**Can Evaluativism about Unpleasant Pains meet the Normative Condition?**

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**1. The Normative Condition and the Normative Contrast Method**

Pains, as experienced in normal circumstances and by normal subjects, are unpleasant. This is a phenomenological fact. It is also arguably a fact that unpleasant pains are non-instrumentallybad for their subjects, although this requires more work to become salient. Consider the following situation. Say a torturer is drilling into my tooth causing unpleasant pain. In what senses is this bad for me? First, he’s damaging my tooth and that’s bad for me. Being tortured also typically precipitates negative emotions, like fear and anxiety about when the torture will cease, or whether it will get worse, and such things are bad for me (I may also develop PTSD, which would be bad for me). But such things are bad *effects* or *consequences* of the inflicted pain. If we could, by thought experiment, subtract away all of these instrumental considerations is there still something about the unpleasant pain which is bad for me? Say the torturer has a benevolent streak and assures me my tooth will be fixed, rectifying the bodily damage, and my memory will be wiped so I won’t remember the torture. Moreover, say I’m a ‘hard nut’ and being tortured doesn’t precipitate fear, anxiety or other negative emotions, and the torturer assures me he’s just going to torture me for two minutes, at the same intensity, after which he will stop. Given this, does there remain a sense in which the unpleasant pain is bad for me?

One intuitive answer is yes: the unpleasantness of the pain itself. Regardless of instrumental considerations, there is something non-instrumentally bad about being subject to unpleasant pain – namely, undergoing the painful experience.[[1]](#footnote-1) This kind of badness-for-one is, therefore, both non-instrumental and phenomenal; it is the experienced unpleasantness from the point of view of the subject in that painful state, regardless of the evaluative standing of instrumental considerations, or enabling conditions for being in unpleasant pain. [[2]](#footnote-2)

Let me briefly say more about the terminological contrasts in play. The first is between ‘phenomenally bad’ versus just ‘bad’. Something can be ‘bad’, and even ‘bad-for-me’, in an entirely non-phenomenal way (e.g. a blood clot in my brain is bad-for-me, although its badness may be in no sense phenomenologically manifest). In the present context of the unpleasantness of pains the idea of ‘phenomenal badness’ tracks the intuition that what is non-instrumentally bad is the *phenomenology* of pain’s unpleasantness. In other words, the kind of unpleasant-constituting badness in play must be in some sense experientially manifest to the subject of unpleasant pain. To further specify that sense is to provide an account of pain’s unpleasantness. Reflecting this, we should accept that unpleasantness is essentially a phenomenal concept – its primary extension is fixed by reference to a specific class of experiences.

The second contrast is between ‘non-instrumentally bad’ and ‘intrinsically bad’. The ‘broad’ intuition canvassed in the first paragraph was that regardless of instrumental considerations, there is something bad about being subject to unpleasant pain – namely, undergoing the painful experience. Talk of ‘non-instrumental badness’ is a way of capturing this intuition in a way that is broad enough to be accepted even by theorists who think that the relevant kind of badness consists in unpleasant experiences (or, perhaps the unpleasantness of unpleasant experiences) being the target of desires to the effect that those experiences should cease.[[3]](#footnote-3) This ‘broad’ intuition, therefore, only rules out that the relevant kind of badness can be sufficiently explained in terms of unpleasant experiences’ antecedently bad consequences or effects (i.e., that the badness of unpleasant experience is *instrumental*).

Talk of ‘intrinsic badness’ is motivated by the following ‘narrow’ intuition. It is not merely that the relevant badness cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of unpleasant experiences’ antecedently bad consequences or effects (i.e., *anti-instrumentalism*). Rather, the relevant badness also cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of any additional *non-intrinsic* feature, for example, a desire that the damage should cease (this intuition expresses what we might call, following David Bain, *anti-additionalism*).[[4]](#footnote-4) Reflecting this latter contrast, intrinsic badness and non-instrumental badness are not co-extensive if we associate intrinsic badness with necessary or essentialproperties something has. X-experience could have bad-making properties or features that are non-instrumental (they do not attend to antecedently bad effects or consequences) but which it has only contingently (e.g. a desire that the damage should cease to occur). In that sense, X-experience may be non-instrumentally bad without being intrinsically bad.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Evaluativism, which is a specific view about the nature of unpleasant pains, and which will be the critical target of this paper, attempts to do justice to both the ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ intuition canvassed above (and so subscribes to both ‘anti-instrumentalism’ and ‘anti-additionalism’ about the badness of pains). As such, talk of *intrinsic badness* is appropriate to this view. In fact, David Bain (2017, 16) – the principal defender of Evaluativism – comes to frame the relevant badness of unpleasant pains on Evaluativist views as not only non-instrumental but *intrinsic*, as reflecting this the ‘narrow’ intuition. Therefore, I talk of *intrinsic phenomenal badness-for-one*. That it is intrinsically phenomenally bad (IPB hereafter) for one to be subject to unpleasant pain is, therefore, a key assumption of Evaluativist views of unpleasant pains, and for the purposes of this paper, I assume it to be plausible. The upshot if one accepts this, however, is a constraint on accounts of pains unpleasantness: accounts of what makes pains unpleasant must be framed in terms of an experiential state it is IPB for its subject to be in.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Running through similar considerations Bain articulates this constraint in terms of the following normative condition (hereafter NC):

NC: Being in unpleasant pain could consist in being in state φ only if being in state φ is, in the relevant cases, noninstrumentally [later intrinsically] bad for its subject. (Bain 2017: 1)

Whatever we plug in for state φ, it needs to be the case that it is IPB for one to be in state φ, otherwise we fail to respect the intuition that it is IPB for one to be the subject of unpleasant pain.

On the basis of the NC, we can articulate a skeptical question, and a step-based method reflecting its import, which I call the normative contrastmethod, which tests accounts of pain’s unpleasantness given plausible claims about pain and values.[[7]](#footnote-7) The question an account of pain’s unpleasantness should be able to answer is ‘what is IPB for one about being in state φ’. One answer to this question is, however, ruled out, namely that it is unpleasant to be in state φ, or (what is equivalent in this context) that state φ includes the *feeling of unpleasantness* – that its phenomenal character includes, or can be characterized in terms of, feeling unpleasant. Given the NC, appeal to state φ is supposed to tell us what the unpleasantness of pains consists in, and so any appeal to unpleasantness in the explanans would be viciously circular.

This caveat aside, we can test accounts of pain’s unpleasantness in line with the NC, and capture the import of the skeptical question, by reference to normative contrast cases, where we run through the following steps (as steps one can take to test an account of pain’s unpleasantness):

1. First, accept that unpleasant pains are IPB for their subjects to undergo
2. Consider that being in unpleasant pain consists in being in state φ (the candidate analysis)
3. Then, consider some state P, and show that it consists in being in state φ
4. Next, show that state P is uncontroversially *not* IPB for its subject to be in
5. If (4) can be established, then consider that there is a *normative contrast* between being in state P and being in unpleasant pain. State P is uncontroversially *not* IPB for its subject to be in, and unpleasant pain is uncontroversially IPB for its subject to be in.
6. Next, consider that given state P consists in being in state φ (given step 3) there is a normative contrast between being in state φ and being in unpleasant pain, namely that it is not IPB for subjects to be in state φ
7. At this step, we remind ourselves that the NC tells us being in unpleasant pain could consist in being in state φ only if being in state φ is, in the relevant cases, IPB for its subject to be in.
8. Finally, we conclude that state φ fails to provide a satisfactory account of the unpleasantness of pains since it fails to satisfy the NC.

(1) – (8) provides a powerful method, as steps one might take to test an account of pains unpleasantness.

However, we need to say more about step 4. What constrains claims about whether being in state P is uncontroversially *not* IPB for its subject to be in? There are two (fallible) tests. The first is intuitive-cum-phenomenological. We should ask does it strain common sense, or is it obviously phenomenologically mistaken, to claim the relevant state is IPB to be in. Using a toy example, it is obviously mistaken to claim that entertaining the thought that Paris is the capital of France is an IPB state for its subject to be in.

The second test, which figures in recent discussions of pains unpleasantness, can be called the sympathetic test. In this case, we ask whether the emotional attitude of pity or sympathy for the subject of the relevant state would be, at least *prima facie*, appropriate.[[8]](#footnote-8) We need to be careful, however, about how to understand this test. Take the following case. We typically pity those who suffer from chronic pain – few would disagree that pity or sympathy is a *prima facie* appropriate attitude in such cases. Yet a significant part of this pity may attend to instrumental aspects of their situation, for example, the way their chronic pain limits their ability to engage in rewarding activities or precipitates negative emotions. However, arguably a central reason why we pity patients of chronic pain is due to the manifest unpleasantness of the pain they are repeatedly subject to, and so arguably the IPB for them of the episodes of chronic pain. So, for the sympathetic test to be part of a guide to whether certain states are IPB to be in, it needs to be a *prima facie* appropriate pity or sympathy which targets the intrinsic phenomenal character of being in those states – the essential ‘what-it-is-likeness’ for the subject undergoing that experience – and so pity or sympathy in the relevant sense. This test is not infallible, but it is intuitive that if pity or sympathy, in the relevant sense, would not be a *prima facie* appropriate attitude, then (along with supporting considerations) we should question whether it is IPB for a subject to be in that state. Using the same toy example, the subject who entertains the thought that Paris is the capital of France would not be a *prima facie* appropriate object of pity or sympathy in the relevant sense.

The aim of this paper is to assess whether Evaluativism, as a view about the nature of unpleasant pains, can meet the NC. To repeat, the focus is principally on the view as articulated by David Bain – the primary and most recent defender of Evaluativism.[[9]](#footnote-9) The normative contrastmethod is the means of assessment. Section 2 outlines Evaluativism in detail. Section 3 applies the normative contrast method, where state P is a doxastic state and suggests Evaluativism can respond by weakening its entailment claim (more on this later). Section 4 then argues, again by using the normative contrast method, that the strategy employed by Bain of appealing to the perceptuality of unpleasant pains is problematic. As such, I conclude that it remains unclear whether Evaluativism, as standardly articulated, can meet the NC.

**2. Evaluativism about Unpleasant Pains**

Evaluativism can be characterized as an attempt to update representationalist theories of pain to capture the unpleasant character of paradigmatic pains. So, it helps to start with a brief look at representationalism and show how, by applying the normative contrast method, it fails to meet the NC.

Paradigmatic pain experience is said by strong representationalists – those for whom the phenomenal character of experiential states reduces to their representational content – to carry information about bodily pathology, bodily disturbance or tissue damage, and so have representational content (for sake of simplicity I talk of pain representing bodily damage).[[10]](#footnote-10) So, for state φ we have an interoceptive experience that represents bodily damage – and so in line with step 2, such a view would claim being in unpleasant pain consists in being in a state that represents bodily damage. Moving to step 3, what plausible candidate is there for state P (the normative contrast case), that also consists in representing bodily damage? An interesting candidate ­– and one that will be seen relevant to Evaluativism – is the state experienced by pain asymbolics. According to standard accounts, and in rough outline, pain asymbolics undergo interoceptive experiences which represent bodily damage, such that specific sensational qualities are registered at (usually) specific bodily locations when paradigmatically pain-inducing procedures are performed (e.g. a laceration to the skin).[[11]](#footnote-11) So we have a good candidate for state P.

 Let’s move to step 4: are the experiences of pain asymbolics (state P) uncontroversially *not* IPB for their subjects to be in? It is true that such experiences may be bad for pain asymbolics instrumentally (e.g. the damage caused by the laceration to the skin is bad for them, say if it were to get infected), but the intuitive answer is that such experiences are not IPB for pain asymbolics. Pain asymbolics often report these experiences as pains, but claim not to mind or be bothered by them ­– a claim reflected in the fact that they do not display the adverse reaction behaviours and general motivational profile typical of paradigmatic pain experiences. Taken at face value such reports indicate that asymbolics do not find these experiential states unpleasant, and so they are not IPB states for them to be in. Moreover, whatever sympathy or pity we may have for them would not be pity in the relevant sense (see section 1).

Moving to step 5, there is, therefore, a normative contrast between the experience of pain asymbolics (state P) and unpleasant pains. But given that, according to the strong representationalist view, having an interoceptive experience which represents bodily damage is the candidate for state φ, then there is a normative contrast between state φ and unpleasant pain (step 6). And once we have got this far we remind ourselves of the NC (step 7), and step 8 follows. The candidate for state φ posited by the strong representationalist view fails to provide a satisfactory account of the unpleasantness of pains; it fails to meet the NC as there is nothing about an interoceptive experience of bodily damage that is IPB for its subject to be in.

One interesting upshot of running through how this view fails to meet the NC by reference to pain asymbolia is that, as noted, we have an experience which is reported as pain, but as not unpleasant. To some theorists, this shows (along with supporting considerations) that the representationalist analysis is not wrong as a specification of the content of pain experience *per se*, but rather that it overlooks something essential when it comes to what *unpleasant* pains consist in.[[12]](#footnote-12)

Evaluativism attempts to update representationalist theories of pain to capture the unpleasant character of paradigmatic pains, and so stands a better chance of meeting the NC. According to such views, in addition to (putatively) representing bodily damage, pain experiences represent that same bodily damage as *bad for you*;[[13]](#footnote-13) and arguably it is in virtue of doing so, in being evaluative representations of bodily damage, that we account for their unpleasantness. As Bain frames the view, ‘it is by dint of representing the badness-for-you of some bodily damage…that your pain is unpleasant, and it is in turn by dint of your pains’ being unpleasant that your pain is bad-for-you’.[[14]](#footnote-14) This is an entailment claim, which should be reflected in the truth of the following counterfactual: if it was not the case that your pain represented the badness-for-you of some bodily damage, then your pain would not be unpleasant and would not be IPB for you to be in. A number of philosophers have found Evaluativism’s account of pain’s unpleasantness, as expressed in this entailment claim, problematic.[[15]](#footnote-15) Principally, because it seems the NC is no more obviously satisfied than on previous non-evaluative representational views. However, before testing Evaluativism against the normative contrast method (see sections 3 and 4), it needs unpacking in more detail.

On this view, we have two senses of badness for the subject. First, we have the extramental badness-for-one of the bodily condition which is represented by the interoceptive experience (the pain experience) – what Bain calls badness in the bodily sense, and which is the intentional content of the experience.[[16]](#footnote-16) And then we have the IPB for one, arguably constituted by being the subject of an experience with that specific evaluative representational content. Importantly though, on this view, there is only one representation, namely the evaluative representation of extramental bodily damage (usually at a specific location) as *bad for one*, which, in turn, is said to constitute the IPB of being in that state. So, on standard Evaluativist views, subjects do not have, in addition to that first-order evaluative representation, any second-order representation (evaluative or otherwise) which would take that first representation as an intentional object. In this sense, unpleasant pains are claimed to be first-order intentional experiences. This is important if Evaluativism is going to be plausible as an account of unpleasant pains as experienced by adult humans, young children and (some) animals, since it is questionable whether young children and (some) animals have the capacity to enter into higher or second-order mental states which take first-order representational states as their intentional objects.[[17]](#footnote-17)

Evaluativism also generates (part of) a plausible explanation of the relevant normative-phenomenal difference between paradigmatic unpleasant pain experiences and those reported as pains by asymbolics. The Evaluativist can say the reason asymbolic pains are *not* IPB for their subjects is because they lack the unpleasantness constituting layer of evaluative content – they do not represent the relevant instance of bodily damage as *bad for one*. Given this, Evaluativism is typically separated into two claims about unpleasant pains; namely, (1) being in pain consists in having an interoceptive experience that represents bodily damage and, (2) that pain being unpleasant consists in one’s experience having an additional layer of evaluative content, and so also representing that bodily damage as *bad for you*.[[18]](#footnote-18) However, we need to be careful whether we understand this as a claim about the analysis of unpleasant pain – revealed to theorists in the contrast between ordinary unpleasant pain experience and non-unpleasant asymbolic pain – or whether this distinction is manifest in the personal level phenomenology. Evaluativists do not typically say, but it is plausible that paradigmatic unpleasant pain experiences are phenomenologically unified; subjects’ experience just one form of intentional directedness, which on Evaluativist views is specified as an interoceptive experience which represents bodily damage as bad-for-one. In this sense, subjects of unpleasant pains would not *experience* the layer of evaluative content as additional, or as qualifying any antecedently presented non-evaluative sensory content.

It is also important to emphasize the reflexive (self-concerning) aspect of the evaluative content. The evaluative representation is of the bodily damage as *bad-for-one*, not just bad *per se*. This needs keeping in mind since in selecting candidates for normative contrast cases since it would be unfair to select states in which something was merely represented as *bad*, rather than as *bad-for-one*. For example, I might entertain the thought that the stock market crashing is *bad*. This is an evaluative representation with a content which represents a state of affairs *as bad*. However, I need not believe this state of affairs is bad*-for-me*, say if I know all my savings are in gold, and so are relatively protected from market fluctuations.

Next, given Evaluativism is intended as an update of representationalist views of pain, the candidate for state φ will have a certain content. Yet, given our interest in personal level pain experiences, and intrinsic *phenomenal* badness, the kind of content should be experiential content, that is the content of personal level occurrent experiences in which something is represented as being *thus and so* through states of phenomenal consciousness. For example, if it turns out that on Evaluativist views state φ is supposed to be a perception (or perception-like in certain respects), then it should be a perceptual or perception-like *experience*. Evaluativist views of pain’s unpleasantness will not get off the ground if the relevant perception is merely a subpersonal state of a perceptual system since it is uncontroversial that there is nothing intrinsically *phenomenally* bad for one about being in a subpersonal state. Relatedly, talk of *intentional* rather than *representational* content may be congenial to discussions of Evaluativist views. This is because when it comes to personal level experiences, we may think talk of representational content hamstrings Evaluativist accounts to an implausible cognitivism about pains, if we associate representational content with doxastic states or propositional attitudes. If we think that perceptual experiences, for example, are non-doxastic presentations, or seemings, that is states in which it doesn’t seem one is entertaining a propositional attitude toward the relevant content, then intentional experiential content can cover the content of both representations and presentations. Intentional content then will be the broader genus of which representational or presentational content are instances (I also use the form *(re)presentation* to signal this, although we will come back to these issues in sections 3 and 4).

A further important point – already broached in the introduction – is that Bain contrasts his Evaluativist view with *additionalism*, that is views according to which the relevant badness for one of unpleasant pain is explained in terms of an additional non-intrinsic feature (e.g. a desire that the damage should cease to occur) – for the Evaluativist, that would be in addition to being experiences with a specific intentional content.[[19]](#footnote-19) Yet given this commitment to anti-additionalism, combined with the original entailment claim (see above), a further philosophical commitment of Evaluativism becomes salient.

For Evaluativists, it might be the case that intentional content must exhaustively constitute, rather than merely constrain, the overall phenomenal character of unpleasant pains.[[20]](#footnote-20) Consider, the weaker merely constraining view, according to which a change in intentional content, and so a change in what the experience (re)presents to phenomenal consciousness, leads to a change in phenomenal character. For example, in a paradigmatic visual perceptual experience, if a road sign was seen as phenomenally-green, rather than phenomenally-red, there would be a phenomenological difference: what-it-is-like-for-me to see the road sign as phenomenally-green is different from what-it-is-like-for-me to see it as phenomenally-red. In this sense, intentional experiential content constrains overall phenomenal character, but need not exhaustively constitute it. After all, the experience may include additional non-intentional or non-object involving subjective features, e.g. anticipations.[[21]](#footnote-21)

But given the entailment claim and anti-additionalism, Evaluativism seems committed to the stronger view, expressed as follows: if Evaluativism is to satisfy the NC it must be because being in a state with a certain experiential intentional content (namely, (re)presenting bodily damage as bad-for-one) exhaustively constitutes the overall phenomenal character of being in that state, which must include that it is IPB for one to be in that state. The Evaluativist could respond that they are not committed to intentional content exhaustively constituting phenomenal character *per se* for unpleasant pains, but rather (given the entailment claim and anti-additionalism) that intentional content exhaustively constitutes the relevant IPB aspect of the phenomenal character of unpleasant pains. This is fair, but makes salient that if there are features or aspects of the phenomenal character of unpleasant pains not exhaustively constituted by its intentional experiential content, then they should, for Evaluativism, make no difference to whether it is IPB for subjects to be in the relevant candidate state.

Once Evaluativism is clarified in the above ways, it should be clear why one way of understanding the so-called messenger-shooting objection is misplaced. The question originally posed by Richard Hall, is why would being in a representational state, namely one which represents bodily damage as bad-for-one, be IPB for one to be in?[[22]](#footnote-22) This worry purports to show that there is an explanatory gap between being in a specific representational state (perhaps understood as a subpersonal representation or a non-phenomenal doxastic state) and being in an experiential state which is IPB for one to be in. Yet, once we see that (1) the relevant (re)presentations posited by Evaluativism are personal level intentional experiences, and accept that (2) personal level intentional content can constitute relevant aspects of phenomenal character, then it becomes possible that there is something IPB about enjoying specific kinds of intentional experiences with specific contents. It is a further question whether Evaluativism can fully close this gap – the normative contrast method is set up to test this – but given (1) and (2) there is no reason to think the gap cannot be closed *in principle*.[[23]](#footnote-23)

As a final point, one can accept the intentionalist framework of Evaluativism, without accepting arguably controversial aspects of strong representationalist views. Specifically, one need not adopt an externalist or ‘information-theoretic’ psychosemantics, where what any token intentional state represents (its content in the wide, Russelian sense) is determined by environmentally specified tracking relations – for example, reliable causal co-occurrence or co-variance with environmental features.[[24]](#footnote-24) Evaluativism, in the context of this paper, can fruitfully be viewed as an attempt to capture relevant aspects of the phenomenal character of unpleasant pains by reference to a specific kind of experiential intentional content. The project of naturalising the content of unpleasant pains can, therefore, be viewed as secondary to satisfying the NC.

**3. Evaluative Thoughts and Intentional Modes**

Given how Evaluativism was framed in section 2, it provides us with a clear candidate for state φ as what unpleasant pain consists in, as one with a specific intentional content. The relevant intentional content, in generic form, is ‘bodily damage as bad-for-me’. Let’s plug this into the normative contrast method.

Evaluativism tells us being in unpleasant pain consists in being in a state which (re)presents ‘bodily damage as bad-for-me’. What candidates are there for state P, which also consists in a (re)presentation of bodily damage as bad-for-me? One obvious candidate is an evaluative belief or judgement. However, we need to be careful, since it would be unfair to Evaluativism if we construe these as states with no phenomenal character, perhaps as subpersonal states or (non-phenomenal) dispositions. A better candidate is something like an occurrent evaluative thought, which has a (cognitive) phenomenology. It is possible we might entertain an evaluative thought with the content ‘my broken leg [the bodily damage] is bad-for-me’. So, we have a candidate for state P.

We now need to see whether entertaining the evaluative thought ‘my broken leg is bad-for-me’ is uncontroversially not IPB for its subject to be in. Using the sympathetic test first, it would be odd to have pity or sympathy (in the relevant sense) for someone who entertained evaluative thoughts with this content, or sufficiently similar ones. Consider the following example. Say I am in hospital with a broken leg, and the doctor gives me a high dose of morphine, enough to completely numb any pain. Lying in the hospital bed I then entertain the thought ‘my broken leg is bad-for-me’. My partner notices a pensive look on my face and asks me ‘what are you thinking about’, to which I respond ‘that my broken leg is bad-for-me’ (or a sufficiently close approximation). It would be odd if my partner, apprised of the contents of my mind, was to pity me for being in specifically that state – for entertaining that evaluative thought. Given any pain has been eliminated, surely any pity or sympathy is appropriately directed at my general condition (a state of affairs) and its consequences and effects (that I’m lied up here rather than at home), not that I’m entertaining evaluative thoughts with the relevant contents (which constitute their specific phenomenal characters).

We might also claim, in line with the intuitive-cum-phenomenological test, that thoughts in general, evaluative or otherwise, are not plausible candidates for necessarily having negatively valenced phenomenal characters. Given this, what could plausibly make the difference in this case of state P as in fact being IPB to be in? Is it the reflexive aspect of the evaluative content, that is, its badness-*for-me*? Clearly not: I can entertain occurrent thoughts with reflexive evaluative contents that are not plausible candidates for being IPB to be in. To see this, consider a transition from the non-reflexive evaluative thought that ‘chocolate is bad’, to the reflexive evaluative thought that ‘chocolate is bad-for-me’. Say I happen to be allergic to chocolate, but am often forgetful of that fact. I see a bar of chocolate and think, ‘chocolate is bad’, and then quickly remember that ‘chocolate is bad-for-me’. When I make the transition to the latter intentional state, does a new, negatively valenced, property come into phenomenal consciousness, thereby qualifying it such that it becomes IPB for me to entertain an evaluative thought with specifically that content? The intuitive answer is no.

Perhaps what makes the difference is that the intentional object which admits of the reflexive evaluative qualification is an instance of bodily damage. However, consider the following case. Say I have just been told by a physician that I have, due to excessive alcohol consumption, fatty liver disease. My body has been subject to damage, or put another way, there is an instance of bodily damage. I happen, however, to have an indifferent attitude toward this information, at least at first. The physician, worried that I will continue to excessively consume alcohol, impresses upon me that my liver being so damaged *really is* bad-for-me, and manages to convince me to the extent that when leaving the appointment, I have impressed on my mind the thought that ‘this liver damage is bad-for-me’. However, is it plausible that entertaining this thought is IPB for me? While the thought may have a distinctive phenomenal character, given its intentional experiential content, what seems negatively valenced and bad is the extramental state of my liver, not the overall phenomenal character of being in an intentional state about it. And to re-apply the sympathetic test, someone might appropriately pity my condition of having a fatty liver (as a kind of bodily damage which is bad-for-me) but *not* my being in the condition of entertaining the evaluative thought with the content ‘my fatty liver is bad for me’.

Intuitions about phenomenology can only get us so far in these cases, but it is reasonable to think the candidate for state P in this instance is *not* IPB to be in. Once we accept this, however, the Evaluativist is in trouble. Given there is the relevant normative contrast between being in state P and being in unpleasant pain (step 5), and that being in state P consists in being in the Evaluativist candidate for being in state φ, then there is the relevant normative contrast between being in state φ and being in unpleasant pain (step 6). Followed to its conclusion, the normative contrast method tells us that Evaluativism’s candidate for state φ – an intentional experience with the content ‘bodily damage as bad-for-me’ – fails to meet the normative constraint outlined by the NC, and so fails as a satisfactory account of the unpleasantness of pain.

Now, the Evaluativist may feel hard done by at this point and are likely to respond as follows. They will say the candidate picked for state P is a doxastic state, in this case an occurrent evaluative thought, whereas their candidate for state φ is a non-doxastic state, namely a specific kind of perceptual experience.[[25]](#footnote-25) Yet, an important feature of the normative contrast method is that at no point does it claim (explicitly or implicitly) that being in unpleasant pain is, or essentially involves, an evaluative thought. Such a claim is problematic on a number of grounds. For example, if we are confident in our ascriptions of unpleasant pains to young children and (some) animals, and if we think the possibility of entertaining evaluative thoughts requires satisfying possession conditions for the concepts which figure in those contents (e.g., the concepts of damage, and of badness-for-me), then we have to ascribe implausible doxastic conceptual sophistication to (some) animals and young children to be correct in attributing them unpleasant pains.

The important point is not that being in unpleasant pain involves entertaining evaluative thoughts with a specific content, but rather that the relevant evaluative thoughts ostensibly have the same intentional content as specified by Evaluativist accounts of unpleasant pains. The burden is then on the Evaluativist to explain why, if the intentional content of unpleasant pain exhaustively constitutes the relevant IPB aspect(s) of phenomenal character, an intentional experience with the same content is not also IPB for its subject to be in. The fact that the intentional mode through which that content is (re)presented is different (e.g. a perceptual mode, rather than a doxastic one) is beside the point given Evaluativism’s entailment claim.[[26]](#footnote-26)

 For the appeal to the intentional mode through which the content is (re)presented to have traction against the normative contrast method, it looks like the Evaluativist has to make an important revision to their view. They have to claim that (at least for *unpleasant* pains) the intentional mode through which a specific intentional object is (re)presented makes a relevant difference to the phenomenal character of being in that state. A broader version of this claim is independently correct anyway: there is a manifest phenomenological difference between *seeing* a red square and *believing* that there is a red square. On standard views, both states have approximately the same content but differ in their intentional mode, which makes a significant difference to phenomenal character.[[27]](#footnote-27)

However, the intentional mode is not – at least not on standard representationalist or intentionalist views – part of the intentional content. Take a paradigmatic visual perceptual experience of seeing a red and rectangular cube. The fact that it is a perceptual experience makes a difference to its overall phenomenal character, indeed on typical views it has a sensational-presentational phenomenology. But it is not as if in stating the correctness conditions we include the fact that it was a visual perception. This is important, because if we accept this then the Evaluativist’s appeal to intentional modes as making the relevant normative difference will not be borne out in a difference in content, but a difference in being in the phenomenal state overall. So, Evaluativism should give up the strong version of the entailment claim (see section 2). It can, however, adopt an arguably more plausible claim, expressed as follows:

Weaker entailment claim: it is by dint of (re)presenting the badness-for-you of some bodily damage, and that content being (re)presented in the personal level intentional mode of perception, that your pain is unpleasant, and it is in turn by dint of your pains’ being unpleasant that your pain is bad-for-you.

While Bain does not frame things in quite these terms, it is clear, given his appeal to perceptuality (see section 4), that he has something like this position in mind.[[28]](#footnote-28)

One alternative response would be to appeal to a difference in the structureof the content. We might say evaluative thoughts, with the relevant contents, have conceptual content, whereas interoceptive pain experiences have non-conceptual content.[[29]](#footnote-29) However, this response raises more questions than it answers. First, it is a matter of debate whether the contents of perceptual experiences are in some sense non-conceptual, or rather involve the deployment of specific, non-linguistic conceptual recognitional capacities.[[30]](#footnote-30) More importantly though, why would being in a state whose content is non-conceptually structured naturally lead to its being, in the relevant cases, IPB for one to be in that state. The connection between the structure of the content of an intentional state and the normative-phenomenal properties at issue do not obviously stand in an entailment relation (they might, but more work would be needed to show they do). Also, given Bain’s reference to John McDowell in his appeal to perceptuality – see section 4 – it would be odd to rest the case for Evaluativism on a claim about non-conceptual personal level content since this is precisely what McDowell argues does not exist.

Note, pain experiences may involve non-conceptual subpersonal evaluative content, but this would be moot in this context, since (as noted in section 2) it is uncontroversial that there is nothing intrinsically *phenomenally* bad for one about being in a subpersonal state. Moreover, such a strategy would raise questions about whether what the Evaluativist claims is the content of unpleasant pain is the personal level content, or rather at best an approximation. Given these issues, the appeal to intentional modes is a less controversial route for Evaluativism to take in attempting to meet the NC. The next step is to see whether this form of the appeal to perceptuality puts Evaluativism in a better position when it comes to the normative contrast method.

**4. The Appeal to Perceptuality**

We saw in the previous section that Evaluativism can respond to the normative contrast method, where state P is an occurrent evaluative thought, by appeal to the idea that the intentional mode through which the content is (re)presented makes a relevant difference to the overall phenomenal character of that state. Following Bain, the intentional mode appealed to is perception, and he claims ‘a crucial ingredient in pain’s unpleasantness is its perceptuality’.[[31]](#footnote-31) Perceptuality, at the personal level, can be (in part) cashed out in terms of sensory-presentational phenomenology, ­where we think of perceptual experiences as ones in which some sense-perceptual object (and its properties) is *impressed* on the senses, or to use a different metaphor, we putatively *encounter*, or are in direct contact with, the relevant part of the environment.[[32]](#footnote-32) So, the perceptuality of unpleasant pains supposedly makes the relevant normative-phenomenal difference – it putatively makes them IPB for their subjects to be in. It is this claim we can now test using the normative contrast method.

One possible candidate for state P – a state that also consists in enjoying a ‘perceptual experience which (re)presents bodily damage as bad-for one’ – is as follows. Consider a soldier who has just been badly wounded, but has not yet noticed his injury. A comrade then alerts him that his arm has been sliced open, and he turns his attention to it. At this moment, the soldier has a visual perceptual experience of his wounded arm as bad-for-him – it certainly looks bad-for-him. The perceptual metaphors seem apt: the badness of his wounded arm is *impressed* on him visually, and he seems to *encounter* it, that is he seems to be in direct contact with the relevant part of the environment ­– in this case, his wounded arm under the aspect of it being bad-for-him. Yet, due to an incredibly high level of adrenaline running through his system, he doesn't (at least not immediately) feel any pain when he sees his wounded arm.

If the above describes a possible situation (in fact cases similar to the example are reasonably well-documented) we have a candidate for state P. That is a state in which it ‘perceptually seems to one that an instance of bodily damage is bad-for-one’, but in which it does not seem obvious that it is IPB to be in that state, not least because *ex hypothesi* our soldier is not in pain. And intuitions about the appropriateness of pity or sympathy (in the relevant sense) bear this out. To see this, consider an amendment of the example, where the soldier didn’t have the pain-suppressing adrenaline and immediately felt intensely unpleasant pain on noticing the laceration to his arm. In this case, pity or sympathy in the relevant sense would be *prima facie* appropriate. Reflecting this, given a choice, it is uncontroversial that *ceteris paribus* we would much rather be in the first phenomenal state than the second.

It would be wrong, however, to claim the perceptual mode makes no phenomenal difference. The experience of our soldier has a manifestly different phenomenal character to the entertaining of evaluative thoughts with the same (or relevantly similar) intentional contents. But it doesn’t seem to have made the relevant normative-phenomenal difference, that is a difference which should strongly motivate in favour of it being IPB to be in that state. So, if we grant the possibility of this candidate for state P then we can follow through the steps of the normative contrast method, and Evaluativism – so formulated – again ends up being unsatisfactory as a view of unpleasant pains.

What responses are open to the Evaluativist? First, one might deny the possibility of this candidate for state P, denying it is possible to have evaluative perceptions with the relevant content. However, such a denial might be problematic given some of Evaluativism’s background assumptions. The appeal to perceptuality is premised on the intelligibility of the notion of evaluative perception, such that values (specifically badness) are the kinds of properties that can be perceptually *impressed* on us, or *encountered*. But it seems ad-hoc to put a constraint on what kinds of contents evaluative perceptions can have, specifically to rule out them having contents which are sufficiently similar to that which the Evaluativist claims are the contents of unpleasant pain experiences. Perhaps such a response could be made to work, but Evaluativists would need to say more about evaluative perception in general and constraints on its contents in particular situations (namely when the intentional object is an instance of bodily damage) than they have done so far.

A more promising response is as follows. The Evaluativist might claim the relevant intentional mode apt to make the requisite normative-phenomenal difference is not *perception* per se, but rather *interoception*. Insofar as the candidate selected for state P above was a visual experience, rather than an interoceptive experience, it is misleading to claim that being in that candidate for state P is the same as being in the Evaluativist’s candidate state φ. In this sense, the appeal to perceptuality should be an appeal to *interoceptive* perceptuality.

To assess this response, we need to determine what interoception is, as a distinctive kind of perceptual-intentional mode. Following A.D. Craig (2003, 500-5), interoception can be defined as an awareness of the physiological condition of the body, also covering all tissues of the body, and so reflected in distinct personal level feelings of pain, temperature, itch, sensual touch, and other relevant and related bodily feelings. Importantly, it is imprecise to think of interoception as merely a perceptual impression or encounter (an experiential presentation) ‘from the inside’ in the literal sense of internal sensations (e.g. visceral feelings). Moreover, the intentional mode of interoception will have a different phenomenal character than visual-perception (and other more standard perceptual modes). For example, consider the obvious difference in phenomenal character – used as a diagnostic tool by physicians to check for sensitivity after suspected spinal injury – between seeing the doctor prick your big toe while ‘feeling nothing’, and interoceptively registering that same pinprick. Both experiences are about – and so have as part of their intentional content – the body (or a part of it), but in interoception we *feel the body*. Nevertheless, we can note an important analogy between paradigmatic sense-perceptual modes (e.g. vision, touch, hearing etc.) and interoception. In standard sense-perceptual experience we (at least seemingly) gather information about our exteroceptive environment. Similarly, in interoceptive experience we (at least seeming) gather information about our *bodily environment*. Both, therefore, have a presentational phenomenal character.

However, the Evaluativist has more work to do regarding an appeal to interoception. First, interoception is not essentially evaluative. Remember Evaluativism employs two senses of badness for the subject, the extramental badness-for-one of the bodily condition, which is (re)presented by the pain experience, and the IPB for one of being in that intentional state. Yet, given that being in the relevant intentional mode is supposed to make the relevant normative-phenomenal difference, and that the evaluative property (re)presented (i.e. badness-for-one) is supposedly *impressed* on, or *encountered* by, the subject, then Evaluativism requires that the relevant interoception be an evaluative interoceptive experience. Now, this may be what being in unpleasant pain consists is, but if interoception is not essentially evaluative (e.g., pain asymbolics interoceptive experiences of bodily damage), then IPB for one will not be entailed by the relevant experience being merely interoceptive. So, the Evaluativist will have to make an appeal to specifically *evaluative* interoception.

Sufficiently qualified, the Evaluativist position now amounts to this: unpleasant pain consists in being in the overall state of an ‘evaluative interoception of bodily-damage as bad for one’, and it is by dint of being in this state that one’s pain is unpleasant, and so IPB for one. In this sense, the appeal to perceptuality ends up being an appeal to a form of *impression* or *encounter* in the mode of evaluative interoception.

The power of the appeal to perceptuality now becomes salient. By specifying unpleasant pain in the above way, the Evaluativist may be able to resist the formulation of *any* state P such that being in state P also consists in being in state φ, and so the normative contrast method cannot get up and running. As Bain notes, there may still be the lingering skeptical worry that ‘evaluativists have not yet explained *what* it is that is bad for you about perceptually (read: in the mode of evaluative interoception) experiencing a bodily state of yours as being bad for you’.[[33]](#footnote-33) Although Bain argues that given that normative explanations have to stop at some point, then the skeptical worry may be just that; a lingering worry that cannot be entirely discharged, but nonetheless something that does not decisively tell against Evaluativism.[[34]](#footnote-34) However, remember that we are not trying to explain the intrinsic phenomenal badness of unpleasant pains – that is a normative fact the truth of which may have to be taken as brute (or at least circularly explained: ‘because they feel unpleasant!’). Rather, we are trying to explain how the Evaluativist account of unpleasant pains can reflect that (putative) normative fact. The IPB for one of unpleasant pains may be an irreducible normative fact, but it begs the question in favour of Evaluativism to claim that the IPB for one of an interoceptive experience of bodily damage as bad-for-one is an irreducible normative fact.

Regardless of the above consideration, there is, however, a way the normative contrast method can be applied against Evaluativism a final time. Consider the case of subject-P who has congenital pain asymbolia. P has never experienced unpleasant pain, but nonetheless has interoceptive experiences of bodily damage. P is first taught, through cognitive learning processes, to *think* of these bodily sensations as *bad-for-her*. Medical professionals, philosophers of mind, and pain psychologists tell her that they typically lead to, or indicate, various kinds of bodily damage, pathology or harmfulness, that she should want to avoid, for everyday pragmatic reasons, and for broader survival reasons – the sensations are therefore cognized by her as *bad-for-her*. As part of this process P also learns the relevant avoidance and reaction behavior, including facial expressions, such as grimaces, and vocalizations (‘Ow, that hurts’!) that are a feature of ordinary unpleasant pain experience. To an external observer unaware of P’s congenital pain asymbolia there would be no reason to doubt P was having ordinary unpleasant pain experiences (at least any more than there is reason to doubt anyone else is having ordinary unpleasant pain experiences).

P’s learning then takes a distinctive twist. Her learning is so successful and internalized that her cognitive evaluations of the relevant sensations have a top-down influence on her interoceptive experiences (i.e. cognitive evaluative penetration). Over the course of many years she no longer explicitly makes the evaluative judgements of the sensations as bad-for-her, but comes to, in the relevant non-doxastic sense, experience them as bad-for-her. P’s interoceptive experiences seemingly become evaluatively qualified. Regarding the perceptuality of P’s now *evaluative* interoceptions the metaphors seem apt; she is fairly described as having the badness of the bodily condition *impressed* on her, and her experiences seem to be *encounters* with the evaluative standing of an extra-mental environmental reality, namely that an instance of bodily damage is bad-for-her. So, we have a case in which a subject comes to interoceptively perceive the relevant bodily state as ‘bad-for-them’ on the basis of top-down cognitive evaluative penetration.

If something sufficiently similar to this case is possible, then we can apply the normative contrast method. We have a candidate for state P which also consists in being in what the Evaluativist tells us is state φ. But *ex hypothesi*, P does not experience their interoceptive states, which (re)present bodily damage as bad-for-her, as unpleasant since she has congenital pain asymobolia. And whatever pity or sympathy we may have for P, it is surely not attendant to any intrinsic phenomenal unpleasantness of her interoceptive evaluations, since we know they are not unpleasant. By contrast, if the top-down process, whereby evaluative properties come to penetrate perceptual experience, gave rise to an emergent phenomenal feature of the feeling of unpleasantness, pity or sympathy would seem more appropriate. So, having established that being in this candidate for state P is uncontroversially *not* IPB for its subject to be in allows us to get the normative contrast method running. And then, as we have seen on a number of occasions, it becomes difficult to resist the conclusion that the Evaluativist account fails to satisfy the NC.

Regarding such a case, Evaluativism would have to insist either that it is impossible or that somehow cognitive penetration does indeed give rise to negatively valenced phenomenal properties. Note though how counter-intuitive the latter option is; P would have, through cognitive learning, overcome her congenital insensitivity to pain!

While the considerations and examples in this final section are not decisive against Evaluativism, and intuitions may clash about the cases described, they show that it is by no means obvious whether the appeal to perceptuality can do the necessary work to resist the application of the normative contrast method. At best, it is still unclear whether the appeal to perceptuality, even sufficiently clarified, has the resources to satisfy the NC.[[35]](#footnote-35)

As a final point, we can note a cost that is accrued if Evaluativism adopts the position of holding there is no state P, such that being in state P could ever consist in being in their candidate for state φ. One way of understanding this position is as saying that the content of unpleasant pains, while evaluative and concerned with bodily damage, is *sui generis*,such that it cannot be accurately stated, but only roughly and approximately characterized by the formulations Evaluativism provides. This position undermines the application of the normative contrast method, but at the same time renders the content of unpleasant pains relatively mysterious compared with that of paradigmatic intentional or representational states. In that sense, it does not seem particularly far from the claim that unpleasant pains are at least partially resistant to the representationalist or intentionalist framework for the analysis of mental states, as an analysis which begins with detailed specifications of content. But if that is the case, Evaluativism starts to look less like an update of representationalist views, and rather something quite different.

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1. As David Bain notes, the badness of emotions consequent on unpleasant pain are themselves in need of explanation. Arguably one might think they are also, at least in part, bad for the subject non-instrumentally, in virtue of the experiential unpleasantness of undergoing them; see Bain (2017, 4). For the purposes of this paper, however, I focus on the badness of unpleasant pains, bracketing whether similar claims apply to negative emotions. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Cf. Martinez (2015, 2261-74), for an instrumental view which denies there is anything intrinsically bad about unpleasant pains. See Bain (2017, 3-5) for criticism. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See Aydede (2014, 119-33) and also Jacobson (2018, 1-27) for ‘first-order desire’ views according to which the unpleasantness of pain consists in having a first-order desire that the sensation of bodily disturbance cease. See Armstrong (1962); Brady (2015); (forthcoming); Heathwood (2007, 23-44) for ‘second-order desire’ views according to which the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order desire that the experience itself cease. On both views, what constitutes the unpleasantness of pain experiences is the subjective experiential frustration attendant to the nonsatisfaction of the relevant first or second-order desire. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Bain (2017, 13-16). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For discussions of intrinsic value pertinent to this formulation see Goldstein (1989, 255–76) and Zimmerman (1999, 653–66). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. The same constraint can be formulated to reflect the ‘broad’ intuition discussed in the text. Namely, that accounts of what makes pains unpleasant must be framed in terms of an experiential state it is *non-instrumentally bad* for its subject to be in (see Bain 2017: 1 as quoted below). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Note, the normative contrast method could be formulated in terms of ‘non-instrumental phenomenal badness-for-one’ rather than ‘intrinsic phenomenal badness-for-one’ to speak to the ‘broader’ rather than the ‘narrow’ intuition concerning the unpleasantness of pains. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See Bain (2013, 69–89); Bain (2017, 1-22); Brady (2015, 406-7). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. See Bain (2013, 69–89); (2017, 1-22). See fn.13 for other Evaluativists. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Tye (1995). Cf. non-intentional feeling theories, e.g., Bramble (2013, 201-17). A similar claim is found in pure perceptualist theories of pain; see Armstrong (1969), and Pitcher (1970, 368-93). The psychosemantics of the representationalist view of content need not concern us (see the end of the section for an explanation of why we can bracket this issue in this context). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. See Grahek (2007), and Bain (2014, 305-20) for discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Non-intentional or non-representational accounts will deny this. See Bramble (2013, 201-17). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See Tye (2005, 107); ‘to experience tissue damage as bad is to undergo an experience which represents that damage as bad’; Tye and Cutter (2011, 91); ‘our pain experiences do not just represent the presence of tissue damage, but also (roughly) represent our tissue damage as being bad for us to some degree’; Helm (2002, 22) ‘bodily pleasure and pains are evaluative: in feeling them, we feel what is going on in a particular body part to be good or bad’. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Bain (2017, 2). See also Bain (2013, 87). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See Jacobson (2013, 509-19); Brady (2015, 403-16;) Aydede & Fulkerson (*forthcoming*). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. See Bain (2013, 82). Given that badness is an evaluative property it is plausible that, like most (if not all) evaluative properties, it is higher-level or resultant property which depends on the presence of specific conjunctions of lower-order basal properties, where the relation would be some form of supervenience. The precise character of the supervenience relation could be spelled out in more detail (i.e., whether the modal force is intended to be metaphysical (logical) necessary or nomological necessity, and whether a disjunctive specification of the relevant basal properties is sometimes appropriate). Nothing here turns on these issues. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See Brady (2015, 409-13) which considers (and critiques) a second-order Evaluativist view according to which the evaluative representation targets a non-evaluative representation of bodily damage. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. See Bain (2017, 40). See also Bain (2013, 82). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. See Bain (2017, 13-16) [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. This claim should not be confused with a similar one – associated with strong representationalism – that phenomenal character *reduces* to representational content; see Tye (1995). The claim at issue is a phenomenological one, namely that once we characterize the intentional content of the relevant intentional experience we have said all there is to say about its phenomenal character. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. See Siegel (2010, 175-182). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. See Hall (1989, 647) See also Jacobson (2013, 509-19) for further discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. Someone may reject some of these intentionalist premises. Specifically, that intentional content can constitute relevant aspects of phenomenal character. For sake of argument, I assume something like this premise is plausible. Yet, as we shall see there is a complication once intentional modes are introduced to explain relevant phenomenological differences (see section 3 and 4). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. See Tye and Cutter (2011, 90-109) for a tracking psychosemantics for unpleasant pains, cf. Aydede (2014, 119-33) for a functional-causal psychosemantics, where the unpleasantness of pain attends to it playing a specific psychofunctional role, although this is claimed to be *not* sufficient for it to have content). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Cf. Nelkin (1994, 325–43), who thinks unpleasant pain consists in an evaluative judgement of bodily damage as bad-for-one. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. See Bain (2017, 2). See also Bain (2013, 87). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. See Horgan and Tienson (2002, 520-33). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. This response assumes a perceptual experience of value is something that is philosophically intelligible. While for the sake of argument I do not question this, it should be noted that it is not uncontroversial, specifically in the related field of emotion theory. See Tappolet (2012, Ch.1) and Deonna and Teroni (2012, Ch.5) for discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See Tye (2005, 168). Tye claims pains have non-conceptual content not just in that the subject need not possess the concepts which would figure in a specification of their correctness conditions, but in the stronger sense that such contents could not in principle be the content of a thought or a belief – this raises epistemological problems beyond the scope of this paper. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See McDowell (1994), cf. Peacocke (2001, 239-64). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Bain (2017, 19). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. See McDowell (1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Bain (2017, 18). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Bain (2017, 5-13) also argues all other extant accounts of pains unpleasant fail to meet the NC. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Brady (2015, 408) considers that the relevant perceptual state may be an *affective* perception. Bain does not consider this, or at least does not consider that there may be some distinctive contribution affectivity makes to the IPB for one of unpleasant pains, that is not to be explained in terms of content. While Brady (2016, 408) is right to question why an appeal to affectivity would make the relevant phenomenal difference, he equates affectivity with phenomenality which is odd. One alternative is that affectivity can be cashed out in terms of affective intentional attitudes of favour and disfavor. However, articulating an affective-attitudinal theory of unpleasant pains is a different project from the one undertaken here. For one such view see Jacobson (2018, 1-27). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)