

## WAS JASPERS REALLY A KANTIAN ?

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### Zusammenfassung

Diese Studie stellt die in der Literatur allgemein vertretene Auffassung in Frage, dass Jaspers Kantianer gewesen sei. Die Autorin weist diesen Ansatz zwar nicht als unrichtig zurück, stellt allerdings die These auf, dass Kants Denken bloß eine entscheidende Rolle bei der Konsolidierung von Jaspers' Denken gespielt habe. Aus dieser Perspektive stellt die Autorin fest, dass Kants Denken für Jaspers nicht eine inhaltliche Quelle gewesen sei, sondern vielmehr eine Grundlage, von der aus sein eigenes Denken ausging. Daher verneint die Autorin – in Gegensatz zur allgemein vertretenen Auffassung – die im Titel aufgeworfene Frage: Um diese Position zu begründen, konfrontiert die Autorin Jaspers' Kommentare der Schriften von Kant mit seinen eigenen Werken. Dabei bezieht sie sich auf die zwei wesentlichen Themen, auf denen das Denken der beiden Philosophen aufbaut: Objektivität und Subjektivität. Anhand dieser Gegenüberstellung lässt sich zeigen, dass die Klüft, die zwischen Jaspers' und Kants Denken besteht, bereits auf der Ebene der Metaphilosophie liegt und deshalb zu jeweils anderen Ergebnissen führt: Während bei Kant die Ideen der Objektivität und der Subjektivität als analytische Konzepte im Rahmen einer Theorie des Wissens fungieren, erschlet Jaspers sie als völlig unabhängige Ziele des Philosophierens. Diese Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Philosophen erklären letztlich die Entwicklung von zwei verschiedenen philosophischen Projekten.

### Summary

The paper takes the challenge of reconsidering the standard picture in the literature, which regards Karl Jaspers as Kantian. The author does not dismiss this view as erroneous and even claims that Kant's thinking played a decisive role in the consolidation of Jaspers' thinking. From this perspective, Kant's thinking did not appear to Jaspers as a source for contents, but as a basis to transcend from. Therefore, in contrast to the common view, the answer given to the question appearing in the title is negative. In order to support this understanding, the author confronts Jaspers' commentary on Kant with his own

writings regarding the two main issues out of which both philosophers were consolidated as a whole: Objectivity and Subjectivity. The discussion demonstrates that the split between Jaspers' and Kant's thinking occurred already at the stage of meta-philosophy and therefore the outcomes were different: instead of Kant's treatment of the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity as analytical concepts that function in a theory of knowledge, Jaspers regarded them as independent targets of philosophizing. Finally, the disparities between the two philosophers transpire as adding up to two different philosophical projects.

#### A.) Preface

"If I ever write a book on Jaspers," so stated Jaspers' colleague in Basel "I will call it 'Karl Jaspers: The first and the last Kantian'".<sup>1</sup> So far, such a book does not exist. However, the existing scholarly literature that deals with Jaspers' relationship to Kant is in almost complete agreement about the affinity and even indebtedness of Jaspers to Kant. Olson, for example, contends that the adaptation of "critical epistemological insights of Kant to the language of Existenz" is so obvious that it seems, in his monograph on Kant, Jaspers was "really speaking of his own". Therefore "formally and historically Jaspers' philosophy is virtually unthinkable apart from the influence of Immanuel Kant".<sup>2</sup> Therefore "formally and historically Jaspers' philosophy is virtually unthinkable apart from the influence of Immanuel Kant".<sup>3</sup> Olson's detailed account is preceded by an historical reasoning according to which, "Because the self... is involved so intimately in the process of determining what is known, many after Kant... developed an utterly skeptical attitude towards the possibility of all metaphysics. ... In Jaspers, however, the opposite is the case. ... Jaspers recovers what he believes to be the essential intent and purpose of Kantian Kritik".<sup>4</sup> A comparable understanding emerges also from Gerber's commentary, as he argues that Jaspers accepted Kant's dichotomy between two kinds of thinking: that of Understanding (Verstand) that stays within the confines of immanence and objectivity, and that of Reason, which seeks whatever lies beyond the grasp of

concepts.<sup>5</sup> This dichotomy between the senses and the transcendent, was realized in Jaspers' understanding of Existenz, so that "the Kantian epistemology becomes an anthropology".<sup>6</sup> Yet Gerber suggests a different setting to support his understanding of Jaspers as Kantian, pointing to the fact that whereas in Jaspers' early works "he adopted the label of Existentialism to characterize this humanist motivation... this existential coloring is abandoned, however after Sartre appropriates that label for himself in 1946. Having now rejected that label... Jaspers prefers to call his philosophy one of 'reason'".<sup>7</sup> Lastly, Walker, the only commentator who refers both to Jaspers' early career as a psychiatrist and to his philosophical work, contributes the far-reaching statements, according to which, "Jaspers in his *General Psychopathology* has provided a Kantian critique of psychopathological reason"<sup>8</sup>, whereas "Jaspers' philosophy is the philosophy of Kant in the twenty-century context".<sup>9</sup> However, citing the afore mentioned quotation of Jaspers' colleague in Basel, Walker alludes to the historical context of post-WWII, when Jaspers left Germany and accepted the invitation of the university of Basel to serve as professor of philosophy.<sup>10</sup>

The recurrence of the use of an historical setting in the above illustrations, especially that referring to the context of German philosophy after 1945, may provide a key to what seems more or less unanimous agreement that Jaspers was a consistent successor of Kant. Olson is right when he distinguishes between Jaspers and both the formal mechanics of the deduction in neo-Kantianism and the prevalent skeptical attitude towards the possibility of all metaphysics.<sup>11</sup> Compared to that culture, Jaspers seems much more Kantian than many other figures. Moreover, the affinity between Jaspers and Kant seems even stronger when one views it from the perspective of second setting. Undoubtedly Jaspers was one of the outstanding German thinkers who were looking to reestablish what was then called "another Germany" upon universal and Cosmo-political values. In contrast to others, Jaspers insisted that the German heritage of Bildung was as relevant then as ever.<sup>12</sup> Thus, he contended:

Once reason gets lost, everything is lost. From its very beginning its task has been, and still remains, to acquire reason, to restore itself as reason, albeit as reason proper. This reason submits to the logical necessities of the understanding and appropriates its methods and results without succumbing to its imitations (VuW, 49)<sup>13</sup>

This clear call for rehabilitation of universal reason appears throughout Jaspers' writings after WWII.<sup>14</sup> Undoubtedly, when the recovery of reason stands at the core of Jaspers' effort, it is understandable that readers recall Kant's critical philosophy, especially as one can find another reason for regarding Jaspers as Kantian. Firstly, there is a prominent repetition of central characteristics in the writings of the two philosophers. Thus, the three topics discussed by Kant in *Critique of Pure Reason* – world, self and God – are parallel to Jaspers' division *Philosophy into the same three themes: Philosophical World Orientation, Existential Elucidation, Metaphysics*. Additionally, the basic orientation of both philosophers is based on common distinctions, in particular: the separation of Being and appearance<sup>15</sup>, the centrality bestowed upon freedom of consciousness, and the use of the transcendental method. Lastly, Jaspers himself can be considered a trigger for promoting such an understanding of his thinking, for he himself mentioned his debt to Kant.<sup>16</sup>

Although these explanations are not dismissed as being erroneous or banal, in my opinion they are not sufficient to support the understanding of Jaspers' thinking as Kantian. Instead of external reasoning – be it the historical setting of Jaspers' work or the resemblance in specific characteristics between the two philosophers – I will suggest a rather immanent reasoning for Jaspers' conscious drawing away from Kant's positive ideas. In that case, even Jaspers' admission of his debt to Kant cannot make any real difference, especially as such admissions are not rare in his writings.<sup>17</sup> Besides, when one takes into consideration Jaspers' fundamental stance towards the philosophical text, i.e. "To experience contradictions in their vitality. Instead of randomly prodding contradictions, we must look for the source of contrariness" (Nietzsche, 17), such acknowledgments seems more an a-priori ap-

proach than an evidence of an identification of himself with a specific way of thinking.<sup>18</sup> In fact, my answer to the question appearing in the title is negative. In my opinion, the divergence between Jaspers' and Kant's thinking had already occurred at the stage of meta-philosophy, and the seemingly external resemblance covers up deep differences, such that could not have permitted the loaning of Kantian contents and concepts to Jaspers' work. Thus the disparities between the two philosophers add up to a different philosophical project. Yet the negative answer is followed by 'but', for Jaspers did not simply reject Kant's ideas, but was aiming to position his own philosophizing vis-à-vis Kantian thinking. In fact, Kant's philosophy functioned for Jaspers as a landmark beyond which he sought to locate his own philosophical vision. Jaspers himself admitted that his view of Kant "brings to something which is not to be found in Kant, and which, where it appears in another philosophy, does not refute Kant but complements him and complements his purifying reason" (GP, 373).<sup>19</sup> In my opinion, the words "another philosophy" refer to Jaspers' thinking, which was not represented in his commentary upon Kant, but rather, alluded indirectly to the criticism and evaluation of Kant's way of philosophizing. In any event by scrutinizing the relations between the two, this paper will neither aim to add a new interpretation to the existing literature about Kant, nor seek to determine whether Jaspers was a good commentator of Kant or not. Indeed, Jaspers' relation to Kant is seen here as another viewpoint, through which one can view the entirety of Jaspers' mind as a psychiatrist and as a philosopher as well. Thus, my question leading to the topic under discussion is: in what way may Jaspers' own ideas function as a response to the unanswered questions in Kant's philosophy? In order to show that, I shall confront Jaspers' commentary of Kant<sup>20</sup> with his own writings, regarding the two main issues from which both philosophies were consolidated as a whole: Objectivity and Subjectivity. Obviously, the whole interpretation of the present issue is directly influenced by the understanding of each of these philosophies. That is to say, that every determination about the discussed relationship is necessarily dependent on the interpretation of both sides, hence one can fall into an infinite regression. The immanent method employed –

which confronts Jaspers' exposition of Kant's ideas with Jaspers' own conceptions, i.e., by confronting Jaspers with himself – is designed to avoid this problem, inherent in every comparative interpretation. Therefore, the analysis of Jaspers' attitude to Kant's Philosophy should be regarded mainly as an implementation of a comprehensive interpretation of Jaspers' thinking.

#### B.) Jaspers' elementary understanding: Kant as transcendental idealist

There is nothing new in Jaspers' commentary on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. The reading he suggests can be classified according to the conventions in the existing literature, which can roughly be divided into two ways of reading Kant's idealism. The first regards it as a metaphysical theory that affirms the unknowability of the "real" (things in themselves) and accordingly reduces the knowledge to pure subjective matter or to mere representation ('appearance'). This view actually includes Kant within the phenomenalist heritage in philosophy, which provided an account of the experience of the mind that assumed it to be 'affected' by things in themselves, thought nothing is being claimed about these (including the claim concerning their existence). The second reading emphasizes the transcendental meaning of Kant's idea about the limitation of knowledge to appearances, namely regarding it "as an epistemological claim about the dependence of human knowledge on certain a priori conditions which reflect the structure of the human cognitive apparatus."<sup>21</sup> According to this view, these conditions do not determine how objects appear, in the empirical sense; rather they express the universal and necessary conditions for recognizing something as an object at all. It is exactly the understanding of Kant as a philosopher who did not investigate objects but our knowledge of objects that does not allow one to expect him to provide an account of Being. Clearly, both have epistemological and metaphysical implications, yet the first interpretation places more emphasis on the metaphysical ones, whereas the second on the epistemological ones.

Jaspers' focus on the various implications of Kant's theory of knowledge provides real substance that enables us to count his commentary on Kant within the view that regards him as transcendental idealist. So, Jaspers contended that "Kant is referring to the grounding of the objective validity of a priori concepts...he excludes from his discussion [the idea that] representations come into being as reactions of the mind to external things...the transcendental is concerned not with matters of empirical facts but with justification of validity" (CP, 260). Yet, it is important to note that in his discussion Jaspers switches indiscriminately between 'object' and 'objectivity'. Thus, in the same breath he contended that there was "objectivity as such", and in support of it he added that "object" even had "the character of substance" (CP, 247). However, not only are 'object' and 'objectivity' not synonyms for Kant, but the term 'objectivity' does not appear in Kant's *Critique* at all, whereas "object" has two central meanings: it may be taken as signifying content (initially<sup>22</sup>, or as affecting the mind.<sup>23</sup> In the first meaning, intuition appears as referring immediately to objects as purely subjective, while in the second, intuition appears as affected by objects, which are accordingly acknowledged as independently real. Clearly, the two meanings of 'object' in Kant's thinking cannot coincide. Nevertheless, in Jaspers' specific perspective on Kant's thinking, not only do the two meanings of 'object' not bring about different implications, but in fact letting things slide from 'object' to 'objectivity' becomes understandable, for objects appear especially as a source of knowledge. This analysis becomes apparent in Jaspers' following clarification, where he explains that he "entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects in so far as this mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.... His goal is no longer the metaphysical knowledge of another world but knowledge of the origin of our knowledge...with his transcendental method he strives to transcend while remaining within the world. He thinks about thought" (CP, 262). It transpires, then, that what Jaspers refers to as Kant's idea of 'objectivity' is especially suited to the first meaning of 'object', i.e. content of knowledge. As to the second meaning, it is not ignored and is even alluded to by the reference to Kant's famous

phrases: : "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concept are blind" (IL, 465; GP, 254).<sup>24</sup> Moreover, as will become clear later on, Jaspers' criticism of Kant was directed precisely to the vanishing of the understanding of the object as independently real.

### C.) *Objectivity and Subjectivity: Jaspers versus Kant*

Jaspers' understanding of Kant's ideas of subjectivity and objectivity indicates the knowing subject and the object of thinking. The subject is defined by his sensibility, which spontaneously receives what is given to it through the senses. Sensibility is the knowing of something through intuition, without which no reality can be assumed. However, sensibility as such is indeterminate and hence it is "meaningless... mere existence, which does not yet stand before me... It is a reality which being undefined is not yet a reality" (GP, 254). Thus, sensibility cannot suffice to grasp what is given by the senses, but needs the mediation of understanding (Verstand), which confers forms by which the endless material turns out to be an object of thinking.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, Kant's idea of objectivity appeared to Jaspers as referring to the specific shape of sense data under the guidance of exact science patterns (GP, 247), which actually subordinate the empirical reality to the particular formulation of mathematics that can be known a-priori. Thus, with the help of understanding, intuition is replaced with discursiveness. So the categories are inserted into the materials of the given senses, which on the one hand are "something universal" that subsumes all particulars of the same kind (GP, 252), but on the other hand are the subjective form of our thinking (GP, 249). Consequently, the representation of the senses' data can never reach the object for "what we perceive has phenomenal reality but is not reality as such" (GP, 249). The idealness of things in Kant's philosophy is, then, not for their illusive nature, but for the very fact that what appears to us is not 'things in themselves' but only the mathematical shape of reality by the categories that can be known a-priori (GP, 248). However, "to interpret Kant's thought as meaning that the

world is produced by the subjectivity of man's mental constitution or the condition of his brain is to reduce it to absurdity" (GP, 261). It is only the discursive understanding that knows the object "through concepts which are never the object itself". Having said all this, it is clear, then, that "everything that exists for us is an object of thought" (GP, 252) and without sensibility, as our witness to reality, there can be no reality for us at all. Nevertheless, besides the relatively consistent understanding of Kant, Jaspers integrated within his exposition parts, which do not fall in line with the entire reading suggested by him. This is very prominent when he pointed to the deficiencies in Kant's two core ideas of object and subject. So, concerning the idea of object, which due to the above analysis is revealing also concerning the idea of objectivity, Jaspers stated: Kant does not...investigate objects; what he inquires into is our knowledge of objects. He provides no doctrine of the metaphysical world, but a critique of the reason that aspires to know it. He gives no doctrine of being as something objectively known, but an elucidation of existence as the situation of our consciousness (GP, 276). The negative approach is maintained regarding the idea of subject: It is not the individual, but the 'I think'... the subject of consciousness as such is not the empirical psychological subject, which I can observe and investigate. It is not accessible to self-observation but only of self-certainty...in the cognitive act of my self-consciousness, I do not gain knowledge of myself as a particular object. ...The more this knowledge identifies itself with thinking, the more it eludes psychological observation (GP, 257-258).

The feeling of surprise is even increased as one reaches the section of the evaluation where Jaspers accuses Kant of communicating no vision of the world; of creating no symbols (GP, 372); of leaving "many men dissatisfied, as though deprived of food and air. They yearn for a transcendent content" (GP, 373). Obviously, this criticism involves terminology that may suit transcendental realism, or better his criticism uncovers expectations and philosophical wishes that can be addressed to a transcendental realist, someone who treats mere representations as 'things in themselves'.<sup>26</sup> That is to say that Jaspers' criticism of Kant does not agree with his own exposition of his ideas, the same that promised that "In considering them [Kant's ideas], we

must keep in mind... the fundamental direction of Kant's thinking" (GP, 246). This situation raises, then, the question: why does Jaspers criticize Kant for not achieving philosophical goals that in regard to his own reading could not even have been expected from it?<sup>27</sup> The answer, as will be clarified below, is inherent in fundamental difference in the understanding of the ideas of subjectivity and objectivity by the two philosophers.

The decisive point that generates the divergence between Jaspers' thinking and that of Kant – as exposed in Jaspers' commentary – is the understanding of the manner in which subjectivity and objectivity are interrelated. According to Jaspers, Kant regarded them as two poles on a single axis, mutually conditional, relative to each other and hence as dependent on mediation. In contrast to that, Jaspers put most of his effort into establishing these two as independent from each other. Additionally, Jaspers and Kant did not share the same content concerning the two ideas. For Jaspers, subjectivity – which is denoted also by the terms of 'psyche' and 'Existenz' – refers first and foremost to the particular dimensions of the self, which, in general, are not accessible to rational predication. Objectivity, on the other hand, represents generality, the scientific approach accessible to rational reasoning and the reality external to the subject being.<sup>28</sup> The discussion of the ideas of subjectivity and objectivity appears throughout Jaspers' writings. Yet, regarding the present issue, one can divide Jaspers' writings into two main periods: the one covers his early writings that deal with the issues from *Psychiatry and Psychology* (1909-1919), whereas the second covers his philosophical writings (1932-1947). Thus, Jaspers contended that "in the Psychiatric practice" the interest always turns to "the human being in his singularity and totality" (AP1, 1). In contrast to the positivistic approach, Jaspers granted priority to the individual personality of the mentally ill person (AP1, 3)<sup>29</sup> and to understanding the 'psychic' elements that accompany the physical illness (AP1, 12)<sup>30</sup> over the investigation of the symptoms (AP1, 3).<sup>31</sup> Thus, the abnormal symptoms were considered as unique expressions of one's own singular personality, and not as a mirror of a concrete disease.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, according to Jaspers, as the investigation of the physiological symptoms progresses, the mental elements that are linked to it evade ex-

amination, so much so that inquiring into the mental symptoms finally reaches a certain point when one can no longer find any accompanying physical aspect (AP1, 5). Therefore, the 'singularity' (Einzelnheit) with which the human being is imbued (Phen, 408) restricts the very possibility of making comprehensive and scientific claims about pathological psychic phenomena as such. Jaspers' description of the psychic element of mental illness as "foam that floats from the ocean depth" (AP1, 14) provides an idea of the elusive nature of the subjective being to which he strived to obtain access, and hence the uselessness of representing it with the inflexible patterns of the science of psychopathology.<sup>33</sup>

Parallel with the exploration of the idea of subjectivity, an understanding of objectivity was consolidated in the early writings. This is apparent in referring to the scientific approach, which is depicted as devoted to "identifying and recognizing, characterizing and analyzing not the single person but the General" and to integrate its findings in the conceptual framework of science (AP1, 1). Hence the physical dimensions of the mental illness, which can be accessed by rational tools of science are especially objective. Jaspers did not ignore the possible relevance of the scientific approach, but opposed the positivistic view that identifies the phenomenon of mental illness with its physiological symptoms, and sometimes even reduces the one to the other. Jaspers' goal was, then, to perform a "demarkation" of the scientific approach to what he termed as 'objective Psychopathology'<sup>34</sup> and to attach to it the awareness of the subjective and particular aspects that concern the mentally ill person as a human being. Indeed, the need to supplement the science of psychopathology with such insights – which generally remain obscure in this context – is also a result of the fact that the science of psychopathology did not achieve a uniform concept of illness (AP1, 3; AP4, 651f).<sup>35</sup> The idea of objectivity does not appear, then, in the present context as opposed to that of subjectivity, but as representing a narrowed perspective about the subjective being. This should not be renounced, but rather supplemented with a wider one based on the intuition according to which one's subjective being is a particular and unique entity.<sup>36</sup>

D.) *The explicit departure: Jaspers' answer to Kant*

Against the above background, one can easily understand why in the writings from his first period Jaspers could not adopt the ideas of Kant concerning subjectivity and objectivity. In the first place, Jaspers rejected the role, which was given to sensibility, according to which it is our witness to reality or "measurement that provides the criterion to reality" (GP, 246). The reality to which Jaspers devoted his search – firstly that of subjectivity and then that of Being – is hidden from the senses in the most part. Besides, our senses are restricted to the observation of the physical symptoms, which are not revealing for the entire reality of subjectivity out of which the mental illness developed. Moreover, not only do the senses not provide immediate contact with the reality of subjectivity, but they even appeared to Jaspers as obscuring it. Therefore, instead of the direct perspective employed by the scientific approach, Jaspers' approach speaks for the need for non-sensual intuition. This is not essentially a matter of distinction between external features and internal ones, but of an evident persuasion of Jaspers about the nature of subjectivity, whose entirety is not represented by rational tools, but via an immediate contact (AP4, 464) that cannot be predicted and needs "witty thoughts" (AP1, 12).<sup>37</sup> The path chosen by Jaspers rejected not only the meaning of intuition in Kant's thinking, as an immediacy that should be substituted in order to achieve knowledge (GP, 256) and its connection to sensibility. For Jaspers, intuition is merely the primordial contact with a wholeness, which is already given to us. Hence, Jaspers defined his approach as aiming at the "whole of the psychic" (AP1, 13).<sup>38</sup> The starting point is thus an undivided unity or an evident intuition, and following it does not add anything to it, but elucidates what is already given.

It goes without saying that Jaspers' rejection of Kant's idea of intuition dismissed also its implementation on the idea of the subject. Jaspers not only does not agree with Kant's representation of the subject by his sensibility, namely, as one who spontaneously receives the given through the senses; moreover he refuses the very idea that the

subject can be represented at all or be reduced to his abilities. Instead, the subject appears to Jaspers as someone to encounter, to experience in a way that one cannot be put in words.<sup>39</sup> In contrast to Kant, for Jaspers, then, filling the information of the senses with conceptual content does not provide significant understanding, but actually appears as a narrowing perspective that indeed damages the whole, which is already given as a non-sensual intuition. Accordingly, in order to achieve an understanding of the subject one needs to withdraw and even to overcome what one receives from the senses.

Within the second period of Jaspers' writings, a prominent change took place: the shift of the focus of the discussion from the idea of subjectivity to that of Being (Sein). The conditions that facilitated this change are important for the understanding of Jaspers' mature thinking. Yet, at present it should be sufficient to note that it stemmed from problems that were inherent in Jaspers' idea of subjectivity, in particular that of solipsism, which is described as "insufficiency in myself alone" (Ph2, 56).<sup>40</sup> However, the initial interest in subjectivity – presently denoted by the term of 'Existenz' – was not relinquished, especially as the very search for Being was acknowledged as existential search (PE, 1, 21-22). Moreover, like subjectivity, the intended Being was exposed as a primordial unity and as a self-sufficient entity too. Yet, in the later writings, a consistent effort was made to achieve a philosophical understanding of Being (Sein) – an understanding which is independent of one's self-understanding, or 'objective' in Jaspers terms. Accordingly, Being is regarded as prior to one's thoughts, rejects them and subordinates them to itself (EP, 59-60). At the same time, new concepts were inserted into the discussion: world, reality, 'encompassing' (Umgreifende) 'cipher' (chiffre) and Transcendence. Indeed, these appeared as various constituents of Jaspers' entire conception of Being.

One can phrase Jaspers' shift from philosophy of Existenz to the philosophizing directed at the explication of Being in two ways: either as an attempt to withdraw from the starting point in which he located his philosophy of Existenz to a more primordial reality – a reality where Existenz represents just one of the possibilities it contains. In Jaspers' words: "[to] the One that [exists] in everything, to the final

purpose, to the first-base, the completeness of world and God" (VdW, 36); "or as an endeavor to transcend Existenz and to find the way to what he vaguely described as 'thinking bounded to one thing'" (VdW, 2). One way or another, the philosophizing that was directed at Being reflected the desire to find a comprehensive and lasting perfection to one's self-understanding that may substitute the ephemeral and wasteful part in subjective human life. Additionally, compared to the previous period in Jaspers' writings, as he was critical of the possibility that the objective aspects could be helpful in the understanding of subjectivity. One can regard this development as an effort to rehabilitate of the idea of objectivity into his discourse. Yet, as will become clear later on, even this modification could not enable Jaspers to adopt the corresponding ideas that he recognized in Kant's thinking. Likewise and not independently, the search for objective understanding of Being did not dismiss the decisive role of intuition in Jaspers' thinking.

The above-depicted modifications are recognizable already at the opening to *Philosophy* where Jaspers stated "Philosophizing starts with our situation" (PhI, 1). What was new about that was not the understanding of human beings as existing in concrete reality, but the insight that in addition to the freedom to fulfill one's possibilities one is also indiscriminately imposed upon by necessities.<sup>41</sup> These necessities are actually limitations stemming from reality's factuality, and as such are considered as objectivities that human beings cannot change but are obliged to handle within their lives. What Jaspers calls 'world-orientation', which can be achieved by scrutinizing the conditions of the reality external to Existenz, is the aim of what Jaspers calls 'world-orientation'.<sup>42</sup> Thus, independence of one's own self-understanding's needs, and externality to Existenz, signify the foundation of Jaspers' idea of objectivity in the second period of his writing.

The initial understanding of objectivity as externality transpired as playing an important role Jaspers' conception of Being, which he denoted by unique idiom of 'Encompassing' and demonstrated by the following table (VdW, 50):

	The Encompassing that we are ourselves	The Encompassing that is Being itself
Immanent	[Dasein] Existence General Consciousness	Word
Transcendent	Existenz Spirit	Transcendence

The 'Encompassing' consists, then, of immanent components (Weisen) as well as transcendent ones.<sup>43</sup> The latter are inaccessible by their very nature, both to the objective viewpoint of consciousness, and to Existenz.<sup>44</sup> The location of 'existence, 'world' and 'Transcendence' in three different cells signifies different grades of externality to subjectivity, or else various stages in overcoming the particular starting-point, i.e. advancing towards something objective. Moreover, the very fact that Existenz itself is included in the encompassing, and especially including it under the category of 'Transcendent', in the first place indicates that it represents a kind of being which cannot be exhausted by its self-consciousness. This is merely the idea of subjectivity that is identified with the search for Being as something beyond one's self, i.e. something that has also an objective dimension. As one continues elucidating phrases that are more extensive and hence occupy wider externality, one might obtain a comprehensive grip on the idea of Being and hence objective insights are accumulated within the scope of philosophizing. In fact, all the modes of the encompassing are aiming at becoming more lucid. Yet, with the growing lucidity grows also the wish to transcend towards the transcendental dimensions of the encompassing until achieving some sense of 'Being in itself'. Therefore, the mode of 'transcendence', which is defined as the "encompassing of all encompassings" (VdW, 109), is the supreme aspiration of Jaspers' philosophizing upon Being.

Additionally, within the present context, Jaspers made an effort to integrate the viewpoint of 'objective/formal consciousness' (Bewußtsein überhaupt). The very presence of the idea of formal consciousness represents a modification in Jaspers' thinking, for only in regard



to the idea of Being did he consolidate a more positive attitude to the objective viewpoint.<sup>45</sup> In fact, Jaspers had never ignored this function of consciousness. Yet, in this context he described 'objective consciousness' as a means for achieving an experience of the presence of Being-in-itself, or of opening ourselves towards the possibility of an 'Other' that we do not recognize and that seems as something we cannot know (VdW, 65). Hence the objective point of view is revealed from the perspective of the 'Encompassing' as no less than one of the sources for uncovering Being itself.<sup>46</sup> Contradictory as that may sound, 'objective consciousness' (Bewußtsein überhaupt) appears as giving support to what it was employed in order to give. Obviously, such a perception avoids subordinating the object of observation to the shape of consciousness itself. One may state the contrary, namely that for Jaspers it is consciousness that is adapting itself to object of Being. This is exactly why the use of 'formal consciousness', together with the continuing presence of the non-sensual intuition, do not exclude but complement one another in the context of the elucidation of Being.

The main factor that makes the objective viewpoint of general consciousness relevant to the elucidation of Being is Jaspers' insight that mere "existence in time" (Zeitdasein) or the concrete reality does not constitute an actuality on its own but only when one comes to terms with it (VdW, 30-31) and consolidates an active elucidating attitude towards it (VdW, 1, 308f). Hence, what stands behind the appeal to the objective viewpoint it is precisely the need to arrive at an understanding of Being, beyond the unmediated and evident experience of it. Moreover, the understanding of the objective viewpoint as applicable for a multiplicity of objects may suit the elucidation of Being which is also consists of a few elements (Weisen) as reflected in the idea of the Encompassing. Here the multiplicity not only reflected the changing faces of the awareness that refers to Being (VdW, 703) that is nourished by different objects (VdW, 36). It also manifested an essential characteristic of Being itself, which is depicted in terms of "splitting" (Zerissenheit) (VdW, 703) and as a "Being of rupture" (Aufgebrosensein) that is unable to "close" itself (VdW, 706).<sup>47</sup>

Thus, the multiplicity calls for a varied method that will access each element as well as the entirety that they create altogether. However, the objective viewpoint of general consciousness can be only one of the methods of approaching Being, and is by no means exhaustive. It is especially incapable for transcendent dimensions, which are central to Jaspers' conception of Being. As in his discussion of Existenz so too in his conception of Being, Jaspers did not back away from his understanding of general consciousness as relative and limited. Nonetheless, instead of dismissing the objective viewpoint for being incomplete, he assigned it to the illumination of the immanent components of the Encompassing.

Apparently, the initial understanding of objectivity as externality to Existenz plus the understanding of 'transcendence' as the further reality from the one where Existenz lives, indicates that 'transcendence' is the most objective among the modes of encompassing. On the other hand, the fact that nowhere in all his writings did Jaspers introduce the basis from which he derived the reality of Transcendence, indicates its origination in an a-priori intuition. Yet, this situation does not point to a contradiction within Jaspers' approach to Being, but only to one of its bottomless insights, according to which within the philosophizing upon Being, mediated objectivity and primordial intuition to join one another. Accordingly, objectivity – to be precise, to search for it – is a means to elevate the particular self-consciousness of oneself and to become open to what exists beyond the subjective being as such (Ph3, 2). Yet at a certain point – specifically, after the illumination of the immanent aspect of Being – objectivity is shifted aside in favor of intuition which itself does not need any reasoning.<sup>49</sup>

Concerning the present discussion of Jaspers' Kantianism, the interesting aspect in the above-depicted development is the fact that though Jaspers' thinking was seeking an objective infrastructure to the idea of Being, and was even granted general consciousness by the role of its achieving, Kant's idea of objectivity was not acknowledged as relevant to it. Jaspers' own conception of objectivity, which is elaborated within his discussion of Being, clearly demonstrates that the barrier to the adoption of the Kantian ideas was not Jaspers' reject-

tion of the possibility of achieving some knowledge of it, but the specific conditioning of such knowledge to subjective faculties which might mistakenly lead to the reduction of Being into discursive knowledge. To put it positively, Jaspers was looking for an unconditioned idea of objectivity, something that he was expecting to find in Kant's 'noumena' or 'thing-in-itself', but was critical of its elimination from Kant's theory of knowledge. Though Jaspers acknowledged the value of the kind of representation of Formal Consciousness, unlike Kant he was reluctant to grant it the total status which he realized in Kant's thinking, but supplemented it with a symbolic approach.<sup>50</sup> This is also an inevitable result of the fact that Being, towards which Jaspers' philosophizing was aimed, is not an object, in both Kant's meanings, as one clearly realizes in the reading suggested by him to Kant. The end is not an object to be known as in the older metaphysics but an awareness of the limits of our knowledge.

The fundamental difficulty is that Kant, in striving to disclose the conditions of all objectivity, is compelled to operate within objective thinking itself, hence in a realm of objects, which must not be treated as objects.

With his transcendental method he strives to transcend while remaining within the world. He thinks about thoughts (GP, 262).

The case is not that Jaspers did not notice that like him also for Kant "Being remains the central interest" (GP, 256). Moreover, Jaspers even describes the start of the Kantian thinking in terms that can be in accord to his own. Thus, he wrote, "Kant wishes to think beyond the dichotomy to the ground from which it springs". Yet, "the [Kant] does so only by means of categories and objectivizations which themselves belong to the dichotomy" (GP, 259). This, and not Kant's original wish with which Jaspers could easily have identified himself, is the explanation for the dualistic ending that led to the result in which "the question of Being becomes the question of being-thought" (GP, 251). Indeed, Jaspers' determination that with Kant "everything that exists for us is an object of thought" (251) can be misleading, and hence

needs an explanation. Elsewhere Jaspers himself determined that "to interpret Kant's thought as meaning that the world is produced by the subjectivity of man's mental constitution... is to reduce it to absurdity" (GP, 261). In addition to that, he rejects as a mistake the judging of Kant as a dualist due to the two stems of the human thinking: sensibility and understanding. Yet, all that cannot change what seemed to Jaspers as a fact, that:

In the elucidation of the medium in which we live and think, Kant is dualistic. But the two sources of knowledge are not to his mind two principles of Being; rather Being is invoked as the one root, which remain unknown to us. Being is conceived dualistically only in respect to the form through which we gain awareness to it. Kant's metaphysics is not dualistic in the sense of conceiving two primal powers... But he [Kant] is impelled to think dualistically for the purpose of exploring a field in which paths to unity are subsequently sought and found. (GP, 255)

Jaspers, then, clearly distinguished between Kant's primordial origin and the actual performance of his thinking. Whereas the latter refers to the consequence about which he is critical, with the former Jaspers could easily have identified. The criticism refers to the inability to preserve and give representation to what Jaspers regarded as Kant's 'desirable' beginnings that consequently did not last within that thinking itself. However, when one takes into consideration Jaspers' own thinking, one cannot be sure whether describing the start of the Kantian thinking in terms of 'unity', 'mystery' and 'secrets' is not actually a self-depiction. In that respect, Jaspers is decent for addressing his judgment to the actual carrying out of the Kantian thinking. If Jaspers is correct, then one can tell that Kant is more faithful to his method, i.e. to the analytical tools that he explored, than to his original wishes as a philosopher. Therefore, when Jaspers states that Kant "does not abandon himself" (GP, 259), he refers especially to the actual performance of his thinking and not to its initial interest, i.e. the interest he realized as motivating the Kantian thinking. Against this background one can understand the conclusion according to which

Kant's philosophy was "not self-sufficient" (GP, 372), i.e. it was not so only if one confronts it with the beginning that Jaspers attributed to it. Finally, for Jaspers, the decisive factor in the evaluation of Kant's thinking was especially the bottom line, or what he acknowledged as the end results of it.

However, whereas Jaspers' assumption concerning the beginning of Kantian thinking remains vague and is not supported with a discernable reasoning, the connection of such a beginning to his own philosophical project is very prominent. Jaspers' aiming towards a mysterious entity, which was present already in the early writings, where it functioned especially as a critical argument against the positivistic approach of the sciences, finds its more explored continuation within the discussion of Being. There he regards the feeling of enchantment (VdW, 1031), the experience of wonder as one finds himself standing before a reality which is imbued with a secret (VdW, 1048), as indispensable to standing before Being. Moreover, Jaspers determine that "only the loosening of possible Existenz lets intrinsic Being be grasped, so that all relativity, all sublimation of the modes of Being, serves this one suspension that makes me aware of Being" (Ph3, 162).

However, the state of mind required for getting a grip on the idea of Being, by no means conflicts with the consistent effort to rehabilitate the above-discussed idea of objectivity. The following clarification by Jaspers is designated precisely to prevent any mystification of the philosophical conception of Being:

Immersion in symbols is not the mystical immersion, the entrance into non-objectiveness of transcendence by way of an objectless and thus incommunicable union. Rather, as I hear the symbolic language, the phenomenon of transcendence is articulated for my Existenz in the medium of lucid consciousness, with the subject-object dichotomy maintained. ... Like the elucidation of consciousness in world orientation, elucidation in the symbol proceeds here by way of objectivity. ... (Ph3, 16-17).

Undoubtedly, both the maintenance of the dialogue with the subject-object dichotomy, and the accompanying emotional experience are connecting points between Jaspers and Kant. Nonetheless, sharing the same sensation of standing in front of a mystery – be it true or not – was not sufficient to treat Kantian thinking a source of contents to adopt. These are only beginnings, intentions, that according to Jaspers do not survive in Kant's thinking as a whole, or at least lose their genuine meaning. Thus, when intuition and the sense of mystery are dissolved, the subject-object dichotomy is taken to the extreme, until it ends in dualism. At the present point, Jaspers' accusation of Kant for "creating no symbols" (GP, 372) becomes transparent by its comprehensive implications. By these words Jaspers is not only referring to what he regarded as Kant's inability release himself from the oppression of the discursive thinking which remains attached to its formulations, and thus erodes the primordial intuition; the same intuition which Jaspers realized as existing in Kant's critical philosophy. Moreover, it is especially evident to the specific stance of Jaspers when facing Kant's thinking: as a completion to the unfinished voyage towards Being in itself.

To be sure, Jaspers did not ignore the value of Kantian thinking. As a matter of a fact, exactly what Jaspers appreciated in Kant, i.e. "the depth of his fundamental philosophical idea lies precisely in the involvement of his method...in the fact that all the aspects we thus clarify belong to an idea which itself cannot be elucidated as a determine, particular idea" (GP, 270), itself provided the reason for criticizing it: firstly it refers to the supreme principle according to which, "everything we know as reality must enter into some mathematical forms that can be known a priori" (GP, 249).

Concerning this, Jaspers claims that "Kant forgoes richness of content, because he wishes to convey pure consciousness of 'forms'. Forms are superior to philosophical embodiment" (GP, 372-373). Additionally he explains, "When we unravel these methods, we are left with a number of philosophically ineffectual parts. The fundamental idea cannot be defined by any method... it is only in their interplay that the truth of the philosophical insight is disclosed" (GP, 270). This criticism stands not only for Kant's concept of Being, which includes

by the same token his idea of objectivity, but also for the previously discussed idea of subjectivity.

Jaspers, then, was longing for positive contents about the subjective being and Being, namely exactly what appeared to him as absent the actual performance of Kant's philosophy. For Jaspers, the substance of one's thinking is not necessarily the form or the method one creates, but the embodiment of real objects, of ontological entities which one acknowledges as already given to him in an undivided unity. So are the ideas of subjectivity and of Being, i.e. they do not represent a conscious representation of what Kant would have called Being-in-itself, but are first-given through an intuition. It is exactly the absence of any definition of these in Jaspers' writings that express their primordial given nature. A conscious synthesis appeared to him more as subsequent to what is already given than as a constitutive process. Thus, differently from Kant's mediated way of approaching the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity which led to the perception of them as a discursive synthesis which is never the object itself (CP, 252) – a way of which he is critical – Jaspers himself remains faithful to the primordial intuition which is not damaged by the philosophical explanation. Thus, Jaspers' thinking assigns itself especially to the illumination of the way intuition functions within the experience of thinking and to the uncovering of a suitable way that represents its most comprehensive objects: I and Being-in-itself. Thus, instead of the vision that regards the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity as analytical concepts that function in a theory of knowledge, Jaspers treats them as independent targets of philosophizing. Finally, Jaspers' distance from what he recognized as Kantian ideas cannot be exhausted by the differences in the "formulation" or historical context as suggested in the literature. Also, there are substantial differences in the "content" that fills the ideas themselves and which could not have met the meaning of objectivity and subjectivity, which appeared to Jaspers as Kantian. In that respect, Jaspers is quite minor in the way he proclaims his criticism of Kant.

### E.) Postscript and Summary

My understanding of Jaspers' work as reacting to that of Kant is the main reason for employing a comparative method. This is intended to demonstrate how Jaspers' acquaintance with Kantian thinking was influential on the consolidation of his meta-philosophy. In this context, the standard picture concerning Jaspers' Kantianism played an important role. Indeed, the challenge of reconsidering the existing agreement among scholars was taken up only after an effort had been made to uncover the logic behind such an understanding of Jaspers' thinking. Paying attention to the significance of the historical setting, which was demonstrated at the beginning of the discussion, was helpful in revealing the specific method employed by the representatives of the reading of Jaspers as Kantian, i.e. reading his writings backwards, or from the relatively later ones to the earlier. Indeed, reading Jaspers' work as Kantian appears sympathetic compared to the familiar evaluation of it, that has often accused him of suggesting no consistent philosophical instruments,<sup>51</sup> of being 'a hovering philosopher' who cannot determine anything positive given his extreme faithfulness to the adventure of a radical openness;<sup>52</sup> of being immersed in the movement towards the whole and hence unable to express his own ideas.<sup>53</sup> All these appear as outcomes of Jaspers' expressive writing. However, regarding Jaspers as Kantian grants him the advantages of Kant's thinking, in particular an epistemological reasoning to his ideas.

Notwithstanding, reading Jaspers backwards seemed to me not only as granting his thinking an epistemological reasoning, which he actually does not need due to the great weight of intuition in it, but also failing to notice the ontological implications that emerge from the specific reaction to Kant, and so misses Jaspers' specific stance when facing Kant's thinking. Additionally, my feeling of difficulty in accepting the standard picture was even intensified as I realized the gap between Jaspers' empathic reading of Kant's philosophy, which by no means manipulated it, and his criticism of it where that reading

seemed to vanish. In order to give reason to these arguments, I suggested reading Jaspers' work forwards, i.e. from the early writings to the later ones, and so follow concurrently Jaspers' understanding of Kant's ideas of subjectivity and objectivity and his own exploration of the same themes. Obviously, this compelled referring to the writings where Jaspers consolidated his conception of these ideas, namely those which cover the two distinguished periods, while those writings written after WWII were excluded from the discussion.<sup>54</sup> Admittedly, this method also has its own historical setting, i.e. the criticism of the positivistic approach in sciences that generated Jaspers' early ideas of subjectivity and objectivity, out of which his whole philosophical project developed. However, this choice seemed to me as naturally derived from the actual carrying out of Jaspers' philosophizing, whereas the inverted perspective seemed problematic for imposing something alienated from it. One wonders why at all base the understanding of Jaspers as Kantian on presumable benefits that he could have derived from it, and not on what Jaspers actually found in Kant's thinking? In other words, what is needed is to demonstrate in what way Kant may contribute to the understanding of Jaspers' entire project: The fact that the understanding of Jaspers as Kantian did not provide an answer to this decisive question, is thus the reason for substituting it with the immanent method: a method that phenomenologically follows the echoing of Jaspers' stance towards Kant, both within the actual performance in his writings, and in his commentary on Kant's critical philosophy.

Consequently, unlike common understanding of Jaspers as Kantian, the suggested interpretation clearly shows that though he had Kant's thinking in the back of his mind, it did not appear as a resource for contents to adopt, but as a basis to transcend from. To be precise, I contend that Jaspers' criticism of Kant – especially of the ideas of subjectivity and objectivity to which the exposition above referred – can be seen as a crucial infrastructure to his own philosophy. Indeed, the early split between the two philosophers, gives reason to the different outcomes of their work. Instead of the Kantian dualism which consolidates a theory of knowledge in which objectivity and subjectivity are mutually conditioned, Jaspers' thinking was led by a non-sensual

intuition; the ideas of objectivity and subjectivity that appear in it not only do not function in a theory of knowledge, but also there is no theory that could pave the way to them since they are already given. The philosophical explication cannot constitute these ideas, but uncovers their independent given nature. Lastly, Kant appeared to Jaspers as remaining in a dichotomy in which objectivity and subjectivity do not touch each other but subordinate one another. Conversely, in regard to the content granted to both ideas in Jaspers' thinking they appear in a consecutive order where subjectivity precedes objectivity but is also preserved in it in a more ripe shape as a subject being who searches for Being.

My analysis intended to show that the same thing that did not enable Jaspers to rely on what he regarded as Kant's idea of subjectivity was the reason preventing him from making use of the idea of objectivity, i.e. the consistent commitment to a non-sensual intuition. Yet the contribution of Kantian thinking was not totally dismissed, for the disagreements about contents do not exclude the possibility of being inspired by structure. This can find both positive and negative support. On the one hand, for Jaspers, the "greatness in Kant's thinking" lies in the thinking of forms and limits that dominate it but "not in any academic knowledge of Kantian concepts" (GP, 373). This acknowledgment is clearly reflected in Jaspers' idea of seeking the borders of philosophizing and of the human experience and in his scrutinizing of the possibility of transcending them. Moreover, also Kant's distinction between limits (Schränken), which are "mere negations which affect a quantity so far as it is not absolutely complete, and 'bounds' (Grenzen) which always presuppose a space existing outside a certain definite place and inclosing it"<sup>55</sup>, is evidently echoed in Jaspers' division between 'contextual borders' (geweiligte Grenzen) and 'principle borders' (prinzipielle Grenzen) (PhI, 45). Whereas the former are temporal and disappear once the philosopher has reached an understanding of his objects, the latter undermine the understanding of the human world as a phenomenon, since in the face of them the rational tools cease to be functional and hence they bring the philosopher to an unsurpassable barrier, which signifies his finitude. Yet, they still open the question of having an idea about what lies beyond

the human world, i.e. the Transcendence (PhI, 45). Therefore, exactly as Kant, so also Jaspers aimed to mark the space in which his philosophizing would take place, namely achieving a concrete content. On the other hand, Jaspers' different implementation of the thinking of limits provides the support from negative side. Actually, the common structure of marking the limits resulted in different goals of philosophizing: Kant withdrew into the realm of Reason related especially to its product, i.e. knowledge. So he stated: "Our reason...sees in its surroundings a space for knowledge of things in themselves, though we can never have definite concepts of them, and are limited to appearances only."<sup>56</sup> Conversely, Jaspers could not be satisfied only within the realm of reason or in what can be crystallized as knowledge, and was longing for what transcends the marked limits of reason from both directions – to the particular that cannot be generalized and to the transcendent that is beyond generalization as such. In Jaspers' words:

In philosophizing on the ground of possible Existenz we take up everything conceivable and knowable we meet in our search; we want Existenz to come out of this, but Existenz is not the final goal. The philosophizing urge goes beyond it. It wants Existenz to dissolve again, in transcendence. Philosophical thought is a beacon (Scheinwerfer): it means not only the lighted object but the light itself... (PhI, 27)

Jaspers, then, exposed two ways of radicalizing of Kant's ethos: either to begin earlier than him or to continue to philosophize after the point where Kant's philosophy culminated. Thus, the two specific objects at which Jaspers' thinking was aiming, subjectivity or Existenz and Being, are not elaborated in Kant's thinking. One can put it also in the following way: Jaspers idea of subjectivity could not have met that of Kant because of the objective shape which eliminated from it any concrete aspect due to the method of transcendental deduction. Additionally, the idea of objectivity, as it arose from Jaspers' explication of Being, is also far from that of Kant, which nonetheless appears as conditioned upon the subjective facilities of the human consciousness.

In other words, according to his understanding of Kant, Jaspers rejected Kant's idea of subjectivity for being too objective and that of objectivity for being too subjective. Thus a complicated mode of an influence between Jaspers and Kant was revealed, namely adopting the frame or better the ethos of seeking borders, but not the content with which it is filled. Accordingly, Jaspers' hunger for positive content about his objects of philosophizing could not find then a relief in what was suggested in Kant's philosophy, for it did not dare to break through the limits imposed by itself, and hence was not radical enough for him. In the end, Jaspers not only rejected the specific contents which were achieved in Kant's philosophy, but especially the very possibility that a theory of knowledge could become accessible to the two targets of his philosophizing: subjectivity and Being. Instead of the definable way traced by Kant, Jaspers suggested something that he regarded as secured against any need of reasoning: an ontological persuasion that Existenz and Being are present to the one who looks for them. Nonetheless, one may still hesitate whether the above explicated disparities between the two philosophers might allow viewing Jaspers as complementing Kant or actually put their work on separate scales.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Quoted from Ehrlich, p. 211.
- <sup>2</sup> Olson, pp. 73-74.
- <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 72.
- <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.
- <sup>5</sup> Gerber, pp. 405-406.
- <sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 414-415.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 401-402.
- <sup>8</sup> Walker 1993, p. 210.
- <sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p.238.
- <sup>10</sup> In the literature about Jaspers, his relationship to Kant is mentioned on various levels also in: Richli, p. 117f.; Young-Brunahl, pp. 13-21/73f., 104f.; Samay, 25f.; Sariny, Kelemen; O'Connor, Walters; Radbruch; Holz; Kommüller; Lichtgfeldt; Milmed; Grinert.

<sup>11</sup> Olson, p. 73.

<sup>12</sup> For a wide view concerning the cultural forces in Germany after World War II (WWII), see: Pitmancher, p. 20.

<sup>13</sup> This quotation appears also in Gerber's article. See: Gerber, p. 402. See also Jaspers' opening preface (Geleitwort) to the periodical *Die Wandlung*, 1, 1945.

<sup>14</sup> See especially: VuF; BuM.

<sup>15</sup> In order to avoid confusion, hereafter the word 'Being' will signify the German word 'Sein' and the word 'being' will indicate the meaning of existence, or what Jaspers frequently referred as 'Dasein'.

<sup>16</sup> PhI, p. 2; OntI, p. 137; GP1, p. 381; P.A, p. 86.

<sup>17</sup> For Jaspers' acknowledgment of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, see: VuF, pp. 7-34. For his acknowledgment of Weber, see: P.A, 55f.

<sup>18</sup> See especially other monographs by Jaspers: Schelling; Nietzsche and Weber. Besides, he frequently referred to other philosophers and sometimes even integrated a historical excursus within the course of the exposition of his own ideas. See: PW, pp. 109-117.

<sup>19</sup> Hereafter, the numbers in brackets in the body text refer to Jaspers' writings according to the abbreviations in the list.

<sup>20</sup> Jaspers dealt systematically with Kant's philosophy within two contexts: II, in: PW, pp. 465-486; GP, pp. 230-381.

<sup>21</sup> The background of the first course of study and the representative scholars of it are depicted by Allison as 'the standard picture' (see: pp. 3-10), while the second express Allison's own interpretation, among others who regarded Kant as 'transcendental idealist' (pp. 10-13; pp. 25-34).

<sup>22</sup> See: PRL, 51, PR2, 75.

<sup>23</sup> PRL, 119, 226.

<sup>24</sup> PRL, 51, PR2, 75.

<sup>25</sup> Jaspers himself did not note the exact place in Kant's writings to which his interpretation referred, or from where his citations were taken. Henceforth, I will point to the main places in which Kant dealt with the subject of discussion. I follow the customary way of referring to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The pagination of the 1<sup>st</sup> edition (1781) is given as PRL, the 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (1787) as PR2. In this context, see, for example: PRL, 68, PR2, 93; PRL, 86, PR2, 118. On the ability of understanding to determine the content, which is given to us by PR2, 93; PRL, 86, PR2, 118. On the ability of understanding to determine the content, which is given to us by content, which is given to us by sensation, see: PRL, 261, PR2, 317.

<sup>26</sup> For Kant's distinction between 'transcendental idealism' and 'transcendental realism', see: PRL, 543/ PR2, 571; PRL, 369; PRL, 490-91/ PR2, 518-19. For an analysis of these references, see: Allison, pp. 14-16.

<sup>27</sup> See also: PRL, 536/ PR2, 564; PRL, 740/ PR2, 768. See also: Allison, pp. 14-24.

<sup>28</sup> For a more detailed analysis, see: Miron (a), p. 151-152.

<sup>29</sup> The individual differences between individuals assumed to be the guiding concept of the psychological approach, therefore, turn out to be no less crucial to the Psychopathology than physiology. The fact that in certain cases psychology cannot be practically implemented by psychiatrists, should serve as to encourage Psychopathology to explore its own psychology that will complete the unique elements that are irrelevant to normal people (AP1, 3-4). Jaspers himself pointed out initiatives that already look up this challenge (AP1, 4, note. 1).

<sup>30</sup> This idea appears as vaguely as described above in the first edition of *General Psychopathology* (1913), but it is largely explored in the enlarged version that appeared as the fourth edition (1942), which contained the philosophical infrastructure that was explored during the intervening years. See: AP4, 624-686.

<sup>31</sup> Jaspers' criticism of positivism was not accompanied by denying the relevance of objective investigation to the understanding of the phenomenon of mental illness. Moreover, Jaspers himself exposed an objective terminology of his own (AP1, 94-144). Actually, his critique was directed against medical training (medizinische Bildung) that did not evaluate a wide understanding of the patient as human being as a first condition for practicing psychiatry (AP1, 22). As an alternative to this approach, Jaspers proposed exploring the appropriate personal qualifications of the psychiatrist (especially empathy) (AP4, 254; Phn, 391-397). For more on this issue, see: Spiegeberg 1972, p. 186; Walker 1995, pp. 247-266; O. P. Wiggins, M. A. Schwartz, M. Spitzer (eds.) 1992, p. 56ff.

<sup>32</sup> Jaspers critically designated the comprehensive theories of psychiatry "prejudices", and in the same spirit he labeled as "brain mythologies" the contemporary theories of his time, that identified mental diseases as brain diseases (AP1, 8). This critique was mainly directed at the psychiatrist Criesinger and other contemporaries. For extensive perspective See: Häfner, Janzarik; Leonard.

<sup>33</sup> On this point, there is a recognizable affinity between Jaspers' and Jung's concepts of hidden subjectivity (see: Jung). Jaspers refers occasionally to Jung's conception. See: AP4, 277f., 300f., 341.

<sup>34</sup> Jaspers also explored his own objective 'Psychopathology', see: AP1, pp. 94-144.

<sup>35</sup> See especially the chapter "concepts of health and illness" (AP4, 651-661). This idea is acknowledged as a landmark in the process of integrating the phenomenological method into the field of psychiatry and psychopathology, see: Spiegeberg, pp. xxxiv-xxxxv.

<sup>36</sup> The focus on the particular dimensions of subjectivity found its continuation in *Psychology of Worldviews* (PW) where Jaspers entirely liberated himself from the scientific discourse. This attempt will not be discussed here, for it makes no real difference concerning the discussed ideas.

<sup>37</sup> Already in the first edition (AP1) Jaspers appointed to philosophy an important part in the exploration and in designing the methodological instruments of Psychopathology (AP1, 6-7). However, in the enlarged version (1942) he granted to philosophy a clear and positive role: it appeared as determining the true borders within which Psychopathology takes place and as facilitating an approach, which is not subordinate to prejudice (AP4, 40). Moreover, philosophy was exposed then as no less than an instrument through which one can achieve contact with the fullness of human life (AP4, 644).

<sup>38</sup> Jaspers explored this thesis later on. See: AP4, 624-686.

<sup>39</sup> Jaspers demands thus close contact with the concrete being of the patient. This point reveals an influence of Dilthey's idea of 'Understanding' upon Jaspers' thinking. See especially: Dilthey 1927; 1977; Walker 1995.

<sup>40</sup> See also: Ph3, 4; Ph1, 12; Ph2, 61. Concerning the implications of solipsistic nature of Jaspers' early idea of subjectivity. See: Miron(b).

<sup>41</sup> Jaspers discussed these possibilities in: Ph2, 9, 18, 134f. A first version of the idea of 'situation' appeared in: GSZ, p. 23. Jaspers continued to explore this term in the context of his famous concept of 'Ultimate Situation' (Grenz-situationen). See especially the later version that appeared in: Ph2, p. 201f (the earlier appeared in: PW, pp. 229f).

<sup>42</sup> See especially: Ph1, pp. 61-148.

<sup>43</sup> It is important to note that the components included in the 'Encompassing' did not represent Jaspers' ontological understanding of Being, for he rejected the very idea of an ontological attempt to give an account of Being. As an alternative to ontology, Jaspers coined his unique term of 'Perichorology' (VdW, 158), which maintained the non-objective understanding of Being. For the etymology of this term, see Knaus, 141-142. For further discussion, see: Heinemann, p. 70f., Rüdli, 119f., Kelemen.

<sup>44</sup> Jaspers explained each of those components, adjusting them to his concept of Being. See: VdW, 53-122, VuE, 38-50. For further details about each of the components, see Knaus (1957), 152-161.

<sup>45</sup> This attitude substituted the restrictive and even negative one evoked both from the early writings, where the idea of subjectivity stood at the core of discussion, and in the later writings (see especially Ph2, 4-5; Ph1, 14-15).

<sup>46</sup> The same orientation can be seen in Jaspers' redefinition of the rest of the components. A different interpretation has also appeared in the literature, ac-

ording to which the elimination of the objective viewpoint serves as a prerequisite for establishing a philosophical attitude towards Being. See: Samay, 48-49; Mader, pp. 55-56.

<sup>47</sup> See also: VdW, 261, 873, 956. Jaspers used the term "Zerrissenheit" also in his discussion on the concepts of "Welt" (Ph1, 64f., 78f, 104f., 218f.) and "Dasein" (Ph2, 249f.).

<sup>48</sup> See also a different interpretation, according to which Jaspers' concept of Being was not based on an a-priori intuition. Heinemann (1954), 72.

<sup>49</sup> The joining of the intuitive aspect with that of formal consciousness' is most explicit within the discussion of the 'cipher', which signifies the understanding that both the immanent reality and objectivity are a symbol or cipher of transcendence. See: Ph3, pp. 128-173; VdW, 1022-1054. Usually Jaspers used the terms 'Symbol' and 'Chiffer' as synonyms. See: Hoffman, p. 108; Thyssen, p. 310; Klein, p. 88.

<sup>50</sup> Jaspers explored his symbolic view within his conception of the "reading of the Ciphers" (Chiffreschrift). See: Ph3, pp. 128-168.

<sup>51</sup> Hoffman, p. 95.

<sup>52</sup> Heinemann, p. 65, p. 71. See also: Mader, p. 58.

<sup>53</sup> Rüdli, p. 119, pp. 142-143.

<sup>54</sup> The accurate referring to the time of writing and not to that of appearance takes into consideration the fact that in at 1938 the Nazi regime enacted a prohibition against the publishing of Jaspers' books, and they only appeared after the war.

<sup>55</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena*, p. 101.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

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