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A Leibniz-Informed Approach to Nietzsche's Drive Psychology

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Abstract: Despite drives’ importance for Nietzsche’s explanation of individuals’ values, controversies persist over how to interpret Nietzsche’s attribution of normative capacities to the drives themselves. On one reading, drives evaluate their aims and recognize the normative authority of other drives’ aims. On another, drives’ normative properties reduce to nonnormative, causal properties. Neither approach is satisfying. The former commits Nietzsche to the homuncular fallacy by granting drives complex cognitive capacities. The latter reading either commits Nietzsche to the naturalistic fallacy, having him derive normative conclusions from descriptive premises, or eliminates normativity from his thought altogether. In response to this impasse, this article advances a Leibniz-informed interpretation of Nietzsche’s drive psychology. By construing the normative and efficient causal orders as parallel modes of explanation distinguished by one’s perspective, a Leibniz-informed reading captures the benefits of extant interpretations while avoiding their drawbacks.

Keywords: causality, drives, Leibniz, order of rank, values

Much of Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology turns on his notion of drives (Triebe). Drives explain individuals’ actions (D 113, 119; GS 360), beliefs (GS 333; BGE 6, 158), and values (GS 115, 118, 335; BGE 6, 200, 268). Little wonder, then, that scholars examine Nietzsche’s understanding of the drives in detail. These efforts yield several points of agreement. There is relative consensus that drives are dispositions toward goal-directed behaviors, that drives produce affects in association with their ends, and that dominant drives command individuals’ cognitive capacities, motivating the pursuit of their aims. But other aspects of Nietzsche’s view remain unclear. In particular, disagreement persists about how to understand Nietzsche’s attribution of normative capacities to the drives themselves.
On one interpretation, advanced by Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, Nietzsche’s attribution of normative capacities to the drives should be taken at face value. According to this “normative reading,” drives carry evaluations of their aims and can recognize the normative legitimacy of other drives’ aims, producing their hierarchical arrangement. Unfortunately, this approach seems to commit Nietzsche to the homuncular fallacy: rather than explaining how the personal-level capacity for normative recognition emerges from the drives, the normative reading imbues drives themselves with the capacity requiring explanation. According to a second interpretation, espoused by Ken Gemes, Brian Leiter, and Mattia Riccardi, Nietzsche’s normative characterizations of the drives reduce to nonnormative, causal properties. Drives are hierarchized, on this “Humean reading,” only by their relative causal efficacy. Since that feature is not necessarily personal-level and it does not require normative evaluations, the Humean reading avoids the homuncular fallacy. But this approach also risks leaving out a central explanatory purpose of the drives, as it is difficult to see how mere differences in causal efficacy could produce the kinds of normative values that occupy Nietzsche’s attention. Neither approach is satisfying, as I shall explain in greater detail in what follows.

In this article, I draw on G. W. Leibniz to advance a third interpretation of Nietzsche’s drive psychology. I begin by showing that portions of Leibniz’s philosophy of mind can be detached from his theistic metaphysics and by reviewing evidence of Nietzsche’s agreement with Leibniz. I then examine the normative and Humean interpretations, arguing that neither is without cost. This backdrop reveals the merits of a Leibniz-informed approach. By understanding the normative and efficient causal orders as parallel modes of explanation distinguished by one’s perspective, the Leibnizian reading captures the benefits of the normative and Humean readings while avoiding their drawbacks.

To be candid, I am not convinced that Nietzsche has a fully developed theory of how drives become hierarchized and produce values. His thoughts on this score are hazy—so much so that some deny they form a coherent whole. Still, even if textual considerations alone cannot determine the best interpretation of Nietzschean drives, I hope to show that a Leibniz-informed approach is a live exegetical possibility, one whose merits make it worth considering.
Motivating the Turn to Leibniz

The suggestion that Leibniz, a paragon of theistic metaphysics, might aid our understanding of Nietzsche, a self-proclaimed “godless anti-metaphysician” (GS 344), may inspire doubt. I will address this skepticism at the outset by arguing that portions of Leibniz’s philosophy of mind can be extracted from his theistic metaphysics.

Less famous than Leibniz’s claim that this is the best possible world is his analysis of “the best” as the maximization of perfection. Leibniz clarifies the latter notion for Christian Wolff: “perfection [. . .] is [. . .] the degree of affirmative intelligibility, so that something more perfect is something in which more things worthy of observation are found.” To be the best, this world must be maximally intelligible. In a maximally intelligible world, Leibniz claims, all properties are grounded in their bearer’s nature. He explains, “whenever we find some quality in a subject, we ought to believe that if we understood the nature of both the subject and the quality we would conceive how the quality could arise from it. So within the order of nature (miracles apart) it is not at God’s arbitrary discretion to attach this or that quality haphazardly to substances. He will never give them things which are not natural to them, that is, which cannot arise from their nature as explicable modifications. [. . .] It would be without rhyme or reason for God to perform miracles in the ordinary course of events.” Despite parenthetically countenancing miracles, Leibniz voices a general aversion to supernatural explanations here. In fact, the only act Leibniz happily explains by way of a supernatural cause is creation. That exception aside, he considers it “empty to resort to God [when] explaining the phenomena of his creatures.” Leibniz’s view that the world is maximally intelligible therefore requires that nature forms a “closed,” internally consistent order wherein all properties are explained by their bearers’ natures rather than by supernatural causes.

The natural order’s maximal intelligibility also underwrites what Leibniz calls “the law of continuity,” which holds that “nature never makes leaps.” This law further constrains Leibniz’s account of natural phenomena by requiring that “any change from small to large, or vice versa, must pass through something that is, in respect to degrees as well as parts, in between.” The law of continuity prohibits sui generis and supernatural explanations of changes in natural entities’ states. It also precludes ontological differences in
kind among natural entities, which would introduce unintelligible lacunae into nature’s order. Leibniz’s conviction that this world is maximally intelligible thus also requires that all changes in properties emerge continuously from entities’ prior states and that all entities are continuous in kind.

The foregoing constraints allow portions of Leibniz’s philosophy to be severed from his theism. Lest God fail to create the best possible world, natural phenomena must be explicable independent of supernatural causes. Concerning his philosophy of mind specifically, Leibniz insists that humans’ mental states must be explained by the nature of the human organism, that changes in mental states must be continuous with prior mental states, and that the human organism must be continuous with other forms of organic life. With the exception of explaining creation, at no point need God enter the picture.

None of this is to suggest, absurdly, that God plays no role in Leibniz’s thinking. By Leibniz’s lights, God underwrites all ultimate explanations—for instance, of why anything exists, of why nature abides by regular laws, and of why the world consists of substances mirroring God’s mind to differing degrees. And everything from Leibniz’s doctrine of Pre-Established Harmony to his explanation of the soul’s immortality hangs on his substance metaphysics. Central as these doctrines are to Leibniz’s thinking, I doubt that Nietzsche would have truck with them. For Nietzsche, existence is without purpose (GS 109); the laws of nature are provisional (BGE 22); the notion of substance is explanatorily inert (GM I:13; TI “Reason” 5); there is no preestablished harmony between what is true and what is good (HH 517; BGE 2, 39); and the soul is mortal (BGE 12). If severing Leibniz’s philosophy of mind from his theism results in the loss of doctrines that Nietzsche considers only metaphysical excesses, there is all the more reason to wield the blade.

Nietzsche’s Agreement with Leibniz

Consistent with the law of continuity, Leibniz maintains against his Cartesian contemporaries that conscious states are continuous with unconscious states. In contrast with Kant and the neo-Kantians of Nietzsche’s era, Leibniz also insists that humans’ capacity for understanding and self-reflection must be continuous with the rest of organic life. One suspects that Nietzsche, who hopes to “translate humanity back into nature”
(BGE 230; see also GS 109) and to develop a naturalist theory of consciousness (A 14), would find these features of Leibniz’s thought appealing.

This suspicion bears out. In a central statement of his philosophy of mind, Nietzsche writes: “the problem of consciousness […] confronts us when we begin to realize how much we can do without it; and now we are brought to this initial realization by physiology and natural history (which have thus required two hundred years to catch up with Leibniz’s precocious suspicion). For we could think, feel, will, remember, and also ‘act’ in every sense of the term, and yet none of all this would have to ‘enter our consciousness’” (GS 354).16 This passage describes Leibniz’s suspicion that unconscious mental processes are “precocious [vorausfliegenden].” The disciplines Leibniz flies ahead of—physiology and natural history—figure prominently in Nietzsche’s thinking: he calls his time prior to studying them “wasted” (EH “Books” HH 3). Further evidence of Nietzsche’s agreement with Leibniz’s appears in GS 357, which reflects on “real achievements in philosophical thinking that can be attributed to Germans.” First among these is “Leibniz’s incomparable insight that has been vindicated not only against Descartes but also against everyone who had philosophized before him—that consciousness [Bewußtheit] is merely an accidens of the power of representation and not its necessary and essential attribute; so that what we call consciousness [Bewußtsein] constitutes only one state of our spiritual and psychic world […] and by no means the whole of it” (GS 357). Here, Nietzsche’s praise of Leibniz’s “incomparable insight” confirms this is something he “got right [Recht bekam].”17 After stressing that “the profundity of [Leibniz’s insight] has not been exhausted,” Nietzsche describes the experience of learning from Leibniz in uncharacteristically glowing terms: “we feel that something in ourselves has been ‘uncovered’ and figured out, and we are grateful. […] Leibniz’s insight] is a thoughtful piece of German self-knowledge, self-experience, and self-conception” (GS 357). Nietzsche clearly applauds Leibniz’s position regarding the existence of unconscious mental processes.18

Nietzsche’s agreement extends beyond this, however, into the nature of unconscious processes. For Leibniz, humans result from a multitude of monads, by which he means substances endowed with perceptions, understood as representations of what is external to a given monad, and appetites, understood as internal principles governing perceptual changes.19 While the majority of humans’ perceptions and appetites are unconscious,20 their aggregation can produce increasingly clear and distinct sensations capable
of crossing the threshold of consciousness.\textsuperscript{21} One way such aggregation can occur is when one monad dominates others, incorporating their perceptions under its appetite.\textsuperscript{22} Although sensations can become the objects of self-conscious reflection, Leibniz maintains that consciousness’s representation of sensations is constitutively confused. He gives the example of our inability to disambiguate the sensory concept \texttt{<green>} into perceptions of blue and yellow to illustrate how the lion’s share of humans’ perceptions and appetites outstrips consciousness.\textsuperscript{23} Still, simplified representations of sensations enable comparisons of one’s present state to possible states that would better satisfy a dominant appetite, inciting action.\textsuperscript{24}

Nietzsche’s awareness of, and agreement with, Leibniz’s positing of unconscious appetites and perceptions is established by \textit{GS} \textsuperscript{354}, which refers to unconscious wills and actions, and \textit{GS} \textsuperscript{357}, which refers to unconscious representations.\textsuperscript{25} Granted, Nietzsche cannot abide Leibniz’s view that perceptions and appetites inhere in \textit{substances}. He considers this concept explanatorily otiose provided one retains the \textit{force} that Leibniz attributes to substances under the notion of appetite (\textit{BGE} 12; \textit{GM} I:13; \textit{TI} “Reason” 5). Excising the metaphysical concept of substance from Leibniz’s philosophy of mind leaves an account of the psyche as comprised of perceptive and appetitive forces. Such forces, I submit, strongly resemble Nietzschean drives.

While Nietzsche sometimes isolates individual drives as proximate explanations of actions and beliefs, this strategy is consistent with the view that drives cannot exist in isolation because, by their nature, they are always embodied in an organism.\textsuperscript{26} As embodied forces, drives have perceptive capacities. Nietzsche declares that drives “do nothing but interpret stimuli” (\textit{D} 119; see also \textit{KSA} 12:7[60], p. 315) and characterizes drives, as well as the affects they produce, as environmentally responsive (\textit{HH} 57; \textit{D} 34, 58; \textit{GS} 14, 117; \textit{BGE} 201; \textit{TI} “Skirmishes” 45). Drives’ abilities to respond to stimuli internal to the organism they inhabit (for instance, sensations, other drives) and external (such as environmental factors) need not be construed anthropomorphically. Leibniz, for one, advances a minimalist account of perception as an information-preserving relation.\textsuperscript{27}

The appetitive character of drives is evident from Nietzsche’s declaration that “a drive without some kind of knowing evaluation of the worth of its objective, does not exist” (\textit{HH} 32; see also \textit{KSA} 12:1[58], p. 25). It is also implied by Nietzsche’s claim that each drive seeks to be “\textit{master} of all the other drives” (\textit{BGE} 6). Absent specific, appetitive aims, it is not only
difficult to see how drives might be *individuated* but also difficult to see how they could *motivate actions*. As dispositions toward goal-directed behaviors, drives are appetitive.

With Leibniz, Nietzsche denies that perceptions and appetites are necessarily conscious. Were *GS* 354 and 357 insufficient proof of this, unconscious perceptions and appetites figure in Nietzsche’s explanation of dreams, where drives interpret stimuli to satisfy their appetites while we sleep (*D* 119). Unconscious perceptions and appetites are also assumed by Nietzsche’s descriptions of drives responding to and resisting one another *beneath* the surface of consciousness (*D* 109, 129; *BGE* 6, 200; *GS* 333; *EH* “Clever” 9). This is arguably the primary purpose of drives: to explain how individuals undertake goal-directed actions in response to their environment *without* conscious awareness of their genuine motives.

Parallels continue when we consider the relation between appetites and perceptions. As Paul Katsafanas demonstrates, drives “interpret” in the sense that their appetitive aims influence which perceptions individuals consider salient.28 This feature of drives aligns with Leibniz’s view that appetites govern the relative clarity and distinctness of perceptions. Just as monadic appetites are “tendencies to go from one perception to another” by making some perceptions clearer than others,29 drives, as dispositions toward particular aims, highlight perceptions pertinent to their expression, with dominant drives determining which perceptions seem significant.

Further points of agreement merit mention. Like Leibniz, Nietzsche maintains that psychic forces are organized in relations of dominance and subordination (*D* 109; *BGE* 6, 19). Combined with their agreement that unconscious forces are continuous with consciousness, this suggests a shared picture on which dominant, psychic forces determine consciousness’s contents (*D* 115–16, 119; *GS* 116, 335; *BGE* 187, 201).30 The two also agree that unconscious forces are oversimplified by conscious reflection, such that the majority of humans’ appetites and their relations are introspectively inaccessible (*D* 119; *GS* 354; *BGE* 24).31 Nietzsche and Leibniz do not merely concur about the existence of unconscious mental forces. They agree that these forces are perceptive and appetitive, with appetites bearing on perceptions; that these forces are hierarchically organized, with dominant forces shaping conscious experience; and that the majority of forces comprising the psyche elude self-conscious detection.32

Obviously, none of this establishes a *historical connection* between Leibniz’s and Nietzsche’s philosophies of mind. Since, as Robin Small
observes, “it is quite possible that Nietzsche never read a word of Leibniz,” establishing such a link would likely require surveying works that Nietzsche studied closely that also engage Leibniz in depth, including works by Voltaire, Kant, Schopenhauer, Lange, Spir, Teichmüller, Leibmann, Drossbach, and Fouillée. However, my present aim is not to establish such a historical connection. I merely claim that Nietzsche’s drive psychology permits a Leibnizian reading. I take the cumulative weight of the foregoing parallels to establish this possibility.

The Normative and Humean Interpretations

To appreciate the merits of a Leibnizian approach to Nietzsche’s drive psychology, it helps to examine its normative and Humean competitors more closely first. This also allows the Leibnizian reading’s distinctive features to appear in sharper relief.

On the normative reading advanced by Clark and Dudrick, Nietzsche’s attribution of evaluative capacities to the drives is straightforward. Drives carry normative evaluations of their aims. What’s more, drives can recognize the normative legitimacy of other drives’ aims, producing hierarchical arrangements. Commenting on Nietzsche’s description of the soul as a political order or “society [Gesellschaftsbau] of the drives” (BGE 12), Clark and Dudrick write:

a political order is not just a causal order, but is also a normative one. The ruler or ruling class in a political order is able to rule not simply because it is stronger. It is stronger, in part, because it is recognized as having the authority to rule. […] The rank order of the drives could be a political order in this sense, so that one drive has a higher rank than another not in virtue of its causal efficaciousness, its ability to win in case of conflicts, but in virtue of being recognized as having a right to win in such cases. It would thus be an order of authority or legitimacy rather than one merely of causal strength.35

While this passage could be taken to mean that the order of drives is not merely causal but also normative, Clark and Dudrick reject this hybrid view. They insist that drives’ organization “is not a naturalistic or causal order, an
order of strength, but is a normative order,” that “it is the political order of the drives, a normative order, and not their causal order that defines ‘who’ one is,” and that “Nietzsche takes the soul to be a normative rather than naturalistic order.”36 On this approach, drives are hierarchized only by their normative authority.

Clark and Dudrick contrast their view with more thoroughly naturalistic readings. They take Nietzsche to hold that “when pursuing knowledge, one should use the method of empirical inquiry found in the sciences as far as possible,” but insist that this method cannot explain the “evaluative commitments” studied by the “unnatural science” of psychology. 37 The lynchpin of Clark and Dudrick’s case—influenced by Wilfred Sellars—is a firm distinction between the descriptive domain of causes and the normative domain of reasons.38 If causal relations cannot explain values, drives must have normative capacities to satisfy their explanatory role.

Unfortunately, Clark and Dudrick’s analysis seems to commit Nietzsche to the homuncular fallacy.39 This fallacy occurs when one attributes necessarily personal-level capacities to sub-personal entities or when one purports to explain some personal-level capacity by positing sub-personal entities endowed with the capacity in question. Clark and Dudrick’s claim that drives recognize the normative authority of other drives’ aims commits the first form of the fallacy. And while they contend that this is acceptable because drives are simpler than persons, it remains doubtful whether drives are simple enough to avoid requiring personal-level capacities: recognizing, understanding, appraising, and obeying normative commands. All these capacities presumably require complex cognitive capabilities. Concerning the second form of the fallacy, when asked how individuals’ values are explained by one’s drives’ ranking, Clark and Dudrick reply that drives themselves have and recognize evaluative commitments. But this replicates the problem of explaining values at the sub-personal level.

A second interpretation maintains that the normative capacities Nietzsche attributes to drives reduce to causal properties. On this Humean reading, drives are ordered by their relative causal strength. Gemes and Leiter espouse variants of this line. Riccardi develops the most technical version of the approach, though, which he contrasts with the normative reading as follows: “I do not assume that Nietzsche’s normative vocabulary—his talk of drives ‘dominating,’ ‘commanding,’ ‘obeying,’ etc.—is irreducibly so. […] The states and processes he describes by appeal to such normative terms can be further analyzed into simpler states and processes describable in
non-normative, dispositional terms. For instance, I suggested that a drive A ‘dominating’ another drive B is (in part) a matter of A’s being able to cause affective states that inhibit the discharge of B. [But] on the normative reading defended by Clark and Dudrick, the relations among the drives Nietzsche describes in agential terms cannot be analyzed into merely causal interactions.” Riccardi thus argues that drives’ normative capacities can “be traced back to non-normative—in particular, causal—properties.” More specifically, he suggests that drives’ relative abilities to activate cognitive resources and to generate affects produce their ordering.

The Humean reading deflates Nietzsche’s descriptions of the soul as a “political” and “social” order. But as Riccardi shows, nineteenth-century psychologists commonly deploy terms such as “dominating” and “commanding” as “dummies that lump together many simpler causal processes,” such that Nietzsche’s appeals to a commanding drive may refer to “just the one that happens to be stronger.” Since this requires neither that drives have necessarily personal-level capacities nor that drives issue the evaluative commitments they purportedly explain, the Humean reading avoids both forms of the homuncular fallacy.

But troubles lie elsewhere. For the Humean approach’s attempt to reduce values to nonnormative, causal facts seems to violate Nietzsche’s insistence that even the most scientific modes of inquiry presuppose evaluative commitments (BGE 14; GS 344, 373; GM III:24). Besides valuing truth, reductive explanations, for example, presuppose that parsimony and simplicity are valuable explanatory traits. Nietzsche’s view that values cannot be fully eliminated from human inquiry is rooted in his drive psychology. He maintains that drives play not merely a genetic role in inciting inquiry but also a constitutive role in conceptualization by highlighting some facts as salient while neglecting others (GM III:12). Consequently, and regardless of how drives generate evaluations, drives’ incessant operations subvert the tidy fact–value distinction that the Humean reader is after.

Another set of problems concerns the Humean approach’s attempt to reduce values to the drives’ ability to cause affects. For one thing, values and affects can come apart, as when recovering alcoholics are affectively motivated to drink without valuing drinking. Values thus seem more enduring than, and capable of overriding, occurrent affects and recurrent affective patterns. Furthermore, even if values did reduce to affects, it is not obvious that affects are nonnormative. For Nietzsche, affects track whether a given context enables or inhibits the expression of the drives that cause
them. Despite falling short of full-throated, overriding evaluative commitments, affects’ psychological functions are evaluative vis-à-vis drive’s ends and thus normative.

Assume for the sake of argument, though, that Nietzsche allows that scientific explanations can be purged of all values, that values do reduce to affects, and that affects are nonnormative properties. Once these assumptions are granted on behalf of the Humean reading, Nietzsche’s drive psychology confronts the so-called naturalistic fallacy. This fallacy occurs when one speciously derives normative conclusions from nonnormative premises. If normative and nonnormative facts are different in kind, no number of descriptive claims about an individual’s affects will generate the sort of prescriptive claims that feature in normative values. Nietzsche has something like this problem in mind when he ridicules reductive materialism as “one of the stupidest of all possible interpretations of the world, i.e., one of those most lacking in significance.” He goes on: “an essentially mechanistic view of the world would be an essentially meaningless world! Suppose one judged the value of a piece of music according to how much of it could be counted. […] What would one have comprehended, understood, recognized? Nothing” (GS 373; see also BGE 14, 21; GM II:12). Here, Nietzsche suggests that if reductively mechanistic explanations succeeded in their attempts to “strip [existence] of its ambiguous character,” the result would be a loss of meaning, significance, and value (GS 373). This is worrisome. The phenomena in question are not just qualitatively distinct from mechanistic, causal interactions; they are among the principal desiderata Nietzsche seeks to explain with his drive psychology. Should the Humean approach successfully reduce Nietzsche’s normative characterizations of the drives to nonnormative, causal properties, then the result would be less an explanation of normativity than its elimination from Nietzsche’s philosophical psychology altogether.

A defender of the Humean approach might dismiss these concerns by insisting that Nietzsche does seek to eliminate normativity because he is an anti-realist about values. Many find this suggestion troubling, however. For while Nietzsche ostensibly rejects the view that values are mind-independent (e.g., GS 301), this problematizes only certain readings of Nietzsche as a metaethical objectivist or perfectionist—and other positions occupy the logical space between these views and anti-realism, such as metaethical subjectivism and constitutivism. Besides, if Nietzsche were an anti-realist about values, his vehement attacks on Judeo-Christian
morality would fizzle out into indefensible expressions of his personal preferences. Similarly, his call to question “the value of [our] values,” appraising whether they harm us by impeding the “splendor of the human type,” would be nearly incoherent (GM P:6). Even apart from these (to my mind, exceedingly high) exegetical costs, anti-realism is still not enough to skirt the foregoing objections, which can be recast in strictly psychological terms. That is, if values are mere projections of human concerns, it is doubtful whether Nietzsche thinks we can “turn off” the relevant psychological mechanisms to arrive at an understanding of the world purified of all values. Moreover, if one grants that Nietzsche endorses a tidy fact–value distinction, then, *ex hypothesi*, nonnormative, descriptive facts are qualitatively distinct from (projected) values. As this makes descriptive facts ill-suited for explaining the *psychologically* distinctive character of values (regardless of their meta-ethical standing), the naturalistic fallacy still applies to an anti-naturalist, Humean approach.

**Beyond the Fact–Value Distinction**

The normative and Humean approaches seem to present a dilemma. *Either* drives explain individuals’ values because drives themselves have normative commitments, in which case Nietzsche commits the homuncular fallacy; *or else* values reduce to drives’ nonnormative, causal properties, in which case the only way to avoid attributing the naturalistic fallacy to Nietzsche is by eliminating normativity from his philosophical psychology altogether. Neither option is appealing.

Fortunately, this dilemma presents a false choice—and Leibniz’s irenic manner of thinking helps reveal why. Despite their differences, the normative and Humean readings both posit a dichotomy between the normative and causal orders. Leibniz, by contrast, understands the normative and causal orders as *parallel* modes of explanation. I now canvass this aspect of Leibniz’s thought before arguing that Nietzsche is amenable to it. This allows Nietzsche to pass through the horns of the dilemma posed by the normative and Humean readings.

Leibniz famously seeks a middle ground between the Newtonian mechanists and Aristotelian scholastics of his day. He takes mechanistic principles to describe accurately the interactions among extended bodies but insists that these principles cannot account for bodies’ qualitative and
nonextended properties—that is to say, forces. Without a notion of force, Leibniz argues, mechanism cannot explain why bodies are unified and obey regular patterns of motion, much less explain organisms’ perceptive capacities and end-directed behaviors. He captures these explanatory demands by construing appetites as a ubiquitous form of final causation. For example, Leibniz considers Fermat’s proof of the refraction law for light evidence that light takes the path of least resistance, which can be construed as the “goal” achieved by rays of light. Absent some argument as to why final causes preclude efficient causes or the reverse, Leibniz sees no need to choose between them; we can have both.

Reconciling scholasticism with mechanism leads Leibniz to treat final causes, which he identifies with the normative order of “good and evil,” and efficient causes, which he identifies with the mechanistic order “governing [bodies’] motions,” as separate but compatible modes of explanation. In the Monadology, he writes, “souls act according to the laws of final causes, through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motions. And these two kingdoms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony.” This observation does not distinguish two ontological realms, one of souls and another of bodies: for Leibniz, only monads exist. His mature view is that bodies are aggregates of monads that appear unified due to the activity of another, dominant monad, which he calls a soul. The distinction between efficient and final causes is thus epistemological. From an external perspective, as when we observe bodies other than our own, efficient causes explain bodily interactions. From an internal perspective though, actions are governed by final causes.

To flesh out the internal perspective on which final causes govern actions, consider Leibniz’s analysis of how a soul acts on its body: “We attribute action to a monad insofar as it has distinct perceptions, and passion, insofar as it has confused perceptions. And one creature is [. . . ] active insofar as what is known distinctly in one serves to explain what happens in another; and passive insofar as the reason for what happens in one is found in what is known distinctly in another.” From an internal perspective, dominant monad A “acts on” subordinate monad B when (i) increases in the clarity of monad A’s perceptions correspond with decreases in the clarity of monad B’s perceptions and (ii) monad A’s appetite explains changes in monad B’s perceptions better than monad B’s own appetite. A soul is thus a dominant monad whose appetite best explains perceptual changes in the subordinate
monads constituting its body. Dominant monads’ appetites incite bodily actions by generating comparisons of a body’s present state to other, possible states that might better satisfy the appetite in question.\textsuperscript{60} For appetites to perform this role of inciting actions, they must be a \textit{species} of efficient causes—to wit, an \textit{irreducible} species owing to their end-directed, intentional character.\textsuperscript{61} As Leibniz posits such final causes throughout nature, the world seen “from the inside” would consist only of hierarchically ordered, appetitive strivings.

Nietzsche is amenable to the view that final causes characterize our internal perspective whereas efficient causes characterize our external perspective. \textit{BGE} 36 invites us to bracket all experience “except the reality of our drives” and to project this experience onto the external world. As a result of this thought experiment, Nietzsche suggests, “we would be able to understand the mechanistic world as a kind of life of the drives.” He insists further, “we are not only allowed to make such an attempt: the conscience of \textit{method} demands it. Multiple varieties of causation should not be postulated until the attempt to make do with a single one has been taken as far as it will go [\ldots] we \textit{must} make the attempt to hypothetically posit the causality of the will as the only type of causality” (\textit{BGE} 36). This provides prima facie evidence that Nietzsche distinguishes external and internal causes on the basis of the latter’s accessibility and that he is open to final causes operating throughout nature. Now, one might argue that \textit{BGE} 36 is unreliable, as the passage’s appeal to first-person experience is at odds with others that \textit{indict} our knowledge of causality for depending on erroneous, first-person experiences of willing (\textit{D} 109, 121; GS 127, 333, 360; \textit{BGE} 21; \textit{TI} “Errors” 3). But the conclusion of these indictments should not be overstated. Nietzsche cannot reject causality tout court, lest his appeals to drives as causes of actions, beliefs, and values be unintelligible. We do better, I think, to read Nietzsche’s critical comments about conventional understandings of causality as advancing two claims. First, purported knowledge of causal relations among external bodies derives from first-person experiences of willing. Second, experiences of willing are misleading because consciousness misrepresents willing as \textit{simple} and thereby neglects the myriad drives that sub tend acts of will. Far from drawing an ontological distinction between types of causation, this argument holds that our understanding of causal relations among external bodies \textit{depends on} experiences of willing, misleading though these may be. Like Leibniz, Nietzsche draws
an epistemological distinction between causal accounts based on phenomenological access.62

Despite consciousness’s oversimplification of the causal relations operative in acts of will, *drives* must satisfy Leibniz’s description of final causes as appetitive, efficient causes. This is required by Nietzsche’s appeals to drives as explanations of actions whose aims escape conscious detection (*D* 109, 119, 121; *GS* 333, 360). Unique aims are also necessary to individuate the drives, which would otherwise be strivings with no direction, and to explain why drives produce specific affects in contexts that facilitate or impede their aims. Drives are thus efficient causes (they incite action) of a special sort—efficient causes characterized by intentionality.63

Nietzsche’s epistemological distinction between mechanistic causes operative among external bodies and final causes operating internally (if unconsciously), coupled with his view of drives as appetitive, efficient causes, licenses an appeal to Leibniz’s understanding of efficient and final causes. From an external, third-person perspective—as when we analyze drives’ operations in other individuals—drives are organized by their causal efficacy. This perspective captures Nietzsche’s most thoroughly naturalistic descriptions of drives, where he flirts with reductive mechanism. From an internal, first-person perspective, by contrast, drives are arranged by final causes, by a ranking of appetites. When drive A dominates drive B it either *overpowers* drive B, so that B perceives A’s appetitive end more clearly than its own, or it *incorporates* drive B, so that drive B’s appetite spurs the pursuit of A’s distinctive end.64 Actions are not mechanistic, on this internal perspective; they result from dominant appetites.

**Assessing the Leibniz-Informed Approach**

We can now compare the Leibniz-informed approach to Nietzsche’s drive psychology to its normative and Humean rivals. To this end, I first revisit the homuncular fallacy, arguing that the Leibnizian reading avoids it while allowing drives’ aims to be characterized normatively. Afterward, I show how this appeal to drives’ final causes coheres with Nietzsche’s critical remarks about teleology and makes the Leibnizian approach uniquely well-equipped to address the relation between drives’ aims and persons’ values without incurring the naturalistic fallacy.
One might worry that appealing to Leibniz still risks committing Nietzsche to the homuncular fallacy. After all, Leibniz’s theory of monads leads him to defend a kind of pan-organicism, on which “there is not only life everywhere, […] but there are also infinite degrees of life in the monads,” as well as a form of pan-psychism, on which all living beings are organized by “an entelechy” endowed with perceptions and appetites.\(^{65}\) In fact, such a neo-Leibnizian brand of pan-psychism was espoused by Alfred Fouillée in a work Nietzsche read closely between 1887 and 1888.\(^{66}\)

Set aside Leibniz’s insistence that not all organisms are conscious, much less self-conscious.\(^{67}\) Even if Leibniz’s pan-organicism entails a vicious form of homuncularism, Nietzsche is no pan-organicist. Whereas Leibniz characterizes his pan-organicism as an endless regress of substances,\(^{68}\) Nietzsche disavows the concept of substance (\textit{GM} I:13; \textit{TI} “Reason” 5) and describes “the development of the organic” as “the exception of exceptions” (\textit{GS} 109). Should this rejection of pan-organicism prohibit construing every natural entity as perceptive and appetitive, the result would still permit such an understanding of organically embodied drives.

Does characterizing drives as perceptive and appetitive commit the homuncular fallacy? No. The first form of this fallacy occurs when one attributes necessarily conscious or personal-level capacities to sub-personal entities. But Nietzsche denies that appetites and perceptions are necessarily conscious (\textit{GS} 354, 357; \textit{D} 119). Nor are perceptions and appetites necessarily personal-level organisms as simple as amoeba, adjusting the pursuit of their aims in response to environmental stimuli. So too, for ranking appetites: plants and nonhuman animals readily prioritize some appetites over others and pursue some appetites as a means of satisfying others, without being conscious persons. Thus, embodied drives can calibrate strivings toward their ends in light of environmental input without being homunculi. The second form of the fallacy occurs when one professes to explain some personal-level capacity by positing sub-personal entities endowed with the capacity in question. This misstep can be avoided by distinguishing drives’ perceptions and appetites from those of persons. Personal-level perception uses (some of) the five sensory modalities of human organisms, whereas drives’ perceptive capacities, I suggested, amount to a non-anthropomorphic, information-retaining relation. Similarly, persons’ appetites are distinct from those of drives: the former are plausibly construed as the aggregate effect of the latter. For example, a drive to aggression, by definition, is appetitively drawn to opportunities for aggressive
behavior. Yet persons with aggressive drives do not always have aggressive appetites: their aggressive drive can be overpowered by others. If drives’ perceptions and appetites are distinguishable from those of persons, the Leibnizian reading can avoid the second form of the homuncular fallacy as well.

Unlike Clark and Dudrick’s reading, the Leibnizian reading eschews the homuncular fallacy. This comparative advantage becomes more decisive to the extent that the Leibnizian reading also countenances normativity. On the Leibnizian proposal, drives pursue—indeed, are defined by—their aims. This end-directedness is irreducible: without it, drives cease to be drives to anything. But the Leibnizian reading also takes such end-directedness to serve normative functions. Drives’ aims explain how dominant drives supply individuals with reasons for acting. These aims also offer success conditions that enable appraisals of drives’ functioning: the affects drives produce, and the actions they incite, are evaluable in terms of whether they accomplish a drive’s aim. This understanding of normativity is much less demanding than Clark and Dudrick’s. Clark and Dudrick draw on Sellars, who typically approaches normativity as a feature of judgments made in intersubjective, linguistic contexts. Attributing this sense of normativity to the drives makes them homunculi. On the Leibnizian approach, by contrast, a less complex sense of normativity is anchored in drives’ final causes. This allows some degree of normativity to characterize the ground floor of Nietzsche’s drive psychology without requiring that drives are capable of rational judgments.

Before examining how the Leibnizian reading’s attribution of nascent normativity to the drives relates to conscious, normative judgments, we should consider whether this appeal to final causes contradicts Nietzsche’s antipathy for teleology. Riccardi raises this sort of concern. He writes, “Nietzsche’s clear rejection of teleological explanations and, more generally, his project of a ‘dehumanization of nature’ is at odds with the kind of vitalism at the heart of Leibniz’s natural philosophy and of its 19th-century descendants (N1881 11[211] KSA 9:525).” Perhaps we should prefer the Humean reading, then, because attributing final causes to the drives is incompatible with Nietzsche’s other philosophical commitments.

I grant that Nietzsche denies that nature as a whole serves some teleological aim (GS 109) and that consciousness determines the aims individual actions seek (GS 360). The Leibnizian reading coheres with these positions, however. It only requires that drives abide by final causes. Again, this aspect
of drives strikes me as ineliminable: specific ends are necessary for *individualizing* drives, for drives to produce affects relative to *their ends*, and for drives to *motivate* actions, even and especially when consciousness does not track the ends actions pursue. Riccardi seems to agree. He describes drives as “dispositions toward patterns of goal-directed behavior” characterized by “intentionality.” The difference between the Humean and Leibnizian approaches, then, is *not* that only the latter appeals to final causes, but that only the latter puts final causes to normative use.

It remains to be seen how the normativity attributed to drives, on the Leibnizian account, relates to normative judgments made by persons. Note, however, that this explanatory gap is helpful: it preserves the logical space needed to distinguish the normative force of drives’ affects, which provide occurrent reasons for acting, from the normative force of *values*, which can override occurrent desires. As for how the normativity characteristic of drives relates to the normativity of consciously espoused, overriding values, I suggest that persons’ values are an emergent product of an integrated hierarchy among their drives’ appetites. That is, as a drive incorporates its competitors, the appetitive force of these subordinate drives amplify the dominant drives’ appetite. If such incorporation endures for a sufficient time, the dominant drive’s affective patterns can become habitual, leading the drive’s appetite to be felt when the drive is not currently dominant. In this way, dominant drives’ appetites can become conscious values that override occurrent affective impulses.

Since the foregoing suggestion is exceedingly tentative, I hasten to emphasize that my broader argument does not depend on it. Setting aside my specific proposal, the Leibnizian reading offers a general framework for approaching the relations between drives and values that is philosophically fruitful. To appreciate this point, recall that the Humean reading posits a firm distinction between normative and nonnormative facts. From here, the Humean reader faces a difficult choice: either take Nietzsche to derive normative claims from descriptive ones, thus saddling him with the naturalistic fallacy, or read him as a normative eliminativist, thus reducing his criticisms of Judeo-Christian values to expressions of his personal taste. The Leibnizian reading, by contrast, does not face this choice. By making *some degree* of normativity an irreducible feature of drives, which play a constitutive role in conceptualization, the Leibnizian reading disavows the sort of tidy fact–value distinction needed for the naturalistic fallacy to gain traction. Unlike the normative and Humean readings, the Leibnizian reading
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construes normativity as a matter of *degree*. For this reason, explaining the relation between drives and values is less demanding for the Leibnizian reading than it is for its normative and Humean counterparts.

A distinctive feature of the Leibniz-informed approach to Nietzsche’s drive psychology is the view that the normative and efficient causal orders are parallel modes of explanation distinguished by one’s perspective. This allows the Leibnizian reading to retain the benefits of the normative and Humean readings alike. But there’s more. The Leibnizian reading, unlike its normative and Humean competitors, construes normativity as *scalar*. This allows drives to be characterized in normative terms without requiring that they enjoy complex cognitive capacities, and it prevents Nietzsche’s account of values from committing the naturalistic fallacy. The Leibnizian reading thus also avoids the drawbacks of the normative and Humean accounts.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding their disagreements about theism and substance metaphysics, Nietzsche and Leibniz both offer accounts of the psyche as composed of perceptive and appetitive forces, with appetites determining which perceptions are deemed salient; both understand such forces as hierarchically ordered in relations of dominance and subordination that are continuous with consciousness, such that dominant psychic forces determine consciousness’s contents; and both argue that the vast majority of humans’ perceptions and appetites are introspectively inaccessible. These similarities give the Leibnizian approach to Nietzsche’s drive psychology textual footing.

The Leibnizian approach to Nietzsche’s drive psychology also enjoys unique philosophical benefits. By construing the orders of final and efficient causes as parallel modes of explanation, the Leibnizian account captures the benefits of the normative and Humean readings. What’s more, by viewing normativity as permitting of degree, the Leibnizian reading offers a normative characterization of the drives that requires neither understanding drives as capable of rational judgments, nor a firm distinction between facts and values. This prevents the homuncular fallacy and the naturalistic fallacy from applying to Nietzsche’s drive-psychological account of values. For these reasons, I conclude that the Leibniz-informed reading is preferable to the normative and Humean readings currently on offer.
NOTES

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4. Clark and Dudrick, Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 141, 150–51, 155, 162.


11. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, 254; see also 143, 197, 290, 324.


16. Katsafanas, *Nietzschean Self*, 23–27, argues that GS 354 treats consciousness in general, but Riccardi, *Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology*, 73–77, argues that it treats reflective consciousness specifically. This disagreement is orthogonal to another, in which Katsafanas contends that Nietzsche takes consciousness states to be conceptual and linguistically articulated and Riccardi argues that Nietzsche permits conscious states that are neither conceptual nor linguistic. As far as I can tell, this disagreement does not bear on the present discussion, since Katsafanas and Riccardi agree that consciousness and self-consciousness are continuous with unconscious mental states.

17. Nauckhoff translates “Recht bekam” as “vindicated.”


22. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, 177, 211, 207–8, 219–20, 222. I shall have more to say on monadic domination below.


32. Riccardi argues that GS 354 and 357 endorse Leibniz's distinction between occurring and non-occurring beliefs (*Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology*, 74–75). I would argue that this requires a strained interpretation of these passages as concerned with propositional attitudes. I cannot press the point here, but I note that if Riccardi is correct, Nietzsche's agreement with Leibniz extends further than I suggest.


35. Clark and Dudrick, Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 150.

36. Clark and Dudrick, Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 141, 155, 162; see also 151.

37. Clark and Dudrick, Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 133.

38. Clark and Dudrick, Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 124, 131.


40. Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 65. See also Gemes, “Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation,” 48, 51; Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, 72; Leiter, Moral Psychology with Nietzsche, 143–44.

41. Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 56.

42. Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 64.


45. See also Clark and Dudrick, Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 127–29; Katsafanas, Nietzschean Self, 94–102; Leiter, Moral Psychology with Nietzsche, 90–98; and Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 33, 37–38, 110–11, 117. Gemes denies that drives are constitutive of conceptualization but concedes that they are “a fundamental cause in [any] given interpretation” of the world (“Life’s Perspectives,” 565).

46. Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 176; and Leiter, Moral Psychology with Nietzsche, 91.

47. See Katsafanas, Nietzschean Self, 177–79.

48. See note 28.

49. Defenders of the Humean approach might reply to this objection, first, by taking GS 373 to target reductive materialism (see Leiter, Nietzsche and Morality, 20) and, second, by insisting that Nietzsche holds that “psychological explanations are autonomous and cannot be reduced to merely biological and physical ones” (Riccardi, Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 55). In this way, the Humean reading might avoid Nietzsche’s rebuke of reductive materialism. I find neither half of this reply convincing.

First, GS 373 not only rebukes reductive physicalism but also criticizes the social Darwinist Herbert Spencer, who cannot be neatly labeled as a materialist. (See Michael W. Taylor, “Herbert Spencer and the Metaphysical Roots of Evolutionary Naturalism,” in The Age of Scientific Naturalism: Tyndall and His Contemporaries, ed. Bernard Lightman and M. S. Reidy [London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014], 71–88. Taylor argues that “the evolutionary naturalist gospel that [Spencer] preached also contained significant metaphysical and rationalist elements” [72], with the result that “Spencer’s evolutionary naturalism had its roots deep in metaphysical
theories that were far removed from empiricism and materialism” [86].) GS 373 charges Spencer with neglecting the way his “needs” and “inner expectations,” his “fear and hope,” circumscribe his study of humans and, in particular, his conclusion that egoism and altruism will be reconciled. Returning to GS 373, and its critique of “materialistic natural scientists” specifically, Nietzsche criticizes their attempts to “strip [existence] of its ambiguous character” to arrive at “a world that is supposed to have its equivalent and measure in human thought, in human valuations.” Notwithstanding Nietzsche’s claim that if reductive materialism succeeded, it would eliminate meaning, significance, and value, his point GS 373 is more basic: scientific inquiry presupposes evaluative commitments. This reading is also contextually supported. GS 372 criticizes idealists for denying the sensuous world and “the music of life.” GS 374 insists that the world permits of “infinite interpretations” (GS 374), which prevents our perspective from being the only perspective. (See also Clark and Dudrick, Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 119–24.)

Second, while I suspect that Nietzsche does consider psychological explanations autonomous from biological and physical explanations, this view is in tension with the Humean approach’s reductive bent. Riccardi’s argument for why Nietzsche considers psychological explanations autonomous turns on an alleged incongruity between BGE 12, which claims that the soul is “a society constructed out of drives,” and BGE 19, which claims “our body is [...] a society constructed out of many souls.” These statements do not strike me as incongruous. I take Nietzsche’s point to be that the body contains multiple hierarchies of drives, each of which might be regarded as a “soul.” This accords with his view that unification of one’s drives into a single hierarchy is a rare achievement (GS 290; BGE 212; TI “Skirmishes” 49). But even if one shares Riccardi’s discomfort, the incongruity at hand is exceedingly shaky ground for extracting a claim as refined as “psychological explanations are autonomous from biological and physical ones,” much less for demonstrating that the Humean reading of Nietzsche grants psychological explanations autonomy.


54. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 54–55.
55. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, 54, 207–8, 223, 319. Strictly speaking, God’s plan of Pre-Established Harmony ensures that all substances’ perceptions and appetites cohere *without* requiring intersubstantial, causal interactions, according to Leibniz (*Philosophical Essays*, 220). This view of causality as a useful, though metaphysically shallow, heuristic for describing phenomena contrasts with Nietzsche’s view, on which bodies genuinely influence each other causally. Another important difference follows from this. For Leibniz, harmony among organisms’ appetites is a *given*, whereas, for Nietzsche, such harmony is a hard-won achievement (*GS* 290; *BGE* 212; *TI* “Skirmishes” 49).


57. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*, 223; see also 319.


60. Teleological explanations are sometimes accused of “backward causation,” where future, nonexistent states of affairs *themselves* cause actions. Leibniz’s view that appetites produce occurrent representations of future states of affairs sidesteps this objection.


62. This epistemological distinction between final and efficient causal accounts does not require endorsing *BGE* 36’s suggestion that “the world seen from the inside [. . .] would be [. . .] ‘will to power’ and nothing else.” Intriguingly, Nietzsche’s late notes surpass Leibniz’s proposed *parallel* between efficient and final causes by claiming that “*causa efficiens* is tautological with *causa finalis*” (*Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 106) and that “*causa efficiens* and *finalis* are one” (*Writings from the Late Notebooks*, 251).

63. I remain agnostic about where intentionality enters Nietzsche’s picture. This issue is orthogonal to controversies surrounding the will to power. One might argue that intentionality, like the will to power, characterizes only the psychological domain. Alternatively, one might claim that intentionality, like the will to power, characterizes all organic life. Or one might claim that intentionality and the will to power are qualities of forces *as such*. For my purposes, what matters is merely that *drives* are intentional. This claim is consistent with each of the readings just mentioned. Clark and Dudrick also consider drives intentional (*Soul of Nietzsche’s*...
Beyond Good and Evil, 165, 175), as does Riccardi (Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology, 32, 57).

64. The difference between “overpowering” and “incorporation” loosely corresponds to Gemes’s (“Freud and Nietzsche on Sublimation”) distinction between “repression” and “sublimation.”

65. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 208, 221–22.


67. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 208, 211, 215, 223.

68. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 207.

69. Riccardi, Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology, 54.

70. Riccardi, Nietzsche's Philosophical Psychology, 32, 67.

71. If drives’ orders form the causal base from which values emerge (see, e.g., GS 335), then hierarchies among persons’ drives are distinct from persons’ values, which potentially enjoy distinct, emergent casual properties. Clark and Dudrick’s view that the order of the drives constitutes one’s values, by contrast, is in tension with Nietzsche’s descriptions of values as symptoms caused by drives’ ranking (Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, 141; cf. GS 335; BGE 6, 268; TI “Improving” 1, “Socrates” 2). An emergent account also seems preferrable to Riccardi’s suggestion that values reduce to affects directly caused by drives in an asymmetric and endogenous fashion, as this unilateral relation leaves little room for values to influence drives (Nietzsche’s Philosophical Psychology, 176, 62–63; cf. GM P: 3, 6, which suggest that moral values might inhibit human flourishing). I set these issues aside for future exploration.