Article

What's in a world? Du Bois and Heidegger on politics, aesthetics, and foundings

Ross Mittiga
Facultad de Historia, Geografía y Ciencia Política, Instituto de Ciencia Política, 7820436 Macul, Santiago, Chile.
ross.mittiga@uc.cl

Abstract Central to W.E.B. Du Bois's political theory is a conception of "world" remarkably similar to that put forward, years later, by Martin Heidegger. This point is more methodological than historical: I claim that approaching Du Bois's work as a source, rather than as a product, of concepts that resonated with subsequent thinkers allows us to better appreciate the novelty and vision of his political theory. Exploring this resonance, I argue, helps to refine the notions of world and founding present in each theorist's work. Yet, it is only by remaining attentive to their differences that we can understand how Du Bois and Heidegger could endorse such dramatically opposed political programs despite similar theoretical starting points.
Contemporary Political Theory (2018). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-018-0281-9

Keywords: WEB Du Bois; Martin Heidegger; world; founding; politics; aesthetics

Martin Heidegger is said to have regarded his conception of "world" [*Welt*] as his greatest original contribution to the study of philosophy (Russon, 1995, p. 525 *n*. 2).[1] Yet, W.E.B. Du Bois used the same term in a strikingly similar fashion years before Heidegger debuted it in *Being and Time*. As I explain below, for both thinkers, "world" refers to the constellation of values, ideals, standards, and stories manifest in and through the historical group-life of a specific people, which together constitute that people's outlook and identity.[2] Moreover, Du Bois and Heidegger possess very similar views about how art and politics can rend the "veil" to reveal what was previously concealed and found a new world.

Some may be wary of comparing these thinkers, considering the tremendous gulf between their political programs. What could we possibly hope to gain from reading them together, when they are themselves very much "worlds" apart? I argue that putting Du Bois and Heidegger into conversation refines the concepts of world and founding in each, which in turn offers a rich intellectual bearing for approaching pressing political issues in late modernity, particularly those

© 2018 Springer Nature Limited.

concerning the constitutive and regulative power of evaluative standards on the judgments and self-understandings of persons and polities.

Yet, while exploring this theoretical resonance, it is essential to keep sight of their differences, as these offer insight into why these thinkers embrace such disparate politics. Thus, in the next section, I argue that while Du Bois and Heidegger hold similar views about how worlds shape individuals and societies, only Du Bois considers the lived experiences of those objectified, marginalized, and degraded by the standards of a particular world.

Moreover, as the succeeding section explains, while Du Bois and Heidegger both argue that foundings occur through an intersubjective communion between leaders and subjects, and artists and audiences, Du Bois provides a much clearer picture of how aesthetics and politics can (and perhaps must) operate *together* in confronting an old world and establishing a new one. And crucially, while Du Bois affirms the role of critical political speech in founding a new world, Heidegger appears oblivious to the possibility that contentious political exchanges could have any value.

These factors help reveal how Heidegger could ultimately embrace a world centered on racial hierarchy and the eradication of difference, while Du Bois calls for one capable of accommodating racial difference without imbuing it with sociopolitical inequality. In effect, by drawing on the experiences of slavery, segregation, and colonial rule, Du Bois shows us how we might found a world that is antithetical to the dehumanization of others.[3] Heidegger, of course, does no such thing.

By demonstrating the ways in which Du Bois's work anticipates Heidegger's, this article cuts against the prevailing tendency in the literature to approach Du Bois as the intellectual heir of earlier (European) thinkers – particularly Hegel.[4] Although such interpretations are often illuminative, I hope to show that approaching Du Bois as a *source*, rather than a *product*, of influential ideas allows us to more fully appreciate the novelty and vision of his political theory. Yet, in arguing that Heidegger and Du Bois possess similar conceptions of world, I am not claiming that Heidegger was directly influenced by Du Bois;[5] it is much more likely that both thinkers' conceptions were shaped by the German intellectual climate within which each began his career.[6]

One final prefatory note. While this is, on one level, an article in the history of political thought dealing specifically with Du Bois and Heidegger, the arguments should interest anyone concerned with how norms and nations come to be formed and reformed – that is, how certain values and ideals come to structure the evaluative judgments, self-understandings, and social and political relations of a given people over time. Moreover, the answers Du Bois and Heidegger give to these questions – and, in the former's case, put into practice – are, I believe, quite plausible. At the most basic level, each claims that it is neither "great men" moving history, nor some desultory morass of people, accidents, and machines, but rather a

quiet ethical–aesthetic–political interplay between leaders and followers, artists and audiences – a process through which the very denominations of "leader," "follower," and so on come to possess practical meaning. Still, one need not accept this view of peoplehood- and value-formation to think it worthwhile to examine how two thinkers who were on the front lines of identity-based, nationalist struggles in the early twentieth century conceptualized this process. For, these same struggles appear to be reemerging today, from Jakarta to Copenhagen, and Budapest to Charlottesville.

Mapping a concept: world, judgment, and prejudice

Five key features of world are salient in both Du Bois's and Heidegger's accounts. First, a world is the source of evaluative norms and standards, which are, second, ineliminably tied to a specific historical people *qua* that people. Third, these values, standards etc. not only define the group-life of a historical people or society but exert tremendous constitutive and regulative power. In other words, worlds largely (albeit not wholly) determine the (self-)consciousness, identity, and evaluative outlook of each individual residing within them. Fourth, the intersubjective imposition and maintenance of a world is always imperfect and incomplete: imperfect in that a world must always be subjectively negotiated and can thus never be *fully* determinative of individual identity; incomplete because a world always simultaneously defines *and* obscures, reveals *and* conceals, and thus never catches the entirety of being.[7]

Du Bois employs this conception of world where he speaks of "the two worlds within and without the Veil": namely, "the white world" and the "black world" (respectively: 1986a, p. 359, 1986b, ch. 6, and 1986a, ch. 1, 1986a, p. 418). For Du Bois, worlds are not just racially demarcated milieus – though they are certainly this as well.[8] Rather, again, each world is a constellation of values, standards, norms, etc. embodied in the historical group-life or character of a specific people. And the various points in this constellation together constitute the peculiar evaluative outlook of that people, instantiated (imperfectly) in the consciousness of each individual member.[9] We see this conception peering through Du Bois's oft-quoted passage on double consciousness:

> …the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American *world*, – a *world* which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other *world*. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a *world* that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two

> unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. (italics added; 1986a, p. 364)

According to Du Bois, a world provides the "tape" by which one "measures one's soul." It reveals an image of oneself – a peculiar evaluative insight – that is central to one's identity. Furthermore, each world contains its own distinct "strivings" and "ideals."

This passage raises several other points I note here and return to below. First is the idea that one can exist between two or more worlds – an experience that may cause considerable harm, particularly if the values, standards, and strivings of these different worlds conflict. Second is the idea that the American world of Du Bois's time is wholly colonized by (or strongly identified with) the white world. The white world presents itself as *the* American world; the white evaluative perspective as *the* American perspective. Being a black American therefore in part means internalizing and assessing oneself in light of the racialized (and racist) standards and values of this white-dubbed-American world. As I argue below, however, Du Bois stresses that 'American' need not equal 'white' permanently. Indeed, he regards the American world as a site of political contestation and possible reconfiguration, i.e., he believes that founding a new American world is possible. Finally, and relatedly, by showing how the American/white world threatens to overwhelm the consciousness of black individuals dwelling within it, Du Bois's double-consciousness passage exposes the difficulty of developing a new world for those who are already (at least partially) determined by another – viz. of enabling those who are regarded as objects to realize themselves as subjects. Grasping this, I argue, is essential for understanding Du Bois's defense of cultural education, his focus on articulating an independent Afro-American aesthetic, and his support for a program of sociopolitical change spearheaded by a "talented tenth" of the black citizenry.

Like Du Bois, Heidegger argues that a world defines (or "sets forth") specific evaluative standards that are central to the social and political construction of communal and individual identity. A world "brings out" and gives measure to "what is as yet undecided and measureless," and thereby "discloses the hidden necessity of measure and decisiveness" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 61). This "necessity" is political in two senses. For one, common standards and values comprise the background context in which autonomous judgments and actions become possible and meaningful (Salem-Wiseman, 2003, p. 551). As Heidegger explains, a world "gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves" (1971, p. 42). Moreover, for Heidegger, just as for Du Bois, worlds define and govern the interrelations of individuals dwelling within them: "As a world opens itself, it submits to the decision of an historical humanity the question of *victory* and *defeat, blessing* and *curse, mastery* and *slavery*" (emphasis added; Heidegger, 1971, pp. 61, 42, 44; see also 2000, pp. 64–65). In short, worlds are political in that they give us common standards and measures, which govern our relation to the external environment and each other.

Unlike Heidegger, Du Bois helps us understand the lived experience of persons subordinated by the standards of their world: those defined as "slave" rather than as "master." He discusses how the white/American world systematically privileges whiteness over blackness, relegating beauty, superiority, righteousness, and goodness to the former, and assigning ugliness, inferiority, subjugation, and evil to the latter.[10] As this suggests, the outlook defined by a world is at once aesthetic and ethical – it ties together notions of goodness and beauty, value and rank. (This is what Heidegger means when he says a world simultaneously "gives to things their look and to men their outlook.") For Du Bois, then, the white/American world constitutes and sustains white-supremacist racism, as well as black self-deprecation[11]; both are expressions of the values, standards, ideals, etc. contained within it.

Yet, the white/American world is not the only world on American soil. According to Du Bois, black individuals in America are not wholly or exclusively *of* the American world; there is also a "Negro world" that structures its members' very understanding of "sunshine and rain," "love and labor," and "all that makes life *life*." As this "black world…surrounds and envelopes the souls of men," it shapes their peculiar identities, ideals, strivings, thoughts, and beliefs (Du Bois, 1997, p. 251).

Robert Gooding-Williams elaborates, arguing that the concept of a "spiritual world" for Du Bois encapsulates a "shared mode of self-understanding, a like-mindedness with regard to the norms (standards), meanings (interpretations…), and aspirations that shape how human beings evaluate their behaviors, interpret their lives, and envision their future" (Gooding-Williams, 2009, p. 141). In short, Du Bois conceives of world as a kind of onto-ethical mode of being. Through a world, a given people come to share a peculiar aesthetic and ethical outlook, identity, and social structure.

This is not to suggest that worlds operate at a purely conscious level; they do not. There are pre-cognitive aspects of every world that elude rational dissection. Put another way, the structure of a world can never be fully articulated.[12] This is because worlds are not just *regulative* – bringing standards to bear on persons and polities – but *constitutive* – structuring the very way people engage with and understand themselves, others, and their sociopolitical environments.

Moreover, a world is never all-encompassing. Heidegger maintains that the "truth" of a given "world" is always paired with concealment; using one measure or standard means not using another, and coming to know *something* means *something else* is rendered obscure. Contrast between what is open and what is concealed, or between "truth" and "un-truth," is essential for meaning to take shape: knowing (and even "being," for Heidegger) is only made possible by the interaction of antitheses or differences (Heidegger, 1971, pp. 53, 56, 61*ff*). Heidegger often describes the line between open, unconcealed "world" and concealed "earth" as a kind of "veil."[13] The veil mediates the boundary between what is known, or "sayable," and what is not (Heidegger, 1971, p. 71).

As many commentators have noted, the image of the "veil" is also central to Du Bois's work.[14] For Du Bois, however, the veil is tied specifically to the "color line." Those living "within" or "behind" the veil are people of color, who are denied presence or subjectivity in the white world that surrounds and subjugates them. Thus, the veil is a barrier to two specific forms of knowing or "disclosure": intersubjective (or, one might say, inter-world) and intrapersonal.

Du Bois explores the problem of intersubjective (inter-world) concealment by demonstrating how the standards, norms, and values that characterize the white world produce tightly policed boundaries that inhibit interracial understanding or solidarity (1999, pp. 70–77). Each person is thereby left with mere projections of the other – often simple and vulgar caricatures, circumscribed by fear and filtered through the prejudicial mechanisms of cultural media.[15] A "veil" thus runs through the social, political, and physical spaces co-inhabited but not shared by America's discrete racial communities, preventing all from "apprehending the character of each other's lives" (Gooding-Williams, 2009, p. 101). For Du Bois, this veil's most palpable form is Jim Crow segregation, which creates "in the South two separate worlds; and separate not simply in the higher realms of social intercourse, but in church and school, on railway and street-car, in hotels and theatres, in streets and city stations, in books and newspapers, in asylums and jails, in hospitals and graveyards" (1986a, pp. 439, 488 *ff*). The color line represented and reinforced by Jim Crow segregation is a veil that separates white from black (e.g., Du Bois, 1986a, pp. 520, 438).

Interpersonal (or inter-world) veiling is not the only form of concealment Du Bois describes. He also considers the intrapersonal concealment that comes from living within – or between – two worlds. This is part of the problem of "double-consciousness" – or what Gooding-Williams calls "false self-consciousness" (2009, pp. 79*ff*). This form of concealment occurs when a person dwells within a world that explicitly denies her any robust subjectivity (by which I mean, roughly, the ability to transcend her physicality, shape values, craft a life, make and live through value, and take part in cooperative ventures autonomously). In other words, intrapersonal concealment happens when a person is *object*ified, viewed as just one instance of a reified kind, and thus (mis)understood as something unchanging and, for black Americans especially during the Jim Crow era, inferior, base, and contemptible or pitiable. As Lawrie Balfour (1998, p. 349) explains, "[f]or Du Bois, double consciousness involves participating in an 'American' culture that sees his African heritage as degraded."

In this way, those behind the veil become inscrutable to themselves; all that is reflexively intelligible is so only by the "revelation of the other world." Consequently, self-disclosure or articulation – through "natural movement, expression, and development" – is hindered (Du Bois, 1986b, p. 650). Those behind the veil are thus afforded "no true self-consciousness": the internalization and reflexive application of white-supremacist values "inevitably" elicits within

them a persistent and grave "self-questioning, self-disparagement, and lowering of ideals" (Du Bois, 1986a, pp. 364–365, 369). The white/American world – with its racist "truths" – conceals the subjectivity and value of the lives of those many millions living behind the veil.

So while Heidegger and Du Bois appear to agree that every world brings with it not just truth, but concealment, only Du Bois attends to the lived experiences of those who are objectified, marginalized, and degraded by a given world – particularly a world whose "truth" is racial hierarchy. This raises the question for each (though especially powerfully for Du Bois): what possibilities exist for rending the veil, revealing the concealed – in short, for founding a new world?

Art, politics, and the founding of a world

In answering this question, Du Bois and Heidegger both appeal to the power of politics and aesthetics. Both also emphasize the interplay between leaders and artists, on the one hand, and communities and audiences, on the other. Because Heidegger's account of world-founding is in some ways more theoretically explicit, I begin there. But as we will see, Du Bois provides a more compelling account of how politics and art can and *must* work together in confronting an old world and founding a new one. Moreover, unlike Heidegger, Du Bois's theory of founding provides a central place for critical political speech and the accommodation of (racial) difference. As I argue below, this accounts for the enormous differences in the political programs Du Bois and Heidegger enact or endorse – the former subscribing to a politics of inclusion, reconciliation, and uplift, the latter to one of oppression and the eradication of difference.

Heidegger's theory of founding

For Heidegger, new worlds are founded by "disclosing" new modes of *alētheia* (roughly, truth).[16] The method of revealing that receives the most extensive treatment in Heidegger's corpus is that following from *poiesis*, the Greek term for art, poetry, or more precisely, "creation."[17] In fact, in "The Origin of the Work of Art" and subsequent works *poietic* or aesthetic foundings comprise his only focus.

In earlier work, however, Heidegger claims that one "way in which truth [as *alētheia*] occurs is the act that founds a political state" (1971, p. 60). Given Heidegger's affiliation with the Nazi party and his own anti-Semitism, his invocation of politics as a foundation of truth rings ominously. And although there is certainly room for interpretation of what precisely he meant to express in his philosophical writings, there can be no doubt that, at least at one point in his career, he had in mind the idea of Adolf Hitler calling into existence a new German world (Thiele, 1995, pp. 133–134, 147).

Outside of considerations of historical context, Heidegger offers little direct insight into what a political founding involves. A couple of points are clear, however. Political foundings are not solely events that occurred, as if by some unseen hand, in the distant past – rather, they can (and must) be deliberately pursued in the present. This is suggested in Heidegger's 1933 rectorate address (1990, p. 9), where he speaks paradoxically of the German people marching toward the "future history" of a new German state. He insists that "[t]he beginning still *is*. It does not lie *behind* us, as something that was long ago, but *before* us. … The beginning has invaded our future. There it stands as the distant command to us to catch up with its greatness" (Heidegger, 1990, p. 8). This suggests that a founding – the occasioning of a new truth, with new standards, values, practices, and ideals – is a permanent possibility for any historical people (or "folk"). It also implies that such beginnings are always grounded in *what is*, and thus that the break between old and new can never be total. In other words, every new beginning must arise by confronting the existing world; in this sense, a beginning "always contains the undisclosed abundance of the unfamiliar and extraordinary, which means it also contains strife with the familiar and ordinary" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 74). Hence Heidegger's description of a founding as an "overflow" – through confrontation, a new world overtakes and partially subsumes the old (1971, p. 73).

While Heidegger ultimately moves away from (though never repudiates) the claim that political acts can found a new world, his later focus on aesthetic foundings, – foundings occasioned by great "works of art" – retains distinctively political features.

For one, perhaps surprisingly, Heidegger does not attribute foundings to the works of great leaders or artists alone. Rather, he claims that foundings require a communion between leaders (or creators/artists) and subjects (or audience). Heidegger argues that those who focus only on the generative acts of the former – the acts of a great leader or artist – fall victim to the fallacy of "modern subjectivism," which "misinterprets creation, taking it as the self-sovereign subject's performance of genius" (1971, p. 73). On this view, a great leader or artist is only able to articulate and "cast forth" a vision of truth "toward a historical group of men." For such a revealing to be capable of founding a new world, that historical group must be prepared to receive it and act as its "preservers" (Heidegger, 1971, pp. 73, 65*ff*, 75). "Preserving" always requires the affirmation of an historical community, which itself is called into being by particular works of art or political speech acts.[18] As Heidegger (1971, p. 66) explains:

> Preserving the work does not reduce people to their private experiences, but brings them into affiliation with the truth happening in the work. Thus, it grounds being for and with one another as the historical standing-out of human existence in reference to the unconcealedness.

It is through this experience that one can take part in the truth of one's community as disclosed through the medium of politics or art, and thus realize oneself as a "being-in-the-world." This process is creative and transformative for both creators and preservers:

> Not only the creation of the work is poetic, but equally poetic, though in its own way, is the preserving of the work; for a work is in its actual effect as a work only when we remove ourselves from our commonplace routine and move into what is disclosed by the work, so as to bring our own nature itself to take a stand in the truth of what is. (Heidegger, 1971, p. 72)

In short, achieving communion between leader and folk, artist and audience, is essential for revealing a new mode of truth and founding a world. This relationship is inextricably political.

Moreover, the truth that is cast forth by leaders and artists, and preserved by subjects and audiences, articulates the evaluative standards that define the judgments of that specific people. Hence Heidegger's claim that "[a]rt is history in the essential sense that it grounds history"; or "[t]he origin of the work of art – that is, the origin of both the creators and the preservers, which is to say of a people's historical existence, is art" (1971, p. 75). Such *alētheiac* disclosures establish the historical "truth" and mission of a specific people *qua* that people by providing them standards and ideals that govern their shared lives.

Heidegger defines history as "the transporting of a people into its appointed task as entrance into that people's endowment" (1971, p. 74). An endowment, in this sense, is a shared historical legacy that already exists in unarticulated form before the work-of-art or political speech-act reveals it as such: "Genuine poetic projection is the opening up or disclosure of that into which human being as historical is already cast" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 73). A people's appointed task may be any number of things, though Heidegger uses similar language elsewhere (1990) to describe the "spiritual mission" of the German *Volk*. Through *poiesis* and politics, "the concepts of an historical people's nature, i.e. of its belonging to world history, are formed for that folk, before it" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 71, see also pp. 40–42, 56).

Before turning to Du Bois, it is helpful to summarize the main pillars of Heidegger's theory of foundings:

(1) To found a world, great leaders or artists must achieve a kind of community with their subjects or audience, based on a revealing of truth (as *alētheia*) through political speech or works-of-art.
(2) Through this revealing, the new and unfamiliar confronts and displaces some aspects of the ordinary and familiar, while retaining others.

(3) Each historical people or folk has an "appointed task" or "spiritual mission," as well as some native "endowment," articulated and realized through *alētheiaic* instances of political speech or works of art.

As I show below, these features – including close attention to the world-founding power of art and politics – also appear in, though are not exhaustive of, Du Bois's work.

Du Bois on founding a world

That Du Bois's corpus is itself essentially an imbrication of political and artistic pieces is well known. Gooding-Williams (2009, pp. 5, 18, *passim*) argues that these overlapping elements – (critical) political and artistic writing – together constitute a "politics of expressive self-realization." While I agree with this basic characterization, for reasons I elaborate below, I depart from Gooding-Williams's view of Du Bois's broader objectives. More specifically, while Gooding-Williams understands Du Bois's project to be aiming at the promotion of black "assimilation" into an existing American world somehow shorn of its racial prejudices,[19] I argue that Du Bois's work has a much more radical goal: the founding of a new American world.

Of course, scholars have already provided compelling rebuttals to the claim that Du Bois's work sought the "assimilation of black culture into white culture" (Mariotti, 2009, p. 364). Some have also argued that Du Bois aimed to re-found the American polity (e.g., Rogers, 2012, p. 188). Yet, there are no sustained theoretical accounts of how Du Bois understood the process of this kind of radical world-founding. Approaching Du Bois's work through the Heideggerian framework outlined above is helpful in this regard. Of course, we must not minimize the differences between Du Bois and Heidegger. Indeed, as we shall see, Du Bois's view of foundings improves on Heidegger's in two crucial respects: while Heidegger regards aesthetics and politics as discrete paths to world-founding (albeit ones that share many features), Du Bois, through the very structure of his most paradigmatic works, shows us that politics and aesthetics can (and perhaps must) operate together in founding a world. In this, Du Bois affords a role to critical political speech – something inconceivable in Heidegger's world. Moreover, Du Bois rejects racial hierarchy, seeking instead a world capable of accommodating racial difference without imbuing it with sociopolitical inequality (Rogers, 2012).

Du Bois pursues the founding of a new American world through a political/aesthetic double tack that simultaneously (a) confronts the white-qua-American world through sustained political critique and contestation (i.e., through the medium of political speech) and (b) identifies, articulates, and produces exemplary "Negro" aesthetic contributions that "cast forth" (in the Heideggerian sense) a vision of a black identity. As noted above, (a) marks a radical break with

Heidegger's view of the role of politics in founding a world. For Heidegger, political leaders cast forth a vision of a new world, and it is up to followers to preserve this vision. In choosing to affirm, the people's duty becomes one of simply getting in line, i.e., following the vision of the leader. We see something of this model in the Nazi requirement of *Gleichschaltung*, which enforced "political conformity in all sectors [of Germany society], from the economy and trade associations to the media, culture, and education" (Strupp, 2013).[20]

Du Bois, by contrast, affords a substantive role to political debate and contestation. In terms of autobiography, he certainly never hesitated to criticize political leaders, within and outside of the black community (1986a, pp. 392*ff*). Also unlike Heidegger, Du Bois did not think criticism could (or should) be conducted only by elites. Writing on Booker T. Washington, Du Bois argues that "Honest and earnest criticism from those whose interests are most nearly touched, – criticism of writers by readers, – this is the soul of democracy and the safeguard of modern society" (1986a, p. 395). Critical speech – of leaders and artists by subjects and audiences – is crucial to affirming leaders who are capable of promoting the "self-realization and self-development" of a people (Du Bois, 1986a, p. 396). Indeed, on Du Bois's view, the very process of critical political interrogation helps to realize these ends:

> If the best of the American Negroes receive by outer pressure a leader whom they had not recognized before…there is…[an] irreparable loss,—a loss of that peculiarly valuable education which a group receives when by search and criticism it finds and commissions its own leaders. (1986a, p. 395)

In short, on Du Bois's view, followers should not "preserve" the truth of a new world uncritically, for the process of criticism can itself aid in the development of a people who are themselves "called forth" – viz. formed into a "people" – by the "truth" they are examining.

Nevertheless, as with Heidegger, leaders remain indispensable for Du Bois, insofar as they alone cast forth standards and ideals worth debating and affirming. "The Negro race, like all races," Du Bois argues, "is going to be saved by its exceptional men."[21] These exceptional men – the so-called Talented Tenth – comprise the natural "internal leadership" of the black community, largely by dint of their political and aesthetic capacities.[22] Like all other leaders, they require the highest forms of education to cultivate these capacities. Hence, the foremost "function of the Negro college" is to "develop men" of precisely this sort. Development, in the broad sense Du Bois has in mind, requires exposure to "high" culture (ancient and modern languages, literary classics, Western philosophy etc.). Such an education is necessary to equip black leaders with the ability to fulfill their "spiritual task" – only "souls" so equipped "have inspired and guided worlds" (Du Bois 1986a, pp. 437–438).

Also like Heidegger, Du Bois believes that achieving an intersubjective resonance between leaders and the lead is essential.[23] Thus, he enjoins, black elites must remain in communion with the historical community they are attempting to lead and make determinate – both for the sake of their own legitimacy as leaders, and in order to fulfill their spiritual mission of "uplift" and articulation. Du Bois's discussion of Alexander Crummell in *The Souls of Black Folk* makes this point. Crummell's failure to lead the black community is rooted in his inability or unwillingness to remain receptive to that community's historical character and sufferings (Gooding-Williams, 2009, p. 110).[24]

Undoubtedly, Du Bois considers himself a member of this leadership class – and, crucially, one who is properly attuned to the community he seeks to represent. Thus, examining his corpus provides a vital example of the double-tack strategy I am describing.

Du Bois's work attempts to dislodge the culturally hegemonic paradigms of a white-supremacist American world (a) by sustaining a political critique of that world and its values, norms, practices, and standards; and (b) by crafting an exemplary cultural product that "casts forth" a unique expression of black group-identity and, through this, an alternative vision of Americanness. In this sense, his *oeuvre* is aptly described as a source of both "literary and political authority" (Gooding-Williams, 2005, p. 204). Much the same is true of many of his individual works – especially *Souls of Black Folk* and *Darkwater*, which replicate this double tack, and thus embody this dual authority. It is through his writings that Du Bois sought to become the kind of leader he extols – one capable of giving faithful expression to the spirit of black "folk" by casting forth a vision of a new American world worthy of being preserved.

Just as Heidegger claims that every new world must confront and (at least partially) subsume what already exists, Du Bois clearly realized that any successful attempt to disclose a "genuine" black identity and vision of a new American world must inexorably confront and overcome the standards, values, ideals etc. of the existing white/American world (especially its procrustean and degrading notions of blackness). He stages such a confrontation – thereby exposing and challenging the identification of white with American – by emphasizing the historical embeddedness of black people *in* America, and the culturally defining contributions of black people *to* America. Consider the following passage from Du Bois's "The Conservation of the Races":

> We [Afro-Americans] are Americans, not only by birth and by citizenship, but by our political ideals, our language, our religion. … We are the first fruits of this new nation, the harbinger of that black to-morrow which is yet destined to soften the whiteness of the Teutonic to-day. We are that people whose subtle sense of song has given America its only American music, its

> only American fairy tales, its only touch of pathos and humor amid its mad money-getting plutocracy. (1986d, p. 822)

It is not legal or citizenship status, but shared ideals, language, and religion – all attributes of a world – that ground the essentially American character of Afro-American people. Du Bois's vision of a new American world balances the spirit of the "black to-morrow" with the "whiteness of the Teutonic to-day."[25]

To promote this vision – to demonstrate how the black world is foundational to an American world – Du Bois emphasizes the unique cultural or aesthetic contributions of black Americans. In *Souls of Black Folk*, for instance, he credits Afro-Americans with producing the "only American music" – "the Sorrow Songs" (1986a, pp. 494, 537). He also points there to the Declaration of Independence – a document likely to be at the core of *any* vision of an American world – identifying its "spirit" with that of "American Negroes" (1986a, p. 370). By this, Du Bois means to emphasize the extent to which American culture and its deepest spiritual and political strivings are bound up with the particular, if unarticulated, culture and strivings of "the Negro people." And thus, the exemplary aesthetic works and "spirit" Du Bois discusses are not only meant to give expression to an exclusively "Negro" identity but to "cast forth" an essential part of a new American identity and world.

At no point does Du Bois presume that his vision will be accepted and thus "preserved."[26] Even as he describes "the Negro folk song – the rhythmic cry of the slave" as "the sole American music" and "the most beautiful expression of human experience born this side of the seas," he readily concedes that it "has been neglected…half despised, and above all…persistently mistaken and misunderstood" (1986a, p. 537).[27] Nevertheless, *Souls of Black Folk* opens with Du Bois enjoining readers to "preserve" the truth it seeks to disclose:

> I pray you, then, receive my little book … seeking the grain of *truth* hidden there. … I have sought here to sketch, in vague, uncertain outline, the *spiritual world* in which ten thousand thousand Americans live and strive. … Leaving, then, the *world* of the white man, I have stepped within the *Veil*, raising it that you may view faintly its deeper recesses,—the meaning of its religion, the passion of its human sorrow, and the struggle of its greater souls. (italics added; 1986a, p. 359)

This further substantiates that Du Bois views himself as the kind of leader or artist needed to disclose the truth of the "world" concealed behind the "veil." As Melvin Rogers (2012, pp. 189, 188) explains, "*Souls* attempts to craft a common horizon for author and reader from which shared emotional judgments regarding racial inequality might be reached," which "creates a space for refounding the polity along more inclusive lines." To truly grapple with the message of *Souls* is to experience simultaneously a kind of knowing and a sense of community; or, as

Heidegger puts it, "Preserving the work, as knowing, is a sober standing-within the extraordinary awesomeness of the truth that is happening in the work." In this way, the preservers help found a world based on the truth disclosed by the work. It is up to us, Du Bois is saying, to perform this role.

Yet, crucially, Du Bois's aim is not simply to supplant the white/American world with a black/American one. As noted above, just as with Heidegger, Du Bois recognizes that a new world cannot entirely displace what has been or what is: some remnants of the old world will inevitably remain, no matter the extent of the confrontation. Du Bois is far from lamenting this, however. Rather, he openly celebrates certain (political and cultural) ideals inhering in "modern civilization" in general, and in the American republic in particular (1986a, pp. 365, 370, 481, 1986d, p. 822).[28] This helps explain why he opens every chapter of *Souls* by pairing the poems of "Byron, Schiller, Tennyson, Elizabeth Barrett Browning" etc. "with wordless musical notations from traditional Negro spirituals" (i.e., the Sorrow Songs). As Mariotti (2009, p. 364) explains, by "putting the two [worlds] together," Du Bois hoped to "transform both."

> It is in this spirit that Du Bois calls for
> …fostering and developing the traits and talents of the Negro, not in opposition to or contempt for other races, but rather in large conformity to the greater ideals of the American Republic, in order that some day on American soil two world-races may give each to each those characteristics both so sadly lack (1986a, p. 370).

Thus Du Bois's is a broadly integrative project. His aim is not to dissolve black into American, or American into black, but to *merge* the two worlds into a new, more exalted one, just as the person afflicted with double consciousness seeks to "merge his double self" into "a better and truer self." In other words, his intention is "not [to] Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa"; nor is it to "bleach [the] Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for…Negro blood has a message for the world" (Du Bois 1986a, p. 365). Rather, much as with Heidegger, Du Bois envisions a new world formed atop the highest peaks (or best ideals) of the old.[29]

It is worth noting here that this description of Du Bois's political project conflicts with a popular view defended by Robert Gooding-Williams. For Gooding-Williams, Du Bois's early work aims at "assimilating" Afro-Americans into a modern civilization somehow denuded of anti-black prejudice. *Pace* this view, I understand Du Bois's work as aiming at a de- and re-constructed American world, predicated on a merging of the highest Negro and American ideals that mutually accommodates the unique strivings or spiritual missions of each, while establishing a new set of evaluative standards. In short, I understand Du Bois's project as aiming at a *re-founding*.

By extension, I reject Gooding-Williams's (2009, p. 131) claim that Du Bois's discussion of the Sorrow Songs is meant (only, or even primarily) to elicit the "sympathy" of black leaders. Rather, Du Bois's focus on the Sorrow Songs should be understood as an attempt to articulate and express a strong, independent black identity, capable of serving as part of the foundation of a new American world in conjunction with the highest ideals of the white/American world it is (partially) displacing. We can see this by considering, first, Du Bois's repeated assertions throughout *Souls* that the Sorrow Songs are "distinctively Negro" productions, and remain so even when blended with "Caucasian" elements (1986a, p. 540); and, second, his claim that one finds in the Sorrow Songs an "unvoiced longing toward a truer world" (1986a, p. 538). Du Bois draws these points together in two rhetorical challenges to the reader. The first of these appears early in *Souls*, where he asks: "Will America be poorer if she replaces…her vulgar music with the soul of the Sorrow Songs?" (1986a, p. 370) The second comes at the end where, after arguing that black Africans brought to America "a gift of story and song – soft, stirring melody in an in ill-harmonized and unmelodious land," Du Bois asks, "Would America have been America without her Negro people?" (1986a, p. 545).[30]

In sum, Du Bois's work is better understood as a constructive and critical project that endeavors to build up black identity while simultaneously breaking down white cultural, social, and political hegemony. And all of this is undertaken to cast forth a *new* American world that, in its most ideal form, would be the culmination of the highest elements of both an independently[31] constructed Negro identity and a de- and re-constructed sense of Americanness. In this way, Du Bois shows us that the projects of "self-formation"[32] and world-*re*formation are inextricable.

Before concluding, a final resonance between Heidegger and Du Bois requires examination. Recall Heidegger's (1971, pp. 74, 75, 1990) claims that each historical people or folk has an "appointed task" or "spiritual mission" that is realized and made manifest through *alētheiaic* instances of political speech or works-of-art. Part of founding a world is disclosing this mission and striving towards it.

It may already be evident that Du Bois shares this view. As Kwame Anthony Appiah (2014) shows, Du Bois's work clearly embodies the romantic ambition of revealing or disclosing a genuine "Negro spirit" (which, of course, presupposes there is such a thing) with its own unique values, ideals, practices, history, norms, and evaluative determinacy. Appiah (2014, pp. 158–159) argues that, while Du Bois's view of a shared black spirit shifted over time, he never relinquished a basic belief in shared black ideals and projects. Indeed, throughout his writings, Du Bois stresses that Negros, as an historical people, share an as-yet unarticulated spiritual mission (or "striving") and "message for the world."[33] It is through the revelation (and preservation) of this shared spirit and striving that black identity is to become worthy of recognition[34] in a global and historical sense:

> Manifestly some of the great races of today—particularly the Negro race—have not as yet given to civilization the full spiritual message which they are capable of giving. … The question is, then: How shall this message be delivered; how shall these various ideals be realized? The answer is plain: By the development of these race groups, not as individuals, but as races. … For the development of Negro genius, of Negro literature and art, of Negro spirit, only Negroes bound and welded together, Negroes inspired by one vast ideal, can work out in its fullness the great message we have for humanity. … [I]f among the gaily-colored banners that deck the broad ramparts of civilization is to hang one uncompromising black, then it must be placed there by black hands, fashioned by black heads and hallowed by the travail of 200,000,000 black hearts beating in one glad song of jubilee. (Du Bois, 1986d, pp. 819–820)

In short, according to Du Bois, a unique racial identity – in this case, a genuine "Negro spirit" – can and must be disclosed by members of that "race group" through exemplary works of "literature and art."

Recall that, for Heidegger, precisely this kind of *alētheiaic* disclosing is necessary to found a new world: it is up to great artists or political leaders to cast forth a vision of an historical people that defines their "spiritual mission" (i.e., the unique strivings that define that people, historically); and it is up to that people (which the artists or leaders are calling into being) to receive and preserve that identity, and to fulfill its essential "task" or mission (1971, pp. 71–75, 1990). In doing this, Heidegger explains, "the concepts of an historical people's nature, i.e. of its belonging to world history, are formed for that folk, before it" (1971, p. 71). Du Bois clearly holds this same view.

In focusing on the "character" and "mission" of a people, there can be little doubt that Du Bois and Heidegger are giving voice to the strident nationalisms that characterized politics for much of their lives.[35] It is nonetheless striking that both thinkers do this by tying together the formative and foundational potentialities of art and politics, the idea that each historical people possesses a spiritual mission that defines it *qua* that people, and the notion that the aspiration to history is the ultimate expression of that people's identity.

Of course, this is not to equate Du Bois's black nationalism with Heidegger's Nazism. As discussed above, among many other important differences, Du Bois's nationalism seeks to accommodate interpersonal difference and remains receptive to critical political speech. Heidegger, on the other hand, overlooks the value of contentious political speech in his writings, and was extremely hostile to difference in both his political activities and personal writings.[36] These differences correspond to two different leadership ideals: Du Bois's Talented Tenth, while not perfectly democratic, is far more capable of brooking dissent and negotiating difference than

the kind of *Gleichschaltung* leadership Heidegger endorsed as a thinker and in his position as Rector of the University of Freiburg.

Conclusion

In this article, I have outlined an important, if overlooked, resonance between W.E.B. Du Bois's and Martin Heidegger's conceptions of world. For both thinkers, a world contains values, standards, practices, and ideals that are manifest in (and that define) the shared life of a specific historical people *qua* that people. Moreover, these values, standards, etc., significantly shape the judgments and identities of individual members, which, for some, can cause considerable intrapsychical harm and fracturing (as Du Bois's discussion of double consciousness vividly demonstrates).

Du Bois and Heidegger also identify art and politics as means for unsettling old worlds and founding new ones. These originary forces work by revealing truth and propagating new values, standards, and ideals. Yet, both thinkers also stress that the efforts of leaders and artists are not enough to make such revealings re-foundings; accomplishing the latter requires acceptance or affirmation on the part of the community called into being by the revealing. Thus, for Du Bois and Heidegger, the audience proves to be just as essential as the artist, the subjects as the rulers, and the preservers as the creators. Only when the former affirm and take part in the truth "cast forth" by the latter is a new world founded.

While these similarities are clearly quite striking, I have not claimed that Heidegger was (directly, at least) influenced by Du Bois. Nor have I claimed that reading Du Bois and Heidegger together is necessarily superior to other ways of reading these thinkers. I have argued simply that the resonance between the two offers a way of deepening our understanding of the politically rich concepts of world and founding in both.

That said, by showing how Du Bois's work anticipates Heidegger's, this article departs from a prevailing tendency among scholars to regard Du Bois as a product rather than as a progenitor of influential concepts. Of course, this literature remains extremely valuable for all serious students of Du Bois. Yet, an approach like that employed here may better enable political theorists to appreciate the ingenuity and scope of Du Bois's political thought.

Reading Du Bois and Heidegger together also provides a different way of thinking about, and through, Heidegger's rich theoretical framework. If, as I have argued, Du Bois's political thought and practice is guided by a theoretical framework conceptually similar to Heidegger's, then studying Du Bois presents us with an alternative vision of what a Heideggerian politics could look like. This is not to theoretically distance Heidegger from Nazism, or to dismiss his actual (maligned) philosophical intentions, but to suggest that Heidegger's theoretical

formulations of world and founding admit of various interpretations and instantiations, arguably including that put forward by Du Bois.

Moreover, understanding Du Bois's project as an attempt to found a new American world based in part on *alētheiaic* artistic contributions of the Afro-American community (like the Sorrow Songs) cuts against the popular view, defended most prominently by Robert Gooding-Williams, which regards Du Bois's primary political aim as assimilation to the existing American world. In other words, taking seriously the importance of concepts like world and founding for Du Boisian political thought supports a more radical reading of his project.

Of course, while Heidegger's conceptual framework helps us to identify Du Bois's project as one of re-founding, Du Bois usefully elaborates Heidegger's account in two key respects. First, while Heidegger uncritically declares that worlds define relations of "master and slave," he never considers the experiences of human beings relegated to the latter class. More broadly, Heidegger does not consider the experience of living in a society founded on serious inequalities, which – as Du Bois shows us – takes a toll on everyone within it, "master" as well as "slave."[37] For, unlike Heidegger, Du Bois gives voice to those objectified and subjugated by the standards of a given world, and even provides insight into the cognitive dissonance experienced by the oppressor class.

Second, and relatedly, Du Bois elucidates what it is to live between or within two worlds with conflicting standards and ideals, i.e., he takes seriously the phenomenon of double consciousness. Heidegger does not. Part of what makes insight into double consciousness so valuable is that it helps explain the impetus for a political re-founding – the desire to mend deeply harmful social and psychological fractures. Of course, social fractures existed in Heidegger's world, between Aryan and Jew, German and Slav, and Nazi and Communist. Yet, rather than pursue a politics of reconciliation, Heidegger (theoretically and materially) endorsed one of eradicating difference.

Examining the cleavage between Heidegger's and Du Bois's politics raises important questions. For instance, if worlds themselves establish the measure of things, what basis (if any) do we have for criticizing different worlds or resisting certain foundings?[38] Is there a world-independent standpoint that can rescue our condemnations and commendations from a totalizing arbitrariness, in which everything is "relative"? If so, would adopting that standpoint entail endorsing a potentially problematic universalism? One possibility is that if a given world causes deep cognitive ambivalence or double consciousness, this would be grounds for thinking it unstable and so rejecting or condemning it. Yet, it may also be that such phenomena are unavoidable, and that there are simply no ahistorical or suitably objective means for assessing a particular world. I cannot settle these questions here, but future work on worlds and founding must engage them, if only to help explain how the conceptual framework explored here maps so seamlessly onto both an emancipatory politics like Du Bois's, and a jingoistic, other-denying politics like

Heidegger's. Indeed, in an era in which white-nationalists are propagating a message of hatred with renewed vigor under the guise of "race realism" and "white rights," developing clear critical standards for distinguishing such bigotry from the work of thinkers like Du Bois is all the more pressing.[39]

About the Author

Ross Mittiga is an Assistant Professor at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile's Instituto de Ciencia Política, and co-chair of the American Political Science Association's Environmental Politics and Theory Related Group. His research focuses on environmental justice, critical race theory, and the history of political thought.

Notes

1 See also Heidegger (2008, sections 17–18). There is some ambiguity about which conception of world Heidegger had in mind when making this claim. In *Being and Time*, he distinguishes between four discrete conceptions of world (2008, p. 93). In this article, I focus on the third, "ontic" sense of the term, which most closely corresponds to how he uses "world" in later work and Du Bois's use of the term.

2 Note that Heidegger and Du Bois sometimes use the term "world" in ways that do not strictly comport with the conception investigated here. For Du Bois, these other usages can have political-theoretic significance. On this, see Nikhil Pal Singh's (1998) discussion of "black worldliness" and Balfour's (2011, pp. 181*ff*) discussion of the global dimensions of Du-Boisian thought.

3 I thank Lawrie Balfour for emphasizing this.

4 This all-too-common tendency can be found in virtually every sustained reading of Du Bois (see, e.g., Gooding-Williams, 2009, pp. 76–77, 280 n. 27, 284 n. 37, 282–283 nn. 35–36; Appiah, 2014; Zamir, 1995). Many other studies focus specifically on the intellectual origins of Du Bois's conception of "double-consciousness" (see Bruce, 1992, pp. 299–309, cited by Gooding-Williams, 2009, p. 282 *n.* 35; Sollors, 1990, p. 182; Lewis, 1993, pp. 96, 279–283; Reed, 1997, ch. 7).

5 Notably, however, Heidegger's mentor, Edmund Husserl, was deeply influenced by Du Bois's teacher, William James (Noel, 2009, pp. 98–101; Spiegelberg, 1981, pp. 105*ff*). Moreover, James, Husserl, Du Bois and Heidegger all shared an interest in phenomenology. But while this helps explain overlap between Heidegger and Du Bois, it does not establish that the latter directly influenced the former.

6 See Appiah (2014, chs. 1–3), and Gooding-Williams (2009, ch. 1).

7 I discuss a fifth feature, which concerns the origins and founding of a world, above.

8 See, e.g., Du Bois (1986b, p. 666).

9 See Du Bois (1986b, p. 673*f*).

10 "Everything great, good, efficient, fair, and honorable is 'white'; and everything mean, bad, blundering, cheating, and dishonorable is 'yellow'; a bad taste is 'brown'; and the devil is 'black'" (Du Bois, 1999, p. 25).

11 See Gooding-Williams's (2009, pp. 79*ff*) discussion of "false self-consciousness."

12 I have in mind here Charles Taylor's sense of "articulation" (1989, pp. 27–31). Elsewhere, Taylor (1985, pp. 319, 328) argues—pulling on Heidegger—that information and experience can only be rendered intelligible in light of an agent's particular "background." This embeddedness explains the pre-cognitive functioning of worlds. As Stephen White (2004, p. 45) explains, "[a]n agent is always already reacting to and evaluating situations that confront it, and doing so against an implicit set of background commitments. The character of this background cannot be illuminated by considering it as a possible object to be comprehended in an attitude of full disengagement. Rather the background is partially constitutive of oneself." Thus, getting clear about the structure of an agent's particular world "requires trying to reconstruct, from within the agent's perspective, how this background structures one's reactions and evaluations."
13 See, e.g., Heidegger (1971, pp. 51, 71, 1977, pp. 25, 6).
14 See, e.g., Balfour (2011) and Mariotti (2009, pp. 361*ff*). So, too, is the metaphor of the "shadow," which is sometimes used in a similar fashion (Balfour 2011, pp. 7–9).
15 See Du Bois (1999, p. 51), on this in the white world, and Du Bois (1986b, p. 651), for this in the black world.
16 More specifically, for Heidegger *alētheia* is truth as "unconcealedness" (as compared to truth in the form of fact), and thus involves revealing or disclosing (see 1971, pp. 35, 49, 57, 84*n*, 1977, pp. 12–13, 21).
17 Heidegger identifies other modes of "revealing," most notably including *Ge-stell* (often translated as "Enframing" or "challenging-forth"), which he later frames in opposition to *poiesis* (1971, p. 84*n,* 1977, pp. 15–16, 27–28).
18 As Thiele (1995, p. 156) explains, "politics lets truth happen in speech," which is to say language is able to create and preserve meaning and is thus central to political foundings. Cf. Gillespie (2000, p. 145). See also Heidegger (2000, pp. 152, 1971, 71–72).
19 See, e.g., Gooding-Williams (2009, pp. 4, 17, 86–7).
20 I thank Stephen White for suggesting this.
21 He continues: "From the very first it has been the educated and intelligent of the Negro people that have led and elevated the mass" (1986c, p. 842).
22 See Gooding-Williams (2009). Cf. Du Bois (1986c, pp. 842–861, d, pp. 815–826).
23 According to Gooding-Williams, this intersubjective resonance is captured in a kind of "sympathy" with the historical and contemporary sufferings of the black masses (2009, pp. 101*ff*).
24 Cf. Heidegger (1971, pp. 71, 73).
25 Cf. Heidegger's discussion of a "future history," noted above.
26 Rogers (2012, p. 188) and *passim*, emphasizes Du Bois's uncertainty as to whether his project would succeed.
27 Compare this to his description of black religion as "not only a vital part of the history of the Negro in America, but no uninteresting part of American history [in general]" (Du Bois, 1986a, p. 495).
28 See also Balfour (1998, p. 349) and Reed (1985, p. 433).
29 Hence—as others have noted (e.g., Rogers, 2012, p. 189; Balfour, 1998, p. 350)—Du Bois's intended audience for *Souls*, and his vision of a new American world, included white people.
30 See also Zamir (1995, p. 172).
31 See Du Bois (1986a, 370).
32 As Gooding-Williams uses the term (2009, p. 87).
33 See, e.g., Du Bois (1986a, p. 365, d, p. 819). Cf. Appiah (2014, p. 159). Note that "world" is used here in a conventional sense.
34 I say "worthy of recognition" for two reasons: (1) to assert that, for Du Bois, affirming the value of black identity is not dependent on "reciprocal recognition," as Gooding-Williams suggests (2009, p. 131; cf. Du Bois, 1986a, p. 370); and (2) to further distance my analysis from the Hegelian interpretation of Du Bois on which Gooding-Williams's view is based.
35 On Du Bois's nationalism, see Appiah (2014, p. 92), and Brotz (1966).

36 On the latter point, see the recently published collections of Heidegger's "black notebooks" [*Schwarze Hefte*]. For discussion, see Gordon (2014).
37 See Balfour (1998, pp. 350*ff*).
38 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
39 I am grateful to Lawrie Balfour, Stephen White, Jordanna Faye Brown, the University of Virginia Political Theory Writing Group, this article's two anonymous referees, and the journal's editors (especially Michaele Ferguson) for their valuable feedback on earlier drafts.

References

Appiah, K.A. (2014) *Lines of Descent: W. E. B. Du Bois and the Emergence of Identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Balfour, L. (1998) 'A most disagreeable mirror': Race consciousness as double consciousness. *Political Theory* 26(3): 346–369.
Balfour, L. (2011) *Democracy's Reconstruction: Thinking Politically with W.E.B. Du Bois*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Brotz, H. (1966) *Negro Social and Political Thought: Representative Texts*. New York: Basic Books.
Bruce, D.D. (1992) W. E. B. Du Bois and the idea of double consciousness. *American Literature* 64(2): 299–309.
Du Bois, W. (1986a [1903]) Souls of black folk. In: N. Huggins (ed.) *Du Bois's Writings.* New York: The Library of America.
Du Bois, W. (1986b [1940]) Dusk of dawn. In: N. Huggins (ed.) *W.E.B. Du Bois's Writings.* New York: The Library of America.
Du Bois, W. (1986c [1903]) The talented tenth. In: N. Huggins (ed.) *W.E.B. Du Bois's Writings.* New York: The Library of America.
Du Bois, W. (1986d [1897]) The conservation of races. In: N. Huggins (ed.) *W.E.B. Du Bois's Writings.* New York: The Library of America.
Du Bois, W. (1997 [1904]) The development of a people. In: D. Blight and R. Gooding-Williams (eds.) *The Souls of Black Folk.* Boston, MA: Bedford Books.
Du Bois, W. (1999 [1920]) *Darkwater: Voices from within the Veil.* Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.
Gillespie, M.A. (2000) Martin Heidegger's Aristotelian National Socialism. *Political Theory* 28(2): 140–166.
Gooding-Williams, R. (2005) Du Bois, politics, aesthetics: An introduction. *Public Culture* 17(2): 203–215.
Gooding-Williams, R. (2009) *The Shadow of Du Bois: Afro-Modern Political Thought in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gordon, P.E. (2014) Heidegger in Black. *The New York Review of Books*, 9 October.
Heidegger, M. (1971) *Poetry Language, Thought*. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought.
Heidegger, M. (1977) *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. New York: Garland Publishing Inc.
Heidegger, M. (1990) The self-assertion of the German University. In: G. Neske and E. Kettering (eds.) *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*. New York: Paragon House.
Heidegger, M. (2000) *Introduction to Metaphysics*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Heidegger, M. (2008) *Being and Time*. New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics.
Lewis, D.L. (1993) *W. E. B. Du Bois: Biography of a Race, 1868-1919*. New York: Holt.

Mariotti, S. (2009) On the passing of the first-born son: Emerson's 'focal distancing', Du Bois' 'second sight', and disruptive particularity. *Political Theory* 37(3): 351–374.
Noel, J.A. (2009) *Black Religion and the Imagination of Matter in the Atlantic World*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Reed, A. (1985) A perspective on the bases of his political thought. *Political Theory* 13(3): 431–456.
Reed, A. (1997) *W.E.B. Du Bois and American Political Thought*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rogers, M. (2012) The people, rhetoric, and affect: On the political force of Du Bois's The Souls of Black Folk. *American Political Science Review* 106(1): 188–203.
Russon, J. (1995) Heidegger, hegel, and ethnicity: The ritual basis of self-identity. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 33(4): 509–532.
Salem-Wiseman, J. (2003) Heidegger's Dasein and the Liberal conception of the self. *Political Theory* 31(4): 533–557.
Singh, N.P. (1998) Culture/wars: Recoding empire in an age of democracy. *American Quarterly* 50(3): 471–522.
Sollors, W. (1990) Of mule and mares in a land of difference; or quadrupeds all? *American Quarterly* 42(2): 167–190.
Spiegelberg, H. (1981) What William James knew about Edmund Husserl: On the credibility of Pitkin's testimony. In: H. Spiegelberg (ed.) *The Context of the Phenomenological Movement*. Boston, MA: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 105–118.
Strupp, C. (2013) 'Only a Phase': How Diplomats Misjudged Hitler's Rise. *Der Spiegel*, 30 January.
Taylor, C. (1985) *Human Agency and Language*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Taylor, C. (1989) *Sources of Self: The Making of Modern Identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thiele, L.P. (1995) *Timely Meditations: Martin Heidegger and Postmodern Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
White, S.K. (2004) *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Zamir, S. (1995) *Dark Voices: W. E. B. Du Bois and American Thought, 1888-1903*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.