



Review

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Despite these problems, the book contains interesting discussions of a number of important topics in philosophical logic, and a spirited defense of Platonism against the objections of Quine and others. The arguments could have been made easier to follow, however, by excising some of the wilder detours, and by more careful editing; there is for instance a paragraph on page 177 repeated in much the same words on page 183.

JOHN HAWTHORN

JOHN L. POLLOCK. *Language and thought*. Princeton University Press, Princeton 1982, xii + 297 pp.

This book touches on many topics and is interesting from a number of aspects. The general aim of the book is to argue for the primacy of communicated meaning in the analysis of spoken language, while retaining the use of a theory of logical form to structure the postulated meanings. It is, put very roughly, an account of meaning as Grice would understand it (see Grice XXXV 351(3) and Schiffer, *Meaning*, Oxford, 1972), expressed with machinery drawn from the Frege to Montague tradition.

The main technical ideas of the project are those of a *dynamical parameter*, a *diagram*, and an *analytic predicate*. When a statement is made and understood, propositions are asserted by the utterer and understood by the hearer. These may be different, on Pollock's theory. For every statement in every situation, there are acceptable sent- and received-propositions, which may be meant and understood in that situation. The dynamic parameters are the features of the situation that are relevant to determining the sent- and received-propositions; they function somewhat like Scott's indices in *Advice on modal logic*, *Philosophical problems in logic*, D. Reidel, 1970, pp. 143–173. The diagram of a statement is a function from the dynamic parameters and the speaker to the acceptable sent- and received-propositions. (There is no connection with the model-theoretic use of the term.) Since the sent- and received-propositions are not public statements, they may be the contents of thoughts that refer to an object without there being any corresponding public sentence containing a name or description of the object. Pollock uses this possibility to define the kind of reference involved in *de re* belief. These beliefs involve a proposition that there is a unique α satisfying some conditions, where α may be a non-public designator. Some propositions may in fact be "logically idiosyncratic"; it is not possible for them to be believed by more than one person. An account of the senses of proper names is given, which has as special cases logically idiosyncratic designators, public names whose sense is given by the causal chains described by Kripke (*Naming and necessity*, *Semantics of natural language*, D. Reidel and Humanities Press, 1972, pp. 253–355 and 763–769, also Harvard University Press, 1980), and, via some complications, token reflexives. A remarkable degree of clarity is achieved on the potentially mysterious subject of private names and unshareable thoughts.

Predicates are treated in a similar way. Predicates in public language are used to express the "concepts" that are components of propositions and thus ascribe "attributes" to objects. In practice, not much use is made of the contrast between concepts and attributes. Attributes can be analytic, or conceptually primitive, or synthetic. Synthetic attributes are expressed by predicates whose meaning is mediated by a theory in much the way that the meaning of some proper names is mediated by a causal chain. Propositional operators such as modalities are treated, in effect, as predicates of propositions. Several different modalities are distinguished.

At the end of the book, Pollock proposes an interesting and definitely heterodox account of linguistic conventions, according to which their force is essentially moral. This allows him to tidy up some loose ends, in particular to say what it actually is to send one rather than another of the acceptable propositions by using a sentence. In an appendix there is a rather formal putting together of the whole semantical machinery, which contains a very general and potentially valuable statement of the principle of compositionality.

The book should interest readers concerned with the theory of reference, *de re* attitudes, and the classification of modalities. More work will have to be done before we can know whether we can simultaneously make sense of the primitive ideas employed (propositions, concepts, moral obligation) while retaining plausibility with real linguistic examples. There is no doubt, however, that it presents an ambitious and powerful theoretical framework and a number of challenging ideas.

ADAM MORTON

CRISPIN WRIGHT. *Frege's conception of numbers as objects*. Scots philosophical monographs, no. 2. Aberdeen University Press, Aberdeen 1983, also distributed by Humanities Press, Atlantic Highlands, N.J., 1984, xxi + 193 pp.