphilosophisch-theologische Untersuchung des Mythos-Begriffs bei Karl Jaspers* (München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1973) 88.

What emerges from these remarks is that the objective viewpoint, which endows immanence with clarity and communicability, has a similar effect on the understanding of Being and Transcendence because they are anchored in immanence. Unlike "mythical wallowing," which is characterized by the blurring of limits at various levels, conscious reason acts according to clear-cut rules; therefore there is room for the dimensions of generality and objectivity in philosophizing towards being. Although the "Cipher" is based on the conception that immanence contains symbolic representations of transcendence and thereby extends beyond the limits of objectivity, Jaspers emphasized the contribution of the objective viewpoint to the clarity and stability of the philosophical understanding of Being. He specifically considered objective reason, which manifests a "universal law" in which man "participates in an impersonal way," as something that might facilitate "an unequivocal understanding" of Being. Objective reason serves as the basis for our trust in the order of consciousness and as a "support and comfort" to such an extent that "fear grips us if its collapse appears to be imminent" (Ph 3: 184–85). Hence, even if the objective viewpoint is unable to facilitate a complete understanding of Being, it contributes to the framework of philosophizing directed towards its explication. The clarification of the limitation of the objective viewpoint, specifically, is the backdrop against which it became possible for philosophical discussion to be liberated from its search after total representations of its objects. The division of the framework of philosophizing directed towards the explication of Being into many—many objects of philosophizing and many viewpoints in which it is anchored—became a constitutive element of a *non-absolute* conception of Being. This pulled the rug out from under the "opponentist position" by laying a foundation for the understanding that the respective viewpoints of "science" and "philosophy" enjoy a reciprocal relationship.

In the "reciprocal position" that arises from the conception of Being presented above through our discussion of "Encompassing" and "Cipher," two factors combined to contradict those that constituted the "opponentist position," which characterized the discussion of "*Existenz*." These two factors were the constitution of the object of philosophizing with reference to a multiplicity of elements and the search after a common infrastructure for this multiplicity. This laid a twofold basis for a connection between the "reciprocal position" and Jaspers's conception of Being. On one hand, the subjective aspect that characterizes the viewpoint of "science" contributed to a more benign understanding of the objective viewpoint, as reflected by the concepts of "Encompassing" and "Cipher." This subjective dimension prevented any identification of science with general and absolute validity that would not have accorded with Jaspers's conception of philosophy's viewpoint. On the other hand, the viewpoint of science's need for supra-temporal, fixed "vantage points" became joined in Jaspers's thinking with recognition of the vital importance of such a dimension in the framework of a philosophical conception of Being too. Not only did the presence of this dimension liberate philosophical discussion from dealing with the representation of particular experiences; it allowed Jaspers to identify the possible contribution of different viewpoints towards Being, including the objective viewpoint of conscious

reason. However, these moves did not amount to the constitution of philosophizing directed towards Being only upon the foundation of the objective viewpoint in which science is anchored. As stated above, in neither his conception of "*Existenz*" nor in his view of "Being" did Jaspers accord this viewpoint any preeminence, let alone the standing of totality. However, by its very presence in philosophizing directed towards Being, the objective viewpoint opened up new ways of thinking that only liberation from the rigor of the "opponent position" could have made possible. Therefore the "reciprocal position" in Jaspers's conception of Being can be characterized as aimed at bridging between the subjective dimension—one that was developed more fully in his philosophy of *Existenz*—and the objective viewpoint, which was discovered to be vital for elucidating the immanent dimensions of Being, but also for making possible a fully mature philosophical understanding of "*Existenz*" as worldly being.

C. SUMMARY

The interpretation here suggested for the presence of two different conceptions regarding the relationship between the respective viewpoints of science and philosophy in Jasper's thinking rests upon a twofold anchor: context and development. My interpretation of Jaspers's philosophy is guided by a basic understanding, according to which the main matter occupying Jaspers's thinking fashioned patterns of thought that were also applied in broader contexts. Thus, his conception of selfhood as particular being that is inaccessible to the objective viewpoint reflects the position that the objective viewpoint in which science is anchored is opposite to the one in which philosophy is anchored. On the other hand, the anchoring of the conception of Being in immanence, as "reality" and as "consciousness," served as a basis for the integration of the objective viewpoint of conscious reason in the framework of philosophizing directed towards Being. Needless to say, the attempt to point to the broader contexts to which the two typological positions examined above refer does not constitute a contention that Jaspers himself posited a connection between these positions and his conceptions regarding *Existenz* and Being. I am contending that the relation between the opponent contention and the conception of *Existenz* and between the reciprocal contention and the conception of Being, respectively, is implicit, and as such serves as basis for interpretation.

However much the connections—between the "opponent position" and the conception of *Existenz* and between the "reciprocal position" and the framework of philosophizing directed towards Being, respectively—may give a more comprehensive meaning to these positions, it leaves moot the question regarding the relation between the two contentions. In truth, the answer to this question derives from the relation between the two principal frameworks of philosophizing, and as such it pertains to an overall understanding of Jaspers's philosophical work. My main contention is that the two principal objects of philosophizing around which Jasper's philosophy took shape, *Existenz* and Being, did not give rise to two independent contexts isolated from one another but reflected a process of development. The emergence of the conception of *Existenz* as solipsistic being, due among other

things to its isolation from the objective viewpoint, led to a crisis that obliged Jaspers to extend the framework of philosophizing beyond the limits of the discussion of *Existenz*. In the following, Jaspers tangibly expressed this crisis:

To me as *Existenz*, absolute independence is indeed my true unconditionality in temporal existence, but it also drives me to despair. I am aware that as flatly self-based I would have to sink into the void. For my self-realization I depend on a fulfillment that comes to me. I am not myself if I happen to default; I relate to myself as if selfhood were bestowed upon me. [*Existenz*] verifies its possibility, only with the knowledge that it rests upon transcendence (Ph 3: 4).

In defining Transcendence as something "that steps up to meet *Existenz*, as that which fulfills it," Jaspers expressed the bursting of the limits of the discussion of "*Existenz*" in the direction of Being that is external to it. Without constituting any position towards such being, *Existenz* is doomed to sink into emptiness and despair. The broader philosophical processes that made this development possible—only the highlights of which this article has alluded to—enabled Jaspers to shift the focus of discussion from *Existenz* in favor of the development of a philosophical conception of Being in which Transcendence as well could be elucidated. This also made it possible for the objective viewpoint to be drawn into the framework of Jaspers's discussion, without leading to the identification of his attitude towards Being and Transcendence with the one typical of science's approach to its objects. Thus, in discussing *Existenz* Jaspers was mainly concerned with buttressing its absolute—in effect, singular—standing in philosophizing; but in discussing Being he found room also for the objective viewpoint, even the particular one of science. It was not only the maturity of Jaspers's philosophical thinking that made it possible to anchor his discussion of Being in a multiplicity of viewpoints and objects of philosophizing; even the conception of selfhood would appear to be in accord. This is because the "opponent position," evident in Jaspers's conception of *Existenz*, manifested a relation between two elements grasped as absolute, to which the variegation of multiplicity was quite alien; but in the absence of a struggle for absolute supremacy or totality, no room was left for it. From this aspect, the conception of the viewpoints of science and philosophy as engaged in a relationship of dependence and reciprocity involved not just an extension of the framework of philosophizing, but making it more flexible as well. This course, which was demonstrated by means of the concepts of "Encompassing" and "Cipher," enabled Jaspers to anchor his conception of Being in several viewpoints without feeling obliged to determine their hierarchy, specifically seeing them as different parts of a single philosophical course.