

TOWARDS REALITY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL ATTITUDE TO REALITY IN THE THOUGHT OF KARL JASPERS

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The question that motivates this article relates to the nature and meaning of reality presupposed in the idea of the self in Karl Jaspers' thinking, which is the primordial theme on which his whole philosophical work was founded.¹ The understanding of reality, in which the subjective being lives and practices, turned out to be a philosophical problem in Jaspers' thinking, because of the decisive status given in it to a person on constituting its own identity. For Jaspers, the person is to determine the meaning and value of various aspects of the reality external to it. Hence, the idea that reality or even dimensions of it could be independent of the subjective being or could impose anything upon it, did not loom large in the initial stages of his thinking. This fact evokes questions about Jaspers' understanding of reality. These questions are primarily concerned with the scope of that reality and with the way one can come to know it.

Allegedly this problem is relevant to other philosophical systems that were anchored in the idea of the self. Yet, in my opinion Jaspers' case is interesting not only because of the transition that appeared in his writings, from his original interest in the self towards philosophizing about Being, which included an explicit account of external reality. Furthermore, the very fact that this development did not entail abandoning the original interest in the self but kept it within the realm of discussion, while integrating the insights concerning the deficiencies of the understanding into the concept of Being, makes Jaspers' case interesting. Hence, this article seeks to determine whether within Jaspers' understanding of the self an awareness of the problem of reality was achieved and whether the transition of the focus from the self to the idea of Being proposed a solution to that problem or at least attempted to do so. The purpose of this paper may be seen also as an attempt to determine the scope and meaning of Jaspers' Idealism and to evaluate the way he dealt with one of the most typical problems characteristic of such a philosophical position, i.e. the meaning of the reality external to the self.

The interpretation suggested in this article is based on a phenomenological viewpoint and will be carried out in the following way: first, Jaspers' concept of the self as it appeared in his early writings (1909-1919) will be presented. In these writings, which focused on the self from the perspective of psychiatry and psychology, external reality was hardly mentioned and actually remained implicit, though clearly not denied. The aim of this section is to discover

which element of the conception of the self here developed hindered Jaspers, or better still, left him no place to conceive of the relation of the self to external reality. Against this background I will clarify the conception of the subjective being as it stands in the forefront of his interest.

The discussion will then shift to Jaspers' understanding of the reality external to the subject, as well as to Jaspers' concept of Being. This part will relate to Jaspers' philosophical writings from 1932 to 1947, in which the reality external to the subject was denoted by a variety of terms: World (*Welt*), Existence (*Dasein*), Reality (*Wirklichkeit*), the "Encompassing" (*Umgreifende*), Being (*Sein*), and Transcendence (*Transzendenz*). The modifications that occurred in Jaspers' understanding of the self and their reflection and implementation within the concept of Being will be elucidated. To put it briefly, Jaspers' understanding of the reality external to the subject will be criticized both as a latent dimension in his early idea of the self and as an explicit theme in his philosophical writings.

The interpretation of Jaspers' philosophy as it arises from these considerations differs from more traditional ones in that these generally failed to recognize what I call 'the problem of reality' as an issue that centrally arises in his writings. Many of these do not pay any attention to the concept of Being, but focused mainly on Jaspers' philosophy of Existence (*Existenzphilosophie*).² Yet, as it will become clear later on, Jaspers' concept of Existence neither exhausts his idea of the self nor his thinking as a whole. Furthermore, the interpretation here proposed disagrees with those commentators who, though acknowledging the awareness to the external reality in Jaspers' writings, saw it as an integral part of his understanding of the self or even as subordinated to it.³ Thus I will lay claim both to the existence of a concept of reality in Jaspers' writings and to its independence of, though not severance from, his idea of the self.

The Internal Reality of the Subjective Being

Jaspers' interest in the being of the subject is apparent already from the opening of his first book *General Psychopathology*, where he posed that "in the Psychiatric practice" the interest always turns to "the human being in his singularity and totality".⁴ Although he thought that the "psychic" element contained the key for the understanding of the particular character of a specific mental illness of the concrete personality (Ap1, 12), he contended that the singularity (Einzelheit) with which the human being is imbued⁵ restricts the very possibility of making comprehensive and scientific claims about pathological psychic phenomena as such.⁶ The description of the psychic element as "foam that floats from the ocean depth" (Ap1, 14) clearly alludes to a hidden reality, deeper than that accessible to psychopathology, which is subjected to the restrictions of rational consciousness.⁷

Jaspers' approach to mental illness, or rather to mentally ill people, differs from the positivistic one, which in psychopathology characteristically focuses on the investigation of the physiological dimensions of mental diseases in order to achieve an objective understanding of them.⁸ Unlike this approach, Jaspers' required close contact with the concrete being of the patient.⁹ Establishing a contact with "what really happens in a human being's soul" was for Jaspers a fulfillment of "The general urge to reality ... in psychopathology" (ApI, 12). In other words, the idea of reality that Jaspers had in mind, or better, the one that is to be addressed by the psychiatrist, was identified with the reality of the internal psychic life. Accordingly, the relation to reality – which is external to the mentally ill person and where scientists as well as healthy people live their lives – was not considered relevant to the understanding of the ill person. Finally, though external reality was not denied, the internal psychic life appeared as the real reality towards which Jaspers' interest was directed.

After Jaspers ceased practicing psychiatry and conducting research in this field, he discussed the subjective and particular being of the normal human individual more directly and systematically from a psychological perspective.¹⁰ This discussion was at the time dominated by the perspective of 'Worldviews' (*Weltanschauungen*) – one of the central concepts of German philosophy. It refers to the sum of knowledge, norms and values that one can absorb from one's culture, as well as characterizing the human being as a universal agent. Jaspers tied this term to the subjective individual, without referring to the general cultural dimensions beyond the subjective agent, which are reflected in it. He contended that one's worldview does not generally contain knowledge (*Wissen*) about the world or even about oneself as a person, but rather different aspects of subjectivity: the experiential part of experience and the human effort to arrange those experiences via rational objectifications (PW 1). According to Jaspers, one's worldview embodies especially one's subjectivity as a total experience that determines exclusively the meaning bestowed upon different objects one considers as existing (PW 22f). Consequently, the reality external to the subject was not a theme that the concept 'worldview' was supposed to cope with, since what was important for Jaspers was reality as a creature of one's own spirit and the self-understanding that comes out of it.

The view described above, appearing in the context of psychiatry – namely that dimensions referring to the reality external to the subject were not considered as relevant to the understanding of the self – was then further developed and deepened. In the present context the subjective being was shaped by Jaspers as a totality whose personal experiences fills the whole world that exists for him/her. Moreover, the hierarchy of values and the nature of reality itself are exposed as determined according to meaning bestowed by the person upon these very experiences.

Furthermore, one can identify in both contexts an inclination to grant the subjective being a solipsistic character. To be precise, the solipsistic inclination was not crystallized as radical solipsism, as in Berkeley's thought or in the methodical solipsism of Descartes. Jaspers did not see the contents of consciousness as the only embodiment of reality or as the exclusive source for certainty. In other words, Jaspers' solipsistic inclination was not based on the metaphysical foundation characteristic of the extreme solipsistic position, which deprives the external world of reality. In positive terms, Jaspers' solipsism appeared more as a kind of 'Egotism' or indicated the existence of an emotional quality of the self which cannot be manifested to other people and relates to no data of external reality. Hence Jaspers' position can be termed as solipsism, more because of its implications than its ontological or epistemological infrastructure.

One can say that Jaspers' observation of the idea of worldview as a general phenomenon extended to the particular and subjective meanings that one can achieve while seeking self-understanding (PW, 4, 15f). Heidegger, for instance, understood Jaspers' psychological observation as not limited to the experience of the subject but as related to the phenomenon of existence.¹² Yet this discussion remained in the margins of his writings from the first period. As to Heidegger's interpretation, it seems to reflect first and foremost his own interest in Being, which he explored later on in *Being and Time*. I contend then that in this context Jaspers simply revealed no interest in the existence of an external world.

Therefore, Jaspers' solipsism was mainly a result of his primordial interest in the subjective being, as well as evidence of the very fact that he lacked the means to explore an inclusive concept of selfhood, not limited to the subjective and particular dimensions of one's personality. It is possible to explain Jaspers' focus on subjectivity, in these writings from the first period, by the very fact that psychic pathology can be manifested in falsification of reality, as well as through the idea that psychological analysis does not necessarily require reference to external reality. In any case, it is clear that the subjective being engaged Jaspers' interest at that time in a way that left no room for exploring an attitude towards the external reality in which this being is anchored.

Nevertheless, the understanding of Jaspers' early concept of the subjective being is crucial and indispensable for considering the change that enabled him to confront the problem of reality in his philosophical writings. In my opinion, it is especially the awareness of the problematic nature of the solipsistic tendency that characterized his early idea of the self, which functioned as a transcendental condition for Jaspers' philosophical attitude towards external reality. As will become clear below, Jaspers began to realize that the solipsistic concept of the self was inadequate or restrictive for an understanding of the

subjective being, and hence should be abandoned. This insight that was to be fulfilled in Jaspers' idea of Existence, at the same time enabled him to consolidate an explicit concept of reality. This development was closely linked to the increasing distance from his early solipsistic inclination, so that every stage of this exploration was at the same time a stage in the process of overcoming that inclination itself.

The Reality in which Existence takes Place

What for Heidegger was an *a priori* basis for the explication of the human being (*Dasein*), i.e. being-in-the-world, which made the elucidation of the world's reality an integral part of human existence, was for Jaspers the consequence of quite a long way which he had already taken in realizing his original interest in subjective being.¹³ In other words, Jaspers' thinking started from an earlier or rather more radical point than Heidegger's, and hence it included the disillusionment with the introspective approach where psychological and extreme kinds of idealistic ways of thinking meet. Yet, it is important to point out that Jaspers' radicalism in this context is limited, or that his solipsism was relatively easy to overcome, precisely because this solipsism was not supported by the Cartesian idea, according to which the existing self is bound to its thinking or cogitations. In other words, there were no positive beliefs or presuppositions to abandon, but a growing awareness of the need to enlarge the perspective of self-awareness, which itself paved the way for dealing with the problem of reality.

Jaspers' first acknowledgment of the relevance of the reality external to the understanding of the self marks the beginning of the philosophical period in his writings. By contending that "philosophizing starts with our situation",¹⁴ Jaspers posed the concrete reality, in which people live and practice, as the framework within which philosophical discourse is to be conducted. Hence philosophizing about the self cannot be exhausted by one's personal and subjective representations, but indispensably needs to include within itself an explicit concept of external reality. This meaningful change was accompanied by a more systematic style of expression, as well as a new terminology that substituted the early terms 'psychic', 'self' and 'subjectivity' with the term 'existence', which was characterized by a clear philosophical connotation.

This new viewpoint of the subjective being as existing in a concrete reality, contained the potential undermining of his early solipsistic stance.¹⁵ Henceforth, Jaspers presented the philosophical elucidation of existence as an integral part of the exploration of the 'philosophical world orientation'. This means that the explication of the reality external to the subject became crucial for the establishment of a philosophical concept of the self. Moreover, treating the subjective being as existing in a concrete reality opened new horizons for Jaspers' thinking, which enabled him later to develop a comprehensive

conception of the reality that exists independently beyond the subject – including the notions of immanence and transcendence. So, in the second period of Jaspers' writings, a fundamental infrastructure for the explicit handling of the problem of reality was established.

Nonetheless, these modifications in Jaspers' thought were not sufficient to detach the dependence of the problem of reality from the context of the elucidation of existence. In his words: "Being will not be elucidated via analysis of existence (*Daseinsanalyse*) but by elucidation of Existence (*Existenzhellung*)" (PhI, 12). That is to say, the boundaries of the discussed reality were determined at the present stage according to their relevance to the understanding of Existence. This limited reality recognized by Existence as its own, Jaspers called 'situation-being' (*Situationsein*). This original term expressed the freedom of Existence, i.e., the possibilities engrained in the environment through which one can achieve self-fulfillment, as well as the existence of limitations stemming from reality's factuality, such that cannot be changed by a person but is indiscriminately imposed on him/her.¹⁶ Finally, the term of 'Situation-being' was the one around which the understanding of Existence was consolidated as a worldly being.

Considering the background of Jaspers' early solipsistic inclination, it is clear that the unique term of 'Situation-being' was very helpful in integrating the new element of concrete reality into his concept of the subjective being. While the general term 'world' (*Welt*) could have demanded a more comprehensive account, not necessarily tied to what could serve the needs of Existence to understand itself, the term 'Situation-being' remained close to the understanding of Existence as a being that establishes itself out of freedom. That is to say that even after Existence was understood as anchored in the concrete reality of the world, Jaspers did not abandon his original wish to put it in the center of his interests, and the reduction of the term 'world' to 'Situation-being' was designated specifically to facilitate that very centrality. This interpretation of the term 'Situation-being' reveals, then, the inner dynamics of, or the transcendental conditions for, his elucidation of the problem of reality: it could not threaten the centrality bestowed upon the original interest in the subject being, but had rather to be understood as crucial to that very interest itself. However, in the light of these considerations a profound truth about the nature of our experience of the world is revealed: a person by no means experiences the entirety of the world, but only some of its dimensions in which it is directly involved. This point is uniquely crystallized in what Jaspers termed 'Situation-being'.

Undoubtedly, the understanding of Existence as a worldly being opened for Jaspers new horizons that drew his thinking nearer to the idea of an external reality. Yet, it seems that the restriction of the idea of reality to the sphere of 'Situation-being' could not be sufficient for his growing interest in an idea of

reality, or better, to the acknowledgement of the need of such a reality as independent of Existence's self-understanding. Henceforth, the general terms of 'world' and 'world's reality' were integrated and the requirement arose to achieve an understanding of the "world's thinking", supposed to provide a broader and more general understanding of reality compared to that in which Existence takes place. Hence, though the idea of 'situation-being' was recognized as "the starting point and the aim (*Ziel*)", because nothing else is real and present" (Ph1, 69), it transpired to Jaspers that

the situation itself becomes clear to me only when I think with reference to the objective being of the world – a being that, time and again, I must conceive as existing only to world it [*laßfallen*]. I can neither grasp my situation without proceeding to conceive the world, nor grasp the world without a constant return to my situation, the only resting ground for the reality of my thoughts. Inescapably, the situation is my mode of real existence (*Dasein*) ... [however] this mobility is not absolute. There remains a tie [*Bindung*] to [my] finite existence and to [my] past habit and usage. (Ph1, 69)

These words reveal the complexity that underlies the awareness of the restrictiveness of the human beings' experience of 'situation': although this awareness is perceived as helping Existence to specify more clearly the expanse in which it finds its existence (*Dasein*), a person nonetheless cannot silence the urge to contemplate reality as independent from his or her own being and thinking. This is the point where the philosophical insight, according to which only a general and objective comprehension of the 'world', can grant Existence a better understanding of the reality in which it takes part, matured. In other words, the consolidation of an independent "world's thinking" transpired as no less essential than the elucidation of 'Situation-being' for Existence's self-awareness.

Accordingly, Jaspers derived two 'world' concepts from this insight: the 'world' as the 'other', accessible for investigation, which is revealed as a single thing and universally applicable, and the 'world' as "existence that finds itself as ... non-I (*Nichtich*)" (Ph1, 63). While the first can be characterized as general and separated from the self, the elucidation of the second is actually integral to the constituting of a comprehensive and philosophical concept of selfhood. However, Jaspers contended that these two realities are "linked to each other within a mutual movement" (Ph1, 63). One cannot avoid the impression that although Jaspers acknowledged the value of an understanding of reality as independent of the subjective being, his more dominant commitment to the subjective viewpoint nevertheless tied his understanding of this concept strongly to Existence's self-explication needs.¹⁷ This interpretation of the dialectic, accompanying Jaspers' growing interest in external reality, can find supplementary support in the concern he expressed that "the urge to have an understanding of existence" would turn "destructive". That would lead to a dangerous immersion, if not to a wallowing in the world in a way that would detract from the uniqueness and particularity of Existence (Ph2, 3). Although

Jaspers previously considered that urge as an inseparable part of one's self-recognition as a worldly being, he introduced Existence as a being that was required by its own self to be distinguished from the world" (Ph2, 3). Finally, Jaspers' concept of reality, consolidated within his philosophy of Existence, is revealed as functional by its very nature, i.e., it was mainly meant to facilitate a better and more complete understanding of the being by which Existence is surrounded and which is meaningful to it.

The apparent return to former insights that were characteristic of Jaspers' pre-philosophical writings, or at least the maintaining ties of the idea of Existence to them, can explain the fact that many of Jaspers' commentators hardly discerned his progress towards attaining an understanding of external reality. Nevertheless, in my opinion, by the very expression of that concern, Jaspers did not retract his understanding of Existence as a worldly being, but revealed his difficulty in overcoming his early solipsistic inclination that characterized his initial concept of subjective being. My contention is that what shaped Jaspers' attitude towards external reality was his innermost anxiety that acknowledging the worldly character of Existence in the reality of the world would influence also the understanding of Existence. If that happens, Existence, like other things in the world, would be conceived via the objective tools of consciousness. These are accessible to the objective dimensions of the world, but nonetheless incapable of representing Existence's unique fullness. This analysis of Jaspers' hidden consideration can be strengthened by his later assertion in the text, according to which "possible Existence separates itself from the world in order that it *afferswärts* genuinely enters into the world" (Ph2, 4). By this contention, Jaspers managed to secure the uniqueness of Existence as a worldly being, so that it would be considered as existent in the world and yet be tested and characterized according to criteria derived from its authentic self-understanding.

Only at this point can we understand the relevance of the world, or better, the value of the disposition towards the world as external reality to the self-determination of Existence: the world acknowledged by Existence as an arena of possibilities through which it can achieve its self-fulfillment. In a way, the world exists for it only as a stockpile of possibilities for self-fulfillment. Nonetheless, Existence itself is not identified by any of these possibilities (Ph2, 32). This specific perspective of the world as perceived by Existence prevents us from regarding the possibility it chooses as derived from a logical or objective understanding of the world's reality. It is only Existence that can see a certain possibility as its own, and hence the whole meaning bestowed upon the reality of the world is necessarily subjective by its very nature. It transpires, then, that Existence shifts between two languages: the existential, which is necessarily subjective and subjected to Existence's needs for self-fulfillment and self-understanding, and the objective, attributed to the external

reality of the world. Not only does Existence use these two languages, but it is the instance which marks both the connection point and the dividing point between them.

Against this background we can discover the complexity that characterized Jaspers' attitude to external reality, which can also be regarded as the relation towards the immanent dimension of the being of Existence. On the one hand, he conceived of the being of Existence as the result of an experience of self-constitution, but, at the same time, Existence was understood as a being that finds itself already in the world as external to itself. Existential freedom is located exactly between these two poles; although forced by conditions indifferent to its wishes and needs, Existence has the ability consciously to transcend concrete situations (*Situationen*) and to avoid identification with anything external to it. Thus Existence incessantly seeks after new possibilities in a world which appears to it as concealing possibilities for a more complete self-fulfilment. True, Existence may abandon a concrete option, in favour of a speculative possibility that at a certain point seems better than the one formerly chosen. While this does not mean that Existence is motivated by caprice or irrational mood, it expresses the dynamic of the way it experiences life and world. Constant movement between actuality and possibility is therefore characteristic of Existence as long as it strives to live as Existence (Ph2, 21).

This dynamic, where Existence knows itself as part of the world external to it, while at the same time separated from it, reflects the dialectic that accompanies Jaspers' concept of reality as developed within his philosophy of Existence. This dialectic is not only clear evidence for the continued presence of residual traces from the early solipsistic understanding of subjective being, but also reveals the struggle for priority or even exclusiveness between two representatives of reality in Jaspers' thinking at this stage: while the *internal* dimension is intended to serve as part of the comprehensive and more complete self-awareness of Existence, the *external* dimension is supposed to be independent of Existence's self-understanding. Though the first bears decisive weight in the context in which Existence is elucidated and the second only comes up without being fully discussed, they nonetheless are in conflict. In my opinion the conflict involved in this duality stems from the irreversibly achieved insight, according to which, despite its uniqueness, Existence is located in the same world towards which objective consciousness (*Bezugsein* *liberthaup*) is directed. Hence, overcoming this dialectic, i.e. loosening the polarity between the idea of the self and that of reality as external to it, only became possible after the subjective dimension ceased to be at the core of Jaspers' philosophical thought. This could occur only with his thought directing itself towards a new independent target: namely to establish a philosophical concept of Being (*Sein*).

Reality as Being

Posing the classic philosophical question "what is Being?" at the beginning of his first book of philosophy (Ph1, 1), clearly indicated Jaspers' intention to widen the scope of his discussion.¹⁸ The term Being (*Sein*), which gradually became pivotal in Jaspers' discussion and took the place formerly granted to Existence turned out to be broader and more comprehensive than 'World', which remained to a large extent tied to the elucidation of Existence's subjective point of view.¹⁹ The extension of the range of reality to which philosophizing was directed was referred to as the 'encompassing' (*das Umgreifende*). Jaspers' unique term for the idea of Being, The 'Encompassing' includes immanent components as well as transcendent ones. The latter are inaccessible by their very nature, both to the objective viewpoint of consciousness, and, in their completeness, also to Existence. Nonetheless, Jaspers made a considerable effort to maintain the link to his concept of Existence, which reflected at the present stage of its explication not only its understanding as a worldly being, but also as one that constituted a relationship with the surrounding world. Accordingly, Jaspers contended that 'Being' as a subject for philosophical explication is an inseparable part of the subjective being that seeks it, to such an extent that searching for 'Being' is identified with the very existence of Existence, while abstention from the search is analogous to its cessation.²⁰ These words ended the aforementioned dialectic that characterized the idea of Existence, and so a new context of discussion was established in Jaspers' philosophical writings.

It was especially the distancing from the solipsistic inclination that functioned as a precondition for this far-reaching change in Jaspers' philosophizing. It is clear that only a self-conscious subject is a being who can shift the focus of his or her thinking away from his or her own personality, yet without thereby becoming detached from it, and who is able to open his or her view towards what exists beyond himself or herself. Though the distancing from the solipsistic inclination started already within the establishment of a philosophical concept of the self, i.e. with Existence, it was first in this new context, aiming at an explication of Being, that distancing became a much more conscious process. To be more precise, distancing now occurs concurrently with the consolidation of the awareness of the restrictions imposed upon the philosophical horizons by the very concept of Existence as a particular and individual being. Anyway, this change aided Jaspers in breaking more significantly with the framework of assumptions that had characterized his former conception of Existence.

Jaspers' contention, according to which 'Being', as an 'origin' and 'purpose' of one's life,²¹ is prior to one's thoughts, rejects them and subordinates them to itself (E 59f), prominently reflects the rejection of the solipsistic view of the self. Consequently, the required reality is anti-

Cartesian by its very nature, i.e. it does not exist only within the boundaries of what can be analyzed by objective thinking, nor of what exists merely subjectively. Furthermore, Jaspers himself tells us that this reality is present within its absence, for those who desire a reality that they do not recognize and which is not their own (E 56). Along the same lines, he depicted Existence as "establishing its own life not just out of self-willing or of mere discipline, but because it faces Being in its completeness", an Existence therefore that is beyond itself (VdW 221). Therefore, even though the very seeking of Being is necessarily attributed to one's Existence, one can no longer see oneself as located at the centre of Being itself. From this point of view, the reality sought by Existence – both as external to it and as independent of it – reflects at the same time the maturity of the mode of its being, i.e., a self-consciousness unoccupied by itself, while open towards a Being beyond itself.

One can point to two results of the shift from philosophizing upon the self to philosophizing upon Being: *from the point of view of the content*, this development was reflected in the new image of Existence. From this moment on, Existence was not conceived as isolated, or as a center of attraction that determines the scope of discussion or the meaning bestowed upon other components in the framework of philosophizing. *From the structural point of view*, Jaspers' argument was no longer directed at a sole object, but was anchored in multiple components as reflected in the concept of the 'Encompassing', each grasped as a mode (*Weise*) of Being. Jaspers used the following table to expose his concept of the 'Encompassing' (VdW, 50).

	The Encompassing that we are ourselves	The Encompassing that is Being itself
Immanent	Existence (<i>Dasein</i>) General Consciousness Spirit	World
Transcendent	Existence	Transcendence

This table includes components (*Weisen*) that I cannot discuss in this paper. However, at first glance, we can see that some of them appeared already in Jaspers' earlier writings, which focused on elucidating Existence. These components have taken on a different meaning due to the transformation that has occurred in their use, according to which they have been understood as an expression of a comprehensive Being, as that of Existence.²² For example, in addition to its usual meaning as the sphere for Existence's experience, 'Existence' (*Dasein*) is now presented as an expression for the direct presence of Being itself (VdW, 53). Consequently, the term 'Existence' serves as a

starting point for a discussion of a kind of reality that transcends the borders of the world's phenomena and immanence as a whole.

A similar orientation can be seen in the redefinition of the term 'objective consciousness'. Alongside the familiar understanding of this term as a tool through which consciousness achieves information about objects, in this context Jaspers described it as a means for opening ourselves towards the possibility of an 'Other' which we do not recognize and cannot know (VdW, 65). Hence the objective point of view, the one whose restrictiveness was constantly emphasized during the elucidation of Existence, is revealed from the perspective of the 'Encompassing' as no less than a source uncovering Being itself.²³

However, the wide perspective of the 'Encompassing' does not abolish the particular meaning of each of its components. No less fundamental for Jaspers than Being's comprehensiveness was the fact that precisely its partial manifestation enables us to have contact with Being itself (VdW 39). As an "unclosed wholeness" that philosophy and human consciousness cannot exhaust, "(*Being*) incessantly facilitates the New" (i.e. thing, phenomenon etc.) "to face us as a particular Being" (VdW 38). In this spirit, Jaspers characterized his own concept of Being, i.e. the 'Encompassing', as a representative of just one of the ways to access Being, one that in any case remains as the "unclosed itself".²⁴

Undoubtedly, the change that occurred in Jaspers' thinking and enabled him to focus directly on Being rested on deep modifications of his concept of the self, as a result of which Existence was no longer conceived as motivated solely by seeking self-understanding of its uniqueness as a particular being. This change was reflected not only in Jaspers' attempt to grant a wider philosophical expression to the reality external to the subject, nor just in the reinterpretation of idioms formerly bound to the concept of Existence. Moreover, within the context of the 'Encompassing', Jaspers explored the important distinction between the immanent and the transcendent dimensions of that reality. This distinction opened new horizons in Jaspers' thought, within which it was possible to explore a more complex concept of reality, encompassing more than just the experiences of Existence, and out of which its identity is established.

At first glance, 'experience', 'world' and 'transcendence' are located in three different cells within the table of the 'Encompassing'. It is clear that transcendence is not identical to the reality external and immediate to the subject, i.e. to 'situation being'. Likewise, transcendence is not identical to the world – a term whose meaning embodies a wider reality than what serves for Existence as a ground of experiencing. In other words, the term 'transcendence' does not relate to the reality that surrounds Existence or to the consciousness in which it relates to that very reality. Although Jaspers never

accounts for the basis from which he derived the reality of a transcendental being ('transcendence'), it seems that his understanding of this point originated in an *a priori* intuition.²⁵ In any case, it is clear that the concept of 'transcendence' transcends both meanings bestowed upon immanence within the context of the elucidation of Existence: as the external reality of the 'world', and as the self-consciousness that relates to the 'existence' in which a person's life takes place.²⁶

From the suggested interpretation, one can intimate Jaspers' shift from a philosophy of Existence to a philosophizing directed at the explication of Being in two ways: firstly, as an attempt to withdraw from the standpoint in which he located his philosophy of Existence to a more primordial reality – a reality where Existence represents just one of the possibilities it contains, or, in Jaspers words, a shift to "the One that [exists] in everything, to the final purpose, to the first-base [*Urgrund*], the completeness of world and God" (VDW 36). Secondly, it is possible to conceive Jaspers' concept of Being as an endeavor to transcend his own idea of Existence and to find the words for what he vaguely described as 'thinking binding-into-one' (*in-eins-bindend*) (VDW 2). One way or another, the philosophizing that was directed at Being reflected not only a loosening of the ties imposed by his own concept of Existence, i.e. the relevance to its self-understanding, but also the desire to find a comprehensive and lasting perfection that could substitute the ephemeral and wasteful part of subjective human life. In this context, there was no longer any need to divide external reality into 'situations', which from this point were integrated as a whole into the vast framework of the 'Encompassing'.

Reality as a 'Cipher' of Transcendence

The wish to live unlocked possibilities that were opened by the awareness of the reality external to Existence – thanks to which Jaspers' work was characterized as "the adventure of radical openness"²⁷ – may explain why Jaspers left the question of the scope of the reality that was covered by the idea of the Encompassing unanswered: whether it includes 'transcendence' as one of its components, whereby the explanation given indicates that this component would in principle be explicable. By this very explication, the scope of the reality to which Jaspers' philosophizing is directed is expanded, whereas the reality within which Existence is illuminated remains mainly immanent; or else the component of transcendence as "the Encompassing of all Encompassings" (VDW, 109) is different from the others which are in principle explicable, due to its location beyond the philosophical explication of Being, i.e. of the concept of Encompassings. From this perspective, the reality towards which Jaspers' concept of the 'Encompassing' was directed at this stage remains the immanent one, namely the same as that underlying his concept of Existence.

Though this question remained unanswered in the explication of the 'Encompassing', it is possible to clarify the scope of reality towards which Jaspers' philosophizing was directed by his unique term of a 'cipher' (*Chiffre*). This term, which appeared in Jaspers' writings parallel to that of the 'Encompassing', was also used for the explication of Being. Central to this concept is the idea that immanence contains a metaphysical depth thanks to its function as a sign or symbol of transcendence.²⁸ As will become clear later, within the concept of 'cipher', the split between two kinds of 'Encompassing' – 'the Encompassing that we are ourselves' and 'the Encompassing that is Being itself' – was replaced by a unified understanding that recognized transcendence already in immanent reality, without identifying the two.

Jaspers' argument that immanence was granted a metaphysical depth rested upon both meanings bestowed upon immanence within the discussion of 'Encompassing': as the *concrete reality* of the world and as one's *consciousness* of the world of objects (*Bewußsein überhaupt*) and of one's own self (*Existenz*). The first meaning consolidated the understanding that the reality of the world is not derivative from the consciousness that relates to it. The second maintained the affinity to the previous infrastructure anchored in his philosophy of Existence. Consciously or unconsciously, Jaspers managed to outline the development of his own thought from its very solipsistic beginning up to the present stage in which his philosophizing was directed towards transcendence.

²⁵To me as Existence, absolute independence is indeed any true unconditionality in temporal existence, but it also drives me to despair. I am aware that as finally self-based I would have to sink into the void. For my self-realization I depend on a fulfillment that comes to me. ... The test of the possibility of my Existence is the knowledge that it rests upon Transcendence. (Ph3, 4)

With these words Jaspers pointed to the roots of the crisis encountered by his concept of Existence, but also indicated the direction of its possible solution. That is to say, that the comprehension of Existence as distinctive beings independent of external reality, i.e. a comprehension characteristic of Jaspers' writings included in the so-called first period, is revealed as pointless, and therefore "drives Existence to despair". However, when Existence acknowledges itself as based upon what exists beyond itself, it can be free to achieve a genuine and more complete self-consciousness, and as such a person she or he will be free to realize her- or himself as Existence. This insight not only concerns one's close reality, i.e. one's 'situation-being', or even the more general reality of the 'world', but it encompasses the reality of transcendence. Only after achieving such a mature self-understanding, will it become possible to view immanence in its genuine depth, namely as a 'cipher' of transcendence.

Furthermore, the essentiality of Existence to the very conception of the 'cipher' is prominent in the definition of immanence as a 'cipher script'

(*Chiffreschrift*)²⁹ In the same way as the existence of a language depends upon its understanding by human beings, the 'Cipher script' is dependent upon Existence, so as to uncover the metaphysical depth concealed in immanence. Jaspers characterizes the 'cipher script' as a mediating language (Ph3, 134), so that thinking transcends as an expression of the contemplative immersion of Existence striving to contact what lies beyond its very existence, again reaches out for transcendence (Ph3, 135). Now it becomes clear that from the point of view of Existence, there can be no access to transcendence except via immanence, or rather, through the two dimensions in which Existence takes place: in the reality of the world and as a being that has consciousness.³⁰

Nevertheless, 'cipher script' is not merely a product of the self-seeking of Existence or just an expression of the creativity of the human being. Actually, this kind of language reveals the very nature of transcendence as a masked reality, but not as a disappearing one (Ph3, 205f). Jaspers clearly emphasized that, while Existence's point of view uncovers the metaphysical faces of immanence, it cannot exhaust the full meaning of the being of transcendence. In his words: "There is no simple parallelism between the fullness of the sensual and that of the content of Being" (VdW, 1034). That is to say that defining the 'cipher script' as rooted in the existential infrastructure (Ph3, 33) does not abolish the gap between human beings, who establish a metaphysical attitude towards transcendental reality, and the object of this attitude, which is inexhaustible by any kind of philosophizing. Hence Jaspers claimed that a "complete and genuine" meeting with Being is impossible (Ph3, 136).

Yet, it is necessary to point out that the reality of transcendence, as a being that transcends immanence, is not a speculative matter for Jaspers. Unlike the reality-beings (*Wirklichen*) that exist for empirical knowledge only within contexts and connections (*Beziehungen*), he claimed that "the being of the symbol (*Symbolsein*) as a 'cipher' of 'transcendence' does not take place in a connection" (Ph3, 146). Therefore, the reality of Being and that of transcendence is perceived by Jaspers as independent of the very existence of any consciousness that is able to confirm it, since immanence itself is "full of transcendence" (VdW 1031f). From this point of view, the concept of the 'cipher' reflects not only an explication of the search of Existence for meaning, but also the attempt to bestow a philosophical expression upon the concealed reality present in immanence itself.

The conception of immanence as a 'cipher' of 'transcendence' consciously undermines the classic positivistic approach to reality that identifies beings with the empirical and the finite (Ph3, 140). Jaspers' contention according to which the fixed logical categories of reality cannot be applied to the elucidation of the being of Transcendence (Ph3, 39), at the same time denied the concept of immanence in which they were anchored (Ph3, 137f). Obviously, having said this, by no means is it said that an ascetic worldview

considering immanence was latent in the concept of 'cipher'.³¹ Just as uncovering the limitations of the objective viewpoint in the elucidation of Existence (Ph3, 11-12) was not accompanied by a negation of the reality of the world, so, in this context, the disagreement with the empirical approach to reality did not serve as a basis for negating immanence as such. The very use of the concept of transcendence in immanence, including its immediate dimensions, first made it possible to understand transcendence as the source for meaning concerning human reality. As a matter of fact, Jaspers contended that the idea of the 'cipher' redefines the whole of human beings' lives as a totality that variously expresses Being itself (Ph3, 142f). In other words, observing phenomena via the perspective of the 'cipher' we become able to reveal the metaphysical depth inherent in the existence of human beings.³² Therefore, it is clear that the unique contribution of the notion of the 'cipher' to the understanding of reality is not only that this viewpoint did not detach the concept of Existence from the immanent reality of the world, but that it also gave rise to a far-reaching change in the understanding of objects that appear in immanence itself. These objects symbolize for Existence that which will never become an object, namely Being itself (VdW, 256f). Thus, alongside the notion of immanence, which the "world orientation" identifies with empiricism, the 'cipher's' viewpoint "poses another mythical reality".³³ However, it is clear that ontologically there is no difference between existence (*Dasein*) perceived as empirical from the viewpoint of objective consciousness, and existence, which from the 'cipher's' viewpoint is grasped as containing within itself the being of transcendence. According to Jaspers these are two dimensions of one world accessible to different viewpoints (Ph3, 16). While empirical reality demands the objective viewpoint, the metaphysical reality requires the 'cipher's' viewpoint.

Herewith it became possible to achieve a more accurate definition of the sort of reality inherent in the idea of 'cipher': this is without doubt the reality of immanence, but it includes a unique remnant (*Rest*) which cannot be completely assimilated in immanence as such (Ph3, 171). This remnant is responsible for the understanding of the reality of immanence as containing wealth that cannot be accessed by the immanent consciousness. According to Jaspers, this wealth is able to "speak" by itself within immanent reality (Ph3, 197). Yet, it represents a "unity without identity with immanence" (Ph3, 138), for a remnant will always last and will refuse any rational explication. As a matter of fact, the very idea of the 'cipher' reflects both the awareness of the fact that we are consciously, existentially and helplessly trapped in immanence, as well as of the attempt to find a door to a reality that transcends the borders of immanence itself. Via the idea of the 'cipher' a wide concept of immanence is consolidated, which can neither be exhausted by Existence's attitude towards it, nor by an account given by objective consciousness.

Despite the fact that the meaning of the transcendent Being itself remained obscure in Jaspers' writings, the idea of the 'cipher' enlarged the scope of the reality toward which his philosophizing was directed, compared to the scope that underlay the former context of Existence. Additionally, a possible reply to the unanswered question that arose from the idea of 'Encompassing' is suggested by the proposed interpretation of the idea of the 'cipher'. Jaspers' concept of reality, which was consolidated within his reflection upon being, does not overlap with immanence but transcends it. By the same token in both ideas of 'cipher' and 'Encompassing' a new and more mature concept of self was developed. According to this concept, Existence is not solely focused on itself but strives to establish an attitude towards a reality that exists beyond itself and its own existence. Transcendence is the name of that reality.

Conclusion

It transpires that the existential infrastructure in Jaspers' thinking *hinders* the development of a concept of reality as well as *facilitating* it. As we have seen, focusing on the elucidation of the particular being of the self, which characterized Jaspers' early writings, led to the consolidation of a solipsistic concept of Existence; this left no place for the exploration of the philosophical concept of reality. Although in the writings of the first period, Jaspers did not reject the very existence of a reality external to self, such reality was not recognized as a significant element in the process in which a person establishes its identity. A change with far-reaching consequences occurred in Jaspers' later philosophical writings, in which the reality external to the subject appeared as a meaningful factor that must be taken into consideration in any explanation of what was now termed Existence. It is true that at this stage traces of the early solipsistic inclination were still visible; traces that are regarded as responsible for the restriction of the discussion to that reality in which Existence finds its being. Nevertheless, the thought directed to Existence created a real basis for a confrontation with what was called above 'the problem of reality', this time at a more explicit level. Furthermore, as has been shown in the discussion of the concepts of 'cipher' and 'Encompassing', that reality was to become a central theme of Jaspers' writing. Thanks to a further distancing from the assumptions that supported the early solipsistic inclination, the domain of reality broadened, and a transcendent dimension was added to it.

This essay has attempted to explicate the dynamics of Jaspers' engagement with the problem of reality – from the early stage of overlooking the relevance of external reality up to that moment where he comes to terms with the most encompassing reality of transcendence. This dynamics can explain not only the fact that many concepts of reality appeared in Jaspers' writings, but also that they mirror the wider philosophical development occurring in his

thinking. In fact, the three meanings bestowed upon reality in the philosophical writings expressed three stages of distancing from the solipsistic inclination contained in the early works. This is exactly why a sufficient explanation of Jaspers' early ideas becomes possible only *vis à vis* the later ones; ideas that mostly realized the latent potential inherent in those that preceded them, and which thus created a real basis for a new understanding of a philosophical sense of reality in Jaspers' thinking. From this we may conclude that the concept of reality consolidated in Jaspers' writings remains connected to his concept of self and to its unique problematic nature. Finally, Jaspers' philosophical project can be seen as a door to other philosophical systems that, by being anchored in the being of the subject, turn the nature and meaning of external reality into a problem or at least raise meaningful questions about it.

Jerusalem

References

1. Despite its general relevancy to Jaspers' understanding of reality, his idea of the self will not be discussed here beyond the context of the relation of the self or the subjective being to its external reality. Jaspers' mature understanding of the self appeared in the second volume of his *Philosophie*, published 1932, named *Existenzbehaltung* ('from now on referred to as *Ph2*). For the main interpretations of Jaspers' idea of the self see: Fritz Heinenmann, *Existenz-philosophie - Lebendige oder Tote?*, Stuttgart 1954; Otto Friedrich Bollnow, *Existenz-Existenzialismus*, Tübingen 1951; Kurt Salaman, *Karl Jaspers*, München 1985; Sebastian Sannay, *Reason Revisited: The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, Dublin 1971; Elisabeth Young-Brahl, *Freedom and Karl Jaspers' Philosophy*, New-Haven 1981. See also Rommy Miron, "Transcendence and Dissatisfaction in Jaspers' Idea of the Self" in: *Philosophische Forschung*, 2005, pp. 221-241.
2. See, for example, Sannay, op. cit. 66f; Hans Mader, "Das Seinssdenken bei Karl Jaspers", in: *Wissenschaft und Weltbild*, vol. 10, 1957, p. 58; and Heinenmann, op. cit. p. 78. There is a clear affinity between these interpretations of Jaspers' philosophy of Being and those interpretations that understood his concept of the Self as irrational, as cut off from any externality and finally as reflecting an extreme individualism. For such interpretations see Bollnow, op. cit. pp. 11-27 and his "Existenzbehaltung und philosophische Anthropologie", in: *Bulletin für deutsche Philosophie*, 122, 133-174, 1938/39; Lenz op. cit., p. 14, 32; Fritz-Joseph von Ranien, *Beyond Existentialism*, London 1961, p. 204ff; Salaman op. cit., 46f; F. Inke, "Jaspers als Existenzphilosoph", in: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft*, Bd. 49, 1936, pp. 487-504, and "Jaspers als Existenzphilosoph", in: *Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görresgesellschaft*, Bd. 50, 1937, p. 86.
3. See, for example, Thomas Riber, *Das Denken in der "Philosophie" von Karl Jaspers*, Bern 1955, p. 84f and Young-Brahl, op. cit. pp. 19-20.
4. Karl Jaspers, *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*, Berlin 1913, p. 1 [from now on referred to as *Ap1*] in the text]. In his understanding of the scientific character of psychiatry, Jaspers was, as he admitted himself, influenced by Weber. For Weber's concept of science compare his "Wissenschaft als Beruf" in: *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen 1922, pp. 534-555 and *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism*, New York 1958, pp. 79-82. For other interpretations of this influence, see Heinenmann, op. cit. pp. 61-66; and Ernst Moritz Marasch, "Max Weber's Influence on Jaspers", in: P. A. Schupp, ed. *The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, New York 1957, pp. 369-393.

5. "Die Phänomenologische Forschungsrichtung in der Psychopathologie", in: *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 1912, Bd. 9, 391-408, p. 408.
6. Jaspers' distinction between the restrictions of science [*Beschrankungen*] and its boundary [*Grenze*], originates in the very fact that it is impossible to achieve an exhaustive understanding of the individual [ApI, 1-2]. This distinction reflected Kant's influence on Jaspers. See: Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, London & New York 1996, p. 11. See also: Chris Walker, "Karl Jaspers as a Kantian Psychopathologist. I: The Philosophical Origins of the Concept of Form and Content", in: *History of Psychiatry*, 1993, Vol. 4, pp. 209-238 and "Karl Jaspers as a Kantian Psychopathologist. II: The Concept of Form and Content in Jaspers' Psychopathology", in *ibid.*, pp. 321-348; J. Rudolf Gerber "Karl Jaspers and Kantian Reason", in: *New Scholasticism*, 1969, Vol. 43, 400-423; and Erich Gröhner, "Der Einfluss Kants auf Karl Jaspers: Zugang zur Transzendenz bei Kant und Karl Jaspers", in: *Frieburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 1956, Bd. III, 21-28.
7. On this point, there is a recognizable affinity between Jaspers' and Jung's concepts of hidden subjectivity. See Jaspers' relation to Jung in: Jaspers, *Allgemeine Psychopathologie*, Berlin, Heidelberg, 1942, 8th Edition, 1965, pp. 277f, 300f, 341. See also: C. G. Jung, *Personlichkeit und Übertragung*, Zürich und Düsseldorf 1996, and Romy Miron, "Was Jaspers really a Kantian?", *Yearbook of the Austrian Karl Jaspers Society*, forthcoming in 2006.
8. However, Jaspers' criticism of positivism was not accompanied by a denial of the relevance of objective investigation to the understanding of the phenomenon of mental illness. Moreover, Jaspers himself developed an objective terminology of his own [ApI, 94-144]. Actually, his critique was directed against any medical training that did not evaluate a wide understanding of the patient as human being, as a first condition for practicing psychiatry [ApI, 22]. As an alternative to this approach, Jaspers proposed exploring the appropriate personal qualifications of the psychiatrist. Cf. ApI, 254, and *Die Phänomenologische Forschungsrichtung*, 391-397. See also: Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry*, Evanston 1972 and Chris Walker, "Karl Jaspers and Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology as Empathic Understanding", in: *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology*, 1995, Vol. 2, No. 3, 247-266.
9. Jaspers critically designated the comprehensive theories of psychiatry as "prejudices", and in the same spirit, he called all theories which identified mental diseases as brain diseases "brain mythologies". This critique was explored in his articles published between 1910-1913 (see also: *Philosophie und Welt, Reden und Aufsätze*, München 1958, p. 290f, from now on referred to as PW), and was mainly directed at Griesinger (see: Wilhelm Griesinger, *Pathologie und Therapie der Psychischen Krankheiten*, Braunschweig, 4th Edition 1986). For further discussion see: Heinz Hilfer, "Einführung in den Psychiatrischen Teil", in: Jeanne Herich, & Jan Milie Lochman, & Reiner Wriahl, (Hrsg.), *Karl Jaspers - Philosoph, Arzt, politischer Denker*, München & Zürich, 1986, pp. 83-87; Werner Janzark, "Jaspers, Kurt Schneider und die Heidelberger Psychopathologie", in: *ibid.*, pp. 112-126; Joachim Felix Leonard, [ed.], *Karl Jaspers in seiner Heidelberger Zeit*, Heidelberg 1983; and Ludwig Binswanger, "Karl Jaspers und die Psychiatrie", in: Hans Saner (ed.), *Karl Jaspers in der Diskussion*, München 1973, pp. 21-32.
10. This perspective was mainly explored in the *Psychology of Worldviews (Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Heidelberg 1985). It is remarkable that as a psychiatrist he points to the need for a psychological book that will give the pathological viewpoint a wider perspective, anchored in the investigation of the "normal" person. He considered such a contribution as crucial as physiology; nevertheless he admitted that it could not always help the practice of psychiatrists [ApI, 4].
11. See C. D. Rollins, "Solipsism", in: Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol. 7, New York 1967, 487-491, p. 487f.
12. Martin Heidegger, "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers' *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*", 1920, pp. 70-100. The same can be said about Jaspers' discussion concerning the physical

- dimensions of mental disease, named as 'objective symptoms' of pathology which are typical and not personal; see ApI, 94f.
13. For Heidegger's path from the *cogito sum* to Dasein see: John N. Deely, *The Tradition via Heidegger*, The Hague 1971, pp. 43-61.
14. Jaspers, "Philosophische Weltorientierung", vol. I of *Philosophie*, Heidelberg 1994, p. 1, from now on referred to as PhI.
15. Jaspers later referred to his *Psychologie* as "a heavy book of my youth" ("Rechenstift und Aushieb", in: *Reden und Aufsätze*, Tübingen 1958, p. 392f).
16. See Ph I, p. 1. Jaspers discussed these possibilities in: Ph2, pp. 9, 18, 134f. A first version of the concept of "situation" appeared in: *Die Geistige Situation der Zeit*, Berlin, Leipzig 1931, p. 23. Jaspers continued to explore this term in the context of his famous concept of the "Limit Situation" (*Grenzsituation*). See especially the later version that appeared in: Ph2, 201f (the earlier appeared in: PW, 229f). See also: William D Blauer, "Heidegger's Debt to Jaspers' Concept of Limit-Situation", in: Alan M. Olson, [ed.], *Heidegger & Jaspers*, Philadelphia 1994, pp. 153-165.
17. See: Samny, op. cit. p.66f; Mader, op. cit. p. 58; Heinenmann, op. cit. p. 78.
18. On the use of "fundamental questions" characteristic of the German philosophical tradition, see: Bernhard Bollen, *Existential Thinking. A Philosophical Orientation*, Dugsworth University Press, 1968, pp. 1-35.
19. This contention concerns all the writings that appeared between *Philosophy (Philosophie*, 1932) and *Of Truth (Von der Wahrheit*, München: Piper & Co 1958, from now on VAW). Mayer suggested a different interpretation of the "reality" sought in the writings from the above period. According to him, in *Philosophy of Existence* it is a question of Existence and Transcendence, while in *Of Truth* Jaspers did not search for Being's reality but for its truth; Mayer Ernst, "Philosophie und Philosophische Logik bei Karl Jaspers", in: Piper Klaus [ed.], *Offener Horizont: Festschrift für Karl Jaspers zum 70. Geburtstag*, München 1953, p. 63f.
20. Jaspers, "Metaphysik", vol. 3 of *Philosophie*, Heidelberg 1994, pp. 1-3 (from now on referred to as Ph3). Jaspers' link between Existence and Being is well reflected in what he termed "internal awareness" (*Innenwahrheit*) of Being. (*Von der Wahrheit*, p. 357). See his usage of this term in VDW 307f, 344, 487. See also Hoffmann's comment, according to which the "internal awareness" of Being serves as a bridge between objective thinking and the thinking of something not objective; Kurt Hoffmann, "The Basic Concept of Jaspers' Philosophy", in: Schllpp, op. cit., pp. 104-106.
21. Jaspers, *Existenzphilosophie*, Frankfurt a. M. 1964, p. 12; from now on referred to as E.
22. Jaspers explains each of those components, adjusting them to his concept of Being. See: VAW, 53-122, and *Vernunft und Existenz*, München 1987, pp. 38-50. For further details about each of the components, see Gerhard Krauss, "The Concept of the 'Encapsulating' in Jaspers' Philosophy", in: Schllpp, op. cit., pp. 152-161.
23. The same orientation can be seen in Jaspers' redefinition of the rest of the components. A different interpretation has also appeared in the literature, according to which the elimination of the objective viewpoint serves as a prerequisite for establishing a philosophical attitude towards Being. See: Samny, op. cit., p. 48f; and Mader op. cit., p. 55f.
24. VAW 149; nevertheless, Jaspers kept the same framework of the Encapsulating's components from its first appearance in his writings until the last one [see: *Der Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung*, München 1962, pp. 111-122].
25. See also a different interpretation, according to which Jaspers' concept of Being was not based on an *a priori* intuition. Heinenmann op. cit., p. 72.
26. It is important to note that the components included in the "Encapsulating" did not represent Jaspers' ontological understanding of Being, for he rejected the very idea of an ontological attempt to give an account of Being. As an alternative to ontology, Jaspers coined his unique term of "Fatectionology" [VDW 158], which maintained the non-objective understanding of Being. For the etymology of this term, see Krauss, op. cit., p. 141f. For further discussion,

- see: Heinenmann, op. cit., 70f; and Urs Richli, *Transzendente Reflexion und sinnliche Entscheidung: Zum Problem der Selbsterkenntnis der Metaphysik bei Jaspers und Kant*, Bonn 1967, p. 119f.
27. Heinenmann, op. cit., p. 61f.
28. Jaspers usually used the terms of cipher and symbol as synonyms. See: Aloys Klein, *Glaube und Mythos: Eine kritische religionsphilosophisch-theologische Untersuchung des Mythos-Begriffs bei Karl Jaspers*, München 1973, p. 88; Johannes Thyssen, "The Concept of 'Foundering' in Jaspers' Philosophy", in: Schlipp, op. cit., p. 310; and Hoffman, op. cit., p. 108.
29. Ph3, p. 35; Jaspers exposed his concept of 'cipher-script' mainly in Ph3, 128-172. About the three languages of the cipher see: Ph3, 130f. For further discussion, see Olson's interpretation of these languages, in: Alan M. Olson, *Transcendence and Hermeneutics: An Interpretation of the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers*, Boston and London 1979, 139f.
30. See other commentators who pointed to the role of Existence in the establishing of the understanding of immanence as a cipher of Transcendence.: Thyssen, op. cit., p. 309; Tilliette, op. cit., pp. 390-391.
31. Jaspers' criticism was directed at the ascetic as well as the pantheistic approach. See: Ph3, 137f.
32. Jaspers demonstrates the metaphysical depth inherent in routine [Ph3, 130], physical nature [Ph3, 178], history [Ph3, 182] and art [Ph3, 192]. For further discussion, see: John Hennig, "Karl Jaspers' Attitude towards History", in: Schlipp, op. cit., 565-591 and Johannes Pfeiffer, "On Karl Jaspers' Interpretation of Art", in: Schlipp, op. cit., pp. 703-717.
33. See: "Die Phänomenologische Forschungsrichtung in der Psychopathologie", p. 128. For a more general understanding of the symbol as an expression of the duality between the immediate world and the world of meaning, see: Robert Doran, "Aesthetics and the Opposites", *Thought*, 1977, vol. 52, pp. 117-133.