Religion as a Social Identity Buffer: Exploring the national, ethnic, and religious identities of Sub-Saharan African Christian immigrants in Europe

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Introduction

Social integration is often conceptualised as a 'secularising' process for immigrants in Western Europe.[1] This is premised on the assumption that immigrants adapt to their new social environment by complying with the mainstream culture of their receiving countries.[2] In this vein, immigrant religiosity declines over time as they assimilate in societies where secular norms prevail. Frank van Tubergen and Jórunn Sindradóttir found that immigrants' length of stay were indeed associated with decreasing religiosity among immigrants in European countries where the majority population reports low individual religiosity.[3] However, this concept of religiosity constitutes a broad definition measured by a self-assessment of religiousness as well as praying habits and participation in worship services. By this definition, religiosity is a composite of both private and public religious practices.[4] With the relegation of religion to the private sphere, one could expect a trend of declining religiosity among immigrants in the EU.

Religious social identity, as explained by Emily Greenfield and Nadine Marks,[5] pertains to a definition of religiosity derived from social identity theory. In lieu of the broad definition of religiosity used by van Tubergen and Sindradóttir, religious social identity does not take into consideration various religious behaviours. Rather, it is concerned with the salience of religion in

[1] Netanel Fisher, "Secularization of Immigration Policy vs. Religion's Influence on Integration: Israel's Non-Jewish Jews' Immigration in a Comparative Perspective," *Nations and Nationalism* 26, no. 1 (January 2020): 221–45, doi:10.1111/nana.12473.
[2] Jon Horgen Friberg and Erika Braanen Sterri, "Decline, Revival, Change? Religious Adaptations among Muslim and Non-Muslim Immigrant Origin Youth in Norway," *International Migration Review*, January 25, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918320986767.
[3] Frank van Tubergen and Jórunn Sindradóttir, "The Religiosity of Immigrants in Europe: A Cross-National Study," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 50, no. 2 (June 2011): 272–88, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41307075.
[4] Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir, "The Religiosity of Immigrants in Europe," 277.
[5] Emily A. Greenfield and Nadine. F Marks, "Religious Social Identity as an Explanatory Factor for Associations between More Frequent Formal Religious Participation and Psychological Well-Being," *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 17, no. 3 (2007): 245–59, https://doi.org/10.1080/10508610701402309.

the individual's perception of self. Though not as robust as religiosity, it allows for a deeper exploration of how religion relates to nationality and ethnicity, two social categories at the crux of immigrant identity conflict in Europe.[6]

For this analysis, I will explore the pertinence of religious identity to immigrants who are ethnic minorities in their receiving countries. Particularly, I will explore the case study of Sub-Saharan African Christian immigrants (SSACIs) in Western Europe who I argue are in an interesting position to explore the concept of religion as a social identity. On one hand, they are ethnic minorities who are more likely to experience identity conflicts between their nationality and ethnicity because of the predominantly white populations of their receiving countries. Previous studies found that minority immigrants in these countries experience tension between their national and ethnic identities, which become more pronounced by lack of citizenship in the receiving country as well as perceived discrimination on the basis of their skin color.[7]

On the other hand, they are self-identified Christians who adhere to a dominant religion in the national context of their receiving countries. Despite the overall decline in religiosity, legacies of Christianity continue to influence notions of national belonging in Western European countries.[8] In this case, a Christian identity could serve as a 'buffer' for minority immigrants who are feeling rejected or isolated and struggling to integrate in their receiving countries. In this analysis, I will compare the national contexts of Germany and France where the two biggest populations of SSACIs reside. As I will discuss later, these two countries also diverge in their *models of immigration assimilation* which directly influence immigrants' degree of identification (or dis-identification) with their respective nationalities and ethnicities.[9]

Hence, this paper will address the following research question: As a social identity, what role does religion play in the identity conflict experienced by immigrants who are both an ethnic minority and a national of a Western European country?

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[6] Jean S. Phinney et al., "Ethnic Identity, Immigration, and Well-Being: An Interactional Perspective," *Journal of Social Issues* 57, no. 3 (September 2001): 493–510, https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00225.

[7] Fenella Fleischmann, Lars Leszczensky, and Sebastian Pink, "Identity Threat and Identity Multiplicity among Minority Youth: Longitudinal Relations of Perceived Discrimination with Ethnic, Religious, and National Identification in Germany," *British Journal of Social Psychology* 58, no. 4 (March 28, 2019): 971–90, doi:10.1111/bjso.12324.

[8] Serdar Kaya, "Institutionalization of Islam in Secular Europe: The Influence of State–Religion Relations on Anti-Muslim Attitudes," *Policy Studies Journal* 47, no. 3 (March 22, 2019): 793–818, doi:10.1111/psj.12332.

[9] Christine Barwick and Jean Beaman, "Living for the Neighbourhood: Marginalization and Belonging for the Second-Generation in Berlin and Paris," *Comparative Migration Studies* 7, no. 1 (January 28, 2019): 1-17, https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-018-0105-3.

In the next section, I will explain the conceptual models and theories I used to frame this research question, from which I derived ten hypotheses. Afterwards, I will discuss my methodology, in which I perform statistical tests on existing survey data to provide the baseline of my analysis. I will also summarise the results from the tests I conducted for each hypothesis. In the third section, I will analyse these results with more depth by discussing the differences between the German and French case studies on the group and individual levels.

Note that the term "Sub-Saharan African" in itself has been widely debated in sociological studies of migrants whose countries of origin belong to this geographical region.[10] As I will discuss under the Methodology and Results section, my main primary source is the database collected from a survey targeted at immigrants originating from different Sub-Saharan African countries. The umbrella term "Sub-Saharan African" was used because once they arrived in Europe, they tended to gravitate towards one another and form migrant communities with the help of new communication technologies despite having different country origins.[11] In this sense, these immigrant communities could be framed as units of analysis despite their members' diverse origins.

Theoretical Framework

For my framework, I employ the *Social Identity Approach* in conceptualising how the social identities of nationality, ethnicity, and religious affiliation interact for immigrants. I use the *Buffer and Bridge* framework in linking these concepts to the perceptions of discrimination among immigrants in Europe. This frames religious identity as a 'buffer' or 'bridge' between the national and ethnic identities of immigrants triggered by perceived discrimination and lack of citizenship. In Western societies, religious identity was found to play a 'buffer' role in the internal conflict between nationality and ethnicity among immigrants.[12]

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[10] On the debated usage of this term in census ethnic data, see Peter J. Aspinall, "Who Is 'Black African' in Britain? Challenges to Official Categorisation of the Sub-Saharan African Origin Population," *African Identities* 9, no. 1 (2011): 33–48, doi:10.1080/14725843.2011.530443;

[11] Erhabor Idemudia and Klaus Boehnke, "Patterns and Current Trends in African Migration to Europe," *Social Indicators Research Series* 81, no. 1 (July 29, 2020): 15–31, doi:10.1007/978-3-030-48347-0_2.

[12] Teresa Garcia-Muñoz and Shoshana Neuman, "Bridges or Buffers? Motives behind Immigrants' Religiosity," *IZA Journal of Development and Migration* 2, no. 23 (2013): 1-23, doi:10.1186/2193-9039-2-23.

The Social Identity Approach

The Social Identity Approach constitutes two key concepts: social identity and self-categorisation. This approach posits that individuals place themselves into multiple social categories whose in-group characteristics are salient to their self-concept. In social psychology, self-concept is the dimension of self that seeks to address the question 'who am I?'; whereas, self-concept clarity refers to the extent an individual could "clearly and confidently" define oneself in a way that is internally consistent.[13]

The concept of social identity derives from the idea that people define themselves through the social categories they feel attached to. This has less to do with the "individual in the group" and more with "the group in the individual." [14] In this approach, individuals are assumed to possess multiple social categories (e.g. gender, language, religion) standing in relative power to each other.[15] Internal consistency among these distinct social identities is needed to maintain a clear self-concept. When a person identifies with social categories with conflicting in-group characteristics, this clarity decreases.[16]

Religion as Buffer

Despite the decreasing religiosity of Europe, immigrants still tend to be significantly more religious than the native populations of their receiving countries. *Buffer* and *Bridge* theories, as their names suggest, have competing explanations for this.

Fig. 1: Bridge and Buffer Theories of Immigrant Religiosity (Simplified)



[13] Ezgi Merdin-Uygur, "How Does Self-Concept Clarity Influence Happiness in Social Settings? The Role of Strangers versus Friends," *Self and Identity* 18, no. 4 (May 17, 2018): 443–67, https://doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2018.1470563.
[14] Greenfield and Marks, "Religious Social Identity as an Explanatory Factor," 246.
[15] Greenfield and Marks, 246.
[16] Blake E. Ashforth and Fred Mael, "Social Identity Theory and the Organization," *The Academy of Management Review* 14, no. 1 (January 1989): 20–39, https://doi.org/10.2307/258189



On one hand, bridge theories suggest that religion could foster the assimilation process. As explained by Teresa Garcia-Muñoz and Shoshana Neuman, there is considerable evidence of religious organisations enabling smoother assimilation in the American context.[17] In some European contexts, it has been suggested that, in the absence of perceived discrimination, national, ethnic, and religious identities were uncorrelated or even positively correlated for immigrants, as illustrated in Figure 1a.[18] This opposes the assumption that religious identities are inherently incompatible (i.e. negatively correlated) with national identity in Europe.

However, for immigrants who "fail to integrate" into the receiving country, nationality and ethnicity are inclined to become incompatible.[19] In such cases, religion is theorised to play a 'buffer' role in the internal conflict between these two identities especially when they feel rejected by the receiving country due to discrimination. Based on this *rejection-identification model*, immigrants with high perceived discrimination tend to identify *less* with their national identity and *more* with their religious and ethnic identities.[20] Citizenship is another source of incompatibility between immigrants' social identities. Immigrants who lack citizenship in their receiving countries are theorised to find their national and ethnic identities very incompatible. Figure 1b illustrates how immigrants' concepts of nationality, ethnicity, and religious identity may interact to cope with such triggers according to buffer theory.

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[17] Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman, "Bridges or Buffers?," 17.
[18] Fenella Fleischmann, Lars Leszczensky, and Sebastian Pink, "Identity Threat and Identity Multiplicity among Minority Youth," 974.
[19] Maren Behrensen, "Identity and Immigration: The Inconsistency of Liberal Nationalism," *Proceedings from The 49th Societas Ethica Annual Conference* (August 23-26, 2012), Lucian Blaga University Sibiu, Romania, https://ep.liu.se/konferensartikel.aspx?series=ecp&issue=97&Article_No=5.
[20] Fleischmann, Leszczensky, Pink, 973.

German and French Contexts of Immigrant Assimilation

On a contextual level, Christine Barwick and Jean Beaman proposed that immigrants' ethnic and religious identities are still influenced by their receiving country's *model of immigrant assimilation.*[21] Comparing Germany and France, they found citizenship to be historically based on shared ancestry in the former, whereas citizenship in the latter were based on shared values. Nationality, or the context-specific notions of 'Germanness' and 'Frenchness', are central to the contemporary debates on immigrant citizenship in these two countries.

In Germany, left-wing parties argue that granting immigrants citizenship would incentivise their "vested interest in society" because it signals their acceptance into the populace.[22] In contrast, conservative parties view citizenship as the reward to incentivise immigrants' compliance to be fully integrated into German society.[23] Whether immigrant citizenship in Germany ought to be a stimulus or reward is often discussed in conjunction with the concept of 'ethnicity' because of the history of this naturalisation process. For example, Germany did not grant citizenship to immigrants who received welfare and unemployment benefits which were targeted at ethnic minorities of Turkish descent.[24] Moreover, German law discourages dual nationality by default. Although there are several grounds for exemption, the identity conflict experienced by immigrants between the German nationality and their country of origin stems from the inherent provisions of German naturalisation.[25]

Naturalisation is oriented differently in the context of France where citizenship is values-based, in which dual nationality is permitted and data collection on ethnicity, religion, and race is banned by law.[26] Regardless of citizenship status, immigrants in France were found to identify stronger with the national identity than their counterparts in Germany. In this vein, the experience of identity conflict was found to be more pronounced among immigrants in Germany than those in France, which is consistent with the predictions derived from the *model of immigrant assimilation.*[27]

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[21] Christine Barwick and Jean Beaman, "Living for the Neighbourhood," 4.
[22] Evelyn Ersanilli and Ruud Koopmans, "Rewarding Integration? Citizenship Regulations and the Socio-Cultural Integration of Immigrants in the Netherlands, France and Germany," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 36, no. 5 (May 2010): 774, doi:10.1080/13691831003764318.
[23] Evelyn Ersanilli and Ruud Koopmans, "Rewarding Integration," 774.
[24] Ersanilli and Koopmans, "Rewarding Integration," 777.
[25] Ersanilli and Koopmans, 780.
[26] Ersanilli and Koopmans, 779.
[27] Barwick and Beaman, 4.

Despite these nuances, immigrants in Germany and France who have been naturalised are theorised to have a stronger sense of national attachment to their receiving country than non-citizens. In both countries, the law requires naturalised immigrants to be automatically counted into the population categories of 'Germans' or 'French', respectively, which signifies their assimilation on the statistical level.[28] However, this does not necessarily reflect how immigrants themselves experience assimilation, especially in navigating their multiple identities.

This paper aims to extend these findings by exploring the potential role of religiosity in immigrant identity conflict. Using the tenets of buffer theory, religion could be framed as a buffer to cope with triggers such as perceived discrimination and lack of citizenship.

Hypotheses

Deriving from the framework described above, these ten hypotheses would be tested. First, one can predict that the SSACIs are significantly more religious than the Christian native populations in their receiving countries. As Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman argued, religious identity tends to be more salient for immigrants because it is not hinged to a particular place, culture, or country.[29]

> **Hypothesis 1:** *In both Germany and France, immigrants associate with their religious identity significantly stronger than the natives.*

Second, drawing from Barwick and Beaman's study, the *model of immigrant assimilation* in Germany still associates national identity with a common ancestry. Whereas, in the French model, national identity is associated with common values. From this, one can argue that ethnic minority immigrants in Germany would feel less attached to the national identity. Hence, the following is predicted:

> **Hypothesis 2:** *In Germany, immigrants associate with their national identity significantly weaker than the natives. In France, immigrants associate with their national identity equally as the natives.*

[28] Ersanilli and Koopmans, 781.
[29] Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman, "Bridges or Buffers," 8.

Third, integrating the *model of immigrant assimilation* with the *rejection-identification model,* national and ethnic identities are theorised to be strongly incompatible when immigrants are not citizens of the receiving country. In this vein, one can predict that non-citizen immigrants' associations with their ethnic identity are stronger than those of citizens, regardless of the immigrant assimilation model.

Hypothesis 3: *In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants have negatively correlated ethnic and national identities. In both Germany and France, immigrants who are citizens of the receiving country have either unrelated or positively correlated ethnic and national identities.*

Hypothesis 4: *In both France and Germany, non-citizen immigrants associate with their ethnic identity significantly stronger than the citizen immigrants.*

Hypothesis 5: *In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants associate with their religious identity significantly stronger than the citizen immigrants.*

Moreover, Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman found that religious identity could even be interchangeable with ethnic identity as a buffer for non-citizens who feel disconnected from the receiving country's national identity. From this, one can hypothesise the following:

Hypothesis 6: *In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants associate with their religious identity equally as or stronger than their ethnic identity.*

Hypothesis 7: *In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants associate with their religious and ethnic identities significantly stronger than their national identities.*

Finally, *rejection-identification model* argues that incompatibilities in social identity are expected when immigrants perceive discrimination. Integrating this with Barwick and Beaman's findings, one could argue that this remains true even among immigrants who have attained citizenship. In this line, one could expect links between perceived discrimination, increased

salience of religion and ethnicity, and decreased salience of nationality even among immigrants with German citizenship. Whereas, these are less apparent for citizen immigrants in France.

Hypothesis 8: *German citizen immigrants associate with their religious and ethnic identities significantly stronger than their national identities. For French citizen immigrants, there are no significant differences in their associations with their religious, ethnic, and national identities.*

Hypothesis 9: *German citizen immigrants associate perceived discrimination with (1) decreased salience of national identity and (2) increased salience of ethnic identity. French citizen immigrants do not associate perceived discrimination with national and ethnic identities.*

Hypothesis 10: *German citizen immigrants positively associate religious and ethnic identities. French citizen immigrants do not associate their religious and ethnic identities.*

Methodology and Results

Overview of Methods

Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir's "The Religiosity of Immigrants in Europe: A Cross-National Study" exemplifies how survey data could be analysed through a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches.[30] In this study, cross-national differences in religiosity among first generation immigrants in Europe were analysed from the individual and contextual levels. To measure the religiosity of each interviewee, select items from the European Social Survey (ESS) on self-reported religious behaviours were used.[31] Correlation and significance tests were then conducted to test their hypotheses. The resulting statistical data from each country was then analysed using the theoretical framework of religiosity from which they derived their hypotheses as well as the qualitative studies of their respective national contexts.

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[30] The three secularization theories tested were the insecurity theory, social integration theory, and scientific worldview theory.

[31] For instance, the aspect of *religious attendance* was measured through the following item: "Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?" Interviewees were asked to respond using a seven-point ordinal scale (1 = 'every day', 2 = 'more than once a week', 3 = 'once a week', 4 = 'at least once a month', 5 = 'only on special holy days', 6 = 'less often', 7 = 'never').

For this analysis, the research method follows a similar flow. First, I extracted relevant data from two surveys to measure the salience of each interviewee's three social identities, and perceptions of discrimination. Select items from the two surveys were also used to filter out data according to the control variables (e.g. *natives and immigrants*: Christian; *immigrants only:* Sub-Saharan African, first-generation) and categorical variables (i.e., *natives and immigrants:* French vs. German, *immigrants only:* citizen vs. non-citizen). Tables 1, 2, and 3 (see *Appendix I*) list these survey items.

Next, I tested the ten hypotheses listed above and derived from two buffer theories. Table 4 (see *Appendix II*) summarises the statistical methods I used to test each hypothesis. I used these three types of statistical methods depending on the type of significance, variables, and samples the hypothesis compares:

(1) significant difference: same variable, two categorical groups

(2) significant difference: two variables, one group

(3) significant correlation: two variables, one group

Lastly, Table 5 summarises the results of the statistical tests conducted and if they are in direct support of the hypothesis or not. For my analysis, results from the statistical tests performed on select items from two surveys would be situated within the frameworks of *Social Identity Approach* and the *Buffer* theories.

Data and Statistical Methods

First, I used the Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS) from 2016 to measure the saliences of nationality, ethnicity, and religious identities among SSACI. For comparison, I used the European Values Survey (EVS) from 2017 to measure the salience of nationality and religion in the self-concepts of their respective native populations.

As van Tubergen and Sindradóttir explained, large-scale surveys like the ESS are "a rich data source to study immigrant religiosity," [32] allowing for cross-national comparisons because of their huge sample sizes and standardised procedures. However, most of these surveys are not "specifically designed to study immigrant populations," [33] and immigrants tend to be underrepresented in these data. Since the ESS was conducted in the national languages of the

[32] Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir, 277.
[33] Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir, 277.

receiving countries, immigrants who could not speak them were presumably excluded from the samples, as van Tubergen and Sindradóttir acknowledged.

To address these limitations, I used the EU-MIDIS and EVS as primary sources. Unlike the ESS, the EU-MIDIS was specifically designed to collect data on select ethnic minorities and immigrant persons across Europe. Similar to the ESS, both the EU-MIDIS and EVS are cross-national, large-scale survey projects with standardised procedures of data collection. *Table 1* lists the specific survey items I used and their corresponding codes and questions from the two surveys. *Table 2* lists the survey items from EU-MIDIS used to measure perceptions of discrimination of immigrants. *Table 3* lists the survey items from the EU-MIDIS and EVS used as control and categorical variables to sort the data accordingly. Tables 1, 2, and 3 are all listed under *Appendix I*.

One limitation of the EVS is that it does not have the equivalent item to measure the salience of ethnic identity among native-born Christians. However, this was left out of the analysis since ethnicity is not as pertinent to native-borns in the receiving society as it is with ethnic minority migrants.

Moreover, the EU-MIDIS and EVS were designed and conducted on different sample populations.[34] Despite having different objectives, both are comprehensive enough to have analogous items on the social identities of immigrant and native populations, respectively. However, the EU-MIDIS and EVS questionnaires use different scales for items that gauge agreement towards statements. Hence, I adjusted each data point from EVS to match the standard five-point scale used in the EU-MIDIS before carrying out the statistical tests and corresponding analyses. See *Appendix III* for the formula I used to adjust the scale accordingly.

Table 4 (see *Appendix II)* summarises the corresponding statistical tests performed to test each hypothesis. I conducted three types of tests. The first type (Type 1) consists of hypothesis-testing on significant differences between two categorical groups. For this, I conducted two kinds of tests. The first treats Likert scale data as continuous (One-way ANOVA and Independent T-Test), whereas the second treats it as ordinal (Mann-Whitney Test). Meanwhile, Type 2 consists of hypothesis-testing on significant differences between two variables on the same sample. I treated this ordinal data as two related samples (Wilcoxon test).

[34] The EU-MIDIS measures attitudes, behaviours, and perceptions of immigrants and/or ethnic minorities towards different forms of intersectional discrimination. Whereas, the EVS measures European citizens' beliefs and attitudes towards different aspects of life, work, religion, morale, family, politics, society, national identity, and environment.

Lastly, Type 3 consists of hypothesis-testing on significant correlations between two variables from the same sample. Two kinds of tests were also conducted. The first treats the data as interval (Pearson correlation), whereas the second treats it as ordinal (Spearman's correlation).

Results

Table 5 below summarises the results of the statistical tests conducted and if they are in direct support of each hypothesis or not. For the complete statistical results conducted to test these ten hypotheses, refer to the tables found under *Appendix III* (H1, H2), *Appendix IV* (H3, H4, H5), *Appendix V* (H6, H7) and *Appendix VI* (H8, H9, H10).

Table 5. Summary of significance test results and support for hypothesis

Group Level: SSACI Citizens, SSACI Non-Citizens, Natives	**Individual Level:** Religious, National, Ethnic Identities
Religious Identity Germany: *Non-Citizens = Citizens > Natives* France: *Non-Citizens > Citizens > Natives* **National Identity** Germany: *Natives > Citizens > Non-Citizens* France: *Natives = Citizens > Non-Citizens* **Ethnic Identity*** Germany: *Non-Citizens > Citizens* France: *Non-Citizens = Citizens*	**Germany** Non-citizens: *Religious = Ethnic > National* Citizens: *Religious > National > Ethnic* Natives: *National > Religious* * **France** Non-citizens: *Religious = Ethnic > National* Citizens: *National = Ethnic = Religious* Natives: *National > Religious* *

* Ethnic identity was not measured for native citizens.

Analysis

Table 6. Summary of statistical test results on salience of social identities

No.	Hypothesis	Significance or Correlation	Support
H1	In both Germany and France, immigrants associate with their religious identity significantly stronger than the natives.	Both: Significant, $p < 0.01$	Yes
H2	a. In Germany, immigrants associate with their national identity significantly weaker than the natives. b. In France, immigrants associate with their national identity equally as the natives.	a. Germany: Significant, $p < 0.01$ b. France: Insignificant	a. Yes b. Yes
H3	a. In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants have negatively correlated ethnic and national identities. b. In both Germany and France, immigrants who are citizens of the receiving country have either unrelated or positively correlated ethnic and national identities.	a. Both: Negative correlation b. Both: No correlation	a. Yes b. Yes
H4	In both France and Germany, non-citizen immigrants associate with their ethnic identity significantly stronger than the citizen immigrants.	Germany: Significant, $p < 0.01$ France: Insignificant	a. Yes b. No
H5	In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants associate with their religious identity significantly stronger than the citizen immigrants.	Germany: Insignificant France: Significant, $p < 0.01$	a. No b. Yes
H6	In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants associate with their religious identity equally as or stronger than their ethnic identity.	Germany: Insignificant France: Insignificant	a. Yes b. Yes
H7	In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants associate with their religious and ethnic identities significantly stronger than their national identities.	Both: Significant	Yes
H8	a. German citizen immigrants associate with their religious and ethnic identities significantly stronger than their national identities. b. French citizen immigrants, there are no significant differences in their associations with their religious, ethnic, and national identities.	Germany: Significant, $p < 0.01$ France: Insignificant	a. Yes b. Yes
H9	a. German citizen immigrants associate perceived discrimination with (1) decreased salience of national identity and (2) increased salience of ethnic identity. b. French citizen immigrants do not associate perceived discrimination with national and ethnic identities.	a. Germany: (1) Negative correlation (2) Positive correlation b. France: No correlations	a. (1) Yes (2) Yes b. Yes
H10	a. German citizen immigrants positively associate religious and ethnic identities. b. French citizen immigrants do not associate religious and ethnic identities.	a. Germany: Positive correlation b. France: No correlation	a. Yes b. Yes

The table above summarises the key statistical test results on the saliences of three social identities in France and Germany at the group and individual levels. The first column pertains to the comparisons of three groups: native Christians, SSACI citizens, and SSACI non-citizens. In both countries, I ranked these three groups based on the salience they attached to their religious, national, and ethnic identities. These rankings are based on the statistical significance of the differences among the groups in terms of the salience they attach to each social identity. For instance, the results indicate that there were no significant differences between the two SSACI groups (non-citizens and citizens) in Germany when it comes to the self-reported salience of religious identity in their personal lives. Meanwhile, the results indicate that religious identity is statistically less salient for most native Christians compared to the two SSACI groups. Hence, the rankings are as follows: *SSACI non-citizens = SSACI citizens > Native Christians*.

In the next two sections, I will discuss these group differences in more depth. First, I will compare the native Christians and the SSACIs by interpreting the statistical results on Hypotheses 1 and 2. Second, I will compare the SSACI citizens and non-citizens to provide insights on how immigrant citizenship, or lack thereof, in the receiving country could be linked to these results. The statistical results derived from testing Hypotheses 3 to 5 would be analysed.

Meanwhile, the second column of this table summarises the statistical comparisons made at the individual level. I ranked the three social identities based on the salience attached to them by members of the same group. For example, SSACI non-citizens in Germany tend to place equal importance on their religious and ethnic identities, having no significant difference in salience between the two. Whereas, most place relatively less importance in national identity compared to these two. Based on these results, the ranking for SSACI non-citizens is as follows: *Religious = Ethnic > National Identity*.

In the last two sections of this analysis, I will discuss the individual level findings under each SSACI group in more depth. In the third section, I will discuss the salience of the three social identities for SSACI non-citizens in each country based on the predictions of Hypotheses 6 and 7. For the last section, I will discuss the findings on SSACI citizens in terms of the three social identities and perceived discrimination, as predicted by Hypotheses 8, 9, and 10.

Comparing Sub-Saharan African Christian Immigrants (SSACIs) and Christian natives

Fig. 2: Group Comparison of SSA Christian Immigrants vs. Christian Natives



In support of the first hypothesis, religious identity was significantly more salient for immigrants than their native counterparts. As illustrated below, most SSACIs in both Germany and France were likely to identify very strongly with their Christian identity. Meanwhile, Christian natives vacillated in the degree of importance they put in their religious identity.

The charts below illustrate the distribution of responses to two items from questionnaires that used different point scales. There were only four valid options for the survey item used to measure the salience of religious identity among Christian natives, whereas there were five for the SSACIs. For the purpose of illustrating the distribution of responses, I eradicated '2' from the charts corresponding to the Christian natives since the middle (average) option was missing from the four-point scale. Note that I adjusted the data points using a standardising formula before carrying out the actual significance tests to generate accurate results, as explained earlier (see *Appendix III*).

Fig. 3: Salience of Religious Identity
SSA Christian Immigrants vs. Christian Natives
Scale: 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly)



Longitudinal studies on religiosity in Europe indicate that there has been a decline in religiosity across the continent. Among immigrants in Europe, a similar, albeit weaker, decline in religiosity has been recorded in the past few decades. However, as Van Tubergen and Sindradóttir found, the difference in religiosity between immigrants and natives remained significant despite this overall decline.[35] In the particular aspect of religious identity, the difference between immigrants and natives was statistically significant in both Germany and France (see *Appendix III*). As such, these findings support the argument that immigrants are more likely to find religion a salient aspect of their identity. However, it is outside the scope of

[35] Van Tubergen and Jórunn Sindradóttir, "The Religiosity of Immigrants in Europe," 272–3.

this paper to test if this is specifically because religion is not hinged to a specific culture or country, as Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman proposed.[36]

The results also support the predictions listed under the second hypothesis, which predicts that national identity is less salient for SSACI citizens than their native counterparts. In Germany, the salience of national identity was significantly weaker among SSACIs than native Christians whereas, in France, there were no statistically significant differences between the two when a nonparametric test was used (see *Appendix III*). As illustrated below, most immigrant responses in Germany were '2' or '3', which is lower compared to the other three groups wherein most responses were '4'. Note that only those with citizenship were considered in testing this hypothesis. As Barwick and Beaman theorised, immigrants who are not citizens of their receiving country are far less inclined to identify with its associated nationality since they lack the formal associations that citizens have with the country's national identity.[37]

I found this to be the case among non-citizen SSACIs in Germany and France. During the initial stages of testing the second hypothesis, I included both citizens and non-citizens in the immigrant sample, which skewed the data since there were significant differences in the responses between these two sub-categories. Hence, I decided to include only those who have citizenship in my immigrant sample to minimise the confounding factors.

Fig. 4: Salience of National Identity
SSA Christian Immigrants vs. Christian Natives
Scale: 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly)



[36] Garcia-Muñoz and Neuman, "Bridges or Buffers," 8.
[37] Barwick and Beaman, "Living for the Neighbourhood," 2-3.



These findings are in line with the *Model of Immigration Assimilation* (MIA), which predicts that minority immigrants would feel weaker associations with national identity in countries like Germany, where nationalism was historically associated with a particular ancestry. On the other hand, no significant differences were found between immigrants and natives in France, where nationalism is associated with common values, as opposed to ancestry. Both coincide with the argument that a receiving country's model of immigrant assimilation could be a factor in the immigrants' degree of association with their national identity. This is further supported by the fact that the immigrants considered in the statistical test were all citizens of their respective receiving countries.

However, longitudinal studies would still be needed to test the validity of the model of immigrant assimilation, since the length of stay, among other variables, could also be a causal factor.[38] Moreover, only first-generation immigrants were considered to minimise confounding factors since the temporal and intergenerational aspects of immigrant assimilation are not within the scope of this paper. Rather, the key advantage of the *Social Identity Approach* is that it allows for a deeper analysis of how religious identity could be a 'buffer' when tensions between nationality and ethnicity arise. As explained earlier, a major source of tension between these two is lack of citizenship. In the next section, I will discuss my findings on the differences between citizens and non-citizens in terms of their religious, national, and ethnic identities.

[38] I found (1) a significant but weak negative correlation between length of stay and ethnic identity among non-citizens in Germany and (2) a significant but weak positive correlation between length of stay and national identity among citizens in Germany and, to a lesser degree, in France.

Comparing the two SSACI groups: Citizens and Non-citizens

Fig. 5: Group Comparison of SSACI Non-citizens vs. Citizens



One of the predictions derived from the *Rejection-Identification Model* (RIM) is that national and ethnic identities become strongly incompatible for immigrants who are not citizens of the receiving country, regardless of the model of assimilation. From this, one could hypothesise that national and ethnic identities would be negatively correlated among SSACIs without citizenship of their receiving country. Whereas, those with citizenship would have either unrelated or positively correlated national and ethnic identities.

Results from both the parametric and nonparametric statistical tests were in line with the predictions under the third hypothesis (see *Appendix IV*). On one hand, non-citizen SSACIs in both France and Germany were found to have slightly negative correlations between their national and ethnic identities. Meanwhile, those with citizenship exhibited negligible or weak positive correlations between these two identities. Note that the resulting coefficients were weak and do not constitute enough explanatory power to conclude that citizenship preempts incompatibility between nationality and ethnicity, per se. Nevertheless, these results indicate that non-citizens are more likely to experience a certain degree of conflict between their nationality and ethnicity than those with citizenship. This provides the baseline for analysing the differences between non-citizen and citizen SSACIs based on the combined predictions from the *Rejection-Identification Model* (RIM) and *Model of Immigration Assimilation* (MIA) in the next four hypotheses.

As the third hypothesis tested, immigrants without citizenship are predicted to use their ethnic identity as a 'buffer' to cope with potential disconnect from their receiving country.

Extending this prediction, the RIM and MIA theorise that religious identity is salient enough to be interchangeable with ethnicity as a 'buffer' for non-citizens. In this vein, the fourth and fifth hypotheses predict that SSACIs without citizenship would have significantly stronger associations with their ethnic and religious identities, respectively, than those with citizenship.

While the fourth hypothesis was only supported in the German sample, the statistical results on the French sample were only in line with the fifth (see *Appendix IV*). As illustrated below, a smaller percentage of citizen immigrants in Germany feel strongly attached to their ethnic identity than those without citizenship. The opposite could be said of the SSACIs in France where ethnicity is particularly salient for most SSACI, citizens and non-citizens alike.

Fig. 6: Salience of Ethnic Identity
SSACI Non-citizens vs. Citizens
Scale: 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly)



Meanwhile, religious identity was significantly more salient for non-citizens than citizens in France (see *Appendix IV*). The opposite could be said of Germany, where religious identity is salient for SSACI, with or without citizenship, as illustrated below.

Fig. 7: Salience of Religious Identity
SSACI Non-citizens vs. Citizens
Scale: 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly)



Each of the two hypotheses were supported by only one of the two national case studies, contrary to the initial prediction that both would apply to non-citizens from Germany and France alike. However, these results could also be interpreted as further support for the RIM and MIA which, as explained earlier, argue that ethnic and religious identities are interchangeable. For instance, the two identities may be interchangeable for SSACI citizens in Germany who identify strongly with their Christian identity but not their ethnicity. In the following section, I will

discuss my findings on the sixth and seventh hypotheses by taking a closer look at the three social identities of SSACI non-citizens.

SSACI non-citizens: Lack of citizenship and the three social identities of immigrants

Fig. 8: Individual Comparison of Non-Citizens



Recalling the tenets of the *Social Identity Approach*, disharmony in an individual's sense of self could manifest as (1) incompatibilities among their social identities or (2) significant gaps in their salience. In the context of immigration in Europe, lack of citizenship is theorised to be a trigger of 'disharmony' between one's nationality and ethnic identities, as predicted by the third hypothesis. Linking the social identity approach with the RIM and MIA, one could predict that religious identity could be a 'buffer' to minimise the incompatibilities or gaps between nationality and ethnicity experienced by SSACI non-citizens. Hence, religious identity is predicted to be equally salient as ethnicity for non-citizens who experience disharmony between their national and ethnic identities.

In line with the sixth hypothesis, there were no significant differences between religious and ethnic identity among SSACI non-citizens in both Germany and France. Meanwhile, both religious and ethnic identities were significantly more salient than national identity, as the seventh hypothesis predicted (see *Appendix V*). On a scale of 0 (not important) to 4 (very important), the average degree of self-identification attached to religious and ethnic identities by SSACI non-citizens in Germany (N = 160) were 3.22 and 3.09, respectively. In contrast, the average degree of salience attached to nationality was 1.81. A similar trend was recorded among SSACI non-citizens in France (N = 202) whose average responses were 3.40, 3.30, and 2.41 in self-identifying with religious, ethnic, and national identities, respectively. As illustrated below,

Christian identity and ethnicity were equally salient for most non-citizens, whereas nationality is seen as the least salient by most.

Fig. 9: Distribution of Responses among SSACI Non-citizens
Salience of Ethnic, National, and Religious Identities



Scale: 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly)

These findings extend the results derived from the third hypothesis, which predicted that national and ethnic identities were negatively correlated among SSACI non-citizens in both France and Germany. To investigate the 'buffer' role religious identity may play in minimising this incompatibility, I conducted a follow-up correlation test between the religious and national identities of non-citizens. In both countries, religious identity was found to have a slightly positive correlation with nationality (see *Appendix V*). However, the correlation coefficients generated were weak and, similar to the third hypothesis, do not have enough explanatory power to draw a causation. Nevertheless, the potential of the Christian identity to act as a 'buffer'

should not be overlooked, given its positive correlation with nationality and its equal (if not higher) degree of salience as ethnicity. These findings are in line with the theory that immigrants could lean on religious identity when there is disharmony between ethnicity and nationality.

SSACI citizens: Perceived discrimination and the three social identities of immigrants

Fig. 10: Individual Comparison of Perceived Discrimination of Citizens



Apart from citizenship, perceived discrimination is theorised to be a key factor in the social identity 'disharmony' experienced by immigrants in Europe. Similar to the sixth and seventh hypotheses, the predictions generated for this section link the *Social Identity Approach* with the RIM and MIA. On one hand, RIM predicts that, depending on the national context, perceived discrimination triggers disharmony in the self-perceptions of immigrants, even among those who have attained citizenship. Integrating this with the MIA, perceived discrimination is more likely to trigger identity disharmony (i.e. incompatibilities or gaps between the three social identities) among immigrants in Germany where concepts of nationality were historically premised on a common ancestry. Meanwhile, perceived discrimination are less likely to trigger identity disharmony among immigrants in France, where nationality was historically based on common values. Hence, one could expect relatively more harmony among the social identities of immigrants in France (i.e. equal degrees of salience and negligible to positive correlations).

In this vein, I predict that perceived discrimination of German SSACIs would be linked to (1) increased salience of religious and ethnic identities and (2) decreased salience of nationality. Meanwhile, none of these are predicted to apply among the French SSACI. Note that only SSACIs with citizenships in their receiving country were considered in testing these hypotheses to eliminate this confounding factor. As discussed earlier, lack of citizenship in itself could already be a key factor in immigrants' identity crisis, particularly in the incompatibility

between nationality and ethnicity. For this reason, I made citizenship a control variable to refine the analysis on perceived discrimination.

In line with the eighth hypothesis, most German SSACIs found their religious and ethnic identities significantly more salient than national identity. Whereas, most French SSACIs associated relatively similar degrees of salience in the three identities, as illustrated below. However, it's worth noting that there was a statistically significant difference in the salience attached to religious and national identities, with the former surpassing the latter.[39]

Fig. 11: Distribution of Responses among SSACI Citizens
Salience of Ethnic, National, and Religious Identities
Scale: 0 (not at all) to 4 (very strongly)



[39] One interpretation of this finding is that religious identity could be salient enough to be interchangeable with nationality, similar to the previous argument with ethnicity.

Both of these support the theory that social identity disharmony is more likely to transpire among immigrants in Germany where the MIA is ancestry-dependent. This was further reinforced by the findings on perceived discrimination derived from testing Hypothesis 9. As predicted, higher perceived discrimination was correlated with lower salience of national identity and higher salience of ethnic identity among German SSACIs (see *Appendix VI*). This incompatibility between nationality and ethnicity was not observed among French SSACIs despite perceiving similarly high levels of discrimination targeted at them as their German counterparts. Rather, perceived discrimination was negatively associated with both national and ethnic identities.

Although incompatibilities were not evident among French SSACIs, they may cope with social identity 'disharmony' when discrimination is perceived by dis-identifying with both social identities. Nevertheless, these findings are in line with the prediction that incompatibility between ethnicity and nationality, specifically, would be observed in the German SSACIs when discrimination is perceived. On that note, the results are also in line with the tenth hypothesis which predicts that German SSACIs are more likely to have positively correlated religious and ethnic identities to cope with this incompatibility. Whereas, the French SSACIs, as predicted, did not exhibit these links and are less likely to experience such incompatibilities. Note that there was a weak negative correlation between religious and ethnic identities among French SSACIs, but the correlation was only significant among German SSACIs (see *Appendix VI*).

Conclusion

In summary, the four key findings from this analysis are consistent with previous studies and predictions derived from the RIM and MIA, demonstrating the reliability of 'buffer' theories of religion in the European context of immigration.[40]

Upon comparing the SSACIs and native groups, immigrants were indeed more inclined to identify strongly with Christianity than their native-born counterparts in both Germany and France. This is in line with previous findings suggesting that religion is more salient for immigrants than native-born populations in Europe.

Comparing the SSACI groups with citizenship in their receiving country and those without, the latter were indeed more likely to experience identity conflict than the former.

[40] Note that these results could only test the *reliability* of these models, not their *validity*.

However, SSACI non-citizens in the two countries exhibited possibly different coping mechanisms to this identity conflict. In Germany, non-citizens may cope by identifying less with their ethnic identity, as evidenced by their weaker identification with ethnicity than SSACI citizens. Whereas, in France, non-citizens may cope by identifying more strongly with their Christian identity than SSACI citizens. Further qualitative studies are necessary to uncover the context-specific factors behind these trends.

On the individual level, non-citizens in both countries were found to identify strongly with their religious and ethnic identities, and significantly weaker with national identity. This further supports the theory that religious identity could be a replacement for those immigrants who feel disconnected from the national identity of their receiving country. These preliminary results suggest that religious and ethnic identity could be interchangeable for non-citizen immigrants, as buffer theory suggests.

Lastly, higher perceived discrimination was indeed linked to more identity conflict among SSACI citizens in Germany, where the MIA is ancestry-based. Interestingly, German SSACI citizens who perceived high levels of discrimination identified more with their Christian identity and less with their ethnic identity, which provides further support for the salience of religion among immigrants in coping with identity conflict even if citizenship was attained. Whereas, in France, where the MIA is values-based, most immigrants did not show the same signs of identity conflict even in the presence of discrimination.

These group- and individual-level comparisons suggest that Christianity, as a social identity, could be a buffer for immigrants in Europe who experience identity conflict. However, the qualitative analyses of these survey results were limited by the lack of interview data from the SSACI focus groups in Germany and France. Also, as explained earlier, the social identity approach is focused on the correlations among religion, nationality, and ethnicity. Hence, conclusive findings on immigrant religiosity pertaining to actual religious practices and behaviours were not within the scope of this study. For a broader and deeper understanding of these trends, further longitudinal and ethnographic research are recommended on the Sub-Saharan African immigrant experiences in Europe. Longitudinal studies are needed to fully understand the role religion plays in immigrant assimilation and the potential differences between first-generation immigrants and native-born second-generation immigrants. Whereas, in-depth analyses of this case study could reveal the distinctions in the SSACI experience across

Christian denominations, ethnic or migrant communities, and national contexts. The cross-sectional findings from this study could be used as a baseline for exploring the identity conflict experienced by SSACIs or as a basis of comparison for other ethnic minority immigrant groups across Europe.

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Appendix I

Table 1. List of survey items used to measure salience of social identity

Social Identity	**EU-MIDIS II** SSA Christian Immigrants		**EVS** Native-born Christians
	Citizens Germany: N = 197 France: N = 224	**Non-Citizens** Germany: N = 160 France: N = 202	Germany: N = 1060 France: N = 652
Nationality	**RA02_2:** On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 equals "not at all" and 5 "very strongly", to what extent do you feel [RECEIVING COUNTRY NATIONAL]?		**G257:** On a scale from 1 to 4, where 1 equals "very close" and 4 "not close at all", how close do you feel to your country?
Ethnicity	**RA02_3** or **RA02_4** or **RA02_5:** On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 equals "not at all" and 5 "very strongly", to what extent do you feel [RECEIVING NATIONAL OF BIRTH]?		**N/A**
Religion	**PB03:** To what extent do you feel Christian on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 equals "Not at all" and 5 "Very strongly"?		**A006:** How important is religion in your life on a scale of 1 to 4, where 1 equals "very important" and 4 "not at all important"?

Table 2. List of survey items used to measure perceptions of discrimination

Perceptions of Discrimination	**EU-MIDIS II** SSA Christian Immigrants	
	Citizens Germany: N = 197 France: N = 224	**Non-Citizens** Germany: N = 160 France: N = 202
	For each of the following types of discrimination, could you please tell me whether, in your opinion, it is very rare, fairly rare, fairly widespread, or very widespread in [RECEVEING COUNTRY]?	
Skin color	**RA03_1:** Discrimination on the basis of skin color	

Ethnicity/Immigrant Status	**RA03_2:** Discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or immigrant background

Table 3. List of survey items used for control and categorical variables

Variables	**EU-MIDIS II** SSA Christian Immigrants	**EVS** Native-born Christians
Native/Generation of immigrant	**Generation:** 1 = First Generation	**G027A:** 1 - I am born in this country
Target ethnic minority migrant group	**IN02:** Category 8 - Sub-Saharans and people of African descent	**N/A**
Citizenship(s) possessed	**HH07:** Citizenship in receiving country	**N/A**
Religious denomination	**PB01:** 1 - Christian	**F025:** 1 - Roman Catholic, 2 - Protestant, 3 - Orthodox, 8 - Other Christian
Receiving country/country of survey	**country:** 10 - France, 11 - Germany	**cntrycow**: 20 - France, 255 - Germany

Appendix II

Table 4. Statistical methods used to test each hypothesis

No.	Hypothesis	Statistical Tests
1	In both Germany and France, immigrants associate with their religious identity significantly stronger than the natives.	**Type 1** **C:** One-way ANOVA, Independent T-Test **O:** Mann-Whitney Test
2	a. In Germany, immigrants associate with their national identity significantly weaker than the natives. b. In France, immigrants associate with their national identity equally as the natives.	**Type 1** **C:** One-way ANOVA, Independent T-Test **O:** Mann-Whitney Test
3	a. In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants have negatively correlated ethnic and national identities. b. In both Germany and France, immigrants who are citizens of the receiving country have either unrelated or positively correlated ethnic and national identities.	**Type 3** **I:** Pearson correlation **O:** Spearman's correlation
4	In both France and Germany, non-citizen immigrants associate with their ethnic identity significantly stronger than the citizen immigrants.	**Type 1** **C:** One-way ANOVA, Independent T-Test **O:** Mann-Whitney Test
5	In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants associate with their religious identity significantly stronger than the citizen immigrants.	**Type 1** **C:** One-way ANOVA, Independent T-Test **O:** Mann-Whitney Test
6	In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants associate with their religious identity equally as or stronger than their ethnic identity.	**Type 2** **O:** Wilcoxon Test
7	In both Germany and France, non-citizen immigrants associate with their religious and ethnic identities significantly stronger than their national identities.	**Type 2** **O:** Wilcoxon Test

8	a. German citizen immigrants associate with their religious and ethnic identities significantly stronger than their national identities. b. French citizen immigrants, there are no significant differences in their associations with their religious, ethnic, and national identities.	**Type 2** **O:** Wilcoxon Test
9	a. German citizen immigrants associate perceived discrimination with (1) decreased salience of national identity and (2) increased salience of ethnic identity. b. French citizen immigrants do not associate perceived discrimination with national and ethnic identities.	**Type 3** **I:** Pearson correlation **O:** Spearman's correlation
10	a. German citizen immigrants positively associate religious and ethnic identities. b. French citizen immigrants do not associate religious and ethnic identities.	**Type 3** **I:** Pearson correlation **O:** Spearman's correlation

Appendix III

Adjusting Formulas

To standardise the Likert scales used in the study, the following formulas were used to adjust the survey items (see Table 1 under *Appendix I*) from the EU-MIDIS II (PB03, RA02_2, RA02_3/4/5, RA03_1) and the EVS (A006 and G257):

- Adjusted_PB03 = (PB03 - 1)/4 * 4
- Adjusted_RA02_2 = (RA02_2 - 1)/4 * 4
- Adjusted_RA02_345 = (Max_A02_345 - 1)/4 * 4, where Max_RA02_345 is the non-empty variable among RA02_3 or RA02_4 or RA02_5
- Adjusted_RA03_1 = 0 if: RA03_1 = 5, Adjusted_RA03_1= RA03_1, if RA03_1= 1 or 2 or 3 or 4
- Adjusted_A006 = ((5 - A006) - 1)/3 * 4
- Adjusted_G257 = ((5 - G257) - 1)/3 * 4

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 1

France: Parametric (One-Way ANOVA)

ANOVA

Religious_Identity

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	236.272	1	236.272	180.496	.000
Within Groups	1411.117	1078	1.309		
Total	1647.389	1079			

France: Parametric (Independent T-Test)

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Religious_Identity	Equal variances assumed	20.713	.000	13.435	1078	.000	.95549	.07112	.81594	1.09504
	Equal variances not assumed			13.955	1025.117	.000	.95549	.06847	.82113	1.08985

France: Nonparametric (Mann-Whitney Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	Religious_Identity
Mann-Whitney U	74432.000
Wilcoxon W	286007.000
Z	-13.420
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000

a. Grouping Variable: SSAFR_or_Native

Germany: Parametric (One-Way ANOVA)

ANOVA

Religious_Identity

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	379.027	1	379.027	287.464	.000
Within Groups	1865.708	1415	1.319		
Total	2244.735	1416			

Germany: Parametric (Independent T-Test)

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Religious_Identity	Equal variances assumed	36.788	.000	16.955	1415	.000	1.19133	.07027	1.05350	1.32917
	Equal variances not assumed			18.551	727.818	.000	1.19133	.06422	1.06525	1.31741

Germany: Nonparametric (Mann-Whitney Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	Religious_Identity
Mann-Whitney U	80330.000
Wilcoxon W	642660.000
Z	-16.754
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000

a. Grouping Variable: SSAFR_or_Native

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 2

France: Parametric (One-Way ANOVA)

ANOVA

National_Identity

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	6.150	1	6.150	9.234	.002
Within Groups	582.105	874	.666		
Total	588.255	875			

France: Parametric (Independent T-Test)

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
National_Identity	Equal variances assumed	18.648	.000	-3.039	874	.002	-.19206	.06320	-.31612	-.06801
	Equal variances not assumed			-2.720	325.145	.007	-.19206	.07060	-.33096	-.05317

France: Nonparametric (Mann-Whitney Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	National_Identity
Mann-Whitney U	68028.000
Wilcoxon W	93228.000
Z	-1.785
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.074

a. Grouping Variable: SSAFR_or_Native

Germany: Parametric (One-Way ANOVA)

ANOVA

National_Identity

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	27.413	1	27.413	40.332	.000
Within Groups	854.355	1257	.680		
Total	881.768	1258			

Germany: Parametric (Independent T-Test)

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
National_Identity	Equal variances assumed	.024	.877	-6.351	1257	.000	-.40700	.06409	-.53273	-.28127
	Equal variances not assumed			-5.762	252.035	.000	-.40700	.07064	-.54611	-.26789

Germany: Nonparametric (Mann-Whitney Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	National_Identity
Mann-Whitney U	86636.000
Wilcoxon W	105942.000
Z	-4.070
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000

a. Grouping Variable: SSAFR_or_Native

Appendix IV

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 3a

France: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		Ethnic Identity	National Identity
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	-.186**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.008
	N	202	201
National Identity	Pearson Correlation	-.186**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.008	
	N	201	201

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

			Ethnic Identity	National Identity
Spearman's rho	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.181**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.010
		N	202	201
	National Identity	Correlation Coefficient	-.181**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.010	.
		N	201	201

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Germany: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		Ethnic Identity	National Identity
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	-.104
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.191
	N	159	159
National Identity	Pearson Correlation	-.104	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.191	
	N	159	159

Correlations

			Ethnic Identity	National Identity
Spearman's rho	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.130
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.103
		N	159	159
	National Identity	Correlation Coefficient	-.130	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.103	.
		N	159	159

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 3b

France: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		National Identity	Ethnic Identity
National Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	.087
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.193
	N	224	223
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	.087	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.193	
	N	223	223

Correlations

			National Identity	Ethnic Identity
Spearman's rho	National Identity	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.115
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.085
		N	224	223
	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	.115	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.085	.
		N	223	223

Germany: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		Ethnic Identity	National Identity
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	.001
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.988
	N	195	195
National Identity	Pearson Correlation	.001	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.988	
	N	195	196

Correlations

			Ethnic Identity	National Identity
Spearman's rho	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.031
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.671
		N	195	195
	National Identity	Correlation Coefficient	.031	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.671	.
		N	195	196

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 4

France: Parametric (One-way ANOVA)

ANOVA

Ethnic Identity

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	1.783	2	.892	.697	.499
Within Groups	546.087	427	1.279		
Total	547.870	429			

France: Parametric (Independent T-Test)

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Ethnic Identity	Equal variances assumed	.057	.811	-.945	423	.345	-.10420	.11024	-.32090	.11249
	Equal variances not assumed			-.945	419.100	.345	-.10420	.11023	-.32087	.11246

France: Nonparametric (Mann-Whitney Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	Ethnic Identity
Mann-Whitney U	21038.000
Wilcoxon W	46014.000
Z	-1.345
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.179

a. Grouping Variable: Has citizenship of survey country (derived variable)

Germany: Parametric (One-way ANOVA)

ANOVA

Ethnic Identity

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	34.379	1	34.379	27.551	.000
Within Groups	439.229	352	1.248		
Total	473.607	353			

Germany: Parametric (Independent T-Test)

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Ethnic Identity	Equal variances assumed	11.876	.001	-5.249	352	.000	-.62651	.11936	-.86126	-.39176
	Equal variances not assumed			-5.341	351.627	.000	-.62651	.11730	-.85722	-.39581

Germany: Nonparametric (Mann-Whitney Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	Ethnic Identity
Mann-Whitney U	10860.000
Wilcoxon W	29970.000
Z	-5.045
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000

a. Grouping Variable: Has citizenship of survey country (derived variable)

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 5

France: Parametric (One-way ANOVA)

ANOVA

Religious Identity

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	13.004	2	6.502	6.497	.002
Within Groups	427.312	427	1.001		
Total	440.316	429			

France: Parametric (Independent T-Test)

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Religious Identity	Equal variances assumed	4.267	.039	-3.473	424	.001	-.33800	.09732	-.52930	-.14671
	Equal variances not assumed			-3.493	423.959	.001	-.33800	.09675	-.52818	-.14782

France: Nonparametric (Mann-Whitney Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	Religious Identity
Mann-Whitney U	18404.500
Wilcoxon W	43604.500
Z	-3.672
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000

a. Grouping Variable: Has citizenship of survey country (derived variable)

Germany: Parametric (One-way ANOVA)

ANOVA

Religious Identity

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	.114	1	.114	.115	.734
Within Groups	352.765	355	.994		
Total	352.880	356			

Germany: Parametric (Independent T-Test)

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means						
									95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Religious Identity	Equal variances assumed	.605	.437	-.339	355	.734	-.03601	.10609	-.24465	.17263
	Equal variances not assumed			-.341	346.231	.733	-.03601	.10554	-.24359	.17157

Germany: Nonparametric (Mann-Whitney Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	Religious Identity
Mann-Whitney U	15605.000
Wilcoxon W	35108.000
Z	-.174
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.862

a. Grouping Variable: Has citizenship of survey country (derived variable)

Appendix V

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 6

France: Nonparametric (Wilcoxon Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	Ethnic Identity – Religious Identity
Z	-.852[b]
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.394

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks.

Germany: Nonparametric (Wilcoxon Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	Ethnic Identity – Religious Identity
Z	-1.291[b]
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.197

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks.

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 7

France: Nonparametric (Wilcoxon Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	National Identity – Religious Identity	Ethnic Identity – National Identity
Z	-7.166[b]	-5.614[c]
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks.

c. Based on negative ranks.

Germany: Nonparametric (Wilcoxon Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	National Identity – Religious Identity	National Identity – Ethnic Identity
Z	-8.648[b]	-7.753[b]
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks.

Correlation Tests between Religious and National identities (SSACI non-citizens)

France: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		Ethnic Identity	National Identity	Religious Identity
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	-.186**	-.018
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.008	.804
	N	202	201	202
National Identity	Pearson Correlation	-.186**	1	.147*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.008		.037
	N	201	201	201
Religious Identity	Pearson Correlation	-.018	.147*	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.804	.037	
	N	202	201	202

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

			Ethnic Identity	National Identity	Religious Identity
Spearman's rho	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.181**	-.026
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.010	.711
		N	202	201	202
	National Identity	Correlation Coefficient	-.181**	1.000	.170*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.010	.	.016
		N	201	201	201
	Religious Identity	Correlation Coefficient	-.026	.170*	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.711	.016	.
		N	202	201	202

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Germany: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		Ethnic Identity	National Identity	Religious Identity
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	-.104	.026
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.191	.746
	N	159	159	159
National Identity	Pearson Correlation	-.104	1	.110
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.191		.166
	N	159	159	159
Religious Identity	Pearson Correlation	.026	.110	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.746	.166	
	N	159	159	160

Correlations

			Ethnic Identity	National Identity	Religious Identity
Spearman's rho	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.130	.086
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.103	.282
		N	159	159	159
	National Identity	Correlation Coefficient	-.130	1.000	.161*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.103	.	.043
		N	159	159	159
	Religious Identity	Correlation Coefficient	.086	.161*	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.282	.043	.
		N	159	159	160

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Appendix VI

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 8

France: Nonparametric (Wilcoxon Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	National Identity – Religious Identity	Ethnic Identity – Religious Identity	Ethnic Identity – National Identity
Z	-2.754[b]	-1.537[b]	-1.083[c]
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.006	.124	.279

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on negative ranks.

c. Based on positive ranks.

Germany: Nonparametric (Wilcoxon Test)

Test Statistics[a]

	National Identity – Religious Identity	Ethnic Identity – Religious Identity	Ethnic Identity – National Identity
Z	-3.814[b]	-6.579[b]	-3.585[b]
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test

b. Based on positive ranks.

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 9

France: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		Discrimination against Skin Colour	Ethnic Identity	National Identity
Discrimination against Skin Colour	Pearson Correlation	1	-.122	-.159*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.070	.017
	N	224	223	224
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	-.122	1	.087
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.070		.193
	N	223	223	223
National Identity	Pearson Correlation	-.159*	.087	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.017	.193	
	N	224	223	224

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

			Discrimination against Skin Colour	Ethnic Identity	National Identity
Spearman's rho	Discrimination against Skin Colour	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.104	-.161*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.122	.016
		N	224	223	224
	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	-.104	1.000	.115
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.122	.	.085
		N	223	223	223
	National Identity	Correlation Coefficient	-.161*	.115	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.016	.085	.
		N	224	223	224

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Germany: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		Discrimination against Skin Colour	National Identity	Ethnic Identity
Discrimination against Skin Colour	Pearson Correlation	1	-.260**	.166*
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.020
	N	197	196	195
National Identity	Pearson Correlation	-.260**	1	.001
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.988
	N	196	196	195
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	.166*	.001	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.020	.988	
	N	195	195	195

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

			Discrimination against Skin Colour	National Identity	Ethnic Identity
Spearman's rho	Discrimination against Skin Colour	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.258**	.154*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000	.031
		N	197	196	195
	National Identity	Correlation Coefficient	-.258**	1.000	.031
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.	.671
		N	196	196	195
	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	.154*	.031	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.031	.671	.
		N	195	195	195

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

SPSS statistical tables for Hypothesis 10

France: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		Ethnic Identity	Religious Identity
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	.126
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.059
	N	223	223
Religious Identity	Pearson Correlation	.126	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.059	
	N	223	224

Correlations

			Ethnic Identity	Religious Identity
Spearman's rho	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.113
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.093
		N	223	223
	Religious Identity	Correlation Coefficient	.113	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.093	.
		N	223	224

Germany: Parametric (Pearson) and Non-parametric (Spearman's)

Correlations

		Ethnic Identity	Religious Identity
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	.288**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	195	195
Religious Identity	Pearson Correlation	.288**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	195	197

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

			Ethnic Identity	Religious Identity
Spearman's rho	Ethnic Identity	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.291**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.000
		N	195	195
	Religious Identity	Correlation Coefficient	.291**	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.
		N	195	197

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).