

## How (Not) to Think of Emotions as Evaluative Attitudes

Jean Moritz MÜLLER<sup>†</sup>

### ABSTRACT

It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the level of intentional mode or attitude (Deonna & Teroni 2012, 2014, 2015). I first argue that this proposal fails to make emotions intelligible as value apprehensions. There are reasons to suppose that emotions do not apprehend value to begin with, but are related to values in a different, non-epistemic sense. I then go on to show that the notion of an evaluative intentional mode can still help elucidate the evaluative character of emotion. I argue that there is a plausible non-epistemic understanding of the view that emotions are evaluative modes. On this account, emotions are not ways of apprehending values, but ways of *acknowledging* values.

Keywords: emotion, intentionality, intentional mode, attitude, evaluation, formal object, reasons for emotion, acknowledgment

### 1. Introduction

Much current philosophical work on affectivity conceives of emotions as evaluations. A popular version of this idea has it that emotional evaluation is a form of epistemic access: emotions apprehend the significance or value of objects and events in our surroundings (e.g. Tappolet 2000; Roberts 2003, 2013; Döring 2004; Deonna 2006; Teroni 2007; Slaby 2008; Deonna & Teroni 2012, 2014, 2015). On this view, the offensiveness of another's insult is apprehended by feeling angry about it. Likewise, the loss caused by the death of a loved one is registered through the grief we feel in response. Since this view asserts an epistemic connection between emotion and value, I shall refer to it as the Epistemic View of emotion.

My concern in this paper is with a recent proposal on how to conceive of this connection. As the Epistemic View is traditionally understood, emotions are experiences with a specific intentional content that includes or refers to certain value properties. The proposal on which I will be focusing rejects this understanding. Instead it conceives of emotions as evaluative at the level of *intentional mode*. I will call this conception the Attitudinal View of emotion. This view is proposed as a novel and more accurate take on the idea that emotions apprehend value (Deonna & Teroni 2012, ch. 7 as well as 2014, 2015).

My paper is sympathetic to the Attitudinal View of emotion. At the same time, I will argue that its authors misunderstand the evaluative character of emotions. As I will show, emotions do not make us aware of value. Accordingly, I will propose an alternative interpretation of this view. On this interpretation, emotions are not ways of coming to be aware of value, but ways of *acknowledging* values of which we are already aware.

---

<sup>†</sup> University of Bonn, Institute of Philosophy, Am Hof 1, D-51331 Bonn, Email: [jean.moritz.mueller@gmail.com](mailto:jean.moritz.mueller@gmail.com).

In Section 2, I elaborate on the Epistemic View and present in more detail the specific version put forward by proponents of the Attitudinal View. In Section 3, I argue that the Epistemic View is false. The arguments I present in this context at the same time support a different, non-epistemic account of the link between emotion and value. In Section 4, I offer an interpretation of the Attitudinal View in terms of this non-epistemic account.

## 2. *Emotion as value apprehension*

The Epistemic View of emotion proposes a specific account of a widely recognized link between particular emotions and specific evaluative properties. This link is generally specified in terms of the notion of the *formal object* of an emotion. It is commonly held, for example, that the formal object of anger is offensiveness and the formal object of grief is serious loss. To think of these evaluative properties as formal objects of a particular emotion is to see them as normatively related to that emotion. Thus, offensiveness (serious loss) delimits the conditions of fittingness for anger (grief): Anger (grief) about  $x$  is fitting if and only if  $x$  constitutes an offence (a serious loss).<sup>1</sup> In having formal objects emotions belong to a wider class of intentional phenomena. For example, truth is usually regarded as the formal object of belief, probability as the formal object of conjecture. These intellectual attitudes bear the same normative connection to truth (probability) that emotions bear to specific values.

The view that emotions apprehend value is based on the idea that formal objects provide conditions of fittingness for emotions. But it goes beyond this idea in making a further, epistemic claim: Provided they are fitting, emotions may constitute grasp of exemplifications of their formal object.<sup>2</sup> Here, ‘epistemic’ is used in a broad sense that includes forms of awareness other than propositional knowledge. Proponents of the view standardly do not understand emotions as ways of coming to know that a given object is (dis)valuable, but as a form of non-propositional awareness of its (dis)value.<sup>3</sup>

As this awareness is most often characterized, it closely resembles ordinary sensory awareness. According to what I call the Perceptual View of emotion, an emotion is an

---

<sup>1</sup> I discuss a further role of formal objects in connection with the intelligibility of attitudes in Section 3.2.

<sup>2</sup> As I use the term ‘exemplify’, to say that something exemplifies a value property is the same as saying that it instantiates, has, bears or possesses that property.

I here say that emotions *may* constitute grasp of such exemplifications because the condition of fittingness does not distinguish between actual apprehensions of value and what one might think of as veridical illusions of value. The latter simply happen to accord with the way things are and thus not constitute actual access to value. Proponents of the Epistemic View are thus required to add a further condition on the emotional apprehension of value. Cf. also Mulligan (2007, 221f. and 2010b, 485).

<sup>3</sup> This is in part because it seems implausible to suppose that having emotions requires possession of the concepts involved in propositional knowledge of value. Cf. e.g. Tappolet (2000, ch. 5), Deonna (2006), Teroni (2007), Deonna & Teroni (2012, ch. 6).

affective perception with a specific intentional content that includes or refers to its formal object (e.g. Meinong 1992 [1917]; Tappolet 2000; Teroni 2007).<sup>4</sup> Provided the emotion is fitting, this perception may constitute genuine awareness of value.<sup>5</sup> In light of several apparent similarities between emotion and sensory perception, this view has gained a considerable number of supporters.<sup>6</sup> However, while it is the most widely held view of emotional evaluation, its conception of emotional awareness of value is not unrivalled.

In their recent work, Julien A. Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have canvassed several dissimilarities between emotion and perception and proposed a considerably different version the Epistemic View (Deonna & Teroni 2012, chs. 6 and 7, as well as 2014, 2015). As they note, unlike perceptions, emotions depend for their intentionality on some distinct intentional phenomenon. For example, in order to get angry *about* someone else's remark one must possess some awareness of that remark. In contrast, perceptions are entirely self-standing intentional phenomena. Likewise, emotions seem to differ from perceptions in that only the former admit of justification. It is appropriate to request a justification for someone's anger by asking 'why are you angry about *x*?' By contrast, this type of request seems senseless in the case of perceptions.<sup>7</sup>

In developing their alternative to the Perceptual View, Deonna and Teroni are guided by the idea that emotions fall within a larger class of attitudes with formal objects.<sup>8</sup> As they propose, an adequate understanding of the Epistemic View should take into account the way we normally conceive of an attitude as related to its formal object. More specifically, it should be sensitive to the fact that this link is an aspect of the attitude's intentional mode, rather than an aspect of its intentional content.<sup>9</sup> To illustrate this point, consider the case of belief. The fact that the fittingness of a belief is a matter of the *truth* of its propositional content seems to

---

<sup>4</sup> Roberts (2003, 2013) and Döring (2004) adopt a congenial view on which emotion is modelled on aspect-perception or 'seeing-as'.

<sup>5</sup> On some views (e.g. Cuneo 2006, Döring 2007), emotion is taken to be analogous to perception only in respect of a specific role played by the latter in justifying judgments, where this analogy is spelled out without assimilating emotion to perception (but e.g. in terms of both serving as evidence for certain states of affairs, as Cuneo (2006) proposes). Insofar as these views do not (or not obviously) construe emotions as value apprehensions they do not qualify as versions of the Epistemic View.

<sup>6</sup> For an overview of those similarities cf. Tappolet (2000, ch. 6) and Goldie (2009).

<sup>7</sup> Similarly, Brady (2011) notes that emotions, but not perceptions, are responses to normative or justificatory reasons. As will become apparent in Section 3.1, the disanalogy also concerns motivating reasons. Cf. also Dietz (2017).

<sup>8</sup> Their alternative proposal can be recognized as a version of the Epistemic View in light of the pre-theoretical considerations which it is supposed to elucidate. Cf. esp. their account of the intuition that emotions apprehend value in (2014, 16). Cf. also (2012, 86). The role which they accord to emotions as value apprehensions is to be distinguished from the further epistemic role they attribute to them in connection with evaluative judgments and our mastery of value concepts. I briefly comment on this further proposal in Section 4.2.

<sup>9</sup> As this distinction is understood here, intentional modes are specified by psychological predicates, intentional contents by their propositional or subpropositional complements. Cf. Searle (1983). On this view, intentional contents need not be propositions, but can also be material objects, events etc.

be a consequence of its specific intentional mode. It is because *S* adopts the mode of belief towards *p* that the conditions of fittingness of *S*'s mental state refer to the truth of *p*. If *S* instead adopted the mode of conjecture towards *p*, *S*'s mental state would be fitting if and only if *p* is *probable*. To believe (conjecture) that *p* is to *take-as-true* (*take-as-probable*) a propositional content. Here, the formal object characterizes the intentional mode, rather than being an aspect of the intentional content.

As Deonna and Teroni argue, these considerations suggest that the Attitudinal View of emotion is the correct approach to its connection with value. Instead of following the Perceptual View and conceiving of emotions as having evaluative content, we should think of them as evaluative at the level of intentional mode. In analogy with the case of belief, the fittingness of *S*'s anger about *x* is a matter of the offensiveness of *x* because *S* adopts a specific intentional mode (the mode of anger) towards *x*. *S*'s emotional state exemplifies the mode of *taking-as-offensive* and has *x* as its content. According to Deonna and Teroni, it is this conception which makes sense of emotional awareness of value: emotions do not apprehend value in virtue of being perceptions with an evaluative content but in virtue of their character as evaluative modes.

I think that much is right about Deonna and Teroni's case for a novel approach to the link between emotion and value. I take the dissimilarities between emotion and perception which they highlight to be strong reasons to doubt the adequacy of the Perceptual View. Moreover, I am sympathetic to the idea that emotions structurally resemble other attitudes in how they relate to their formal objects. At the same time, I do not believe that the Attitudinal View is any more successful in making sense of emotions as apprehensions of value. As I show in what follows, the Epistemic View mischaracterizes emotions to begin with. Accordingly, if the idea that emotions are evaluative modes is to help illuminate their connection to value, it must be interpreted in a different, non-epistemic sense.

### 3. *Objections to the Epistemic View*

The Epistemic View is subject to two serious objections. The first of these generalizes one of the objections raised by Deonna and Teroni against the Perceptual View (Section 3.1). Considerations on reason requests suggest that emotions are importantly dissimilar not only to perceptions but to forms of apprehension more generally. The second objection shows the view to be incompatible with a specific role played by formal objects as reasons for emotions (Section 3.2). This objection invokes a specific non-epistemic conception of the connection between attitudes and their formal objects, which will prove important also in developing a

alternative, non-epistemic reading of the Attitudinal View in the further course of the paper.

### 3.1 *The admissibility of reasons*

To develop the first of these two objections I shall first say a little more about the difference between emotions and perceptions in respect of their relation to reasons. As indicated above, Deonna and Teroni establish a normative disanalogy between the two phenomena by appealing to reason requests of the form ‘Why do you  $\varphi$   $x$ ?’ (for intentional mode  $\varphi$  and content  $x$ ). This question allows for multiple readings. On one reading, it enquires about the reasons why someone  $\varphi$ s. Such enquiries are typically answered by specifying what causes her  $\varphi$ -ing. For example, an enquiry about the reasons why Sam is angry about Sally’s remark might be answered by indicating that he drank too much. On a further, more common reading, this question enquires about the reasons for which someone  $\varphi$ s  $x$  (her motivating reasons). In the sense of ‘reason’ invoked here, the term refers those (real or apparent) aspects of a situation *in light of* which she  $\varphi$ s  $x$ . Note that answers to such enquiries differ from ordinary causal explanations. It makes little sense to suppose that Sam is angry about Sally’s remark in light of having drunk too much. An explanation in terms of motivating reasons would rather refer to specific aspects of her remark.<sup>10</sup> On a third reading, the question constitutes a request for a justification. That is, it enquires about the reasons *for which* someone  $\varphi$ s  $x$  (her motivating reasons), where these also constitute reasons *to*  $\varphi$   $x$  (normative or justifying reasons). Thus, if Sally’s remark was deliberately provocative, Sam’s being angry for that reason is justified.

In their discussion of the Perceptual View, Deonna and Teroni focus on the third reading and note that it makes sense where  $\varphi$  stands for an emotional mode, but not where  $\varphi$  stands for the mode of perceiving. Note, though, that the same holds true also on the second reading. That is, the same asymmetry arises when such requests are understood as enquiring simply about motivating reasons. It is not just that emotions, but not perceptions, admit of justification. Rather, only emotions are felt *in light of* certain aspects of their subject’s circumstances.<sup>11</sup> We can put this point also by saying that only emotions are *responses*.<sup>12</sup> Importantly, here the term ‘response’ is deployed in a specific sense, which is roughly

---

<sup>10</sup> Accordingly, the use of ‘because’ to specify motivating reasons is not the same as that involved in ordinary causal statements. In the former case, there is always an equivalent specification involving ‘in light of’.

<sup>11</sup> This point is noted also by Dietz (2017).

<sup>12</sup> On this use of ‘response’, cf. Scheler (1921), von Hildebrand (1969a [1916]; 1953). Cf. also Dietz’ (2017) claim that thinking of emotions as having motivating reasons is an important way of understanding them as responses, as well as Hornsby’s (2008) and McDowell’s (2013) use of the term to refer to actions performed in the light of a fact.

equivalent to ‘answer’.<sup>13</sup> On this use, to say of *S*’s  $\varphi$ -ing that it is a response to *x* is the same as saying that *x* is a reason for which *S*  $\varphi$ s. In the following section, it will become apparent that emotions are responses inasmuch as they are intentional.<sup>14</sup>

Now, while these remarks highlight a disanalogy specifically between emotion and perception, the basic point can be shown to generalize beyond the case of perception. As a request for motivating reasons, the question ‘why do you apprehend *x*?’ expresses as much confusion as the question ‘why do you perceive *x*?’ The same goes for cognate epistemic verbs such as ‘grasp’, ‘register’, ‘discover’, ‘detect’, ‘(come to) be aware of’. Thus, it is not just the Perceptual View that ignores the responsive character of emotion but in fact *any* view that conceives of emotions as apprehensions of value. This suggests that Deonna and Teroni’s own attempt at elaborating the Epistemic View can be attacked on the same grounds on which they attack the Perceptual View.

### 3.2 Formal objects as motivating reasons for emotions

To elaborate the second objection to the Epistemic View, I shall introduce a further role that is commonly assigned to formal objects.<sup>15</sup> The formal object of an attitude not only specifies its conditions of fittingness. It also imposes a constraint on its very intelligibility.

On the standard reading, this intelligibility constraint specifies how the subject of an attitude must construe its intentional content in order for her to intelligibly hold that attitude. For example, *S*’s attitude towards *x* makes sense as anger only if *x* is construed by *S* as offensive. In denying that *x* is construed by *S* as even remotely offensive we fail to comprehend *S*’s attitude as anger directed at *x*.

There are two possible ways of interpreting this requirement. According to one interpretation, the requisite construal is constituted by the attitude itself. On this interpretation, anger about *x* is intelligible only as a construal of *x* as offensive. This reading is compatible with the Epistemic View as long as we assume that the requisite construal may constitute epistemic access to value. Note, though, that there is a further interpretation, on which attitude and construal are distinct. This interpretation conceives of the construal as providing a motivating reason for the attitude.<sup>16</sup> It says that anger about *x* is intelligible only

---

<sup>13</sup> Some authors use ‘response’ to characterize both emotions and perceptions. Cf. e.g. Brady (2011, 136). In contrast, this use applies exclusively to phenomena that admit of motivating reasons.

<sup>14</sup> This indicates a difference in respect of the way in which emotions and perceptions are intentional. I elaborate on this in some detail in a separate paper (Müller 2017).

<sup>15</sup> This objection was first raised by Mulligan (2004). Cf. also Mulligan (2010a), Teroni (2007). I here set it up in a slightly different and, I hope, more perspicacious way.

<sup>16</sup> While he does not explicitly put it in those terms, this reading can be plausibly attributed to Kenny (2003 [1963], ch. 9). On this interpretation, cf. also Teroni (2007).

as a *response* to the offensive light in which *x* is construed. This interpretation is incompatible with the Epistemic View. Before I explain why it is, let me first show that it is the correct interpretation.

It is plausible to suppose that ascriptions of emotions implicitly represent them as responses to their content. Consider the following sentences<sup>17</sup>:

Sam is angry about Sally's remark, though he is not angry because of her remark  
Maria grieves over John's death, though she does not grieve because of John's death  
Peter is afraid that he will lose his job, though he is not afraid because of this prospect

These sentences seem incoherent in a way that renders the ascribed emotion incomprehensible. They indicate that ascriptions of an emotion conceptually entail that its content is a reason for which the emotion is felt. It here makes sense to think of this as entailed since it can neither be cancelled nor detached.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, the entailment is conceptual since it follows from an application of the respective emotion concept.<sup>19</sup> Supposing this is correct, we can go on and ask what it is about emotional contents that makes them motivating reasons for emotions. Does the intelligibility of emotions depend on their being responsive to something specific about their content?

Further considerations along similar lines suggest that it does. To see this, consider the following set of sentences:

Sam is angry about Sally's remark, but not because her remark seems even remotely offensive to him  
Maria is grieving about John's death, but not because it appears to her as a loss of any sort  
Peter is afraid that he will lose his job, but not because this prospect seems in any way

---

<sup>17</sup> I here stick to the most natural way of specifying motivating reasons, i.e. by means of a 'because'-clause. Note that the 'because'-clauses to follow can be replaced by a corresponding clause preceded by 'in light of'.

<sup>18</sup> While the incoherence shows that it cannot be cancelled, this itself is compatible with the view that it is conventionally implied rather than entailed. However, it is also not detachable since such ascriptions cannot be reformulated in a way that does not have this implication.

<sup>19</sup> In a similar vein, Dietz (2017) argues that, in the case of emotions ascribed by means of factive constructions of the form 'S Vs that p' (where V stands for an emotion verb or adjectival phrase of the form 'is F') the content of the emotion is a motivating reason for it. As the third of the above examples suggests, this point is not restricted to emotions ascribed by means of factive constructions. 'Peter is afraid that he will lose his job' does not entail that he will lose his job. Yet it entails that Peter is afraid in light of the prospect characterized by this proposition. Unlike Dietz, I here take it that every emotion has a motivating reason provided by its content. Some might want to insist that certain forward-looking emotions such as hope constitute exceptions. Perhaps it seems counterintuitive to say that what S hopes for is a motivating reason for her hope. However, it still seems right to me to say that when S is hopeful about some prospect, there will be something about that prospect because of which S hopes for it. As I precisify the claim below, it is in fact always a certain aspect of the content of an emotion, rather than its content simpliciter, which constitutes a motivating reason for that emotion. An intimate connection between the content of an emotion and reasons for that emotion is also (at least implicitly) recognized by Kenny in his discussion of objects and causes of an emotion (cf. 2003 [1963], 51ff.). While Dietz and Kenny focus on reason ascriptions that imply that the reasons ascribed are propositional known (or at least constitute the content of some propositional intellectual state), I take it that many ascriptions of reasons for emotion do not imply that the subject is in a propositional state. There is nothing inconsistent in the supposition that an infant is afraid because of an angry face without her knowing or believing that there is an angry face. I say a little more about the cognitive prerequisites of emotional responses in Section 3.3.

threatening to him

These sentences likewise render the ascribed emotion incomprehensible. As they indicate, ascriptions of an emotion conceptually entail that it is a response to its content *under the guise of its formal object*.<sup>20</sup> That is, they entail that the emotion is felt in light of what seems to its subject to be an exemplification of its formal object by its content. This supports the second interpretation of the intelligibility constraint: emotions make sense as such only as responses to a specific evaluative light in which their content is construed.<sup>21</sup>

On this basis, we can now formulate a further argument against the Epistemic View. If it is true that emotions are by conceptual necessity responses to a specific evaluative way of construing their content, then it seems that they cannot apprehend value. This is in part because, under certain conditions, this evaluative construal already provides the epistemic access to value that emotions are supposed to provide. Moreover, in those cases where it doesn't, the connection between emotion and value is too accidental to qualify as an epistemic connection. We can flesh this argument out in two steps. The first step is as follows:

(P1) Necessarily, *S*'s emotion towards *x* is a response to how *x* is evaluatively construed by *S*.

(P2) Where *S*'s attitude towards *x* is a response to how *x* is construed by *S*, *S*'s construal temporally precedes *S*'s attitude.

(C1) Where *S* has an emotion towards *x*, the construal to which *S*'s emotion is responsive temporally precedes *S*'s emotion.

(P3) In some cases, *S*'s pre-emotional construal of *x* apprehends the value of *x*; in the other cases, *S*'s construal is a mere apprehension as of the value of *x*.

(C2) When *S*'s emotion responds to a construal which apprehends the value of *x*, *S* apprehends the value of *x* prior to having that emotion.

---

<sup>20</sup> This is conceptually entailed for the same reasons indicated in discussing the foregoing set of examples.

<sup>21</sup> It is worth stressing also that this reading is not threatened by the fact that reason-giving explanations of emotions often exclusively refer to non-evaluative reasons (cf. Teroni 2007; Deonna & Teroni 2012, ch. 8). Consider:

Sam is angry about Sally's remark because it touches on private issues

Maria is grieving about John's death because they shared a common past

Peter is afraid that he will lose his job because it pays for his living

Although such explanations do not explicitly cite the formal object, their cogency depends on an implicit reference to it:

Sam is angry about Sally's remark because it touches on private issues, though not because it thereby seems even remotely offensive to him

Maria grieves about John's death because they shared a common past, though not because their common past makes his death appear to her as a loss of any sort

Peter is afraid that he will lose his job because it pays for his living, but not because this makes the prospect of losing his job seem in any way threatening to him

Again, the respective emotion is incomprehensible unless we think of it as motivated by an apparent exemplification of its formal object.

(P4) It is not possible for *S* to apprehend what *S* has already apprehended.

(C3) When *S*'s emotion is responsive to a construal which apprehends the value of *x*, *S*'s emotion does not apprehend the value of *x*.

The assumption expressed by (P2) is supported by the observation that motivating reasons for an attitude play a crucial part in *bringing about* that attitude. If *S* believes that *x* is *F* for the reason that *x* appears to be *F*, this appearance is (at least partly) responsible for her forming the belief that *x* is *F*. However, to play this role motivating reasons must temporally precede the attitude they are reasons for. The first clause of (P3) is supported by a particular case of emotional response. That is, pre-emotional construals constitute apprehensions of value in cases in which emotions are responsive to actual value. Note that explanatory discourse clearly recognizes the possibility of emotionally responding to actual value. We commonly explain emotions along the following lines:

Sam is angry about Maria's remark because her remark was pretty offensive  
Maria grieves about John's death because his death constitutes a great loss for her  
Peter is afraid that he will lose his job because this likely prospect constitutes a threat for him

If we take such explanations at face value, we thereby recognize the respective pre-emotional construal as affording awareness of value. This is because in these cases the emotion is responsive to what its subject is aware of. More generally, actual aspects of *S*'s situation qualify as something *in light of* which *S* adopts a particular attitude only if they are not unknown to *S* (von Hildebrand 1969a [1916], 1953; Baier 1985; Mulligan 2004, 2010a, 2010b).<sup>22</sup> Accordingly, in some cases, *S*'s emotional response to how *S* evaluatively construes things is a case of responsiveness to value that *S* is aware of. Here, *S*'s antecedent construal of *x* constitutes an apprehension of *x*'s value. Of course, it is possible that the requisite conditions for a construal to apprehend value are not satisfied. In this case, the emotion is not a response to what its subject is aware of. All the construal affords in these cases is awareness *as of* value. This possibility is recorded by the second clause of (P3).

To fend off a possible objection, I should stress that the awareness in question is to be distinguished from noticing or consciously registering value. After all, it is possible to have an emotion without noticing the value of the object at which it is directed.<sup>23</sup> Note that it is

---

<sup>22</sup> Cf. also Dietz (2017) on the requirement of propositional knowledge in the case of reasons for factive emotions and Hyman (1999), Hornsby (2008) and McDowell (2013) on the role of propositional knowledge in connection with reasons for action. As I elaborate in Section 3.3, it makes sense to conceive of pre-emotional access to value in non-propositional terms. This is compatible with the claim that factive emotions such as being glad that *p* require propositional knowledge that *p*.

<sup>23</sup> It is often only after the emotion itself has been expressed or articulated that we are in a position to notice what it is responsive to.

generally plausible to suppose that one can be aware of something without noticing it. In search for my wallet, I look in the drawer but fail to notice it. Later, I think back and realize that I actually saw it there: the wallet perceptually registered with me, though not consciously (Martin 1992). We also often invoke this distinction in specifying motivating reasons for emotions. For example, we sometimes explain people's fondness for or disdain towards another in terms of them responding to certain qualities (the other's discreet charm, elegance etc.) which they have not yet noticed.<sup>24</sup> Importantly, in giving such explanations, we presume that the respective motivating reason is not completely beyond the subject's ken. Otherwise we could not make sense of it as something *in light of* which she feels fondness (disdain) towards the other. When I speak of pre-emotional awareness as of formal objects in the context of (P3), I here likewise have in mind awareness as distinct from noticing.<sup>25</sup>

As for (P4), this premise simply makes explicit a consequence of apprehending something. The same point holds in connection with cognate epistemic verbs: one cannot register, grasp, discover or detect something one has already registered, grasped, discovered or detected. The intuitive point here is that what is within someone's ken can no longer be brought within her ken. If we relate this point to the role accorded to pre-emotional construals in the first clause of (P3), we compromise the role assigned to emotions by the Epistemic View: where pre-emotional construals already apprehend value, the emotion itself is thereby pre-empted from doing so.

Now, as the argument has been developed so far, its conclusion exclusively concerns emotions based on construals that apprehend value. However, the supposed epistemic role of emotion is undermined even when such construals provide mere awareness as of value. This is established by the second step:

(P5) Where *S*'s construal of *x* constitutes a mere apprehension as of value, either (i) *x* does not exemplify the property in question, or (ii) the construal lacks the requisite non-accidental connection to *x*'s value in order to qualify as apprehending this value.

(C3) In the case of (i), *S*'s emotion does not apprehend the value of *x* either, since the relevant property is not exemplified by *x*.

(C4) In the case of (ii), the connection between the emotion and the value of *x* is likewise too accidental to qualify as a case of apprehension since this connection is

---

<sup>24</sup> Consider e.g. the case of Mrs. Crawford in Jane Austen's *Mansfield Park*, whose liking for Edmund is explained as follows: 'There was a charm, perhaps, in [Edmund's] sincerity, his steadiness, his integrity, which Miss Crawford might be equal to feel, though not equal to discuss with herself.' (2006, 460)

<sup>25</sup> The same point applies to the awareness which emotions are supposed to afford on the Epistemic View. The initial consideration also tells against an understanding of emotions as ways of noticing value. Accordingly, there is also little prospect of defending the Epistemic View against the argument presented here by proposing that emotions are ways of noticing previously unnoticed values.

mediated by the accidental link between the evaluative construal and the value of  $x$ .

To appreciate the point of (C4), it is helpful to consider an analogy with belief. Suppose that  $S$  forms the belief that  $x$  is  $F$  because  $x$  appears to be  $F$ . Suppose, moreover, that this appearance accords with the facts, but falls short of an actual apprehension of  $x$ '  $F$ -ness. In this case,  $S$ 's belief does not constitute epistemic access to the fact that  $x$  is  $F$ . That is to say that it falls short of knowledge that  $x$  is  $F$ . Although the belief is fitting, its connection to the fact that  $x$  is  $F$  is insufficiently robust for it to qualify as knowledge. After all, it is based on mere awareness as of  $F$ -ness. Since its own connection to this fact is mediated by a state which only accidentally accords with this fact, this connection is no less accidental than the connection between the latter state and this fact.<sup>26</sup> The same consideration applies where  $S$  has an emotion towards  $x$  in response to a construal of  $x$  as  $F$ , which is accurate but does not apprehend the  $F$ -ness of  $x$ . Although  $S$ 's emotion is fitting, it is based on mere awareness as of  $F$ -ness and therefore bears too accidental a connection to the exemplification of  $F$ -ness to afford genuine awareness of it.<sup>27</sup>

If this argument is sound, it gives us a further reason to abandon the Epistemic View. It suggests that the link between emotion and value radically differs from the epistemic connection posited by its proponents. On the view that has emerged from the foregoing considerations, values are never apprehended by emotions themselves. Instead, emotions are preceded by apprehensions as of value. I shall call this view the Response View of emotion. On this view, emotions are responses to real or mere apparent exemplifications of their formal object, depending on whether the antecedent apprehension is real or mere apparent. Since my claims concerning the intelligibility of emotion can be shown to generalize *mutatis mutandis* to all attitudes with formal objects, a corresponding account can be formulated for each of them.<sup>28</sup>

If it is correct to think of emotions as responses to, rather than apprehensions of, value, it follows that Deonna and Teroni's proposal is no more successful than the Perceptual View

---

<sup>26</sup> One might think differently if  $x$ 's appearing to be  $F$  were a case of awareness of  $x$ '  $F$ -ness. Cf. McDowell (1982; 2011; 2013).

<sup>27</sup> This echoes the earlier thought that fittingness by itself does not make an emotion an apprehension of value (cf. n. 2). However, the present thought is more specific: if the evaluative construal to which an emotion responds only accidentally accords with the facts, then the emotion cannot constitute awareness of value because its own connection to the facts is mediated by this construal. That it is mediated by this construal means that it is likewise insufficiently robust to qualify as epistemic contact with the way things are.

<sup>28</sup> I take it that, pre-theoretically, it sounds just as odd to say that  $S$  believes that  $p$  whilst simultaneously denying that this is because  $p$  has any appearance of truth for  $S$ . While perhaps philosophically unorthodox, the view that belief is responsive to apparent truth sits rather well with several important truisms about belief. As I argue in Section 4, it is entailed by a plausible interpretation of the idea that believing is taking-as-true. I intend to show that it moreover supports a coherent overall picture of reasons for belief in a separate paper, which expands on these considerations. On the idea that attitudes are responses to their formal objects, cf. also de Sousa (2011, 72) and Mulligan (2010b, 485).

in making emotions intelligible as value apprehensions. If it is false to suppose that emotions apprehend value to begin with, it is also false to suppose that they apprehend value in virtue of being evaluative modes. However, to note that the appeal to evaluative modes is of no use in substantiating the Epistemic View is to reject only one possible way in which the Attitudinal View might be thought to illuminate the idea of emotional evaluation. In the remainder of the paper I show that it is possible to develop this view in a different way which recognizes emotions as value responses rather than value apprehensions. Before I move on to this, I would however like add a few more remarks on the idea that emotions respond to value. More specifically, I would like to defend the Response View against a worry which Deonna and Teroni have raised against it.

### *3.3 Pre-emotional value awareness*

In discussing possible alternatives to their own view, Deonna and Teroni reject the Response View as being committed to a questionable epistemology of value. As they argue, there is simply no satisfactory way to conceive of the requisite pre-emotional awareness as of value (Deonna & Teroni 2012, ch. 8; Teroni 2007). The candidates one might propose in this context either require too much intellectual sophistication as to be attributable to all creatures capable of emotion or they fail to be plausible as genuine aspects of our psychology.<sup>29</sup>

This dismissal seems too quick, though. It is certainly fair to enquire about the nature of the antecedent value awareness to which the Response View is committed. At the same time, the fact that a prior value awareness is presupposed by the very intelligibility of an emotion warrants scepticism against Deonna and Teroni's assessment. Indeed, if one considers more closely the phenomena they survey, it turns out their verdict on several of them is unwarranted. According to one proposal, for example, formal objects are apprehended via a specific form of aspect-perception which is informed by the subject's cares and concerns. As several authors have noted, such aspect-perceptions are ubiquitous in everyday experience (e.g. Goldie 2002, 251, n. 17; Starkey 2008, 432).<sup>30</sup> Moreover, contrary to what Deonna and Teroni suppose, they can be attributed to creatures lacking sophisticated conceptual abilities (Roberts 1996; 2009; 2013, ch. 4). Similarly, Deonna and Teroni do not give sufficient consideration to the possibility that pre-emotional construals afford a primitive type of acquaintance with value. This proposal conceives of them as a *sui generis* form of

---

<sup>29</sup> Since Deonna & Teroni (2012, ch. 8) are mainly concerned with the justification of emotion, some of their objections moreover allege that these candidates entail an implausible view of justified emotions.

<sup>30</sup> Both authors are in fact concerned to show that concern-based aspects perceptions are too ubiquitous to be plausibly identified with emotions themselves. I explicitly address this issue below.

non-propositional awareness that is known in the phenomenological literature as *feeling value* (*Wertfühlen*; cf. Scheler 1921; von Hildebrand 1969a [1916], 1969b [1922]; Mulligan 2009, 2010b). Deonna and Teroni reject this account for lacking psychological plausibility without considering any of the phenomenological and linguistic considerations that have been offered in its support. For example, as Mulligan (2009, 2010b) points out, our reports of value experiences or impressions ('How offensive/funny/vulgar/...!') often seem less aptly conceived as reports of emotions than of the speaker's felt acquaintance with value. In light of such considerations, this proposal seems much less ad hoc than Deonna and Teroni suggest.<sup>31</sup>

There might perhaps be a worry that these phenomena are hard to distinguish from emotions themselves. After all, the notion of a concern-based aspect-perception was originally introduced to offer an account of the nature of emotions (Roberts 2003, 2013; Döring 2004). Likewise, talk of feeling value might look like a disguised appeal to emotional feeling. However, this worry ignores an important difference that I noted in Section 3.1. Concern-based aspect perceptions are apprehensions as of the significance of something with respect to a particular concern. Similarly, to feel the value of something is to apprehend its value.<sup>32</sup> Yet, apprehensions, unlike emotions, are not responses. If aspect-perceptions and value feelings were emotions, they ought to admit of motivating reasons.<sup>33</sup>

Referring back to my earlier qualification regarding pre-emotional value awareness, it is worth noting also that neither of the two forms of awareness implies the conscious registration of value. As they are characterized, it is possible to enjoy concern-based aspect-perceptions and feelings of value without noticing what is apprehended.<sup>34</sup> Admittedly, more would need to be said about each of these proposals to show that either of them adequately characterizes the construals presupposed by emotional responses. However, if they escape Deonna and Teroni's objections and moreover satisfy further constraints on the requisite value awareness, this warrants some confidence that a plausible account of this awareness is possible.

---

<sup>31</sup> Note also that, contrary to Deonna and Teroni's (2012, 94) view, this proposal does not imply that answers to reason requests for emotions must explicitly cite the subject's possession of a special access to value (e.g. 'S emotes x because S somehow intuits x' F-ness'). They may simply take the form 'S emotes x because x is F' or 'S emotes x because x seems F to S'.

<sup>32</sup> Here, 'feel' is used as transitive verb. This indicates that feeling value is a form of awareness of value. In contrast, in canonical ascriptions of emotional feelings, 'feel' is followed by an adjective ('feel angry/sad/...'). On this distinction, cf. Mulligan & Scherer (2012, 354).

<sup>33</sup> Plausibly, forms of apprehension differ from (most) emotions also in lacking valence. Cf. Mulligan (2009, 2010b) on feeling value. For reasons of space, I can here not develop this point in more detail.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Roberts' (2003, 72, 80) on the link between aspect-perception and conscious awareness. Cf. also Scheler (1921, 262f.) who seems to suppose that modes of feeling (*Fühlen*) need not vary with modes of attention. Perhaps this is compatible with feeling requiring some degree of attention. The basic phenomenon is independent of noticing, though, as I take to be illustrated e.g. by the passage quoted from *Mansfield Park* in n. 24.

To help remove any remaining air of mystery surrounding the Response View, it may also be useful to consider that the notion of pre-emotional value awareness is common coin in the psychological literature. According to the standard version of appraisal theory, emotions are caused by prior cognitions which determine the significance of a situation for their subject.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, such appraisals come in non-intellectual forms.<sup>36</sup> Far from being unorthodox, the Response View's commitment to such cognitions thus closely resonates also with prominent views in the empirical literature.

In some respects, it may in fact seem tempting to think of the Response View itself as a version of the appraisal theory. Thus, appraisals are commonly taken to play a similar systematic role as value awareness on the Response View in that emotions are in an important sense based on them. Yet, it is important not to be too quick in assimilating the two views. The Response View is a view about motivating reasons, while appraisal theories are standardly concerned with the causal genesis of emotion. As noted in Section 3.1, specifying the causes of an emotion is not the same as specifying its motivating reasons. To be fair, it might be argued that the Response View at least entails a version of the appraisal theory. This would be so on the assumption that the mental state which makes available the reasons for which we hold an attitude is also causally responsible for that attitude. However, though perhaps intuitive, this assumption is not entirely uncontroversial.<sup>37</sup> That said, it is clear that the two approaches are closely related in that both start from the observation that awareness as of the significance of objects or events contributes to bringing about emotions and thus precedes them.<sup>38</sup>

In the final section of this paper, I will now draw on the Response View to show how I think the Attitudinal View should be developed. As I propose, the claim that emotions are

---

<sup>35</sup> This approach goes back to Arnold (1960a, 1960b) and Lazarus (1966). Admittedly, the term 'appraisal' has been used to cover a variety of different evaluative phenomena. Strictly speaking, not all of them count as apprehensions (as) of value. However, it is common for appraisal theorists to characterize appraisals as registering or detecting the significance of events for their subject.

<sup>36</sup> On this point cf. e.g. Arnold (1960a, 175). Cf. also Leventhal & Scherer's (1987) hierarchy of processing levels in connection with appraisal.

<sup>37</sup> Mulligan might perhaps be read as being sympathetic to this view. Cf. his (2009) and (2010b). Cf. also Mulligan & Scherer (2012). In contrast, von Hildebrand seems to reject it. Cf. e.g. (1969a [1916], 38).

<sup>38</sup> There is a starker contrast between the Response View and those versions of psychological appraisal theories that see appraisals as constitutive of emotion. Cf. e.g. Ellsworth & Scherer (2003), Scherer (2005). In taking appraisal to be constitutive of emotion, these bear a certain resemblance to the Epistemic View. However, the underlying idea is usually different and often concerns the specific way in which emotions are supposed to be guided by appraisal. Cf. Mulligan & Scherer (2012, 351). In clear contrast to these views, the construal invoked by the Response View is distinct from emotion, just as the mental state which makes available the reasons for which we hold a belief is distinct from that belief. Cf. also Mulligan (2010a, 233f.; 2010b, 486f.). It seems that the considerations adduced by proponents of these views can often be reinterpreted in ways more congenial to the Response View. However, showing this would require a much more detailed discussion of the specific roles they accord to appraisals. The 'working definition' of emotion proposed by Mulligan & Scherer (2012) might be read as a first rapprochement between the Response View and this type of appraisal theory.

evaluative at the level of mode does not characterize them as a form of epistemic access to value, but rather refers to their responsive character.

#### 4. *Towards an alternative explication of the Attitudinal View*

Let me briefly recapitulate the main motivation of the Attitudinal View. As indicated in Section 2, this view takes its lead from a certain parallel between emotions and other attitudes with formal objects. It is based on the idea that the intentional mode of an emotion makes a specific contribution to its conditions of fittingness: just as truth enters into the conditions of fittingness of beliefs by virtue of their intentional mode, so specific values (e.g. offensiveness) enter into the conditions of fittingness of emotions by virtue of their respective intentional mode (e.g. the mode of anger). This consideration on fittingness is central to Deonna and Teroni's view of emotional modes as the taking-as-*F* of a particular content.

I believe that Deonna and Teroni are right to advocate a unified account of the determination of conditions of fittingness for attitudes with formal objects. It is important to realize, though, that acceptance of this account by itself does not commit one to the view that emotions apprehend value. It is compatible with conceiving of them as responses to their formal object. To suppose that anger about *x* is responsive to *x*'s apparent offensiveness does not make it less plausible to assume that it is the specific mode (rather than content) of this emotion which makes offensiveness its standard of fittingness.<sup>39</sup> What is more, it seems that the Response View not only coheres with Deonna and Teroni's basic understanding of emotional modes. It is moreover integral to a full explication of the sense in which emotional modes are evaluative. As I show in the following, the notion of taking-as-*F* offers a substantial characterization of their evaluative character which goes beyond a claim about conditions of fittingness. This characterization is not only compatible with, but in fact entails the Response View.

In conceiving of emotions as responses to their formal object, the explication I will propose of the Attitudinal View significantly deviates from Deonna and Teroni's epistemic conception of emotional modes. My account is yet very much congenial to their approach in that it recognizes an important structural commonality between emotional modes and the modes of other attitudes with formal objects. In this respect, the main insight of the Attitudinal View is preserved, while it is developed in a way made available only by

---

<sup>39</sup> In Section 4.2 I argue that it is precisely because emotional modes are responsive to values that values provide this standard.

recognizing the responsive connection between emotion and value.<sup>40</sup>

#### 4.1 Emotional modes as evaluative acknowledgments

To gain a fuller grasp of the idea of taking-as-*F* a particular content, it helps to consider that the mode of attitudes is also sometimes characterized by means of another verb. In addition to ‘take *x* as *F*’ one also sometimes encounters constructions involving ‘acknowledge’, which go back to Frege’s account of judgment (e.g. 1892, 164 (35), 1918a, 345 (63), 1918b, 373 (134), 1976, 245 (163)).<sup>41</sup> In the literature on doxastic attitudes, the mode of beliefs and judgments is occasionally described as the acknowledgment of a proposition as true. According to a further usage of this verb, judgment and belief are modes of acknowledging the truth of a proposition. While the latter, nominal characterization is factive, I will here assume that ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ also admits of a non-factive reading. For example, it makes sense to speak of mistakenly acknowledging children as one’s own or political organizations as democratic. This is important inasmuch as an account of attitudes ought to allow for the possibility of error.<sup>42</sup>

I contend that this non-factive use of ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ affords a plausible, non-epistemic way of understanding the Attitudinal View. Accordingly, I propose to conceive of emotional modes as ways of acknowledging something as exemplifying their formal object. Even though ‘take *x* as *F*’ and ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ are different verbs, this proposal still captures the thought that attitudes with formal objects are modes of *taking-as-F*. There is a use of ‘take *x* as *F*’, which is equivalent to the non-factive use of ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’. In line with Fregean accounts of doxastic attitudes, I assume that it is this use of the former which adequately characterizes the mode of attitudes with formal objects.<sup>43</sup> I nevertheless stick to ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ in what follows, since ‘take *x* as *F*’ is also sometimes used in a way which lacks the specific force of the former. For example, one can take a proposition as true for the sake of argument (as opposed to believing it). In this case, the usage of ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ seems inappropriate. If we compare taking a proposition as true for the

---

<sup>40</sup> Deonna and Teroni themselves go on to further elucidate the Attitudinal View. However, their account is mainly concerned with the psychological realization of emotional modes by the felt aspect of emotion. Cf. (2012, ch. 7; 2014; 2015). As such it does not help further clarify what is meant by describing the intentional mode of attitudes with formal objects as the taking-as-*F* of an intentional content. Clarifying this seems important to me also in light of recent commentators of their approach who largely ignore the parallel between emotions and other attitudes with formal objects. Cf. e.g. Dokic & Lemaire (2015).

<sup>41</sup> In the first three cases, page numbers in brackets refer to the English translations in Frege (1984), in the latter case, to the English translation in Frege (1980).

<sup>42</sup> For this reason, ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ is preferable also to the factive verbs ‘acknowledge that *x* is *F*’ and ‘acknowledge the truth that *x* is *F*’.

<sup>43</sup> Cf. the German ‘*x* für *F* halten’ and ‘*x* als *F* anerkennen’. In characterizing judgment, Frege uses the two interchangeably.

sake of argument with believing it, it seems intuitive to say that it is only in the latter case that the proposition is actually acknowledged as true.<sup>44</sup>

What, then, does it mean to characterize an attitude as the acknowledgment-as-*F* of a certain content? To make sense of this proposal, it is helpful to initially consider a number of examples of our ordinary use of this verb in connection with attitudes. As this suggests, this usage is by no means restricted to doxastic attitudes. Having gained a better intuitive sense of this notion, I will subsequently show that it characterizes attitudes as responses to their formal object.

Consider, for example, our talk of acknowledgment in connection with negative emotions like grief and anger. It is common to describe someone who has suffered a serious loss, but shows no sign of grief, as failing to fully acknowledge her loss as such. We often speak in the same vein of someone who has been offended, but is perhaps too ‘good-natured’ to get angry: in remaining calm she fails to ‘take the offence for what it is’, that is, to acknowledge it as genuinely offensive. In much the same way, positive emotions are often characterized as acknowledgments of something as positively valuable: only in feeling pride we properly acknowledge a major personal achievement as such; and to merely show mild approval rather than admiration in response to a great artwork is, intuitively, to fail to acknowledge it as the excellent piece it is.

In light of these observations, it seems that we use ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ to characterize both doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes. Moreover, this characterization concerns their intentional mode rather than content. When we describe someone unmoved by a serious loss as failing to acknowledge her loss as such, we thereby think of her as failing to adopt a specific intentional mode (the mode of grief) towards this loss. Perhaps the examples I have given so far will be seen as showing only that this usage is intuitive in connection with responses to actual exemplifications of formal objects. However, it can easily be shown to extend to attitudes responsive to their mere apparent exemplification. For example, it makes sense to deploy ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ in connection with irrational fear. Even though one knows the flight poses no danger, one is conquered with fear upon boarding the plane. As fear takes over, one thereby ‘gives in’ to the appearance of threat and acknowledges the flight as a danger. Similarly, to a sensitive art critic the admiration of kitsch is not a mere sign of trivial taste. Rather, it is a false concession, that is, a mistaken acknowledgment of kitsch’s claim to artistic value. In these cases, ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ characterizes episodes that are not

---

<sup>44</sup> One might also think of pre-emotional evaluative construals as ways of taking something as (dis)valuable. This usage of ‘take *x* as *F*’ likewise lacks the specific force of ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’. The difference will become clearer as I further explicate our usage of the latter. Cf. also n. 50.

responsive to actual *F*s.

If these and the foregoing examples are bona fide instances of our ordinary use of this verb, they should give some intuitive sense to the idea that emotions are modes of acknowledging something as (dis)valuable. Inasmuch as this usage is a fairly common aspect of ordinary discourse, I take them to moreover provide some motivation for my proposed understanding of the Attitudinal View.<sup>45</sup> As will become apparent in the remainder of this section, this interpretation is attractive also in that it is intimately related to the account of the link between emotion and value which I opposed to the Epistemic View. That is, our use of ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ in connection with emotions can be shown to connect the notion of an evaluative mode with the view that emotions are responses to value. To demonstrate this, I shall say a little more about this usage and its specific normative import.

#### *4.2 Evaluative acknowledgment as appropriately responding to value*

Closer examination suggests that the conditions under which we deploy ‘acknowledge *x* as *F*’ in connection with attitudes concern their propriety as responses. More precisely, this usage is guided by the thought that attitudes are *appropriate responses to their formal object*. This becomes evident if one considers the specific normative role which it implicitly accords to formal objects.

Consider once more how we characterize cases of failure to respond accordingly to the exemplification of a formal object. In describing someone emotionally unaffected by a serious loss as failing to acknowledge her loss as such we seem to suppose that a certain response is appropriate to her situation: qua loss it merits grief. Accordingly, to count her as properly acknowledging it as a loss we expect her to respond by feeling what is appropriate to feel in response to losses. Similarly, in describing the absence of anger as a lack of acknowledgment of an offence as such, we conceive of this acknowledgment as the response proper to offence: to acknowledge it as an offence is to respond to its offensive character by feeling what is appropriate to feel in response to offence. Although there has been some debate about the notion of a prescriptive norm of truth<sup>46</sup>, I take the same account to be intuitively adequate also to cases of withheld belief. It is not unusual to describe someone unwilling to believe an

---

<sup>45</sup> This accords with Frege’s use of ‘acknowledge’, which aims to capture an aspect of our pre-theoretical notion of judgment. This motivation is congenial also to the philosophical approach favored by Deonna and Teroni, who partly advocate the Attitudinal View on the ground that it conforms to ordinary discourse. Cf. esp. (2012, 77f.).

<sup>46</sup> This idea has recently gained some popularity. Cf. Gibbard (2005), Wedgwood (2002; 2013). For criticism see e.g. Bykvist & Hattiangadi (2007), McHugh (2012). I say more about the normative force of formal objects below, though I lack the space to address specifically this controversy about truth. I intend to address this controversy in my prospective article which defends the claim that belief is a response to truth.

uncomfortable truth as refusing to acknowledge the truth as such. Similarly, it seems that, we thereby think of her as someone who does not respond to this truth in the way appropriate to truths.

In order to avoid an overly normatively charged picture of emotion, it is important not to overinterpret the normative force which is here accorded to formal objects. To say that actual exemplifications of formal objects merit or make appropriate a particular response is not to say that one ought to respond accordingly. I take the term ‘merit’ to qualify such exemplifications as normative reasons to adopt the corresponding attitude.<sup>47</sup> While formal objects are thereby recognized as demanding a certain response, the reason they constitute may be outweighed by normative reasons against thus responding. Where successfully dealing with a dangerous situation requires a calm mind, there are better reasons not to be afraid. Even though qua danger the situation merits fear, in this case one ought not respond accordingly. Note, further, that this use of ‘merit’ should be clearly distinguished from a further use which one might invoke in this context. One can also conceive of responses as merited in virtue of how the respective situation subjectively appears or the information available to one. If the situation is safe, but I believe that it poses a danger, then there is no normative reason for me to be afraid: it does not merit fear in the sense just introduced. Yet, in light of my belief there is still a certain subjective sense in which fear is merited: it would seem irrational for me not to be afraid in these circumstances. For the purpose of elucidating my proposed reading of the Attitudinal View, I use the term exclusively in the former, ‘objective’ sense concerned with normative reasons.<sup>48</sup>

To be clear about the normative propriety attributed to attitudes in this context, I should moreover stress that I here deliberately speak of *appropriate* instead of *fitting* responses. Remember that an attitude is fitting as long as its formal object is exemplified and

---

<sup>47</sup> My use of the term ‘merit’ in this context goes back to von Hildebrand’s (1969a [1916]; 1953) development of Scheler’s (1921) considerations on value. Cf. also McDowell (1985), Naar (2015). While more restrictive than Scheler in his use of the term ‘value’, von Hildebrand (1953) extends this view beyond the evaluative domain. On his view, facts (evaluative and non-evaluative) merit an adequate intellectual response.

<sup>48</sup> Cf. Gibbard’s (2005, 340) corresponding distinction between an objective and a subjective sense of ‘ought’. If we fail to keep these two senses of ‘merit’ apart, there might seem to be disanalogy in respect of the formal objects of emotion and belief. It can seem that danger merits fear regardless of our take on the situation, whilst the analogous claim does not hold for the truth of a proposition: belief is due only what one has sufficient evidence for. This dissimilarity turns out illusory if the two above uses of ‘merit’ are clearly distinguished. Just as there is both an objective and a subjective sense in which fear is merited (as illustrated in the main text), both uses of ‘merit’ are applicable also in the case of belief. Adapting an example from Gibbard, suppose you throw a coin and hide the result from both of us. If the coin landed heads, then this is the thing for me to believe – believing that it landed heads is merited in the objective sense insofar as it is true. This is so even though I have no information that indicates its truth. Accordingly, neither the belief that it landed heads nor the belief that it landed tails are merited in the subjective sense. This would be different if I were previously informed that the coin has a strong bias towards tails. In this case, believing that it landed tails would be subjectively merited – even if I were misinformed and it landed heads.

thus regardless of whether it is a response to this exemplification. Since fitting attitudes can be based on construals that merely happen to be accurate and thus afford no awareness of how things are, they need not be responsive to what makes them fitting. In contrast, the above illustrated usage of ‘acknowledge  $x$  as  $F$ ’ concerns how to correctly respond to actual exemplifications of a formal object. I here reserve the term ‘appropriate’ for an attitude’s propriety *qua* response to its actual exemplification.

More generally, then, our use of ‘acknowledge  $x$  as  $F$ ’ to describe attitudes responsive to real instances of their formal object can be explicated as follows:

In the case of attitudes responsive to actual instances of their formal object, to acknowledge  $x$  as  $F$  is to respond to  $x$ ’s  $F$ -ness in the manner appropriate to  $F$ -ness.

This use characterizes the adoption of a specific intentional mode towards  $x$  as the proper response to a particular normative reason, which  $x$  provides insofar as  $x$  exemplifies the corresponding formal object. On this conception, the modes of emotions are evaluative in a sense that concerns their responsiveness to value. This sense of being evaluative thus crucially differs from the sense invoked by proponents of the Epistemic View.

Since this account is restricted to attitudes that respond to real exemplifications of their formal object, it does not yet fully elucidate my proposed reading of the Attitudinal View. After all, this reading concerns emotional occurrences in general. Note, though, that a very similar account can be given of ‘acknowledge  $x$  as  $F$ ’ as used to describe attitudes that respond to its mere apparent exemplification. That is, the notion of appropriate responsiveness to formal objects plays a crucial role in how we characterize these other cases, too. When we think of the admiration of kitsch as a way of acknowledging its object as artistically valuable, we likewise presume that admiration is the response proper to a particular normative reason. In this case, we conceive of the emotion as responsive to a mere apparent exemplification of artistic excellence in the way appropriate to real artistic excellence. Similarly, in being afraid to enter the plane we acknowledge the flight as dangerous insofar as we respond to an appearance of threat in the way appropriate to actual danger. In these cases, what we respond to does not actually, but only appears to merit the corresponding response. However, although we are not appropriately responsive to actual value, there is still a sense in which the normative role of formal objects governs our use of ‘acknowledge  $x$  as  $F$ ’ in these cases: we are still responsive *in that way* which is appropriate to their actual exemplification.

This suggests that we can supplement the foregoing partial account of our use of ‘acknowledge  $x$  as  $F$ ’ in connection with attitudes:

In the case of attitudes responsive to mere apparent instances of their formal object, to acknowledge  $x$  as  $F$  is to respond to  $x$ 's apparent  $F$ -ness in the way appropriate to  $F$ -ness.

Accordingly, we can give a comprehensive account of emotional modes and conceive of the Attitudinal View as recognizing two types of case: In some cases, adopting an emotional mode towards  $x$  is to acknowledge  $x$  as  $F$  in the sense of appropriately responding to  $x$ 's actual  $F$ -ness; in the other cases, it is to acknowledge  $x$  as  $F$  in the sense of responding to  $x$ 's apparent  $F$ -ness in the way appropriate to actual  $F$ -ness.

While this account covers all emotional occurrences, it might yet still seem incomplete since it does not make explicit an important commonality between the two cases of response. That is, we can further elaborate the account by noting that the characterization given of attitudes responsive to mere apparent  $F$ -ness holds in fact true also of attitudes responsive to actual  $F$ -ness. Since the latter are based on awareness of their formal object they are likewise responsive to its apparent exemplification. Here, the formal object appears to be exemplified in virtue of the subject's awareness of its exemplification. Hence, attitudinal responses to actual  $F$ -ness, too, can be characterized as responsive to apparent  $F$ -ness in the way appropriate to actual  $F$ -ness. Thus, we can characterize the mode of every emotional occurrence as an acknowledgment-as- $F$  in the second of the two senses I distinguished. I shall here take this as the basic characterization of emotional modes since it uniformly applies to all emotional occurrences. Accordingly, to accommodate what is specific to emotional responses to actual value, I will take them (and only them) to be amenable to a further characterization: in these cases, adopting an emotional mode is an acknowledgment-as- $F$  also in the sense of being appropriately responsive to actual  $F$ -ness.<sup>49</sup>

Altogether, I thus propose to explicate the Attitudinal View as follows:

- (i) The mode of an emotional occurrence is an acknowledgment-as- $F$  of a particular content  $x$  in that to adopt this mode is to respond to  $x$ ' apparent  $F$ -ness in the way appropriate to actual  $F$ -ness.
- (ii) Where the emotional occurrence is responsive to  $F$ -ness actually exemplified by  $x$ , its mode is also an acknowledgment-as- $F$  of  $x$  in that to adopt this mode is to respond to  $x$ ' actual  $F$ -ness in the way appropriate to actual  $F$ -ness.

We might call this explication the Responsivist Attitudinal View.

In giving this explication we give a substantial account of emotional evaluation which

---

<sup>49</sup> Here it is appropriate also to use the factive construction 'acknowledge the  $F$ -ness of  $x$ '.

highlights the responsive connection between emotion and value.<sup>50</sup> While this elucidation of the view is thus incompatible with Deonna and Teroni's epistemic conception of evaluative modes, it still accords with their basic understanding of modes as contributing to conditions of fittingness. More precisely, it makes emotional modes intelligible as setting up two standards of normative propriety.

Since emotional modes respond to apparent value in the way appropriate to actual value, we can assess the propriety of an emotion in terms of whether it is responsive to an actual, as opposed to mere apparent, exemplification of the relevant value. The standard invoked in this case concerns its responsiveness to a specific normative reason:

An emotion is appropriate if and only if it responds to a normative reason constituted by an actual exemplification of its formal object.

In addition, my account of emotional modes allows for the propriety of emotions to be assessed in terms of whether the apparent value to which they respond is actually exemplified. In this case, we enquire about the emotion's fittingness. We can think of the standard invoked here as requiring conformity with, as opposed to responsiveness to, a specific normative reason.

An emotion is fitting if and only if there is a specific normative reason to have that emotion, irrespective of whether it is had *for* that reason.

In line with Deonna and Teroni, we can suppose that the specific mode we adopt determines the standard of fittingness of the resultant emotional state. More specifically, both standards of propriety are determined by emotional modes: Emotions are subject to standards of propriety invoking a particular normative reason because the emotional modes we adopt are responsive to an appearance of that normative reason.

It is worth highlighting also that this reading of the Attitudinal View is true both to the non-reductive spirit of the view as well as to the idea that emotional modes structurally resemble other modes. As Deonna and Teroni emphasize, the Attitudinal View does not conceive of emotions as instances of another, allegedly more familiar mode (such as the mode of perception) but recognizes them as intentional modes in their own right. At the same time, it conceives of these modes as structurally analogous to those of other, non-emotional

---

<sup>50</sup> An anonymous referee has suggested that the Perceptual View can likewise accommodate for the idea that emotions are acknowledgments of something as (dis)valuable: if emotions are understood as a vivid, experiential grasp of the value of something, it would seem that they thereby also constitute acknowledgments of its value. Perhaps this impression is underwritten by the fact that 'acknowledge *x* as *F*' is sometimes used interchangeably with 'recognize *x* as *F*'. The latter can be used in a purely epistemic sense to refer to an episode of coming to be aware of *x*' *F*-ness. However, as I have explicated my use of 'acknowledge *x* as *F*' above, it sharply distinguishes emotions from apprehension, grasp or recognition (in the purely epistemic sense), since it implies that they are responses. A fortiori, it also distinguishes emotions from feeling value and any other candidate for the value apprehensions preceding them (cf. Section 3.3).

attitudes with formal objects. The account I have offered of their evaluative character further articulates the sense in which emotional modes structurally resemble, while being distinct from, these other modes. Emotional modes like anger and grief are akin to intellectual modes like belief or conjecture in that all of them are modes of acknowledging-as-*F* a particular content. Still, each is a distinct mode that differs from the others by the specific property which it acknowledges as being exemplified. As I have explicated the notion of acknowledging-as-*F*, these similarities and differences can be further spelled out in terms of the responsive character of these modes. That is, all of these modes share the property of being appropriate responses to a specific normative reason. What distinguishes them is the specific properties they respond to: the emotional ones are each responsive to a particular value property, whereas belief and conjecture are responsive to truth and probability, respectively.<sup>51</sup>

There is considerable space to further elaborate on this understanding of emotional modes and to spell out its wider implications. In particular, in light of its opposition to the Epistemic View of emotion, one might wonder whether my account leaves any room at all for emotions to contribute to the epistemology of value. Although my interpretation of the Attitudinal View is non-epistemic in that it does not conceive of emotional modes as value apprehensions, there is a question as to whether it allows for emotions to play other epistemic roles vis à vis value. More specifically, one might wonder how it relates to two further roles which Deonna and Teroni accord to emotions with respect to the justification of evaluative judgments and our mastery of evaluative concepts (2012, ch. 10). As they propose, evaluative judgments may inherit their justifying reasons from emotions that give rise to them. Moreover, emotions are thought to provide the canonical conditions of application of evaluative concepts. Importantly, these additional claims are not based on Deonna and Teroni's commitment to the Epistemic View but rather put forward on the basis of an independently developed account of the justification conditions of emotions. Thus, while my proposed reading of the Attitudinal View is incompatible with the Epistemic View, it does not follow that it cannot recognize them as epistemically important in these further respects.<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> Accordingly, the proposal sharply differs from intellectualist accounts of emotion that reduce them to judgments. Cf. Nussbaum (2001). This is a further reason why I prefer 'acknowledge *x* as *F*' to 'acknowledge the truth that *x* is *F*' in explicating the Attitudinal View. Using the latter would imply that emotions are responsive to truth. This blurs the difference highlighted here between emotional and intellectual modes in terms of the properties to which they are responsive.

<sup>52</sup> A further issue is whether emotions can serve as evidence of the exemplification of certain values even if they do not constitute apprehensions of value. On the face of it, it seems plausible to suppose that they can. Cf. also Dietz (2017) who notes that there is no simple inference from the observation that emotions admit of motivating reasons to the conclusion that they cannot be evidence for evaluative states of affairs. One might think that if emotions can play this role this suffices to maintain an interesting epistemic analogy between emotion and

It would take far more space than I have available here to adequately address the wider consequences of my view for the epistemic significance of emotion. As regards its compatibility with Deonna and Teroni's further epistemological claims, matters are complicated by the fact that these rely on an account of justified emotion which differs from the picture of the normative role of formal objects I have elaborated. This account recognizes only non-evaluative aspects of an emotion's content as relevant to its justification (2012, ch. 8). It thereby ignores the status possessed by formal objects themselves as normative reasons for the corresponding attitude. Acknowledging this status seems to me to have several implications for the role Deonna and Teroni assign to emotions in relation to justified evaluative judgments and the possession of evaluative concepts. In particular, it seems to constrain the extent to which justified evaluative judgments may inherit their justifying reasons from the emotions which give rise to them.<sup>53</sup> However, spelling out these implications in detail would require examining at some length the connections between normative reasons for emotions and normative reasons for judgments, as well as the link between the former and the application conditions for evaluative concepts. Though worthwhile and crucial to a full assessment of the epistemic import of emotional modes, this examination is a project in its own right and would go considerably beyond the primary aims of this paper. Here, my primary purpose has been to outline an alternative understanding of the Attitudinal View which dispenses with the popular view that values are disclosed by emotions and instead recognizes them as responses to value. While one may want to show that emotions contribute to the epistemology of value in other respects, this understanding opposes a narrow epistemological concern with them as forms of value awareness and casts a very different light on our emotional engagement with value.

##### 5. Conclusion

I assessed a recent proposal by Deonna and Teroni according to which emotions are evaluative at the level of intentional mode. This proposal is put forward as elaborating the view that emotions apprehend value. Highlighting their character as responses to value, I argued that emotions do not apprehend value. At the same time, I suggested that Deonna and Teroni's proposal is still relevant to an adequate understanding of emotional evaluation. I thus proposed a different understanding of the evaluative character of emotional modes in terms of

---

perceptual experience given that perceptual experiences are widely taken to serve as evidence of certain states of affairs. Cf. n. 5.

<sup>53</sup> This is because, on the picture I have elaborated, judgments are appropriately responsive to truth, whilst emotions are appropriately responsive to specific values.

the responsive connection between emotion and value. On this reading, to have an emotion is never to come to be aware of values, but to acknowledge values we are (or seem to) already be aware of.\*

#### REFERENCES

- ARNOLD, M. (1960a). *Emotion and Personality*. Vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press.
- ARNOLD, M. (1960b). *Emotion and Personality*. Vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press.
- AUSTEN, J. *Mansfield Park*. In: *The Complete Novels*. London: Penguin, 2006.
- BAIER, A. (1985). “Rhyme and Reason: Reflections on Davidson’s Version of Having Reasons”. In LEPORE, E. & MCLAUGHLIN, B. (eds). *Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- BRADY, M. (2011). “Emotions, Perceptions, and Reasons”. In BAGNOLI, C. (ed.). *Morality & the Emotions*. New York: OUP.
- BYKVIST, K. & HATTIANGADI, A. (2007). “Does Thought Imply Ought?” *Analysis* 67 (4), 277-285.
- CUNEO, T. (2006). “Signs of Value: Reid on the Evidential Role of Feelings in Moral Judgment”. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 41(1), 69-91.
- DE SOUSA, R. (2011). *Emotional Truth*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- DEONNA, J. (2006). “Emotion, Perception and Perspective”. *dialectica* 60(1), 29-46.
- DEONNA, J. & TERONI, F. (2012). *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction*. London/New York: Routledge.
- DEONNA, J. & TERONI, F. (2014). “In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations?” In ROESER, S. & TODD, C. (eds.). *Emotion and Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- DEONNA, J. & TERONI, F. (2015). “Emotions as Attitudes”. *dialectica* 69(3), 293-311.
- DIETZ, C. (2017). “Reasons and Factive Emotions”. *Philosophical Studies*, Online First (accessible at: <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-017-0929-y>).
- DOKIC, J. & LEMAIRE, S. (2015). “Are Emotions Evaluative Modes?” *dialectica* 69(3), 271-292.

---

\* I am very grateful to Joel Smith, Fabrice Teroni, Kevin Mulligan and Hichem Naar for extensive discussion of the views discussed in this paper. I am also grateful to audiences at the EPSSE Annual Conference 2015 at the University of Edinburgh, the GAP Congress 2015 at the University of Osnabrück as well as the PONS Group of the Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, Tübingen, for helpful comments on earlier versions of this material. Last but not least I would also like to thank *dialectica*’s anonymous referees for their extensive insightful comments on previous versions of this article.

Published in: *dialectica* 71 (2) (2017), pp. 281–308. The definitive version is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com. (<https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12192>)

- DÖRING, S. (2004). *Gründe und Gefühle: Zur Lösung "des" Problems der Moral*. Habilitationsschrift Universität Duisburg-Essen.
- ELLSWORTH, P. & SCHERER, K. (2003). "Appraisal Processes in Emotion". In DAVIDSON, R. & GOLDSMITH, H. & SCHERER, K. (eds.). *Handbook of the Affective Sciences*. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- FREGE, G. (1892). "Über Sinn und Bedeutung". *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 100, 25-50. Engl. translation in Frege (1984), 157-177.
- FREGE, G. (1918a). "Der Gedanke: Eine logische Untersuchung". *Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutsche Idealismus*, 1, 58-77. Engl. translation in Frege (1984), 351-373.
- FREGE, G. (1918b). "Die Verneinung". *Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutsche Idealismus*, 1, 143-157. Engl. translation in Frege (1984), 373-389.
- FREGE, G. (1976). *Wissenschaftlicher Briefwechsel*. GABRIEL, G., HERMES, H., KAMBARTEL, F., THIEL, C. & VERAART, A. (eds.). Hamburg: Meiner. Abridged and translated as Frege (1980).
- FREGE, G. (1980). *Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence*. MCGUINNESS, B. (ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- FREGE, G. (1984). *Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic and Philosophy*. Guinness, B. (ed.), Kaal, H. et al. (trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- GIBBARD, A. (2005). "Truth and Correct Belief". *Philosophical Issues* 15(1), 338-350.
- GOLDIE, P. (2002). "Emotions, Feelings and Intentionality". *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1(3), 235-254
- GOLDIE, P. (2009). "Getting Feelings Into Emotional Experience in the Right Way". *Emotion Review*, 1(3), 232-239.
- HORNSBY, J. (2008). "A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons". In HADDOCK, A. & MACPHERSON, F. (eds.). *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- HYMAN, J. (1999). "How Knowledge Works". *The Philosophical Quarterly* 50 (197), 433-451.
- KENNY, A. (2003 [1963]). *Action, Emotion and Will*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Originally published 1963.
- LAZARUS, R. (1966). *Psychological Stress and the Coping Process*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- LEVENTHAL, H. & SCHERER, K. (1987). "The Relationship of Emotion to Cognition: A Functional Approach to a Semantic Controversy". *Cognition & Emotion* 1, 3-28.

Published in: *dialectica* 71 (2) (2017), pp. 281–308. The definitive version is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com. (<https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12192>)

- MARTIN, M. (1992). “Perception, Concepts, and Memory”. *The Philosophical Review* 101(4), 745-763.
- MCDOWELL, J. (1982). “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge”. *Proceedings of the British Academy* 68, 455-79.
- MCDOWELL, J. (1985). “Values and Secondary Qualities”. In Hondrich, T. (ed.). *Morality and Objectivity*. London: Routledge.
- MCDOWELL, J. (2011). *Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge*. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press.
- MCDOWELL, J. (2013). “Acting in the Light of a Fact”. In Bakhurst, D., Little, M. O. & Hooker, B. (eds.). *Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MCHUGH, Conor (2012). “The Truth Norm of Belief”. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 93(1), 8-30.
- MEINONG, A. (1972 [1917]). *On Emotional Presentation*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Originally published as “Über emotionale Präsentation“ in *Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien: Philosophisch-historische Klasse* Vol. 183, Article 2, Vienna.
- MULLIGAN, K. (2004). “Husserl on the “Logics“ of Valuing, Values and Norms“. In CENTI, B. & GIGLIOTTI, G. (eds.). *Fenomenologia della Ragion Pratica: L'Etica di Edmund Husserl*. Naples: Bibliopolis.
- MULLIGAN, K. (2007). “Intentionality, Knowledge and Formal Objects”. *Disputatio* 23(2), 205-228.
- MULLIGAN, K. (2009). “On Being Struck by Value“. In Merker, B. (ed.) *Leben mit Gefühlen: Emotionen, Werte und ihre Kritik*. Paderborn: Mentis.
- MULLIGAN, K. (2010a). “Husserls Herz“. In Frank, M. & Weidtmann, N. (eds.). *Husserl und die Philosophie des Geistes*. Berlin: Suhrkamp.
- MULLIGAN, K. (2010b). “Emotions and Values”. In Goldie, P. (ed.). *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MULLIGAN, K. & SCHERER, K. (2012). “Toward a Working Definition of Emotion”. *Emotion Review* 4(4), 345-357.
- MÜLLER, J. (2017). “Emotion as Position-Taking“. Unpublished manuscript.
- NAAR, H. (2017). “Subject-Relative Reasons for Love”. *Ratio* 30(2), 197–214.
- NUSSBAUM, M. (2001). *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: CUP.

Published in: *dialectica* 71 (2) (2017), pp. 281–308. The definitive version is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com. (<https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12192>)

- ROBERTS, R. (1996). “Propositions and Animal Emotion”. *Philosophy* 71, 147-156.
- ROBERTS, R. (2009). “The Sophistication of Non-Human Emotions”. In Lurz, R. W. (ed.), *Philosophy of Animal Minds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ROBERTS, R. (2003). *Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- ROBERTS, R. (2013). *Emotions in the Moral Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SCHELER, M. (1921). *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. Halle: Niemeyer.
- SCHERER, K. (2005). “What Are Emotions? And How Can They Be Measured?” *Social Science Information* 44(4), 695-729.
- SEARLE, J. (1983). *Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SLABY, J. (2008). “Affective Intentionality and the Feeling Body”. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 7, 429-444.
- STARKEY, C. (2008). “Emotions and Full Understanding”. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 11(4), 425–54.
- TAPPOLET, C. (2000). *Émotions et valeurs*. Paris: Presses Universitaires France.
- TERONI, F. (2007). “Emotions and Formal Objects”. *dialectica* 61 (3), 395-415.
- VON HILDEBRAND, D. (1969a [1916]). *Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung*. Special Edition. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Originally published in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. 3, 126-251, 1916.
- VON HILDEBRAND, D. (1969b [1922]). *Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis*. Special Edition. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Originally published in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, Vol. 5, 463-602, 1922.
- VON HILDEBRAND, D. (1953). *Christian Ethics*. New York: McKay.
- WEDGWOOD, R. (2002). “The Aim of Belief”. *Noûs* 36, 267-297.
- WEDGWOOD, R. (2013). “The Right Thing to Believe?” In T. Chan (ed.). *The Aim of Belief*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.