

Chapter 4

Gilles Deleuze's Interpretation of the Eternal Return: From *Nietzsche and Philosophy* to *Difference and Repetition*

James Mollison

Deleuze famously describes his generation as 'more or less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy'.¹ His means of escaping this stifling atmosphere is infamous: 'The main way I coped with it', Deleuze writes, 'was to see the history of philosophy as a sort of buggery . . . I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous' (1995: 5–6). This provocative image makes it unsurprising if scholars working within the philosophical tradition tend to neglect Deleuze's readings of other philosophers. Respectable historians of philosophy seldom fraternise with monsters. But even if one adopts this dismissive view of Deleuze's historical commentaries, an exception would need to be made for his *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. For, in the same 'Letter to a Harsh Critic', Deleuze goes on to state: 'It was Nietzsche . . . who extricated me from all this. Because you can't just deal with him in the same sort of way. He gets up to all sorts of things behind *your* back. He gives you a perverse taste for . . . saying simple things in your own way.' Here, Deleuze indicates that his study of Nietzsche is not an instance of interpretive 'buggery'. In fact, reading Nietzsche relieves Deleuze's need for such an approach by enabling him to write in his 'own name' (6). Yet, there is a cost for attributing this catalytic function to Nietzsche. If we take Deleuze at his word when he describes *Nietzsche and Philosophy* as an attempt to pay his 'debts' to the history of philosophy (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 16), then this early work seems vulnerable to the stifling interpretative demands that Deleuze otherwise seeks to abjure.

Deleuze's encounter with Nietzsche occurs at the boundary between the burdens of traditional interpretation and unabashed concept creation. This is perhaps best illustrated by Deleuze's interpretation of the eternal return. Nietzsche reveals the idea in a demonic declaration: 'This life as you live it now and have lived it you will have to live once

again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it' (GS 341).² Notwithstanding the myriad controversies surrounding this idea, its central point seems obvious enough: each detail of our lives will repeat, endlessly and identically. Yet, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze takes the eternal return to express the priority of becoming over being and to function as a selective ethical and ontological principle that eliminates all negativity. The claim that the eternal return eliminates all negativity is especially contentious among Nietzsche scholars. Some argue that a selective approach to ontology violates the doctrine's ethical aspiration of motivating an unconditional affirmation of existence.³ Others argue that the elimination of negativity and reactive forces also eradicates affirmation and active forces.⁴ And still others argue that the attempt to purge negativity and reactivity is ethically and politically dangerous.⁵ While it is tempting to dismiss such arguments as hermeneutic concerns for which Deleuze has little patience, his claim that his reading of Nietzsche occurs *within* the history of philosophy suggests that things are not so simple. Nor are these concerns confined to *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. In the first work Deleuze authors in his own name, *Difference and Repetition*, the eternal return occupies a privileged place in Deleuze's theory of time, functioning as a transcendental synthesis of the *future*. Little wonder, then, that Deleuze is uncharacteristically defensive over his reading of the eternal return (1994: 297–302) – as his reading claims that the eternal return, which seemed to guarantee the past's endless and identical reappearance, is really a cypher for unbridled novelty. To Nietzsche scholars, the image of philosophical buggery could hardly seem more appropriate.

In this chapter, I examine Deleuze's interpretation of the eternal return and advance two claims about it. First, I suggest that much of the controversy surrounding *Nietzsche and Philosophy*'s appeal to the eternal return as a principle of selective ontology can be mitigated by attending to Deleuze's novel reading of the will to power as an evaluative typology that produces individuals' ontological commitments. The eternal return enacts an ontological selection, for Deleuze, by transforming the evaluative qualities of the will. Motivating this point takes some time, but it also sets the stage for the second claim advanced here – namely, that Deleuze's interpretation of the eternal return undergoes a significant shift in *Difference and Repetition*. In particular, I suggest that whereas *Nietzsche and Philosophy* hesitates over the metaphysical status of the eternal return, *Difference and Repetition* pursues an overtly metaphysical use of this idea as a principle of transcendental empiricism.⁶ As a result, the eternal return ceases to denote the *present's* internal differ-

entiation as simultaneously becoming-past and becoming-future, and comes to denote the priority of the *future* as a passive, temporal synthesis that grounds the present and past alike. In addition to revealing how the eternal return, in Deleuze's hands, comes to describe the future, I hope this discussion sheds light on Nietzsche's catalytic role in helping Deleuze develop his philosophy of time.

Deleuze's Will to Power

An evaluative typology

Deleuze describes *Nietzsche and Philosophy* by stating that 'this book sets out, primarily, to analyse what Nietzsche calls becoming' (1983: xii). It is thus unsurprising that he takes Nietzsche's world to consist of *forces* rather than beings.⁷ Forces, for Deleuze, are essentially relational and plural (6). They are also necessarily unequal, such that whenever two forces relate, one is quantitatively superior. Deleuze analyses these quantitative disparities in terms of relations of 'command' and 'obedience', though he hastens to add that such quantitative differences produce *qualitative* differences, which he analyses in terms of 'activity' and 'reactivity' (40–3). Since Deleuze maintains that any relation among forces produces a body – whether chemical, biological, social or political – *Nietzsche and Philosophy* examines all phenomena by treating the active and reactive forces comprising them.

Deleuze distils Nietzsche's tendency to analyse allegedly primitive and simple concepts as products of dynamic principles down to a single concept – force. He also distils Nietzsche's tendency to explain divergences among individuals' outlooks in terms of qualitative differences in their constitutions down to a single qualitative distinction – active/reactive. But the active/reactive distinction cannot completely reduce to forces' quantitative differences. If it did, Deleuze could not explain Nietzsche's view that reactive forces can triumph over active forces while *remaining* reactive. Slave morality is exemplary in this regard. Nietzsche says of slave morality that 'its action is, from the ground up, reaction' (GM I.10). And while slave morality defeats master morality and shapes humanity today, it *remains* reactive (BGE 202; GM I.11–12). How does this occur? Nietzsche tells us that slave morality overthrows master morality by positing 'an indifferent substratum that is free to express its strength – or not to'. After likening this to misleading expressions such as 'lightning strikes' or 'force moves', which add an explanatorily otiose substratum behind activity, Nietzsche concludes:

1 ‘there is no “being” behind the doing, effecting, becoming; “the doer”
 2 is simply fabricated into the doing – the doing is everything’ (GM I.13).
 3 The lesson Deleuze draws from this is that reactive forces triumph – not
 4 by forming a quantitatively superior force, but – by *decomposing* active
 5 forces (1983: 57). This decomposition is enabled by the fiction of a force
 6 separate from its expression.

7 If forces’ qualities do not reduce completely to quantitative differences,
 8 then what else explains them? Deleuze answers that qualitative differ-
 9 ences among forces trace to qualities of the will to power, ‘*the element*
 10 *from which derive both the quantitative difference of related forces and*
 11 *the quality that devolves into each force of this relation*’ (1983: 50). In
 12 its affirmative dimension, the will to power is ‘the power of transforma-
 13 tion’ (42). In its negative dimension, it is ‘a will to nothingness’ and
 14 ‘a power of subtraction’ (57). Deleuze observes a complicity between
 15 affirmative wills and active forces, on the one hand, and negative wills
 16 and reactive forces, on the other, but insists that affirmative/negative and
 17 active/reactive distinctions must not be conflated (53–4). The ability of
 18 these distinctions to come apart enables nuanced evaluations, such as the
 19 reactive affirmation of the ass and the negative action of priests. It also
 20 allows nihilism to be overcome via the *active negation* of reactive forces.
 21 Still, we must also resist distinguishing will from force too firmly, as this
 22 would make the will to power a ‘metaphysical abstraction’ that violates
 23 Nietzsche’s rejection of transcendent principles. Deleuze accordingly
 24 analyses the will to power as ‘an essentially *plastic* principle that is no
 25 wider than what it conditions, that changes itself with the conditioned
 26 and determines itself in each case along with what it determines’ (50).
 27 Each change in relations among forces is thus accompanied by changes
 28 in the qualities of the will.⁸

29 Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche can be clarified by situating it
 30 among debates over how to reconcile the will to power with Nietzsche’s
 31 perspectivism. In its least restricted form – as when Nietzsche claims
 32 that the world’s ‘essence is will to power’ (BGE 186) – the will to power
 33 verges on a metaphysical concept that contradicts Nietzsche’s claim
 34 that all knowledge is perspectival (GM III.12; GS 354). Some scholars
 35 address this tension by prioritising perspectivism over the will to power,
 36 for example, by taking the will to power to describe human psychology,⁹
 37 or by taking it to reflect Nietzsche’s own, non-privileged perspective.¹⁰
 38 Other scholars opt to prioritise the will to power over perspectivism, for
 39 example, by interpreting the will to power as a metaphysical¹¹ or quasi-
 40 scientific hypothesis¹² that holds for all perspectives. Deleuze cuts between
 41 these extremes. He takes will to power to be a non-anthropomorphic

notion, comparable to Schopenhauer's Will but distinguished by its affirmative and pluralist aspects (1983: 6–8; 82–4). While this much is common, Deleuze also claims that *evaluation* is non-anthropomorphic. 'To actualise the will under any quality whatever, is always to evaluate. To live is to evaluate' (184). Deleuze thus reconciles the will to power with perspectivism by pushing evaluation beyond human psychology. The will to power, understood non-anthropomorphically, is itself perspectival and evaluative.

The will to power's qualities, on Deleuze's reading, issue distinctive evaluations of the *differences* among forces in an ontogenetic field. Whereas an affirmative will to power celebrates these differences, a negative will to power opposes them. It is paramount to Deleuze's interpretation that affirmation and negation 'do not have a univocal relation'.¹³ Whereas negation *opposes* affirmation, affirmation *differs* from negation. To illustrate such a relation of unilateral opposition, we might recall Socrates' opposition to the Sophists, which the Sophists deny. Another example of unilateral opposition is Nietzsche's view of the relation between mind and body. While the mind opposes the body, the body views the mind as a particular organic development. A third example might be a two-way mirror, which represents space as enclosed from one side and as continuous from the other. The import of this notion of unilateral opposition is seen in Deleuze's insistence that 'we cannot think of affirmation as "being opposed" to negation: this would be to place the negative within it' (1983: 188). The unilateral relation of the will to power's qualities thus allows Deleuze to avoid contaminating affirmation with negation. But it also allows him to maintain that the will to power is *fundamentally* affirmative, that '*the will to power is essentially creative and giving*' – *despite* its negative qualities (85; see also 53–4, 184–5). Negative wills to power also create interpretations and evaluations, and bestow these onto forces, though negative wills disavow this creative activity.

Images of thought

Nietzsche regularly explains individuals' perspectives in terms of their values – values which trace to psycho-physiological and socio-historical forces. For Deleuze, this explanatory strategy is emphatically non-reductive. Forces themselves carry evaluations, which emerge from still more fundamental, evaluative qualities of the will. Unflinching commitment to the view that values extend beyond the psychological domain reverberates in Deleuze's comparisons of Nietzsche with

Kant.¹⁴ Notwithstanding Kant's 'genius' for conceiving of 'an immanent critique', Deleuze contends that Kant 'lacked a method which permitted reason to be judged from the inside without giving it the task of being its own judge'. If transcendental idealism safeguards reason, it is because it precludes the question of reason's genesis. Genealogy, by contrast, prompts us to ask, 'what is the will which hides and expresses itself in reason?' (Deleuze 1983: 91). Against Kant's critique of all *claims* to knowledge and truth,¹⁵ Nietzsche criticises knowledge and truth *themselves* by tracing them to the evaluations of a will (89–90). It is worth dwelling on this aspect of Deleuze's interpretation, as it reveals how the will to power's qualities produce different accounts of the function of thought. How we construe the world, and the eternal recurrence, depends on the will's qualities.

Deleuze takes genealogy to reveal that the unconditional valuing of truth derives from a negative will to power (1983: 95–6). The belief that truth is always valuable could not arise from a will not to let oneself *be* deceived without assuming that truth is always beneficial. But some truths are useless and even harmful, and some illusions are life promoting. (To use one of Nietzsche's preferred examples, tragedy provides an artistic illusion that affirms the way life's exorbitant dynamism undermines individuation.) Hence the view that truth is unconditionally valuable must arise from a moral judgement never *to* deceive, not even oneself (GS 344). It is easy to see how the belief that truth is always valuable is life-negating in cases where truth is harmful or illusion is life-promoting. But Deleuze further claims that attributing anything other than instrumental value to truth is ascetic insofar as it leaves behind *life* as the ultimate arbiter of value (GM III.24–7). Even more strongly, Deleuze suggests that, if truth is valued as something that must be sought, this is because life is *already condemned* to mere appearance, because life and truth are already understood as *opposed*. Such oppositional thinking typifies a negative will to power.

A negative will which values truth as *opposed* to life yields a reactive image of thought as subordinate to *knowledge*. For Deleuze, knowledge is not only quantitatively reactive, in that it emerges from consciousness' reaction to forces superior to the body (1983: 39–41). Knowledge is also *qualitatively* reactive. 'Knowledge gives life laws that separate it from what it can do, that keep it from acting, that forbid it to act, maintaining it in the narrow framework of scientifically observable reaction: almost like an animal in a zoo' (100). Deleuze's claim that knowledge is paradigmatically reactive is bold, but it receives support from familiar features of Nietzsche's thought. Nietzsche not only explains the

emergence of the self-conscious subject in terms of the herd's need to hold individuals accountable for their actions (GM I.13; GS 354). He also explains the notion of substance in these terms, analysing the concept of substance as a projection of the ego onto forces (TI III.5; VI.3; WP 485, 498). This, in turn, implicates causal categories – both because efficient causation is modelled on consciousness' *ex post facto* experience of 'willing' bodily actions (D 121; GS 127; BGE 21, 36) and because commonplace causal explanations posit discrete beings in place of continuums of forces (D 6; GS 112). This also undercuts the view of time as a series of discrete causally related moments (WP 520, 487, 545). Without belabouring the point, we can glimpse the reasoning behind Nietzsche's view that 'knowledge and becoming exclude one another' (WP 517), such that 'a world in a state of becoming could not, in a strict sense, be "comprehended" or "known"' (WP 520). And if knowledge categorically *opposes* the world's becoming, then we can also see the reasoning behind Deleuze's claim that 'the spirit of revenge is the genealogical element of *our* thought, the transcendental element of *our* way of thinking' (1983: 35). The basic categories humans use to make forces intelligible oppose life's dynamism.

Whereas negative wills oppose life's becoming and subordinate thought to knowledge, affirmative wills celebrate life's dynamism. An affirmative evaluation of becoming entails nothing less than a new image of thought, 'a thought that would *affirm* life instead of a knowledge that is opposed to life . . . Thinking would then mean *discovering, inventing, new possibilities of life*' (Deleuze 1983: 101). Here, Deleuze draws on Nietzsche's celebration of art as superior to knowledge for its ability to affirm life. Unlike Kant's approach to beauty from the perspective of observers' disinterested contemplation, Nietzsche approaches beauty from the perspective of the artist, who is overtly interested in selecting and amplifying active forces to stimulate further life-affirmation. If 'the activity of life is like a power of falsehood, of duping, dissimulating, dazzling and seducing', the artist doubles this power of falsehood in 'a *will to deceive*' (102–3). Deleuze describes this shift as one where the element of thought is no longer *truth*, but sense and value (104). Whereas the claimant of knowledge proceeds from a negative will that renounces thought's evaluative and creative qualities, the artist celebrates these, so that '*creation takes the place of knowledge*' (173).

At this point, it is important to recall Deleuze's notion of unilateral opposition. While claimants of knowledge *oppose* artists, artists do not reciprocate this opposition. Strictly speaking, in a world of becoming, *all* conceptual schemes are selective appropriations of forces

based on the will's evaluative qualities. From an artist's vantage, those who pursue knowledge are merely conflicted artists, artists who select reactive forces, negate life's becoming and disavow thought's creative power. Affirmative artists, by contrast, select active forces, celebrate life's becoming and affirm the creative powers of the false. Whereas claimants of knowledge view truth and appearance as opposed, 'for the artist, *appearance* no longer means the negation of the real in this world but this kind of selection, correction, redoubling and affirmation. Then truth perhaps takes on a new sense. Truth is appearance' (Deleuze 1983: 103). For Deleuze, the difference between knowledge and art is not epistemological, since knowledge and art both selectively falsify becoming, but evaluative. Whereas the seeker of knowledge renounces thought's creative power, the artist celebrates thought's creativity to enable greater life affirmation.

Deleuze's Eternal Return

Physical, temporal and selective aspects

Since the will to power's qualities implicate our image of thought in the broadest sense, these qualities also inform our understanding of the eternal return. Nietzsche's best-known statement of the eternal return occurs in the following pronouncement, delivered by a demon:

This life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you in the same succession and sequence . . . (GS 341)

Some scholars contend that this message is meant factually. On this 'cosmological reading', the eternal return describes the cyclical structure of time, which ensures that everything recurs in identical fashion *ad infinitum*.¹⁶ Other scholars emphasise Nietzsche's discussion of how we might *respond* to the eternal return. The idea could 'possibly crush' us or, if we are sufficiently well disposed toward life, we might '*long for nothing more fervently*' than the eternal return (GS 341). On this 'hypothetical reading', the eternal return is not meant as an accurate piece of cosmology but as a thought experiment that diagnoses one's ability to affirm life.¹⁷

Deleuze cannot abide either of these interpretations of the eternal return, as he thinks that they fail to affirm life's becoming. Against the

cosmological reading, Deleuze argues that if we resolve the *prima facie* tension between this view of the eternal return and Nietzsche's emphasis on becoming by making becoming a feature of limited perspectives within temporal cycles, then the eternal return would resemble ancient formulations of the idea that Nietzsche rejects (Deleuze 1983: 29).¹⁸ Likewise, if the eternal return is a thought experiment that diagnoses one's ability to affirm life, then, insofar as life is characterised by *becoming*, the test's appeal to cyclical time is inconsistent with its aim. Both interpretations negate life by subordinating becoming to being via cycles of time. For Deleuze, the definitive formulation of the eternal return appears in Nietzsche's notes, where we read: 'That *everything recurs* is the closest *approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being*' (WP 617). Deleuze thus contends that '*return is the being said of that which becomes*' (1983: 24).¹⁹ Similar to his extension of sense and value beyond the psychological domain to non-anthropomorphic forces and wills, Deleuze pushes the eternal return past its application to individuals' dispositions until returning characterises *becoming*.

By making return said of becoming, Deleuze can appeal to the eternal return as an explanation of time's passage. Here, he draws from notebook entries where Nietzsche argues against the possibility of equilibrium among forces and in favour of ceaseless becoming (WP 1062, 1067, 708). On the assumption that past time is infinite, Nietzsche reasons that if an equilibrium of forces was possible, it would have been achieved. Yet, the dynamism of the present shows that this has not occurred. Deleuze takes these reflections to further undermine cosmological readings of the eternal return, as the incompatibility between equilibrium and becoming raises questions about why a cycle of time would begin and why a completed cycle would give way to another (1983: 49). Deleuze then applies this reasoning about cycles' extreme states to the present moment. If time were a successive series of 'closed' moments, we could not explain why one moment gives way to the next. On pain of perpetual stasis, Deleuze concludes that 'the present must coexist with itself as past and yet to come' (48).²⁰ Becoming requires that the present is *internally differentiated*. Similar to how 'it is not being that returns but rather the returning itself that constitutes being insofar as it is affirmed of becoming', so the present does not return, for Deleuze. Rather, by affirming 'the synthetic relation of the moment to itself as present, past, and future', returning *constitutes* the present (48).

While Deleuze does not confine the eternal return to the psychological domain, he nevertheless considers its ethical application. He compares the eternal return to Kant's practical synthesis for action: '*whatever you*

1 *will, will it in such a way that you also will its eternal return* (1983: 68).
2 This imperative eliminates all half-hearted willing. ‘Laziness, stupid-
3 ity, baseness, cowardice or spitefulness that would will its own eternal
4 return would no longer be the same laziness, stupidity, etc.’, because
5 the practical thought of the eternal return pushes reactive forces to their
6 limit. Although this practical use of the eternal return ‘makes willing
7 something whole’, ‘makes willing a creation’, Deleuze thinks that this
8 is insufficient to overcome nihilism (69). Nietzsche describes the eternal
9 return as ‘the most extreme form of nihilism’ (WP 55) because reactive
10 forces *can* pass its practical test. This casts further doubt on hypothetical
11 readings of the eternal return, as the thought of life’s identical replica-
12 tion fails to transform the Last Man content with a reactive life. Deleuze
13 infers from this that the eternal return must carry out a second selection,
14 one that ‘involves the most obscure parts of Nietzsche’s philosophy and
15 forms an almost esoteric element on the doctrine of the eternal return’
16 (1983: 69).

17 This second selection is ontological. Whereas the first selection concerns
18 reactive forces, the second submits the *will to nothingness* to the
19 eternal return. This leads the will to nothingness to break its alliance
20 with reactive forces. As Deleuze puts the point, ‘only the eternal return
21 can complete nihilism *because it makes negation a negation of reactive*
22 *forces*’ (1983: 70). He illustrates this transition by distinguishing the
23 Last Man from the Man who actively destroys himself (69–70; 174). But
24 the details of this transmutation remain obscure. Inasmuch as the eternal
25 return forecloses the possibility of any life other than this, perhaps
26 it compels any evaluation which opposes life to confront its internal
27 contradiction, its use of life’s creative powers to negate life itself. On
28 this suggestion, the eternal return forces the ascetic who denies life in
29 favour of heaven to either abandon asceticism or to affirm asceticism as
30 an active negation of life. Likewise, the eternal return forces those who
31 pursue truth in opposition to life to either question the value of truth or
32 to affirm the will to truth as an active negation of life. Generalising the
33 point: if one attempts to affirm the practical thought of the eternal return
34 under the sway of nihilism, negation is pushed to break its alliance
35 with reactive forces and to actively pursue the destruction of reactive
36 forces themselves. Unfortunately, though, I suspect that such an expla-
37 nation of the eternal return’s selective ontology remains all-too-human.
38 Throughout *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze insists that the will to
39 power must not be confined to psychology – both because human psy-
40 chology is categorically reactive (21, 34, 41, 64, 167–9) and because the
41 will produces forces more basic than individuals’ psychological outlooks

(49–55, 84–6). The foregoing explanation of the eternal return's selective ontology is therefore in tension with Deleuze's reading, as it implies that the eternal return's selective ontology depends on the way the thought's practical application compels individuals to transform their values. Deleuze's claim that 'in and through the eternal return negation as a quality of the will to power transmutes itself into affirmation, becomes an affirmation of negation itself, it becomes a power of affirming', must somehow be understood non-anthropomorphically (72). The eternal return must compel negative wills to overcome their opposition to affirmation, if only to affirm themselves, and *without* making this transmutation pivot on human psychology.

Selective ontology

Despite my suspicion that the eternal return's selective ontology cannot reduce to individuals' reflection on its practical application, I'd like to ask whether the eternal return's ethical selection might yield a selective ontology. An affirmative answer to this question would amount to a general defence of Deleuze's reading, as scholars typically accept his claim that the eternal return functions as an ethical principle but resist his further claim about selective ontology.²¹ Examining Deleuze's notion of selective ontology from this vantage also allows the distinctness of *Difference and Repetition's* interpretation of the eternal return to emerge in sharper relief.

The suggestion that the eternal return's ethical application *could* produce a selective ontology might seem ill formed. If ontology describes unalterable features of reality, and if the eternal return's ethical selection results from a psychological transformation, then one might think that the eternal return's ethical application cannot affect ontology, which is more fundamental than psychology.²² However, at least in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze denies that ontology and metaphysics describe the ground floor of reality. 'According to Nietzsche the philosophy of the will must replace the old metaphysics: it destroys and supersedes it' (1983: 84; see also 35). Consistent with Nietzsche's explanations of individuals' ontological commitments in terms of their psychological constitutions, Deleuze maintains that the will to power's qualities produce our image of thought, including our ontological categories, such that 'metaphysics and the theory of knowledge themselves belong to typology' (145). Deleuze does not shrink before the consequences of this intrepid claim. He takes Nietzsche to replace the Platonic question of essence (*what is [x]?*) with questions of sense and value (*who wills*

[*x*]?), and concludes that, ‘truth, as a concept, is entirely undetermined. Everything depends on the value and sense of what we think. We always have the truths we deserve as a function of the sense of what we conceive, the value of what we believe’ (104). Not only is it the case that, in a world of becoming, every phenomenon has multiple senses, such that there is no *one* way the world ‘is’; even more to the point, in a world of becoming, *every ontology is selective*. Granted, a negative will to power leads thought to disavow its creative power, such that we mistakenly think that ontology circumscribes sense and value. But under an affirmative will, ‘realist’ ontologies are merely different modes of selection – to wit, selections of reactive forces. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, metaphysics is subordinate to typology. By transforming the evaluative qualities of the will, the eternal return transfigures everything.

Even if ethical selection can transform individuals’ values and thereby produce a selective ontology, one might object that any selective ontology violates the eternal return’s ethical aspiration. That is, if affirming the eternal return requires unconditional acceptance of the world as it is, then selective approaches to ontology might seem to express life-negation.²³ However, the suggestion that the eternal return inspires a global acceptance of the world is thoroughly at odds with Deleuze’s account. To motivate this point, we can recall Deleuze’s insistence that the world is irreducibly plural and dynamic, such that there is no *one* way that the world is for us to accept. Beyond this reply, we should also observe Deleuze’s insistence that ‘affirmation conceived of as acceptance, as affirmation of that which is, as truthfulness of the true or positivity of the real, is false affirmation’ (1983: 184). Acceptance, according to Deleuze, is reactive. Affirmation differs from acceptance in compelling *creation*, and ‘there is creation, properly speaking, only insofar as we make use of excess in order to invent new forms of life rather than separating life from what it can do’ (185). For Deleuze, affirming the eternal return cannot entail *accepting* the world – even as pluralist and dynamic – because affirmation requires actively contributing to the world’s becoming.

A third class of objections concerns Deleuze’s view that the eternal return reveals that ‘negation *sacrifices* all reactive forces’ and that ‘there is no return of the negative’ (1983: 175, 189). Some object to this aspect of Deleuze’s interpretation on the grounds that active forces require reactive forces for their distinction, such that eradicating reactive forces also eradicates active forces.²⁴ Others object that Deleuze’s claims about elimination express a form of life-negation that is ethically or politically dangerous.²⁵ To address these concerns, recall Deleuze’s insistence that

the will to power's qualities are not univocal. Granted, from the perspective of a negative will, the eternal return is a kind of auto-destruction. To the extent that negative values define our human condition, affirming the eternal return is therefore difficult indeed.²⁶ But from an affirmative vantage, the eternal return does not require the elimination of negation or reactive forces; for, affirmation *does not oppose* negation or reaction. This affirmative perspective on the eternal return is reflected in Deleuze's descriptions of transmutation – not as a sacrifice, but – as revealing that negation *depends on* affirmation. The eternal return 'makes negation a power of affirming' (86), so that 'negation ceases to be an autonomous power' (191; see also 176–9). Similarly, reactive forces unilaterally *depend on* active forces (41). And insofar as Deleuze maintains that bodies in which active forces prevail are fundamentally active (86), there is a sense in which reactive forces need not be eliminated but only subordinated to active forces. Affirming the eternal return does not eliminate negation and reaction in some *physical* sense. Rather, it reveals that negation and reactivity *depend on* affirmation and activity. This is why the eternal return produces a double affirmation (186). Selective ontology does not select *some* phenomena as opposed to others; it affirms the affirmative wills and active forces that subtend *all* phenomena. Negation and reaction also rely on the affirmative powers of the false – the fiction of a will which does not create, or the fiction of forces separated from their expression, for example. The eternal return asks whether we can affirm such falsification to push the powers of the false still further.

Insofar as the practical thought of the eternal return forecloses the possibility of any life *other than this*, it compels individuals either to abandon life-negating values or to affirm these values as an active negation of the world. The ascetic deprived of the promise of heaven must either abandon asceticism or affirm asceticism as an active negation of life; the claimant of knowledge must either abandon their subordination of life to truth or affirm the will to truth as an active negation of becoming. Either response to the eternal return produces an ontological transformation. If the life-negating value of truth is replaced with the life-affirming value of artistic creation, our conceptualisation of the world becomes an artistic selection that contributes to the world's creativity. But if negative values are actively affirmed, instead of replaced, a profound conversion still unfolds. The ascetic who actively negates life is not the same as the ascetic who merely reacts to forces beyond their power. For, the active ascetic ceases to disavow the will's creativity and acknowledges that their will *evaluates* life but finds it wanting. Neither response to the practical thought of the eternal return – the replacement

of negative with affirmative values, or the active affirmation of negative values – requires the physical destruction of negative wills or reactive forces. Rather, the transformation is evaluative. To affirm the practical thought of the eternal return, we must affirm the affirmative wills and active forces that subtend *all* phenomena, including the negative and reactive. Such a double affirmation actively contributes to the world's creative dynamism. To be clear: I am not suggesting that Deleuze's claim that the eternal return produces a selective ontology is beyond reproach, but that any *successful* reproach to this portion of Deleuze's reading must confront his interpretation of the will to power as a nonunivocal, evaluative typology that produces individuals' ontological commitments.

The Repetition of Difference

Transcendental empiricism

If the foregoing, sympathetic reconstruction provides a general defence of Deleuze's account of selective ontology, it does so by exploiting the puzzling position occupied by the will to power and the eternal return in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Insofar as Deleuze insists that these concepts are not confined to psychology but describe becoming, metaphysical interpretations of both notions seem invited. Yet *Nietzsche and Philosophy's* discussions of metaphysics primarily aim at showing that metaphysics *in general* expresses a negative will to power. For Deleuze, 'Nietzsche . . . makes nihilism the presupposition of all metaphysics rather than a particular metaphysics: there is no *metaphysics* which does not judge and depreciate life in the name of a *supra-sensible* world' (1983: 34; see also 195). But this only makes the status of affirmative wills and the return of becoming more perplexing. Are these not metaphysical? Sometimes, Deleuze seems to permit the possibility of an affirmative metaphysics – as when he claims that 'Nietzsche . . . develops a philosophy which must . . . replace the old metaphysics' (145, see also 84). Still, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* seems to vacillate before this possibility, leaving us with an odd picture on which the phenomenal world is produced by non-anthropomorphic evaluations, which are affirmed non-anthropomorphically in the process of returning – and without any of this being metaphysical. If Deleuze wavers before the possibility of an affirmative metaphysics in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, he overcomes this hesitation in *Difference and Repetition* by developing his method of transcendental empiricism.

For orientation purposes, it helps to very briefly consider Kant's transcendental idealism as Deleuze views it.²⁷ Deleuze takes Kant to advance beyond Descartes' *cogito* by realising, first, that determination (I think) implies an undetermined existence (I am) and, second, that determination cannot directly bear on the undetermined. Kant therefore introduces a third element, the form of determination, which is the form of time. As Deleuze puts it, 'my undetermined existence can be determined only *within time* as the existence of a phenomenon, of a passive, receptive phenomenal subject *appearing within time*', so that 'the spontaneity of which I am conscious in the "I think" cannot be understood as the attribute of a substantial and spontaneous being, but only as the affection of a passive self which experiences its own thought'. Deleuze celebrates this glimpse of the passive self, which fractures the I, as 'the discovery of the transcendental' (1994: 86). Nevertheless, he charges Kant with concealing this fracture with 'active synthetic identity' (87). Kant's active, *a priori* syntheses preserve the identity of the transcendental subject at the expense of making the unconditioned external to sensibility and of making the sensibility external to the understanding. Following Solomon Maimon, Deleuze contends that Kant's transcendental idealism only offers the conditions of *possible* experience, not those of *actual* experience.

Transcendental empiricism emerges against this background. Whereas Kant considers the difference between the undetermined and the determined an epistemological limitation of the transcendental subject, Deleuze considers this difference ontologically productive. He retains Kant's notion of the unconditioned but renders it *immanent to* phenomena. This 'noumenon closest to the phenomenon' is, of course, difference itself (1994: 222). Difference is 'not a sensible being but the being of the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given' (140). Difference is thus a speculative concept that cannot be grasped empirically. It is not an *extensive* relation among sensible qualities, but an *intensive* relation that produces sensations. Such intensive differences produce ideas by *repetition*. Repeated variations among intensive differences in light, for example, communicate a kind of violence to the faculties, prompting the understanding to structure these intensive differences in an idea, say, of RED. Ideas are always actualised in unique ways; no two shades of red are identical. Like difference itself, repetition is a speculative concept, one that produces the ideas that structure sensations.

The concepts of difference and repetition allow Deleuze to remedy Kant's externalisation of the unconditioned from the given and of

sensibility from the understanding. Difference in itself produces sensible qualities and ‘forces us to think’ by providing ‘an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*’ (Deleuze 1994: 139). As this description of thought as forced upon us suggests, transcendental empiricism remains faithful to Kant’s discovery of the passive self. Beneath Kant’s active synthesis of the present, Deleuze posits a prior, passive synthesis (habit) that makes corporeal receptivity possible. Beneath the active synthesis of the past, he posits a prior, passive synthesis (memory) which enables time’s passage. Beneath the active synthesis of the future, he posits a prior, passive synthesis (the new) which makes the recognition of endurance possible. Without treating these syntheses in detail,²⁸ we can observe how they subject the Self and Ideas to the pure and empty form of time. Just as the I is fractured into undetermined being, the determinability of being and the process of determining being, so Ideas are ‘undetermined with regard to their object, determinable with regard to the objects of experience, and [bear] the ideal of an infinite determination with regard to the concepts of the understanding’ (169). The empty form of time fractures being and thought alike, revealing their emergence from the repetition of difference.

Far from being the form of the immutable and eternal, the pure and empty form of time, for Deleuze, is ‘the form of change’ itself. As the pure and empty form of time is a transcendental form that precedes all empirical content, Deleuze merely describes it as a ‘caesura’, which does not so much emerge *within* linear time as it *reorders* time as a whole, breaking time into the time before and the time after the emergence of the New (Deleuze 1994: 89–90). The consequences of this shift can hardly be overstated. Deleuze insists that ‘there is nothing that does not lose its identity . . . when the dynamic of space and time in its actual constitution is discovered’ (218). Indeed, insofar as philosophy traditionally defines truth as eternal and unchanging, the pure and empty form of time puts truth in crisis, revealing that concepts are not universal and necessary essences, but singular *creations* produced in response to shifting problematics.²⁹ Transcendental empiricism accordingly champions artists over truthful thinkers of common sense. Whereas the latter *judge* according to the eternal form of the true, the former *create* by deploying the powers of the false under the pure and empty form of time.

The eternal return of the new

Kant’s transcendental idealism denounces the notions of the substantial self (the Soul), the totality of what exists (the World) and a first cause

of this totality (God) as transcendental illusions produced by the unrestricted use of reason. Deleuze's transcendental empiricism attempts to go beyond Kant, however, by developing an account of the transcendental that actively *excludes* the coherence of the Self, the World and God. It is therefore fitting that *Difference and Repetition* makes much use of Nietzsche. For, already in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Deleuze claims that 'Nietzsche seems to have sought (and to have found in "the eternal return" and "the will to power") . . . a re-invention of the critique which Kant betrayed at the same time as he conceived it' (1983: 52). Nevertheless, it is only in *Difference and Repetition* that Deleuze fully elaborates on the way the will to power and eternal return might yield a non-representational image of thought.

The notion of difference free from any dependence on identity is one of Deleuze's great philosophical achievements. If this concept resembles any from the history of philosophy, it is Nietzsche's will to power, as Deleuze understands it. Foreshadowing Deleuze's development of transcendental empiricism in *Difference and Repetition*, *Nietzsche and Philosophy* claims that 'the will to power manifests itself, in the first place, as the sensibility of forces and, in the second place, as the becoming sensible of forces', and that 'thinking depends on forces which take hold of thought' (1983: 63, 108). But in this early work, Deleuze is more concerned with analysing the image of thought produced by *negative* evaluations and *reactive* forces. In *Difference and Repetition*, by contrast, he dispenses almost entirely with negative wills and reactive forces to develop a thoroughly affirmative and active image of thought. *Difference and Repetition* thus describes the will to power as 'the world of flashing metamorphoses, of communicating intensities, differences of differences', and claims that 'difference in the will to power is the highest object of sensibility' (1994: 243). The first of these statements characterises the will to power as a theory of *singularities* that escape the notions of the Self, the World and God. The second characterises difference – which is celebrated under an affirmative will – as that which produces the given from the unconditioned. Difference in itself is a metaphysical concept appropriate to an affirmative will to power, a metaphysical notion free of transcendence and of the negative evaluations that characterise a representational image of thought.

The gap between sensibility and understanding is bridged by difference's repetition, which forces ideas to emerge as ways of structuring intensive variations. Deleuze claims, in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, that 'we can only understand the eternal return as the expression of a principle which serves as an explanation of diversity and its reproduction,

of difference and its repetition', and that 'the *thought* of the eternal return [as a selection of affirmative wills] goes beyond all the laws of our *knowledge*' (1983: 49, 108). While these cryptic claims foreshadow *Difference and Repetition*, they cry out for elaboration inasmuch as *Nietzsche and Philosophy* vacillates before the questions of what a non-anthropomorphic affirmation of the eternal return might entail and of how such an affirmation could be non-metaphysical. *Difference and Repetition* overcomes this hesitation. There, the eternal return 'is the only Same which can be said of this world and which excludes any prior identity therein', because the eternal return is a transcendental affirmation of difference itself. Insofar as the eternal return, as a double affirmation and a repetition of difference, marks the emergence of understanding from the given, Deleuze claims that 'repetition in the eternal return is the highest thought' (1994: 243). Just as *Difference and Repetition* dispenses with the will to power's negative qualities to focus on its affirmative aspect, Deleuze also dispenses almost entirely with the cosmological and psychological uses of the eternal return in favour of a transcendental use of the idea as an affirmation of difference. The eternal return ceases to describe a psychological transformation that induces a selective *approach* to ontology and becomes a properly *ontological selection*, one which ensures that only extreme intensive differences emerge in the understanding.

As the repetition of difference, the eternal return also marks the passive, temporal synthesis of the future. Deleuze is forthright about the speculative character of this portion of his interpretation of Nietzsche. He maintains that 'the Nietzschean doctrine of eternal return was never stated but reserved for a future work', and that 'Nietzsche gave no exposition of the eternal return' because '*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is unfinished' (1994: 92, 297). While this gives Deleuze some reason to speculate about Nietzsche's ultimate formulation of the eternal return, such speculation is distinct from 'buggery'. Far from intentionally subverting Nietzsche's thought, Deleuze attempts to formulate what the eternal return would have become were it not for Nietzsche's collapse. Deleuze takes his conjectures on this score to be warranted by the way that the eternal return presupposes an absence of identity – the death of God and the dissolution of the Self. If what returns is *difference*, then sameness and identity only emerge as simulacra (126), 'as secondary powers' of difference (301). Strictly speaking, then, 'the eternal return affects only the new', since what repeats is always different (90). This view of the eternal return as a transcendental synthesis of difference entails a radical rethinking of time. While *Nietzsche and Philosophy*

describes the eternal return's temporal consequence as the affirmation of the *present* as internally differentiated into a simultaneous becoming-past and becoming-future, *Difference and Repetition* appeals to the eternal return as the passive synthesis of the *future*. Deleuze describes this synthesis as 'the royal repetition', one which 'subordinates the other [passive temporal syntheses] to itself and strips them of their autonomy' (94). The emergence of the New constitutes the present and past alike, producing 'a universal ungrounding' (91). Everything that returns is new; only *creation* returns. Many Nietzsche scholars wrestle with the psychological consequences of the eternal return, asking how we might overcome the weight of the past in favour of the promise of the future. But Deleuze sidesteps these issues by making the present and the past *metaphysically* dependent on the future. He largely dispenses with the eternal return's psychological applications in favour of a transcendental use of the idea.

It might seem that Deleuze's ultimate appeal to the eternal return as an ontological selection of intensive differences leaves behind Nietzsche's preoccupation with the thought's ethical consequences. However, repetition is selective in the ontological and ethical senses. Repetition tests our ability to leave behind the illusions of being and identity, so that we might affirm a life of becoming and difference. In this sense, Deleuze remains committed to the eternal return's ethical challenge of demanding an affirmation of life's creative dynamism. He pursues an immanent ethics which encourages us to go to the limits of what we can do. While Nietzsche articulates the eternal return as a principle of the past (as cosmological condition) and present (as conditioning ethical transformation), his collapse prevented him from formulating the eternal return as a principle of the future (as the unconditioned, the repetition of difference). Deleuze attempts to complete Nietzsche's project, as he understands it, by transforming the eternal return's ethical imperative into a demand to be open to the new so that we might transform ourselves into extreme and singular forms and thereby discover who we might become.

Conclusion

Deleuze's interpretation of the eternal return develops at the threshold of the traditional demands of the history of philosophy. Attending to Nietzsche's views that evaluations subtend even the most banal descriptions of the world and that becoming exceeds all knowledge leads Deleuze to push the will to power's evaluative qualities and the eternal return's

transformative effects beyond psychology, until they characterise the world's becoming. This makes *Nietzsche and Philosophy's* claim that the eternal return produces a selective ontology more defensible than it might seem, as Deleuze holds that the eternal return selects *affirmative* wills and that the will to power is a non-anthropomorphic, nonunivocal evaluative typology that produces one's ontology. But this also prompts questions about the metaphysical status of affirmative wills to power and of a non-anthropomorphic affirmation of the eternal return. If these questions haunt *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, they are answered in *Difference and Repetition*, where Deleuze develops a transcendental account of the will to power as difference in itself and of the eternal return as the difference's repetition. This break from a psychological interpretation of the eternal return in favour of a transcendental interpretation of it also transforms the doctrine's temporal consequences. Whereas *Nietzsche and Philosophy* takes the eternal return to mark the present's internal differentiation as a simultaneous becoming-past and becoming-future, *Difference and Repetition* takes the eternal return to mark the priority of the *future* as a passive, temporal synthesis that constitutes the present and past alike. The consequences of Deleuze's admittedly speculative interpretation of the eternal return certainly merit closer examination. But hopefully the foregoing discussion clarifies Nietzsche's pivotal role in enabling Deleuze to develop his own theory of time, according to which all that returns is *new*.

Notes

1. Selected portions of this chapter are adapted from Mollison (forthcoming).
2. Citations from Nietzsche use abbreviations listed in the references. Arabic numerals refer to section numbers. Roman numerals to major divisions within works.
3. See Schrift 1995: 139 n.32; and D'Iorio 2011.
4. See Ansell-Pearson 1994: 114–16; Ward 2010: 106–10; and Woodward 2013: 134–7.
5. See Hallward 2006: 149–52; Malabou 2010; and Woodward 2013: 140–3.
6. This shift is concealed by the tendency to interchangeably cite *Nietzsche and Philosophy* and *Difference and Repetition* when examining Deleuze's reading of the eternal return. For examples, see Hallward 2006; Malabou 2010; Ward 2010; and, to a lesser extent, Woodward 2013. My developmental approach to this topic also distinguishes my discussion from those that only appraise Deleuze's interpretation as a reading of Nietzsche (e.g., Ansell-Pearson 1994; Malabou 2010; Ward 2010; D'Iorio 2011; and Woodward 2013) and those that grant Deleuze's interpretation to examine the use he makes of it (e.g., Williams 2011; and Voss 2013).
7. Deleuze's choice to draw from Nietzsche's *Nachlass* merits emphasising here. For while Nietzsche's publications provide some support for the claim that the

- world is comprised of forces (e.g., BGE 12, 17; GM I.13), his notebooks provide drastically more support for it. The concept of force (*Kraft*) is used to analyse the world in general (WP 1064, 1062, 638, 1066), organic life (WP 641, 650, 647, 689, 702–3), human life (WP 686, 490, 660, 704), phenomenology and psychology (WP 664, 668, 568), value judgements (WP 260, 667, 781, 931, 386, 863, 576), social phenomena (WP 750, 762, 786, 784) and aesthetic activities (WP 852, 842, 809, 812, 815).
8. D'Iorio criticises Deleuze's interpretation of the will to power as entailing 'a form of dualism which Nietzsche's monistic philosophy strives to eliminate' (2011: 3). The portion of D'Iorio's argument concerning the legitimacy of the French translation of Nietzsche's notes that Deleuze uses is well-taken (see Montinari 1996). However, D'Iorio's accusation of dualism is complicated by Deleuze's analysis of the will to power as a plastic, empirical principle.
 9. For examples, see Kaufmann 1956: 152–80; and Reginster 2006: 103–48.
 10. For example, see Clark 1990: 205–44.
 11. For example, see Richardson 1996.
 12. For example, see Schacht 1985: 212–34.
 13. On this aspect of Deleuze's reading, see Norman 2000.
 14. On *Nietzsche and Philosophy's* relation to Kant, see Marsden 1998.
 15. This gloss is supported by Kant's description of his critical project as a 'ripened power of judgement, which will no longer be put off with illusory knowledge, and which demands that reason . . . institute a court of justice, [to] secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions' (1998: Axi–xii).
 16. For examples, see Kaufmann 1956: 274–86; Heidegger 1991; Loeb 2010; and D'Iorio 2011.
 17. For examples, see Nehamas 1985: 141–69; Clark 1990: 245–86; and Reginster 2006: 201–27.
 18. A similar argument motivates Deleuze's claim that the eternal return affirms chance (1983: 25–9).
 19. D'Iorio argues that Deleuze's claim that *difference* eternally returns 'relies on one fragment by Nietzsche, and one fragment only' (2011: 1). The fragment in question results from Geneviève Bianquis' decision to combine two notes from Nietzsche's *Nachlass* and thereby obscure the fact that these notes criticise Johannes Gustav Vogt's rendering of the eternal return (D'Iorio 2011: 1–3; see also Woodward 2013: 128–9). D'Iorio is right to challenge Bianquis' rendering of these texts (see Montinari 1996), but I think he overstates his case against Deleuze. Nietzsche rejects ancient formulations of the eternal return as a cyclical hypothesis, insists on the priority of becoming over being, and argues that metaphysical notions of identity abstract from reality's complexity. Deleuze's claim that *difference* returns largely derives from *the cumulative force* that these themes exert on our understanding of the eternal return. Though, as we will see, Deleuze becomes more forthright about the speculative nature of his interpretation by the time of *Difference and Repetition*, where the return of *difference* is emphasised over the return of *becoming*.
 20. This point bears a striking affinity with Deleuze's reading of Bergson – although, whereas Deleuze takes Bergson to claim that the present and past are contemporaneous (Deleuze 1988: 58–9), he takes Nietzsche to claim that the present, past and *future* are coeval. While Deleuze suggests that this point follows from Nietzsche's analysis of temporal cycles' extreme states, Borradori (1999) argues that Deleuze's earlier essay, 'Bergson's Conception of Difference', operates throughout much of *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. So, Deleuze may be perverting Nietzsche somewhat here.
 21. For examples, see Ansell-Pearson 1994: 113–16; Schrift 1995: 139 n.32;

- Malabou 2010; Ward 2010: 106–7; D’Iorio 2011; and Woodward 2013: 128–44. At the risk of seeming facile, I will not reconstruct and rebut specific objections raised against Deleuze’s notion of selective ontology. Isolating any one objection strikes me as overly ad hoc and reconstructing all of the relevant arguments would take considerable time. Still, I think a broad defence of Deleuze’s reading can be offered, at least insofar as one accepts that the eternal return carries ethical implications.
22. Ward seems to have something like this in mind when he accuses Deleuze of ‘conflating two different notions of selection’. The first selection, according to Ward, operates ‘purely as a thought, as something which forces us to think about existence in a particular way’, whereas the second selection operates as ‘a universal, cosmological process’ (Ward 2010: 106).
 23. For objections of this sort, see Schrift 1995: 139 n.32; Ward 2010: 106–10; D’Iorio 2011; and Woodward 2013: 134–7.
 24. For examples, see Ansell-Pearson 1994: 114–16; and Ward 2010: 106–8.
 25. For examples, see Hallward 2006: 149–52; Malabou 2010: 25; and Woodward 2013: 134–7, 140–3.
 26. While Ward argues that Deleuze’s selective ontology makes the eternal return ‘something blandly cheering and optimistic’ (2010: 106), I think this downplays Deleuze’s insistence that humanity is categorically reactive. The elimination of the *ego*, for example, is neither comforting nor easily accomplished.
 27. On *Difference and Repetition*’s relation to Kant, see Lord 2012.
 28. For a detailed treatment of these syntheses, see Williams 2011.
 29. On the relation between truth and the empty form of time, see Smith 2013.

References

Nietzsche’s Works

- BGE *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. Judith Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
- D *Daybreak*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- GM *On the Genealogy of Morality*, trans. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998.
- GS *The Gay Science*, trans. Josefine Naukhoff and Adrian Del Caro, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- TI *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Judith Norman, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- WP *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York: Vintage, 1968.

Other Sources

- Ansell-Pearson, K. (1994), *An Introduction to Nietzsche as a Political Thinker*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Borradori, G. (1999), ‘On the Presence of Bergson in Deleuze’s Nietzsche’, *Philosophy Today*, 43: 140–5.
- Clark, M. (1990), *Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (1983), *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (1988), *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Zone Books.

- Deleuze, G. (1994), *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G. (1995), *Negotiations 1972–1990*, trans. Martin Joughin, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Deleuze, G. and C. Parnet (2007), *Dialogues II*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, New York: Columbia University Press.
- D'Iorio, P. (2011), 'The Eternal Return: Genesis and Interpretation', trans. Frank Chouraqui, *The Agonist*, IV (1): 1–43.
- Hallward, P. (2006), *Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation*, New York: Verso.
- Heidegger, M. (1991), *Nietzsche*, trans. David Farrell Krell, New York: Harper Collins.
- Kant, I. (1998), *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaufmann, W. (1956), *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, New York: Meridian.
- Loeb, P. (2010), *The Death of Nietzsche's Zarathustra*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lord, B. (2012), 'Deleuze and Kant', in *The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze*, ed. Daniel W. Smith and Henry Somers-Hall, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Malabou, C. (2010), 'The Eternal Return and the Phantom of Difference', trans. Arne De Boever, *Parrhesia*, 10: 21–9.
- Marsden, J. (1998), 'Critical Incorporation: Nietzsche and Deleuze', *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, 16: 33–48.
- Mollison, J. (forthcoming), 'Deleuze's Nietzschean Mutations: From the Will to Power and the Overman to Desiring-Production and Nomadism', *Deleuze and Guattari Studies*.
- Montinari, M. (1996), *'La volonté de puissance' N'existe Pas*, Paris: Éditions de l'éclat.
- Nehamas, A. (1985), *Nietzsche: Life as Literature*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Norman, J. (2000), 'Nietzsche contra Contra: Difference and Opposition', *Continental Philosophy Review*, 33: 189–206.
- Reginster, B. (2006), *The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Richardson, J. (1996), *Nietzsche's System*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schacht, R. (1985), *Nietzsche*, Boston: Routledge.
- Schrift, A. (1995), *Nietzsche's French Legacy*, New York: Routledge.
- Smith, D. W. (2013), 'Temporality and Truth', *Deleuze Studies*, 7 (3): 377–89.
- Voss, D. (2013), 'Deleuze's Third Synthesis of Time', *Deleuze Studies*, 7 (2): 194–216.
- Ward, J. (2010), 'Revisiting Nietzsche et la Philosophie', *Angelaki*, 15 (2): 101–14.
- Williams, J. (2011), *Gilles Deleuze's Philosophy of Time: A Critical Introduction and Guide*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Woodward, A. (2013), 'Deleuze, Nietzsche, and the Overcoming of Nihilism', *Continental Philosophy Review*, 46: 115–47.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41