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SOUND ONTOLOGY AND THE BRENTANO-HUSSERL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME*

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Both Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl addressed sound while trying to explain the inner consciousness of time and gave to it the status of a supporting example. Although their inquiries were not aimed at clarifying in detail the nature of the auditory experience or sounds themselves, they made some interesting observations that can contribute to the current philosophical discussion on sounds. On the other hand, in analytic philosophy, while inquiring the nature of sounds, their location, auditory experience or the audible qualities and so on, the representatives of that trend of thought have remained silent about the depiction of sound and the auditory phenomena in the phenomenological tradition. The paper's intention is to relate both endeavours, yet the perspective carried out is that of analytic philosophy and, thus, I pay special attention to conceptual analysis as a methodological framework. In this sense, I first explain what sound ontology is in the context of analytic philosophy and the views that it encompasses—namely, the Property View (PV), the Wave View (WV) and the Event View (EV)—. Secondly, I address the problems it entails, emphasising that of sound individuation. In a third section, I propose the possibly controversial conjunction of a “Brentano-Husserl Analysis of the Consciousness of Time” (for short “Brentano-Husserl analysis”) and outline the commonalities of both authors, without ignoring its discrepancies. My main focus is Husserl's 1905 *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des Inneren Zeitbewusstseins*. While addressing the Brentano-Husserl analysis, I elaborate on the problem of temporal and spatial extension (*Raumlichkeit* and *Zeitlichkeit*, respectively) of both consciousness and sound. Such comparison is a key one, since after these two developments, one can notice some theoretical movements concerning the shift of attention from sounds to the unity of consciousness, and how they mirror each other. After examining the controversial claims concerning

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the temporal and spatial extension of both consciousness and sound, I argue in the concluding paragraphs that while considering the accounts of sound ontology, the Brentano-Husserl analysis would probably endorse a Property View and that this could have interesting consequences for the issue of Sound Individuation.

Key words: sound, auditory experience, Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl, sound ontology, sound individuation, consciousness of time (*Zeitbewusstseins*), temporal extension (*Zeitlichkeit*), spatial extension (*Raumlichkeit*).

ОНТОЛОГИЯ ЗВУКА И АНАЛИЗ СОЗНАНИЯ ВРЕМЕНИ У БРЕНТАНО И ГУССЕРЛЯ*

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Как Франц Brentano, так и Эдмунд Гуссерль обращались к звуку в своих попытках объяснить внутреннее сознание времени, пользуясь им в качестве поясняющего примера. Хотя их исследования и не были нацелены на детальное прояснение природы акустического опыта или самих звуков, у них есть интересные наблюдения, которые могут быть продуктивными в контексте современной философской дискуссии относительно [природы] звуков. С другой стороны, представители аналитической философии, обсуждая природу звуков, их локализацию, акустический опыт, акустические качества и т. д., умалчивали об анализе звука и акустических феноменов в феноменологической традиции. В статье предпринята попытка соотнести оба подхода; в то же время, перспектива, из которой я исхожу, относится к аналитической философии, ввиду чего я уделяю особое внимание методу концептуального анализа. В этой связи я, прежде всего, объясняю, что представляет собой онтология звука в контексте аналитической философии и концепций, разрабатываемых в ее рамках, а именно, концепции свойств, волновой концепции и событийной концепции. Во второй части я обращаюсь к содержащимся в ней проблемам, делая акцент на проблеме индивидуации звука. В третьей части представлена, возможно, небесспорная попытка рассмотреть анализ сознания времени у Brentano-Гуссерля (для краткости именуемый «анализ Brentano-Гуссерля») в качестве некоей единой концепции и очертить сходства между этими двумя авторами, не игнорируя, в то же время, различия между ними. Я фокусируюсь, прежде всего, на гуссерлевских «Лекциях по феноменологии внутреннего сознания времени» 1905 года. На материале анализа Brentano-Гуссерля я детально рассматриваю проблему временного и пространственного протяжения (*Raumlichkeit u Zeitlichkeit*, соответственно) как сознания, так и звука. Это сравнение является ключевым, поскольку после появления двух этих концепций заметными становятся некоторые теоретические разработки,

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основанные на смещении внимания от звуков к единству сознанию и тому, как они отражаются друг в друге. В заключение, после рассмотрения конкурирующих утверждений относительно пространственного и временного протяжения как сознания, так и звука, я делаю вывод, что, будучи рассмотрен в свете обозначенных подходов к онтологии звука, анализ Brentano-Гуссерля является, скорее всего, аргументом в пользу концепции свойств, и это обстоятельство также открывает интересные перспективы [в анализе] проблемы индивидуации звука.

Ключевые слова: звук, акустический опыт, Франц Brentano, Эдмунд Гуссерль, онтология звука, индивидуация звука, сознание времени, временная протяженность, пространственная протяженность.

Los zorros del desierto de Sechura aúllan como demonios cuando
llega la noche; ¿sabes por qué?:
para quebrar el silencio que los aterroriza

*(Sechura's desert foxes howl like demons at nightfall. Do you know
why? In order to break the silence that terrifies them)*

MARIO VARGAS LLOSA, *La ciudad y los perros*
(*The Time of the Hero*)

Después reflexioné que todas las cosas le suceden a uno precisamente,
precisamente ahora. Siglos de siglos y sólo en el presente
ocurren los hechos innumerables hombres en el aire, en la tierra y
el mar, y todo lo que realmente pasa me pasa a mí...

*(Then I reflected that everything happens to a man precisely, precisely
now. Centuries and centuries and only in the present do things hap-
pen; countless men in the air, on the face of the earth and the sea, and
all that really is happening is happening to me)*

JORGE LUIS BORGES, *El jardín de los senderos que se bifurcan*
(*The Garden of the Forking Paths*)

If I hear a mocking bird singing for three or four minutes I have a temporal experience of the mocking bird singing, but it also could be said that I have a temporal experience of the song. To point out other possible distinctions, there is the song of the mocking bird and the sound produced by the mocking bird as events in the world, being, presumably, independent of me and my will. For Edmund Husserl and, before him, Franz Brentano, a distinction must be made between the experience of that sound and the sound itself. And, not being focused primarily on sound, what they are really concerned with is the inner experience of time.

These developments have been, to a certain extent, alien to another field where the philosophical discussion on sound has taken place: that of analytic philosophy. Since Strawson's *Individuals*, sounds have gained new philosophical appeal and, for

the last twenty years, there have been new contributions (Casati & Dokic, 1994, 2014; O'Callaghan, 2007, 2009).

This topic reveals a situation of mutual negligence. On the one hand, analytic philosophy has not paid attention to Husserl's or Brentano's treatment of sounds, not even for the sake of exemplification; not to mention works such as Ihde's (2007)¹. While they address 'phenomenology,' they give this word a different meaning from that of the philosophical movement started by Husserl. Meanwhile, there is little mention of the debate on sound in analytic philosophy in current phenomenological research—albeit Ihde considers, as I will underline below, Strawson's thought experiment (Ihde, 2007, 32). Therefore, there is a need to build a bridge between both traditions and my contempt is to prove this to be fruitful.

Within the analytic debate, there are two general inquiries concerning sounds: that of sound Ontology and that of sound topology. The first is focused on the question of *what* sounds are; the latter is engaged with the inquiry about *where* sounds are. Therefore, the main problem to address here is the place that the "Brentano-Husserl" analysis of the inner consciousness of time has, or would have, within the philosophical (mostly analytical) debate on sounds. Surely, the conjunction of Husserl and Brentano can be problematic, so certain nuances are needed.

Against this background, there is a major issue that philosophers of sound have described as "infamously difficult to resolve" (O'Callaghan, 2007, 64): that of sound individuation. This is the second issue I want to address: can the Brentano-Husserl analysis solve the problems of the individuation of sound?

A first step to consider this possibility is to describe the options concerning both the ontology and the topology of sound in a schematic way. Here I will stick to the depictions made by Casati and Dokic (1995, 2014) and O'Callaghan (2007).

In a second section, it is necessary to describe the problem of sound individuation and what it entails, the way it is inscribed within the ontology and topology of sound, and the hierarchy of sub-problems it encompasses.

After these two sections, the proper discussion on Brentano and Husserl commences. It is necessary to describe what I have labelled as the Brentano-Husserl analysis. In phenomenological studies it is common to emphasise the differences between the authors and to analyse them in deep. Here I will go against the grain, since I am rather concerned with the commonalities between them and, while considering such commonalities, I try to systematise their view(s).

¹ A careful look into the canon bibliography (some of it cited in this paper) can confirm this. For instance in Casati & Dokic (2014), O'Callaghan (2007), O'Callaghan & Nudds (2009).

What I pretend to elaborate by referring to the Brentano-Husserl analysis is a common concern they both had pertaining the problem of spatial and temporal extension of particulars and of consciousness. Here I also pay attention to the main commonality of both authors: their endorsement of a “retentional model” (Dainton, 2017)².

After this, I turn to two theoretical movements that can be drawn from this perspective when applied to sounds: *shifting* (namely, the change in the focus of attention on certain issues, such as sound individuation), and the *mirroring* effect involving sound and consciousness. I have written a subsection for each of these movements.

The particular depiction I propose for the Brentano-Husserl analysis is devoted to sounds and specifically aimed at facing the derived problems from the ontology of sound that I have already outlined; especially, that of the individuation of sound. In that sense, if the Brentano-Husserl analysis enhances a good theory for sounds, it should be able to respond to some of the difficulties previously reported. I dedicate a section to how the Brentano-Husserl analysis would respond to this challenge.

In the conclusions, I will argue that the Brentano-Husserl analysis is close to a view called the Property View-1 (PV1), which holds that sounds are properties of the perceiving mind. A final remark is concerned with the value of sounds as an example used by our both authors: as I believe, from this view, what can be said about sounds can be said, *a fortiori*, for consciousness, which is a—if not the—major philosophical issue.

§ 1. ONTOLOGY AND TOPOLOGY OF SOUND

Ontology of sound deals with questions such as: are sounds objects? Are they particulars? Are they properties or secondary qualities? In recent years, the views produced to answer these questions have been reduced to three (or four, if one counts one of them as twofold): the wave view (WV), the property view (PV) and the event view (EV). Each view has its proper logical extension for the term “sound.”

WV is the view according to which sounds are acoustics waves. This is the hegemonic and dominant definition of sounds, and it is so probably beyond the disciplinary fields of philosophy and psychology.

In WV, sound properties are usually known as volume or intensity, and pitch. They have the logical extension of amplitude and frequency, respectively, since such

² Such endorsement could be questionable. Robin D. Rollinger (1999, 59), for instance, attributes this term to the late Husserl and would not grant its use to Brentano.

equivalences are a direct result of the identity statement “sound = acoustic wave”³. One could fairly say that WV is the physicalist position within sound ontology.

I will not focus on the criticism to WV, but it is worth mention that, phenomenologically, there is more to sounds than amplitude and frequency. The main criticism (Pasnau, 1999) for WV is that *we, for one, do not perceive sounds as being in a medium, but at the sounding events*. Moreover, some of the properties of waves, in the physical sense, do not seem exportable to sound, for instance, their capacity to move (or travel) (Casati & Dokic, 2014).

The second view, PV, is twofold. In formal terms it is very different from other views, given that here sounds *are not* particulars, but properties of something else. While considering to what such properties can be predicated of, it turns out that we have two possibilities. The first one, which I label as PV1, states that sounds are properties of the perceiving mind. The second one, PV2, holds that sounds are properties of objects.

The first one, in its more explicit formulation, would be certainly closer to a subjective idealist point of view and, for this reason, it is not easy to find such a stance in theory⁴. An implication here, however counterintuitive it may seem, is that sounds could then be private, and not public.

There are, of course, degrees, in the extent to which PV1 can be endorsed. As I have stated before, an upshot of this article is to hold that, at some stage of formulation of PV1, the Brentano-Husserl analysis is more prone to this view than to others.

PV2 is an interesting option because, if it claims that sounds are properties of the object, namely the sounding or vibrating object, it is yet to be seen which kind of properties we are discussing here. A possible candidate is that of dispositional properties, but that is a task beyond the scope of this article. The argument of secondary qualities, as stated since John Locke’s *Essay*, is a modality of PV2.

Finally, EV is a philosophical formulation (Casati & Dokic, 1994; O’Callaghan, 2007, 2009; Scruton, 2009) that regards sounds as *events* that take place and are bounded spatiotemporally.

There is yet another way of tackling the issue of the location of sound. That is the scope I have labelled as sound topology, which has been developed by Casati and Dokic (1994, 2014). The positions are: proximal, medial, distal and aspatial. The scheme here is a subject-object model instantiated by the hearer-sounding. In the first

³ Timbre, which is the other sound property, can also be characterised in a physicalistic fashion, yet it include more variables (like harmonic content and vibrato) that are not as easy to depict schematically.

⁴ Casey O’Callaghan, one of the main authors in this discussion, usually points to D. L. C. Maclachlan (1989) as a representative of this view.

sense, the sound *is* at or *in* the hearer; in the second, the sound is somewhere *between* the hearer and the sounding object; in the distal proposition, the sound is at or in the object. Meanwhile, the aspatial view emphasizes one of the main problems of the ontology of sound: its lack of inner spatial structure. Considering this, the aspatial view would claim that sounds are nowhere. The latter is a stance that radicalises Strawson's thought experiment of a purely acoustic world.

So far, I have offered an overview of the philosophical discussion about sound. Clearly, there is no agreement regarding sound ontology and, perhaps connectedly, also when it comes to sound topology.

Far from being another philosophical issue on which a common understanding has not seen the light, the discrepancy gives rise to certain consequences in the understanding of sounds. One of them is, precisely, that of sound individuation.

§ 2. SOUND INDIVIDUATION AND ITS PROBLEMS

§ 2.1 What individuation means

Identity, identification and individuation are deeply connected problems and conceptual confusion may arise. Let us start with probably the easiest of the three: identification. To *identify* a sound is to be able, as a perceiving subject, to detect an acoustic phenomenon and, perhaps but not necessarily, to account for its properties, mainly, that of timbre.

Should the identification go well, to single out a sound is to individuate it. Individuation, in this sense, is oriented by the identification of the particular, in this case a sound (if sounds can be considered as such) (Méndez-Martínez, 2019). The problem of sound individuation also appears in the literature as 'auditory grouping,' when the singling out of auditory objects is discussed (Nudds, 2010).

In a metaphysical and theoretical sense, individuation is also to be considered as what makes a particular what it is and, some would add, how it "differs from all other particulars" (Davis, 2005, 292). But, following Castaneda (1975), individuation and individuality are different from distinctiveness. Indeed, distinctiveness is rather a consequence of individuality and individuation.

Apart from establishing that an object is indeed what it seems to be or, in other words, ensuring its individuation and individuality, we could say that an object is persistent through time if, despite its possible changes, it keeps its *identity*. We can also appeal formally to identity, for instance, when we say that "*a* is identical with *b*," or "*a* = *b*."

Here, I am specifically concerned with the individuality-individuation and identification of a sound and the way this is affected by the perplexities of sound ontology.

§ 2.2 Aspatiality

The problem of spatiality and aspatiality (or sounds' possession/lack of inner spatial structure) does not derive from the problem of the individuation of sound and it could be said that they share the same hierarchy while considering the importance of the problems of sound ontology. However, they remain connected.

Connecting sound ontology with sound topology is a way to show the problem of location of particulars or, if you hold PV in either of its two options, particulars' properties. When one considers individuation, the problem becomes in that of *individuating-where*.

The views in the ontology and topology of sound almost group in tandem: PV1 with proximal; PV2 with distal; EV and WV with medial. Stating that a sound individuates-in-consciousness, like in PV1-proximal, is very different from saying that it individuates in an acoustic wave, or that sound is secondary to the individuation of an object that possesses the sounding property.

The aspatial view is, surely, more problematic. How is it that something lacking inner spatial structure individuates? There are two ways of individuating in an aspatial scheme. The first is by appealing to a pure and abstract sense of individuation. The medieval discussion about *haecceity*, for instance, is mainly metaphysical and does not encompass the problem of identification. The second solution is to emphasise the temporal features of sound. It is in this last option that the Brentano-Husserl analysis can prove fruitful.

§ 2.3 Sound complexity

A “complex” sound is composed by the interaction of several sounds. A clear example of this is a chord or a moment in an orchestra's performance. It could also be said, that the latter is “more complex” than the former because there are more sounds interacting in it.

Sound complexity, in this sense, is clearly connected with SI while inquiring: “Is it *one* sounds or *many*?” A problem here is not to appeal to an arbitrary criterion, to designate where a sound is considered as *a* sound as opposed to another.

This sort of sound complexity meets other typical issues in ontology and mereology: the establishment of boundaries and the notion of part of a particular. A sceptical route here is feasible⁵.

⁵ An example of this is Peter Unger's “Problem of the many” and the cloud consisting of water drops. Unger's goal, by using a Sorites-like argument, is to query even the very notion of ordinary object. The same can be applied to a complex sound as the ones here considered.

Yet, the complexity of sounds is not only that of the interaction of several sounds or, more accurately, many causal sources of sound. Even a sound with one causal source can be complex when we observe its properties: pitch, intensity or volume, and timbre. While playing the guitar, or any of the other chordophone instruments that have a board, one can play *glissando* and obtain a change in pitch; in that case, one could say that it is the same sound as it has the same causal source⁶. This is an example of a sound that could have a certain degree of *pitch complexity*.

A sound that increases or decreases its intensity or volume, with no interruption, like in *crescendo* or *decrescendo*, could be considered as having a *volume complexity*.

In accordance to this, *timbre complexity* is theoretically possible, although the examples are not easy to describe, given its qualitative nature.

However, these inner complexities of sound are not as related to individuation as to identity, especially identity through time.

§ 2.4 Reidentification issues

Let us go back to the case of an instrumentalist. We have a violinist and she plays a C in a particular pitch. After playing the note for a certain amount of time, she plays it again with the same duration, volume, and, of course, timbre and pitch. Both times or both events are qualitatively the same. The question here is: are those *two* (individually different) sounds or is it the same sound played twice?

Strawson (1959, 69–70) takes this into consideration: if we say that we hear the *same* sound, then we are talking about sound as a universal, not a particular. Here he is addressing, among other things, the issue of *reidentification*.

Long before Strawson, Husserl (1984) addressed this problem in his *Logische Untersuchungen*. In that work, he considered sound, and more specifically, the musical note, as a universal. In the second investigation (§ 14), he discusses nominalism and the correspondence between an *ideal object* and a name. In that account, the note would be a Universal, such as red (or redness) and the note played or an object being red would be particulars or occurrences of the universal.

The identification, reidentification and individuation of sounds are problematic when we consider them as particulars and not universals. This is more patent with EV. If sounds are events, such as my first kiss, the battle of Waterloo and me submitting this article, and each event has its own identity as *that* event, with its own indi-

⁶ The notion of “causal source” in this view is, of course, a matter of debate. In a technique such as *glissando* the left hand (or the hand in the board) is moving in order to produce the change of pitch. One could say that this movement is another causal source different that the right hand.

viduality, then we are surrounded by a myriad of microevents, namely, sounds. There is, *prima facie*, an issue of parsimony here.

§ 2.5 Duration puzzles

Every entity or particular that can be taken as being temporal is supposed to have duration: life marks the duration of a living being as it is born and eventually ceases to exist. Should sounds be considered as particulars, the same criterion applies: they have a beginning and an end. But, if they are properties, then their duration is of a different kind. Let us consider a typical property of a spatiotemporal particular: the shape of an apple. We could say that an apple is almost round or, to avoid inaccuracies in the description, we could refer to an apple-like shape. An apple can change this property as it can be cut into pieces or smashed and turned into applesauce. Other properties, typically conceived as secondary qualities, can also change: its taste, its smell, and so forth.

Duration of a particular and duration of a property (of a particular) seem, thus, to deserve different considerations. In doing so, the following cases, or duration puzzles as I labelled them, would receive a different emphasis for sound:

- a) *False continuum*: An auditory subject *S* unites, from tiny and almost continuous or adjacent but differentiated sounds to regard them as a *single and individual sound*. This could be a problem of lack of attention from *S* when it comes to the unnoticed discontinuity.
- b) *The acoustic cutter*: An auditory subject *S* constantly presses/releases her ear tragus, and, thus, “cuts” a sound which is, publicly, *one sound*.

The problem of continuity, the *continuum*, was, by the way, a key philosophical concern for both Brentano and Husserl.

§ 3. THE BRENTANO-HUSSERL ANALYSIS OF TIME

While theorising, philosophers rely on examples. Apart from its pedagogic use, examples function as reality-anchor for the most theoretical and abstract discussions. In this sense, while referring to tables and chairs, philosophers are not proposing a “philosophy of tables and chairs,” but a more general discussion, say, “reference,” “perception” or the like, which can cover tables, chairs, cats, and sometimes human beings as well.

Moreover, some examples make us to reconsider our theories about what we would otherwise regard as unproblematic. It is precisely in this sense that sounds, as

examples, are intriguing. In Strawson's (1959) endeavour of descriptive metaphysics, he wonders what place sounds should take since, if they are understood as particulars, they are not clearly spatial-material particulars. Along with other perplexities, the complexity of this case allows for the development of a 'philosophy of sound' beyond mere exemplification. Philosophy is rarely as casuistic as this.

It is interesting to notice that analytic philosophy has approached the problem of sounds as an anomaly that tests them and confronts our theories with difficulties. The Brentano-Husserl analysis, however, offers a different viewpoint.

Sound has, in general, a pedagogical value, yet there are two ways to employ it: whereas for analytic philosophy sound gives rise to perplexities and puzzles (and a dispute at the core of sound ontology), in phenomenology, on the other hand, this pedagogical value has favoured the clarification of important themes, like that of the inner consciousness of time.

Is it because phenomenology is neglecting the problematic aspects of sound? Or is it because the aspects of the inner consciousness of time are more problematic than those of sound? I believe it could be both. In this analysis, the problem of aspatiality of sounds does not have the same role as in the analytic tradition, and the place sounds have in Brentano and Husserl's works is fundamentally that of examples that allow us to problematize the subject of consciousness. What I refer to as the movement of *mirroring* is directly connected to this observation.

Caught between two philosophical traditions, sounds have proved fruitful both as examples and as paradoxes, a matter I will return to in the conclusions.

Before that, allow me to elaborate on the label "Brentano-Husserl analysis." My approach to Brentano and Husserl's work eschews the conventional exegesis in an effort to think *with* these authors and not only *about* them. A similar effort is seen in 'experimental phenomenology' or 'post-phenomenology' (Ihde, 2007).

In that sense, I will also underline the commonalities between our two authors, rather than the differences, although these will not go unnoticed.

In the *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*, Husserl's starting point is Brentano's theory (*Lehre*) of original associations and it consists only of three sections. Although in that time academic culture was less keen on referring the sources, Husserl construes this theory from his own manuscripts while visiting Brentano's lectures, rather than citing the published treatises of his mentor. According to Oskar Kraus (1976, 224), neither Husserl nor the editor of the *Vorlesungen*⁷, were

⁷ Who was none other than Martin Heidegger, in whose work time would become the heart of his ontological project.

concerned with the fact that Brentano no longer held in his late years the theory that Husserl attacks here⁸.

Also in Husserl we can notice changes. Some authors, for example, claim that his 1905 position changed (Kelly, 2016, 81). Henceforth, I will elaborate on a *static* Husserlian picture, concerning on a specific reading of the Husserl's 1905 *Vorlesungen*⁹; and a *dynamic* one, focused in the genetic phenomenology of the *Bernauer Manuskripten* and the *C Manuskripten* that bestow a different character to the *Zeitbewusstseins*. If the caveat is necessary, it is precisely the static picture, which comes closer to Brentano's account and which makes possible the "Brentano-Husserl analysis" conjunction. Yet, as I will clarify in the conclusions, there might be enough room for both the static and the dynamic pictures while accounting for sounds at least.

Going back to Brentano, in his view, there is a dualistic two-fold structure of consciousness that is aimed at the object of sensation or the sensing of that object: those are the primary and secondary objects of perception, respectively (Brentano, 1995, 92). This is not a picture essentially contested by Husserl, what he rejects is Brentano's initial proposal: that the object of a retention (for instance, a sound) is secondary, and that the primary object of perception is in the now. For Brentano, the objects of retention were "unreal." Husserl regards this as one of the least acceptable features of his theory¹⁰. Brentano, according to Kraus, later modified this view¹¹, but no further amendments or clarifications were made public by Husserl on this regard.

⁸ With caution, Peter Simons (1995, xv) notices the way Kraus is usually amending Brentano's claims on this and that and trying to exempt him from any mistake.

⁹ Now, when it comes to Husserl alone, it is possible to interpret that there are signs towards this dynamic picture in the very *Vorlesungen*. It is, of course, a matter of debate to make this division in Husserl's works pertaining time. These caveats will be clearer while specifying our understanding on the extensional, cinematic and retentive models.

¹⁰ According to Simons (2015), Brentano is a *reist* in his approach to ontology and, probably in correspondence with this, the things that do not exist, the *irrealia*, were an important concern, as they were clearly for Meinong and for Husserl himself. The problem, of course, as I elaborate below, is the identification of the past with such a realm. But it is worth mentioning that there were several types of *irrealia* in Brentano's conception, being the *temporalia* just one of them (For a comprehensive revision on Brentanian typology on this regard see Abella (2009, 390–414)).

¹¹ Kraus says: "The essential thing is this: Brentano recognised, as we have already noted, that the intuitions of time differences that provide us with the presentation of 'earlier,' 'later,' 'present,' and 'past,' could not be differences of the primary objects, i.e., of what is usually called the 'content' of sensation; [...] he recognised that the intuition of time goes back to the intuition of a continual modification of the sensory act itself, a modification that is present to us as an intuition in inner perception" (Kraus, 1976, 225).

Even if we are on Husserl's side, we can notice that the retentional model (which I will outline in the following section) is not at stake. What separates Husserl from Brentano is that his mentor does not distinguish act from content (Husserl, 1928, 380). This omission can be blamed on the lack of resolution about the conditions of possibility of the inner consciousness of time (Husserl, 1928, 382). Also, as Bennet, Kern and Marbach (1996, 87) notice, another implication of this not-so-small difference between Brentano and Husserl is that such differentiations concerning intentionality pertain rather to the noetic structure of the intentional act, than to its object.

Despite this disagreement, some authors have claimed that both philosophers defended similar understandings of the inner perception of time (Dainton, 2017, 26). Husserl's famous assertion that „*Sukzession von Empfindungen und Empfindung der Sukzession ist nicht dasselbe*“ (Husserl, 1928, 376) follows Brentano's thought. If this is so, then using labels such as “Anti-Brentanian” (Olbromski, 2011; Shim, 2017) for Husserl's criticism on Brentano would be misleading. Perhaps, however, there is more to this assertion than it seems. In the first place, we had to recognise that Husserl's constant changes make it difficult to assess how close or far he was from Brentano. The Husserl of 1905 who wrote the *Vorlesungen* certainly differs from the Husserl of the *Bernauer Manuskripten* or the *C Manuskripten*. Again, this is the core of the difference between the static and dynamic pictures.

The following section will make a consideration from the static point of view and further on I will elaborate on its implication. The Brentano-Husserl analysis, because of the conjunction of commonalities between Brentano and the 1905 Husserl, would be that of the static point of view.

§ 3.1 Spatiality (*res Extensa, Räumlichkeit*) and temporality (*res temporalis, Zeitlichkeit*)

Because phenomenology developed principally in a German context, it is important to consider some of its terminologies and caveats. Franz Brentano uses the terms *Räumlichkeit* and *Ortlichkeit* to refer to the ‘spatiality’ of something, these terms have often been translated to English as ‘spatial determination.’ I understand these terms as equivalents of *res extensa*¹².

¹² Regarding the expression “spatial extension,” there are interesting observations considering its historical conceptual proliferation in the 20th Century. Ivor Leclercq (1979, 209) says that: “By the nineteenth century, the phrase ‘a spatial extent’ came to make sense; it would have done so prior to about the mid-eighteenth century. In fact, the adjective ‘spatial,’ according to the O. E. D., was of mid-nineteenth-century origin. Previously the phrase ‘spatial extent’ would have been a pleonasm; it would have meant ‘extensive extent.’ The introduction of this adjective, meaning ‘of or pertaining

For the case of temporality we can use the term *res temporalis* (Summa, 2014) or *Zeitlichkeit*. Having clarified this, we can refer to the exploration of temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) and spatiality (*Räumlichkeit*) using the jargon of phenomenology. For both Brentano and Husserl, the issue of finding out whether consciousness is temporally extended is the key point in their approach to the analysis of the inner consciousness of time. Yet prior to this inquiry, for both authors, and this is even more manifest for Husserl, there was quite a clear difference between time in the physical sense, on the one hand, and in the phenomenological one. Hence the suspension of objective time (*Ausschaltung der objektiven Zeit*), following the principle of ἐποχή, and their tagging as transcendencies (*Transzendenzen*) (Husserl, 1928, 371–372). Thus, there is a sense in which the *Zeitlichkeit* we are pointing out has a transcendent character, which is the one we are considering first here.

Taking into account, spatial and temporal extension as an issue to be applied to sound, can these approaches meet a crossroad with analytic philosophy?

In Strawson's descriptive metaphysics, for example, the basic particulars he points out (material bodies) have mainly spatial extension. They also have temporal extension, although Strawson is not very concerned with this. A cat is spatially extended because it is a material body and it is also temporally extended in the sense that it has, as a living entity, a beginning and an end. If we follow the discussions of the previous sections, sound's spatiality is not as clear. *Prima facie*, sounds are thought to be temporally extended; yet we do not know if they are spatially extended, albeit they give us information about our surroundings.

There is a reason for the double value of temporal extension: in the case of sound, it largely depends on the ontology chosen. Most of the views I described above would consider sound as temporally extended (in a transcendent way): WV, EV, PV2 and even a version of PV1. But in PV1 there are also different stances on what consciousness is. If PV1 follows the guidelines of the Brentano-Husserl analysis, as I will explain later, then sound *would not be* temporally extended; however, this depends on certain nuances that distinguish perceived-experienced sound from 'objective sound.'

Strawson does not query "consciousness" in this way. Some of his mentions would imply that "states of consciousness" might be particulars, yet he is rather con-

to space,' signifies a new meaning of the word 'space,' one which has now very much come to be taken for granted, indeed by most as the basic meaning of the word."

"Space" and "extension" were, in this sense, exchangeable. There is even an etymologic consideration that we should have: the Latin "spatium" and the Greek "spaein," which means 'to draw, stretch out.'

cerned with how states of consciousness can be ascribed to some particulars (namely, persons).

Consciousness, on the other hand, is not only a central matter for the Brentano-Husserl analysis but for a vast portion of the phenomenological tradition. One of the most distinctive points of the Brentano-Husserl Analysis (in the static sense), when it comes to consciousness, is that it seems to point out that *consciousness is not temporally extended*, insofar as we are taking time in the objective-transcendent sense, as I explain below.

The claim could be controversial if we consider the dynamic picture that genetic phenomenology has to offer and it might even be considered non-Husserlian. But as I will explain below, this depends on an understanding of the commonalities between Brentano and the 1905 Husserl, as analytic philosophy understands it. In the conclusion I will explain how this could gear with a more general and complex picture of Husserl's philosophy.


What would it imply to assume that consciousness is not temporally extended? The conundrum here is that if we are aware of time, this might lead us to think that such awareness is also extended on time as it changes. But what we directly experience is the momentary present so, in that sense, how can we say that consciousness is temporally extended? According to Dainton (2017), there are three models to approach the consciousness of time:

- *The Cinematic Model* claims that consciousness is not temporally extended. It is made of snapshots, like a film. It states, thereof, that change, succession and persistence cannot be directly perceived.
- *The Extensional Model* claims that consciousness is temporally extended, and it claims that change, succession and persistence can be directly perceived.
- *The Retentional Model* claims that consciousness is not temporally extended, but it contains packed codified representations (namely retentions or *proteraesthesia*) and that we can account for change, succession and persistence.

In such interpretation, both Brentano and Husserl would defend the retentional model. Yet, this ascription to the retentional model works insofar as we consider temporal extension in a transcendent and objective sense. Dainton's model inquires the correspondence of consciousness with time in an *objective* (that is, transcendent) sense. However, for Brentano, and even more for Husserl, the suspension of objective time had certain time to add to this.

As I have mentioned, there is a difference concerning the *static* and *dynamic* pictures offered mainly by Husserl that trouble our conjunction of the latter's view with that of Brentano. However, even in the 1905's *Vorlesungen* we can find claims that could contradict Dainton's interpretation according to which the Brentano-Husserl analysis (or Husserl, at least) could meet the retentional model and not, say, the extensional one: "Es ist ja evident, dass die Wahrnehmung eines zeitlichen Objektes selbst Zeitlichkeit hat, dass Wahrnehmung der Dauer selbst Dauer der Wahrnehmung voraussetzt, dass die Wahrnehmung einer beliebigen Zeitgestalt selbst ihre Zeitgestalt hat" (Husserl, 1928, 384). Therewith, we could understand this as a claim pertaining the possibility of accounting directly for duration and perception and, thus, to conceive the Brentano-Husserl analysis as closer to an extensional model. But that would be towards an extensional model that has a different conception of time (not the objective-transcendent) and not as Dainton is portraying it. So, let us explore more what does it entail to go for the retentional model.

The first step is the schematic model as Husserl presents it in more than one occasion:



This scheme can be found on several accounts on attributions to Brentano (Stumpf, 1976) and in Husserl himself (Husserl, 1928, 446). From left to right there is a line of time: here the column on the right hand indicates the now or the specious present, and to the left we find the past moments. Let us suppose we perceive a succession of four sounds. For the moment we are at T_4 , listening directly to "d," meanwhile "a," "b" and "c" have already passed: they already sounded. In the cinematic model that is not a problem: it is just a collection of those moments; in an extensive model the consciousness of time goes along with that of the temporal phenomenon. For a retentionalist view, the present moment is "specious" because it contains a version of "c," "b" and "a," just as the moment "c," contains a version of "b" and "a"; and the moment "b," a version of "a."

One of the axes of the discussion of this model is, for Husserl, to know what the expression “version of” entails. What is the object of such *representations*¹³? Brentano, according to Husserl, first thought that the object of the representation was different from the object of the representation for the present time and that those conscious past moments were unreal. Husserl is dubious that such a continuum between real and unreal might be possible, a matter that is even delicate if we consider that the so-called continuum is the origin of our representations of the past (Kortooms, 2002, 34)¹⁴.

By criticising this, Husserl additionally detects that specious time is indeed not as slippery and that, besides retentions, our consciousness at the present time is oriented towards the future. Hence the Husserlian conceptual contribution to the retentional model: *protentions*.

Protentions give sense to the idea of a continuum that, naturally, had to keep going after the always ephemeral and extinguishing now and not only does it give a sense to the present, but also entails the anticipation of the future. It is not outlandish to say that by coining the concept of ‘protention,’ Husserl is moving from a static phenomenology to a genetic one (Illescas Nájera, 2012, 276).

The Brentano-Husserl analysis has a particular standpoint on why consciousness might seem a *res temporalis* but, in reality, is not. This, of course, brings about certain difficulties: how is it possible that a “stream” of consciousness avoids being

¹³ Instead of “representation” we might as well use “presentation.” This is an important issue especially for Husserl. As Klaus Held notices the form of the intuition implies making something present: “The perception of a thing is intuition, insofar as the thing shows itself to me in the presence of Here and Now. Intuition means having something present for Husserl, where ‘presenting’ (*Gegenwärtigung*) is distinguished from the many possibilities of ‘re-presenting’ (*Vergegenwärtigung*), such as, for example, memory or imagination” (Held, 2003, 37).

¹⁴ In Husserl’s portrait of Brentano’s *Lehre*, he criticises the concept of ‘phantasy’ (*Phantasie*). Is it possible that Brentano, or Husserl’s Brentano, was utilising a troublesome term rather than committing to the realm of the non-being?

Brentano used this term in the lectures Husserl attended and gave a more elaborated account of it in the *Gründzuge der Aesthetik*. Against an Aristotelian background, he was trying to go through the problem of representation. That of the representation of phenomena in the past (or in the future!) was among the Brentano’s uses of *Phantasie* in that work (Abella, 2009, 266).

On the side of confusing terms, Husserl sometimes uses the term ‘phantom’ while, presumably, referring to the *res extensa*, perhaps one of the less unreal (or phantasmatic) things to deal with. On this, Michela Summa notices: “...in the texts written around the 1910s, Husserl coins the concept of phantom [Phantom]. In manuscript A IV 5 he defines the meaning of this concept as ‘what is aesthetic in the material thing.’ Thus, if we consider this definition in connection with the already mentioned stratification of the thing presented in *Ideas I* and *Ideas II*, we can say that the phantom or the thing of the transcendental aesthetic coincides with the *res extensa*” (Summa, 2014, 112).

pointed out as temporally extended? What is the core of its juncture? I will address these questions in the following section, for now let us turn to spatial extension. Are sounds a *res extensa*?

We have already mentioned the analytic debate on this matter. The Brentano-Husserl analysis, on the other hand, is ambiguous but seems, surprisingly, prone to bestow sounds with *Räumlichkeit*. Brentano, for instance, implies this in his *Descriptive Psychology*. First, he states it in a general sense: “Every primary object of a sensation shows itself spatially” (Brentano, 1982, 111), and then, as in other passages of that work, he considers the spatial determination of sound phenomena and colour, (and even smell!) He does not, however, elaborate on this “determination.”

Husserl, on the other hand, pays special attention to space, particularly in works such as *Philosophische Versuche über den Raum* (Hua XXI) and *Ding und Raum* (Hua XVI). In the former, he distinguishes four types of space: the lived space (*Raum des Alltagslebens*), the space of geometry as a pure science (*Raum der reinen Geometrie*)¹⁵, the space of applied geometry or of natural sciences (*Raum der angewandten Geometrie*), the space of metaphysics (*Raum der Metaphysik*) (Husserl, 1983, 270–271). Husserl himself seems to deal particularly with space in two ways: when it concerns geometry (and, presumably, that can connect with logical space) and in its genetic phenomenology, where the examination of the lived body (*Leibe*) and the lived world (*Lebenswelt*) takes place. But can we think of sounds and consciousness as tokens of the *res extensa*?

In more than one section of *Ding und Raum*, Husserl says that temporal extension is a sibling (*verschwistert*) of the spatial one. Yet they do not fill the appearance in the object similarly for all qualities: „...das physische Datum der Art Ton kann nicht ein gegenständliches Merkmal der Artung Farbe“ (Husserl, 1973, 55). In that sense, sound *would not be spatially extended*: „Wie steht es mit den akustischen [*Bestimmtheiten*]? Sie werden in der Wahrnehmung auf das Objekt bezogen, gehören ihrem Sinn gemäß zu ihm, aber sie füllen das Objekt nicht im primären und eigentlichen Sinn aus, d.h. seinem Raum nicht aus“ (Husserl, 1973, 66).

Then again, in a text where Husserl appears to be more focused on sounds *via* the problem of perception, he seems to decisively consider sounds as particulars. Does that mean sounds are *temporally extended*? For a late Husserl it apparently does, and that covers also the problem of individuation: an individual and temporal being (*individuelle, zeitlich Sein*) (Husserl, 2001, 334).

¹⁵ This is an extremely important field for both Husserl and those trying to reconstruct on his thought. In a recent article, Claudio Tarditi (2018) has shown how Husserl’s concern on the *continuum* (also a crucial discussion for Brentano), at first a typical mathematical problem for set theory, relates to his consideration on spatiotemporal extension in terms of a philosophy of perception.

Therefore, in this case we have a disruption between the static and the dynamic views, which, ultimately, points to changes in Husserl's own views.

With consciousness it happens the other way around. For Husserl, the copula space and consciousness is important, especially when considering the problem of the lived body (*Leib*), as it can be found in many places, in particular in *Ideen II*.

But one can keep some doubts about the problem of the spatial extension of consciousness. That is not the case for Michael K. Shim (2017), for whom Husserl proceeds by doing a "spatialization of consciousness." His core argument seems to be the following:

- i) Husserl is a realist about objects.
- ii) Perceptible objects are spatial.
- iii) Objects can be immanent to consciousness.
- iv) Consciousness should be spatial.

The premises in this argument are moot. Premise i) is certainly a matter of interpretation and it does not distinguish what 'object' means here. For ii) it is not clear how a unified version of objects' *Räumlichkeit* works. Premise iii) is not at ease with i), and with iv), there is *non sequitur*: partitures can report music, maps can report geographical space, but partitures are not *themselves* music in the same way maps are not territory. Representational mediations are missing in that argument.

There is a way, however, for which taking into account the dynamic picture, consciousness and sounds can meet spatiality through the concept of embodiment, and maybe that is what Shim has in mind. Phenomenological considerations on the body have animated the phenomenological panorama from *Ideen II* to Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry at an extent that it is needles to specify its relation to consciousness. But also when it comes to sound, that seems to be the case. In the already cited source, late Husserl says: "Der Ton ist dauernder Ton und als solcher ist er als leibhafter charakterisiert" (Husserl, 2001, 358)¹⁶.

Brentano, on the other hand, is very clear in this regard. In his *Descriptive Psychology*, Brentano considers that physical acts are components—and this usage of "component" is almost mereological—of human consciousness. Such components,

¹⁶ Such aspect is also considered in Ihde's post-phenomenology, where he, precisely, contests the idea of a No-Space, as P. F. Strawson has envisioned it: "...whereas I can emptyly 'imagine' or conceive of a 'world' of sound as a 'No-Space' world in Strawson's sense, when I turn to all the variations of my fulfillable experience of listening I find this is essentially false. For such a 'No-Space' experience to be actualized I should have to be disembodied—but then would there be any 'hearing' at all? Ultimately, were this the point at issue I should argue that it is essentially impossible to fulfil even the imagination of a 'No-Space' world" (Ihde, 2007, 32).

namely, physical acts, *individualise reality* and they are *without spatial location or spatial extension* (Brentano, 1995, 89). In this taxonomy sounds appear as qualities or specific determinations (Brentano, 1995, 95), as for 1905 Husserl—but not there where he considers “Ton” as an individual, certainly.

Concerned with the way consciousness appears, Brentano first states that “inner perception does not display spatially diverging [*räumlich auseinandertrende*] parts” (Brentano, 1995, 16) and more explicitly says: “consciousness does not appear [in a spatially extended [manner]]” (Brentano, 1995, 17).

While considering the static Husserlian picture and Brentano’s assertions, it seems that there is a manner in which neither sounds nor consciousness *are spatially extended*.

A word is needed, then, for what the understanding of sound is, given that, being a temporal object *par excellence*, it would seem at least odd if we denied its temporal extension. A first way to hold that sounds are not temporally extended, however counterintuitive as it might seem, is that as they are perceived and captured by this retentional model. Although we could also say that this mismatch with temporal extension is when considering the transcendent-objective extension that, precisely, Husserl criticises while suspending such notion and that the perceived sound has its own *sui generis Zeitlichkeit*.

On the other hand, surely, sound as acoustic wave is temporally extended: hence the expression “velocity of sound.” Thus, we could invoke an old strategy in the philosophy of sounds: what has temporal extension is the acoustic wave, *in which sound is instantiated*, but for “sound” to be “sound,” it has to be perceived. This is a preliminary way of clarifying why, in a sense, the Brentano-Husserl analysis could be PV1 as it concerns the problem of sounds.

§ 3.2 The shifting

When I shift my attention from A to B, this can happen in several ways and for diverse reasons. A and B do not have to be conceptually connected for the shift to occur. If I was intellectually paying attention to a mereological axiom and immediately afterwards I start paying attention to a cat nearby me, I have shifted attention from the former to the latter, and the cat and the mereological axiom are not logically connected in any way. One could even say that this was a distraction and, indeed, this is a way in which I can switch my attention from A to B. The problem of attention for the subject of knowledge is a really interesting phenomenological issue. But what I am concerned with here is a theoretical shift of attention to a situation in which A and B are conceptually connected and, even more, they are organised hierarchically.

The theoretical shift in attention that I have announced is the one that goes from the problem of sound individuation to that of the unity of consciousness. In the Brentano-Husserl analysis, as it has been mentioned, sound is only taken as an example; the focus is not only on the inner perception of time but, ultimately, on consciousness.

What does the expression “unity of consciousness” mean? The term appears in Brentano’s *Descriptive Psychology* and it is probably traceable up to Kant’s *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (*KrV*). Here the Husserlian formulation is closer to my concerns. In the fifth investigation of the *LU*, Husserl addresses this unity as the phenomenological unity of the experiences (*Erlebnisse*) of an *Ego* that comes directly from inner perception.

As a conscious being, my experiences do not form a heterogeneous conglomerate were they are not *of* something and produced *by* someone, namely, an epistemic agent. In the first sense, it is worthwhile emphasising that this is what phenomenologists mean by intentionality. We know, since Descartes, that if there is something we cannot doubt about is that my experiences and mind states are *mine*. They are, thus, adhered to something. This idea has been discussed broadly in philosophy and has suffered a lot of changes. We can identify it, for instance, in the Kantian claim „Ich denke, muss alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können“ (Kant, 1956, B131–132), when dealing with the *unity of apperception*¹⁷.

For the case of the inner consciousness of time, this unity is represented by the stream of consciousness that joins the different “nows” into a coherent picture of the perception of time¹⁸. And this unity alone is at the centre of all epistemological inquiry as it is the one that makes knowledge possible. The major importance of the unity of consciousness is evident. It has a significant theoretical weight within the philosophical inquiries.

¹⁷ Later on in the *KrV*, Kant states: „Also nur dadurch, daß ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegebener Vorstellungen in einem Bewußtseins verbinden kann, ist es möglich, daß ich mir die Identität des Bewußtseins in diesen Vorstellungen selbst vorstelle“ (Kant, 1956, A 134).

¹⁸ How is this stream of consciousness joined or adhered to anything? Is something that Husserl would solve out by introducing the idea of the pure *Ego* (different from an empirical *Ego*, obviously). That such a stream of consciousness turns out to be unified by a pure *Ego* is an idea that did not appear in the *Vorlesungen*. In the *LU*, for instance, Husserl does not seem to favour such ideas, and that unifying *Ego* is more of a shortcut that appears in *Ideen*. For Dainton this solution marks that Husserl is moving to an obscure territory (Dainton, 2017, 104). But even for a phenomenologist like Sartre (1966), who wrote a small treatise devoted to criticise this idea, the move is not less controversial. I cannot address this in detail because, among other things, is not within the scope of this article. For critical reviews on the evolution of Husserl’s phenomenology of time concerning this, and other terms, see (Kelly, 2016; Kortooms, 2002; Lohmar, 2016; Illescas Nájera, 2009).

My use of the word *shifting* refers to the realization that when we pay attention to A, namely, the problem of sound individuation, we soon discover that, from the Brentano-Husserl analysis, it is connected to a wider and more important issue: that of the unity of consciousness.

This theoretical dependence can also be sketched in the following manner: Sound Individuation is possible if the unity of consciousness is possible. That is so because, from this perspective (and from the basics of the view in sound ontology that the Brentano-Husserl analysis participates in, namely, PV1), experience, and thus the experience of properties such as sounds, is unified in the stream of consciousness. Without this unity, it would be impossible to have a coherent experience of the perceived duration of sound and, clearly, we would not be able to single it out either.

The unity of consciousness is a necessary condition for sound individuation as for the differentiation of sounds. However, considering the unity of consciousness does not, in and of itself, shed light on the duration puzzles described in 2.5. This shifting is made only once we elucidated the compliance of both sounds and consciousness with their temporal and spatial extension. And there is more to this than the shifting and identification of theoretical dependence of sound individuation from the unity of consciousness. Something revealed by the examination of their spatio-temporal extension is that of their structural and almost isomorphic resemblance. This is what I have in mind when I use the term *mirroring*.

§ 3.3 The mirroring

The metaphor evoked by this theoretical movement is rather different from that of shifting, and this is why it might seem intriguing that the elements involved in it are the same. If A mirrors B it means that they *resemble* each other. If I look at myself in the mirror, I am not really looking at myself, but at a reflection. The resemblance in the visual field might seem identical, but beyond the reflection of these features, what makes mirroring more interesting is motion, that is, that the motion of A is reflected in B, despite refractions and changes in the direction of it.

When I speak of a mirroring effect between *sound* and *consciousness* I am compelled to describe that motion¹⁹. Interestingly enough for an Aristotelian mind-set, Brentano was thinking about motion while addressing the problem of time and tem-

¹⁹ Just as “shifting,” “mirroring” is a general theoretical evocation where I am not trying to relate to a specific aspect of the phenomenological treatment of perception. In that sense, I am not implying here a theory of representations (or *Abbildtheorie*) with which most likely Husserl would have disagreed.

porality (*Zeitlichkeit*) and what I choose to be the core of the comparison between sound and consciousness is their inability to abide by the standards of spatial and temporal extension, as argued in § 3.1, when conceiving such extension in an objective-transcendent fashion.

As I pointed out above, sound has pedagogical value as an example of the more difficult aspects of consciousness. Mirroring sounds and consciousness show us that there is a point where it seems that *neither consciousness nor sound are spatio/temporally extended* if we stick to the static picture and we are keen on the way analytic philosophy, specially Dainton, interprets Husserl. The constant changes of the Moravian philosopher, truth be told, enable this interpretation. But nuances and even amendments can still be made (see § 4).

On the other hand, this mirroring effect between consciousness and sound suggests that the Brentano-Husserl analysis could be thought of as a possible stance within the ontology of sound: as a variety or a precision of PV1.

§ 4 CONCLUSIONS

In the second part of this paper I have addressed some issues that, according to my interpretation, are a product of the state of affairs in sound ontology and its irresolution. I believe that the Brentano-Husserl analysis can be considered within the ontology of sound and, if so, it should be able to face some of the problems pointed out in that discussion, especially, sound individuation.

If we admit that the Brentano-Husserl analysis is a kind of PV1, we must address how the problems formulated in § 2 can be faced from the Brentano-Husserl analysis as a view in sound ontology. Before doing this, it is necessary to say a few things concerning my general approach in this article.

Taken schematically, this paper may be seen as consisting of an intention, an argument (whose claims depend upon the interpretation of Brentanian and Husserlian texts), the potentiality of a given theory for offering solutions to some internal problems of sound ontology, and the opening of scope for major issues.

In this sense, the paper's conclusions are located at each level of such structure, namely, matching with the intention, the argument, the potentiality and the opening of scope. And, in such spirit, this paper can be judge yielding, or not, a fruitful discussion.

Concerning the intention, I think it can be understood as that of building a bridge between the analytic tradition and the phenomenological one. Working from

the analytic perspective, it should be a matter of concern that zero attention had been given to the Brentanian and Husserlian considerations of sound in the philosophy of sound and auditory experience in the analytic fashion. This is a lacuna that had to be filled and, in that sense, I think the effort of this paper can be assessed positively.

The most delicate part is in the argument, because it depends on the interpretations of Husserl's and Brentano's works which are and will be in a perpetual state of agonistic readings. The interpretation I offer from their texts is that of analytic philosophy, which is, closer to Dainton (2017). Yet, unlike Dainton, I try to ground this in an exercise closer to the exegesis of the text themselves and that is, of course, a risky business.

I have written this article with the purpose of glancing at some of the arguments brought forward by phenomenology through the lens and means of analytic philosophy. This enterprise is made difficult by the tradition in continental philosophy of dedicating a crucial part of the work to considerations on the history of the development of concepts within an author's work, a matter that appears necessary when one encounters the complex and substantial transformation of a philosopher's terminology through the evolution of his thought, as we have briefly noticed in the case of Husserl. The same happens, perhaps to a lesser extent, with Brentano. Historical and philosophical revisions, in this sense, tend to pay a great deal of attention to particularities and differences from T_1 in which an author₁ had this idea and the changes it suffered from T_1 to T_2 and the way similar conceptions can be observed in some other author₂. I have not disregarded the importance of this analysis because I am aware of the fact that the problem of time, space and consciousness of time are of a major importance in philosophy at large and in the philosophy of Brentano and Husserl in particular. Yet, I have tried to synthesise this part of the analysis.

In this fashion, I recognise the following claims as the controversial corpus contained in the argument:

- a) The Brentano-Husserl analysis is closer to PV1.
- b) Sound is analogous to consciousness.
- c) For such view, neither sound nor consciousness are spatiotemporally extended.

Of course, I have believed that by introducing the static and dynamic pictures in which you can give a more complex account on how a), b) and c) can fit altogether is enough. And I also thought that, in order to be on the safe side, I could well emphasise that this interpretation of Husserl could work for the *Vorlesungen* but not in the case of the *C Manuskripten* or *Die Bernauer Manuskripten*.

Finally, I have held likewise that all the controversial claims can be nuanced with clauses suggesting interpretations and, therewith, to claim that “for a particular interpretation, sound might not be spatiotemporally extended,” which is different from claiming “for Brentano and Husserl, sound is not spatiotemporally extended.” The same goes for the controversial claim concerning consciousness.

My contention, thus, is that these claims can be calibrated but not to the extent of resist a falsifiability criterion. That is, I do think they can be countered if showing that both sounds and consciousness are without reservations extended.

The static-dynamic model tries to be an adjustment that works both at an analytic-descriptive level and at a hermeneutic one. It works in the hermeneutic sense by recognising the differences with the most advance doctrine of Husserl on time. And below, I elaborate how it works at an analytic-descriptive level. In this sense, even if the reading of the *Vorlesungen* turned out to be hasty into fitting it in the static claim, I do believe that the combination of static and dynamic features is still worth as to the results it can yield.

There are, of course, some important issues, like those of the articulations of different retentions-protentions, and the problem of the publicity of sounds, as displayed by the considerations on intersubjectivity, that could eventually be covered by considering those contributions, but that task is beyond the scope of this work.

To delimit the corpus of work I considered relevant for my argument, I have omitted references to Husserl’s *Bernauer Manuskripten* and the *C Manuskripten* and, hence, further considerations on genetic phenomenology. This circumscription has the effect of providing the static picture and not the dynamic one, and certainly the latter is farther from Brentano.

More exegetic caveats are needed in this sense. The static picture is historically coherent as long as we keep on adhering Husserl’s views to those of Brentano and that means the 1905’s *Vorlesungen*. However, the very *Vorlesungen*, as I have pointed out already, contain elements that, under certain interpretation, contest the possibility of placing Husserl next to any version of the static picture and, likewise, the controversial claims of the argument. I do think, however, that the correct setting of both the dynamic and static picture is pertinent, as I will elaborate more on this below. In a similar way, even if we suppress the controversial claims from this proposal, some main of our main goals remain.

It is not entirely impossible to reconcile the static and the dynamic pictures. Before doing so, it is convenient to consider a mereological note from Brentano, while he addresses the parts-elements of consciousness and distinguishes between “distinctional” and “separable” parts (Brentano, 1995, 16). Distinctional parts are products

of an analytic effort and they *do not actually* separate from the whole, as pieces in a mechanical device. The *snap-view* that the static picture offers for *each* retention is a sort of *distinctional part* that is tied with a chain of moments forming a flow. Maybe this is similar to the *Abschattungen* but displayed strictly in a temporal sense. That is how we can perceive, for instance, a melody as a whole or words as a whole, and not just unconnected musical notes and unconnected phonemes. This amounts to the very concept of “concrete perception” (*konkrete Perzeption*), as Husserl elaborates in *Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit*:

Was wir konkrete Perzeption nannten, ist ein kontinuierlicher Erlebnisstrom, dem ein kontinuierlicher Korrelatstrom entspricht. Jeder Querschnitt dieses Stroms ist ein Erlebnis (das aber als bloßes Abstraktum „ist“), das seinerseits ein Kontinuum von Phasen darstellt. Eine einzige Phase dieses Kontinuums ist reine Perzeption nach unserem fixierten Begriff, und diese Phase zerteilt das Kontinuum in zwei Strecken: eine protentionale und eine retentionale. Jede dieser Strecken ist ebenfalls unselbständig, da sie, genau so, wie sie ist, nicht für sich sein kann; oder: Konkrete Perzeption ist „eigentlich“ ein Strom von Perzeptionen, die nach sich ziehen einen Kometenschweif von Retentionen (nämlich von Retentionen, in die sich diese Perzeptionen nach einem wunderbaren Gesetz notwendig verhandeln) und vor sich her gehen lassen einen Strom von Protentionen, die ihrerseits bestimmt sind, sich in die Perzeptionen zu verwandeln. (Husserl, 2004, 362)

Therefore, while forming the flow or stream of consciousness it is not that the static picture is wrong, but that it participates as a distinctional part of the dynamic full picture. Likewise, sound and consciousness obey to the same criterion and that is why they appear as not extended from one angle, but as extended in the other. After proposing this arrangement of things, how can it be linked to PV1?

Here, I have focused on observing that PV1, perhaps not explicitly formulated by any potential advocate, would entail that mind (or consciousness), is a particular to which we can ascribe properties and predicate things of. In its naïve formulation sound is a property of that object called mind. The Brentano-Husserl analysis is, clearly, not this kind of PV1²⁰.

This article initiates a proposal, the possible coincidence between PV1 and the Brentano-Husserl analysis that invites further elaboration. A more sophisticated ver-

²⁰ Since we are underlying here the incompatibilities with transcendent sound, I should also be clear with the fact that the difference with sound as hyletic datum (as stated by Husserl (1928, 385)). An aspect to consider in such identification, and given the importance granted to the dynamic/static opposition, is that of the problem of properties being, actually, too static. While taken as universals, of course, they could not be considered as dynamic. And what about their manifestations? Or in the changes introduced in their manifestations, for instance those concerning sound complexity? The identification with PV is not troubleless.

sion of PV1 is that which emphasizes the phenomenological, sensory or cognitive aspects in the auditory perception as the defining phase of stating what a sound is. The Brentano-Husserl analysis would emphasize, in this sense, the phenomenological aspect, that is, the sound as it is experienced.

To my view, the Brentano-Husserl analysis endorses a sophisticated version of PV1 as it emphasises, through abundant examples, the inner experience of sound and not that of the physical acoustic phenomenon of sound. After Husserl's suspension of the objective time in the *Vorlesungen*, certainly a transcendent sound could not be considered as a property²¹. This difference is constantly emphasised, leaning on Husserl's static picture, and even for the dynamic picture as well.

It can be observed, in this sense, that neither Husserl nor Brentano state something along the lines of: "Sound is clearly a matter of the inner conception of time rather than related to the acoustic phenomenon." But there is clearly a thematic focus on what they do elaborate and on what they do not.

A possible criticism of my proposal would be that a thematic focus does not entail reductionism. In other words, that there are studies about consciousness, it does not imply that such studies are part of an endeavour to reduce everything to consciousness.

An important implication of the identification of this analysis with PV1 pertains to the description of relations of analogy, relationship, and dependence, (what I have called mirroring and shifting) between sounds and consciousness. This is grounded in comparisons and examination of their spatiotemporal extensions. In short, I state that:

For the Brentano-Husserl analysis, sounds are properties or qualitative determinations of the object (that is the way it indeed appears in both Brentano and Husserl, at least for the one of 1905). Like consciousness, there is an interpretation where sounds cannot account for a straight spatio-temporal extension, mainly while relying on the static picture. Sound is that which is perceived. Both Brentano and Husserl identify this distinction (although for the latter the distinction got less convenient over time. (Summa, 2014, 91)

The other properties of sound can also be understood in this way—which probably echoes a dualist-talk—: intensity and volume as amplitude; pitch as frequency.

Finally, I deem it necessary to observe how the problems of sound ontology are faced in the Brentano-Husserl analysis, as well as some possible complications in the kind of PV1 implied in this view. The diversity of sound complexity is an aspect that

²¹ Although it could be argued, as well, that the *ἐποχή* itself had to undergo through several conceptual elaborations in order to match with an analytic approach.

could make sound identification more difficult. Many examples, for instance those concerning melodies, which can be found in Husserl's texts, are related to the notion of *change*.

We have two general kinds of sound complexity: dynamics and by density. The dynamic ones are those concerning sound properties (properties of properties as it can be now seen) like intensity, pitch and timbre complexity. These constitute *changes* to the individual sound.

Since, for the Brentano-Husserl analysis sound is always the perceived sound, we can appeal to the shifting referred above: what is relevant is to identify the kind of retention that makes a sound. In the model, we could find a sound that was A at T_1 , and B at T_2 , alluding to a pitch complexity. A specious present might pack both A and B and maybe more. The same happens to complexity by density, for instance an accord or a single moment of an orchestra's performance.

There are interesting passages in the addenda to the *Vorlesungen* (Husserl, 1966) that exemplify *via* sounds using melodies as extended temporal objects²². Here, Husserl distinguishes between the intuition-series that makes a unitary object, such as a melody, and the single apprehensions of individual sounds (Husserl, 1966, 149). It is in the apprehension-retention-protention that a particular sound is capsuled. Consciousness forms, thus, a sound as complex or simple, either for dynamics or density.

The problem of aspatiality is one of the main issues for sound ontology; however, looked at from the perspective of the Brentano-Husserl analysis, it is because of the non-spatial extension of perceived sound that we can find the analogical coincidence with non-spatial consciousness.

Husserl's perspective allows us to notice different understandings of space and spatiality (*Räumlichkeit*). Spatiality for natural sciences (*Raum der angewandten Geometrie*) would be certainly applied to the phenomenon of acoustic wave but not bestowed on sound in a phenomenological sense. A notion of space in the sense of lived space (*Raum des Alltagslebens*) can be more closely connected to perceived sound, as noticed by Ihde (2007).

One of the most intriguing issues derived from the considerations on sound individuation and aspatiality was that of reidentification. Here, the Brentano-Husserl analysis has some interesting contributions to offer. A significant contribution from Husserl's work is the idea of *protentions*. Protentions give an anticipation of sound that is possible thanks to the consciousness of habits²³. It is, then, *thanks to protentions*

²² A habit that, apparently, we can also find in Alexis Meinong (Bernet, 2009, 125).

²³ And, why not, maybe some evolutionary traits play a role here.

that reidentification of non-clearly-spatially-extended particulars, like sounds, is possible. This is a movement towards a dynamic interpretation.

In the priority shifting displayed by the Brentano-Husserl analysis, we can see that a concern such as that of duration puzzles loses its puzzling feature. These puzzles are established on the basis of auditory perception.

What really is at stake here is the issue of how perceived duration affects sound individuation and what are the criteria to discern the boundaries (physical or cognitive, that is, if blocking or ear tragus or lacking attention respectively) that are imposed on duration, *i.e.*, the problem of discontinuity.

From what has already been discussed regarding the retentional model, the problem of continuity would be shifted in the Brentano-Husserl analysis for that of the stream of consciousness, that is, the connection between the different retentions that form a phenomenological continuity. Now, most of the problems are reformulated on the basis of that shifting, yet certainly the identification of the Brentano-Husserl analysis with PV1 gives place to new concerns.

One of these concerns is the problem of publicity *versus* privacy of sounds. The most common objection to PV1 or proximal theories (Casati & Dokic, 2014) is that if we assume that sounds are properties of the perceiving mind, that would allow auditory hallucinations to be included in the category of sounds²⁴. Here Husserl's criticism of Brentano's lack of distinction between act and content could prove relevant. The necessary assertion here is that of presence, namely, the presence of the physical cause of sound: the real presence of the object is caused by the phenomenological content (sometimes called *noema* in the Husserlian jargon), while the false presence of it is caused by the *act of presence*, whereas the latter's temporality has been shaped by consciousness (Olbromski, 2011, 14).

Yet, if sounds are, in this sense, perceived sounds, what happens to publicity? Here, the Brentano-Husserl analysis is unable to respond without appealing to the dynamic picture. Fortunately, the problem of the relationship between the consciousness of time and intersubjectivity was addressed by Husserl in the *Bernaer Manuskripten*. Then, there are grounds on which this model can be improved.

Finally, sound individuation, as I said from the beginning, is one of the issues where the Brentano-Husserl analysis can contribute in a significant sense. Of course, in this case the *shift* is important. However shifting the point of attention is not the

²⁴ This analytic exclusion of PV1 is not distinguishing between the perceived and the transcendent sound, because actually the *Tinnitus* sound is as of an empirical apprehension. This is, as I emphasise further one, not so close from the phenomenological view on sound.

only problem. Actually, individuation *per se* was a concern for Husserl and *individuation in time* would be so as well.

An important aspect of Husserl's and Brentano's treatment of time is that of distinguishing it from time in its physical sense. We already made this consideration while considering *temporal extension* as transcendent. This implies that there are *two levels* in which time can be considered: that of its subjective constitution, and that of the objective world. In which of these two levels does individuation take place and, by extension, sound? Well, revolving around the dynamic picture and Husserl's *Bernauer Manuskripten*, Dieter Lohmar states that: "She can perform an individuation in the full sense only in the objective time, because all our considerations to insert an object into a most plausible story of its change and movements rests on objective time and our knowledge of causality, motivations and movements etc." (Lohmar, 2016, 130). What this interpretation implies for our endeavour is that, in such sense, sound individuation would have several complications to be considered as a property of the perceiving mind. In other words, PV1 would be troubled. If this holds, then we either have to give up on PV1 *toto caelo*, in either its naïve or subtle formulation, or fix it with the account of the view with an individuation in the objective time and, therefore, not in a *proximal* sense. An alternative view would be to clarify that such requirement would hold for particulars, which, by definition, would not be properties of consciousness. This is, certainly, a still pendant issue to elaborate on if we keep on the track of the dynamic picture. Because of this sort of entanglements, the shift remains as an important product of this inquiry.

When emphasising the importance of the shifting movement in this analysis, we could say that for each of the problems generated in sound ontology, there is an equivalent, purportedly more relevant, problem for consciousness. But are the problems actually "solved"?

I believe that rather than solved, these problems have been *dissolved* into the big picture or the major philosophical problems that emanate from the philosophical discussion of consciousness. A last word concerning one of these issues is that which mirrors the problem of sound individuation, namely, that of the unity of consciousness.

One of the critical issues, as Dainton (2017) reports, for the retentionalist models is that of the *surplus* of content: "...they generate more experience (or phenomenal content) than it is plausible to suppose actually occurs over a given interval of experiencing." And that is an issue of individuation for the unity of consciousness, if not, the most important issue for the unity of consciousness.

The *a fortiori* turn implied in the relation between the problem of sound and that of the unity of consciousness also evidences the way that this theoretical meto-

nyms or parts are connected to a whole. These mereological considerations are also an open-ended implication of this discussion where both phenomenologists and analytic philosophers could find a common ground to continue the discussion. It is in the hope of the opening paths for such theoretical crossroads that, in turn, build bridges between philosophical traditions, that I have offered this analysis on sound.

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