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Chapter 7

[AU1] From the Natural Attitude to the Life-World

[AU2] Dermot Moran

Here I explore the deeper meaning of Edmund Husserl's breakthrough discussion of the "natural attitude" (*die natürliche Einstellung*) in *Ideen I* (1913)¹ in relation to his evolving conception of the surrounding world or "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*),² a term that emerges in his writings around 1917 (e.g., in Supplements XII and XIII to *Ideen I*)³ and becomes perhaps the most prominent theme of the *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften* (1936 and 1954).⁴ I contend that the parallels between the "natural surrounding world" (*natürliche Umwelt*) of *Ideen I* and the "life-world" of the *Krisis* have not been sufficiently explored by commentators.

¹ E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Erstes Buch: *Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* 1, ed. K. Schuhmann, Hua III/1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977); trans. F. Kersten, *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book*. (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983). Hereafter "*Ideas*" followed by the page number of the English translation and the Husserliana (abbreviated to "Hua") volume and page number. Schuhmann's edition includes comments and corrections added by Husserl in his four different personal copies of the text.

² See Rudiger Welter, *Der Begriff der Lebenswelt: Theorien vorthoretischer Erfahrungswelt* (Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1986).

³ See E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Zweites Buch: *Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution*, ed. Marly Biemel, Hua IV (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952); trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuweras *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book*, Husserl Collected Works III (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989). Hereafter "*Ideas II*" followed by the page number of the English translation and the Husserliana volume and page number.

⁴ The German edition is E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana (hereafter "Hua") Volume VI (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954). This edition includes the published parts of the *Krisis* as well as a selection of associated documents.

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12 I also want to mention the philosophical context that conditioned Husserl's contrast
 13 between the natural surrounding world and the world of science. Husserl's exploration
 14 of the experience of the natural world in the 1920s more or less coincides with the
 15 advocacy by the Logical Positivists of the Vienna School⁵ of a "scientific conception
 16 of the world" (*eine wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung*), articulated in their Manifesto
 17 of 1929.⁶ The Positivists advocated a scientific conception of the world to correct—or
 18 even replace—the naïve, natural, pre-scientific approach to the world and thereby to
 19 set philosophy and the other human sciences on the road to rigorous science.⁷ Husserl's
 20 alternative, already in *Ideen I*, wants, on the other hand, to *re-situate* the scientific
 21 conception of the world *within* the life-world and show how the idealizing scientific
 22 attitude requires and cannot replace the natural attitude.

23 Husserl offers a devastating analysis of the problems imposed by a narrow promotion
 24 of the natural scientific outlook in all areas of life. From "Philosophie als strenge
 25 Wissenschaft" (1910/1911)⁸ to the *Krisis*, he builds a critique of *naturalism* and
 26 *objectivism* and defends the need for a rigorous transcendental science to replace the
 27 failed objective science of subjectivity that modern psychology purported to be.

28 In his later years, Husserl often reflected on and offered interpretations of his ear-
 29 lier efforts. Thus, in a very late text from summer 1937 entitled "Zur Kritik an den
 30 *Ideen I*" (Towards a Critique of the *Ideen*)⁹—perhaps the last text he ever wrote before

It is substantially translated by David Carr as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern U. P., 1970), although some supplements have been left out of the Carr edition. Hereafter the *Crisis of European Sciences* will be cited as "*Krisis*" followed by the page number of the English translation (where available) and the Husserliana volume and page number.

⁵ On the complex history of the Vienna Circle, logical positivism and logical empiricism, see Thomas Uebel, "On the Austrian Roots of Logical Empiricism: The Case of the First Vienna Circle," *Logical Empiricism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, eds. Paulo Parrini et al. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003) and Alan Richardson and Thomas Uebel, eds. *The Cambridge Companion to Logical Empiricism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). See also Friedrich Stadler, ed., *The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism: Re-evaluation and Future Perspectives* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004) and idem, *The Vienna Circle—Studies in the Origins, Development, and Influence of Logical Empiricism* (Vienna: Springer, 2001). For Husserl's relationship with positivism, see Manfred Sommer, *Husserl und der frühe Positivismus* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1985).

⁶ See *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis* (1929); trans. "The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle," *The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: from 1900 to the Vienna Circle*, ed. Sahotra Sarkar (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996), 321–40.

⁷ Between 1928 and 1937, the very period in which Husserl was developing his views on the *Lebenswelt*, the Vienna Circle published ten books in a collection named *Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung (Monographs on the Scientific World-Conception)*, eds. Moritz Schlick and Philipp Frank. These works have now been translated in the series *Unified Science: The Vienna Circle Monograph Series Originally Edited by Otto Neurath* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987).

⁸ E. Husserl, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921)*, Hua XXV 3–62, trans. Marcus Brainard, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," *The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* Vol. II (2002): 249–95.

⁹ E. Husserl, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlaß 1934–1937*, ed. Reinhold N. Smid, Husserliana Vol. XXIX (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992).

he fell ill—Husserl writes of devising various ways into transcendental phenomenology and characterizes the way in *Ideen I* as leading in “a single leap” (*in einem Sprunge*, Hua XXIX, 425) to a new form of experiencing. He also says that *Ideen I* provided a way from “the natural concept of the world” (*natürlicher Weltbegriff*, Hua XXIX, 425) which he characterizes as “the ‘concept’ of the world of the ‘natural attitude’” and parses as “the pre- and extra-scientific life-world or the world that, correspondingly, has always been and always will be, in all of our natural practical life-interests, the standing field (*das ständige Feld*) of our interests, our goals, our actions” (Hua XXIX, 425). He acknowledges further that this natural conception of the world was sketched “only in the roughest outlines” (*nur in rohesten Zügen*) in *Ideen I*. The systematic analysis and description of this “Heraclitean-moving world” presents a great and difficult problem. Finally, he writes that the reduction to the life-world restores the sense of history missing from the Cartesian way:

We shall see that the life-world (considered omnitemporally) is nothing other than the historical world. From this, we can see that a complete systematic introduction to phenomenology is initiated and carried through by a universal historical problem. If one introduces the *epoch* without the thematic of history, then the problem of the life-world, that is to say, the problem of universal history, will be entirely left out. The way introduced in *Ideen I* has its legitimacy, but now I maintain that the historical way (*den historischen Weg*) is more primary (*prinzipieller*) and more systematic. (Hua XXIX, 425–26, my translation)

This is an extraordinary admission. Husserl effectively admits that what he had uncovered in *Ideen I*, i.e., the natural concept of the world, would become clarified in his later analysis of the life-world as a *historical* concept. This “historical” way into phenomenology, moreover, is actually more primordial and all inclusive than the “Cartesian way”!¹⁰ Husserl’s various ways to the reduction are well known, although there is dispute about their nature, number and interrelatedness,¹¹ but it is unusual to speak of a “historical reduction.” Husserl’s own students (Ludwig Landgrebe,¹² Alfred Schutz, and Aron Gurwitsch) read the *Krisis* as representing a novel point of departure with its interest in history and the life-world as an attempt to rebalance the Cartesian presentation of transcendental phenomenology, explicated

¹⁰I am grateful to LAU Kwok-Ying for his article “History and the Phenomenological Reduction in the Last Husserl,” presented at the Fourth OPO meeting, *Razón y vida*, Segovia, Spain, 19–23 Sept 2011.

¹¹ See for instance Iso Kern, “Die drei Wege zur transzendental-phenomenologischen Reduktion in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls,” *Tijdschrift voor Filosofie*, XXV (1962): 303–49; trans. as “The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl,” *Husserl. Expositions and Appraisals*, eds. F. Elliston and P. McCormick (South Bend, IN: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 126–49; and Iso Kern, “The Phenomenological or Transcendental *epoch* and Reduction,” *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*, eds. R. Bernet, R. Kern, and E. Marbach (Evanston, IL: Northwestern U. P., 1993), 58–77. See also John Drummond, “Husserl on the Ways to the Phenomenological Reduction,” *Man and World* 8 No. 1 (February 1975): 47–69. Both Kern and Drummond agree in seeing *Ideen I* as primarily promoting the Cartesian way.

¹² See, for instance, L. Landgrebe, “The World as a Phenomenological Problem,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1/1 (Sept. 1940): 38–58; and Ludwig Landgrebe, “Husserls Phänomenologie und die Motive zu ihrer Umbildung,” *Revue internationale de Philosophie* 1/2, (Brussels, 1939).

61 in *Ideen I, Cartesianische Meditationen*¹³ and reaffirmed in the “*Nachwort zu*
62 *meinen 'Ideen'*” (published in 1930 in the *Jahrbuch* and in English in Boyce
63 Gibson’s 1931 translation of the *Ideen*).¹⁴

64 Thus Landgrebe connects Husserl’s interest in the life-world with the manner in
65 which space and time are experienced by the embodied person. In this connection
66 Husserl had written in 1934 a fragment “*Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre in der*
67 *gewöhnlichen weltanschaulichen Interpretation. Die Ur-Arche Erde bewegt sich*
68 *nicht*” that connected the life-world with the world as experienced prior to
69 science.¹⁵ Landgrebe writes: “Thus, in explicating immediate experience, the experi-
70 ence of our world as a ‘life-world,’ Husserl effects a reversal of the ‘Copernican
71 Revolution,’ by the insight that every experience necessarily presupposes an ultimate
72 unmoved basis, which is not itself objectivated. For ‘us men,’ this basis is ‘our
73 earth’—as an actual exemplification of an essential necessity.”¹⁶

74 Commentators are not wrong to see as new in the *Krisis* the themes of life-world
75 and history. Husserl himself, however, believed he had been moving in this broadly
76 historical direction since *Ideen I*; indeed, there are undoubtedly tentative discus-
77 sions in that work that anticipate the later explicit discussion (e.g., in the portrayal
78 of phenomenology as a “science of origins” in *Ideen I*, §56).

79 In many later texts, Husserl regarded the Cartesian way into phenomenology as
80 “one-sided” and deficient and saw the way into transcendental phenomenology
81 through the life-world (sometimes called “the ontological way”) as more “basic” or

¹³ E. Husserl, *Méditations cartésiennes: Introduction à la phénoménologie*, trans. G. Peiffer and E. Levinas (Paris: Almand Colin, 1931). The German text was not published until 1950 as *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge*, ed. Stephan Strasser, Husserliana I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950); trans. D. Cairns as *Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960). Hereafter “CM” followed by page number of English translation, and Husserliana volume and page number.

¹⁴ Husserl’s “Author’s Preface” was written in 1930 and was published in English translation in Boyce-Gibson’s translation of *Ideen I* published in 1931, see E. Husserl, “Author’s Preface to the English Edition,” *Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier Books, 1962), 5–22. Husserl’s German text is somewhat different, and was originally published in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, vol. XI (1930). It is reprinted as “*Nachwort*,” Hua V 138–62, and translated as “Epilogue” in *Ideas II*, 405–30. Husserl had originally planned both a Foreword and an Afterword to the volume to explain the significance of *Ideen I*.

¹⁵ Edmund Husserl, “*Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre in der gewöhnlichen weltanschaulichen Interpretation. Die Ur-Arche Erde bewegt sich nicht. Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Körperlichkeit der Räumlichkeit der Natur im ersten naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne. Alles notwendige Anfangsuntersuchungen*,” *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, ed. Marvin Farber (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1940), 307–25; trans. as “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” *Husserl. Shorter Works*, trans. and eds. Frederick Elliston and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame: U. of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 222–33; revised by Len Lawlor in M. Merleau-Ponty, *Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology*, eds. L. Lawlor and B. Bergo (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2002), 117–31.

¹⁶ L. Landgrebe, “The World as a Phenomenological Problem,” trans. D. Cairns, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1/1 (Sept. 1940): 46.

[AU3]

“primary” (*prinzipiell*) and more complete. Thus he contrasted the manner in which the phenomenological reduction is introduced, as mentioned, in “one leap”—a phrase repeated in the *Krisis*, §43) in *Ideen I* with the various ways to the reduction in later works including the *Krisis*. According to *Ideen I*, §56, it is precisely the natural world—including the physical, psychophysical, and cultural worlds—that must undergo “switching off” or “exclusion” (*Ausschaltung*, *Ideen I*, §56, 131; Hua III/1, 122) in the reduction. In *Ideen I*, as 2 years earlier in the *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1910/1911)¹⁷—and indeed as in the 1907 *Idee der Phänomenologie*¹⁸—Husserl presents Descartes as the great originator of transcendental philosophy. Thus in the *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* he writes: “The first philosopher who achieved a phenomenological reduction was Descartes. However, he achieved it only to relinquish it immediately. It is a most noteworthy fact that the fundamental consideration that inaugurates the entire course of the development of modern philosophy was nothing other than the staging of the phenomenological reduction” (BPP, 41; Hua XIII, 150).

Husserl gradually became aware that the “Cartesian way” uncovered pure subjectivity but seemed to leave it without content, without connections to other subjects or to the world. The greatest danger of the Cartesian way is that it can invite a new consideration of consciousness precisely in the natural attitude and thus distorting its true essence. Hence, Husserl proposes a more “universal and radical epoch” in *Erste Philosophie* 1923/1924 (Hua VIII, 129),¹⁹ for instance, which he thinks might uncover directly the transcendental spectator with its transcendental life (Hua VIII, 127). Only gradually, does Husserl come to realize that what one could call the “being-in-the-world-with-others” of the transcendental subject cannot be left to one side in the reduction. Husserl’s thinking about Kant, especially in his 1924 Kant lecture,²⁰ led him to reconsider the problem of the givenness of the world.

Husserl’s students and followers (from Landgrebe, Schutz, Gurwitsch, Patočka, Fink and Merleau-Ponty to Gadamer and Habermas) all recognised that one of the novel features of the *Krisis* is its account of the phenomenological reduction based

¹⁷ E. Husserl, “Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie,” *Zur Phänomenologieder Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass Erster Teil: 1905–1920*, Husserliana XIII, ed. Iso Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973); trans. Ingo Farin and James G. Hart, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Husserl Collected Works XII (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006). Hereafter “BPP” followed by English pagination and Husserliana volume and page number.

¹⁸ See E. Husserl, *Die Idee der Phänomenologie. Fünf Vorlesungen*. Nachdruck der 2. ed. Auflage. Hrsg. W. Biemel, Husserliana II (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), trans. Lee Hardy as *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Husserl Collected Works VIII (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999). Hereafter “IP” followed by page number of the English translation and the Husserliana volume and page number.

¹⁹ E. Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/24)*. Erster Teil: *Kritische Ideengeschichte*, ed. R. Boehm, Hua VII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965) and Zweiter Teil: *Theorie der phänomenologischen Reduktion*, ed. R. Boehm, Hua VIII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965). An English translation is currently in preparation for the Husserl Collected Works series (Springer).

²⁰ See E. Husserl, “Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy,” trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl, *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy* 5 (Fall 1974): 9–56; original collected in *Erste Philosophie*, Hua VII, 230–87.

111 on the life-world (as Husserl makes clear in *Krisis*, §43, where he explicitly invokes
112 *Ideen I*) which is contrasted with the scientific world constructed on it. He writes:

113 I note in passing that the much shorter way to the transcendental *epochē* in my *Ideen toward*
114 *a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy*, which I call the “Cartesian way”
115 (since it is thought of as being attained merely by reflectively engrossing oneself in the
116 Cartesian *epochē* of the *Meditations* while critically purifying it of Descartes’s prejudices and
117 confusions), has a great shortcoming: while it leads to the transcendental ego in one leap
118 (*in einem Sprunge*), as it were, it brings this ego into view as apparently empty of content,
119 since there can be no preparatory explication; so one is at a loss, at first, to know what has been
120 gained by it, much less how, starting with this, a completely new sort of fundamental science,
121 decisive for philosophy, has been attained. Hence also, as the reception of my *Ideas* showed, it
122 is all too easy right at the very beginning to fall back into the naive-natural attitude—some-
123 thing that is very tempting in any case (*Krisis*, 155; Hua VI, 157–58)

124 Indeed, the long discussion of the “primordial foundation” (*Urstiftung*) of modern
125 mathematical science with Galileo in *Krisis*, §9 is similarly seen by most commentators
126 as a novel development of Husserl’s late years. A re-reading of *Ideen I*, however, reveals
127 that in 1913 he already recognizes the importance of the notion of the naturally-lived,
128 naively-experienced, pregiven world (see especially *Ideen I*, §§39, 40) and also presents
129 a brief sketch of the Galilean picture of objectivity in the natural sciences. Husserl is
130 already preoccupied with the relation between what he calls the “world of experience”
131 (*die Erfahrungswelt*)²¹ and the scientific world, as his 1937 reflection confirms. Indeed,
132 his view that *Ideen I* has its own “justification” (*Recht*, Hua XXIX, 426) must now be
133 situated within the exploration of the genesis of the historical world which is “more
134 primary” (*prinzipieller*).

135 *Ideen I* is—like the *Logische Untersuchungen*—“a patch-work” (*Stückwerk*), an
136 Aladdin’s cave of phenomenological insights, supposedly presented in systematic
137 form, although the progression of thought is not always obvious. I do not believe
138 the greatness of the work lies in its introduction of the phenomenological *epochē*,
139 the reductions, the noetic-noematic correlation, and so on. Rather I maintain the
140 extraordinary breakthrough is to be found in Husserl’s discovery of the *natural*
141 *attitude* (albeit already mentioned in print in “Philosophie als strenge
142 Wissenschaft”²²) and its correlate the natural world (*Ideen I*, §47), themes which
143 lead him to conceive of a new way of uncovering the presuppositions of the natural
144 attitude and of mundane life in general. We shall concentrate hereafter only on the
145 notion of the natural attitude.

²¹ The term “world of experience” (*Erfahrungswelt*) is frequently used by Husserl, see, for instance, *Ideen I*, §46, Hua III/1, 96 and §48; III/1, 102.

²² Edmund Husserl, “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” *Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Kultur* 1 (1910–1911), 289–341; reprinted in Edmund Husserl, *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1911–1921), mit ergänzenden Texten*, eds. Thomas Nenon and Hans Reiner Sepp, Husserliana XXV (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987); trans. M. Brainard, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” *New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy* II (2002): 249–95. Hereafter “PRS” followed by page number of English translation and Husserliana volume and page number.

Ideen I, §27 introduces very abruptly, and in a sketchy but evocative outline, the notion of the “natural attitude” and of normal sciences as carried out in this attitude and in its theoretical complement (“the natural theoretical attitude,” *Ideen I*, §1).²³ In this work, Husserl emphasizes the “worldly” (*weltlich*, later he often uses the word *mundane*)²⁴ nature of the sciences of the natural attitude and their dogmatic nature, which must now be confronted by a critical turn, activated by an *epochē* or “suspension,” which puts out of play all worldly “positings” (*Setzungen*) of consciousness (“the general thesis”) in order to grasp its very essence. The natural attitude is characterized as possessing a positing or thesis, something Paul Ricoeur questions, given the “profound” manner objects are present in our experience.²⁵

Husserl’s concept of the “natural attitude” (*die natürliche Einstellung*) is a major discovery. Furthermore, its correlate—“the natural surrounding world” (*die natürliche Umwelt*), which eventually evolved into the notion of the “life-world” (*Lebenswelt*) in Husserl’s Freiburg era—is equally significant.²⁶ The term “natural attitude” emerges more or less alongside the *epochē* in Husserl’s thinking, probably around 1906/1907 in Göttingen (it is mentioned, for instance, in the *Idee der Phänomenologie*, 1907, §1, where it is characterized as a direct orientation towards things and not at all occupied with the critique of knowledge or the questions raised by scepticism, Hua II, 17).²⁷ The concept of the immediate subjective and intersubjective “surrounding world” (*Umwelt*) is given its first *published* characterization in *Ideen I*, §§27–31.

In *Ideen I*, a central characteristic of the natural attitude is its “general thesis” (*Generalthesis*), or overall intentional presumption or belief that the world exists, is actual, is really there. All attitudes built on or related to the natural attitude are also permeated with this general conviction. In *Ideen I* Husserl stresses that the particular sciences are involved in and supported by the natural attitude. The “exclusions” performed by the *epochē* are designed not just to exclude our assumptions about the

²³ Husserl’s concept of *the natural attitude* (*die natürliche Einstellung*) includes the “pre-scientific” (*Krisis*, Hua VI 121, 152, 156) or “extra-scientific attitude,” the “natural theoretical attitude” (*Ideen I*, §50, 113; Hua III/1 94), the “natural-naïve attitude” (“Nachwort,” Hua V 148), the attitude in which I live my “natural worldly life” (*natürliches Weltleben*, *Krisis*, Hua VI 121, 152, 156), the “pregiven world of experience” (*die vorgegebene Erfahrungswelt*, *Krisis* Hua VI 120).

²⁴ In *Krisis* Husserl employs both the adjectives “*weltlich*” (Hua VI 178, VI 180) and “*mundane*” (VI 208) to characterize life in the natural attitude.

²⁵ *A Key to Edmund Husserl’s Ideas I*, trans. Bond Harris and J. Bouchardf Spurlock, ed. Pol Vandavelde (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996).

²⁶ Rudolf Bernet has denied that the life-world is to be understood as the correlate of the natural attitude but acknowledges that Husserl must have given rise to this impression since it is so widely believed. I can, however, document many places where Husserl identifies the natural world of naïve experience with the life-world. See also Sebastian Luft, “Husserl’s Phenomenological Discovery of the Natural Attitude,” *Continental Philosophy Review* (formerly *Man and World*) 31 (1998): 153–70.

²⁷ The term “natural attitude” does not occur in Husserl’s 1906/07 lectures, see Edmund Husserl, *Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07*, ed. Ullrich Melle, Hua XXIV (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1985).

172 real world, or “nature” but also Husserl wants explicitly to exclude the natural sciences,
 173 both formal (mathematical physics) and experiential (biology), as well as cultural
 174 sciences (*Ideen I*, §§56–60). According to the “Cartesian way” of *Ideen I*, what
 175 remains after the exclusion and suspension of this general thesis is the immanent
 176 domain of “pure consciousness” with its *cogitationes* and *cogitata*. Already in
 177 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* Husserl makes clear that “[T]he correlate of
 178 the phenomenological perception is the *cogitatio* in the Cartesian sense, for which
 179 we can say instead: the pure, in contradistinction to the empirical consciousness”
 180 (BPP, 41; Hua XIII, 150). By the *Krisis* Husserl had come to see the distortion
 181 introduced by this move. The performance of the reduction does not so much
 182 uncover “pure consciousness,” in this narrow sense, as reveal an intentionally
 183 constituted life-world of significances, actions, and social intercourse in which the
 184 ego is at once embedded and contemplating. The problem is to articulate this
 185 movement from the natural world to the disclosing of the life-world without engaging
 186 in circular reasoning.

187 By contrast with the early emergence of the concept of the “natural attitude” and
 188 its correlated “surrounding world,” the concept of “life-world” did not take its
 189 precise form until after the publication of *Ideen I*, probably around 1917. In *Ideen I*,
 190 the concept of “world” is expressed largely through the concept of the “surrounding
 191 world” (*Umwelt*), e.g., in §§27 and 28, or “surrounding worlds” (*Umwelten*) in the
 192 plural: there is the “natural surrounding world” and there are “ideal worlds.” Husserl
 193 also invokes the “environment” (*Umgebung*) several times, meaning usually my
 194 immediate “surroundings” (*Ideen I*, §27), or, later, the “surroundings” of a perception
 195 (*Ideen I*, III/1, 257).²⁸ Much of the later discussion of *Umwelt* focuses on its role as
 196 the background of thing-perception (*Dingwahrnehmung*, see *Ideen I* III/1, 101).
 197 *Ideen I*, §53 deals with the nature of the world of real animals and other living
 198 things, but how does this relate to the material world and also to the world of abso-
 199 lute subjectivity? Later, Husserl will call the familiar surrounding world the “home
 200 world” (*Heimwelt*) or “familiar world” (*Nahwelt*, see *Krisis*, 324; Hua VI, 303) and
 201 will broaden this concept of “world” until it becomes the central theme of his late
 202 reflections.

203 An important discussion concerns the appropriate kind of *transcendence* that can
 204 be said to belong to the natural world. In *Ideen I*, §47, “The Natural World as a
 205 Correlate of Consciousness,” Husserl explicates the notion of *Umwelten* more
 206 specifically to be the correlates of possible consciousness. The actual *Umwelt* is one
 207 of many possible *Umwelten*. He elaborates:

²⁸ Surprisingly only *Umgebung* and not *Umwelt* is listed in the index made by Gerda Walther to accompany *Ideen I*. *Umgebung* appears in *Ideen I*, §27 with the sense of immediate surroundings. But it is invoked relative to the “intersubjective” world we share with other “I-subjects” (*Ichsubjekte*) in *Ideen I*, §29 (*die intersubjektive natürliche Umwelt*, III/1 60). Avenarius speaks of humans belonging to an *Umgebung* that includes other humans. Husserl often uses the word “*Umgebung*” to refer to the habitats of humans and animals (cf. *Krisis*, Hua VI, 354).

But if the kinds of mental processes included under experience, and especially the fundamental mental process of perceiving physical things, can be submitted by us to an *eidetic* consideration, and if we can discern essential possibilities and necessities in them (as we obviously can) and can therefore eidetically trace the essentially possible variants of motivated experiential concatenations: then the result is the correlate of our factual experience, called "*the actual world*," as *one special case among a multitude of possible worlds and surrounding worlds* which, for their part, are nothing else but the *correlates of essentially possible variants of the idea*, "*an experiencing consciousness*," with more or less orderly concatenations of experience. As a consequence, one must not let oneself be deceived by speaking of the physical thing as transcending consciousness or as "existing in itself." The genuine concept of the transcendence of something physical which is the measure of the rationality of any statements about transcendence can itself be derived only from the proper essential contents of perception or from those concatenations of definite kinds which we call demonstrative experience. The idea of such transcendence is therefore the eidetic correlate of the pure idea of this demonstrative experience. (*Ideen I*, §47, 106; III/1, 100–101)

This might be said to articulate the absolutely central tenet of Husserl's transcendental idealism. Indeed, the exclusion of every transcendence regarding consciousness is precisely what Husserl calls "transcendental phenomenology" in *Ideen I*, §86.

In the *Krisis* Husserl continues to use more or less the same language as in *Ideen I*. In his 1931 *Nachwort* he indeed affirms that *Ideen I* is an essential if incomplete articulation of his transcendental idealism. What is interesting is that the notion of life-world does not just replace the notion of the natural world (as correlate of the natural attitude) but is also revealed as a transcendental-phenomenological conception. In other words, the transcendental-phenomenological *epochē* and reduction themselves reveal the life-world as the inescapable and unsurpassable ground of all experience. Husserl has shifted from a natural to a transcendental conception of "worldhood" or "worldliness" (*Weltlichkeit*, *Krisis*, 188; Hua VI, 192—the term does not appear in *Ideen I*) involves—a term he uses although it is more usually associated with Heidegger, and which appears in the third draft of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* article, Hua IX, 274.²⁹ Generally speaking, Husserl continues to use *Umwelt* broadly to mean my overall surrounding world in contrast with *Umgebung* which he used for my immediate surroundings, my immediate context. But in the *Cartesianische Meditationen* (where it appears four times, including *Lebensumwelt*) and in the *Krisis* he makes deliberate use of a new term *Lebenswelt*.

Although Husserl is closely associated with the term *Lebenswelt*, the term did not originate with him, but can be found in a number of contemporary writers such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal, Georg Simmel,³⁰ Rudolf Eucken, among others, all of whom used the term in the first decade of the twentieth century. The term is already

²⁹ It would be interesting to compare Husserl's and Heidegger's conception of "worldliness" or "worldhood" (*Weltlichkeit*). See Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1993); trans. J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, *Being and Time* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), §14.

³⁰ Georg Simmel, *Die Religion* (Frankfurt, 1912), 13. See Andreas Brenner, "Gibt es eine Ethik der Lebenswelt," *Phenomenology of Life from the Animal Soul to the Human Mind, Analecta Husserliana* XCIII, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (2007), 253–67. See also Christian Bermes, *Welt als Thema der Philosophie: vom metaphysischen zum natürlichen Weltbegriff* (Meiner Verlag, 2004).

246 listed in Grimme's *German Dictionary* of 1885 (according to XXXIX, xlvi). Ernst
 247 Wolfgang Orth writes: "The earliest known occurrence is found, as far as I know, in
 248 Hugo von Hoffmannsthal in 1907/1908 in his introduction to his Insel Edition of
 249 'One Thousand and One Nights' ... Hoffmannsthal speaks of poems that speak to us
 250 because they emerge from out of a life world that is 'incomparable.'"³¹ As we have
 251 noted, the term "*Lebenswelt*" does not appear in *Ideen I*. Husserl does employ
 252 another similar term, "*Lebewelt*"—"the world of living creatures," or "biosphere"—
 253 in the three published editions of *Ideen I* (Hua III/1 115) in discussion concerning
 254 paleontology, but, the editor of the Husserliana edition, Karl Schuhmann corrected
 255 this as *Lebewesen* in his Husserliana edition, based on the occurrence of the word
 256 *Lebewesen* in Husserl's *Krisis* in a similar context. I believe however that *Lebewelt*
 257 is intentional and indeed the term "*Lebewelt*" (along with "*Landlebewelt*") was in
 258 use among German-speaking natural scientists (e.g., the Austrian geologist, paleon-
 259 tologist and mountaineer Karl Diener 1862–1928),³² at times to refer to the whole
 260 biological world of flora and fauna (both past and present)—the biosphere or
 261 ecosystem.³³ One should also mention a possible influencer of the biologist and
 262 semiotician Jakob von Uexküll (1864–1944), an Estonian who became professor at
 263 Hamburg and established there an Institut für Umweltforschung and who published
 264 already in 1909 his *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere*, followed by *Streifzüge durch*
 265 *die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen* (1934).³⁴

266 The term *Lebenswelt* first shows up in the draft manuscripts associated with
 267 *Ideen II* and Martin Heidegger was already employing the term in his early Freiburg
 268 lecture series of 1919. Possibly the first occurrence of the term in Husserl is in

³¹ Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter, and Alexander Ulfing, eds., *Protosoziologie im Kontext »Lebenswelt« und »System« in Philosophie und Soziologie* (Frankfurt: Humanities, 2000), 29: Der früheste bekannte Beleg findet sich meines Wissens 1907/08 bei Hugo von Hoffmannsthal in seiner Einleitung zur Insel-Ausgabe von "Tausendundeine Nacht." Fellmann (1983, 120) zitiert die Stelle (vgl. Hofmannsthal: *Gesammelte Werke*, Prosa II 1959, 276). Hofmannsthal spricht von Gedichten, die uns ansprechen, weil sie aus einer "Lebenswelt hervorstiegen," die "unvergleichlich" ist. Georg Simmel (Goethe, Leipzig 1913, 152) charakterisiert Goethes Menschengestaltung im Meister mit der Fähigkeit, "durch ihre [der Menschen] Wechselwirkung eine Lebenswelt erwachsen zu lassen" (vgl. Fellmann 1983, 120). In fact earlier references can be found. The theologian Ernest Troelsch uses it to describe the "Christian *Lebenswelt*."

³² See, for instance, Theodor Arldt, *Die Entwicklung Der Kontinente und ihrer Lebewelt: Ein Beitrag Zur Vergleichenden Erdgeschichte*, Volume 1 (Leipzig, 1907).

³³ Gerhard Preyer, Georg Peter, and Alexander Ulfing, eds., *Protosoziologie im Kontext »Lebenswelt« und »System« in Philosophie und Soziologie*, 29; 1910 wird der Terminus "*Lebewelt*" von Karl Diener (Paläontologie und Abstammungslehre, Leipzig 1910, S. 70) für vergangene und rezente Systeme von Floren und Faunen verwendet; er findet in diesem Sinne – auch als "*Landlebewelt*" – Eingang in Hörbigers, "Glacial-Kosmogonie" mit der berühmten Welteiszeitlehre (bearbeitet von Ph. Fauth, Kaiserslautern 1913, 382, 508).

³⁴ Jakob von Uexküll, *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere* (Berlin: Springer, 1909) and *Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen. Ein Bilderbuch unsichtbarer Welten*. (Berlin: J. Springer, 1934); trans. Joseph D. O'Neil, *A Foray into the Worlds of Animals and Humans. with A Theory of Meaning* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011). I am grateful to Jean-Claude Gens for bringing von Uexküll to my attention.

Beilage XIII of *Ideen II* (Hua IV, 372–77), written c. 1918–1920. Here Husserl writes: 269
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The lifeworld is the natural world—in the attitude of natural life (*Einstellung des natürlichen Dahinlebens*) we are living functioning subjects together in an open circle of other functioning subjects. Everything objective about the lifeworld is subjective givenness, our possession (*Habe*), mine, the other's, and everyone's together. Subjects and possessions are not equal. The subjects *are*, without qualification, what is not personal is surrounding world (*Umwelt*), what is lived is lived experience of the surrounding world, and that holds also for what is seen and thought, etc. (*Ideen II*, p. 385; Hua IV, 375)³⁵ 271
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Husserl writes in the same supplement that the worlds of the natural and the human sciences are correlative (*Ideen II*, 384; IV, 374) rather than incompatible. There is no straightforward clash between these approaches towards the world. Rather two different “attitudes” (*Einstellungen*) are involved. 278
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Interestingly, Husserl—and later Heidegger—regularly use the verbs (or verbal nouns) *dahinleben*, *hineinleben* and *hineinhandeln* to refer to life in the natural attitude.³⁶ The primary meaning of the life-world is, for Husserl, the “world of everyday experience” (*Alltagswelt*), the “intuitive” world (*die anschauliche Welt*), or the “pregiven” surrounding world (*Krisis*, 47; VI, 47). In *Ideen I*, §30, Husserl speaks of arriving at the “entrance gate of phenomenology” when one grasps the “quite universal characteristics of the natural attitude” (*Ideen I*, 56; III/1, 520). The way of natural living in the world, follows the stream of one's interests, capacities, habitualities, and so on. Husserl even speaks in *Krisis* §72 of the “subscientific everydayness of natural life” (*Krisis*, 260; VI, 264), utilizing the term “everydayness” (*Alltäglichkeit*) more usually associated with Heidegger (see *Sein und Zeit*, §52). 282
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Both Husserl and Heidegger speaks about absorption in everyday life, spontaneous absorbed “living along” (*Dahinleben*, see SZ, 396; 345). Life in the natural attitude is life driven by interests. Depending on what one is interested in, the world manifests or displays itself in a particular manner. Natural living is spontaneous “living along” (*im natürlichen Dahinleben*, *Ideen I*, 54; III/1, 50), just getting into it, throwing oneself into it, immersing oneself, literally “living into it” (*hineinleben*) as it were. To live in the natural attitude is to live, as Husserl puts it, “naïvely,” “spontaneously,” unquestioningly, with “blindness” (*Scheuklappen*) on. Indeed, to break out of the natural attitude is like someone blind who has suddenly been enabled to see (Hua VIII, 122). 293
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³⁵ The German reads: “Die Lebenswelt ist die natürliche Welt—in der Einstellung des natürlichen Dahinlebens sind wir lebendig fungierende Subjekte in eins mit dem offenen Kreis anderer fungierender Subjekte. Alles Objektive der Lebenswelt ist subjektive Gegebenheit, unsere Habe...” (*Ideen II*, Hua IV, 375).

³⁶ The German verb “*hineinleben*” means literally “to live into,” “to immerse oneself into,” but it is used in colloquial German expressions to mean “to take each day as it comes” (*in der Tag hineinleben*). Similarly “*dahinleben*” has the colloquial sense of “to vegetate” or “to waste one's life,” to while away one's time in a less than fully committed manner. I am grateful to Julia Jansen for pointing out this somewhat negative inflection to the term “*dahinleben*.” The verb “*hineinhandeln*” (literally “acting into”) is used by Husserl with regard to natural acting in the world at Hua VIII, 122.

303 It is a somewhat difficult question to chart the exact relationship between the
 304 natural attitude, the “naturalistic attitude” (discussed already in “Philosophie als
 305 strenge Wissenschaft” and *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*) and the outlook
 306 of *naturalism*. All three are associated in Husserl’s account. In this regard
 307 Sebastian Luft has commented: “The natural attitude consists in viewing the world
 308 as ‘nature,’ hence as existing independent of an experiencing agent.”³⁷ But to see
 309 the physical, material world as really there, as present—which Husserl often
 310 characterizes as the main thrust of the natural attitude—is not enough. In *Ideen II*,
 311 §11 (and elsewhere), Husserl speaks of the “natural-scientific attitude,” and of the
 312 correlate of the modern natural scientific attitude as “the idea of nature” (*Ideen II*,
 313 §11). In this regard, he speaks of the *scientific* idea of nature as that of a closed
 314 domain of physical objects in the one space-time connected by laws of causation,
 315 whereas this “experienced world” also includes living things, animals, persons,
 316 social and cultural products, and so on.

317 Husserl becomes more focused on this issue in his later writings and on the
 318 connection between the natural, the naturalistic, and the personalistic attitudes. In
 319 *Ideen I*, §54, Husserl speaks of the reduction as removing everything that is “personal”
 320 (interestingly in his D copy of *Ideen I* Husserl had crossed out “personal” and
 321 substituted “human,” see *Ideen I*, 127 n. 95) from consciousness so we are left with
 322 a pure stream of experiences. According to this exercise, one can strip a lived-
 323 experience of everything personal, everything psychological, egoic, and reflect on it
 324 as a pure possibility of experiencing, as what he calls “the absolute mental process”
 325 (*das absolute Erlebnis*, *Ideen I*, 128; Hua III/1, 119). One cannot accept anything
 326 “personal” as anything but relative. Similarly, in *Ideen I*, §60, Husserl speaks in the
 327 plural of “transcendencities” (*Transzendenzen*) such as physical thing, psychic thing,
 328 and person as having to be excluded. Yet, in *Ideen II*, the personal world plays a
 329 major role.

330 In *Ideen II* (perhaps, in part, under the editorial influence of Edith Stein, and
 331 indeed the challenge of Max Scheler), the personalistic attitude emerges very
 332 strongly and originally. In *Ideen II*, in Supplement XIII (connected with Supplement
 333 XII and written sometime between the teens and the early 1920s, see the Editor’s
 334 comments at Hua IV, 423), Husserl emphasises that the life-world of *persons* escapes
 335 natural science and has to be understood in its own “spiritual terms”: “The life-
 336 world of persons escapes (*entschlüpft*) natural science, even though the latter inves-
 337 tigate the totality of realities” (*Ideen II*, 384; Hua IV, 374).

338 In *Ideen II*, Supplement XII, Husserl had stated that persons as psychophysical
 339 organisms are indeed part of nature and are encountered in nature in the natural
 340 attitude. The “investigator of the world” or natural scientist (*Weltforscher*) sees
 341 persons as physical entities in this sense. Embodied subjects are simply encountered
 342 as part of the pre-given world (*Ideen II*, 363; IV, 352). Now, paradoxically, and going

³⁷ See Sebastian Luft, “A New Look at Husserl’s Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction,” in *Anuario Filosófico* (Madrid), No. 36/1 (2004), *Intencionalidad y Juicio en Husserl y en Heidegger*, 65–104, see 75.

against the thought experiment in *Ideen I*, persons are perceived—like physical objects—to be more than their “appearances” and to have an “in itself” which is absolute over and against appearances. Husserl is explicit:

Things have a causal essence, absolutely, whether I experience it or not. They are, together with their determinations, without need of me. Subjects, too, have their mundane in-itself, and to a certain degree they have a “causal” essence, whether they know about it or not and whether I know about it or not. There exist, accordingly, psychophysical connections, whether or not they enter into the compass of actual intentionality. (*Ideen II*, Supplement XII, 364; Hua VI, 353)

Husserl then considers the psychophysical understanding of human beings as natural beings embedded in a physical world as an entirely appropriate way of considering them. Human beings are *conditioned* by physical, causal processes (what Husserl calls “psycho-physical conditionalities”) whether they know it or not. They belong to nature understood as the causally closed domain of space-time. Husserl is clear that, at one level, even the human sciences investigate humans as part of nature and that this nature has been discovered or revealed through the process of mathematization as inaugurated by Galileo and modern natural science (see *Ideen II*, 364; IV, 353, where he speaks of “mathematical naturalization”). But there are limits to that perfectly legitimate form of human science. There is another form of human science—operating in transcendental register—which sees human beings as self-conscious normative personal agents recognizing, cooperating and in conflict with other self-conscious personal agents: “The human sciences are, essentially, personal sciences. They deal with persons in personal associations and with the personal surrounding world, which arises out of personal acts in personal motivations” (*Ideen II*, 365; IV, 354). It is this latter sense of the person as free autonomous agent motivated by rational and irrational motives that escapes natural science.

Husserl contrasts the personalistic attitude with the naturalistic attitude in *Ideen II*. Already in “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” all forms of *naturalism* (*Naturalismus*) or “naturalistic objectivism” are said to harbor an inbuilt “absurdity” or “countersense” (*Widersinn*), which he defines as an “evident inconsistency” (PRS, 254; Hua XXV, 9). This absurdity consists in the attempt to *naturalize* consciousness: “What characterizes all forms of extreme and consistent naturalism, from popular materialism on down to the most recent sensation-monism and energeticism, is, on the one hand, the *naturalization of consciousness*, including all intentionally immanent givens of consciousness, and, on the other hand, the *naturalization of Ideen*, and thus of all absolute ideals and norms” (PRS, 254; XXV, 9). Already in this 1910/1911 essay, Husserl acknowledges the hold of naturalism on our intuitions: “It is not easy for us to overcome the primeval habit (*die urwüchsige Gewohnheit*) of living and thinking in the naturalistic attitude and thus of naturalistically falsifying the psychical” (PRS, 271; Hua XXV, 31). The “spell of the naturalistic attitude” and “primeval naturalism” prevents us from grasping the psychical as such and indeed, in general, from seeing essences. Naturalism misconstrues the essential nature of consciousness and indeed the nature of the eidetic in general.

In “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft” Husserl shifts from talking about the *natural attitude* to the *naturalistic attitude*. In *Ideen II*, §49 he elaborates on the

388 distinction between the naturalistic attitude with the personalistic attitude. There has
389 been considerable debate about the manner in which these attitudes coordinate or
390 overlap. Possibly, then, these are two sub-divisions within the overarching natural
391 attitude. While Husserl characterizes naturalism as at bottom countersensical, he
392 does acknowledge one area where he thinks naturalism gets it right, namely, that it
393 recognizes the necessary *embodiment* of consciousness: “The legitimate ‘natural-
394 ization’ of consciousness consists in the fact that [animate] body (*Leib*) and soul
395 form a genuine experiential unity and that, in virtue of this unity, the psychic obtains
396 its position in space and time” (*Ideen II*, §46, 176; Hua IV, 168). Husserl under-
397 stands that the natural attitude approaches living things as psychophysical unities.

398 As the mature Husserl often insists, the natural attitude is, of course, an attitude
399 that is, in its very naiveté, unknown to itself. The natural attitude is a kind of
400 “primordial” (*urtümlich*) attitude (as Husserl puts it in his 1924 Kant lecture) that
401 runs through every aspect of “worldly life” (*Weltleben*—a term that becomes
402 prominent for natural living in the *Krisis*). Husserl speaks of our natural living in the
403 world from childhood on in *Erste Philosophie* (Hua VIII § 45).

404 We know from *Ideen I*, §31 that it takes a radical change or alteration of
405 attention or interest to bring the natural attitude to light. To illuminate the natural
406 attitude as such is itself to effect the *philosophical attitude* (Hua II, 18). Thus,
407 Husserl states that phenomenology is a science, but it is also “at the same time
408 and above all a method and an attitude, the specifically *philosophical attitude of*
409 *thought*, the specifically *philosophical method*” (IP, 19; Hua II, 23). More
410 precisely, the attitude that illuminates the natural attitude is the transcendental-
411 phenomenological attitude. In fact, in historical terms, it is the “breakthrough”
412 of the “ancient Greek philosophers” (“a few Greek eccentrics” as he says in the
413 Vienna Lecture, *Krisis*, 276; Hua VI, 321).

414 In his mature work, Husserl has a particular interest in the description of the
415 natural attitude itself; indeed in the *Krisis* writings he speaks of a “science of the
416 life-world” and an “ontology of the life-world” (see *Krisis*, §51). Rochus Sowa
417 dates this project of a science of the life-world (understood as a rethinking of Kant’s
418 transcendental aesthetic, i.e., the analysis of the a priori framework of sensible
419 experience) to the early twenties and sees it as Husserl’s response to the twin chal-
420 lenges of Avenarius and Dilthey (Hua XXXIX, xxvi). Sowa correctly locates
421 Husserl’s thinking here in the *Ding und Raum* lecture series (1907) where Husserl
422 is discussing the constitution of the physical thing in perception. In *Ideen I*, however,
423 he is far more interested in the manner in which this attitude can be bracketed,
424 suspended, interrupted, put under erasure to gain access to what he will call the
425 “transcendental” attitude.

426 As is well known, from the beginning of his career, Husserl’s overall concern is
427 with science and how science is possible. To make the question more precise, his
428 question is: how is scientific objectivity or the objectivity of knowledge possible?
429 His overall aim was to develop a well-grounded *Wissenschaftslehre*, a theory of
430 scientific knowledge. In order to make more precise the meaning of scientific objec-
431 tivity, quite early on, probably in his early years at Göttingen, Husserl introduces a
432 crucial and permanent distinction between experiential objectivity in naïve

experiencing in the natural attitude and the specific kind of scientific objectivity that comes about through the adoption of the special “theoretical attitude” (*die theoretische Einstellung*, mentioned right at the beginning of *Ideen I*, §1, and described as the “natural theoretical attitude” at *Ideen I*, §50, and discussed in more detail at *Ideen II*, §3). The point is well made (and crucially important for the planned *Ideen III*)³⁸ that Husserl wanted to ground not just the natural sciences but also the human sciences, but he is more interested in the relations between the natural and the theoretical attitudes. Husserl defines theoretical acts very broadly as *self-conscious* acts of perceiving, judging, valuing, etc. “Again it is one thing to be conscious at all that the sky is blue, and it is another thing to live in the performance of the judgement (that the sky is now blue) in an attentive, explicitly grasping, specifically intentional (*meinend*) way. Doxical lived experiences in this attitude, in this manner of explicit performance (*in dieser Weise des Vollzugs*) ... we term theoretical acts” (*Ideen II*, §3, 5; Hua IV, 3–4).

In the theoretical attitude (as described in *Ideen I* and *II*) the ego is explicitly *attentive*, engaged; it is in a genuine way “objectifying.” In this attitude, objects that will be explicitly thematized are also in a certain way laid out in advance. In *Ideen I*, the natural attitude is introduced precisely as a theoretical attitude (see §1). Certainly, the theoretical attitude belongs with the natural attitude as something that can be adopted prior to and independent of the reduction. In *Ideen II*, Husserl explicitly distinguishes between straightforward acts of, for example, perception and affection, and theoretical acts:

But we are no longer performing the seeing in this eminent sense when we see the radiant blue sky, live in the rapture of it. If we do that, then we are not in the theoretical or cognitive attitude but in the affective (*Gemüteeinstellung*). On the other hand, though we have adopted the theoretical attitude, the pleasure may very well be present still, as, for example, in the observing physicist who is directing himself to the radiant blue sky, but then we are not living in the pleasure. There is an essential phenomenological modification of the pleasure, and of the seeing and judging, according as we pass over from one attitude to another. This characteristic change of attitude (*Einstellungsänderung*) belongs, as an ideal possibility, to all acts ... that is all acts which are not already theoretical at the outset allow of being converted into such acts by a change of attitude. (*Ideen II*, §4, 10; IV, 8)

Theoretical acts achieve or constitute a new and higher level of objectivity, one divorced from practical involvements. What is objective becomes a theoretical object (*Ideen II*, §4, 13; IV, 11). Furthermore, and this is crucial, Husserl distinguishes carefully between this transition from the practical attitude to the theoretical and the transition from straightforward experience to reflection (*Ideen II*, §6).

³⁸ E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Drittes Buch: *Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften*, ed. Marly Biemel, Hua V (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952); trans. Ted E. Klein and W.E. Pohl, *Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Third Book*. Husserl Collected Works I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1980). Hereafter “*Ideas III*” followed by the page number of the English and the Husserliana volume and page number.

470 In the purified theoretical attitude (the attitude that is predominant in modern
 471 natural science), feelings are dropped, one no longer experiences “houses, tables,
 472 streets or works of art” (*Ideen II*, §11), but “merely material things” with their stratum
 473 of “spatio-temporal materiality.” The theoretical attitude is indifferent to the values
 474 of these things, but is not indifferent to the *value of knowledge* of them. In *Ideen II*
 475 Husserl sharply contrasts nature objects with everyday natural-attitude objects: “In
 476 ordinary life (*im gewöhnlichen Leben*) we have nothing whatever to do with nature-
 477 objects (*Naturobjekten*). What we take as things are pictures, statues, gardens,
 478 houses, tables, clothes, tools, etc. They are value-objects (*Wertobjekte*) of various
 479 kinds, use-objects (*Gebrauchsobjekte*), practical objects. They are not objects which
 480 can be found in natural science.” (*Es sind keine naturwissenschaftlichen Objekte*,
 481 *Ideen II*, §11, 29; Hua IV, 27.)

482 The theoretical attitude as a specific mode of *natural reflection* is inexorably
 483 moving towards becoming the scientific attitude. Husserl speaks of a certain *epochē*
 484 of interests and practical purposes already taking place in the theoretical attitude
 485 (and this even more so when the natural attitude is itself put in question, see *Krisis*,
 486 138n; VI, 141). But Husserl is always insistent that natural reflection does not have
 487 the resources on its own to take the transcendental turn. An *epochē* is needed to
 488 effect an “unnatural” turn to transcendental reflection (see *Erste Philosophie*, Hua
 489 VIII, 121–22). Indeed, the phenomenologist must learn to adjust to the new world
 490 of constituting subjectivity, just as the “beginner in physics” has to learn to under-
 491 stand the spatiotemporal realm in a manner that lets go of the child’s naïve attitude
 492 to the natural world (see Husserl’s analogy at Hua VIII, 123). Phenomenology has
 493 its own “world of experience” (*Erfahrungswelt*, Hua VIII, 123) different from the
 494 natural world of experience of everyday life. The phenomenologist must leave
 495 behind his own *Weltkindschaft* (VIII, 123). Husserl writes: “In this manner the natural
 496 child, the child of the world, is transformed into the phenomenological child, the
 497 child in the realm of pure spirit” (*Erste Philosophie*, VIII, 123).³⁹

498 Husserl is attempting to articulate a new insight, but is somewhat inhibited due
 499 to his retention of the metaphysically loaded terms “immanence” and “transcend-
 500 ence.”⁴⁰ In this part of *Ideen I* there are several different threads of argumentation
 501 conducted at the same time. On the one hand, Husserl is continuing his earlier critique
 502 (from the *Logische Untersuchungen*—especially the Second Investigation) of all
 503 forms of *representationalism*. He is specifically seeking the “clarification of a funda-
 504 mental error” (§43); the “fundamental error” of modern philosophy being the
 505 assumption that perception does not reach the true thing in itself. The perceived
 506 thing, on this view, is just a place-holder for the thing in physics.

³⁹ Husserl in this period speaks of the phenomenological reduction in religious terms as turning us into children in a new sense. He sometimes quotes Christian scripture—“unless we become as little children we cannot enter the Kingdom of Heaven,” cf. Hua VIII, 413–18.

⁴⁰ In *Cartesianische Meditationen*, §11, Husserl says that the concept of the “transcendent” has to be explored exclusively on its own terms.

Husserl has always been an opponent of the “sign” theory of perception. The thing is not a sign or cipher for something that lies hidden behind our experiences. As he writes: “Between perception, on the one hand, and depictive-symbolic objectivation, on the other hand, there is an unbridgeable essential difference” (*Ideen I* § 43, 93; Hua III/1, 79).

In contrasting the experienced thing with the thing as a scientific construct, Husserl adverts to the “well known distinction between primary and secondary qualities” (*Ideen I*, §40, 84; Hua III/1, 71), which claims the true physical thing is the one determined by physics. Husserl writes:

When physics determines the physical thing given exclusively by such concepts as atoms, ions, energies, and so forth, and as, in any case, space-filling processes for which only characterizations are mathematical expressions, it means them as something transcendent to the whole physical thing-content standing there “in person.” As a consequence, it cannot mean the physical thing as something located in the natural space pertaining to the senses. In other words, the space of physics cannot be the space belonging to the world given “in person” in perception: if it were, then the Berkeleyan objection would also apply to it. (*Ideen I*, §40, 84–85; Hua III/1, 72)

What is the Berkeleyan objection that Husserl is invoking here? It is the claim that the so called “primary” properties are as subjective-relative and perspectival as the secondary qualities. Primary qualities are relative to a perceiver; there are no “properties-in-themselves.” The space of physics cannot be the space of lived experience. This is surely the lesson of the *Krisis* and associated works, but here it is already explicitly stated in *Ideen I*. Indeed, rather than being an innovation in *Krisis*, §9, Husserl is interested in Galileo’s revolution in physics already in “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” where he writes: “For the knowledge of external nature the decisive step from naive to scientific experience, from vague everyday concepts to scientific concepts with full clarity, was first made, as is well known, by Galileo” (PRS, 266; Hua XXV, 24).

What I want to stress here is the direct continuity, despite the gap of a quarter century, between *Ideen I* and *Krisis* in the analysis of the relation between natural and scientific experience of the world. In both *Krisis* and in *Ideen I* Husserl is struggling with the contrast between the naturally lived, naively experienced world (the world of “perception” in Husserl’s broadened sense that became Merleau-Ponty’s) and the world as projected in the theories of the modern mathematical sciences. Husserl is constantly questioning how the formally constructed world of science has come to be substituted for the ordinary world of experience. In *Formale und transzendente Logik*, §96,⁴¹ for instance, Husserl speaks of “higher questions concerning the constitution of what we may call a theoretical world” (FTL, 243; Hua XVII,

⁴¹ Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Mit ergänzenden Texten*, hrsg. Paul Janssen, Husserliana XVII (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974); trans. Dorion Cairns, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). Hereafter “FTL” followed by English page number and Husserliana volume and page number.

545 250), i.e., the world as formalized by the sciences. According to this “idealization,”
 546 there is a “world in itself” and “the idea of exact nature” (*Idee der exakten Natur*,
 547 XVII, 250). This world in itself is precisely that which can never be experienced.

548 In *Krisis*, Beilage XVII, written around 1936–1937, Husserl insists all sciences
 549 are founded on the life-world and remain within the life-world:

550 Here is again something confusing: every practical world, every science, presupposes the
 551 life-world; as purposeful structures (*Zweckgebilde*) they are *contrasted* with the life-world,
 552 which was always and continues to be “of its own accord (*von selbst*).” Yet, on the other
 553 hand, everything developing and developed by mankind (individually and in community) is
 554 itself a piece of the life-world (*ein Stück der Lebenswelt*): thus the contrast is suspended .
 555 (*Krisis*, 382–83; VI, 462)

556 Husserl says this is only confusing for scientists because the life-world is not
 557 their subject matter no matter how it remains the “foundation” of their research.
 558 Scientific worlds are literally “pieces” (*Stücke*) of the life-world which provides
 559 a “fundament” or “ground” (*Grund, Boden*), and indeed “sub-soil” (*Untergrund*).
 560 I note here in passing that part of Heidegger’s implicit critique of Husserl is that he
 561 did not have an adequate conception of grounding (in *Vom Wesen des Grundes*—
 562 submitted to Husserl’s seventieth-birthday *Festschrift*).⁴²

563 At the end of *Ideen I*, §151 Husserl returns to discuss the many levels or “strata”
 564 (*Schichten*) involved in the transcendental constitution of the thing (a topic he had
 565 also explored in *Ding und Raum*) from the lower level of the “sensuous schema” to
 566 the highest stratum of the “substantial-causal physical thing” (*Ideen I*, §151, 363;
 567 III/1, 316), a theme on which he will elaborate in *Ideen II*. Interestingly Husserl
 568 speaks of the “intersubjectively identical physical thing” as being on one level down
 569 from the highest level. This intersubjective world is the correlate of the world under-
 570 stood in *empathy* (*Ideen I*, §151, 363; III/1, 317). This identifies a particular prob-
 571 lematic—why is the physical-causal thing in nature the highest level—surely the
 572 intersubjectively agreed thing should be on the highest level? Husserl states “very
 573 difficult problems are attached to the *interwovenness* of different regions” (*Sehr*
 574 *schwierige Probleme haften an der Verflochtenheit der verschiedenen Regionen*
 575 (*Ideen I*, §152; Hua III/1, 354)). He struggles to unite these different strata. At times—
 576 especially in his later work—he talks as if the physical thing gains its objective status
 577 precisely from the intersubjective agreement (or “triangulation” as Donald Davidson
 578 calls it), but here he makes intersubjective agreement to be a level below that of the
 579 highest stratum of the “substantial-causal physical thing”! It is the perceptual encoun-
 580 ter with the physical thing that forms our dominant conception of it.

581 Husserl spends a long time discussing the constitution of the idea of *nature* and
 582 of the *natural thing* (*Naturding*) as well as the idea of exact *causality* in *Ideen II*—
 583 although the bare bones of the discussion can also be found in *Ideen I*, §47 (just
 584 before the notorious discussion of the annihilation of the world). In *Ideen II* he
 585 thinks that the scientific idea of a thing as not changing without a cause is not in fact
 586 in line with intuitive experience (*Ideen II*, §16, 53; Hua IV, 49). Naïve experience

⁴² M. Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes*; trans. Terrence Malick, *The Essence of Reasons* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969).

believes a thing *can* change on its own and finds nothing incoherent in that idea. 587
Husserl writes: 588

It was the new science of nature which first grasped this idea of a strict identity in the 589
absolutely determined and unequivocal dependencies of causality (an idea that has to be 590
set off from any empirical apprehension) and which developed the demands implicit in this 591
idea, demands which determine essentially the course of the scientific investigation into 592
nature. (*Ideen II*, §16, 52; 49) 593

This statement could have been taken directly from the *Krisis* where Husserl 594
writes: “One can truly say that the idea of nature as a self-enclosed world of bodies 595
(*Körperwelt*) first emerges with Galileo” (*Krisis*, §10, 60; VI, 61). 596

In *Ideen II*, §16 Husserl states that modern mathematical natural science has 597
prescribed the idea of nature as that which is governed by exact laws (especially 598
causality) and that determines from then on what is even to be called a “natural 599
thing.” In *Ideen III* Husserl distinguishes between “the world of actually present 600
experience, the actual, subjectively and intersubjectively intuitive world” and the 601
“objective, non-intuitive world of determinate mathematical-physical predicates” 602
(*Ideen III*, 56; Hua V, 65, translation modified). 603

In one sense, the scientific apprehension of things builds seamlessly on the intuited 604
experience. Certain apprehensions of science (e.g., that a thing is made of molecules 605
and atoms) can also be justified on the basis of everyday experience because the thing 606
is grasped as a complex composed of parts. So, in a certain sense, the scientific 607
conception of body or aspects of it, are founded on sensory perceptual experience of 608
bodies (for which *rigid, impenetrable, extended bodies* provide the criterion or the 609
optimal case), but in another sense the scientific grid manifests and explores bodies 610
in a way which is quite independent of and never supported by sensory experience. 611
Husserl’s position, therefore, is not simply to contrast the naïve common-sense object 612
with the scientific object. Modern philosophy since Descartes and Galileo had been 613
attempting to explain natural phenomena, e.g., the rainbow, the rising and setting of 614
the sun, in terms which challenged our natural conception of these things but were 615
built on the observed phenomena. But there are other cases—and Kant of course also 616
stresses this in opposition to Hume’s sceptical account of causation—where science 617
applied a certain grid of lawfulness to nature and expects nature to respond to what 618
is demanded by this grid (e.g. Hua XXIV, 348, where Husserl speaks of the “lawful 619
nexus” (*gesetzliche Zusammenhang*) of nature). 620

Husserl returns again and again to meditate on this complex relation between things 621
as they are encountered in the natural attitude and the formalized and idealized structur- 622
alization of those same things (confusingly called by the same *names*) as mediated by 623
the scientific attitude. The key to the later Husserl is that he shifts to talking about the 624
attitude rather than the *object* in his later works. His essays on the nature of lived space 625
versus geometrical space (including the “Genesis of the Copernican world” paper from 626
1923/1924 *Erste Philosophie*, Hua VII) treat this topic over and over again. 627

⁴³ Hermann Weyl, *Raum Zeit Materie Vorlesungen über allgemeine Relativitätstheorie*, 1. Auflage (Berlin, 1918); trans. H. L. Brose, *Space Time Matter* (London: Methuen, 1922).

628 The challenge is to state how precisely the life-world is *interwoven* with the
 629 scientific world, how lived space with its intuitive causal style experienced by
 630 embodied subjects provides support for scientifically described space, time and
 631 causality (see *Ideen I*, §150). This issue appears in Husserl's correspondence with
 632 the physicist Herman Weyl (1885–1955).⁴³ In a 1918 letter Husserl expresses his
 633 appreciation that a mathematician—Weyl—could recognise the importance of a
 634 phenomenological treatment of fundamental scientific concepts. Following Husserl,
 635 Weyl thinks the a priori concept of space in mathematical physics (with its notions
 636 of congruence, etc.) needs to be aligned with the phenomenological conception of
 637 lived space.⁴⁴ Indeed, already in *Ideen I*, Husserl talks about the profound phenom-
 638 enological problem of the “origin of the idea of space” (*Ideen I*, 362; III/1, 315) in
 639 relation to the experience of things as near or far, oriented in a certain way with
 640 regard to us. He returns to this problem in “Die Ur-Arche Erde bewegt sich nicht”
 641 (c. 1934), and most famously in “Ursprung der Geometrie” (1936), where Husserl
 642 talks about the manner in which, for example, surfaces experienced in daily life
 643 become selected for various practical purposes (e.g., smoothness) and then become
 644 idealized into the concept of a two-dimensional surface without a third dimension
 645 of depth. Then this concept of two-dimensional surface is—through an idealizing
 646 abstraction—constituted as an object in itself with essential properties to be deter-
 647 mined by its own science.

648 In the end Husserl's *Ideen* offered breakthrough analyses of the natural attitude
 649 and the surrounding world that eventually would be reworked in the discussions of
 650 the life-world in his late philosophy. Husserl saw *Ideen I* as the first step on the path
 651 to the *Krisis*. But the problems opened up by the manner in which the natural attitude
 652 and natural surrounding world are introduced in *Ideen I* continue through to the
 653 *Krisis*. In Husserl's mature work, the real question is how to inhibit the manner in
 654 which the natural world of experience acts on me so that I can uncover my transcen-
 655 dental life and its world of experience. As he writes in his Author's Preface to Boyce
 656 Gibson's translation of *Ideen I*:

657 On the other hand by means of this epochē the regard is freed for the universal phenomenon,
 658 “the world of consciousness purely as such,” the world purely *as given* in the manifold flux
 659 of conscious life: that is, *as appearing* “*originaliter*” in a manifold of “concordant” experiences.
 660 In these concordances it is characterized, for consciousness as “actually existing.” In its de-
 661 tails, however, but only in details, it can happen that this character of “actual being” is
 662 overturned and becomes “hollow semblance.” This universal *phenomenon*, “world existing
 663 forme” (and then also “existing for us”) is made the phenomenologist's new field of
 664 theoretical interest, the field of a new sort of theoretical experience and experiential
 665 research. (*Ideen II*, 412–13; Hua V, 145)

666 Husserl has shifted the emphasis from phenomenology as an a priori exploration
 667 of pure consciousness to phenomenology as the a priori exploration of the life-world.
 668 To set phenomenology on this transcendental path is, for Husserl, the true achievement
 669 of *Ideen I*.

⁴⁴ See Weyl's letter to Husserl of 26/27 March 1921 in Dirk van Dalen, “Four Letters from Edmund Husserl to Hermann Weyl,” *Husserl Studies* 1 (1984): 1–12.

Author Queries

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Queries	Details Required	Author's Response
AU1	Chapter title mismatch with the one given in ToC. Please check.	
AU2	Please confirm author affiliations and provide Department name in the 2nd affiliation if appropriate.	
AU3	Please provide opening parenthesis for the sentence "a phrase repeated in the <i>Krisis...</i> ".	

Uncorrected Proof