Perceptual Variation and Relativism

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1. Introduction

According to Sextus, children perceive brighter colors than their grandparents (Outlines of Scepticism 1.105). Suppose that Sextus is right, and that Jacob perceives brighter colors than Sarah, his grandmother. In particular, suppose that Jacob and Sarah are looking at the same stone tile, and that while Sarah has the kind of perception you have when you look at the square on the left in Figure 1.0, Jacob has the kind of perception you have when you look at the square on the right. Whose perception of the tile is accurate, Jacob’s or Sarah’s?

Sextus rejects the standard responses. One response is that neither of their perceptions is accurate, because the tile isn’t really colored. Sextus attributes this response to Democritus (Outlines 1.213, 2.63; see also Against the Logicians 1.135–40). Sextus objects that we would then know something about the tile, namely that it is not colored, and that this conflicts with his skeptical view that we can’t know anything about external objects, not even whether they are or are not colored (Outlines 1.15). But one needn’t be a skeptic like Sextus to find this first response objectionable. An influential non-skeptical objection is that it’s central to the way we think and talk that
objects are really colored, and that, by default, we should try to preserve these ways of thinking and talking (see, e.g., Lewis 1997, 325–28; Johnston 1992, 221–22; Cohen 2009, 15, 65). There's obviously a lot more to say about this non-skeptical objection, but I hope it's familiar enough.

Another response is that one of their perceptions is accurate. Sextus objects that, if only one of their perceptions is accurate, we can't know whose. For example, suppose that only Jacob's perception is accurate. According to Sextus, the mere fact that Jacob is younger does not give us any justification for believing that his perception is accurate (Outlines 1.105–12). Neither does the mere fact that Jacob is healthier (1.102–3) or in the majority (1.89). More generally, none of the facts about Jacob and Sarah give us justification for believing that one of them, rather than the other, is accurately perceiving the tile. We also can't use facts about the tile, because we can't know anything about external objects (e.g., 1.99). Sextus also rejects a proposal, available to the Dogmatists, that one should rely on one's own perception, so that if one has the same kind of perception as Jacob, one has justification for believing that Jacob's perception is accurate, and if one has the same kind of perception as Sarah, one has justification for believing that Sarah's perception is accurate. Sextus objects that relying on one's own perception would be question-begging, given that one also doesn't have justification for believing that one's own perception is accurate (1.90, 112–13). He concludes that, if only one of their perceptions is accurate, we can't know whose (1.112, 2.51–53). In other work (Morrison 2019), I argue that one should accept Sextus' conclusion, even if, unlike Sextus, one thinks that we can know a lot about external objects, including what our best scientific theories tell us. I also explain why it would be unacceptable for us to be ignorant about whose perception is accurate, even if, unlike Sextus, one is willing to say similar things in other domains—for example, that only one estimate about the size of a distant galaxy is true, even if we can't know which. Once again, there's obviously a lot more to say about this non-skeptical objection, but I hope it's familiar enough (see, e.g., Block 1999, 46, 54).

A third response is that both of their perceptions might be accurate. Let's call this “perceptual relativism,” because it implies that, in some sense, what Jacob is perceiving is relative to him, and what Sarah is perceiving is relative to her. As we'll see, there are many senses in which color perception might be relative. In one sense, the colors themselves are relations to perceivers (e.g., medium-gray-for-Jacob, dark-gray-for-Jacob). But in another sense,
it’s the descriptions under which we perceive the colors that are relative to perceivers. I elsewhere call this response “both-ism” to emphasize that it subsumes any view that implies that both perceptions might be accurate (Morrison 2018b).

Sextus attributes relativism to Protagoras:

He [Protagoras] says that . . . our senses are rearranged and altered depending on age and the other constituents of the body. He also says that the reasons for all apparent things are present in matter, so that matter can, as far as itself is concerned, be all the things it appears to anyone to be. Men grasp different things at different times, depending on their different conditions: someone in a natural state apprehends those things in the matter which can appear to those in a natural state, someone in an unnatural state apprehends what can appear to those in an unnatural state. And further, depending on age, and according to whether we are sleeping or waking, and in virtue of each sort of condition, the same account holds. According to him, then, man is the standard for what is; for all things apparent to men actually are, and what is apparent to nobody is not. (Outlines 1.217–18; see also 1.79–87; Against the Logicians 1.60–64; and Plato’s Theaetetus 153d–154b)

I think that Sextus’ description captures what’s right about perceptual relativism. Suppose we fill one hundred unmarked tubes with different amounts of mercury and then place them in a warm room. Their mercury will rise to different levels. It would be silly to then ask which tube out of all the tubes is accurately measuring the room’s temperature. Each tube just registers the temperature in a different way. Likewise, nature has filled our eyes with different amounts of the relevant kinds of detectors, distributed those detectors in different patterns along our retinas, wired our brains to respond differently to the signals sent from our eyes, and so on. Consequently, people’s eyes and brains respond differently to the same object, producing different perceptions. As with the unmarked tubes of mercury, it seems misguided to ask which perceptual system out of all perceptual systems is accurately measuring the tile’s color. Different perceptual systems just register the tile’s surface in different ways. For this reason, I think there’s something right about perceptual relativism.

Sextus disagrees. The motivation for perceptual relativism depends on a characterization of matter as in flux, and our senses as rearranged and
altered depending on our age and other factors. Similar to before, Sextus objects that we can’t know anything about matter, not even whether it is in flux, and that we can’t know anything about our senses, not even how they’re constituted (Outlines 1.219). He concludes that perceptual relativism is unmotivated. However, few contemporary philosophers would endorse this objection. Most contemporary philosophers believe that we can know a lot about matter and our senses, including what our best scientific theories tell us. Perhaps as a result, perceptual relativism continues to have many proponents, including Cohen (2009), Egan (2010), Gert (2013), Jackson and Pargetter (1987), Kalderon (2007), Matthen (2009), and McLaughlin (2003).

But one needn’t be a skeptic to object to perceptual relativism, as least when it is developed in the way Sextus describes. In particular, if relativism is developed so that it implies that “all things apparent to men actually are,” then it has trouble explaining two phenomena that are central to color perception: color inaccuracy and color constancy. I will go into more detail later, so, for now, just a quick sketch. Let’s start with color inaccuracy. In some cases, it seems that our perceptions are inaccurate, as when we’re looking at an object under a misleading illuminant, or against a misleading background. But it’s unclear how any of our perceptions can be inaccurate if “all things apparent to men actually are,” because this seems to imply that our perceptions are always accurate. Likewise, in many cases, it seems that we perceive the same colors across different contexts, as when we view an object under different illuminants, or against different backgrounds. But it’s unclear how that’s possible if “all things apparent to men actually are,” because this seems to imply that, with each new appearance, we’re accurately perceiving a new color, and thus that there is no color that we perceive as constant. I will also argue that varieties of relativism with weaker implications (e.g., that “all things apparent to Sarah in normal conditions actually are”) are similarly unable to explain color inaccuracy and color constancy.

I would like to identify a new way of developing perceptual relativism that can explain these phenomena. With this goal in mind, I will argue that the difficulty in explaining color inaccuracy and color constancy is the result of combining perceptual relativism with a plausible and widespread assumption about perception, which I call “perceptual atomism.” I will conclude that, if we want to preserve what’s right about perceptual relativism, we should develop it in a way that doesn’t rely on perceptual atomism. Toward the end of
the essay I’ll briefly sketch an alternative to perceptual atomism that I think perceptual relativists should develop, and which I call “perceptual structuralism.” The key difference between atomistic relativism and structural relativism is that, whereas atomistic relativists say that color perception is relative to a perceiver and a kind of perception, structural relativists say that color perception is relative to a “structure” built out of comparisons to other objects. I elsewhere develop perceptual structuralism in more detail (see Morrison 2018b, sec. 6).

Of course, Sextus would reject perceptual relativism even when combined with perceptual structuralism rather than perceptual atomism. His objection—that we can’t know anything about matter or our senses—applies to all variants of perceptual relativism, including variants that can explain color inaccuracy and color constancy. Thus, my focus in this essay is on two themes within Sextus’ philosophy, namely the puzzle of perceptual variation and the feasibility of perceptual relativism, rather than on his philosophy as a systematic whole. My focus is also limited to our perception of secondary qualities, with color as the central example. Sextus, in contrast, extends the debate to all of our judgments about the external world, including our judgments about shapes, causes, times, places, bodies, morality, and God (see Vogt 2016, secs. 4.4, 5.4).

Sextus gives two other examples of interpersonal variation in color perception: that those with jaundice perceive yellower colors, and that those with blood-suffusion perceive redder colors (Outlines 1.44, 101, 2.51). While the difference between children and their grandparents is genuine, and attributable to the hardening of their grandparents’ cataracts, I’m not aware of any evidence that corroborates these other examples. Like other ancient authors, Sextus mistakenly assumes that, because jaundice yellows the eye, it yellows one’s perceptions, and because blood-suffusion reddens the eye, it reddens one’s perceptions (see Burnyeat 2012, 288). But nothing important depends on these examples, because we now have compelling empirical evidence of widespread interpersonal variation in color perception, even among those with perfectly healthy eyes. This is partly due to variation in the density, placement, sensitivity, and tuning of the detectors responsible for color perception. I review the empirical evidence elsewhere (Morrison 2018b, 2019; and see Cohen 2009, 29–30; Hardin 1997, 76–80, 163–64). We could focus on any of these other examples. Nonetheless, given that this is a volume on Sextus, let’s continue to focus on the variation between children
and their grandparents, specifically the variation between Jacob’s and Sarah’s perceptions of the stone tile.

2. Perceptual Atomism

Perceptual atomism is a view about how we manage to perceive secondary qualities, and thus how we manage to perceive them accurately or inaccurately. Let’s introduce perceptual atomism by elaborating on our initial example. If Sarah is perceiving the stone tile alongside a porcelain tile, she doesn’t just perceive the stone tile as dark gray. She also perceives the porcelain tile as bright white, and the stone tile as darker than the porcelain tile. Let’s separate these three elements:

(1) Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray.
(2) Sarah perceives the porcelain tile as bright white.
(3) Sarah perceives the stone tile as darker than the porcelain tile.

What explains (1), (2), and (3)?

We’re looking for a kind of explanation that’s familiar from the philosophy of language. Philosophers of language want to explain how “Napoleon” manages to refer to Napoleon. Some appeal to causal relations between “Napoleon” and Napoleon. Others appeal to descriptions associated with “Napoleon” that single out Napoleon (e.g., “the French general who lost at Waterloo in 1815”). These aren’t the only explanations of how “Napoleon” manages to refer to Napoleon, but I hope they’re enough to get a grip on the relevant kind of explanation. Explanations of this kind are called “metasemantic,” because they don’t just indicate the objects and properties that our terms refer to (that’s semantics); they explain how our terms manage to refer to those objects and properties.

We’re searching for a similar kind of explanation. We want to explain how Sarah manages to perceive the stone tile as dark gray, the porcelain tile as bright white, and the stone tile as darker than the porcelain tile. Explanations of this kind are often called “psychosemantic.” They don’t just indicate the objects and properties that our psychological states refer to; they explain how our psychological states manage to refer to those objects and properties. (For this reason, “psychometasemantics” is a better description.)
Perceptual atomists start by explaining facts like (1) and (2), and they explain them by appealing to relations involving perceptions of the same kind. We might think of atomists as first filling in a schema like:

(1′) Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because . . .
(2′) Sarah perceives the porcelain tile as bright white because . . .

Atomists often appeal to causal relations. For example, an atomist might say that Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because dark gray objects cause that kind of perception in ideal perceivers under ideal conditions (Tye 2002, 138). Or an atomist might say that Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because dark gray objects cause that kind of perception in normal perceivers under normal conditions (Peacocke 1984, 373). Or an atomist might say that Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because dark gray objects cause that kind of perception in Sarah under normal conditions (Egan 2010, 88–92; and Chalmers 2006, 59, on what he calls “imperfect colors”). Or an atomist might say that Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because that’s the color shared by all the objects that caused that kind of perception in Sarah during her learning period (Dretske 1981, ch. 8). Or an atomist might say that Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because that’s the color shared by objects that most frequently caused that kind of perception in Sarah in the past (extrapolating Rupert 1999). Etc.

Atomists don’t always appeal to causal relations. An atomist might instead appeal to teleological relations. For example, an atomist might say that Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because that kind of perception was selected for its ability to indicate dark gray objects (extrapolating Millikan 1989). Or an atomist might say that Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because that’s part of the best explanation of how Sarah and members of her species use that kind of perception to avoid predators, catch prey, and perform other, similarly significant zoological actions (extrapolating Burge 2010, ch. 8).

Still other atomists appeal to phenomenal relations, or relations that obtain solely because of the phenomenal character of one’s perception. An atomist might say that Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because the phenomenal character of her perception perfectly matches dark grayness (Pautz 2010a, 58–60; and Chalmers 2006, 66, on what he calls “perfect
colors”). Or an atomist might say that Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray because the phenomenal character of her perception was in some sense inherited from the dark grayness of the stone tile (Campbell 1993, 268).

As I hope this list makes clear, atomism is a big tent, covering a diverse group of philosophers. What all these philosophers have in common is that they start by explaining facts like (1) and (2), and explain each kind of perception by appealing only to relations involving that kind of perception. For example, their explanation of (1) doesn’t mention the kind of perception involved when we perceive a porcelain tile as bright white, and their explanation of (2) doesn’t mention the kind of perception involved when we perceive a stone tile as dark gray. In this sense, their explanations of facts like (1) and (2) are independent of each other.

After explaining facts like (1) and (2), atomists explain facts like (3). Atomists claim that Sarah perceives the stone tile as darker than the porcelain tile because she perceives the stone tile as dark gray and the porcelain tile as bright white. They think of color perception like a by-the-numbers painting, where what’s explanatorily basic are assignments of colors to individual objects, such as dark gray to the stone tile and bright white to the porcelain tile. This assignment of colors to individual objects gives rise to color relations between the objects.

Explaining (3) in this way is less straightforward than it might first appear. At least in principle, it seems possible to think that the stone tile is dark gray and think that the porcelain tile is bright white, without thinking that the stone tile is darker, perhaps because it never crossed one’s mind to compare them. In some cases, it might even be possible to perceive that the stone tile is dark gray and perceive that the porcelain tile is bright white, without perceiving that the stone tile is darker, perhaps because the stone tile and porcelain tile are sufficiently far apart. Thus, the atomist must explain what’s different about this case, so that Sarah perceives the stone tile as darker than the porcelain tile. That is, they must explain what it is about Sarah and her perceptions such that she perceives the stone tile as darker than the porcelain tile because she perceives the stone tile as dark gray and the porcelain tile as bright white. We might think of atomists as filling in a schema like this:

(3’)
Sarah perceives the stone tile as darker than the porcelain tile because Sarah perceives the stone tile as dark gray, Sarah perceives the porcelain tile as bright white, and . . .
Importantly, an atomist needn’t say that Sarah first perceives the stone tile as dark gray and the porcelain tile as bright white, and then perceives the stone tile as whiter, perhaps as the result of something analogous to an inference. That is, an atomist needn’t postulate a delay between facts like (1) and (2) and facts like (3). The connection between these facts could be much tighter, so that (3) is simultaneous with (1) and (2), and no further psychological activity is necessary.

I don’t think this issue has received the attention it deserves. But we don’t need to worry about it here, because, for our purposes, it’s enough that, for the atomist, facts like (1) and (2) are supposed to be part of the explanation of facts like (3).

Why do I call this “perceptual atomism”? I think there’s a helpful parallel with metaphysical atomism. Metaphysical atomists claim that stone and porcelain tiles result from combining more fundamental objects that are metaphysically independent of one another. At a minimum, the most fundamental objects are independent of each other in that we can say what each is without mentioning the others. They might also be independent of each other in that it’s possible for each to exist without the others. Likewise, perceptual atomists claim that Sarah’s total perception of the porcelain and stone tiles results from combining more basic perceptions, namely her perception of the stone tile as dark gray and her perception of the porcelain tile as bright white, and that these perceptions are explanatorily independent of one another. At a minimum, the atomist’s explanations are independent of each other in that the atomist’s explanation of each doesn’t mention the others. They might also be independent in that it’s possible for her to perceive the stone tile as dark gray even if she’s unable to perceive anything as bright white.

I also call this “perceptual atomism” because there’s a helpful parallel with conceptual atomism. Conceptual atomists explain why Sarah has the concept of dark gray without appealing to relations involving other concepts, such as the concept of bright white (see Jackman 2017). But there are also dissimilarities. An obvious dissimilarity is that conceptual atomism is about how we manage to think about dark gray, whereas perceptual atomism is about how we manage to perceive dark gray, and these capacities might have different explanations. Another dissimilarity is that conceptual atomism implies that all our concepts are explanatorily independent of each other, and thus that our concept of darker is independent of our concept of dark gray and bright white. Perceptual atomism, in contrast, just implies that our perceptions of individual colors, such as gray and white, are
explanatorily independent on each other. According to perceptual atomists, our perceptions of relations, such as darker, are explanatorily dependent on our perceptions of individual colors. A final dissimilarity is that conceptual atomism is about what’s required for us to possess a concept, not about what’s required for us to then employ that concept. Even if conceptual atomism is wrong, and we can possess the concept of gray only if we possess many other concepts, including the concept of white, that might not place any restrictions on our employment of those concepts. For example, we might still be able to think about an object as gray without thinking about anything as white. Perceptual atomism, in contrast, is about what’s required to perceive a color relation between two objects, and thus about what’s required to employ a perceptual representation, rather than merely about what’s required to possess that representation. According to perceptual atomists, we perceive an object as darker than another only if we perceive the individual colors of those objects and our perceptions satisfy whatever further condition is slotted into (3').

Perceptual atomism is widespread and plausible. Nonetheless, I will argue that, when perceptual atomism is combined with perceptual relativism, it becomes hard to explain color inaccuracy and color constancy. At root, the problem is that, given atomism, the relativist is pushed to say that perception is relative to contexts as well as perceivers, and thus to accept that “all things apparent to men actually are.” In the next two sections I’ll explain why.

3. Relativism and Context

So far, we've been considering variation across two perceivers, namely Jacob and Sarah. But there’s also variation within the same perceiver. Sextus provides a number of examples: if you look at the sun, and then look at a book, the letters will look golden (Outlines 1.45); if you smear your lampwick with bronze rust, everything will look bronzed (1.46); if you smear your lamp-wick with cuttlefish ink, everything will look black (1.46); if you look at a lamp under sunlight, it will look dimmer than when you view it in the dark (1.118); and if you look at a dove’s neck as it turns its head, you will see a range of colors (1.120).

These are vivid examples, but hard to replicate. Let’s therefore focus on Kitaoka’s (2006) lightness illusion (Figure 1.1). Perhaps surprisingly, the left and right squares are intrinsically alike. More precisely, they reflect light in
the same way, and, as a result, could be interchanged without affecting the illusion. Which square, if either, are you accurately perceiving?

As we defined “relativism,” it is a view about variation across different perceivers, not a view about variation within the same perceiver. It thus doesn’t imply any particular answer to this question. Nonetheless, a relativist who accepts atomism should answer that you’re accurately perceiving both squares. To see why, let’s consider why they shouldn’t give a different answer.

To start, an atomistic relativist shouldn’t answer that you’re accurately perceiving only one of the squares. For the sake of argument, suppose that you’re accurately perceiving only the left square. The problem is that, from an atomistic point of view, nothing seems to justify the belief that you’re accurately perceiving only the left square. Let’s consider the available evidence: Your perception of the left square is phenomenal-dark-gray, while your perception of the right square is phenomenal-medium-gray. But there’s no reason to believe that the accurate perception is phenomenal-dark-gray rather than phenomenal-medium-gray. Similarly, your perception of the left square is the result of viewing it against a relatively light background, while your perception of the right square is the result of viewing it against a relatively dark background. But there’s no reason to believe that the accurate perception results from viewing the left square against a lighter background rather than a darker background. Finally, underlying each perception is a different pattern of activity in your eye and brain. But, once again, there’s no reason to believe that the accurate perception resulted from one causal process rather than the other. More generally, none of the intrinsic features of these perceptions, including their phenomenal characters, and none of their relations to the squares, including their causal relations, seem to justify the belief that you’re accurately perceiving only the left square. From an atomistic

Figure 1.1 Kitaoka’s illusion
Source: Kitaoka 2006.
point of view, it’s unclear what else could justify that belief, because atomists say that only your perception’s intrinsic features and relations to objects are relevant. Thus, an atomist who claims that you’re accurately perceiving only one of the squares is apparently committed to ignorance about which square it is. But perceptual relativism is motivated, in part, by our unwillingness to say that only one perceiver is accurate, because that would lead us to this very kind of ignorance. Thus, an atomistic relativist should be similarly unwilling to say that only one of your perceptions is accurate.

An atomistic relativist also shouldn’t answer that neither perception is accurate. According to relativism, you, Sarah, Jacob, and all other normal observers can accurately perceive the colors of objects. Thus, an atomist who denies that you’re accurately perceiving the left square’s color in its current context must think that you accurately perceive its color in another context. But, similarly to before, there’s no reason to believe that you accurately perceive the square’s color in another context rather than in its current context. More generally, there’s no reason to believe that you accurately perceive the square’s color in any particular context rather than all the other contexts.

I conclude that an atomistic relativist should answer that you’re accurately perceiving both squares.

Importantly, this line of reasoning doesn’t presuppose that there’s no way to distinguish between normal and abnormal contexts. How might atomistic relativists distinguish them? As noted in the introduction, our natural ways of thinking and talking are what push us to maintain that things are colored. Thus, it would be natural for anyone who maintains that things are colored to also rely on these ways of thinking and talking to distinguish between normal and abnormal contexts. Alternatively, one might use statistical regularities. But, even granting the atomist this distinction, the problem remains, because there will still be enough variation across normal contexts. For example, the atomistic relativist will be pushed to classify the left square’s current context as normal, because it’s so similar to paradigmatic examples of normal contexts. We’re surprised to learn that the squares are intrinsically alike precisely because there doesn’t seem to be anything abnormal about their current contexts. We often view objects against dark and light backgrounds, and we don’t regard either background as abnormal. More generally, our eyes and brains aren’t perfect at tracking lightness constancies, and as a result intrinsically alike objects sometimes look different, even in paradigmatic examples of normal contexts, such as classrooms and playgrounds. Kitaoka’s illusion is just a vivid example of this widespread phenomenon (see, e.g., Gilchrist
2006, ch. 10). Thus, even if the atomistic relativist can motivate a distinction between normal and abnormal contexts, there’s still no reason to believe that you accurately perceive the square’s color in any particular normal context, rather than any of the other normal contexts in which they cause perceptions with different phenomenal characters.

For these reasons, I think that atomistic relativists should respond that you’re accurately perceiving both squares. But how is that possible? After all, there are obvious differences between your perceptions. In the next section, I’ll introduce what I think are the two most promising proposals. After explaining why these proposals make it hard to explain color inaccuracy and constancy, I will briefly consider other proposals, and explain why they either make it just as hard to explain color inaccuracy and constancy, or have other, more serious drawbacks. I will conclude that perceptual relativists should give up perceptual atomism.

4. Two Proposals

According to perceptual atomists, you perceive the left square’s color because of a certain relation involving that kind of perception. Which relation? To what kind of perception? And in what context? I think that an atomistic relativist should say that it’s a causal relation to perceptions with that phenomenal character in that context. In particular, I think an atomistic relativist should say that you perceive the left square as dark gray because the left square causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in you in that context. The appeal of this suggestion will become clear when we consider the alternatives. But briefly: it doesn’t lead to ignorance about who can accurately perceive the squares; it doesn’t lead to ignorance about the contexts in which they can accurately perceive the squares; it doesn’t attribute any properties to the squares that aren’t already attributed by our best scientific theories; and it doesn’t appeal to any relations between you and the squares that aren’t already mentioned by our best scientific theories.

There are two proposals along these lines. The first is about the colors themselves. The second is about the descriptions that pick out the colors. More specifically:

Proposal 1. The first proposal is that you are perceiving the left square as instantiating causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in this [left] context. According to this proposal, this is among the many colors of the left
square. Thus, you're accurately perceiving its color. Likewise, you are perceiving the right square as instantiating *causes phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions in me in this [right] context*. Thus, you're accurately perceiving its color as well. This first proposal likewise explains why Sarah and Jacob are both accurately perceiving the stone tile. In particular, Sarah perceives the stone tile as instantiating *causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me [Sarah] in this context* and Jacob perceives the stone tile as instantiating *causes phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions in me [Jacob] in this context*. Because these are among the stone tile's many colors, they are both accurately perceiving a color of the stone tile. Cohen (2004, 2009) endorses and develops this proposal. It's the proposal about the colors themselves.

Proposal 2. The second proposal is that you are perceiving the left square as instantiating whatever property satisfies a description like: the property that disposes the left square to cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in this context. Likewise, you are perceiving the right square as instantiating whatever property satisfies the description: the property that disposes the right square to cause phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions in me in this context. Each description picks out a property of the relevant square. Thus, you're accurately perceiving both. Moreover, you're accurately perceiving *the colors* of both squares, because to be a color is just to satisfy a description of this kind. This second proposal also explains why Sarah and Jacob are both accurately perceiving the stone tile. In particular, Sarah perceives the stone tile as instantiating whatever property satisfies a description like: the property that disposes the stone tile to cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me [Sarah] in this context. And Jacob perceives the stone tile as instantiating whatever property satisfies a description like: the property that disposes the stone tile to cause phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions in me [Jacob] in this context. Thus, Sarah and Jacob are both accurately perceiving its color. Jackson and Pargetter (1987) and McLaughlin (2003) endorse and develop this proposal.

Some further observations about this second proposal might help clarify it. To start, it is natural to think of the relevant descriptions as *modes of presentation*, so that you're perceiving the left square's color under a different mode of presentation than the right square's color, and Sarah is perceiving the stone tile's color under a different mode of presentation than Jacob is perceiving the stone tile's color (see Jackson 2000, 158; 2007, 175–78). But one needn't think this. One might just think of these descriptions as singling out
the properties you, Sarah, and Jacob are perceiving, without corresponding to anything like a mode of presentation.

Moreover, the second proposal doesn't imply that the relevant properties belong to a specific metaphysical category. For example, they might be the percentage of light that the relevant objects reflect at each wavelength, i.e., their “reflectances” (as Byrne and Hilbert 1997, 2003 claim). Or they might belong to a metaphysical category that isn't mentioned by our best scientific theories (as Campbell 1993 claims). In other possible worlds, they might even be shapes, because in those words an object’s shape is what disposes it to cause perceptions with the relevant phenomenal character. Thus, whereas the first proposal tells us exactly which properties you, Sarah, and Jacob are perceiving, the second proposal just implies that the relevant properties dispose objects to cause certain perceptions, leaving the metaphysical category of those properties as a question for further investigation.

Finally, the second proposal leaves open how these properties relate to one another. For concreteness, suppose that the colors we perceive are reflectances. One possibility is that when you perceive the left square, you’re perceiving its reflectance, and when you’re perceiving the right square, you’re perceiving its reflectance. In that case, because both squares have the same reflectance, you’re perceiving each square as having that reflectance. Another possibility is that you’re perceiving each square as having a different determinable of that reflectance. Perhaps (massively oversimplifying) the left square is disposed to cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions because it reflects between 20 and 40 percent of light, and the right square is disposed to cause phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions because it reflects between 30 and 50 percent of light. In that case, because the squares have the same reflectance, you’re accurately perceiving both squares, even though you’re perceiving different determinables of that reflectance. One might think of these determinables as different colors, or, following Kalderon, one might think of them as different “aspects” of the same color (Kalderon 2011, 248–49). A third possibility is that you’re perceiving completely unrelated properties. While this is unlikely in the actual world, given the systematic correlation between our perceptions and how objects reflect light, it’s not hard to imagine a counterfactual in which phenomenal-dark-gray and phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions have radically different causes. In one such counterfactual, phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions are caused by elliptical objects, and phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions are caused by objects with sufficient
density, and thus in that world you’re perceiving completely unrelated properties, namely a shape and a density.

The difference between Proposal 1 and Proposal 2 is analogous to the difference between role functionalism and filler functionalism about mental states (see Cohen 2009, 76, 176; Pautz 2010b, n. 1). Functionalists of both kinds agree that there’s a close connection between a mental state, such as the belief that it is raining, and the function of that mental state, such as to prompt you to carry an umbrella. According to role functionalists, the belief just is that function (more carefully: the property of being in that functional state). According to filler functionalists, the belief is whatever state in an organism carries out (“fills”) that function, regardless of whether it’s a neural state, silicon state, or state of some other kind.

I will now argue that these proposals have difficulty explaining color inaccuracy and color constancy.

4.1. Inaccuracy

The problem with both proposals is that almost all color perceptions would be accurate, even though at least some of our perceptions seem inaccurate. Consider the first proposal. If you have a phenomenal-dark-gray perception in a context, and your perception is caused by an external object, that object instantiates causes phenomenally dark-gray perceptions in me in that context. Moreover, if you have a phenomenal-dark-gray perception in a context, you perceive an object as instantiating causes phenomenally dark-gray perceptions in me in that context. This is because, whatever your perception’s phenomenal character, you perceive something as the cause of a perception with that phenomenal character. Thus, unless you’re misidentifying the object causing your perception, or the causal chain is deviant, your perception is accurate. The second proposal has the same consequence, with the unimportant difference that your perception represents the property that disposes the object to cause a phenomenally dark-gray perception in you in that context. Thus, at least with respect to color perception, both proposals imply that “all things apparent to men actually are,” at least when we’ve correctly identified the cause of our perception, and the causal chain is nondeviant.

This is a problem, because at least some of our perceptions seem inaccurate. In Kitaoka’s illusion, we perceive the left square as darker, even though the squares are intrinsically the same, and thus we seem to be misperceiving
at least one of the squares. This illusion is due to variation in the background. In White’s illusion (Figure 1.2), we perceive the gray rectangles between the black bars on the left as darker than the gray rectangles superimposed on the black bars on the right, even though they are intrinsically the same as the rectangles on the right, and thus we seem to be misperceiving at least some of the rectangles. Our misperception is due to the differences in the occlusion and illumination cues. In Cornsweet’s illusion (Figure 1.3), we perceive the left square as darker than the right square, even though they reflect light in exactly the same way, and thus we seem to be misperceiving at least one of the squares. Our misperception is due to a misleading edge cue, in particular the line between the two squares. Our misperceptions have many other causes. For example, even if two objects reflect light in the same way, we
might perceive one as darker, because of an undetected asymmetry in how the objects are illuminated, or because of misleading motion and depth cues. These other causes of misperception are important, but harder to illustrate in print.

It would be hard for anyone to deny that we misperceive the individual color of at least one of the relevant objects. But it would be especially hard for an atomist, because in all of the examples above, we misperceive the relation between two objects. For example, in Cornsweet’s illusion we misperceive the left square as darker than the right square. According to the atomist, we perceive that relation because of the individual colors we perceive. Thus, the atomist seems forced to concede that we misperceive the individual color of at least one of the squares.

Other illusions provide equally compelling examples of misperception, even though they might not seem to involve a misperception of a relation between two objects. Consider the scintillating grid illusion, in which black dots appear and disappear inside the white dots as you look around (Figure 1.4). Whenever a black dot appears inside a white dot, you seem to be misperceiving the white dot. Consider also the illusion that results when you focus your gaze on the center of a hazy circle (Figure 1.5). After a few seconds,
the haze will seem to shrink. When it does, you seem to be misperceiving the page where the haze used to be.

In all of these examples, you seem to misperceive the colors of objects. But both proposals imply that you're perceiving the colors of all the objects accurately.

Cohen acknowledges this difficulty (2007, 338–39; see also Clark 2000, 226–27). He tries to mitigate it by claiming that standard examples of color illusion involve inaccurate predictions at the level of thought about how an object will look in other contexts. With respect to Kitaoka's illusion, you might inaccurately predict that the squares would look different if viewed by certain perceivers in certain contexts. Which perceivers? Which contexts? Cohen suggests that the relevant context is determined by our linguistic community, because illusions involve the misapplication of color predicates, and our linguistic community uses certain perceivers and contexts to establish the correct application of predicates such as “gray.” Cohen thereby relocates color inaccuracy to cognition and language. For example, in Kitaoka’s illusion, your false predictions might be about how the relevant objects would look if viewed against a uniform white background, rather than a graded or black background, because that’s the
context our linguistic community uses to establish the correct application of “gray.” Likewise for the other illusions.

This is unsatisfying, because, as Cohen (2007, 346–47) acknowledges, it implies that animals are incapable of color inaccuracy, unless they have a non-linguistic way of singling out certain perceivers and contexts as normal, and also represent those perceivers and contexts at the level of thought. It also implies that whether a perception is illusory can change as a result of a change in our language, or perhaps even just a change in which language we’re inclined to use at that moment, as long as users of those languages single out different perceivers and contexts as normal. But most fundamentally, this proposal is unsatisfying because our errors are sometimes entirely perceptual. In Kitaoka’s illusion, we’re misperceiving the left square as darker, and thus we’re misperceiving at least one of the squares. In White’s illusion, we’re misperceiving the rectangle on the left as darker, and thus we’re misperceiving at least some of the rectangles. And so on. Our errors are perceptual, not cognitive or linguistic. There is disagreement about where to draw the border between perception and cognition. But I think anyone who draws the border so that these errors are non-perceptual is drawing the border in the wrong place.4

This difficulty is ultimately due to perceptual atomism. From an atomistic point of view, there’s no way to justify the belief that you’re accurately perceiving in one normal context rather than the other. This pushes atomists to say that you’re accurately perceiving in both contexts. But, as we just saw, the best proposals imply that almost all of your perceptions are accurate, because what you perceive is relative to your current context, and in your current context the relevant object really is causing a perception with that phenomenal character.

4.2. Constancy

Both proposals also have trouble explaining color constancy. Consider a sphere illuminated from only one side (Figure 1.6). Different regions on the sphere’s surface cause perceptions with different phenomenal characters. Even so, there’s a sense in which you perceive the entire sphere as the same color. Both proposals have trouble capturing this aspect of color constancy. Because they have trouble for different reasons, I will consider them
separately. I will also consider them in reverse order, because I’ll have more to say about the first proposal.

Proposal 2. McLaughlin, Jackson, and Pargetter don’t offer explanations of color constancy. But, given their account, a natural strategy is to appeal to the colors picked out by the relevant descriptions. In particular, that we perceive the entire sphere as the same color because a certain color is picked out by all of the relevant descriptions (e.g., “the property that disposes the sphere to cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in that shadow context”).

However, this isn’t sufficient for color constancy. In Kitaoka’s illusion, the squares are intrinsic duplicates, so the same property might satisfy both of the relevant descriptions. Yet we don’t perceive the squares as the same color; the left square looks darker. It also wouldn’t be sufficient to perceive the squares as different determinables of the same determinate, because then your perception would leave open the possibility that the squares are the same as well as the possibility that they’re different, and thus you wouldn’t perceive the left square as darker. Analogously, if I tell you that my son Ian is between 5 and 10 years old, and my son Isaac is between 3 and 6 years old, I haven’t told you that Ian is older. I’ve left open the possibility that they’re the same age as well as the possibility they’re different ages.
In addition, given McLaughlin, Jackson, and Pargetter’s account of color perception, perceiving the same color also isn’t necessary for color constancy, because there are illusions of color constancy. We can perceive objects as the same color even though they’re intrinsically quite different. For example, if we modify Kitaoka’s illusion by lightening the left square until the two squares look exactly the same, we’ll perceive their color as constant even though the squares will have different reflectances. Thus, we can perceive objects as the same, even though different properties satisfy the relevant descriptions.

It’s unclear how else they might explain color constancy. As far as I can tell, their only remaining option is to appeal to the descriptions themselves. Returning to the sphere illuminated from only one side (Figure 1.6), perhaps you perceive it as a uniform color because of a similarity between the descriptions under which you perceive each region. But the relevant descriptions just specify contexts and phenomenal characters, and there’s little similarity between the contexts and phenomenal characters of your perceptions of the sphere. The contexts involve a range of different illuminations, and the phenomenal characters are as different as phenomenal-dark-gray and phenomenal-medium-gray. Perhaps there’s some other relation between the relevant descriptions, besides similarity, that explains why you perceive the sphere as a constant color. But I can’t think of one.

Proposal 1. Cohen (2008) offers an account of color constancy. Consider again the sphere illuminated from only one side. There is a region on the sphere’s surface that’s causing phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in you. According to Cohen, you perceive that region as causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in that shadow context. While other regions on the sphere are causing perceptions with different phenomenal characters, they would cause phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions if rotated into the same shadow context. Thus, they also have the dispositional property causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in that shadow context. According to Cohen, this explains the sense in which the sphere looks the same color: you perceive each region as having all these dispositional properties, and you also perceive this uniformity, even though each region manifests only one of those dispositions.5

I don’t find Cohen’s explanation satisfying, because I think it misdescribes color constancy. We don’t just perceive all regions of the sphere’s surface as having the same bundle of dispositional properties. We perceive something
above and beyond those dispositions. We think we can pick out that extra
something using a demonstrative like “that color.” There’s a helpful parallel
with shape constancy. Rotate the page while focusing your eyes on the shape
in Figure 1.7. At each angle of rotation, the figure is disposed to cause a per-
ception with a different phenomenal character. But you don’t just perceive
the figure as having a constant bundle of dispositions. Assuming you perceive
these dispositions at all, you also perceive a property that’s above and beyond
them—namely, the figure’s shape. Your perceptions of colors and shapes
differ in many other respects. But in this respect I think they’re the same.
Even if Cohen has explained a sense in which we perceive all regions on the
cube’s surface as the same, he hasn’t explained color constancy, because color
constancy involves something over and above the relevant dispositions.6

As a way of reinforcing this point, consider the number of dispositions that
you’d have to perceive in order to perceive the entire sphere as the same color
(Gert 2010, 678). Of course, it’s hard to count the number of dispositions, be-
cause there’s at least one disposition for each phenomenal character, and it’s
hard to count your phenomenal characters. Nonetheless, because you pre-
sumably have more than fifty phenomenal characters, there are presumably
more than fifty dispositions. Thus, according to Cohen, you’re perceiving
at least fifty dispositions at each location on the sphere’s surface, you’re per-
ceiving that uniformity, and this is the sense in which you perceive the sphere’s
color as constant. I’m doubtful that you perceive so many dispositions at each
location, at least if your perception of the sphere is like mine, because I don’t
find anything like that. In addition, even if you do perceive all of these colors,
this doesn’t seem to be the sense in which you perceive the sphere’s color as
constant. There seems to be a special color that you perceive as constant, and
which you can pick out using a demonstrative like “that color.” If anything, it’s
your perception of this special color that seems to underlie your predictions
about how each region on the sphere would look if you rotated it to the left or
right, moving it farther into or farther out of the shadow. Likewise, it's your perception of the ellipse as an ellipse that seems to underlie your predictions about how it would look if you moved it closer or farther, to the left or to the right.

There's another way of bringing out this same problem. Your perception of the sphere is an example of synchronic color constancy, or constancy at a given time. There's also diachronic color constancy, or constancy across times. Suppose at $t_1$ under a bright light you perceive an object as causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in context, and then a few seconds later at $t_2$ someone dims the light so that you perceive the same object as causes phenomenal-light-gray perceptions in me in context. According to Cohen, if you perceive its color as constant, it's because at $t_2$ you still perceive it as causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in context. If we reversed the order in which you viewed the object, so that you first viewed it under the dimmer light, and then under the brighter light, you would have perceived its color as constant because at the later time you would still perceive it as causes phenomenal-light-gray perceptions in me in context. Thus, if we reversed the order in which you viewed the object, you would perceive its color as constant because of your perception of a different disposition. This loses an important feature of color constancy, which is that, in many cases, the constant color is the same regardless of the order of our perceptions, such as whether you perceive the object under a dim light that's getting brighter, or under a bright light that's getting dimmer. In this respect, color constancy is again like shape constancy, because the constant shape you perceive doesn't seem to depend on the order of your perceptions, such as whether you start rotating it from its current position, with its major axis up-down, or from another position, such as with its major axis left-right. As you rotate an object, or move it closer to the illuminant, the shifts in your phenomenal character might allow you to become aware of additional dispositions. But this doesn't affect your perception of it as a constant color.

I conclude that Cohen's proposal fails to explain color constancy. It might be helpful to distinguish this objection from an existing objection. Armstrong (1987, 4–5) and many others object that colors don't look like relations, and thus don't look like dispositions to cause certain perceptions in us (see Cohen 2010, n. 5, for additional references). Unlike Armstrong, I'm hesitant to assume that the metaphysical nature of the colors is revealed to us by our phenomenology (for more discussion, see Cohen 2010, 15–22; and Johnston 1992, 226–28, 254–59). I think we should be open to the possibility...
that colors are relations, even if that's not how they seem. We didn't make that assumption. We argued, on phenomenological grounds, that a perception of the sphere’s constant color is not just a perception of each region as instan-
tiating *causes phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions in me in that shadow context*, *causes phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in me in that other shadow context*, and so on. That is, we argued, on phenomenological grounds, for the *existence* of a color above and beyond these dispositions, without making any assumptions about its metaphysical nature.⁸

It’s unclear how else Cohen could explain color constancy, at least while respecting the motivations for atomism. Atomism is motivated, in part, by the thought that there’s a tight connection between our perceptions of individual colors and our perceptions of their color relations, and that this connection is intelligible through introspection. For example, when we perceive a stone tile as gray, a porcelain tile as white, and the stone tile as darker than the porcelain tile, our perception of the tiles’ individual colors doesn’t merely seem *associated* with our perception of their relation, as a perception of a banana might be associated with a perception of yellowness. The connection is much tighter. Within Cohen’s framework, it’s unclear how the individual colors of the sphere’s regions could have a sufficiently tight connection to anything except disjunctions and conjunctions of those colors.

All of these authors—Cohen, McLaughlin, Jackson, and Pargetter—could always deny that we *perceive* the sphere as a constant color (see n. 4; Chalmers 2006, 85). But I don’t think they should. From a first-personal perspective, your representation of the sphere as a constant color seems paradigmatically perceptual. Among its hallmarks, it’s conscious, automatic, accessible, dis-
sociable from what you believe, directed toward nearby objects and prop-
ties, and fast enough that we can’t detect any delay. From a third-personal perspective, it also seems paradigmatically perceptual, given that color constancy is the product of activity in the visual cortex (Gegenfurtner 2003, 566–67). It also influences perceptual grouping, among other paradigmatically perceptual phenomena (Palmer 2002, 103–4).

But more fundamentally, denying that constancy is perceptual wouldn’t help, because the problems we identified don’t depend on classifying constancy as perceptual. In particular, even if color constancy involves a post-
perceptual judgment, that judgment still seems to represent something over and above the dispositions shared by all the regions (the problem with the first proposal), and the relevant descriptions still won’t be necessary or suf-
ficient for representing constancy (the problem with the second proposal).
I conclude that the relativist has difficulty explaining color constancy. Like the relativist’s difficulty explaining color inaccuracy, this difficulty is ultimately due to perceptual atomism. From an atomistic point of view, there’s no way to justify the belief that you’re accurately perceiving one square but not the other. This pushes the relativist to say that you’re accurately perceiving both squares. But, as we just saw, the best proposals imply that you’re perceiving a different color in every context, making it hard to explain what’s constant across contexts.

4.3. Stepping Back

We just considered two proposals for combining perceptual relativism and perceptual atomism. I argued that both proposals have difficulty explaining color inaccuracy and color constancy. Importantly, these difficulties aren’t peripheral to perceptual atomism. They conflict with both of its definitive commitments.

The atomist’s first claim is that our explanations of how we perceive individual colors, such as dark gray and bright white, appeal to a relation involving that kind of perception, and don’t appeal to relations involving perceptions of other kinds. Thus, this first claim is about our perceptions of individual colors. But I argued that atomistic relativists who endorse these proposals don’t have a good explanation of our perceptions of individual colors, because they’re pushed to say that all our perceptions of individual colors are accurate.

The atomist’s second claim is that we perceive color relations, including the relations involved in color constancy, because of how we perceive individual colors. For them, color perception is like a by-the-numbers painting. But I argued that atomistic relativists who endorse these proposals don’t have a good explanation of our perceptions of color relations, because they’re pushed to say that the colors we perceive are relative to the context, and thus they have trouble explaining how we can perceive an object as the same color across different lighting conditions within the same scene, as when an object is partially covered by a shadow.

Given that these proposals make it difficult, if not impossible, to combine perceptual relativism and perceptual atomism, it’s natural to wonder about other proposals.
5. Other Proposals

How many other proposals are there? Too many to count. According to the atomist, you perceive a tile as dark gray because dark gray objects have a certain kind of relation to a certain kind of perception in a certain kind of perceiver in a certain kind of context. Thus, there are as many proposals as there are combinations of relations, perceptions, perceivers, and contexts. In Morrison (2018a), I consider the most promising proposals, and identify several difficulties with each. Here, I’ll focus on only four proposals, and on only one of their difficulties.

Both of the proposals we considered in the last section focus on a perception’s phenomenal character. Other proposals focus on a perception’s functional role. But these proposals still have difficulty explaining color inaccuracy, and for the same reason. In Kitaoka’s illusion, you perceive the left square as darker than the right square. According to the atomist, this is because you perceive the squares as having different individual colors. Thus, if functional roles are relevant, the squares must cause perceptions with different functional roles. Let’s say that your perception of the left square has the functional role left-function, and your perception of the right square has functional role right-function. Which perception is accurate? Like before, the atomist doesn’t seem to have any evidence that could justify saying that it’s one perception rather than the other. Atomists are thus still pushed to say that both perceptions are accurate, and the most natural explanation is that your perception of a region on the left represents whatever color is shared by objects that cause perceptions with left-function in that context, and your perception of a region on the right represents whatever color is shared by objects that cause perceptions with right-function in that context. And we’re back into familiar territory, because that quickly leads to the conclusion that all our perceptions are accurate. Thus, atomists who endorse these proposals still have difficult explaining color inaccuracy.

Next, both of the proposals we considered focus on you in your current context. Other proposals focus on an ideal perceiver in an ideal context. But that’s inconsistent with perceptual relativism. If Sarah perceives the stone tile as causing phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in that perceiver in that context, and Jacob perceives the stone tile as causing phenomenal-medium-gray perceptions in that same perceiver in that same context, then at most one of their perceptions is accurate, because the stone tile can cause a perception with at most one of these phenomenal characters in the relevant perceiver.
Perceptual relativism, however, implies that Sarah and Jacob can both accurately perceive the stone tile.

Still other proposals focus on a normal perceiver in a normal context. But then, if you're a normal perceiver, it's not possible for you to misperceive an object's color in a normal context. In particular, if an object causes a phenomenal-dark-gray perception in you in a normal context, you'll accurately perceive that object as causing phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions in a normal perceiver in a normal context. However, the illusions we considered in section 3 seem to involve misperception. Moreover, at least some of them seem to occur in normal contexts. Kitaoka's illusion is perhaps the most compelling example, because we normally view objects against white and black backgrounds. It's possible to generate similar illusions in other ways. For example, we can make one object look darker than another, even if they are intrinsically the same, by varying the lighting, distance, viewing angle, and objects previously seen at that location. And we normally view objects under dim lighting and bright lighting, from a few inches away and several feet away, directly ahead of us and slightly to the side, and after viewing dark objects and bright objects.

Finally, both of the proposals we considered focus on a causal relation. Other proposals focus on other relations. Some focus on a teleological relation. In particular, perhaps phenomenal-dark-gray perceptions were naturally selected for their ability to indicate a certain reflectance, and therefore represent that reflectance. Another suggestion is a phenomenal relation to a color, i.e., a relation that obtains solely because of the phenomenal character of your perception (Campbell 1993; Kalderon 2011; and Pautz 2007; see also Chalmers 2006 on Edenic colors). Both suggestions have the same general problem: whereas causal relations can vary from person to person, these other relations are usually unvarying across the entire population. As a result, appealing to these other relations can make it hard for the relativist to explain how Sarah's phenomenal-dark-gray perception of the stone tile and Jacob's phenomenal-medium-gray perception can both be accurate, and thus represent compatible colors, without thereby implying that your phenomenal-dark-gray perception of the left square and your phenomenal-medium-gray perception of the right square also represent compatible colors, and are thus insufficient for perceiving the left square as darker. If Sarah's and Jacob's perceptions are both accurate, they're perceiving compatible colors, and if your perceptions are accurate, you're perceiving
incompatible colors. For this reason, it seems that the relevant relation must vary from person to person.

As I said, these are just a few of the other proposals, and I consider more proposals in Morrison (2018a). But I hope this is enough to convince you that a perceptual relativist should consider giving up perceptual atomism and looking for an alternative. In the final section I’ll sketch the alternative that I prefer.

6. Perceptual Structuralism

Let’s return to Kitaoka’s illusion. We asked: Which square, if either, are you accurately perceiving? Because you’re perceiving one of the squares as darker than the other, I think the natural answer is that you’re accurately perceiving at most one of the squares. This is the kind of answer we’re inclined to give in other domains: if you perceive one person as taller than another, and they’re really the same height, the natural conclusion is that you’re accurately perceiving at most one of their heights. But an atomistic relativist is pushed to give another answer. From an atomistic point of view, there’s nothing that justifies the belief that you’re inaccurately perceiving one square rather than the other, because none of the intrinsic features of your perceptions, and none of their relations to the squares, seem to indicate which perception is inaccurate. From a relativist point of view, this seems like a good reason to conclude that both perceptions are accurate. Thus, the atomistic relativist is pushed to say that you’re accurately perceiving both squares, leading to conclusions like “all things apparent to men actually are,” and “all things apparent to Sarah in normal contexts actually are.” But that makes it hard to explain color inaccuracy and constancy. What’s the alternative?

One alternative is that there is a contradiction between your perception of the individual colors of the squares and your perception of their relation. In particular, there is a color c such that you perceive the left square as c and the right square as c, but nonetheless perceive the left square as darker. This alternative would allow one to say that both perceptions are accurate without relativizing color perception to contexts. However, this would leave it mysterious why we rarely, if ever, notice contradictions between our perceptions of colors and our perceptions of color relations. It would also still be hard to explain color inaccuracy. If you accurately perceive the color of both squares
in their respective contexts, despite the dramatic differences between those contexts, it is hard to resist concluding that you accurately perceive the color of that kind of square in all contexts, leaving us a short step away from the conclusion that you accurately perceive the color of every object in every context, even if you sometimes misperceive their relations. That’s not a satisfying explanation of color inaccuracy.

According to the alternative I prefer ("perceptual structuralism"), what’s basic to color perception are comparisons between objects, including that the left square looks darker than the right square. Your perceptions of the individual colors are explained by these comparisons. There’s a helpful analogy with maps. Figure 1.8 doesn’t give us any information about a’s location; it could be anywhere. In contrast, Figure 1.9 describes a’s location by describing its relations to other objects. Similarly, a map of landmarks in New York City might describe PennStation’s location by describing its relations to Grand Central Station, the Empire State Building, Central Park, and the Statue of Liberty.

Suppose that a is in fact in the same location as b. In that case, the map is accurately describing at most one of their locations. But is it accurately
describing $a$’s location or $b$’s location? It depends on what the map says about their relations to the other objects. If the map accurately describes $a$’s relations to the other objects (namely: $c$, $d$, $e$), and it inaccurately describes $b$’s relations to these other objects, then its description of $b$’s location is inaccurate, while its description of $a$’s location might be accurate. Similarly, if a map of landmarks in New York City misdescribes Penn Station as a mile south of Madison Square Garden, even though they are in fact in the same location, we can ask whether it is inaccurately describing Penn Station’s location or Madison Square Garden’s location. If the map accurately describes all of Penn Station’s relations to the other landmarks (the Empire State Building, Central Park, and the Statue of Liberty), while it inaccurately describes Madison Square Garden’s relations to the other landmarks, then its description of Madison Square Garden’s location is inaccurate, while its description of Penn Station’s location might be accurate.

Structuralists say something similar about Kitaoka’s illusion. According to structuralists, you are accurately perceiving the color of at least one of the squares, because of the relations you are perceiving to other objects. Which objects? Which relations? In other work (Morrison 2018b), I argue that you are perceiving relations to other objects you’re currently perceiving, objects you saw recently, and groups of objects you perceived in the more distant past. The details are of course important, but this isn’t the right place to introduce them. For now, I just want to point out that structuralists can explain why you’re inaccurately perceiving at least one of the squares, and thus aren’t pushed to say that you’re accurately perceiving both. More generally, they can give a straightforward account of color inaccuracy.

They can also give a straightforward explanation of color constancy. For the structuralist, sameness in color is one of the relations out of which the structure is built. Thus, unlike the atomist, they don’t need to first explain your perceptions of individual colors, and then, on that basis, explain your perception of constancy. They can take it for granted that you perceive constancy; it’s not something that needs to be explained in terms of a more basic kind of perception (for details, again see Morrison 2018b). This isn’t to say that color constancy is computationally straightforward. Structuralism is a psychosemantic theory, not a computational theory. Analogously, the causal theory of reference provides a straightforward explanation of how “Napoleon” manages to refer to Napoleon, without giving any explanation at all of the computational processes that underlie our acquisition and use of that term.
One final point in favor of structuralism: it coheres nicely with perceptual relativism. Once again, the analogy with maps is helpful. Figure 1.9 and Figure 1.10 describe a’s relations to different sets of objects. Nonetheless, both maps might accurately describe a’s location, by accurately describing its relations to those objects. Structuralists say something similar about Sarah’s and Jacob’s perceptions, namely that they might both be accurately perceiving the color of the stone tile, despite perceiving different relations to different objects. In particular, they might both be perceiving relations that describe the same color (or at least compatible colors). Structuralists can thereby explain why both Sarah and Jacob are accurately perceiving the stone tile, while also explaining why you’re inaccurately perceiving at least one of the squares. Both are consequences of the fact that the relevant “structure” of comparisons is specific to each individual. What sets structuralists apart from atomists is that, whereas atomists claim that color perception is relative to a kind of perception (e.g., a phenomenal-dark-gray perception), structuralists claim that color perception is relative to a “structure” built out of relations between objects.

Of course, there’s a lot more to say about perceptual structuralism. But, for present purposes, what’s most important is that perceptual relativism doesn’t lead inextricably to the conclusion that “all things apparent to men actually are,” or to an equally problematic conclusion, such as “all things apparent to Sarah in normal contexts actually are.” It leads to these conclusions only when combined with perceptual atomism. Alternative views about how we manage to perceive the colors of objects, such as perceptual structuralism, give us the resources to explain why you’re misperceiving one of the squares, and thus to avoid relativizing color perception to contexts in a way that makes it difficult to explain color
inaccuracy and color constancy. Perceptual structuralists are therefore well advised to rethink their basic assumptions about the nature of perception.

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Notes

1. Some of these authors use “perceptual relativism” more restrictively, and therefore don’t describe themselves as relativists (see, e.g., Cohen 2009, 10; Kalderon 2007, 584). But they’re all perceptual relativists in our sense, because they’d all say that Jacob’s and Sarah’s perceptions might both be accurate.


3. Other than hallucinations, McLaughlin mentions just one way for perceptions to be inaccurate, namely that the relevant property isn’t shared by everything that disposes your current phenomenal character in your current context (2003, 123). I’m setting this aside, because it doesn’t seem to explain the inaccuracy of your perceptions of these illusions.

4. Tye (2012, 301–2) also objects to Cohen’s account of color inaccuracy. Tye focuses on Adelson’s checker-shadow illusion, but his point applies equally to Kitaoka’s illusion. According to Tye, Cohen would say that you misperceive the left square as darker than the right square, and would offer a certain explanation of why your perception is inaccurate. Tye objects to that explanation. In Cohen’s published work, however, he says that inaccuracy is at the level of thought, rather than at the level of perception, and thus seems committed to denying that your perception is inaccurate (see earlier discussion). Cohen’s view of color similarity also suggests he would deny that your perception is inaccurate. For example, if you perceive a lemon as similar to an orange, he would say that you’re accurately perceiving a similarity between the phenomenal characters that those fruits produce in you (Cohen 2003, 82–84; 2009, 196–97). I would thus expect him to say that when you perceive the left square as darker than the right square, you’re accurately perceiving a difference in the phenomenal characters that those squares produce in you. Note that Tye says his interpretation is based on a private conversation, rather than on published work.
5. I’m setting aside a complication: Cohen (2008) is noncommittal about whether you perceive each region as instantiating all these dispositional properties, and thus about whether you perceive constancy. He wants to leave open the possibility that this occurs later, at the level of cognition, because he doesn’t want to commit to any specific way of distinguishing perception from cognition. He thus merely describes constancy as driven by our visual system (80). In a more recent paper (2015, 632–34) he says that the empirical evidence strongly suggests that color constancy isn’t “exclusively perceptual.” But this doesn’t mean he’s now committed to saying that constancy occurs only later, at the level of cognition. To start, he never makes this stronger claim. In addition, the only evidence he cites is that constancy is enhanced for familiar objects. Even granting that this is evidence of a top-down influence on perception, constancy might still be exclusively perceptual in the sense that it might be represented by a state that’s exclusively perceptual. Despite Cohen’s official neutrality, I’m going to present him as offering a proposal about the sense in which you perceive the sphere as the same color, because I think that’s the best version of the proposal he offers. I’ll explain why later. I’ll also explain why the problem with this proposal doesn’t depend on whether the relevant representation is perceptual or cognitive.

6. Other philosophers have made a similar point about constancy in connection with intentionalism, the view that for every change in the phenomenal character of our perceptions, there is a change in what color we perceive (most famously, Peacocke 1983, 12–13). These philosophers point out that there also seems to be a color that we perceive as constant. I think they’re right, and that, regardless of whether this is really a problem for intentionalism, it seems to undermine Cohen’s attempt to explain color constancy.

7. As E. J. Green pointed out to me, this isn’t always true for shape constancy. If you perceive a diamond, and it is then rotated forty-five degrees, you might perceive it as a diamond on its side, whereas if you perceive a square, and it is then rotated forty-five degrees, you might perceive it as a square on its side, even though it’s the same geometrical shape in both cases. However, color constancy isn’t like that. It’s like most cases of shape constancy, in which the order of your perceptions doesn’t matter.

8. It might also help to distinguish this objection from another existing objection. Johnston (1992, 226–27) observes that we can perceive a series of rapidly changing dispositions without perceiving a constant color, as when we look at the back of a compact disk. Building on this observation, Kalderon (2008, 950–53) argues that there’s no principled explanation for why perceiving the compact disk’s dispositions isn’t sufficient for color constancy, but (to use our example) perceiving the sphere’s dispositions is sufficient for color constancy. He concludes that color constancy involves more than just perceiving dispositions. While I agree with the conclusion, I’m not convinced by the argument. Perhaps the compact disk’s dispositions are too unstable, in that even the slightest shift can change which dispositions are manifest. Or perhaps, as Gert (2013, 194–97) suggests, the compact disk’s dispositions just haven’t been unified under the kind of concept that’s necessary for color constancy. As these alternative explanations suggest, it might be possible to explain why perceiving dispositions is sometimes, but not always, sufficient for perceiving a constant color. Our objection is
different. We argued that, even if the relevant dispositions are stable and unified, the color we perceive as constant is above and beyond these dispositions. Tye (2012, 302–4) objects that it “seems highly contrived” to explain our perception of color constancy by appealing to our perceptions of unmanifested dispositions (n. 4). But he doesn’t explain what’s contrived about it.