Abstract

This essay first appeared as a contribution to a special issue of *European Journal of Philosophy* to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of P.F. Strawson’s *The Bounds of Sense*. In that book Strawson asks whether we should agree with Kant’s claim, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, that there can be only one world. What Kant means by this claim is that the four-dimensional realm that we inhabit must constitute the whole of empirical reality. Strawson gives reasons for challenging this claim. This essay raises the question whether, even if Strawson is right, we may nevertheless have reason to believe that there can be only one world on a broader understanding of ‘world’. The aim is as much to clarify the issue as to settle it, although an attempt is made to motivate the view that there can indeed be only one world on this broader understanding.

Keywords

Kant, one, reality, Strawson, world

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One World

My starting point in this essay is a brief but fascinating section in *The Bounds of Sense*,[[1]](#footnote-1) in which Strawson discusses a likewise brief but fascinating passage in Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason*.[[2]](#footnote-2) I am referring respectively to Part Two, Chapter III, §8 (which incidentally contains Strawson’s sole reference to Wittgenstein in his entire book—we shall see the significance of this reference in due course) and A216/B263. In the latter Kant writes that ‘all appearances lie in one nature, and must lie therein’. In the former Strawson asks why we should accept any such conclusion. Why, to appropriate the title of that section, only one objective world?

It is important to be clear what Strawson, following Kant, is asking. Consider the four-dimensional realm that we inhabit. Call this ‘the Cosmos’. Then Strawson’s question, in effect, is why we should agree that the Cosmos constitutes the whole of empirical reality. The word ‘empirical’ is important here. It connects with Kant’s explicit reference to ‘appearances’.[[3]](#footnote-3) Kant himself allows for the possibility that the Cosmos does not exhaust reality in a broader sense of ‘reality’ (a point to which we shall return). But the Cosmos does, Kant insists, exhaust *empirical* reality. And Strawson asks why we should agree.

It is a good question. Who knows but that physicists will one day convince us that the Cosmos does not exhaust empirical reality?[[4]](#footnote-4) Kant seems to be involved in an error akin to that of insisting that space must be Euclidean. In this case, as in that, it seems that there can be empirical evidence for a possibility that he disavows. Strawson considers different forms that such evidence might take. He does not appeal to anything that appears, or might be expected to appear, in physics. Rather he appeals to various relatively homespun thought experiments.[[5]](#footnote-5) In one of these there is a community whose members can successively occupy each of two spatially unrelated universes.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Even if Kant is wrong to insist that the Cosmos constitutes the whole of empirical reality, however, an analogous question arises with respect to whatever does. Indeed—harking back to the point that I made in connection with Kant’s use of the term ‘appearances’—an analogous question arises with respect to whatever constitutes reality in a yet broader sense of ‘reality’ that may embrace the non-empirical or the supernatural. Is there any reason to subscribe to the unity of *that*, in some correspondingly extended sense of ‘unity’, or to believe that it consists of only one world, in some correspondingly extended sense of ‘world’? This question, though different from Strawson’s, is an extension of his. And it is on this broader question that I wish to focus.

Part of my interest in the question lies in the fact that I have elsewhere nailed my own colours to the ‘unity’ mast. That is, I have elsewhere subscribed to the unity of reality, in the relevantly extended sense.[[7]](#footnote-7) And although I have also insisted on the unjustifiability of this stance,[[8]](#footnote-8) this has been according to high standards of justification. I have not denied that the stance has *anything* to be said in its favour. I hope that this essay will show that it has.

But what is the issue? What would it *be* for there to be more than one world, in the relevantly extended sense? Such worlds would have to lack even whatever intermundane unity binds together the two universes that Strawson envisages; and it is difficult to see what could then secure for worlds other than our own the status of the actual as opposed to the merely possible. One way to make this difficulty graphic is to consider David Lewis’ modal realism. Lewis famously believes in the existence of infinitely many possible worlds, each a spatio-temporally unified universe that is both isolated from and causally independent of all the others. He also holds that for something to be possible is for it to be the case in one of these universes. It immediately follows that, for Lewis, it is *not* possible that two or more of these universes be co-actualized. Lewis acknowledges this and says, with commendable candour, that he ‘would rather not’—though he takes it to be a price worth paying for a gain in theoretical simplicity (Lewis ([1986](#B190)), pp. 71–72). The question is: what exactly would he rather do instead? What exactly would constitute the co-actualization of two or more of these universes? Had Lewis allowed for possible worlds other than our own to be co-actual with it, what exactly would it have taken for any of them to satisfy this condition?[[9]](#footnote-9)

The very intractability of such questions is, I think, a reason to accept the unity of reality. Roughly: if reality is not unified, then it is obscure what makes it *reality* that is not unified, as opposed to reality plus items of unrealized possibility. The very unity of reality is part of what constitutes it as reality. To be real *is* to stand in some suitable relation of unification to *this* (or to *us*, or to *here*, or to *now*).[[10]](#footnote-10) Or so it seems to me. But even if I am right, there is of course more to be said. In particular, there is more to be said about this relation of unification—call it ‘the Unity Relation’.[[11]](#footnote-11) We can take for granted, as a minimum, that the Unity Relation is both reflexive and symmetric,[[12]](#footnote-12) and also that for anything in reality to be unified in the relevant sense (including, at the limit, for reality as a whole to be unified in the relevant sense) is for all of its parts to stand in the Unity Relation to one another. But until we have some further account of the Unity Relation, this is purely schematic and there is no telling why some other, weaker relation—for instance, and most notably, the ancestral of the Unity Relation—might not be robust enough to reach out from here to all and only what is real.

Before we go any further, we need to settle on some further terminology. In particular, we need terms for:

(i) the sum total of that which is co-actual with us

and

(ii) any maximally unified whole

where by a ‘maximally’ unified whole I mean a unified whole that is not part of some bigger unified whole. The need to settle on such terminology is relatively urgent, because there are several crucial terms in this vicinity—‘nature’, ‘universe’, ‘world’, ‘reality’, *et al*—that not only get used (with suitable modification) in both the (i)-rôle and the (ii)-rôle, but that also get used in further incompatible ways, and the scope for confusion is vast. So far, I myself have played a little fast and loose with these terms, to allow myself latitude in characterizing the various different positions that I am interested in. In as much as my usage *has* been systematic, then I have reserved the term ‘reality’ for the (i)-rôle and the term ‘world’ for the (ii)-rôle. Thus I have presented the principal issue as an issue about whether ‘reality’ is unified, or whether, on the contrary, it consists of more than one ‘world’. This means that my use of ‘reality’ has been broad. Even so, it has not been as broad as it might have been. For instance, Lewis’ modal realism is sometimes expressed as the thesis that ‘reality’ comprises infinitely many possible worlds in addition to the one that is actual: ‘reality’, on this usage, embraces everything there is, even what is merely possible.[[13]](#footnote-13) To repeat: the scope for confusion is vast.

I propose that we henceforth never use any of these terms in the broad way that encompasses even the merely possible.[[14]](#footnote-14) I further propose that we allow each of them to be used in *either* the (i)-rôle *or* the (ii)-rôle, registering the distinction by writing them in small capitals when they are used in the (i)-rôle and in ordinary lower case type when they are used in the (ii)-rôle. In these terms, then, the question is: can there be more than one world in the world, more than one reality constituting reality, more than one actual realm within the actual realm? Equivalently: can there be more to the world than the world?[[15]](#footnote-15)

Now I have already characterized such questions as intractable. But I do not mean to imply that no-one has proffered interesting answers to them. John Leslie has. He proposes, as part of an elaborate theodicy, that something is actual if and only if God contemplates it; and this is expressly meant to accommodate universes other than our own.[[16]](#footnote-16) Let us not worry about his reasons for this proposal. The question is: can we really make sense of it?

Michael Dummett, in a different context, suggests that at any rate we cannot make sense of a universe’s being actual if it contains no sentient creatures. And he does so in such a way as to suggest that God’s contemplating such a universe would precisely fail to compensate for its lack of sentience; would precisely fail, in other words, to elevate it from the status of the merely possible. ‘What would be the difference,’ Dummett asks, ‘between God’s creating such a universe and his merely conceiving of such a universe without bringing it into existence? It seems to me that the existence of a universe from which sentience was perpetually absent is an unintelligible fantasy’.[[17]](#footnote-17) He continues: ‘What exists is what can be known to exist. What is true is what can be known to be true.’ Dummett is tapping a deep intuition here: that whatever is actual must be within epistemic reach of some actual finite being; that finite knowledge is, to that extent, capable of playing a fundamental metaphysical rôle that infinite knowledge (or infinite contemplation, or infinite conception) cannot play.[[18]](#footnote-18) This has a significance to which we shall return.

In the current context, however, the intuition, however deep, and however defensible,[[19]](#footnote-19) helps at most by yielding a non-trivial necessary condition for something’s being actual. There is no corresponding non-trivial sufficient condition. Although it is true that whatever is within epistemic reach of some actual finite being is actual, it is trivially true. It merely shifts our attention to what it is for a finite being to be actual, as opposed to merely possible, in the first place. And if we now ask whether Leslie is right that being contemplated by God is enough to make the difference, then it once again seems to me that we are asking something intractable. *What* difference?

To further motivate my scepticism about such questions, I need to say more about the Unity Relation. Here it is helpful to consider matters as it were from below rather than from above. So far I have been taking for granted the unity of the Cosmos. But this is not beyond dispute. Consider the following view.

Tensism: Suppose that *t* is a true tensed thought about the Cosmos. That is, suppose that *t* is a true thought about the Cosmos from some temporal point of view π. Then only from π is it possible to express the fact that makes *t* true. This is because the fact that makes *t* true *ipso facto* contains something that corresponds to *t*’s tense, something that is itself accessible only from π. Thus suppose I think, truly, that it is humid today. Then what makes my thought true is a fact involving ‘hodiernal’ humidity. If I say tomorrow, ‘It was humid yesterday,’ that will not express the same fact. At best it will express some intrinsically related fact involving ‘hesternal’ humidity, which can itself be expressed only tomorrow. Each temporal point of view is accompanied by its own world, and the facts that peculiarly constitute one of these worlds are expressible only from the corresponding point of view.[[20]](#footnote-20) It follows that the Cosmos is not itself a world. It is a multiplicity of worlds—more specifically, temporal worlds.[[21]](#footnote-21)

Now tensism seems to me no less problematical than Leslie’s view. But I mention it because I think it helps to give us a grip on the Unity Relation. First, it suggests what the relata of the relation are, namely facts.[[22]](#footnote-22) Second, it suggests the following principle.

The Unity Principle: Two facts, one of which is expressible from some point of view, stand in the Unity Relation to each other if and only if they are both expressible from that point of view.[[23]](#footnote-23), [[24]](#footnote-24)

For such co-expressibility is precisely what may be lacking if tensism is correct. If tensism is correct, then the fact that it is humid today cannot be expressed tomorrow, though facts about how things are then can be.

Not that the Unity Principle can serve as an *analysis* of the Unity Relation. For one thing, it has no application in lifeless worlds where there is no question of any fact’s being expressed from any point of view (assuming, *contra* Dummett, that there are such worlds). More significantly, it is a substantive principle. And it is a substantive principle for which I lack any compelling argument. It nevertheless has some plausibility, and I shall adopt it as a working assumption in what follows. I shall also continue to assume, in opposition to tensism and other such views, that the Cosmos is unified.

Now one immediate corollary of the Unity Principle is that, for any fact *f*1 about the Cosmos, and for any point of view π from which *f*1 is expressible,[[25]](#footnote-25) any other fact *f*2 stands in the Unity Relation to *f*1 if and only if *f*2 is likewise expressible from π.[[26]](#footnote-26) This seems to me to put additional pressure on the idea that reality is not unified. For it means that, if reality is not unified, then—given that the Cosmos *is* unified—there are facts that are inexpressible from ‘here’, where ‘here’ is just any point of view from which some fact about the Cosmos (say, the fact that Jupiter is larger than Saturn) is expressible. And that, it seems to me, is a deeply problematical idea.[[27]](#footnote-27)

This all takes on additional significance when the point of view in question is *mine*. For whatever can be expressed from my point of view can now be seen to constitute a world: ‘my’ world; ‘the’ world.[[28]](#footnote-28) It is irresistible to relate this to ideas that we find in Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction’ (A95–130 and, differently in the second edition, B129–169).[[29]](#footnote-29) It is also irresistible to relate it to ideas that we find in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*.[[30]](#footnote-30) Similar significance would accrue from taking the point of view in question to be *ours*—for various more or less inclusive values of ‘we’. It would be irresistible to relate *this* to ideas that we find in Wittgenstein’s later work.[[31]](#footnote-31) Many significant currents of philosophical thought are converging here. Collectively they signal how much is at stake in the claim that reality is not unified. To claim that reality is not unified is to claim that there are facts that are not part of ‘my’ world, or ‘our’ world. Not only is it obscure what this claim comes to. There is a venerable philosophical tradition to which it stands opposed.

Nevertheless, it is a claim that Kant himself makes, or at least that he is prepared to take seriously. In some parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, including the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, Kant appears to argue strenuously for the unity of reality, which in turn he appears to identify with the Cosmos.[[32]](#footnote-32) In fact, however, as I pointed out at the beginning of this essay, what Kant identifies with the Cosmos is *empirical* reality. He expressly allows for the possibility that there is more to reality than that. ‘An existence outside this field,’ he says, ‘cannot be declared absolutely impossible’ (A601/B629). Partly he has in mind God.[[33]](#footnote-33) But he also allows for the possibility of beings whose sensibility is not ‘bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition’ (A27/B43) in other words beings whose own world is not spatio-temporal.[[34]](#footnote-34) If there *were* such beings, then there would assuredly be facts about their world that were not expressible from our point of view. For Kant, then, there is a distinction to be drawn between reality (‘our’ reality) and reality. Quite how this relates to that other distinction that he draws, between empirical reality and—and what?—here already there is an issue—the *reality* of things in themselves?—the *reality* of things in themselves?—that is a delicate exegetical question that need not detain us now. Suffice to remark that there is a familiar concern, famously pressed by Strawson himself in *The Bounds of Sense* (Pt. Four), about whether Kant, or anyone else for that matter, has the resources to make sense of any such distinction.

Strawson’s own reflections on the possibility of our engaging with other spaces certainly do not provide us with those resources. For suppose that Strawson is right in allowing for such a possibility. *That* does not yield a distinction between ‘our’ reality and reality: it yields a distinction between ‘our’ reality and the Cosmos. It shows that there may be more to ‘our’ reality than the Cosmos, not that there may be less to ‘our’ reality than reality. Moreover, it does so by extending Kantian principles that are intended by Kant himself to demonstrate the unity of the Cosmos, as Strawson makes clear at the end of the section with his appeal to ‘the connexion between objective reality and systematic unity’ (p. 152). In the scenario that Strawson envisages, there is, as he puts it, ‘a single concept of the objectively real’ extending to the different spaces (p. 152). There is nothing here to threaten the unity of reality.

Kant’s preparedness to allow for the possibility of beings with their own non-spatio-temporal world is something of an altogether more radical kind then. And note: the Kantian thought is not simply that *there might have been* such beings. The Kantian thought is that *there may be* such beings. May there? In what would their actuality consist? We have been catapulted back to precisely the sort of question that I earlier characterized as ‘intractable’.

But was I too quick to dismiss a Lesliean response to such questions? Or, if not a Lesliean response, at any rate a response involving some appeal to God? Could we not defend Kant, *and* at the same time maintain the unity of reality, by declaring all facts to be expressible from God’s point of view? True, if some facts are not expressible from our point of view, this would mean abandoning the Unity Principle and trying to get some other grip on the Unity Relation.[[35]](#footnote-35) But that principle was only ever a working assumption, an assumption whose plausibility may now have been discredited.

Invoking God in this way is problematical, however—for all sorts of reasons. First, and most obviously, it has no purchase if God does not exist. But it arguably has no purchase even if God does exist. For arguably God *has* no point of view.[[36]](#footnote-36) And even if God does have a point of view, we cannot simply take for granted that all facts are expressible from that point of view. (A theistic advocate of tensism will doubtless say that facts about temporal worlds are not expressible from God’s point of view because God’s point of view is atemporal.) Finally, even if all facts *are* expressible from God’s point of view, and even if this provides grounds for subscribing to the unity of reality, it does so only by trading one mystery—the mystery of a non-unified reality—for another—the mystery of Divine infinitude.[[37]](#footnote-37) This illustrates something that I take to be of the utmost importance. The claim that all facts are expressible from the point of view of a *finite* being, and hence that the whole of reality is, to that extent, accessible from somewhere within its midst, has a certain metaphysical bite which the claim that all facts are expressible from the point of view of an infinite being lacks (an echo of the suggestion that I paraded earlier in connection with Dummett’s intuition).[[38]](#footnote-38)

Now I have already urged that Strawson’s reflections on the possibility of our engaging with other spaces do nothing to support the disunity of reality. But do they support its *unity*? This is where Strawson’s one reference to Wittgenstein in *The Bounds of Sense* is relevant. To see how, let us begin by considering two initial concerns that we might have about this part of Strawson’s discussion.

First, when he introduces Wittgenstein, he does so as a way of heralding ‘the *social* character of our concepts’ (<IBT>p. 151</IBT>, emphasis in original). This is unfortunate. Shortly afterwards he refers to the ‘public’ rather than the ‘social’, and he makes clear that by the ‘public’ he means the ‘objective’ (ibid.). This is much better. It is the public rather than the social, or the shareable rather than the shared, that Wittgenstein himself takes to pertain to our concepts.[[39]](#footnote-39) And it is the public rather than the social that reflects the fundamental character of ‘our’ world, indeed of ‘my’ world, indeed of *any* world.[[40]](#footnote-40)

The second initial concern that we might have about this part of Strawson’s discussion relates to its whiff of verificationism. For Strawson seems to focus at least as much on what it would be for us to *tell* that something was part of reality as on what it would be for something to *be* part of reality. Insofar as his concerns *are* ontological, then they have less to do with what it takes for something to be part of reality than with what it takes for various kinds of relativization to be found within reality. Thus suppose it seems to me that I have visited a space in which pigs can fly. That (the fact that it seems to me that way) is part of reality. But what else is? *Is* there in fact a space in which pigs can fly? Or is it simply that, in these four dimensions, that is to say here in the Cosmos, I have imagined (or dreamt, or had my brain stimulated in such a way as to make it seem to me) that I was in such a space? The public ratifiability that Strawson considers is obviously related to the question of just what form of relativization we would think was appropriate in order to ‘place’, within reality, the appearance of volant pigs that I have experienced.

Now we can readily give Strawson the benefit of the first of these doubts. This is simply because, as we have seen, he provides his own corrective. And once we have given him the benefit of that doubt, we can more easily see our way to giving him the benefit of the second doubt too. We can say that what is really at stake in Strawson’s discussion is not what would be involved in our collectively telling that something was part of reality, but what would make it *possible* for us to do so. True, this does not make the whiff of verificationism go away, but it does arguably make that whiff less malodorous. And it gives us reason to think that, in order for some fact to be part of reality, there has to be shareable access of sorts to it from ‘our’ point of view. Furthermore, although the devil of what exactly this comes to lies in the detail of shareable access, it is hard to see how such access can fail to include expressibility. So Strawson’s reflections do indeed support the unity of reality.

This in turn connects with what I said earlier about the finite/infinite distinction. For ‘we’ are finite. The accessibility of reality at issue here is the accessibility of reality to one of its own finite constituents: it is, as I put it earlier, the accessibility of reality from some particular point within its midst. If reality *is* unified, then that accessibility in a way constitutes its unity. Given any two facts, it ensures that they stand in the Unity Relation to each other, by suitably anchoring them both at the point in question. These various connections are, moreover, chief among those that Kant himself establishes in his ‘Transcendental Deduction’—albeit not, in his case, with a view to extending them beyond the Cosmos to reality as a whole. To say that the unity of reality is constituted by its accessibility from some point within its midst is to connect that unity with the possibility of a single finite representation of any arbitrary selection of its component facts: a representation that can be accompanied by the very same ‘*I think*’, or ‘*we think*’, that can accompany a representation, from there, of each of those facts severally (cf. B131–132 and 138–139).

‘*If* reality is unified,’ I said in the previous paragraph. I must repeat something that I have already been at pains to emphasize, that nothing in this essay is conclusive as far as that goes. In particular, where my support for the unity of reality has depended either on the claim that the Cosmos is unified or on the Unity Principle, I have been assuming each of these without argument. But I do believe that this essay, by indicating some of the challenges confronting the claim that reality is not unified, helps to show how extraordinary a claim it is. More than that, perhaps, the essay serves as a reminder of something of which Strawson’s work too is a reminder: the remarkable extent to which, and the remarkable depth at which, Kant’s work engages with our finitude.[[41]](#footnote-41)

1. Strawson ([1966](#B322)). All unaccompanied references in this essay to work by Strawson will be to this book. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <<CE: Reference Kant (1988 has not been provided in the Bibliography. Please check.>>Kant (1988). All unaccompanied references in this essay to work by Kant will be to this book. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Cf. A418–419/B446, note. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Consider e.g. some variation on the ‘many worlds’ interpretation of quantum mechanics or certain versions of string theory. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. See also, in addition to the section already cited, pp. 142–143. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. This incidentally precludes our characterizing the Cosmos *à la* David Lewis as all and only that which exists ‘at some distance and direction from here, or at some time before or after or simultaneous with now’ (Lewis ([1986](#B190)), p. 1). If there were spatially unrelated but temporally related universes, as in Strawson’s thought experiment, then, given the disjunctive nature of this characterization, it would capture all of them, not just the four-dimensional realm that *we* inhabit, or at any rate that we *now* inhabit. (Not that this is any indictment of Lewis. His characterization is not intended to capture what I mean by ‘the Cosmos’. It is intended to capture what he means by ‘the actual world’: see further below.) [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See e.g. Moore ([1997](#B224)), Ch. 4, §4. The unity of reality is part of what I there call the Basic Assumption. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See Moore ([1997](#B224)), esp. pp. 113 and 188–189. See also Essay 11, esp. pp. **???–???**. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Kant raises similar questions at A230/B282 ff., partly with a view to dismissing them as bad questions. This is essentially what I want to do too, though for reasons that are more radical than Kant’s (albeit akin to his). My reasons are more radical than Kant’s because his criteria for being a good question are tied, once again, to the empirical. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Cf. the material cited in the previous note, esp. A231/B284 and A234/B286. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Kant gives an account of a related relation at A418–419/B446, note, as ‘thoroughgoing connection through an inner principle of causality.’ But again (cf. n. 9) this extends only to empirical reality. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. But not transitive? Not transitive. The reasons for this will emerge in due course. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Cf. Lewis ([1986](#B190)), pp. 100–101, n. 1. Cf. also Moore ([2012](#B227)), p. 414, where I contrast such usage, along with Lewis’ own use of ‘actual’, with that which is found in Bergson. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. So I shall not allow the fact that we can entertain the possibility of flying pigs to warrant saying that there are, in reality, flying pigs. Note, however, that some maximally unified wholes are merely possible (this is a quite separate matter—it concerns their own status, not what they encompass) and I shall sometimes use terms in a way that reflects this. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. By ‘the’ world I mean whichever world includes the Cosmos. I should acknowledge, however, that it is not entirely obvious that there *is* such a thing. For it is not entirely obvious that there are any worlds at all; that there are *any* maximally unified wholes. This raises some exceedingly important and exceedingly difficult metaphysical issues concerning what counts as a whole, issues that I shall ignore in this essay. I shall assume that the world exists. (For the record, I shall also assume, as I have been doing up to now, that the world exists. That too is not entirely obvious. For it is not entirely obvious that there is anything that deserves to be called ‘the sum total’ of what is co-actual with us. Note that, if the world exists but the world does not, say because no worlds do, then not only is there not more to the world than the world, there is not even that much.) [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Leslie ([2001](#B188)), esp. Ch. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Dummett ([2004](#B101)), p. 92. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. I say that the intuition is deep; I do not say that it is unassailable. I have argued elsewhere that it may involve an unacceptable idealism: see Moore ([2012](#B227)), esp. Ch. 14, §4. A further issue is that, if there cannot be a universe devoid of sentient creatures, then it is unclear in what sense such a universe can so much as be conceived (even by God). A third issue is that we appear to be able to show, by a modification of a famous argument due to Fitch, that if whatever is actual is within epistemic reach of some actual finite being, then whatever is actual is in fact epistemically *reached* by some actual finite being, which is as much as to say that whatever is true is known to be true by some actual finite being, which is (surely) not the case: see Fitch ([1963](#B117)). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. See again the previous note. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. The word ‘peculiarly’ in this sentence is important. Some facts e.g. the fact that *e* = *mc*2, may constitute more than one world. This in turn explains why we cannot take for granted that the Unity Relation is transitive (see n. 12). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. For further discussion of tensism see Essay 11. See also Essay 13, esp. section 4. In the latter I consider other views that entail the disunity of the Cosmos: the view that there is a multiplicity of ‘world-versions’, as defended by Nelson Goodman in his (1975); and the view that there is a multiplicity of *social* worlds, a view that can be extracted from, though it is not endorsed in, the work of Bernard Williams (see e.g. Williams ([1985](#B353)), esp. Chs. 8 and 9, though note also Ch. 4, n. 19). Cf. also the view that Carol Rovane dubs ‘multimundialism’ in her (2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. This means that worlds have facts as their parts. Cf. Wittgenstein ([1961](#B365)), 1–1.1. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. This is related to what I have elsewhere called the Fundamental Principle: see Moore ([1997](#B224)), pp. 21–22.Cf. also Moore ([1997](#B224)), pp. 150–151, where I advert to the idea (which I believe can be found in the early Wittgenstein) that the world’s unity, or perhaps the world’s unity, is the possibility of its being represented from a single point of view. This bears on what I shall say later. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. N.B. Expression needs to be understood in a comparatively weak way if the Unity Principle is not to fall foul of facts which, for reasons having nothing to do with the unity of reality, can be precisely captured only from one particular point of view. To *express* a fact *f*, let us say, is to produce a linguistic item whose content *f*0 contains *f* in a sense of containment weak enough to allow for *f*’s supervenience on *f*0: cf. Moore ([1997](#B224)), pp. 15–16, and Essay 11, n. 26. Express*ibility* likewise needs to be understood in a comparatively weak way. This is so that the Unity Principle does not fall foul of points of view whose occupants, as things stand, and again for reasons having nothing to do with the unity of reality, lack the sophistication to produce linguistic items of the relevant sort. For discussion that bears on what is required here see Moore ([1997](#B224)), Ch. 5, §1, esp. pp. 81–82. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. If reality is not unified, then π can just be the world. If reality is unified, however, then the world exhausts reality and will not count as a point of view: see Moore ([1997](#B224)), p. 14. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. I said earlier that Leslie’s view accommodates universes other than our own. We now have a better grip on why. None of the facts that peculiarly constitute any of those universes is expressible from π. This is because it is impossible, from π, to determine which part of reality any purported expression of any such fact is answerable to. This in turn is because it is impossible, from π, to single out any of those universes. And *this* is for reasons that Strawson himself famously explores in Strawson ([1959](#B321)), Pt. I. (I am assuming that it is impossible, from π, to single out any of those universes in a purely qualitative way—e.g. as the densest, or as the seventh most beautiful.) Note incidentally that, even if it *had* been possible to express such facts from π, this would not have been, as we might naturally suppose that it would, a threat to Dummett’s intuition. The reason why we might naturally suppose that it would have been a threat to Dummett’s intuition is that we might naturally think that some of the facts in question could have been about lifeless universes. In fact, however, their very expressibility from π means that they could at most have been about lifeless *parts of our* universe—which is of course not lifeless. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Cf. Essay 16, sections 1 and 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. See again n. 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. See also A401–402 and, for an outstanding discussion, Gomes ([2011](#B133)). In these terms, the second part of the second edition of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ (§§22 ff.) can be viewed as an attempt to show that ‘my’ world extends to the whole of the Cosmos; Strawson’s original question can be viewed, at least in part, as the question why we should think that the Cosmos extends to the whole of ‘my’ world; and the issue with which *I* am primarily concerned can be viewed as the issue whether ‘my’ world extends to the whole of reality. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. See esp. Wittgenstein ([1961](#B365)), 5.6 ff.; and cf. n. 25. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. See e.g. Wittgenstein ([1967](#B366)), Pt. I, §§241–242. And see further below. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. See also ‘The Postulates of Empirical Thinking in General’ at A218–235/B265–294, esp. A225/B272 ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See e.g. A641/B669. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. See further A230/B282 ff. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. The following variation on the Unity Principle suggests itself: two facts, one of which is expressible from some point of view, stand in the Unity Relation to each other if and only if they are both expressible, if not from that point of view, then from *a* (common) point of view. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Cf. Moore ([1997](#B224)), p. 27. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Would there be grounds for subscribing to the unity of reality, but without incurring the same cost, in the existence, not of one privileged point of view from which all facts are expressible, but of an infinite sequence of points of view π1, π2, π3, … such that (i) for each π*i* in the sequence, any fact expressible from π*i* is expressible from π*i*+1 but not vice versa, and (ii) every fact is expressible from some π*i* in the sequence? No. That *would* incur the same cost. The mystery to which I have adverted lies not in the existence of one privileged point of view from which all facts are expressible, but in the existence of facts that are not expressible from ‘here’. The first stage in this sequence that involved such facts would also, already, involve the mystery. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. I do not mean to imply that nothing can remedy the lack. Consider e.g. Leibniz’ equation, which he takes to be fully visible only from God’s point of view, of what belongs to reality with what is for the best (see e.g. Leibniz ([1973](#B184)), §§53–60). And indeed we find essentially the same idea in Leslie. For although Leslie does not subscribe to the Leibnizian view that this is the best of all possible worlds, he does subscribe to the Leibnizian view that—if I may put it this way—this is the best of all possible worlds. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Cf. Wittgenstein ([1967](#B366)), Pt. I, §243; and cf.McGinn ([1984](#B206)), pp. 79–80. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Even Dummett’s intuition does not require that there be more than one sentient creature in any world, at least not in its rawest form. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. I am extremely grateful for comments from the audience at a meeting of the Post-Kantian Seminar in Oxford at which I presented an earlier version of this essay. Special thanks are due to Anil Gomes and Yuuki Ohta. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)