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Nietzsche contra stoicism: naturalism and value, suffering and amor fati

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ABSTRACT
Nietzsche criticizes Stoicism for overstating the significance of its ethical ideal of rational self-sufficiency and for undervaluing pain and passion when pursuing an unconditional acceptance of fate. Apparent affinities between Stoicism and Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially his celebration of self-mastery and his pursuit of amor fati, lead some scholars to conclude that Nietzsche cannot advance these criticisms without contradicting himself. In this article, I narrow the target and scope of Nietzsche’s complaints against Stoicism before showing how they follow from his other philosophic commitments. I suggest that the first line of criticism follows from his denial of teleology and his skepticism toward moral values’ descriptive objectivity. I then suggest that the second line of criticism follows from Nietzsche’s account of overcoming as bestowing contributory value upon pain and suffering. Explaining Nietzsche’s criticisms of Stoicism in this way substantially qualifies similarities between his philosophy and that of Stoicism while absolving him of the charge of inconsistency.

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Nietzsche’s view of the Stoics has long been portrayed as positive, despite his limited disagreement with them. Yet, a notebook entry from 1881 suggests the relationship is more fraught than it appears:

I believe one misjudges Stoicism. The essence of this disposition—for that’s what it is, before the philosophy conquers it for itself—is its attitude against pain and disagreeable perceptions: a certain weightiness, pressure, and inertness are heightened to the extreme in order to feel but little pain: stiffness and coldness are its anesthetic devices. The primary intention of Stoic education: to annihilate easy excitability, to restrict more and more the number of objects that can affect at all, belief in the contemptibility and low worth of most things that arouse the passions, hatred and hostility against excitement, as if
the passions themselves were a sickness or something ignoble: scrutiny for all ugly and distressing revelations of suffering—in sum: petrification as a remedy against suffering, and henceforth all the high names of divine virtue are offered before a statue. What of it—embracing a statue in winter when one has become dull against the cold? What of it, if a statue embraces a statue! If the Stoic attains the character that he wants to have—in the majority of cases he brings it with him and therefore chooses this philosophy!—Thus he has the pressure of a bandage, which produces insensitivity. This mode of thought is highly repugnant to me: it underestimates the worth of pain (it is as useful and beneficial as pleasure), the worth of excitation and passion. It is ultimately forced to say: all that comes to me is right; I want nothing different.—He no longer overcomes distress, because he has killed off the sensibility needed for distresses. He expresses this religiously as complete conformity with all the actions of a divinity (e.g. as with Epictetus). (KSA 9:15[55])

After describing the Stoics’ essential psychological characteristics, Nietzsche advances two obscure but critical remarks. First, he questions whether the Stoics’ attainment of their ethical ideal is significant on the grounds that the decision to adopt Stoic therapy is determined in advance by one’s character. Second, he rebukes the Stoics for underestimating the worth of pain and passion, and for the fatalistic acceptance of life that their therapy produces. Confusingly, however, Nietzsche elsewhere celebrates characteristics for which Stoicism is well known; for instance, self-sufficiency and its associated characteristics, such as hardness, independence, and self-mastery. Moreover, the Stoic’s fatalistic declaration, ‘I want nothing different!’, seems to express precisely the love of fate, or amor fati, that Nietzsche himself embraces.

In what follows, I analyze these critical remarks with the aim of showing, scholarly consensus notwithstanding, that they evince deep disagreement between Nietzsche and the Stoics, and that they cohere with those aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy that have suggested to these scholars a kinship with Stoicism. I argue that the first critique turns on Nietzsche’s rejection of Stoicism’s teleological understanding of nature, which carries metaethical implications for his endorsement of self-sufficiency. The second critique, I contend, turns on Nietzsche’s rejection of the Stoic view that pain and suffering necessarily lack positive value, which leads him to reconsider how fate might be loved. Fleshing out these two lines of criticism substantively qualifies Nietzsche’s relationship to Stoicism—and in a way that

Nietzsche’s writings are cited using the abbreviations listed in the references section, according to title, volume or chapter (where applicable), and section number. Translations of Nietzsche’s posthumously published notebook fragments are my own.
absolves him of apparent inconsistency by distinguishing his notions of self-sufficiency and *amor fati* from their Stoic counterparts.

I. Stoicism’s ethical ideal

I.1. Target and scope

Nietzsche read Epictetus’ *Handbook* and Marcus Aurelius’ *Meditations* closely around the time he wrote the notebook entry under discussion (Brobjer 2003). The context needed to appreciate Nietzsche’s criticism of Stoicism’s ethical ideal can therefore be provided by considering uncontroversial aspects of Stoic virtue that are accepted by Epictetus and Marcus. Notwithstanding disagreement about how to achieve this ideal state, there is relative consensus within Stoicism about virtue’s primary characteristics (Brennan 2003, 275–294).

The Stoics view nature as rationally ordered and teleological. Their world is pervaded by a ubiquitous casual order, called fate, which governs everything in accord with reason (Gould 1974, esp. 17–18; Long and Sedley 1987, 331, 340–343). Since Stoicism also holds that only bodies can act or be acted on, a kind of materialism follows, whereby gods and souls are corporeal (Long and Sedley 1987, 273–274). The cosmos is understood as an organic unity in which each part has a proper function that contributes to the whole (Long 1985, 14–16). Fulfilling such proper functions constitutes flourishing, generally speaking (Long and Sedley 1987, 364–368). Specifically human flourishing, or virtue, consists in perfecting humanity’s uniquely rational nature (Epictetus 6; Marcus VII.55). This requires assenting only to impressions in accordance with nature’s rational order, desiring only what is appropriate to this order, and acting only on rational desires. If achieved, such rational self-discipline allows joyful acceptance of fate (Epictetus 8; Marcus VIII.26).

Stoicism is most starkly distinguished from competing ethical accounts by its insistence that virtue is the only good and that it is entirely self-sufficient (Epictetus 1; Marcus III.6–7; see also Long and Sedley 1987, 357–358; Lesses 1989, 96–102; Nussbaum 1989, 131–136; Brennan 2003, 275–294).

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3 For an overview of Stoicism’s historical development that notes such disagreements, see Gill (2003) and Sedley (2003).

4 Epictetus’ *Handbook* 31 (2014) and Marcus’ *Meditations* VI.42 (1983). Citations to Epictetus and Marcus refer to sections of the *Handbook* and *Meditations*, respectively. I restrict my citations to Epictetus’ *Handbook* because, as Brobjer (2003, 430) notes, we do not have evidence that Nietzsche read Epictetus’ *Discourses* (2014). On Stoicism’s teleology, also see Long and Sedley’s (1987, 200) commentary, which refers to primary and secondary sources on Stoicism, also provided by their text.
Humans’ rational capacities lead us to shape desires and actions in accord with nature, but should these actions be impeded by something beyond our control, our rationality remains unaffected. Nothing can make us assent to misleading impressions, form irrational desires, or act irrationally (Epictetus 5, 9; Marcus IV.39, VIII.47–48). As Stoic virtue cannot be affected by external contingencies—including loss of loved ones, physical harm, or death—the only evil is irrational judgment, which underlies wrong desires and actions. As Stoic virtue has no necessary conditions outside rational judgment—including friends and family, physical well-being, or long life—it is the only good. Everything outside our complete control, everything other than the exercise of reason, is an ‘indifferent’ without value. Granted, some indifferents are preferable to their opposites; we are naturally drawn to them and they help us undertake right actions. But strictly speaking, these preferred indifferents are valueless. They are neither instrumentally necessary for, nor constitutive parts of, virtue.5

Before discussing how Nietzsche’s first objection follows from his other philosophical commitments, let me mention two points of agreement that constrain his reproach. First, both Nietzsche and the Stoics approach ethics in a way that can be broadly described as ‘naturalistic’.6 We can see this in Stoicism’s insistence that to live well is to live according to nature, as well as in their belief that ethics must be consonant with physics and cosmology (Long and Sedley 1987, 160–162; Hadot 1998, 79). Nietzsche also observes naturalistic constraints on ethics, emphasizing that human beings must be understood as continuous with nature rather than as distinct from it (e.g. GS 109, 346; BGE 230).7 A second point of agreement concerns the value of self-sufficiency. The virtuous Stoic achieves self-sufficiency by recognizing that the external world is indifferent to virtue, that it cannot affect our capacity for rational judgment. Nietzsche’s acclaim for self-sufficiency can be inferred from his recurrent praise of hardness, independence, and self-mastery. He uses these terms to describe Stoicism positively (PTAG 2; D 131, 251, 546; WP 943; KSA 7:19 [122]), and to contrast it with Christianity (D 131, 139, 546; GS 122; GM III.18; WP 60, 195, 268, 342, 427). This does not, however, commit Nietzsche

5Though there is some controversy over whether preferred indifferents have instrumental value, there is agreement that if they do, they are not necessary for virtue. See Long and Sedley (1987, 357–358); Lesses (1989, 114–115); Nussbaum (1989, 134–135); Brennan (2003, 263–264).

6On this aspect of Stoic ethics, see Brennan (2003, esp. 258). On similarities between this theme in Stoicism and in Nietzsche, see Groff (2004, 142, 152); Nabais (2006, 85–86); Armstrong (2013, 7).

7Leiter (2002, 1–21) interprets Nietzsche’s naturalism as striving to be consistent with the methods and results of empirical science. Bernard Williams (1994) provides a looser interpretation of Nietzsche’s naturalism.
to the full picture of Stoic virtue. One can value self-sufficiency without holding that it has no necessary conditions, or that it is defined by living in accord with nature, as the Stoics say. Nonetheless, these points of agreement demonstrate that Nietzsche’s objection is more fine-grained than merely denying that ethics should be approached naturalistically or that self-sufficiency has any value.

I.2. Deriving the criticism from Nietzsche’s broader philosophy

Unlike the Stoics, who view nature as rational and teleological, Nietzsche views nature as chaotic and purposeless. This disagreement, while often noted in passing, is crucial for understanding Nietzsche’s relationship to Stoicism. It necessarily limits the concordance between their ethical naturalisms, warrants Nietzsche’s criticism of Stoic virtue, and underscores differences in the way each values self-sufficiency.

Nietzsche warns against understanding the world as an organic, teleological unity. The following passage sharply distinguishes his view of nature from Stoicism’s:

Let us beware of thinking that the world is a living being. […] we know roughly what the organic is; are we then supposed to reinterpret what is inexpressibly derivative, late, rare, accidental, which we perceive only on the crust of the earth, as something essential, common, and eternal, as those people do who call the universe an organism? […] The total character of the world, by contrast, is for all eternity chaos, not in the sense of a lack of necessity but of a lack of order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms are called. […] How could we reproach or praise the universe! […] In no way do our aesthetic and moral judgments apply to it! […] When will all these shadows of god no longer darken us? When will we have completely de-deified nature? When may we begin to naturalize humanity with a pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature? (GS 109; see also GS 346; BGE 9; TI IX.7)

This passage advances the empirical claim that chaos is more common than regular movement or organic life, a claim Nietzsche then supplements with an explanation of why we draw erroneous conclusions about the ‘secret aim’ of the cosmos. Anthropomorphic assumptions underlie nature’s apparently teleological character. Indeed, Nietzsche suggests that all aesthetic and moral judgments about nature are anthropomorphisms, rather than features of the world independent of

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The passage thus moves from an empirical observation about the prevalence of disorder in the cosmos to an alternative, more parsimonious explanation of teleological principles on the basis of human psychology.

While the Stoics justify their claims about proper functions and moral properties by way of their teleology, Nietzsche’s denial of teleology gives him grounds for doubting their account of moral values’ objectivity. This theme runs throughout Nietzsche’s writing. An early work states: ‘There is nothing good, nothing beautiful, nothing sublime, nothing evil in itself, but […] there are states of soul in which we impose such words upon things external to and within us’ (D 210). One of his last works similarly declares: ‘there are absolutely no moral facts’ (TI VII.1; see also HH 4, 16; D 3; GS 301; Z I.15; BGE 108; WP 12, 428). Following Bernard Reginster, I call the view that Nietzsche denies ‘descriptive objectivism’ (2006, 58). Descriptive objectivism holds that moral values are objective features of nature independent of human judgment. The plausibility of Nietzsche’s denial of this view depends, in part, on whether moral values can be explained without positing them as features of reality independent of humans. Recharacterizing moral properties as anthropomorphisms goes some way toward such an explanation. But Nietzsche is often more specific than this, explaining particular moral values by appealing to physio-psychological facts about, and the socio-historical conditions of, their proponents.

Before considering how this method might apply to Stoic virtue, notice that Stoicism’s view of indifferents reduces Nietzsche’s explanatory burden. Intuitive examples that support moral values’ descriptively objective status include things like illness and death, which seem objectively bad, and their opposites, like health and life, which seem objectively good. Stoics cannot appeal to such examples, however. They hold that, strictly speaking, these are without value. Accordingly, the only value that Nietzsche must explain by appeal to physio-psychological facts and socio-historical conditions is the value that Stoics attribute to rational self-sufficiency.

Nietzsche considers moral values symptoms of individuals’ psychology. He writes, ‘Your judgment “that is right” has a prehistory in your drives, inclinations, aversions, experiences, and what you have failed to experience’ (GS 335). This is one reason why he is skeptical about moral values’ alleged universality; ‘it is selfish to consider one’s own judgment

Note that Nietzsche restricts his point to moral and aesthetic judgments. Accordingly, we needn’t worry that his indictment of these judgments’ veracity undermines his description of nature as chaotic.
a universal law' (GS 335). Concerning Stoicism’s commitment to the value of rational self-sufficiency, Nietzsche describes the ‘indifference and stone column coldness which the Stoics prescribed and applied as a cure for the feverish idiocy of the affects’ (BGE 198). He considers Stoic virtue symptomatic of an ‘easy excitability’ that needs dampening (KSA 9:15[55]). How this underlying disposition manifests itself, and what moral prescriptions it recommends, depends on socio-historical factors as well. In this sense, Stoic virtue is also ‘a recommendation for constraint in proportion to the degree of danger in which the individual person lives’ (BGE 198). The Hellenistic period when Stoicism gains popularity is highly dangerous and uncertain. For the especially sensitive or anxious, and for those facing extraordinary insecurity, the notion that there is nothing to be prized other than rational judgment and nothing to be feared but its absence is likely attractive. If one suffers slavery, as Epictetus did, advises a violent and impulsive emperor, as Seneca did, or faces wars on multiple fronts, as Marcus did, then the invitation to turn away from the external world toward the inner citadel of reason may provide great comfort. In such cases, Nietzsche himself might counsel Stoicism: ‘Stoicism may well be advisable for those with whom fate improvises and who live in violent times and depend on impulsive and dangerous people’ (GS 306). But these cases are exceptional—especially in the modern era.

Nietzsche’s physio-psychological explanation for Stoic predilections also allows him to challenge Stoicism’s characterization of virtue as ‘living according to nature’. In another passage worth quoting at length, he writes:

So you want to live ‘according to nature?’ Oh, you noble Stoics, what a fraud is in this phrase! Imagine something like nature, profligate without measure, indifferent without measure, without purpose and regard, without mercy and justice, fertile and barren and uncertain at the same time, think of indifference itself as power—how could you live according to this indifference? Living—isn’t that wanting specifically to be something other than this nature? Isn’t living assessing, preferring, being unfair, being limited, wanting to be different? And assuming your imperative ‘live according to nature’ basically amounts to ‘living according to life’—well how could you not? Why make a principle out of what you yourselves are and must be?—But, in fact, something quite different is going on: while pretending with delight to read the canon of your law in nature, you want the opposite [...] Your pride wants to dictate and annex your morals and ideals onto nature [...] you demand that it be nature ‘according to the Stoa’ and you want to make all existence exist in your image alone—as a huge eternal glorification and universalization of Stoicism! For all your love of truth, you have forced yourselves so long, so persistently,
This passage presents Stoicism with a dilemma of sorts. Either ‘living according to nature’ means living according to the amoral and chaotic cosmos, in which case the Stoic maxim is trivial and without normative content, or ‘living according to nature’ means living in accord with reason, in which case Stoicism misunderstands nature. Failing to guard against the way their physio-psychological needs shape their interpretation of the world, the Stoics unknowingly take the latter route.

Importantly, Nietzsche is not merely arguing against imbuing nature with anthropomorphic values. He writes,

Every morality […] is a piece of tyranny against both ‘nature’ and ‘reason’. But this in itself is no objection; for that, we would have to issue yet another decree based on some other morality forbidding every sort of tyranny and unreason. (BGE 188)

He even acknowledges that moral values can be beneficial: ‘everything there is, or was, of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, or masterly assurance […] has only developed by virtue of “the tyranny of such arbitrary laws”’ (BGE 188; see also BGE 44). Accordingly, Nietzsche does not object to Stoicism’s projection of values onto nature, but to their conflation of these values with facts about nature. The conflation is essential to Stoicism: if rational self-sufficiency is to be more than prudential, if it is to have the universality and overriding significance characteristic of moral values, then it must belong to nature itself. Nietzsche denies this. He instead suggests that the value of rational self-sufficiency reflects facts about the Stoics’ condition, not facts about nature or even humanity in general. This error leads the Stoics to ‘generalize what should not be generalized, [to] speak unconditionally’ (BGE 198; see also WP 420, 940), even though ‘everything unconditional belongs to pathology’ (BGE 154). This tendency, combined with a renunciation of external goods, explains why Stoicism is appropriated by Christianity despite their differences in orthodoxy (BGE 189; A 42; WP 195, 342, 360, 427). Like Christianity, Stoicism erects a universal and unconditional ethical ideal. In demanding that all adhere to this ideal, Stoicism prohibits alternative values that might promote ‘the highest power and splendor of the human type’ (GM P.6). Nietzsche frequently objects to moral values on the basis of
their pretensions to universality and objectivity (e.g. GS 335; BGE 198, 43, 221). But the notebook entry under consideration makes this point in a less familiar way. Rather than objecting that Stoicism’s universal ethical standard has deleterious consequences for some individuals, Nietzsche contends that it is self-congratulatory to praise oneself for achieving a standard set by one’s physio-psychological needs and self-aggrandizing to elevate this standard to a universal ideal. ‘If the Stoic attains the character that he wants to have—in the majority of cases he brings it with him and therefore chooses this philosophy!’

I.3. Consistency with other aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy

Nietzsche denies the teleological view of nature that secures rational self-sufficiency’s status as a descriptively objective moral value and provides an alternate account of how it might come to occupy pride of place for Stoics. But he also values self-sufficiency highly. He champions such character traits as hardness, independence, and self-mastery, loudly and often. When he writes, for example, that ‘the noble human being honors himself as one who is powerful, also as one who has power over himself […] delights in being severe and hard with himself and respects all severity and hardness’, the Stoics likely come to mind (BGE 260). Describing the hardness and independence of free spirits, he declares ‘we free spirits […] are the last of the Stoics!’ (BGE 227). Such passages might lead us to overstate the similarities between Nietzsche and Stoicism, as Martha Nussbaum does when she interprets Nietzsche’s project as ‘[bringing] about a revival of Stoic values of self-command and self-formation’ (1994, 140; cf. Kain 1983, 371; Elveton 2004, 193, 203). If this is Nietzsche’s project, his objections to Stoicism clearly undercut it. Fortunately, closer examination reveals that Nietzsche values self-sufficiency as helpful for critiquing moral values, and for re-valuing them, without construing self-sufficiency as a ‘descriptively objective’ moral value, as the Stoics do.

Keenly aware of the pressure to conform to moral conventions, Nietzsche emphasizes the value of self-sufficiency for questioning morals’ objectivity. Free spirits who criticize the morals of the majority must value solitude and independence (BGE 41, 44, 284). Such skeptical individuals are characterized by ‘a high, independent spiritedness, a will to stand alone, even an excellent faculty of reason’, ‘severity or hardness’, and ‘self-reliance’ (BGE 201). A typical passage describes philosophy as ‘applying the vivisecting knife directly to the chest of the virtues of the age’, before concluding that nobility requires ‘wanting to be for yourself,
the ability to be different, [and] standing alone’ (BGE 212). These descriptions may remind us of Stoicism, but the resemblance is only skin-deep: Nietzschean self-sufficiency cannot entail conforming to nature’s providential order. Rather, it marks a skeptical disposition toward any such order and toward claims about morals’ descriptive objectivity (GS 347; A 54). It might nevertheless seem that Nietzsche encourages everyone to adopt this self-sufficient, skeptical disposition, which would violate his opposition to universal maxims. One way of responding to this worry is by denying that Nietzsche writes for everyone, limiting his intended audience to a select few. Alternatively, one could emphasize that Nietzsche’s recommendation that we cultivate a self-sufficient, skeptical disposition occurs in a specific socio-historical context, i.e. the advent of nihilism, or that he expects very few will successfully cultivate such a disposition. These approaches avoid positing self-sufficiency as a universal, descriptively objective value grounded in nature.

Nietzsche also associates self-sufficiency with his project of re-valuing values. He heralds the ability of future philosophers and free spirits to confer normative authority on values despite the falsity of descriptive objectivism. Zarathustra asks, ‘can you give yourself your own evil and good and hang your will above yourself like a law?’ (Z I.17; see also D 453; GS 301, 335; Z II.12; BGE 203, 211–212; TI IX.1). How exactly Nietzsche thinks normative authority can be conferred on values without appealing to an objective description of human-independent nature is controversial.10 But regardless of the details of how such a re-valuation occurs, there seems to be no problem, in principle at least, with understanding self-sufficiency as a trait of those who confer normative authority without appealing to descriptive objectivism—and while leaving, for the time being, the source of that normative authority an open question.

For the Stoics, self-sufficiency consists in realizing that our proper function lies within us and that all external objects and states of affairs are indifferent to virtue. For Nietzsche, self-sufficiency is valued for the role it plays in critically examining these and other moral values—and perhaps in creating new values. In one sense, Nietzsche’s self-sufficiency is more restricted than Stoicism’s. Whereas Stoics deny that virtue has any necessary conditions and contend that rational judgment is unharmed

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10 Some of the available interpretations include Brian Leiter’s (2002) proposal that Nietzsche is a subjective realist, Bernard Reginster’s (2006) proposal that he is a subjective anti-realist, Nadeem Hussain’s (2007) proposal that Nietzsche is a normative fictionalist, Jessica Berry’s (2011) proposal that Nietzsche remains skeptical about normative commitments, and Paul Katsafanas’ (2013) interpretation of Nietzsche as a constitutivist.
by things like illness or enslavement, Nietzsche doesn’t deny that thought is informed by physio-psychological and socio-historical conditions (e.g. GS P.3; EH II.10). His critical method precludes such a denial. We should therefore question Nussbaum’s charge that Nietzsche ‘follows Stoicism [by] denying that the physical goods of life are necessary conditions for eudaimonia’ (1994, 159). In another sense, Nietzsche’s notion of self-sufficiency is less restricted than Stoicism’s. He denies the intrinsic value not just of indifferents but also of what the Stoics call virtue and proposes that we somehow create values without relying on a teleological understanding of nature. For Nietzsche,

it is a measure of the degree of strength of will to what extent one can do without a meaning in things, to what extent one can endure to live in a meaningless world because one organizes a small portion of it oneself. (WP 585)

His intellectual notion of self-sufficiency encourages us to be skeptical of all dogmatic moral prescriptions—including those advocated by Stoics. He warns against overly strict self-control, for example, because it might make one more irritable or closed off from learning experiences (GS 305) and counsels against becoming ‘stuck in our own detachment’ so we may better test our independence (BGE 41). While Nietzsche restricts self-sufficiency by admitting that thought is informed by physio-psychological and socio-historical facts, he expands the scope of self-sufficiency so that moral values and practices are open to critique.

II. The Stoics on suffering

II.1. Target and scope

Nietzsche’s second critical remark about Stoicism in the 1881 notebook passage concerns the value of pain and passion. Again, the context needed to appreciate his point can be provided by remembering some uncontroversial aspects of Stoic doctrine.

The Stoics understand passions as cognitive, evaluative judgments (Epictetus 5, 16, 20; Marcus IV.7, VIII.47–49; also see Brennan 2003, 269–274; Long and Sedley 1987, 420–423; Nussbaum 1989, esp. 137–144). A monistic psychology underlies this view. Stoics such as Zeno and Chrysippus, as well as Epictetus and Marcus, understand the soul as entirely

11Nussbaum (1993) notes some disagreement within Stoicism about whether passions are cognitive judg- ments or non-cognitive impulses. This disagreement isn’t relevant at present. The Stoics Nietzsche reads in 1881, Epictetus and Marcus, both understand passion cognitively. Besides, Nietzsche’s objection doesn’t concern Stoicism’s understanding of passion but its devaluation of it.
rational and consequently consider all motivations forms of belief. On their view, the soul receives impressions that purport to represent reality in proposition-like content, and to which we either assent, affirming their accuracy, or from which we withhold our assent, deeming them inadequate. When we assent to them, impulses incite movement within the soul, immediately motivating action. On this view, passions are evaluative judgments that mistake indifferents for things necessary to, or constitutive of, virtue (Long and Sedley 1987, 420; Nussbaum 1989, 137–150, 163; Brennan 2003, 364). Passionate judgments immediately harm the soul, contribute to irrational desires and actions, and make us susceptible to additional suffering by misleading us to value things outside our control.

Since passions harm our moral character, the Stoics demand that they be extirpated completely (Epictetus 1.5; Marcus III.4, XI.2). Extirpation primarily occurs through rational argumentation, though the Stoics also prescribe habitual reflection on the indifference of everything outside our control—including our loved ones, physical condition, and life (Epictetus 1, 3; Marcus VI.47, VIII.25). Recalling how Stoicism holds that the only evil is irrational judgment and that nothing can force us to be irrational, it follows that misfortune and harm only occur with our assent (Epictetus 1, 9, 16; Marcus IV.7, V.19). An experience involving physical pain may be unavoidable, but it is strictly speaking a dis-preferred indifferents. The soul only suffers when we mistakenly judge that physical pain actually harms us. If the passions are fully extirpated, suffering ceases. The dispassionate, virtuous person is therefore also the happiest (Long and Sedley 1987, 357–359).

Two points of agreement between Nietzsche and the Stoics constrain his criticism of this account of passion. First, Nietzsche admits that the Stoic therapy of extirpating the passions is effective for reducing suffering. As noted previously, he concedes that ‘Stoicism may well be advisable for those with whom fate improvises and who live in violent times and depend on impulsive and changeable people’ (GS 306). However, he considers cases where Stoic therapy is the best course of action exceedingly rare. He criticizes ‘soul-doctors’ who claim ‘happiness arises only with the annihilation of the passions’ for overlooking ‘the super-abundant happiness’ of passionate people, before writing:

is our life really so painful and burdensome that it would be advantageous for us to trade it for a fossilized Stoic way of life? Things are not bad enough for us that they have to be bad for us in the Stoic style! (GS 326)
Second, Nietzsche agrees with the Stoics that external objects and states of affairs lack intrinsic moral value. This follows from his denial of descriptive objectivism about morality. As a result, he cannot object to Stoicism’s characterization of externals as morally indifferent or to their characterization of passionate judgments as erroneous.

It seems implausible—if not psychologically contradictory—to suggest that pain and suffering are final ends, valued independent of the contribution they make to some greater aim or good. Nietzsche is more plausibly construed as insisting that passion, pain, and suffering can be valuable insofar as they contribute to some other, final end. This might make his critique seem minor, but the Stoic position is strict. Stoicism considers pain a dis-preferred indifferent that is never valuable and it considers passion and suffering essentially harmful. Hence, Stoics recommend the diminishment of pain to the greatest possible extent and the elimination of all passion and suffering. Since Nietzsche thinks pain, passion, and suffering are sometimes valuable, he has reason to depart with Stoicism.

II.2. Deriving the criticism from Nietzsche’s broader philosophy

Nietzsche calls Stoicism ‘highly repugnant’, in part because ‘it underestimates the worth of pain [...] the worth of excitation and passion’ (KSA 9:15[55]). While there are several ways one could defend the view that pain, excitation, and passion have some worth, Nietzsche suggests his own line of reasoning by writing, ‘[the Stoic] no longer overcomes distress, because he has killed off the sensibility needed for distresses’. The crux of his second critique is thus that overcoming distress is preferable to the Stoic method of forestalling distress—that the former strategy sees the potential value of pain, excitation, and passion, whereas the latter does not.

Overcoming presupposes the pursuit of some prior aim. As Nietzsche writes, ‘overcoming [...] has in itself no end’ (WP 552). It also presupposes some resistance or obstacle to attaining this aim. Pain and suffering epitomize such resistance. Crucially, resistance is overcome when it is—not

12Further evidence that Stoics think pain and suffering lack any positive value is their endorsement of suicide in the face of unavoidable vice; As a counterexample to this characterization of Stoicism, one might cite Aristo’s argument that physical sickness has instrumental value. However, Aristo intends this argument as a reductio of the view that preferred indifferents are instrumentally valuable. This dismissal of preferred indifferents’ instrumental value is heterodox (see Long and Sedley 1987, 358–359; Lesses 1989, 102).

13I refer to ‘pain and suffering,’ rather than ‘pain, excitation, and passion’ below. As Stoicism considers passion and suffering co-extensive, this doesn’t alter Nietzsche’s point—but it may help us refrain from thinking of passion as mere enthusiasm. While Stoicism denies that physical pain entails
merely destroyed or averted, but—*incorporated* to promote or stimulate the pursuit it initially impedes. Discussing the example of health, Nietzsche claims that ‘the standard remains […] how much of the sickly it can take and overcome—how much it can make healthy’, by turning illnesses into ‘stimulants of *great health*’ (WP 1013; see also HH I.P.3–6; GS 382; GM III.9; EH I.2; NCW E.1). Another notebook entry reads: ‘Overcoming of the affects?—No, if what is implied is their weakening and extirpation. But putting them into service […] so they] go voluntarily wherever our best interests lie’ (WP 384). Overcoming the passions is thus distinct from extirpating them. In keeping with his physio-psychological method, Nietzsche further suggests that the inability to overcome the passions might motivate their devaluation. ‘The passions have been brought into ill repute on account of those who were not sufficiently strong to employ them’ (WP 778).

By incorporating resistance to further stimulate a pursuit, overcoming strengthens those drives and individuals that achieve it.14 ‘The *great health*’ described previously is ‘a health that one doesn’t only have, but also acquires continually and must acquire because one gives it up again and again’ (GS 382), thereby revealing that ‘sickness can actually be an energetic *stimulus* to life’ (EH I.2). More generally, Nietzsche defines an increase of power as overcoming resistance (A 2). He repeatedly suggests that strength is measured by the degree of resistance overcome (EH I.7; BGE 257, 259; GM I.13; TI IX.38, 49). His point isn’t that stronger drives and individuals *can* overcome more resistance; strength is not a latent property waiting to be actualized. Rather, strength simply *is* overcoming. Where overcoming is absent, strength declines (BGE 259; GM II.11; A 6; TI IX.38). If one values the strengthening of some drives and individuals, as Nietzsche does, then one must also value suffering as something that contributes to strength by providing resistance to be overcome.

Overcoming also contributes to the value of achievements involving it. Nietzsche defines ‘what is good’ as ‘everything that enhances people’s feeling of power’, just before defining an increase in power as overcoming resistance (A 2). Zarathustra also associates value with overcoming, genuine suffering, this distinction turns of their view of vice as the only harm. Nietzsche rejects this view, making his conception of suffering broader than Stoicism’s. In a Schopenhauer-inspired vein, we can define pain as sudden, typically physical, displeasure and suffering as the inability to satisfy some desire (see Reginster 2006, 113–114). Insofar as pain incites a desire for its cessation, suffering typically accompanies it. Furthermore, insofar as resistance to an aim thwarts our desire for this aim, resistance constitutes suffering.

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14 I set aside complications surrounding how drives figure into the psychic economies that define individuals’ characters. For an extended treatment of such issues, see Katsafanas (2016).
declaring, ‘A tablet of the good hangs over every people. Observe, it is the tablet of their overcomings. [...] Praiseworthy to them is whatever they consider difficult, [...] the most difficult—that is praised as holy’ (Z I.15). Readers of Nietzsche might more readily recognize the reciprocal of this position: ‘whatever can be common will never have much value’ (BGE 43). The details of how overcoming contributes to an achievement’s value depends on several factors, e.g. whether the resistance is intrinsic (i.e. essential and pertinent) or extrinsic (i.e. non-essential or non-pertinent) to the accomplishment. Intrinsically resistance might contribute value to an accomplishment, whereas extrinsic resistance contributes to the value of the person who accomplishes it. But these details needn’t detain us, as Nietzsche only needs to show that resistance such as pain and suffering can have contributory value to justify his departure from Stoicism. His notion of overcoming provides this.

As an illustrative example, consider someone who values intellectual drives and accomplishments, but suffers from a severe and protracted illness. While the suffering brought about by illness might impede their intellectual endeavors, overcoming can transform such suffering into an intellectual stimulant. Nietzsche describes such a case in ‘On the knowledge acquired through suffering’.

He who suffers intensely looks out at things with a terrible coldness [...]. If until then he has been living in some perilous world of fantasy, this supreme sobering-up through pain is the means of extricating him from it: and perhaps the only means. [...] The tremendous tension imparted to the intellect by its desire to oppose and counter pain makes him see everything he now beholds in a new light [...] He thinks with contempt of the noblest and most beloved of the illusions in which he himself formerly indulged. [...] With dreadful clear-sightedness as to the nature of his being, he cries to himself: ‘[...] Raise yourself above your life as above your suffering, look down into the deep and the unfathomable depths!’ [...] The stimulus to justness of judgment has likewise never been greater than it is now, for now it represents a triumph over our self, over a condition which, of all conditions, would make unjustness of judgment excusable. (D 114; see also GS P.3; EH I.1)

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16 Nietzsche also defines happiness as the feeling that resistance is overcome, thereby departing from the view of pleasure and displeasure as opposed (A 2). Implicitly relying on his notion of overcoming, GS 12 asks, ‘What if pleasure and displeasure are so intertwined that whoever wants as much as possible of one must also have as much as possible of the other? Nietzsche suggests the Stoics are aware of this possibility, writing ‘at least they were consistent when they also desired as little pleasure as possible in order to derive as little pain as possible from life’ (GS 12). He accordingly questions Stoicism’s characterization of virtue: ‘by using the saying “The virtuous man is the happiest man”, [the Stoics] had both a slogan for the masses and a fine caustic delicacy for the refined’ (GS 12).
In claiming that protracted suffering might be ‘the only means’ of amplifying someone’s critical capacities to examine their ‘most beloved illusions’, Nietzsche does not merely suggest that pain and suffering act as an accidental occasion for an insight. Were it not for the ‘tremendous tension imparted to the intellect by its desire to oppose and counter pain’, the insight would not be achieved. Here, suffering stimulates the intellect, amplifying its power to gaze into the depths of existence. Suffering also contributes to the intellectual achievement’s value, which is more impressive since it is accomplished under ‘a condition which, of all conditions, would make unjustness of judgment excusable’.

Overcoming also strengthens creativity and contributes value to creative achievements. Zarathustra claims that, ‘in order for the creator to be, suffering is needed and much transformation’ (Z II.2; see also WP 957). Creativity requires suffering because it requires overcoming. As Reginster observes,

> the creative individual […] deliberately seeks to confront and break boundaries, to expand the domain of human experience, to overcome limitations hitherto unchallenged, or to vanquish resistance perhaps thought unassailable. (2006, 191–192)

The possibility of transforming suffering into a creative catalyst is seen in Nietzsche’s reflections on geniuses’ torment (HH I.157; GS 24, 301–302) and in his account of the slave revolt (GM I.10). As creativity requires overcoming resistance, valuing creativity requires bestowing contributory value upon resistance and suffering. This is why Zarathustra calls creating ‘the great redemption from suffering’ (Z II.2).

The amount of resistance one overcomes marks their degree of Nietzschean self-sufficiency. Nietzsche considers overcoming a measure of strength (GM I.13), freedom (TI IX.38), and nobility (BGE 257, 212). Overcoming is also needed for intellectual greatness, which requires a skeptical confrontation with cherished beliefs and values (A 54; GS 297). Another sense in which suffering must be overcome to realize Nietzsche’s philosophical aims is this. If the absence of a meaning for suffering causes additional suffering (GM III.28), and if believing in a descriptively objective moral order alleviates this additional suffering by providing meaning, then our ability to acknowledge the falsity of descriptive objectivism turns, in part, on our ability to overcome this additional suffering, transforming it into something that contributes to the drives, characters, and achievements we value. Moreover, insofar as creativity requires overcoming, resistance such as suffering can contribute to self-sufficiency in the
sense of spurring the creation of values that are not descriptively objec-
tive. Nietzsche’s account of overcoming thus explains how pain and
suffering can have contributory value for his philosophical aims.  

II.3. Consistency with other aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy

After indicting the Stoics’ strategy of forestalling suffering by cultivating
indifference to the world, Nietzsche censures their acceptance of fate.
‘[The Stoic] is ultimately forced to say: all that comes to me is right; I
want nothing different. […] He expresses this religiously as complete con-
formity with all the actions of a divinity’ (KSA 9:15[55]). The similarity
between this acceptance of fate and Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati
makes this grievance somewhat surprising. If we view amor fati as some-
thing that ‘[Nietzsche] directly borrows from the Stoics’, as Michael Ure
does, then we might worry that Nietzsche ‘gives us no reasonable
account of how it is possible to unconditionally affirm fate without adopt-
ing some form of Stoic indifference or apatheia’ (2009, 75, 80). Nuno
Nabais also sees a close connection between Stoicism and amor fati, con-
sidering amor fati ‘the central pillar of the ethical programme of the phil-
osophy of the Portico, [one] embodied in the maxim “live in accordance
with nature”’ (2006, 85). If amor fati is as inseparable from Stoicism as
Nabais suggests, then perhaps he is right to conclude that, ‘in his criticism
of Stoicism […] Nietzsche is criticizing his very own foundations’ (97). We
can dispel this tension, however, by clarifying Nietzsche’s notion of amor
fati and its relation to suffering. Afterward, the contrast between amor fati
and Stoicism’s acceptance of fate will appear in sharper relief.

Nietzsche describes love of fate as his ‘formula for human greatness’ (EH
II.10) and as the ‘thought [that] shall be the reason, warrant, and sweetness
for the rest of [his] life’ (GS 276). But what amor fati requires is not
altogether clear. He describes the disposition as ‘not [wanting] anything
to be different, not forwards, not backwards, not for all eternity. Not just
to tolerate necessity, still less to conceal it—all idealism is hypocrisy
towards necessity –, but to love it’ (EH II.10). Calling amor fati his

17One might worry that overcoming, or increasing power, functions as a descriptively objective moral
value. There are several ways of avoiding this inconsistency. Leiter argues that power is merely
Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic value (2002, 117–126). Hussain argues that power is a simulacrum of value,
which Nietzsche acknowledges as fictitious (2007). Berry contends that Nietzsche’s appeals to power
are equipollent arguments against traditional defenses of morality (2011, 127–132). Reginster contends
that power is a second-order desire that presupposes other, first-order desires, adding to them the
desire for resistance (2006, chap. 3). Katsanafas similarly describes the pursuit of power as a claim
about how, rather than what, we value (2013, chap. 6). None of these approaches make power a descrip-
tively objective moral value.
‘innermost nature’, he writes: ‘What my innermost nature tells me is that everything is necessary, seen from above and in the sense of a great economy, is also useful in itself—it should not just be tolerated, it should be loved’ (NCW E.1). Evidently, this entails learning ‘how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them—thus [... making] things beautiful!’ (GS 276). These passages permit a weak and a strong reading. On the weak reading, the necessity loved refers to one’s life as a whole. On the strong reading, the necessity loved refers to each part of life, which is somehow necessary to the whole. The strong reading makes achieving amor fati more difficult. While it requires, perhaps counterintuitively, that each part of a life is necessary to the whole, Nietzsche suggests this follows from his denial of teleology.¹⁸

Whether and how suffering might be consistent with amor fati depends on whether we adopt the weak or the strong reading. On the weak reading, fate can be loved if the value of life as a whole compensates for undesirable parts, including suffering. On the strong reading, amor fati requires loving each part of a life, including those characterized by suffering, by seeing them as necessary to the whole. Overcoming provides a means of accomplishing this. If overcoming suffering is intrinsic to the accomplishments that make a whole life valuable, then suffering is a necessary part that contributes to the value of the whole. For example, perhaps suffering is necessary to achieve a particular insight, e.g. to realize that nature is amoral. While this doesn’t make suffering necessary to the whole life’s value, if we further posit that this insight is integral to the whole’s value, then we have a case where suffering is necessary to a whole life’s value. Nietzsche seems to value his own suffering this way.

Reflecting on amor fati, he writes:

> As far as my long infirmity is concerned, isn’t it the case that I am unspeakably more indebted to it than I am to my health? I owe a higher health to it [...] I owe my philosophy to it as well. (NCW E.1; see also GS P.3; EH I.1)

Regardless of what achievements might make a life valuable, if they require overcoming, then suffering contributes to them, such that removing suffering would diminish the value of life as a whole.¹⁹

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¹⁸Once you know that there are no purposes, you also know that there is no accident; for only against a world of purposes does the word “accident” have a meaning’ (GS 109).

¹⁹It might seem that only suffering that is intrinsic, i.e. essential and pertinent, to a life-defining accomplishment will have contributory value and that other, non-relevant instances of suffering will remain regrettable. If so, the strong interpretation of amor fati is unmet. While this could be reason to adopt the weak reading, it is worth recalling that Nietzsche denies that ‘accident’ is a meaningful notion absent preexisting purposes (GS 109). Elsewhere, he denies that objects or experiences have any intrinsic or essential features, suggesting that they are only defined in relation to other objects and experiences.
Stoic virtue requires perfecting our rational capacities so we might accept divine providence. Epictetus advises, ‘Don’t seek that all that comes about should come about as you wish, but wish that everything that comes about should come about just as it does’ (8; see also 31, 49). Marcus describes the virtuous individual in similar terms: ‘he loves and welcomes whatever happens to him and whatever his fate may bring [...] modestly following the divine’ (III.16; see also IV.10). Stoic acceptance of fate entails living in conformity with nature’s teleological order.

It is doubtful whether any Stoic—most of whom write in Greek—uses the phrase amor fati (Hadot 1998, 143–144). Still, it is worth clarifying the contrast between Stoicism’s acceptance of fate and Nietzsche’s love of fate, since many readers have been mislead by the superficial resemblance between them. The two differ fundamentally in their understandings of necessity. By Nietzsche’s lights, Stoics do not really accept, much less love, necessity because they erroneously imbue it with teleology, denying purposelessness by embracing divine providence. Stoic acceptance of fate entails fabricating a ubiquitous rational order before submitting to it. Overlooking their creativity, Stoics feel ‘forced to say: all that comes to me is right; I want nothing different’ (KSA 9:15[55], emphasis added). Nietzschean amor fati, by contrast, does not require a pre-existing purpose. It requires valuing our lives despite the falsity of descriptive objectivism. Another dissimilarity is that Stoicism addresses distress by withdrawing from the world, judging it as indifferent. Nietzsche thinks this solution is decisive: ‘[the Stoic] no longer overcomes distress, because he has killed off the sensibility needed for distresses’ (KSA 9:15 [55]). Amor fati, by contrast, doesn’t require divesting value from the world or avoiding all suffering by anaesthetizing oneself completely. If suffering is compensated for (on the weak reading) or makes a necessary contribution to what makes life valuable (on the strong reading), fate can be loved. Whereas Stoicism creates a teleological order that must be submitted to at the expense of finding anything outside reason valuable, Nietzsche seeks to love fate without positing a preexisting purpose or withdrawing from the world.

III. Conclusion

Many scholars align Nietzsche with Stoicism, for their naturalist approaches to ethics (e.g. Groff 2004, 142, 152; Nabais 2006, 85–86; (e.g., WP 557–560). These points complicate our ability to clearly distinguish intrinsic suffering from extrinsic or inessential suffering.

See footnote 10 above.
Armstrong 2013, 7) and their positive valuations of self-sufficiency (e.g. Kain 1983, 371; Nussbaum 1994, 140; Elveton 2004, 193). But the alignment is unsustainable. Stoicism’s teleological understanding of nature secures the objective moral value of rational self-sufficiency. Fulfilling humanity’s purpose, on their view, requires acting in accord with reason and realizing that rationality’s unconditioned, self-sufficient goodness makes all external objects and states of affairs indifferent. Nietzsche, by contrast, rejects the teleological view of nature and questions moral values’ objectivity. As his critical method shows, his notion of self-sufficiency doesn’t deny that thought is shaped by physio-psychological or socio-historical facts, but is better understood as the intellectual fortitude needed to critically examine conventional beliefs and to value life despite its amoral character. His sense of self-sufficiency is more limited than Stoicism’s in that it is largely confined to an intellectual domain, but within this domain it is not limited by preexisting purposes or objective moral values.

Several scholars have attempted to forge a strong link between Stoic acceptance of fate and Nietzsche’s amor fati, too (e.g. Brobjer 2003, 371; Elveton 2004, 194; Nabais 2006, 85–86; Sellars 2006, 161; Ure 2009, 73–76). Stark differences, not only in their respective views of nature, but also in their responses to suffering limit this resemblance. Stoic fate is a ubiquitous rational order safeguarded by divinity. Under fate, we suffer only due to erroneous judgments that value things outside our control. Physical pain, for example, is an indifferent—but thinking that pain harms us entails actual suffering because irrational judgments damage virtue. As suffering betrays some vice, Stoicism seeks to eliminate it by judging the external world as valueless and accepting fate. For Nietzsche, fate lacks a preexisting purpose. Diverging from Stoicism, he allows that pain and suffering can have positive value. In providing fodder for overcoming, they can contribute to the strength of the drives and characters we esteem and to the greatness of the accomplishments we celebrate. Unlike the Stoic acceptance of fate, amor fati doesn’t require withdrawal from the world or avoidance of suffering; overcoming encourages full, passionate engagement. Appreciating the manifest differences between amor fati and Stoic acceptance of fate should silence any remaining worries about whether Nietzsche can rebuke Stoic ‘fatalism’ and still love fate. He can. And that he can is not only compatible with his objections to the Stoic conception of virtue, it follows from them.
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Nietzsche’s Works

Other Works


