

APPRAISAL

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The Boston Issue

Papers from the 2015 International Conference on Persons
at Boston University

Lockean Persons and their Properties

Do Lockean Persons Even Exist?

Lexical Mistakes

Moral Persons with and without Tails

Peirce on Personality

Emotional Response Systems

Theology and Cosmology

Emergence and the Sublime

Reported Speech and Textual Persons

Love and Equality in Frankfurt



Appraisal

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- *Appraisal* takes a particular, but by no means exclusive, interest in the works of Austin Farrer, John Macmurray, and Michael Polanyi.

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- All contributions should be in good, clear English, without jargon, and with end-notes and frequent sub-headings (at approximately every 700 words).
- Please see inside rear cover regarding references to the works of Michael Polanyi.
- **Please ask for the Style Sheet or save or print it from our web site:**

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CONTENTS

This issue's contributors.....	1
Editorial.....	2
<i>Mihretu P. Guta</i> Looking into Objects, Dispositions and the Lockean Person-Making Properties	4
<i>Sam N. Johnson</i> Mixed Modes and the Non-existence of Lockean Persons	12
<i>M. B. Raehll</i> On the Mistaken Lexical Liberty of Conflating Self and Person in Philosophy	16
<i>Sari Kisilevsky</i> Moral Personhood and Humans with Tails: Exploring the Bounds of the Moral	20
<i>Cheongho Lee</i> Peirce on Person: Peirce's Theory of Determination and the Existence of Personality	26
<i>Eleanor Wittrup</i> Emotion Makes the Person.....	33
<i>Gilbert Fulmer</i> Persons, Theology, and Cosmology	41
<i>Leslie Murray</i> The Emergence of Personhood and its Importance in the Experience of the Sublime	44
<i>Joseph C. Harry</i> Quotational Characters	48
<i>Martin Montoya Camacho</i> Love, Identification and Equality: Rational Problems in Harry Frankfurt's Concept of Person	56
Journals Received	61

Notes on this issues new contributors

Gilbert E. Fulmer was born in San Diego, CA; educated in Kansas City, MO public schools; BA and Ph.D. in philosophy, from Rice University, Houston, TX; taught at Texas State Univ. 1972-2015; married 39 years to Christina Lynne Fulmer; widowed; published in various journals, including *Analysis*, *The Personalist*, *Journal of Value Inquiry*, and *International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion*.

Mihretu P. Guta completed his Ph.D. in Philosophy at Durham University (UK) under the supervision of Professor E. J. Lowe and Dr. Sophie Gibb. He subsequently worked as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Durham Emergence Project (funded by the John Templeton Foundation). His main research focuses on metaphysics, philosophy of mind and the philosophy of neuroscience, with special emphasis on the emergence of consciousness and its relation to the brain. He recently co-edited with Sophie Gibb, a Special Issue entitled: 'Insights into the first-person perspective and the self: an interdisciplinary approach', the *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 11-12 (2015). Currently he is an adjunct faculty member in the School of Arts and Sciences at Biola University and in the Department of Philosophy at Azusa Pacific University, where he lectures on philosophy and the philosophy of neuroscience. He is also working on a manuscript entitled: *The Metaphysics of Substance and Personhood: A Non-Theory Laden Approach*.

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Leslie Murray is a philosophy graduate student at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. He received his B.A. this May and is beginning graduate study this fall. Leslie was awarded the Graduate Dean's Fellowship at SIU and his primary philosophical interests include personalist and environmental philosophy. He plans to explore the connections between these two areas of philosophical inquiry as he continues on his philosophical journey.

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EDITORIAL

2016 has been a very busy year thus far, not least because we have been participating in a vitally important temporal experiment. We have, as more astute readers will doubtless have guessed, been testing out a whole new time zone. Casting off the bonds of Greenwich, we have taken the advice of a trusted member and adopted Tasmania-Time. In the process, we have engaged in the traditional copious and creative swearing with much vigour and vim. The casual racism alleged of our new temporal neighbours is taking a little longer to “bed in,” however.

Crucially, our adoption of Tasmania-Time means that the Spring Issue of *Appraisal* is far from being late. Since we are still firmly in the grip of what the Anti-hyperboreans, in their innocence, call “winter”, this Spring Issue is actually early.

Despite being upside down, we are, as usual, pleased to present a most excellent collection of articles in this issue. For your edification and enjoyment, we bring you papers from the International Conference on Persons, held at Boston University last August. Any of our readers who have attended previous ICsP will know very well just how much fun they are. Attendees are guaranteed as diverse a range of topics and approaches as they could wish for: everything from neuroethics to neo-classical theology. Our current selection is, we believe, entirely representative, including as it does such subjects as personal properties, Peirce, and, perhaps inevitably, people with tails.

All our authors are new to *Appraisal* and have much to offer; we hope this won't be the last we'll see or hear of them. I'm sure they will not mind, however, if I single out for particular mention Mr. Leslie Murray. Mr Murray attended the conference as a representative of the “Next Generation” of personalist scholars. As such, we are particularly pleased to have him with us here and look forward to seeing much more of his work when he completes his graduate studies.

The ICP is, of course, one of the most important conferences in the personalist calendar. It is also an excellent opportunity to meet and talk with new and aspiring scholars, like Mr. Murray, as well as those venerable thinkers who have been shambling along this path for many years. Attendance at the next one, which is to be held in Calabria, is highly recommended. We hope to have more details of the event in the next issue.

The ICP may be big, but surely it cannot compare to our own BPF Conferences. Indeed it cannot. The most recent of these, as I'm sure everyone knows, was held at York St. John University in June. I'm told that the whole thing went off very well; although I was there, I spent my time running round and organising things, thus I missed most of it. That it was a success – assuming it really was – is entirely down to all our excellent speakers and, most especially, the considerable support of Dr. Anna Castriota and Mrs. Orla Smith.

We were particularly fortunate to have some excellent speakers from across Europe and as far as Russia. We were even more fortunate to have Prof. Tom Buford and his son, Dr. Russ Buford. Prof. Buford is, as readers may be aware, one of the most highly respected of personalist scholars; his son, a Psychologist by trade, is no less interesting a fellow, despite his apparently dubious taste in music. Julian Stern, Dean of Education & Theology at York St. John, also joined us; and very gracious about it he was too, considering we had forgotten to tell him we were holding a conference in his own backyard.

One particularly good upshot of this event was that Dr. Castriota and I have been approached by a publisher. The profoundly sagacious Vernon Press has invited us to put together a collection of papers from York. This process is now well underway; we shall, no doubt, have more information about it in the coming months. Our most important task, as I see it, is to come up with a good title. I favour something attention-grabbing, like “Wuthering Heights II: Lust in the Dust”. Dr. Castriota, I fear, would prefer something more soberly and philosophically informative.

The Vernon editor is getting to know us quite well at the moment. Whether he feels honoured by our attentions, as he should, or victimised by them, as he frankly is, I cannot say. Nevertheless, two further volumes will soon be coming your way thanks to Vernon. The first is a collection of yet more choice papers from the Boston ICP entitled *In the Sphere of the Personal: New Perspectives in the Philosophy of Persons*. The remarkably talented editors, Drs James Beauregard and Simon Smith, have selected a fine range of themes. Questions of social justice figure large, as do a variety of perspectives on the meaning and nature of “personhood”; equally, the lover of Germanic endnotes will not be disappointed. Best of all, it comes very highly recommended. Indeed, one commentator who has neither been bribed nor blackmailed went so far as to say that the Introduction is worth the price of the book by itself. Being very modest chaps indeed, the editors could not comment on such rare wisdom and perspicacity or such remarkable taste.

The second collection currently in Vernon's very capable hands is *Freedom, Authority and Economics*, edited by Richard Allen. This collection of essays on Polanyi began life in 2011 as an memorable seminar organised by Dr. Allen and Prof. Klaus Allerbeck at the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung Für die Freiheit. The papers were published by the Stiftung as an introduction to Polanyi's political and economic thought, but they were not made generally available. Thanks to Dr. Allen, they very soon will be.

We shall, of course, have further details of these publications, including reviews in due course. In the meantime, readers are strongly advised to purchase of many copies for themselves and their loved ones. Together, these volumes will make the perfect Christmas and/or birthday present. What impassioned partner, what doting child, what loving parent could ask for more? As there is likely to be a run on copies once they become available, stockpiling copies is highly recommended.

Simon Smith
Haslemere

LOVE, IDENTIFICATION AND EQUALITY: RATIONAL PROBLEMS IN HARRY FRANKFURT'S CONCEPT OF PERSON

Martin Montoya Camacho

Abstract: Harry Frankfurt has published *On Inequality*, but this is not the first time he has written about this subject. Frankfurt already criticized a rationalistic notion of equality on other occasions (Frankfurt, 1987 & 1997). In these works he says a rationalistic notion of equality cannot fit in with our belief that agents possess their own volitional necessities, which shape volitional structures of the human will. However, Frankfurt's explanatory connection between volitions, love and identification make it difficult to talk about personal freedom.

Key Words: inequality, moral necessities, respect, volitional structure

1. Introduction

Harry Frankfurt defends a non-Cartesian and non-standard notion of the will. For Frankfurt, agent volitions are organised in a hierarchical structure. This structure establishes the bounds of desires of the person. Volitional necessities are basic human volitions of this structure and are associated with the effort to pursue personal goals.¹ These deep necessities of the will should not be defined in terms of any cognitive process. Frankfurt also says that the designation of some agents as persons implies identifying them as agents with personal volitions. In this respect, Frankfurt identifies love as a genuine volitional necessity. Love determines personal free action. Love moves agents to adopt caring attitudes because they love someone.² If this assertion is true, love is also essential in making decisions about what is important to the beloved person.

This paper has three parts. In the first one I will talk about self-acceptance of the structure of the person and the requirement to accept others as persons, i.e., to act as an agent who is able to act respectfully in society. The second part is concerned with inequality; it explains why both love and rationality must work in tandem to create the conditions for the acknowledgement of others as persons. Recognition of this inequality begins with the acknowledgement of other people. Finally, I affirm that the ability to accept others as persons should be in continuous development, and is a requirement to act as a free person.

2. Acceptance and Acting as a Person

Harry Frankfurt introduced a counterexample against the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) in 1969. PAP's formulation is 'a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise.'³ Frankfurt thinks PAP is false because a person could be responsible for what he did even if he couldn't have done otherwise. The counterexample is

a new version of the Cartesian Evil Demon who is able to deceive some people by manipulating their beliefs, blocking their choices or alternate possibilities to act.⁴ But the Frankfurt case goes beyond the level of cognition. These kinds of case were formulated to support intuitions in favour of an agent's moral responsibility beyond alternate possibilities, i.e. the agent's autonomy is exclusively related to volitions and freedom of the will.⁵ To salvage a certain kind of freedom, the Frankfurt case shows how agents who are under a power that manipulates their cognition, want to do what the manipulator wants. Hence, in the Frankfurt case, the agent could be morally responsible for his actions because he acts according to his own desires, even if he couldn't have done otherwise. Frankfurt says this would be a case against a universal validity of the PAP, because this principle doesn't explain the agent's moral responsibility founded on the freedom of the will. Frankfurt's conclusion on this point is that a person's will is more important than his cognitive processes.

Frankfurt affirms that freedom of will can't be identified by means of a simple observation of human actions and events that are brought about by the person. Freedom of will is determined by the hierarchical structure of volitions. For this reason 'one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will.'⁶ A person is provided with 'the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.'⁷ But, also, Frankfurt explains that a person is not only provided with a hierarchical structure of desires, but also possesses an ability to accept the volitional structure to act based on reflection.⁸

The notions of *person* and 'volitional structure' are distinct and separate. Persons are able to reflect on their own volitional structure. On the other hand, 'human will' is not the same as

[S]omething that merely inclines an agent in some degree to act in a certain way. Rather, it is the notion of an effective desire – one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action. Thus the notion of the will is not coextensive with the notion of what an agent intends to do.⁹

In Frankfurt's account, a capacity for reflective self-acceptance is essential for the formation of the higher-order desires in the human person. Higher-order desires are hierarchically organised by means of love and a personal reflective activity that is concerned with being a person.¹⁰ The basic material for the

formation and effectiveness of the volitional structure is the primary desires, or what the agent intends to do. Considered together, Frankfurt's explanation of structure of desires and the manipulation of cognitive processes, we can say that, for Frankfurt, even if the manipulator has some external control over the cognitive processes of the agent, the agent still has an inner condition of freedom founded on the structure of his will and reflective self-acceptance.

Now, let us consider what happens with self-acceptance defined as the identification of the person with his own desires. Because not only is the hierarchical structure of desires important for the person, but also the self-acceptance of that structure, both of which are required to be concerned with people, otherwise the ordinary experiences in human life would be only a series of confrontations with others. Through the identification of persons with their own desires, agents should act according to what they want and know about living as persons. This is an interesting idea because the will of the person is the essence of human acts. But the person also needs to identify what he wants to do regarding other people. Frankfurt seems to suggest that a typical necessity for personal identification of desires and possible actions is *love*. *Love* leads us to identify and take care of our genuine volitional necessities.

In Frankfurt's view, *love* cannot be assimilated by the volitional structure. In fact, if love is no more than a kind of desire in the hierarchical structure, then it is not suitable to discover our genuine volitional necessities. *Love* must be at the level of the essential characteristics of the person. Like the person, *love* shouldn't be identified with the basic structure of desires or any elements in it.¹¹ Therefore, *love* can shape the desires of the volitional structure of the agent through identifying what he loves for himself. Accordingly, what we love shapes our volitions and expands what we think are our options to act.

Love is a kind of power required to identify what the person is able to care about. Frankfurt seems to say that by means of love we can identify our desires, the priority among them, and the main objects of our care. As a consequence, according to Frankfurt, we discover through love both what we are and what we care about. This kind of knowledge based on identification of volitions is what makes us *persons*, and therefore, able to act as *persons*. Accordingly, for Frankfurt, to be able to act as a person is impossible without love and self-acceptance as a person, i.e. the agent must love himself as a person to be self-known as such. This self-love extends beyond the limits of the person's own volitional structure.

For Frankfurt, the objects of personal caring, that are loved by the person, represent the motives of his personal actions.¹² For that reason, the main objectives of caring for a human person are his genuine volitional necessities, or particular objectives that freely determine personal actions. Shaped by *love*, the

agent selects what to take care of using all of his hierarchical structure.¹³ These objectives, however, need to be cognitive in some aspects to be identified.

To be consistent with the social condition of the person, we need to say that the ability for self-acceptance of the person must be completed by another ability, otherwise, the volitional structure would be able to identify desires of the self, but not those of others. In fact, if persons can only identify and love themselves and their own volitional structures, they would be irretrievably locked in their own volitional necessities. Love should be enough to go beyond the bounds of human will. If this is not the case, the person is unable to act socially.

At this point, we can say the agent needs to be disposed to both self-acceptance and the acceptance of others to act as a person. The disposition to acceptance of others moves the person to think about the other person's necessities. This disposition is based on personal inequality and is required to be connected with rational decision-making. Otherwise, agents are not able to respect other people's necessities in the ordinary decisions of their lives.

3. Moral Necessities of the Person and the Agent's Decision-Making

In this section we are concerned with the relationship between love and cognitive processes. Frankfurt's works offer many attempts to refute an ideal position in which the epistemic foundations of egalitarianism can be taken as the basis of a logical decision-making process of the agent. For Frankfurt, 'the fundamental error of egalitarianism lies in supporting that it is morally important whether one person has less than another regardless of how much either of them has.'¹⁴ This means that, for the person, what must be important for an evaluation of the social condition is not the comparative situation of the agent with other people, but the degree of satisfaction of the agent's personal necessities.

Harry Frankfurt explains that 'there is no necessary conceptual connection between a person's economic relative position and whether he has needs of any degree of urgency.'¹⁵ For Frankfurt, from a perspective of personal values, if the conceptual connection between personal necessities and the rational requirements to act does not exist, then the agent cannot perceive the egalitarian requirements as an urgent reason to act in a specific moment. According to Frankfurt, the decision to help other people is not a function of a comparative process, but of *love*.¹⁶

Frankfurt makes his position about a rational process of decision-making manifest by refuting Thomas Nagel's position about the differences among people. For Nagel, a principle 'establishes an order of priority among needs and gives preference to the most urgent.'¹⁷ Frankfurt contradicts Nagel's account, saying: 'But the preference actually assigned by the Difference Principle is not in favour of those whose

needs are most urgent; it is in favour of those who are identified as worst off.’¹⁸ So, there may be cases such that *the worst off people* do not need any help because to be in the *worse off situation* is not the same as *one’s basic necessities are not satisfied*. Therefore, although Nagel’s principle can set some priority according to the logic of maximising profit, it may not necessarily determine what the agent needs. Thus, Frankfurt again denies that general principles, like PAP, reveal the real needs of people. For Frankfurt, what constitute our decision-making processes are the reasons that love reveals. And these reasons forge our volitional necessities.¹⁹

Therefore, for Frankfurt, what is important for the agent and what moves him to action is not the product of a rationalistic mental process that in comparing the rational objects would find advantages or disadvantages among them. Because this kind of mental process is not essential for the person, it cannot resolve the main questions of personal life.²⁰ Frankfurt’s defence of the essential role of personal necessities within the decision-making process is an attempt to protect the personal condition of the agent that permits respect for people. From the Frankfurtian point of view, the person has a necessary ability to accept other people, originating from the identification of personal needs. The agent identifies other persons, and accepts their personal conditions through love. But problems in Frankfurt’s account can arise if the *love* that supports this ability is disconnected from the cognitive or reflective decision-making processes. If love is not an integral part of the agent’s reflective processes, then the person cannot act as a social agent because he cannot make decisions considering other persons.

Frankfurt rejects a logical maximisation of benefits as a rational process in human life. Actually, this type of rational process is not the only basis upon which to justify human decisions to act. In addition, Frankfurt wants to protect the deep necessities from any extrinsic manipulation so that they can be genuine necessities (e.g. in the PAP counterexample). For this reason, he avoids any relationship between a comparative process in decision-making and love in the formation of the personal volitional necessities. However, eliminating this kind of rationality from the process of shaping the volitional structure could lead to the conclusion that a rational requirement in making choices regarding our own wills is unnecessary. Persons without this rationality cannot recognise others as persons.

Love is required to support a rational decision-making process, otherwise, the ability to accept others cannot be used as support in making decisions about one’s personal self-acceptance as an agent with moral possibility. Being morally responsible implies having reasons to act that are chosen with the knowledge of what is better or worse for the self and others. Love and rationality must be applied jointly in the decision-making process, because love and reason are

fundamental for self-acceptance and acceptance of others as persons. To make a decision about the beloved, the person needs a connection between volitional self-acceptance and a rational acceptance of others. Personal moral choices must come from both love and cognitive processes to have reasons to act in a personal way.²¹ Without both of these elements, how can we identify personal moral needs and genuine volitional necessities, such as the respect for people?

4. Personal Epistemic Condition for Respect and Inequality

Frankfurt’s approach to social issues, such as *equality* and *respect*, is closely linked to *love* and rational processes as conditions to ‘act as persons.’ He clearly states this question, pointing out the difference between two kinds of human agents who are divided into wantons and persons.²² While the former is a creature without the relevant consciousness to act coherently, persons are able to act according their own personal desires.²³ This idea means that people require a relevant way to know and reflect on their own desires, and to reflect on and assess the moral correctness of their choices.²⁴ The social relevance of these distinctions is clear, not only in the public sense of morality, but also in the personal one, which is required to build a respectful society for persons. A person is someone who is able to *act as a person* with other persons.

For Frankfurt, a wanton’s life is incoherent because it is broken and is lived through a set of disjointed episodes. However, the wanton does perceive these episodes at some level.²⁵ The wanton wants according to his structure of desires but is not able to want as a person. By contrast, persons maintain their caring for the beloved over time.

The assertion that the wanton is not a person because constitutively he cannot act like a person is not relevant in this discussion. Understanding the wanton as an incomplete person in terms of constitutive characteristics would lead us to an ontological discussion, which is not our concern.²⁶ A sufficient condition to talk about respect and inequality is to say that the wanton’s behaviour is socially incoherent because his loving and reflective processes are disconnected. Even though he perceives that he needs to care for others, he cannot do so. Wantons do not have the relevant condition for their own freedom of the will, i.e., control over their personal desires. Therefore, we can understand the wanton’s status as a non-social agent who needs help integrating his inner processes.

Identification as a kind of ability to accept others is required for respecting people. But the effectiveness of this concept requires another one: that the person must possess an effective and growing ability to identify personal conditions of others in order to reflect in a richer and more dynamic way. This ability

is what gives us the freedom to act morally. In this way, *acting as a person* is to be respectful of the personal conditions and the choices of others, i.e. the acceptance of others with their personal lives and choices. This acceptance is not devoid of interest, but rather requires the adoption of a caring attitude. A good example of this is the relationship between parents and children, also present in Frankfurt's work. In a world with this personal condition, the life of a human person will necessarily be respected because personal choices are always shifting.

The power of the manipulator to block personal choices in the Frankfurt cases is a good metaphor for a certain cognitive pessimism. With this blockage, wantons are looking for the effectiveness of their desires only in a cognitive way, but without the personal loving condition, which provides the power to choose, using their volitions to act as persons. The wanton is unable to make decisions as a person. His condition will be not personal, but as a manipulated being. A world of wantons does not need any real manipulator because the main problem is the unarticulated and weak relationship between love and the reflective processes in decision-making.

This paper was written throughout a research period at Jacques Maritain Centre of the University of Notre Dame, and presented in the 13th International Conference on Persons at Boston University in August 2015. I'm very thankful to John O'Callaghan (University of Notre Dame) for his invitation to this research period, to Eleanor Wittrup (University of the Pacific) who provided insight and expertise that greatly assisted the presentation of this paper, and for her commentaries in the session of discussion. Also, I thank to Richard C. Prust (St. Andrews Presbyterian College) and William Jaworski (Fordham University) for their commentaries in the same session. Finally, thanks to my colleagues at University of Navarra, José María Torralba and Enrique Moros, for their remarks in the preparation of the paper.

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Notes

1. Harry Frankfurt (*The Importance of What We Care About*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [1988]: 85-86; 181-182).
2. Harry Frankfurt, "Taking Ourselves Seriously," in *Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right*, ed. Debra Satz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 44-45. Also, Frankfurt says: 'Only by virtue of the necessity that it imposes upon us does love intensify our sense of identity and of freedom.' Harry Frankfurt, *Necessity, Volition and Love* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 114. Nonetheless, Frankfurt has not satisfactory answer about how this kind of love would be a rational way to act, and not a blind force in our life.
3. Frankfurt, 1988, 1.
4. This is a broad interpretation of the Frankfurtian counterexample that is shown through the Frankfurt cases' debate. See David Widerker, Alfred Mele, David Robb and

Carlos Moya discussions about the topic. David Widerker ("A defence of Frankfurtian-friendly libertarianism", *Philosophical Explorations* 12 [2009]: 87-108); Alfred Mele & David Robb ("Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases", *The Philosophical Review* 107 [1998]: 97-112); Carlos Moya ("Blockage Cases: No case against PAP", *Crítica* 35 [2009], 109-120).

5. In this sense, Frankfurt case allows a room for a kind of autonomy derived of love's labour in the human will. Frankfurt explains that 'a person acts autonomously only when his volitions derive from the essential character of his will. [...] When he acts out of love, accordingly, his volitions do derive from the essential character of his will. Thus, the personal grip of love satisfies the conditions for autonomy' Frankfurt, 1999, 132.

6. Frankfurt, 1988, 12.

7. Frankfurt, 1988, 12.

8. See Harry Frankfurt, *The Reasons of Love* (Princeton, USA: Princeton University Press, 2004), 18-19.

9. Frankfurt, 1988, 14.

10. 'In those senses of the word [person] which are of greater philosophical interest, however, the criteria for being a person do not serve primarily to distinguish the members of our own species from the members of other species. Rather, they are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most important and most problematic in our lives' Frankfurt, 1988, 12.

11. 'The heart of love, however, is neither affective nor cognitive. It is volitional. That a person cares about or that he loves something has less to do with how things make him feel, or with his opinions about them, than with the more or less stable motivational structures that shape his preferences and that guide and limit his conduct.' Frankfurt, 1999, 129.

12. See Harry Frankfurt, "Taking Ourselves Seriously," in *Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right*, ed. Debra Satz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 1-26.

13. In this respect Frankfurt says that genuine necessity of the will should be susceptible to alteration, but not in the same sense as inhibitions or aversions (Frankfurt, 1999, 112). These necessities are required for personal autonomy. But 'what autonomy requires is not that the essential nature of the will be a priori, but that the imperatives deriving from it carry genuine authority. Kant insists that the requisite authority can be provided only by the necessities of reason. I believe that it can also be provided by those of active love.' Frankfurt, 1999, 135.

14. Harry Frankfurt ("Equality as a Moral Ideal", *Ethics* 98 [1987]: 34).

15. Frankfurt, 1987, 35.

16. See Frankfurt, 1987, 36.

17. Thomas Nagel ("Equality," *Mortal Questions* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979], 117).

18. Frankfurt, 1987, 35.

19. See Frankfurt, 1987, 38-40

20. Frankfurt, explaining what is the essential nature of a person, says: "the essential nature of triangles, or of triangularity, includes the characteristics that any figure correctly identified as triangular must necessarily possess. [...] The essential identity of an individual differs, however, from that of a type of thing. The essence of triangularity is an a priori matter of definitional or conceptual necessity. The essence of a person, on the other hand, is a matter of

the contingent volitional necessities by which the will of the person is as a matter of fact constrained.' Frankfurt, 1999, 138.

21. See, e.g., Christine Korsgaard, "Morality and the Logic of Caring", in *Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting It Right*, ed. Debra Satz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 74-75.

22. Frankfurt, 1988, 16.

23. This statement is concerned with Harry Frankfurt's discussion on drug's consumers. Addicts who are not able to reflect on his first-order desires cannot be identified as persons, because 'his actions reflect the economy of his first-order desires, without his being concerned whether the desires that move him to act are desires by which he wants to be moved to act.' Frankfurt, 1988, 18.

24. 'The wanton addict cannot or does not care which of his conflicting first-order wins out. His lack of concern is not due to his inability to find a convincing basis for preference. It is due either to his lack of the capacity for reflection or to his mindless indifference to the enterprise of evaluating his own desires and motives.' Frankfurt, 1988, 18-19.

25. 'When a person acts, the desire by which he is moved is either the will he wants or a will he wants to be without. When a wanton acts, it is neither.' Frankfurt, 1988, 19.

26. It seems that, for Frankfurt, wanton is a human being, and the respect due to him is about this condition, beyond another ontological consideration. For Frankfurt all humans have the ability to form second-order desires: 'Human beings are not alone in having desires and motives, or in making choices. They share these things with the members of certain other species, some of whom even appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based upon prior thought. It seems to be peculiarly characteristic of humans, however, that they are able to form what I shall call 'second-order desires' or 'desires of the second order' Frankfurt, 1988, 12. Also, all humans 'appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.' Frankfurt, 1988, 12. The problem with the wanton is that he 'may act wantonly, in response to first-order desires concerning which they have no volitions of the second order, more or less frequently.' Frankfurt, 1988, 17.

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