International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/riph20

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Published online: 23 Jul 2013.


To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559.2013.812605

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Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present

Dermot Moran

Abstract
Intentionality (‘directedness’, ‘aboutness’) is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, John Searle’s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review recent discussions of intentionality, including some recent explorations of the history of the concept (paying particular attention to Anselm), and suggest some ways the phenomenological approach of Husserl and Heidegger can still offer insights for contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness.

Keywords: intentionality; phenomenology; Brentano; Husserl; Anselm; Heidegger; Searle; Dennett

Setting the Stage
Intentionality (the ‘directedness’ or ‘aboutness’ of conscious experiences) is not only a topic central to phenomenology, contemporary philosophy of mind, and the cognitive sciences, it is also one of the major themes with which both analytic and continental philosophers have been separately engaged, from Edmund Husserl’s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1900/1) through key papers by Roderick Chisholm, Daniel Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, and John Searle’s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi. In this paper I shall review recent discussions of intentionality, including some recent explorations of the history of the concept, and suggest some ways the phenomenological approach can still be mined for important insights for understanding embodied, conscious life.

Husserl’s phenomenological explorations can be credited with the introduction and critical elaboration of a number of crucial concepts,
themes, and problems that were taken up by analytical philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences – after the Dark Ages of behaviourism from J. B. Watson through Carnap to Skinner – only from the mid twentieth century onwards. These themes include: intentionality, consciousness, subjectivity, the first-person perspective, embodiment, intentional agency, awareness of others (‘empathy’), intersubjectivity, and the constitution of the social and cultural objects and institutions, as well as the whole idea of the meaning-context which is the ‘lifeworld’. For phenomenology, moreover, especially in the tradition that includes Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, these issues are interrelated in important ways, and they all build on and presuppose the central phenomenological insight regarding intentionality that human comportment necessarily involves meaningful interaction with other entities (persons, things, situations, etc.) that have been constituted as meaningful in an always already meaning-loaded environment. There is no escaping the network of intentionality. In this regard, understanding intentionality is vital for understanding the philosophical issues at the heart of consciousness, embodiment, alterity and intersubjectivity.

Understanding the import and the evolution of the concept of intentionality, however, is itself a most challenging project. Grasping how a cluster of related and interdependent concepts have evolved in the philosophical tradition (or traditions) is crucial for allowing one to gain a perspective on current discussions, for highlighting operative presuppositions, and for allowing alternative visions to appear. The topic of intentionality re-emerged in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind with the pioneering work of Elizabeth M. Anscombe (1919–2001), Roderick M. Chisholm (1916–1999), and others in the late 1950s, but it quickly became entangled in a number of other problematics that distract from understanding it.

It is broadly recognized that many mental states (and how these are to be defined is itself not a trivial matter) – and not just perceptual, memorial, imaginative and other cognitive states (e.g. judgements), but also, in various ways, emotional, affective, and volitional states – have a property which is sometimes called ‘directedness’ or ‘aboutness’. Although there is no agreement on the terminology, there is a general recognition that mental states are directed towards, invoke or refer to, something beyond or ‘transcendent to’ the subjective, ‘phenomenal’ experience of the state itself. According to one virulently contested way of describing this, mental states may be said to be representational although just about everything connected with representation is under interrogation. How mental states represent was already discussed by Descartes but was framed in modern terms by Immanuel Kant in his famous 1772 letter to Marcus Herz, where he sees it as the issue of hitting the target, of ‘preciseness’ (Triftigkeit). As Robert Brandom insightfully writes:
Kant takes as his initial focus intentionality rather than knowledge. He asks about the conditions of even purported representation. What makes it that our ideas so much as seem to point beyond themselves, to something that they are about? 22

Thinking of intentionality in terms of representation leads to a number of questions about what it is that is represented (objects, properties, relations, states of affairs [Sachverhalte] as the correlates of judgements) and about the nature of the representing, i.e. how the representing takes place and what, if anything, guarantees its success. 23 Phenomenological accounts, on the other hand, tend to reject representationalism outright, and prefer to talk about meaning-constitution and establishing a sense of a shared world within which objects are encountered. Even to frame the problem as how individual minds reach outside their inner domain to grasp something that is not a part of mind is itself to misstate the problem.

Similarly, intentionality has become tangled up with the question of reference, especially how singular terms, etc., pick out their objects (e.g. theories of direct reference). 25 A further issue is to understand the ‘I’ or ‘ego’ as the bearer of the state and its presence in the stream of experience. Most recently, analytic philosophers of mind have also begun to pay attention to collective, shared intentionality and to social cognition, two issues intensely discussed in Husserlian phenomenology in the 1920s. Intentionality, then, expresses a set of relations and a set of problems – how it is that humans (leaving aside other primates) live, act and understand meaningful matters in a meaningful world. As in other matters in philosophy, how we pose the problem is itself often the real problem. So how did the problem of intentionality get posed originally?

The contemporary discussion of intentionality was initiated by Franz Brentano (1838–1917) 26 whose specific aim was to define ‘psychic phenomena’ as opposed to ‘physical phenomena’ in order to specify the domain of descriptive psychology. In his own sketch of the history of the problem, Brentano refers specifically Aristotle, Philo and Aquinas, but also, interestingly to Anselm (to whom we shall return). 27 However, the precise manner in which he revived it is controversial and, indeed, his very manner of posing the issue inevitably leads to an impasse since the notions of ‘act’, ‘relation’, ‘content’ and ‘object’ all led to insoluble problems. As Peter M. Simons has put it, the modern theory of intentionality in Brentano was ‘conceived and born in sin’. 28 Thus, almost as soon as intentionality was reintroduced, issues arose concerning the nature of the intentional relation and the metaphysical status of the intentional object. Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), in particular, attempted to establish an entire hierarchy of ‘objectivities’ (Gegenständlichkeiten), all of which have ‘outside-being’ (Aussensein) and only some of which had
existence. Secondly, there is the question: how does this ‘aboutness’ come about? What is the nature of this intentional relation? Can it be reduced to a causal relation? Or does intentionality involve a new kind of non-causal relation, what some disparagingly have characterized as a ‘noetic ray’ that links the mind to its intended object?

There is a further question as to whether this intentional relation can be reduced to something else or naturalized within the framework of the sciences. This has led to a debate as to whether intentionality is, as John R. Searle puts it, a ‘ground floor property of the mind’, or whether it is an upper-level, emergent property that depends ultimately on non-intentional robotic doings of the brain (as Daniel C. Dennett maintains). We shall return to the Searle/Dennett debate. There are also many wider questions that arise, e.g. what is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? Is all consciousness intentional? Can there be non-intentional conscious states or is the very phenomenality of experience a sufficient condition for its intentional character? Alternatively, can there be unconscious intentions or, more generally, unconscious mental states? In what sense, if at all, are other mental states such as moods intentional? There is a very significant problem also concerning the intentionality of self-conscious states (a problem that was given special attention by Brentano and Husserl since descriptive psychology (later phenomenology) relied on the evidence of these states). One can see how the very idea of intentionality has exploded into a many-sided problematic or set of problematics in the philosophy of mind.

There are furthermore many competing analyses of intentionality, including content and object theories, relation theories, adverbial theories, theories regarding the role of phenomenality in defining mental content, inferentialist theories, and so on. The manner in which the intentional act succeeds in ‘lassoing’ its objects (as Colin McGinn has put it) invites an account that focuses on the nature of the intentional relation. On the other hand, adverbial accounts fail to capture our sense of being related to things transcendent of us, a sense of being more complex and multi-sided than our intending apprehends, and, in the case of the perceived object, its being ‘there in the flesh’ (leibhaftig da), as Husserl puts it. How can being-appeared-to-redly give the sense of being appeared to by an object which is red and has the sense of existing independently apart from the phenomenal appearing and of having other aspects and sides? Intentional states need not just to be adverbially modified, as it were, but in fact must refer beyond themselves and carry the sense of a transcendent domain. This, in Husserl’s language, is the ‘transcendent’ character of intentionality and how a consistent and pervading sense of the objectivity of the common world is constituted out of these intentional intertwinings by subjects is one of the mature Husserl’s major preoccupations. I will not rehearse here current ongoing
technical discussions concerning the nature of the intentional relation (a two-place or one-place property, external or internal) or on the ontological status of intentional objects (mental, existent, possible, impossible, imaginary, fictive, temporal, propositional, and so on). Rather I shall begin with some considerations concerning Brentano and his view of the tradition, and then follow on with a discussion of the unique phenomenological contribution.

**Brentano’s Ambiguous Reintroduction of the Notion of Intentionality**

In my Presidential Address to the Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and Mind Association in Dublin in 1996, I attempted to articulate Brentano’s precise sense of intentionality, which is more peculiar than many modern advocates realise. Historical studies of Brentano have shown that he began from explicitly Cartesian assumptions and indeed some (including Heidegger and Hubert Dreyfus) claim these assumptions continue to haunt Husserl’s elaboration and critique of the Brentanian concept. Contemporary analytic philosophers, moreover, tend to parachute Brentano into another quite separate discussion – historically alien to him – namely: whether intentionality can or should be naturalized. A complicating factor is that Brentano was a sceptic or, at the very least, an indirect realist about perception. He believed that the existence of external objects was inferred from immediate sensory and inner experiences. External perception was fallible but inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung) was not just self-reflexive but also existent in an incontrovertible or self-evident manner. In the case of inner perception, Brentano maintained, esse est percipi.

In the now famous or even notorious paragraph from *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874), Brentano, having rejected various other contenders offered a positive criterion for identifying mental states:

> Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.

The German text contains all the terms that make the whole issue so perplexing; he talks of ‘relation’ (Beziehung), ‘directedness’ (Richtung),
‘object’ (Objekt), ‘content’ (Inhalt), ‘a thing’ (ein Reales), and ‘inexistence’ (Inexistenz). To make matters worse in this very passage Brentano employed two different formulations, between which he never clearly distinguished: (i) ‘directedness towards an object’ (die Richtung auf ein Objekt), and (ii) ‘relation to a content’ (die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt). The passage contains two other troubling formulations which suggest some special ontological status of the intended object:

(i) the intentional or mental inexistence of the object (intentionale, mentale Inexistenz).
(ii) ‘immanent objectivity’ (die immanente Gegenständlichkeit)

Strictly speaking – and here he is deeply influenced by Descartes – Brentano’s view was that the intentional object is ‘immanent’ in the act or state and does not have an independent existence or subsistence. Clearly, Brentano is offering only a very selective and impressionistic record of discussions of in-esse, ‘indwelling’ (Einwohnen) or ‘inexistence’ (Inexistenz) of the intentional object in the act. But, as Liliana Albertazzi has affirmed:

Brentano never altered his initial assumption that not only do acts of presentation – as psychic phenomena – have intentional existence, in that they are directed towards some sort of object or objectuality, but they also possess real, effective existence; and it is this that distinguishes them from physical phenomena which in consciousness are given merely as appearances. Consequently, acts of presentation like knowing, rejoicing and desiring have existence endowed with evidence in inner perception, while colours, sounds and emotions, for example, have only mediated existence. The same applies to judgmental acts and contents.47

As became clearer in the later Brentano (in his reist phase), it is the mental act or indeed the thinker having the act who is the substance that can be truly said to exist and the intentional object is simply some modification of the being of the performer of the act or is a kind of intentional colouring of the act.48 In the 1911 addition to Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Brentano approaches intentionality more as a kind of relation within the subject, what he calls a ‘quasi-relation’. He writes:

one could doubt whether we really are dealing with something relational here, and not, rather, with something somewhat similar to something relational in a certain respect, which might, therefore, better be called ‘quasi-relational’ [etwas Relativliches]. (PES 272)
Brentano’s mature view (post 1905) was meant to close off discussion as to the ontological status of the intentional object. But clearly he failed and already, beginning with his own students, a lively debate on ‘objectivities’ (Gegenständlichkeiten) and the various possible grades of existence, subsistence and so on emerged. Brentano’s followers (‘the Brentano school’), especially Kasimir Twardowski (1866–1938) and Alexius Meinong sought to improve on Brentano’s formulations. In 1894, exactly twenty years after the initial publication of Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, his Polish student Twardowski proclaimed:

It is one of the best known positions of psychology, hardly contested by anyone, that every mental phenomenon intends an immanent object. The existence of such a relation is a characteristic feature of mental phenomena which are by means of it distinguished from the physical phenomena.

Twardowski’s innovation was to more clearly distinguish between content and object. Meinong, building on Brentano, was more interested in developing a general ‘theory of objects’ (Gegenstandstheorie), i.e., specific types of objects, namely, intentional objects, having intentional inexistence, as opposed to ordinary physical objects, having real existence or ‘actuality’ (Wirklichkeit). Meinong proposes a kind of branching tree of different forms of being (Sein) from Aussersein to ‘holding’ (Bestehen), ‘subsistence’ (‘being thus’, Sosein), to ‘existence’ (Existenz, Wirklichkeit) whereby intentional entities could retain some degree of self-identity and sustain repeated acts of referring to them. This has led to all kinds of ontological discussions about strata or hierarchies of ‘objectivities’.

As Roderick Chisholm commented concerning Brentano’s account:

This passage contains two different theses: one, an ontological thesis about the nature of certain objects of thought and of other psychological attitudes; the other a psychological thesis implying that reference to an object is what distinguishes the mental or psychical from the physical. According to the doctrine of intentional inexistence, the object of the thought about a unicorn is a unicorn, but a unicorn with a mode of being (intentional inexistence, immanent objectivity, or existence in the understanding) that is short of actuality but more than nothingness.

The fascination with objects which, although they do not exist in a strict sense, can be talked about and be the subjects of valid predication has a long history in philosophy going back to Plato’s Sophist (if not earlier). It is worth considering Brentano’s own delineation of the
heritage of the problem. In order to explain his own conception, Brentano himself, in a long footnote, invokes Aristotle and especially the Stagirite’s discussion of intentionality in *De Anima*:

> Aristotle himself spoke of this mental in-existence. In his books on the soul he says that the sensed object, as such, is in the sensing subject; that the sense contains the sensed object without its matter; that the object which is thought is in the thinking intellect. In Philo, likewise, we find the doctrine of mental existence and in-existence. However, since he confuses them with existence in the proper sense of the word, he reaches his contradictory doctrine of the *logos* and Ideas. The same is true of the Neoplatonists. St. Augustine in his doctrine of the *Verbum mentis* and of its inner origin touches upon the same fact. St. Anselm does the same in his famous ontological argument; many people have observed that his consideration of mental existence as a true existence is at the basis of his paralogism (ep. Überweg, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, II). St. Thomas Aquinas teaches that the object which is thought is intentionally in the thinking subject, the object which is loved in the person who loves, the object which is desired in the person desiring, and he uses this for theological purposes. When the Scriptures speak of an indwelling of the Holy Ghost, St. Thomas explains it as an intentional indwelling through love. In addition, he attempted to find, through the intentional in-existence in the acts of thinking and loving, a certain analogy for the mystery of the Trinity and the procession *ad intra* of the Word and the Spirit. (PES 67)

The effort to put meat on Brentano’s skeletal history has led to a lively discussion concerning intentionality in Aristotle (Myles Burnyeat, Richard Sorabji, Victor Caston, among others), focusing on the pivotal role of *phantasia* (as discussed by Aristotle in *De anima* Bk III. Ch. 3). Recent research focuses on the Stoic talk about *ennoe-mata* – literally objects that are ‘in thought’ – immanent in the thinking process. Brentano himself refers to Philo of Alexandria’s discussion of mental and real existence, to St Augustine on the ‘inner word’, and indeed to Anselm. St Augustine played a pivotal role in the development of intentionality in the Middle Ages with his discussion of *intentio* in his monumental *De Trinitate*.

Sorabji has greatly improved knowledge of the subsequent Neo-Aristotelian and Arabic heritage especially in relation to perceptual intentionality. The Arabic tradition discussed the notion of *ma’nā* (translated into Latin as *intentio*). As Gyula Klima points out, Aquinas describes colour as having ‘intentional and spiritual being’ (*esse intentionale et spiritual*) in the mind and ‘natural being’ (*esse natural*) in
the thing \((\textit{in re})\). For St Thomas, colour has \textit{esse intentionale} in the transmitting medium of the air. Similarly, when the sea takes on the colour of the sky, the sky’s colour resides in the sea ‘intentionally’, i.e., the sea has a ‘natural’ colour of its own and takes on another colour when reflecting the sky. Thus he writes:

The sense receives the form without the matter, since the form has one mode of being in the sense and another in the sensible thing. For it has natural being in the sensible thing, whereas in the sense it has intentional and spiritual being.\(^{65}\)

According to the Aristotelian tradition, the senses receive the form without the matter. Aristotle himself uses the example of the stamp of the signet ring on the wax, which is continued in Descartes and into the modern tradition as the exemplary instance of the manner in which the representation is carried from one entity to another. Klima points out, however, that Aquinas thinks of \textit{esse intentionale} as marking out the manner form informs matter other than the specific matter found in the thing. Clearly on this account intentional ‘inexistence’ cannot be any mark of the mental. ‘Mental phenomena’ for medieval philosophers are strictly speaking only \textit{the proper operations of a mind (mens)}, i.e., a rational soul having the cognitive faculty of intellect and the practical faculty of will. Strictly speaking, the senses are not \textit{mental} at all, for the medieval, but belong to the body. The medieval discussion then often takes place in a different context regarding the prevailing conception of the mental and the physical.

\textbf{Anselm’s Fool and Gaunilo’s Insightful Response}

Both Husserl and Brentano are aware of Anselm’s contribution. Brentano discusses Anselm’s ontological argument in some detail in \textit{Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint} (PES 178) and again in his lectures \textit{On the Existence of God}.\(^{66}\) Husserl alludes to Anselm in discussing the nature of the intentional relation in the Fifth Logical Investigation (Appendix to §§ 11 and 20):

It is a serious error to draw a real (\textit{reell}) distinction between ‘merely immanent’ or ‘intentional’ objects, on the one hand, and ‘transcendent’, ‘actual’ objects, which may correspond to them on the other. It is an error whether one makes the distinction between a sign or image really present in consciousness and the thing it stands for or images, or whether one substitutes for the ‘immanent object’ some other real datum of consciousness, a content, e.g., as a sense-giving factor. Such errors have dragged on through the
centuries – one has only to think of Anselm’s ontological argument – they have their source in factual difficulties, but their support lies in equivocal talk concerning ‘immanence’ and the like. (LU V, Appendix to § 11 and § 20, II pp. 126-27; Hua 19(1) 438–9)

In his *Proslogion* Anselm considers the Biblical sentence where ‘the Fool hath said in his heart there is no God’ (Psalms 13:1; 52:1), a sentence that Augustine had already used in support of his contention that thought is a kind of inner speech. Anselm shows that anyone who understands the meaning of the term or name ‘God’ as ‘that than which nothing greater can be thought’ (*aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit*, *Proslogion* II) must in fact recognise that the bearer of that name also exists. But, if the inner thought about ‘God’ leads to the affirmation that God exists, how can the Fool meaningfully think or say in his heart that there is no God? To say the name of God and to know what one means (or designates) by that name is to recognise the existence of God. In *Proslogion* Chapter Four Anselm explains how the Fool can persist in denying the existence by making a distinction between the *vox significans*, the word signifying the thought of God, and *id ipsum quod res est*, the thing itself which is thought or signified by means of the word: ‘for in one sense a thing is thought when the word signifying it is thought; in another sense when the very object which the thing is is understood’ (*Proslogion* IV). This distinction between thinking of the *thing itself* and thinking of the *name* of the thing is vital to St Anselm’s explanation of how it is possible to be thinking about God and yet not to be compelled rationally to the recognition that God exists. Anselm’s brilliant critic, the otherwise unknown Gaunilo, in his reply on behalf of the Fool (*Pro Insipiente*), however, counters that, on the basis of Anselm’s own argument, anything whatsoever which could be thought of could be said to exist, since it could be said to be understood. Gaunilo considers the case where someone may be talking about a man that the hearer does not personally know. The hearer understands what that person says ‘on the basis of the words used’ (*secundum vocem*) and indeed he can represent to himself, or to think about, a human being in general (*per illam specialem generalemve notitiam*). But he will not have in mind or intend the particular individual man (*ille homo*) that the speaker is talking about. Furthermore, if the speaker is lying and there exists no man to be talked about, then, when the hearer is thinking about the man the speaker is mentioning, he is thinking literally of something that does not exist, although, paradoxically, the hearer is indeed thinking of something genuine, i.e., any human in general (*homo quilibet*), and is not just mouthing or representing silently a mere verbal formula to himself. Gaunilo here is employing a more sophisticated understanding of the relation between words and their meanings than Anselm. Whereas
Anselm had a two-fold distinction between the word and the sign, the *vox significans* and the *res significata*; Gaunilo, on the other hand, quite properly recognises a threefold relation: first we hear the articulated word (*vox*) which Gaunilo notes (following Augustine’s *De doctrina christiana*) is itself a real thing, a *res*, made by the breath, and expressing the sound of the letters or syllables (*res, hoc est litterarum sonus vel syllabarum*), and then we have the *sense or significance* of the heard word (*signiciatio vocis auditae*), and finally we have the external thing being thought about or referred to. Anselm in his Reply to Gaunilo insists that whatever is understood is in the understanding:

> Observe then that, from the fact that it is understood, it does follow that it is in the mind. For, just as what is thought is thought by means of a thought, and what is thought by a thought it is thought is thus, as thought, *in thought* (*in cogitatione*), so also, what is understood (*quod intelligitur*) is understood (*intelligitur*) by the mind (*intellectu*); and what is understood by the mind is thus, as understood, in the mind (*in intellectu*). What could be more obvious than this? 70

If something is understood, what is understood is in the understanding. This seems to be an Aristotelian formulation, as Brentano had noted. But what precisely does ‘in’ mean in Anselm’s phrase ‘in the mind’ (*in mente, in intellectu*) or ‘in the heart’ (*in corde*)? We are back to the issue of *in-esse* – a concept that received new configuration with the revival of Aristotle and especially with the Scotist traditions discussions of ‘objective being’ in the intellect (which survives in Descartes’ discussion of the objective and formal reality of ideas in the Third Meditation). 71 It is to this long and complex tradition that Brentano is alluding in his long footnote in *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*. Furthermore, Gaunilo’s triadic account of word-meaning-object is revived in Twardowski’s refinement of Brentano. The rich history of intentionality in Western philosophy, involving both the concept of mental reference 72 and the nature of the intentional object, continues then to offer insight into intentionality, although it is still true to say that Brentano’s researches opened up the main lines of discussion that continue today and that he was quite aware of the main features of the discussion in the tradition. But it is still important to bear in mind the issues Brentano himself was contemplating and that lie behind his formulations.

**The Linguistic Turn: Dennett and Searle**

In the mid twentieth century, discussion of intentionality took the linguistic turn (already prefigured in post-Thomistic medieval discussions)
when Roderick Chisholm famously recast the Brentanian account of intentionality\textsuperscript{73} in logical and linguistic terms (relating it to the logical notion of intensionality):

(i) Failure of existential generalization  
(ii) Failure of substitutivity of identicals \textit{salva veritate}

Chisholm’s and Gustav Bergmann’s\textsuperscript{74} accounts of Brentano were taken over by W. V. O. Quine in his classic \textit{Word and Object} (1960).\textsuperscript{75} Quine agrees with Chisholm that ‘there is no breaking out of the intentional vocabulary by explaining its members in other terms. Our present reflections are favorable to this thesis’.\textsuperscript{76} Quine cites indirect quotation and belief sentences as examples of sentences that cannot be reduced to ‘behavioral terms’. He equates Brentano’s irreducible claim to the same claim as that of indeterminacy of translation. However, Quine thinks Brentano is to be understood as ‘showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of intention’.\textsuperscript{77} Quine acknowledges that they are practically indispensable (something Dennett retains), and cannot be foresworn in daily usage\textsuperscript{78} but not that they belong to the ‘true and ultimate structure or reality’,\textsuperscript{79} which knows only, as Quine puts it, ‘direct quotation’.\textsuperscript{80}

Following directly from Chisholm and Quine, two influential accounts of intentionality emerged in Daniel C. Dennett (following Gilbert Ryle)\textsuperscript{81} and John R. Searle (following J. L. Austin). Searle’s account of intentional states uses linguistic strategies drawn from Austin’s classificatory analysis of speech acts, whereas Dennett relies on Ryle’s deflationary way of dealing with what he called ‘category mistakes’. Indeed, rather cruelly if not entirely inaccurately, Thomas Nagel has described Dennett as ‘Gilbert Ryle crossed with Scientific American’.\textsuperscript{82} Dennett enthusiastically employs Ryle’s notion of ‘category mistake’ to resist any attempt at reification of the mental, although later he concedes that Ryle was not entirely successful in the analysis of this kind of mistake.

In his first book \textit{Content and Consciousness} Dennett attempts to face the question of the genuine intentionality of consciousness without hypostasising consciousness into a separate mental substance but also without accepting behaviouristic reductionism.\textsuperscript{83} Searle, on the other hand, adapts Austin’s distinction between \textit{propositional content} and \textit{illocutionary force} to become the distinction between the propositional content and propositional attitude or what Searle terms ‘psychological mode’. Not all content is propositional in form; for non-linguistic states, such as seeing, thus Searle prefers the term ‘intentional content’ or ‘representative content’ to propositional content.\textsuperscript{84} For Searle, intentions can be directed at a single object (John loves Sally) or part of a proposition, as well as at the ‘proposition’ itself (John believes \textit{that it is raining}).\textsuperscript{85}
Just as in speech acts, intentional states are characterised by ‘directions of fit’ (world to word; word to world) depending on whether the states are satisfied by events in the world or bring about events in the world (as is the case with promises). Orders have world to word fit and desires have world to mind direction of fit; perceptions like assertions have word (mind) to world direction of fit. Speech acts and intentional states both can have sincerity conditions and conditions of satisfaction. The conditions of satisfaction of an intentional state are internal to the intentional state, e.g., part of what makes my belief a belief that it is raining is that certain conditions will satisfy it. For Searle, consciousness of belief just is consciousness of the conditions that satisfy it, the intentional content is internal to the state. For Searle, an intentional state represents its conditions of satisfaction. Thus, it is part of the meaning of my seeing a car that I believe that this seeing is caused by the car. Being caused by an object in the world is a condition for the satisfaction of seeing, and this is represented in my intentional state itself. Husserlians would challenge this claim on phenomenological grounds. While it is the case, that seeing implies that what is seen is really there, ‘in the flesh’ (as Husserl says), it is not the case that we have the sense of our seeing being caused by the object seen. Husserl prefers to speak of a certain horizon of expectation, motivation and intentional implication being given rather than a sense of causation.

Searle contends that intentionality is intrinsic and primary whereas for Dennett it is derivative. For Dennett, there are, as he puts it, no ‘unmeant meaners’. Indeed, in the last decade of the twentieth century, a ‘battle of the giants’ raged between Searle and Dennett on issues connected with intentionality and consciousness with each claiming to have refuted the other. The chronicle of their respective refutations has been set out by Searle in New York Review of Books and by Daniel Dennett in his reply there and elsewhere. Searle, furthermore, sees no reason to hold that the mental cannot be physical as well. Consciousness, he claims, is an emergent higher-level property of the brain. Intentionality is a real property of minds, albeit physically based: ‘mental phenomena are caused by neurophysiological processes in the brain and are themselves features of the brain’. In this sense, he agrees with Dennett that the basic processes are physical and that many of the macrophenomena are explicable in terms of the microphenomena. Both Searle and Dennett accept some form of supervenience. As one ascends the hierarchy, one encounters higher-order properties not found at the lower levels, e.g., water is a fluid due to molecular behaviour, no molecule itself has fluid properties.

Turning now to Dennett, for him intentionality is a strategy used to explain beings (or ‘systems’ as he prefers to call them) that appear to act in a planned, rational way. In his breakthrough 1971 article, ‘Intentional
he argued that intentional systems are systems whose behaviour can be explained and predicted only by invoking intentional notions such as beliefs and desires. We attribute beliefs and desires to the system as a means of making predictions about its behaviour, e.g., the mouse knows the cat is on his left and therefore the cat has decided to go to the right. This stance can be effectively used to explain and predict the behaviour of others (e.g., road users) including obviously inanimate entities. As a stance, Dennett sees this as ‘innocent anthropomorphising’, ‘deliberately anthropomorphising’, ‘ontologically neutral’, ‘ontologically blind’, making no commitments. It is a purely pragmatic stance that can be dropped if it does not work. But, for Dennett, the point is that it does work and very well. Its latitude and tolerance is such that it allows us to interpret thermostats as being in (limited) states of belief. In his 1981 essay ‘True Believers’, elsewhere described as the ‘flagship expression’ of his position, Dennett summarises his view:

To a first approximation, the intentional strategy consists of treating the object whose behavior you want to predict as a rational agent with beliefs and desires and other mental states exhibiting what Brentano and others call intentionality.

In another essay, ‘Real Patterns’, he argues that entities that behave in seemingly intentional manner can be shown to develop with independent lives of their own on the basis of several inflexible and completely determinate ground rules. The superstructure of patterns (constructed out of lights that light up – like images on an electric advertising hoarding) has a macro-level behaviour that is best predicted intentionally, although everything is happening in terms of simple micro-level on/off switching obeying Laplacean determinacy.

Both Searle and Dennett embrace naturalism; both accept that consciousness and intentionality are ‘real’ (e.g., patterns are real for Dennett; money is real for Searle) in some important sense, both assert that they are not involved in reductionism, both accept that the brain and material factors (including the environment) are sufficient to produce the mental realm (denying any kind of spiritualism). Both accept some version of Darwinian evolution – our minds are the products of evolutionary selection. Dennett explicitly adopts the ‘third-person, materialistic perspective of contemporary science’; whereas Searle maintains that subjective states are parts of nature. Both Searle and Dennett dismiss metaphysical worries about the status of the intentional object. For neither is intentionality anything mysterious. For Searle, there is no more metaphysical mystery about how intentionality is possible than how digestion is possible. Similarly, Dennett claims ‘there is no voice-throat problem to set alongside the mind-body problem’.
are, therefore, especially from the viewpoint of phenomenology, many assumptions (including some version of naturalism and a claim about the explanatory priority of natural science) held in common between these two antagonists, assumptions which phenomenology rejects ab initio. One way of articulating the difference between both philosophers is that Searle believes in an intrinsic intentionality which underlies and underwrites all the subsequent intentionality of signs, words, pictures, and so on, whereas Dennett sees all intentionality as derived. Intentionality for Dennett is derived from the intentionality of our selfish genes (see also Intentional Stance: p. 298) or from Mother Nature. Dennett maintains what he believes to be a biologist’s view of function. There is no fact of the matter that determines proper function – it is determined by the context, by the environment. Content is to be assigned by trying to assess reasons – what Dennett calls ‘indeterminacy of content’. Most of the rationality Dennett detects in nature is of the ‘free-floating’ type. Rationality is assumed in a particular situation although it cannot be located internal to one of the beings in the situation. Thus the cuckoo acts rationally in removing other eggs from the nest but it most probably does not have a representation of so doing. In recent years, Dennett has struggled to articulate both his agreement with and his departure from phenomenology. Indeed, most recently, he has been defending the need for a description of the life-world or what he calls, following Sellars, the manifest image. Searle too has been trying to define his position over and against the phenomenological tradition. Although Searle is reluctant to admit it, his descriptive analysis of intentionality has many features in common with Husserl’s. The overall commitment to naturalism, however, remains a stumbling block.

**Husserl’s Phenomenological Alternative**

The phenomenological tradition of intentionality, stemming from Husserl, actually approaches intentionality from an entirely different perspective. Following Husserl, phenomenologists reject out of hand representationalist approaches to the problem of intentionality. In particular, the view of the mind as a self-enclosed box through which the arrow of intentionality has to cross in order to make contact with extra-mental objectivities is thought to be nonsensical. Thus, in his Basic Problems of Phenomenology lectures (1927), Martin Heidegger criticizes as a Cartesian misinterpretation the characterization of the key question of intentionality as:
How can this ego with its intentional experiences get outside of its sphere of experience and assume a relation to an extant world?\textsuperscript{110}

Heidegger correctly recognizes that it is Husserl not Brentano who first opened up the problem of intentionality as the problem of transcendence (as opposed to the indwelling of the object in the mental act), which was never a central theme for Brentano. Indeed, Husserl claimed that Brentano discovered something which he went on to grossly misinterpret. Thus in a late letter to Marvin Farber, Husserl writes:

Brentano asks for and provides a psychology whose whole topic is the ‘psychic phenomena’ which he on occasion defines also as ‘consciousness of something’. Though his psychology is nothing less than a science of intentionality, the proper problems of intentionality never dawned on him. He even failed to see that no given experience of consciousness can be described without a description of appertaining an ‘intentional object as such’ (for example, that this perception of the desk can only be described, when I describe this desk as \textit{what} and \textit{just as} it is perceived). Brentano had no inkling of intentional implication, of intentional modifications, of problems of constitution, etc.\textsuperscript{111}

Husserl claims to be the first to see the universal relevance of intentionality and indeed to be able develop a new science of a priori intentional description involving an entirely new approach based on what he calls ‘intentional implication’ – not entirely distinct from what Robert Brandom and others refer to as inferentialism, except that intentional implication includes the manner in which meanings shade off into one another in an associative manner rather than focusing solely on rational or logical implication. Husserl is particularly interested in this shading off of meanings into the general context of what he calls ‘horizons’. Husserl makes a similar remark in his 1929 \textit{Formal and Transcendental Logic}:

Brentano’s discovery of intentionality never led to seeing in it a complex of performances, which are included as \textit{sedimented history} in the currently constituted intentional unity and its current manners of givenness – a history \textit{that one can always uncover following a strict method}.\textsuperscript{112}

It is true that in his pre-phenomenological writings, e.g. his 1894 review of Twardowski’s \textit{On the Concept and Object of Presentations} and in his 1896 essay on ‘Intentional Objects’,\textsuperscript{113} Husserl seemed to be preoccupied with overcoming the problem of the ‘being of the intentional object’ as
bequeathed by Brentano. However, Husserl regarded the way this debate was developing – the discussion of non-existent objects – as entirely wrongheaded and instead set out to offer careful clarifications and disambiguations of key Brentanian terms, especially the terms ‘presentation’ (Vorstellung), ‘content’ (Inhalt, Gehalt), and ‘judgement’ (Urteil), and ultimately to radically question the most basic Brentanian distinction between inner and outer perception. Husserl drew on Bolzano and indeed developed an account that had structural similarities with Frege’s tripartite distinction between sign, sense (Sinn) and meaning (Beudeutung) with whom he was in correspondence, but, in the 1890s he did not yet have a way of articulating the notion of the object-as-perceived, the thing-as-thought, which he will later capture with the original notion of noema introduced in print in Ideas I (1913). Bolzano had discussed ‘objectless presentations’ and the problem of the status of thoughts that involved impossible or non-actual entities (round squares, golden mountains, and so on) taken up subsequently by Brentano’s pupils, especially Twardowski and Meinong.

Husserl’s much discussed interaction with the logician Gottlob Frege in the early 1890s may also have helped to accelerate the shift that was already occurring in his thinking. Both philosophers separately were developing sophisticated accounts of the difference between the ‘sense’ (Sinn) of an expression and its objective reference. In Husserl’s case this distinction would deepen his understanding of the structure of the intentional relation leading ultimately to his ‘breakthrough’ recognition of the essential correlation between thinking and its object, which he says occurred around 1898.

Husserl’s main early strategy was to distinguish between the real (reelle) psychological ‘content’ of the act (a temporal slice of the act), the intentional content or object and the ideal content which was tokened in the act (in the relation if instantiation). Later, in Ideas I, he distinguished between what he calls ‘real’ contents (which include both the actual and the ideal parts) and intentional contents. He refines Brentano’s account of mental acts and the inner structure of intentional experiences both by questioning its consistency and conceptual sense and especially through a recourse to what he claims is evidence given immediately in intuition (something on which he puts greater stress in the 1913 Second Edition or ‘B-Edition’, see the paragraphs added to LU V § 27, for example). Overall, in the Investigations he makes devastating – and still pertinent – criticisms of Brentano. In the Fifth Investigation, Husserl himself refers to his ‘deviations’ from Brentano, his ‘departures’ (Abweichungen) both from his master’s ‘convictions’ (Überzeugungen) and his technical ‘vocabulary’. In the Sixth Investigation, Husserl speaks of separating ‘what is indubitably significant in Brentano’s thought-motivation from what is erroneous in its elaboration’. He
wants to challenge Brentano’s fundamental notion that ‘presentations’ are a distinct class of psychic acts which are found nested or embedded in all other acts. Instead, Husserl wants to argue that each class of ‘objectivating acts’ has its own kind of objectual intending, leading to a completely different construal of intentionality and of the essential relations between intentional acts.

Husserl’s focus is on the *inner essential structure* of intentional acts, their contents and objects, independent of all reference to real psychic episodes with their causal structure and interconnections, and conceiving in terms of their ideal conceptual interconnections. He criticises Brentano’s account of the intentional relation; it is not a relation between two ‘real’ (reale) things, a consciousness and a thing. Nor is it a psycho-physical relation, nor are we dealing with an act and its content, a sort of ‘box-within-a-box’ view (*wie eine Ineinanderschachtelung*).\(^\text{120}\) Husserl is not entirely happy with the term ‘relation’ but if it is unavoidable we must stop thinking of it as a relation having psychological *Realität*.\(^\text{121}\) In the *Logical Investigations*, furthermore, Husserl rejects the Brentanian conception of the ‘intentional inexistence of the object’. According to Husserl, however, if we dissect our occurrent thought of the God Jupiter, the God Jupiter is not found inside our thought:

I have an idea of the god Jupiter: this means that I have a certain presentative experience, the presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter is realized in my consciousness. This intentional experience may be dismembered as one chooses in descriptive analysis, but the god Jupiter naturally will not be found in it. The ‘immanent’, ‘mental object’ is not therefore part of the descriptive or real make-up ([*Bestand*]) of the experience, it is in truth not really immanent or mental. But it also does not exist extramentally, it does not exist at all.\(^\text{122}\)

In particular, Husserl seeks to distinguish *what is given in perception* from the sensation which representational philosophy (Descartes to Brentano) insists is the primary objects of consciousness. For Husserl, as for Kant, sensations are part of the matter of our intentional acts and not the objects of those acts. Husserl denies we are directed towards sensory data in our awareness of an object. In fact, he denies that there is any act of sensing at all. There are *sensations*, but they are a material part of the act, which have to be taken up in an ‘interpretative grasp’ (*Auffassung*) in order to play a role in determining the object.\(^\text{123}\) Husserl says in the *Logical Investigations*:

I see a thing, e.g., this box, but I do not see my sensations [*Ich sehe nicht meine Empfindungen*]. I always see *one and the same* box,
however it may be turned and tilted. I have always the same ‘content of consciousness’ – if I care to call the perceived object a content of consciousness. But each turn yields a new ‘content of consciousness’, if I call experienced contents ‘contents of consciousness’, in a much more appropriate use of words. Very different contents are therefore experienced, though the same object is perceived. The experienced content, generally speaking, is not the perceived object…

And he goes on

Sensations, and the acts ‘interpreting’ them or apperceiving them, are alike experienced, but they do not appear as objects: they are not seen, heard or perceived by any sense. Objects on the other hand appear and are perceived, but they are not experienced.

We see a box and not our own sensations; in fact, all sensations are already interpreted as the sound of a train, the feeling of an itch, and so on. Furthermore, in visual perception, the object as a whole is somehow apprehended even though one does not actually see more than one of its ‘profiles’ or ‘adumbrations’ (Abschattungen). The other profiles are somehow apprehended as co-present but in an empty manner. There is an ‘excess’ involved in all perceiving, a kind of ‘empty intending’ that accompanies what is given fully. This gives intentionality a peculiar complexity of present and absent moments and ‘horizons’, features that have not been taken up by the analytic discussion generally.

Husserl’s maintained that Brentano’s true discovery was that intentionality had the specific character of ‘relating beyond itself’ and this must be given its due. In the Second Investigation, Husserl had already introduced the idea that the central feature of consciousness was its intending (Vermeinen, Intention) character and had already stated there that objects are not in consciousness as in a box (an image which is repeated over and over by Husserl, see for example Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 94). Husserl returns to these themes in the Introduction to the Fifth Investigation where he states that the notion of act, the more controversial notion in descriptive psychology, is under review. A key distinction occurs in LU V § 16, where Husserl distinguishes descriptive from intentional content. Here he acknowledges that what he had called real (‘reelle’) contents, he had also called ‘phenomenological’ in the First Edition. He now wants to contrast them with ‘reale’ or ‘intentional’ contents (but he eventually restricts ‘reale’ to the metaphysical status of things in reality). In the Logical Investigations, furthermore, Husserl rejects Brentano’s naïve conception of ‘presentation’ (Vorstellung) as a neutral act of givenness underlying other acts of judgement,
although he does accept that acts are founded on some kind of objectifying act. The matter of a judgement, for instance is contra Brentano not the underlying presentation. In fact, his considered view is that the role supposedly played by presentations is in fact played by non-independent abstract aspects of the intentional essences of acts.129 Husserl (as does Meinong) wants to distinguish a judgement (LU V § 28) in the sense of a realised act of judging or deciding from the mere entertaining or mental postulating of it without the commitment of assertion (what is signified by the ‘judgement stroke’).130 Again, the act of judging does not contain the act of merely entertaining the idea, plus something extra, namely, some sort of assent (LU V § 29). Rather Husserl moves to a consideration of the different structural elements of judging, including the manner in which judgings (Urteilen) allow of being modified into nominalised forms, an a priori possibility belonging to judgements as such.

Husserl also criticises Brentano’s conception of inner perception in the Appendix to the Sixth Logical Investigation. Husserl is aware that Brentano understood consciousness as inner perception and took inner perception to be the genuine mark of the mental. Brentano’s criterion of ‘intentional inexistence’ simply picked out the same domain as that of inner perception. First of all the distinction between inner and outer as traditionally drawn does not coincide with the distinction between evident and non-evident. Not every perception of a psychic state is given with ‘self-evidence’ (Evidenz) as Brentano thought, since some can present with bodily locations (e.g. a tooth ache or a pain in the stomach), which can be mistaken.131 In the First Edition, Husserl raises the question whether inner perceptions can be externally grasped, in other words are they also transcendent objects. In the Second Edition, Husserl is more definite that inner perceptions are still bits of the transcendent world, whereas a true phenomenology must treat them without any reference to the transcendent. As he puts it: ‘The pure presentedness of experiences [Erlebnisgegebenheit] presupposes a purely phenomenological attitude which will inhibit transcendent assertions [Setzungen]’:132 Moreover, the distinction between evident and non-evident appearances does not mark out two separate classes of experience, as in Brentano, but rather the phenomena of adequate versus inadequate givenness (Gegebenheit) a matter he had treated at length in the Sixth Investigation. According to Husserl, one cannot doubt an ‘adequate, purely immanent perception, since there are no residual intentions in it that must yet achieve fulfilment’.133

In Ideas I (1913), Husserl offers a new account of intentionality in terms of noesis and noema, a move that facilitated a much richer exploration of intentionality. Every act, no matter how varied, has a noetic side, understood as a ‘direction of regard of the pure ego’134 and as
containing in itself a ‘sense-bestowal’, although the noetic act contains more than this sense-bestowal. Correlated with this noetic content there is the ‘noematic correlate’ or ‘noematic content’ or noema. It is also called a ‘sense’ (Sinn) and Husserl frequently uses Sinn interchangeably with noema in this chapter,\textsuperscript{135} understood the sense as precisely inhering immanently in the Erlebnis, not as a real part (reeller Teil) but rather as ‘irreal’ (irreell). But this appearing sense is not the ‘full noema’. In perception, the noema is the perceived as perceived; in remembering, the remembered as remembered.\textsuperscript{136} The object as meant is an immanent content of the act.\textsuperscript{137} Furthermore, it is an individual, concrete unity, something that appears.

Husserl offers the example of a perception of a blossoming apple tree. According to the natural attitude, the tree is something transcendent to the act, out there in nature. Under the \textit{epoche} all relation to existence is bracketed, not just the tree but the actual relation holding between tree and equally real Erlebnis is lost and what is left is the ‘pure immanence’ of the perceiving as part of the stream of experiences. But even this phenomenologically reduced experience is still an experience of a blossoming apple tree. Under the transcendental attitude, we have before us the tree as perceived, the tree noema (Hua 3(1) 183). In it at this point that Husserl writes:

\textit{The tree simpliciter, the physical thing belonging to Nature, is nothing less than this perceived tree as perceived which, as perceptual sense, inseparably belongs to the perception. The tree simpliciter can burn up, be resolved into its chemical elements, etc. But the sense – the sense of this perception, something belonging necessarily to its essence——cannot burn up; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties.}\textsuperscript{138}

The ‘sense’ cannot burn up and cannot be destroyed (see also \textit{Crisis} § 70).\textsuperscript{139} On the other hand, the noema, for Husserl, does not survive apart from the act, it is not self-sufficient. Yet it can be compared with other noemata, made the focus of reflective attention and so on. It has an ambiguous status; it is not an abstract object as such. It is an individual unity not a universal (like a true sense or meaning).\textsuperscript{140} This conception of noema – supplemented with the concept of the inner and outer horizons within which intentional objects are situated – offers a helpful reformulation of one aspect of the intentionality problematic. It avoids the view that the object given in experience is actually the ideal meaning which the object has. However, generally speaking, phenomenology moved beyond the noesis-noema discussion, and even Husserl himself did not give it extensive critical analysis. The mature Husserl saw intentionality more as the name of a specific approach to consciousness and
its objects. It is a mode of description (noetic-noematic description) under the *epoché* which clearly rules out the imposition of metaphysical or ontological theses.\(^{141}\) Moreover Husserl's mature phenomenology is anti-naturalistic, regarding the project of the 'naturalization of consciousness' – a phrase he himself presciently used – as at best a conceptual confusion. His phenomenology also became a form of transcendental idealism, with a strong emphasis on the constituting role of the transcendental ego (albeit understood in the plural as interrelated transcendental intersubjectivity), a move that alienated many of his own students and, of course, analytic philosophers such as Gilbert Ryle.

**Heidegger and Current Phenomenology on Intentionality**

It has often been thought that Martin Heidegger abandoned the concept of intentionality because of the paucity of references to it in *Being and Time*.\(^{142}\) In fact, *Being and Time* contains only two brief references to intentionality: a critical remark regarding the inadequacy of Scheler's analysis of the person as the *performer* of intentional acts (SZ § 10, 73; 48), and a single footnote on intentionality as grounded in the temporal transcendence of Dasein.\(^{143}\) Elsewhere, however, Heidegger had quite deep meditations on intentionality, especially in his 1925 and 1927 lecture courses. In his 1927 *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger portrays the 'enigmatic phenomenon of intentionality'\(^{144}\) as Designating a problem rather than a solution (cf. his 1928 lecture course *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, § 9, 134; GA 26 168).\(^{145}\) The being of the intentional had not been interrogated, he insists; and its treatment in recent philosophy has been 'inadequate and external'\(^{146}\) – presumably he is thinking here not just of Brentano and Husserl but also of Scheler and Rickert. In his 1928 lectures Heidegger claims that Husserl's insight into intentionality did not go far enough and that 'grasping this structure as the essential structure of Dasein must revolutionize the whole concept of the human being'.\(^{147}\) For Heidegger, the whole intentional relation must be rethought in terms of Dasein's being-in-the-world and the manner in which human comportment discloses the world as such.\(^{148}\) This concept of existent as meaning-disclosure is at the centre of current phenomenological approaches to intentionality and of course renewed attention has now to be paid to embodiment, embeddedness (*Einhbettung* – a term originally found in Husserl's student Gerda Walther)\(^{149}\) and social action. Most interesting aspects of intentionality began to emerge in Husserlian phenomenology in the 1920s. Here we get the first discussions of collective intentionality and of social acts – found in Husserl, Adolf Reinach, Edith Stein, Max Scheler and others.

Current phenomenological approaches to intentionality understand it not as a mysterious relation or quasi-relation between an isolated mental
‘act’ (itself a somewhat abstract notion given that mental life is experienced as a continuous, multi-layered stream) and an equally mysterious quasi-existent or non-existent object. Rather, intentionality is now understood as the manner in which embodied human agents (and some animals) orient themselves and act in a meaningful world (understood not as a set of physical objects but as a set of affordances, possibilities, horizons, and futurity) as disclosers and creators of meaning. Phenomenology aims to capture the essential structures of the particular manner in which the world (and objects in the world) appear to embodied conscious agents who are comporting themselves within it. This world-disclosure or ‘phenomenality’ is not an objective fact in the world but rather a specific and necessary accomplishment of an interwoven web (Husserl speaks of a Zusammenhang) of subjectivities that in this sense transcend the world and are presupposed by the sciences that study the world (what Husserl would have called ‘mundane’ sciences). Transcendental phenomenology, moreover, maintains that intentionality cannot be naturalized because the subjective stances and attitudes that constitute the world can never be brought into view except by suspending worldly commitments, the very commitments naturalism assumes ab initio. This wider conception of embodied, social agents coping in the common world is now the paradigm which is challenging contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science and we are a long way from Brentano’s inesse.

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Acknowledgements

An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the workshop on Intentionality, held at the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, on 4-5 February 2010, as part of the Irish Research Council sponsored project ‘The Phenomenology of Consciousness and Subjectivity’ (2010–12). I want to thank the IRCHSS, the School of Philosophy, UCD, the Dept. of Philosophy Trinity College Dublin, and the Embassy of France in Ireland, for their support. In particular, I would like to thank Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Lilian Alweiss, Tim Crane, Maeve Cooke, and Peter Simons, for their comments. This research is also supported by the ARC Discovery Grant, ‘Judgment, Responsibility and the Life-world’.

Notes


4 See Tim Crane, ‘Intentional Objects’; and ‘What is the Problem of Non-Existence?’.


7 On the interrelations between intentionality and phenomenology, see Terence Horgan and J. Tienson, ‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality’. The claim explored here is that phenomenal mental states (e.g., sensory-experiential states such as color-experiences, itches, and smells) have intentional content that is inseparable from their phenomenal character, and also that intentional mental states (e.g., cognitive states such as beliefs and desires), when conscious, have phenomenal character that is inseparable from their intentional content.

8 See Charles Siewert, *The Significance of Consciousness*.

9 See Dan Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*.


13 See G. Rizzolatti and C. Sinigaglia, *Mirrors in the Brain: How our Minds Share Actions and Emotions*, and A. Melzoff and R. Brooks, ‘“Like Me” as a Building Block for Understanding Other Minds: Bodily Acts, Attention,
and Intention’; and Dan Zahavi, ‘Beyond Empathy. Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity’.


17 G. E. M. Anscombe, *Intention*, and ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’, where she distinguishes between ‘material’ and ‘intentional’ objects of perception. Anscombe tends to see the intentional object as semantically and linguistically constituted and so belongs to the linguistic turn in the discussion of intentionality, independently of Chisholm. For a comparison between Anscombe and Chisholm, see William Lycan, ‘On “Intentionality” and the Psychological’.

18 See Roderick Chisholm, ‘Sentences about Believing’; idem, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study* and ‘Intentionality and the Mental’.

19 See Martin Davies, ‘Consciousness and the Varieties of Aboutness’.

20 For a useful overview of the problem of representation, see David Pitt, ‘Mental Representation’. See also Kim Sterelny, *The Representational Theory of Mind. An Introduction*.


22 Brandom, *Tales of the Mighty Dead*, p. 23.

23 For an overview of different positions, see John Haugeland, ‘The Intentionality All Stars’; and Dermot Moran, ‘“Our Germans are Better Than Their Germans”: Continental and Analytic Approaches to Intentionality Reconsidered’.

24 See John J. Drummond, ‘Intentionality without Representationalism’. Of course, it all depends on how ‘representationalism’ is defined but phenomenologists tend to be suspicious of representationalist language as suggesting something ‘in the head’ that is directly apprehended. On the other hand, Tim Crane’s version of represesentationalism has very much in common with Husserlian ‘anti-representationalism’. The very idea that perception has content need not itself imply commitment to an indirect theory of
perception. Thus Alva Noé says that perception has representational content while promoting a Husserlian-style analysis in his Perception in Action.


26 The title of Brentano’s University of Vienna lecture course for 1888–9 was ‘descriptive psychology or descriptive phenomenology’ (Deskriptive Psychologie oder beschreibende Phänomenologie), see Franz Brentano, Descriptive Psychology, trans. and ed. Benito Müller.

27 With regard to medieval discussions of intentionality, much can be learned from Leen Spruit’s two-volume study, Species intelligiblis: From Perception to Knowledge; and Dominik Perler, Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter.

28 See Peter Simons, ‘Prolegomenon to an Adequate Theory of Intentionality (Natural or Otherwise)’, p. 12.

29 See Alexius Meinong, ‘The Theory of Objects’. See also Arkadiusz Chrudzimski, Gegenstandstheorie und Theorie der Intentionalität bei Alexius Meinong.


32 Husserl in the Logical Investigations (and in Ideas I), for instance, regarded sensations as non-intentional components in intentional states.

33 Terence Horgan and J. Tienson, ‘The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality’; and David Bourget, ‘Consciousness is Underived Intentionality’.

34 See D. W. Hamlyn, ‘Unconscious Intentions’.

35 Martin Heidegger for instance, claims in Being and Time that anxiety differs from fear in having nothing as its intentional object – although more precisely it is one’s whole being-in-the-world which is the intentional object. See also Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion, and Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni, The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. See also B. J. Fish, ‘Emotions, Moods and Intentionality’. Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi defend the intentionality of moods in their The Phenomenological Mind, op. cit., ‘moods are not without a reference to the world’, but distinguish between a narrower ‘object-intentionality’ and a broader openness to the world.

36 See, for example, Roy W. Perrett, ‘Intentionality and Self-Awareness’.

37 See Uriah Kriegel, ‘The Dispensability of (Merely) Intentional Objects’. Kriegel proposes to distinguish between two kinds of adverbialism: inferentialist adverbialism and phenomenological adverbialism. According to inferentialist adverbialism, on his account, thinking something is a matter of being in a mental state that has that something in an inferential or functional role (he sees Robert Brandom and Hartry Field as advocates of versions of this position). According to phenomenological adverbialism, thinking something is a matter of being in a mental state that has that something’s phenomenal character.

38 See Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality, who claims his approach is, broadly speaking, functionalist, inferentialist, holist, normative, and social pragmatist.


40 Uriah Kriegel evaluates similar objections against his adverbialism in his The Sources of Intentionality, see esp. pp. 138–88.

41 See Ben Blumson, ‘Images, Intentionality and Inexistence’.


44 See Dermot Moran, “‘Let’s Look at it Objectively’: Why Phenomenology Cannot be Naturalized’ and ‘Husserl’s Transcendental Philosophy and the Critique of Naturalism’.


46 PES, p. 88; The German is: “Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben, und was wir, obwohl mit nicht ganz unzweideutigen Ausdrücken, die Beziehung auf einen Inhalt, die Richtung auf ein Objekt (worunter hier nicht eine Realität zu verstehen ist), oder die immanente Gegenständlichkeit nennen würden. Jedes enthält etwas als Objekt in sich, obwohl nicht jedes in gleicher Weise. In der Vorstellung ist etwas vorgestellt, in dem Urteile ist etwas anerkannt oder verworfen, in der Liebe geliebt, in dem Hass gelehmt, in dem Begehren gebeurt usw.”, Brentano, *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, § 5, op. cit., pp. 124–5.


49 See Tim Crane, ‘Brentano’s Concept of Intentional Inexistence’.


52 See Reinhardt Grossmann, ‘Meinong’s Doctrine of the *Aussersein* of the Pure Object’. These objects (e.g. golden mountains, round squares) do not exist but have properties and can be parts of states of affairs. See also Dale Jacquette, ‘Meinong’s Doctrine of Implexive Being’.


55 Roderick M. Chisholm, ‘Intentionality’.

56 On Plato see David Bostock ‘Plato on “Is Not” (Sophist 254–9)’. For recent studies, see Graham Priest, *Towards Non-Being. The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality*; Dale Jacquette, *Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of
Existence and Nonexistence; and Jocelyn Benoist, Représentations sans objet. Aux origines de la phénoméno­logie et de la philosophie analytique.

57 See Myles Burnyeat, ‘Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind still Credible (a draft)?’


60 See Jacques Brunschwig, ‘Sur une façon stoicienne de ne pas être’. Dominik Perler has done invaluable work in relation to the classical and medieval history of intentionality, see Perler (ed.) Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality, and the review by Lloyd P. Gerson, ‘Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality’.

61 See Victor Caston, ‘Connecting Traditions: Augustine and the Greeks on Intentionality’. Caston makes the point that the history of intentionality has too often focused on the occurrence of the word ‘intention’, whereas the problem can be discussed without invoking the term ‘intention’ and this is particularly the case in ancient Greek discussions.


65 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, trans. Kenelm Foster, O. P. and Sylvester Humphries: ‘Sensus recipit formam sine materia, quia alterius modi esse habet forma in sensu, et in re sensibili. Nam in re sensibili habet esse naturale, in sensu autem habet esse intentionale et spirituale’ Aquinas, Sentencia de anima, lib. 2, l. 24, n. 3. See also Gyula Klima, ‘Intentional Transfer in Averroes, Indifference of Nature in Avicenna, and the Representationalism of Aquinas’; and Myles Burnyeat, ‘Aquinas on “Spiritual Change” in Perception’. Thomas allows that in some senses (e.g., touch) there is a physical transfer of the form, but in the case of sight it is ‘spiritual’.

66 See F. Brentano, Vom Dasein Gottes, ed. Alfred Kastil.


See Lilli Alanen, ‘Sensory Ideas, Objective Reality and Material Falsity’; Dan Kaufman, ‘Descartes on the Objective Reality of Materially False Ideas’; and Lionel Shapiro, ‘Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes’.

For the medieval discussion, see Alain de Libera, *La référence vide. Théories de la proposition*.

See Linda L. McAlister, ‘Chisholm and Brentano on Intentionality’.


William Van Orman Quine, *Word and Object*.

Ibid., p. 220.

Ibid., p. 221.

Ibid.

Ibid.

For a discussion of the import of Quine’s rejection of indirect quotation, see Murray Murphey, *The Development of Quine’s Philosophy*, 119ff. See also David Woodruff Smith, ‘How to Husserl a Quine – and a Heidegger Too’.

Dennett was an undergraduate at Harvard and a graduate student at Oxford. He summarises his intellectual evolution as follows: ‘Quine’s message stuck with me, and all Ryle could do is add his own to it’, see his review of Thomas Nagel, *Other Minds*, in *Journal of Philosophy* 93(8) (August 1996): 425–28.

Dennett cites this remark in his review of Thomas Nagel, *Other Minds*, in *Journal of Philosophy*, op. cit.

Daniel C. Dennett, *Content and Consciousness*.

Searle, *Intentionality*, p. 6. Searle thinks that intentional attitudes can have objects as part of their representational content, e.g., ‘Love (Sally)’. He acknowledges that most of his discussion in Intentionality is about propositional content but not all ‘Intentional states have the an entire proposition as intentional content’, see ibid., p. 7. Searle agrees with Husserl that perception can have as its object an individual object or property.

Searle follows Russell and the British tradition for using the term ‘proposition’ to mean the state-of-affairs expressed by the linguistically expressed or thought ‘sentence’, see *Intentionality*, p. 6.


Ibid., p. 87.

Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Intentional Systems’.

Dennett, *Kinds of Minds. Towards an Understanding of Consciousness*, p. 27.


Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Real Patterns’.


345
98 See John R. Searle, ‘Foreword’, p. 11.

100 It is not possible to enter into the debate here as to whether Searle and Dennett are both non-reductive, evolutionary naturalists of broadly similar kind (Searle calls himself a ‘biological naturalist’ – consciousness is a biological process, yet defends subjective states as part of objective nature; whereas Dennett is a scientific naturalist who defends our everyday way of interpreting the world in terms of the intentional stance). I maintain, on the other hand, that phenomenology regards ‘nature’ and the scientific outlook as dependent on the intentional way of understanding humans and the world. For a debate about whether phenomenology can be naturalised, see Dan Zahavi ‘Naturalized Phenomenology: A Desideratum or a Category Mistake’, in Havi Karel and Darian Meacham (eds) *Philosophy and Naturalism*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012): 23–42, and Dermot Moran, ‘“Let’s Look at it Objectively”: Why Phenomenology Cannot be Naturalized’, ibid., pp. 89–115.

102 Ibid., p. 59.
104 Ibid., p. 306.
105 Daniel Dennett, ‘Heterophenomenology Reconsidered’ and ‘Heterophenomenology’.
106 See Dennett, ‘Kinds of Things’.

108 Although some phenomenologists believe it is compatible with naturalism, see Francisco J. Varela, ‘The Naturalization of Phenomenology as the Transcendence of Nature. Searching for Generative Mutual Constraints’; J.-M. Roy, J Petitot, B. Pachoud, and F. J. Varela, ‘Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology’; and Dan Zahavi, ‘Naturalizing Phenomenology’.


111 Husserl’s letter to Marvin Farber, 18 June 1937, translated in Kah Kyung Cho, ‘Phenomenology as Cooperative Task: Husserl-Farber Correspondence during 1936–37’. For Husserl’s complex adoption and critique of Brentano, see Dermot Moran, ‘Husserl’s Critique of Brentano in the Logical Investigations’; Karl Schuhmann, ‘Intentionalität und intentionaler Gegenstand beim frühen Husserl’; and Peter Varga, ‘Brentano’s Influence on Husserl’s Early Theory of Intentionality’. Varga makes the point that the early Husserl tends to replace the concept of intentional relation with the part-whole relation.


114 Husserl acknowledged that he was deeply influenced by Bernard Bolzano’s distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ presentations (*Vorstellungen*) as he read it in his *Wissenschaftslehre*, abridged and trans. by Rolf George as *Theory of Science*.


118 LU V § 9, II, p. 353 n.1; Hua 19(1) 378n; LU V § 11.

119 LU VI Appendix, II, p. 340; Hua 19(2) 760.

120 LU V § 11, II, p. 98; Hua 19(1) 371.

121 Husserl makes the same distinction in *Ideas I* §36: intentionality is neither a real relation with an existent object nor a psychological relation.

122 LU V § 11, II, p. 99; Hua 19(1) 373.

123 For a recent discussion, see Walter Hopp, ‘Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation’.

124 LU V § 14, II, p. 104; Hua 19(1) 396. Husserl adds in the Second Edition: ‘We must note, further, that the object’s real being [wirkliches Sein] or non-being is irrelevant to the true essence of the perceptual experience’ (LU V § 14, II, p. 104; Hua 19(1) 396).

125 LU V § 14, II, p. 105; Hua 19(1) 399.

126 One of the problems with Husserl’s account, especially of the *Auffassungssinn*, is that all the ‘meaning-loading’, as it were, is on the side of the subject. Sensations, for instance, are ‘bearers of interpretation’ or ‘bases of interpretation’ (*Fundamente der Auffassung*, Hua 19(1) 399). How the interpreting of ‘raw feels’ takes place is left unclear. The later account of noema attempts to overcome this problem of an uninterpreted given as prior to the meaningful encounter in the perception itself. Of course, even in *Ideas I* where the noema account is first publicly presented, there is still an element of ‘matter’ (now called ‘hyle’) but these are as it were abstract parts of the concrete experience of the object. Husserl’s account of the sensory content of experience involves recognizing various stratified layers of constitution right down to the level of non-sensational time-consciousness, but Aron Gurwitsch, for instance, prefers to understand sensational contents as products of the phenomenological method of analysis or ‘unbuilding’ (*Abbau*) rather than as being encountered directly. See Aron Gurwitsch, *The Field of Consciousness*.

For further discussion of Husserl’s critique of Brentano’s account of intentionality, see Dermot Moran, ‘Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s and Brentano’s Accounts of Intentionality’.

Meinong made a similar distinction in his *On Assumptions*.

Meinong’s distinction is further elaborated in his *On Assumptions*, particularly in Appendix, II, p. 346; Hua 19/2 240.

Meinong’s distinction is further elaborated in his *On Assumptions*, particularly in Appendix, II, p. 341; Hua 19/2 232.

Husserl makes a similar distinction in his *Ideas I*, Hua 3(1) 181.

Husserl makes a similar distinction in his *Ideas I*, Hua 3(1) 182.

Husserl makes a similar distinction in his *Ideas I*, Hua 3(1) 184.

Husserl’s notion of noema is further elaborated in Føllesdal, ‘Husserl’s Notion of Noema’; and John J. Drummond, *Husserlian Intentionality and Non-Foundational Realism: Noema and Object*; and ‘An Abstract Consideration: De-ontologizing the Noema’.

Ideas I, Hua 3(1) 189, 216; Hua 3(1) 184.

Ideas I, Hua 3(1) 89, 216; Hua 3(1) 184.

In this chapter of *Ideas I*, Husserl unfortunately continues to describe the noema both as a ‘content’ and as ‘immanent’ in the flow of consciousness. It is not, however, a real part of the *Erlebnis*; it is a purely phenomenological concept but Husserl gives us no clearer account of what this might mean.

Ideas I, Hua 3(1) 89, 216; Hua 3(1) 184.

Of course, to be more precise, it belongs to the eidos of an apple tree that an apple tree is something that can be chopped up and burnt.

See, in *Ideas I*, Rudolf Bernet, ‘Husserl’s Begriff des Noema’, *Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung*, ed. Samuel I Jessen. Bernet finds three separate meanings of noema in Husserl: noema as the appearance as such, as the ideal meaning, and as the constituted entity. The ontological status of the noema is that it can be understood – somewhat like the Aristotelian form as that which supports in some way both the universal idealization and the individual existent entity. Husserl himself distinguished between free and ‘bound idealities’ in late texts such as *Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*, ed Ludwig Landgrebe; trans. J. S. Churchill and K. Ameriks, *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic*, § 65.

In Husserl, the term ‘ontology’ (*Ontologie*) refers to ‘eidetic science’ (cf. *Ideas I*, §§ 9 ff.) subdivided into ‘formal’ and ‘material’ domains. Phenomenology, on this account, is the ontology of pure consciousness. What is nowadays, following Quine, called ontology (answering the question ‘what is there?’), would count as ‘metaphysics’ in Husserl’s terminology.


In this footnote, *SZ* § 69, p. 363n23, which is a comment on Husserl’s characterization of sensory perception as a ‘making present’ (*das Gegenwärtigen*) in the Sixth Logical Investigation §37, Heidegger promises to address the grounding of intentionality in ‘the ecstatical temporality’ of Dasein in the next Division, which, of course, was never published (the Macquarrie-Robinson translation erroneously has ‘ecstatic unity’ in place of ‘ecstatical temporality’). The importance of this footnote is underscored by Heidegger himself in his 1928 Marburg lecture series, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, Gesamtausgabe (= GA) 26 (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 215, trans. Michael Heim, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 168. Hereafter
‘MFL’ followed by page number of English and then German. ‘Gesamtausgabe’ will be abbreviated to ‘GA’.

144 BP, 58; GA 24 81.
146 ‘unzureichend und äusserlich’, BP § 15 161; GA 24 230.
147 MFL § 9, 133; GA 26 167.
150 It is of course a matter of considerable debate as to whether non-human animals possess intentionality and in what sense. Various forms of perceptual and motor intentionality, empathy, capacity for deliberate deception, self-awareness, etc., can be identified in some species (from bees to gorillas). Some speak of a kind of ‘proto-intentionality’ of animals – and pre-linguistic human children – but this debate only further complicates an already complicated discussion. See Marian Stamp Dawkins *Through Our Eyes Only?: The Search for Animal Consciousness*; John R. Searle, ‘Animal Minds’; Clive D. L. Wynne, *Do Animals Think?*; Susan Hurley and Matthew Nudds (eds) *Rational Animals?*; and Robert W. Lurz (ed.) *The Philosophy of Animal Minds*.

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