

painful inner conflict, because my *loving* desire for the beloved's good as she sees it can conflict with my *benevolent* [n.b., not "loving"] desire for her good as I see it' (81).

Throughout *Personal Love* Fisher often mentions this conflict between HB and PB (e.g., 75-6; quite confusingly on pp. 19-20). His favored position seems to be that HB is *in* the love, PB is outside it, this correlating with the ways in which lovers have and have not fused, so that HB exists in the fusion and the challenge from PB exists, or persists, just because fusion is incomplete. Were fusion to be complete (which Fisher says is impossible [27]), there would be no conflict because nary a bit of PB would remain, all of it ousted by HB. If I am right, however, that full fusion destroys HB, the incompleteness creates conflict in a different way, by making logical space available for HB to exist, which then comes face to face with the PB that exists in virtue of the same incompleteness. The conflict is not fusion vs. no fusion, but occurs altogether outside of fusion.

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Jay L. Garfield and Murray Kiteley, eds.

Meaning and Truth: The Essential

Readings in Modern Semantics.

New York: Paragon House 1991.

Pp. xxviii + 637.

US\$17.95. ISBN 1-55778-300-4.

This collection of readings is offered for intermediate and senior undergraduates in philosophy, linguistics or cognitive science as a companion to Ken Taylor's forthcoming *Introduction to Modern Semantics*. The collection includes essays from both philosophy and linguistics, and is divided into seven sections based on loosely defined and overlapping issues. Each section contains a brief introduction, which summarizes the readings and outlines their contribution to the debates around which the book is organized.

Garfield and Kiteley define the domain of semantics broadly, as encompassing, 'what linguistic meaning is, how it is represented, and how we can decode the linguistic message to arrive at it' (xxiv). Most of the sections treat central and familiar issues within theory of meaning: definite descriptions, Tarski's definition of truth, opacity, and possible worlds. As the editors point out, other subjects such as presupposition and logical form can be addressed by rearranging the order of readings. Many of the articles are classics, and

the collection as a whole offers a good cross-section of work from the nineteenth century to the present. On the other hand, Garfield and Kiteley have not attempted to include all of what might be considered essential readings in a field as broad as this. Some important subject areas, such as speech act theory, propositions, and the empiricist-rationalist debate are not represented except as they arise in articles on other subjects.

The first section contains modern classics by Mill, Frege, Tarski, and Russell, selected to reveal the roots of contemporary debate. The selection from Mill, 'On Names and Propositions', is effective in setting modern semantics against its background in nineteenth century logic. The articles by Frege, Tarski, and Russell ('On Sense and Nominatum', 'The Semantic Conception of Truth' and 'On Denoting') introduce the subject matter of subsequent sections. Section Two offers a good selection of readings on definite descriptions. It includes time-honoured pieces by Strawson, Russell, Carnap, and Donnellan, and more recent articles by Kripke, Bergmann, and Kaplan. Section Three contains philosophical responses to Tarski's work, including Davidson's 'Truth and Meaning', and Field's and McDowell's examinations of the adequacy of Tarski's definition of truth. Section Four, entitled 'Intensionality', presents alternative solutions to the problems surrounding opaque contexts. The section begins with Quine's 'Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes', and Davidson's 'On Saying That'. These are set against an overview of Montague semantics by Weisler, and Kiteley's own 'Subjectivity's Bailiwick', which argues that opacity is not susceptible to a unitary analysis. Section Five is an interesting collection bearing on compositionality and logical form that reveals the overlap between philosophy and linguistics. Two chapters from Cresswell's *Structured Meanings* are placed together with Hornstein's analysis of quantifier scope, and a study of the logical form underlying verb-phrase deletion by Sag. Section Six is a good collection of contemporary classics on possible-worlds semantics by Stalnaker, Lewis, Plantinga, and Lycan. The final section is a collection of articles on nonlinguistic determinants of meaning. It contains two articles on metaphors, one by Skulsky and one by Bergmann, together with a study of indefinite noun-phrases by Cormack and Kempson, and Perry's, 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical'.

What draws the collection together is not obvious from the table of contents, but the book does have a unifying theme. The intent of the editors is to emphasize the interdisciplinary nature of modern semantics. The articles are selected and introduced with a focus on how solutions to the problems of meaning necessarily demand the resources of a number of disciplines: logic, linguistics, cognitive science and metaphysics. This is an excellent goal, although it places some constraints on the range of courses to which the text is suited. The book requires some background in first-order logic, and the articles employ a variety of formal notations. So the collection may not be ideal for all students first encountering theory of meaning, and instructors will need to be adept at rendering formal material approachable. But students will gain from the book a good sense of the complex character

of semantic theory, and Ken Taylor's companion text, when it appears, may well fill in the background necessary to bind the articles together.

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Jeffrey C. Goldfarb

*The Cynical Society: The Culture of Politics
and the Politics of Culture in American Life.*

Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991.

Pp. xi + 200.

US\$22.50. ISBN 0-226-30107-9.

Goldfarb, a sociologist at the New School for Social Research, has written a provocative book of interest to social theorists and philosophers. Goldfarb sees cynicism as 'the single pressing problem of our time'. Political parties, media reporting, and social scientific analysis all contribute to a 'cynical malaise'. Issues of substance are avoided or distorted due to a cynical mode of interpretation, according to which statements are systematically regarded as the rhetorical manifestation of self-serving interests. Substantive analysis, commitment to shared values as a basis for collective action, and reasoned discourse can scarcely survive. Goldfarb elaborates these claims in discussions of a wide range of topics including the U.S. presidential campaigns of 1984 and 1988, the Reagan presidency, fictional works by Thomas Wolfe and Toni Morrison, and fundamentalist proposals for improving American education.

Although this is not basically a philosophical book there are, I think, a number of themes which should interest philosophers. These include Goldfarb's understanding of cynicism as a (faulty) interpretive frame, his comments about the relationship between cynicism and relativism, and a brief historical account relating and contrasting destructive mocking cynicism with the ancient cynicism of Diogenes. Goldfarb sees cynical interpretations of political and social life as effecting self-fulfilling prophecies. He stresses shared democratic values — which persist in spite of media cynicism — and 'reasoned discourse' as essential in yielding non-cynical interpretations and substantive analysis of social problems. Especially intriguing — and to me plausible — is Goldfarb's claim that cynicism, while appearing on the surface to offer social critique, turns out in the end to be 'a form of legitimization through disbelief.'