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To cite this article: Dean Moyar (2012) How the Good Obligates in Hegel's Conception of Sittlichkeit: A Response to Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation, Inquiry, 55:6, 584-605, DOI: 10.1080/0020174X.2012.746036

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2012.746036

Published online: 04 Dec 2012.
Inquiry, Vol. 55, No. 6, 584–605, December 2012

How the Good Obligates in Hegel’s Conception of Sittlichkeit: A Response to Robert Stern’s Understanding Moral Obligation

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(Received 15 October 2012)

ABSTRACT In Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Robert Stern argues that Hegel has a social command view of obligation. On this view, there is an element of social command or social sanction that must be added to a judgment of the good in order to bring about an obligation. I argue to the contrary that Hegel’s conception of conscience, and thus the individual’s role in obligation, is more central to his account than the social dimension. While agreeing with Stern that Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit does preserve a role for obligation, and that the social plays an important part in that account, I argue that there is no extra social component that converts the morally good into obligation. Rather, Hegel’s conception of Sittlichkeit as the “living good” means that judgments of the moral facts are simultaneously judgments of obligation.

I.

We should be very grateful to Robert Stern for providing a lucid account of three difficult philosophers in Understanding Moral Obligation. He not only gives novel interpretations of each thinker, but also weaves their thoughts together to stage a dialogue about crucial metaethical issues. Reading Stern’s book has forced me to rethink Hegel’s treatment of duty and value, to clarify my own positions and to reconsider the interpretive options. I would like to thank Stern in particular for producing such an excellent work at the juncture of historical research and systematic philosophy. We learn not only
about an important historical episode, but also to think more deeply about contemporary ethical debates.¹

I want to register one formal complaint up front about Stern’s treatment of Hegel. There are ostensibly two chapters devoted to Hegel’s ethics in the book, but three quarters of the first is actually a discussion of Schiller, and half of the second is taken up with discussing contemporary social command accounts and Bradley’s ethics. Stern does not read the text he cites from Hegel with the detailed attention that the texts of Kant, Schiller, and Kierkegaard receive. Of course Stern has done such reading elsewhere, and I imagine that it was mainly for reasons of length or elegance he chose not to go into more detail on Hegel’s positions. But this does come at the price of oversimplification. My worry is that Hegel has been squeezed into a mediating role between Kant and Kierkegaard, and that the goal of offering a neat tripartite dialectic has resulted in a truncated picture of Hegel’s ethics.

Stern’s account of Hegel has two main parts, one presenting Schiller’s critique of Kant and Hegel’s extension of that critique, and another that argues that Hegel holds a social command theory of obligation. Stern claims that Hegel follows Schiller in opting for Aristotelian virtue as opposed to Kantian duty, tracing to Schiller’s influence Hegel’s emphases on habituation and second nature (UMO, p. 137). Drawing especially on the early “The spirit of Christianity”, Stern writes that Hegel aimed to use love as a corrective to Kant’s emphasis on the law. In this same vein (and drawing again on “The spirit of Christianity”) Stern writes that Hegel thought that Kant’s dualism of reason and sensibility, of law and desire, did not allow for full autonomy because it merely establishes an inner rather than an outer tyrant.

Stern ends the first Hegel chapter by writing of “how Hegel tried to overcome the problem of moral obligation” (UMO, p. 147), which makes it sound as though Hegel does not in the end have a theory of moral obligation. On the basis of this chapter it can seem that Hegel so despised Kant’s theory of moral motivation that he would never dream of providing a replacement for the self-legislation theory of obligation. By Stern’s own lights that theory depends fundamentally on Kant’s dualist moral psychology, so that it is unclear how, without such a psychology, obligation remains a major problem for ethical theory.

Yet in the second Hegel chapter, Stern turns to arguing that Hegel provides a social command solution to the problem of moral obligation. Countering the idea that Hegel simply drops the concepts of duty and obligation, Stern instead claims that “Hegel tries to retain these notions, but to offer an account of them that goes against both divine command theory and the hybrid theory put forward by Kant” (UMO, p. 156). He claims that in Sittlichkeit Hegel argues for the “social basis of these obligations” (UMO, p. 157) against both Kantian self-legislation and against the naïve idea that obligations have a divine origin. He is, however, concerned that his solution not be seen as going too far in valorizing the social. Stern qualifies the social command as a
necessary and not sufficient condition for obligation. The commanding State must be rational and have the aim of preserving the freedom of the citizens who are commanded. In the end, though, “what renders something a duty or obligation for an individual is the ‘absolute authority and power’ of the ethical community” (umo, pp. 160–61). stern does not wish to claim that Hegel is an authoritarian political thinker, but he does take pains to show how attenuated the individual’s authority is under the Hegelian State.

Before offering some criticisms of the book, I want to review one of stern’s earlier essays to highlight a tension within his current view. the 2007 essay, “Freedom, self-legislation and morality in Kant and Hegel: constructivist vs. realist accounts”, focuses on the systematic issue, constructivism vs. realism, that stern makes central to his reading of Kant in umo. given that including in the book his earlier treatment of Hegel would have made clearer the parallels between his readings of Kant and Hegel, I was surprised that stern left most of this material out, offering instead only a brief account of how Hegel’s views on freedom do not prevent us from reading Hegel as a realist. in the essay he takes much the same tack as Hegel as he does in the book with Kant, arguing that it is perfectly possible to be a realist in ethics and yet an advocate of autonomy. His target is mainly Robert Pippin’s constructivist account of Hegel’s ethics, and he sides with John McDowell against Pippin in reading Hegel as a realist who aims to depart from the obligation-as-command model altogether. He writes, “The key issue is how Hegel is seen to handle the apparent obligatoriness of morality. As we saw previously, this is what makes the question of autonomy pressing; if moral oughts command or oblige us, how can they do so except on a legislative model? But then how can they be legislated in a way that will preserve our autonomy unless they are legislated by us?” (stern, 2007, pp. 255–56). in the essay stern argues that Hegel leaves behind the legislative or command model of obligation, claiming that “Hegel raised the more fundamental question of whether the relation between a good person and what he ought to do is a relation of being commanded or bound at all” (stern, 2007, p. 256). stern even writes that “whereas in the sphere of Moralität, duty still has the feeling of a command imposed on the agent, in the sphere of Sittlichkeit, this is precisely what is lost” (stern, 2007, p. 256). it was quite surprising, then, to find stern defending a social command account of Hegel in umo. While in the essay he takes Hegel to be altering the nature of the debate by arguing against the very framework of Kantian obligation, in the book he takes Hegel to accept the command framework and to replace one account of obligation with another account of the same item, namely of obligation conceived in a roughly Kantian (i.e., command) way.

It does seem that bracketing the realism issue in discussing Hegel is partly responsible for this shift, since in the essay stern advocated a non-command view of Hegel as a way of eliminating the tension between realism and autonomy. stern writes in the article, “the tension that the constructivist feels between realism and autonomy is not one that has a place in Hegel’s
thought—but not because he himself is a constructivist, but because the legalistic conception of morality that generates this tension is not there in the first place” (Stern, 2007, p. 257). This does raise the question of whether the tension, and thus the constructivist argument, reappears in full force if Hegel is seen as retaining a legalistic command account of obligation. I will leave that question to the side, since adjudicating the realism-constructivism issue in Hegel is beyond the scope of the present essay. We should focus instead on Stern’s shifting views on Hegel’s approach to “the problem of obligation”. Can the problem be avoided, as McDowell and Stern in his essay imply? Must we have a command account, whether individual or social, in order to do justice to obligation, as Stern in UMO and Pippin claim? Or is there a way to save obligation without attributing a command account to Hegel?

In his criticism of the moral ought and his endorsement of an ethical second nature, Hegel seems to opt for an Aristotelian view of ethics against the very idea of obligation, law and ought. But in UMO, Stern also rightly points to passages in the introduction to “Ethical Life” where Hegel invokes the language of duty and law. We cannot adequately understand that language if we jump right into Hegel’s Philosophy of Right at that point. Sittlichkeit itself is the result of a complex dialectic of moral value (content) and moral subjectivity (form). We must first unpack that dialectic if we are to understand the pronouncements at the beginning of “Ethical Life” and pin down Hegel’s view of obligation.

II.

In this section, I will look at Hegel’s theory of value and his critique of Kant in the “Morality” section of the Philosophy of Right in order to set up an alternative to Stern’s social command account of obligation in Sittlichkeit. There is a case to be made that Hegel saw the problem of obligation as peculiar to the sphere of “Morality”, such that overcoming that specific problem is one of the main achievements of Ethical Life. Stern’s argument, by contrast, must be that Morality deals with an unacceptably individualistic conception of obligation, and that Ethical Life provides a social conception of obligation that overcomes the problems of the Kantian individualistic account. Stern is surely right that Hegel does aim to overcome the individualism of “Morality” and the strict duality of the Kantian will, but by setting up his dialectic through Schiller and Hegel’s early writings, he does not do justice to the elements of Hegel’s solution that are established within the moral sphere itself.

A crucial part of Stern’s thesis throughout UMO is that judgments of the right and good are separate from the command that establishes obligation. Such a separation is a key element of “Morality”, which is defined by the relation of the individual will to the ethically good. Hegel writes, “When it [the infinite self-determination of the will] makes this first appearance in the individual will, it has not yet been posited as identical with the concept of
the will, so that the moral point of view is consequently the point of view of
relationship, obligation [Sollen], or requirement [Forderung]” (§108). The goal
of “Morality” is to work towards an identity of the individual will and the
good, so the key question becomes whether there is room for obligation once
that identity is achieved in Ethical Life. Significant steps towards that identity
are already taken in the development of the moral sphere. The account of
“Morality” reframes the contrast between the good and obligation, between
content and form, so that the problem of obligation is more focused and more
tractable.

In his account of “Morality”, Hegel often pairs subjective rights with rights
of objectivity. That is, he pairs claims about individual authority with claims
about accountability to others. We should expect both sides to be present in
Sittlichkeit as well. One way to express in a preliminary way my disagreement
with Stern is that while he emphasizes the right of objectivity in Sittlichkeit,
as the element of social expectation and sanctioning, I want to stress the role
for the individual holding herself to the morally good. This individual element
first comes into focus in Hegel’s comments on the “right of subjective freedom,
[which] is the pivotal and focal point in the difference between antiquity and
the modern age” (§124). Though Stern has a place for this aspect of particu-
larity in his account of Sittlichkeit, and though it is important for his account
of Hegel’s criticism of Kant, Stern’s account of obligation opposes the social
and individual in a way that seems contrary to Hegel’s remarks here. Hegel
writes,

This right, in its infinity, is expressed in Christianity, and it has become
the universal and actual principle of a new form of the world. Its more
specific shapes include love, the romantic, the eternal salvation of the
individual as an end, etc.; then there are morality and conscience, fol-
lowed by the other forms, some of which will come into prominence
below as the principle of civil society and as moments of the political
constitution . . . (§124)

Hegel takes pains here to emphasize the pervasiveness of this subjective right
in the modern world. By referencing morality and conscience as aspects of
this right, he seems to encourage a more individual-oriented conception of
obligation.

The distinctive problem of moral obligation arises only once the “will of
others”, and thus a more robust universality, has become an issue for the
individual will. He first gives an abstract description of ethical content, or
value, in the idea of the good. The good as Hegel has defined it is an abstract
ideal, “the absolute final purpose of the world” (§129), that includes all the
major elements of value introduced in previous sections of the Philosophy
of Right. This abstract content requires individual action for its realization.
At the opening of Sittlichkeit, Hegel refers to the “living good” (§142), which
describes the world in which the full conditions for the realization of the good are met within Sittlichkeit. The text in between “the good” and Sittlichkeit is largely concerned with the problem of obligation, or with the relation between the abstract content (the good) and the subjective form (the self-determining will).

Hegel’s treatment of Kant in “Morality” seems to line up with Stern’s reading of Kant, and thus to set up Stern’s version of the transition from Kant to Hegel, but there is a crucial difference. Stern formulates Kant’s position as a hybrid position in which the “content” of morality is conceived in a realist way while the “form” of morality is self-imposed obligation. According to this division, Hegel’s Schiller-inspired criticism and social account fall on the side of form. The form-element of obligation no longer comes from the will imposing law upon itself, but rather from other agents and the State imposing norms on the individual will. Hegel worries that Kant’s conception of obligation gets in the way of determining the specific content of the good. He worries about properly uniting form (obligation) and content (the good, right), rather than about altering the form from the individual to the social (which is the focus of Stern’s reading). Hegel does link Kantian autonomy specifically to the theme of moral obligation, for he introduces the theme of moral obligation through a claim about the “right of the subjective will” (§132) to be held responsible according to the subject’s knowledge of the value of her action. This right does not trump all other rights, of course, as Hegel quickly complements it with the claim that subjects can be held to universal standards of objectivity. Once again, Hegel offers a pair of rights that must both figure into the final picture of normativity. Stern’s account links the social to objectivity and lets that element dominate the subjective right.

The specific issue of obligation is thematized most pointedly in §133, where Hegel writes, “the good is the essential character of the subject’s will, which thus has an unqualified obligation [Verpflichtung] in this connection” (§133). An obligation arises as a relation to the will because the will is not identical to the good. But there is a demand for such unity. The content and form can be united, but only in the empty imperative to do duty for the sake of duty, as if the content or reason for one’s actions were dutifulness itself. The main problem here is that the purity and immediacy of this relation to the good leaves no room to specify conditions for realizing the good. Hegel writes that with the resources of Kant’s abstract universality, the only “determination is identity without content” (§135). This “infinite autonomy” (§135R) of “pure and unconditional self-determination” (§135R) does not contain a principle for determining what our duties actually are. Hegel writes that Kant was right to insist on the universal character of the obligatory (the form), but wrong to think that the form of lawfulness could provide a criterion for the content of duty.

The thrust of the emptiness criticism is that we cannot know what to do, and cannot derive that content in a systematic and immanent manner, from
the form of lawfulness alone. The connection to the good is too immediate, for nothing is allowed to intervene between the universal purpose and my self-determining will. This focus on content does not seem to support Stern’s main narrative, according to which Hegel moves from criticizing the duality of the Kantian will on the formal side of obligation to invoking a social story in which that duality is overcome. Stern can of course say that the move to Ethical Life also answers the issue of ethical content, but he then risks running afoul of the threat to autonomy he discussed in his earlier article. Hegel sought to locate the proper form of obligation, a form that could be united with determinate content, in the individual conscience, the main concept that comes in between Kantian duty and “Ethical Life”. Stern’s neglect of this concept leads him to place too much weight on the social and not enough weight on the individual’s role in holding herself to ethical norms.

III.

Hegel introduces conscience in §136 as an antidote to the emptiness of Kant’s ethics. The language, however, is so abstract that the exact role of conscience in the PR’s overall account of ethical content and obligation is hard to decipher. Hegel writes, “Subjectivity, in its universality reflected into itself, is the absolute inward certainty of itself; it is that which posits particularity, and it is the determining and decisive factor—the conscience” (§136). Especially noteworthy here is the reference to conscience as “determining and decisive”, providing specification for the merely abstract command of Kantian duty. For linking this to Stern’s narrative, the key questions are: (1) is this a judgment of the good that would require a further factor to be obligating? Or is it also a judgment of duty that determines obligation? (2) What is the final role for conscience in Ethical Life?

The first issue will occupy most of this section. Hegel links conscience directly to obligation in the lectures, where we find, “Earlier and more sensuous ages have before them something external and given, whether this be religion or right; but [my] conscience knows itself as thought, and that this thought of mine is my sole source of obligation [das allein für mich Verpflichtende]” (§136A). This seems to run directly counter to Stern’s social command account of Hegel on obligation. It also calls into question the very separation of the good (content) and obligation (form), for conscience seems both to determine the good and to be the source of obligation. Yet one cannot put too much weight on a single passage from the lecture notes. This is also the kind of comment that Hegel makes to indicate the typical thought about a certain concept, a thought that later turns out to be one-sided.

To understand Hegel’s views on conscience the key precursor is Fichte rather than Schiller. Fichte elevates conscience over the Kantian moral law because conscience captures the specificity of first-person judgment. Though I cannot go into Fichte’s theory in detail, a couple points will help us
understand Hegel’s very compressed remarks about conscience. A key difference from Kant is that for Fichte conscience is a feeling of harmony, a positive motivational unity rather than a painful feeling of tension between our sensible and rational natures. Conscience signals a unity between the individual and the world (between the empirical and absolute I on Fichte’s telling) that captures the specificity of the situation and the autonomy of the agent. Fichte separates out conscience and reflective judgment as two capacities that jointly determine what an agent’s obligation is in each situation. Conscience is the absolute certainty that an action is my duty, but for Fichte conscience itself is not an epistemic capacity. That is, conscience imposes obligation but is not itself directly the capacity that arrives at the various possibilities of action in an ethical situation. In this respect, Fichte seems to fit perfectly into a hybrid account where the content of ethics is given for judgment and the imposition of obligation comes from the self. The act of imposition does not add any new content. The idea is that reflective judgment runs through the options after inspecting the content of the ethical landscape and taking all relevant factors into account. When it lights on the right one, conscience as harmony and absolute self-certainty rings its bell, as it were, and imposes obligation.

While taking over many of the basic features from Fichte, Hegel reunites the functions of judgment and obligation in a single capacity of conscience. Separating the functions is a way of separating access to content (reflective judgment) from the formal act of obligation. Hegel objects to this individualistic version of what I shall call the Add-on Thesis, the claim that some extra factor must be added to the judgment of the good in order for there to be an obligation. I will argue (in Section IV) that Stern attributes to Hegel a social version of the Add-on Thesis that is incompatible with Hegelian Sittlichkeit. By reuniting the aspects that Fichte had separated, Hegel can reconceive the individual–ethical world relationship such that true judgments of the right and good are obligating without the need for an additional factor.

Conscience is the ultimate subjective right in that through conscience the good is determined as obligating for the individual. Hegel writes,

This subjectivity, as abstract self-determination and pure certainty of itself alone, evaporates into itself all determine aspects of right, duty, and existence, inasmuch as it is the power of judgement which determines solely from within itself what is good in relation to a given content, and at the same time the power to which the at first only represented and ought-to-be good, owes its actuality. (§138)

In the first part of this statement Hegel describes the aspect of practical deliberation in which the agent suspends the bindingness of the various prima facie duties or morally relevant considerations. This suspension is necessary in order to arrive, on the output side, at an all-inclusive judgment. This is clearly supposed to be a judgment of an obligation, though not the kind of
self-accusing judgment that is often associated with conscience. The contrast between the ought-to-be and actuality is especially striking in light of the dynamics of Stern’s account. Does this imply that conscience overcomes the very problem of obligation since the sollen and obligation seem to be inseparable (“vorgestellte und sein sollende” is actually translated as “only an Idea and an obligation” by Nisbet)? This would be odd, given that conscience seems even in Hegel’s own words from the lecture notes to be the “source of obligation”. But in one important sense this is correct, for conscience does overcome the command conception of obligation. The implication of the ought is that there is a gap between the conditions of action and the conditions of obligation. So in the Kantian case, I ought to determine my will through the moral law (the condition of obligation) even though I am a finite will pulled by sensible desires (the conditions of action) against the moral law. For Hegel’s version of conscience, the actuality claim represents the coincidence of the conditions of action and the conditions of self-ascription or obligation. There need not be a command since on this model one is typically not pulled away (by desire) from the conclusion of one’s judgment.

In the Philosophy of Right the most important point is that this version of conscience enables a mediated relationship of the good and the individual will. Rather than assert a pure realization of the good, conscience admits the role of the individual’s commitments in judging the good and judging it as obligatory. In contrast to the Kantian law, conscience does not place the obstacle of formal universalizability in the way of uniting form and content. For Hegel the obligation cannot just be added once the epistemic capacity has done its work, for the individual’s own commitments help determine not only the duty, but the good itself. This does not mean that conscience is arbitrary or relativistic. When Hegel refers to “actual conscience” in the Phenomenology he underscores that conscience is a judgment that aims at universal content.

In my view, conscience should be seen as making one’s motivating reasons answerable to the justifying reasons that ultimately support them. At the risk of courting paradox I will call this the self-incorporation view of obligation. It turns on the idea that the individual incorporates the universal in her own judgments, and that the individual is thereby incorporated into the common purposes of the community. In an earlier version of this essay I wrote of self-imposition, but in the end I think that remains too close to Kant’s self-legislation and to command accounts generally. I have opted against self-actualization because it does not adequately capture the dynamic or dialectical character of Hegel’s view (the sense in which it is not just a matter of realizing a preordained potential).

In several respects, Hegel’s view of conscience is the result of the kinds of criticisms of Kantian dualism that Stern traces from Hegel back to Schiller. Yet Stern’s reading of Hegel’s criticisms relies heavily on the early “The spirit of Christianity”, where Hegel’s solutions are much more “communal” than
the ones in his mature writings. It makes all the difference that Hegel has a way to overcome the dualism in the first-person register, for the social account cannot on its own solve the problems of Kantian autonomy.

My focus on conscience may seem to leave the individual the sole arbiter of obligation. This would run contrary to Hegel’s well-known criticisms of formal conscience in §137 and of subjective ethics in §140. Don’t these passages show that conscience is not Hegel’s last word on the concept of obligation? Don’t they in fact open the door to precisely the social command reading that Stern has put forth?

I don’t think so. Let’s look at §137 first. His central concern there is with what is willed, the content. He is not criticizing conscience on the issue of how the content is binding, as we would expect if Stern’s claim about the move to the social were correct. In §137, Hegel identifies the conscience at issue in “Morality” with form, or with the self-determination that stands in contrast with ethical content. Hegel’s point in emphasizing “true conscience” is that the goal of a full account of ethics is the unity of form and content. One cannot let the side of form, of “the subjective self-consciousness” (§137R), usurp the side of content. In one sense this just repeats Stern’s charge against the constructivist arbitrary self-launching readers of Kantian ethics. Without content secured apart from the voluntary act of the individual, the project of autonomy is self-defeating. The content is largely secured with the move to the social. But Stern’s claim is that the form, too, namely the nature of obligation, is only secured with the move to Sittlichkeit. Hegel’s criticism would have to be that “formal” conscience has no standing apart from social pressure. But this is not how Hegel’s argument goes, for he does endorse conscience even while insisting that formal conscience by itself cannot conclusively secure the content of that obligation.

But what about the devastating critique of ethical subjectivism in PR §140 (one of the longest sections in the book)? Looked at closely, this section is not a critique of formal conscience per se, but rather a critique of possibilities that arise when form and content are not properly united. The issue is one that Stern, with his sharp separation of realist content and subject-imposed form, does not really allow to arise. Modern subjects are self-conscious about the form–content divide, and can play form (subjectivity) and content (the right and good) off of each other. The degenerate forms of subjectivity in §140 are ways of manipulating the content of the right and good that Stern conceives of as separable from obligation. Hegel discusses two cases that bring out especially well this interplay of detached form and content. In discussing probabilism, Hegel objects to the idea of finding one good reason that “probably” suffices, and ratifying an action as obligatory on that ground. He has in mind the father-confessor with his list of reasons, all of which may be good in some sense, but all of which can also be invoked as a justification for a bad action (there are many other factors that can render the action
Hegel's next case involves joining the abstract good to my particularity by declaring my intention to be good when there is "anything positive at all" (§140). Hegel cites the content of "doing good to the poor, or caring for myself, my life, my family" in order to highlight that it may be an "essential end", an indisputably moral piece of content, that one invokes. This shows that having an unorganized heap of abstract content (of the right and good) can actually interfere with securing content for determinate obligation.

So there is little in Hegel's criticism of excess subjectivism that impugns the obligating character of conscience itself. What §137 and §140 do bring to light is that there are rational requirements that are constitutive of conscience. Hegel lays this out in more detail in the Phenomenology account, where he writes that conscience presupposes the other key moments of Geist. One of these is the moment of substance, that requires that one act in a way that is recognized by others because it is embedded in social institutions. This constitutive social element brings us right back to the question of whether the individual or social has primacy in Hegel's theory of Sittlichkeit.

IV.

Stern cites several passages from the introduction to Sittlichkeit as the main evidence for his social command view. The idea behind the social command account of obligation is that social pressure is the added ingredient that converts the ethically good into the obligatory. Taking Kurt Baier's position as paradigmatic, Stern writes, "Baier does not treat moral goodness as a sufficient condition for obligatoriness and duty: something further must be added to what is morally good if it is to count as an obligation. . . . what is added is the demand by society to act in accordance with what one has moral reason to do" (UMO, p. 152). For Stern, the social pressure from other agents and from the State is what is distinctive about Hegel's conception of obligation in Sittlichkeit. There are social sanctions that attach to non-compliance with obligatory content, and these sanctions separate the morally good from the morally obligatory. Stern's account thus depends on a version of the Add-on Thesis: there is a discrete element of social pressure that is added to the goodness/rightness of a possible action. If this social Add-on Thesis can be upheld, then the problem of obligation persists in Ethical Life and is solved through social command.

The three main passages that Stern cites in support of his social command view begin at §146, but the immediately preceding sections suggest a different interpretation. The first line of §142 states that "Ethical Life is the Idea of Freedom as the living good which has its knowledge and volition in self-consciousness, and its actuality through self-conscious action" (§142). The crucial point here is that Hegel identifies Ethical Life as a whole with the living good, that is, with value. This runs counter to Stern's intuition that something additional is needed to convert the good into the obligatory. This
is not to say that there is no room for obligation in Ethical Life, but rather that we should not expect to find a gap between the moral facts and obligation. Stern should in one sense be amenable to my reading of this section, since it does imply a kind of value realism. One way to put my objection to his command account is to say that you cannot go value realist halfway with Sittlichkeit. Everything in Ethical Life is part of the good, or can be viewed in terms of value. The gap between the good and obligation is overcome by the end of “Morality”. In §144, Hegel writes, “The objective sphere of ethics, which takes the place of the abstract good, is substance made concrete by subjectivity as infinite form”. The entire sphere is identified with the good, a good that is no longer abstract because it now incorporates the individuality of conscience. Part of this is the added element of reflexivity, such that institutions must withstand the scrutiny of conscience. But the greater part for Hegel is that the institutions, in treating individuals as valuable in their particularity, configure value in ways that allow judgments of the good to be obligating in a non-dualistic, non-command fashion.

It is worth noting that Hegel’s position on Ethical Life may thus end up looking, surprisingly enough, like Stern’s description of the natural law view. According to that view, judgments of the good are obligating even without a command. This comparison to natural law is probably more misleading than helpful (Hegel is not a natural law theorist), and I cannot carry out a comparison here, but Hegel does accept a version of the claim that judgments of the good are judgments of obligation in Ethical Life.

Turning then to Stern’s three passages, a big part of my strategy will be to read them as claims about value rather than as claims about how command must be added to value in order to generate obligation. Stern’s first passage reads, “In relation to the subject, the ethical substance and its laws and powers are on the one hand an object, in as much as they are, in the supreme sense of self-sufficiency. They are thus an absolute authority and power, infinitely more firmly based than the being of nature” (§146). Stern emphasizes the reference to “authority and power” in support of the social command view. But Hegel is referring to the good with “ethical substance”, and he includes the “laws and powers” as aspects of that good. To say that “they are” is to highlight their availability for the subject’s objective judgment and to say that they embody the good. They are self-sufficient in that they form a system of value that structures the lives of individuals and reproduces itself.

The debate over Hegel’s position runs into a major complication here, which is that reference to “laws and powers” takes us out of the normal setting in which metaethical issues such as obligation are adjudicated. Hegel is in part talking about actual positive law and powers such as the police and judiciary. The question this raises is whether Hegel is really talking about moral obligation as opposed to legal obligation. Once we are talking about actually instituted laws, it is not hard to make the case that the sanction (i.e., punishment) for disobeying the laws is essential to their bindingness. In so far as
the institutions of Sittlichkeit are shapes of Recht in a Rechtsstaat, they are bound up with the legal system in a way that seriously complicates the task of identifying Hegel’s position as one of moral obligation. If we read Hegel as saying that the morally good becomes obligatory only when non-compliance means breaking a positive law and incurring punishment, we would have a social command view but a very strange picture of moral obligation. Hegel does not, in any event, hold such a view, nor does Stern attribute it to him. But I suspect that much of the plausibility of Stern’s reading stems from this overlap of the legal and moral in Ethical Life. Is there a way to separate these issues without losing what is distinctive about Ethical Life?

An initial point is that we should separate the system-level position from the position on single isolated obligations. For the systematic view (and Hegel does link the rationality of Ethical Life to its systematic character), the legal element is essential, and thus social sanctions are essential. But at the singular level, neither legal sanction nor social command generally is necessary for there to be an obligation. Hegel’s reference to a duty of charity in Civil Society (in §207) is a good example of a duty that is not tied to sanction and law. The same system–individual split holds for conscience. At the systematic level the role of conscience is key in legitimating the modern institutions (more on this in the next section), but an individual can have a duty even when he judges that he does not.

Tying this point about legal obligation back to my first point about value, I would say that on Hegel’s full systematic conception of Ethical Life we are supposed to judge legal requirements as morally good. We have a duty to comply with them, not because of the sanction, but because they express the good. In that sense the legal structures can themselves be part of the good and not an extra factor to be added to the good in order to make it obligatory.

In Stern’s second main passage, Hegel does invoke in recognizable form the problem of obligation, but not in a way that supports the social command account. Hegel writes, “All these substantial determinations are duties which are binding on the will of the individual; for the individual, as subjective and inherently undetermined—or determined in a particular way—is distinct from them and consequently stands in a relationship to them as to his own substantial being” (§148). This passage echoes the language of “Morality”, where the claim was that the individual stands in relation to the good and therefore has duties to fulfill. Hegel’s point here is that there is always a potential gap between the “substantial determinations” and the individuals, so the bindingness of duty should not be conceived like a natural attraction, but rather as a duty. We do not have the ought of Kantian duty here because the conditions of realization of these duties are present at hand. But rather than supporting the idea that a social command secures this bindingness, the claim about “substantial determinations” is more naturally read as a claim about value configurations. As I read it, these passages refer to the contexts of value set by the institutional structures. We stand in relation to these structures of value
in that we are separable from them, and have duties based on them, that we can fail to fulfill. We have the duties because of the values, not because of the social pressure, though that pressure exists in Hegelian Sittlichkeit just as it has in every social system in recorded history.

The passage above and other aspects of Hegel’s account do support Stern’s claim that Hegel does not abandon the idea of obligation. For the individual it does seem that Ethical Life serves to distinguish a limited set of duties from the unlimited pursuit of the morally good. This coincides with Stern’s justification for the need to retain a conception of obligation. Drawing on an essay by Susan Wolf, Stern writes that having an obligatory set of actions with “a higher level of expectation that people will do them” (UMO, p. 155) is a great good for dealing with problems of social coordination. Second, without an account of the obligatory we would end up with an unlimited (and thus overly demanding) account of what is morally good. We can see Hegel’s view of Kantian morality as encouraging an unlimited and over-demanding view of moral requirements, and in circumscribing those requirements in Ethical Life, which identifies our essential duties, we are relieved of the burden of fulfilling impossible ideals. So we have good reason to think of Hegel as preserving a role for obligation in Ethical Life, but we as yet have not seen any compelling evidence that social pressure or sanction is the distinguishing feature of this view. There is also an important caveat here. In shifting the burden of accomplishing the good to the institutional level, Hegel expects the institutions to fulfill moral ends as well. So even though there is a limitation placed on how much we should expect from the individual, the transition to Ethical Life is about the effective means of realizing value and not about adding an extra factor to the good in order to make it obligatory for the individual.

The third passage from the introduction to Ethical Life gives some credence to the social command account in so far as it refers explicitly to the community. Hegel writes, “In an ethical community, it is easy to say what someone must do and what the duties are which he has to fulfil in order to be virtuous. He must simply do what is prescribed, expressly stated, and known to him within his situation. Rectitude is the universal quality which may be required of him, partly by right and partly by ethics” (§150). There are at least three distinct points here. (1) In the normal situation in an ethical community, there is no epistemic problem that would require deliberation. (2) One has done enough, morally speaking, if one fulfills the ordinary duties of everyday life. These two points are not an argument against the conscience-based view of obligation, for that view does not require one to do unnecessary epistemic work or to become a moral saint (though these are hazards of taking conscience as the sole authority). There is also no mention in this text of a social sanction that would convert the morally good into the obligatory. The good just is configured in the relations that we recognize in a community. (3) Hegel defines rectitude as “simple adequacy” to the context of duty, which I think can be read as responsiveness to the values operative in one’s community.
At the end of this passage, when Hegel uses the key term—about what is required of him, he refers not to the community or to other individuals, but to “right” and “ethics”. This sounds like a view in which the right and the good are doing the obligating/requiring, rather than a view in which the social command must be added to the good. The passage states that the social conditions allow easy knowledge of the good; it does not say that the social makes the good into duty.

It is important to stress that Hegel does not support the Add-on Thesis in either its social (Stern) or its individual (Fichte) guises. The individual does not stand outside of the relations of Ethical Life, and does not, in a discrete act of self-imposition, merely choose to take them on. That is, the Add-on Thesis is just as incorrect for conscience’s obligating role as it is for the social command view. We do not take the content of Sittlichkeit as so many reasons and then add to them the obligating element of conscience’s approval. Hegel critiques this idea in attempting to distinguish his theory of duties in Ethical Life from (among others) Kant’s and Fichte’s: “The difference between its presentation here and the form of a theory of duties lies solely in the fact that the following account merely shows that ethical determinations are necessary relations, and does not proceed to add in every case ‘this determination is therefore a duty for human beings’” (§148). Adding this phrase would misleadingly suggest that there is something extra to the dutifulness quite apart from the content of the duty. Hegel’s idea of “necessary relations” is the idea of a certain kind of obligating fact that is operative in an ethical world, and that normally requires neither the deliberate act of self-incorporation nor the exercise of overt social pressure.

The difference between my reading of Sittlichkeit and Stern’s can be made clearer through examining his interpretation of the passage in which Hegel invokes the identity of the individual with the “ethical laws”. Hegel writes, “On the other hand, they are not something alien to the subject. On the contrary, the subject bears spiritual witness to them as to its own essence, in which it has its self-awareness and lives as in its element which is not distinct from itself—a relationship which is immediate and closer to identity than even faith or trust” (§147). Stern contrasts this identity to the type of obedience that would stem from “external ends” such as fear of punishment or self-interest, and writes that “the motivating reason . . . can be based on the recognition of it as an obligation, grounded in the acknowledged authority of the ethical community over the individual, where at the same time the individual is part of this group, and so not subordinated to it as by an alien will” (UMO, p. 158–59). On Stern’s reading, the social command is not alien, because I am a member of the social and thus in part the author of the command. This reading strikes me, however, as too close to the kind of social contract theory of ethical norms that Hegel often criticizes. The idea is that since I am part of the commanding authority I can find my freedom in obedience to that authority even if on occasion my will resists the social command. But
if this individual–group relation is not to be a kind of voluntarism, in which my consent to join with others eliminates the alienness, then the individual–group relation must be based on value (or content) itself. It makes more sense to think of the spiritual witness as a witness to the configuration of value realized in the institutions and laws. I read the “more identical” claim as follows: because I am constituted by my purposes and those purposes are ultimately grounded in the institutional purposes or realizations of the good, I am constituted by (identical with) the ethical institutions.

On my view of motivating reasons in Ethical Life, they are the first-order values that figure into individual purposes. These values consist of items such as my child’s well-being. The question then is how to make this attachment more than just a particular immediate relationship. How do we specify the universal aspect and the role of the institutional powers in an action such as helping my child with her homework? This action is “ruled” by the ethical powers in so far as the structure of the family, and the legal responsibilities associated with parenthood, deeply inform my immediate relationship to my particular family members. Nonetheless, my relation to my child is the kind of fact that is directly obligating in the sense of not requiring an additional command to make it obligatory. The relation is “necessary” in so far as it is determined by the family structure, which in turn is integrated in various ways into the economic and political organization of the State. The overall requirement is that one’s motivating reasons and the institutional justifying reasons are linked in a kind of identity relationship. The reasons are usually not strictly identical (I do not act with the express goal of upholding the institution of the family), but they are responsive to each other. My motivating reasons are answerable to the justifying reasons/institutional structures, and those structures can change in response to changes at the basic level of experience.

Having argued against the social command view, I should say that I do agree that our holding each other to the community’s norms is a crucial part of Hegel’s ethics. Elsewhere I have argued that the social bindingness is the objective side of the rational identity, while conscience is the subjective side, and both are necessary in Hegel’s overall view. The very fact that Hegel’s ethics include the judicial system and constitutional law means that there is a public element of sanction in his overall view. Nonetheless, I do think that Hegel’s position should be called a self-incorporation or conscience-based view, rather than a social account. In the next section, I would like to review a few further reasons why I think this is so, and then relate my claims to Stern’s arguments against the Identification view of social norms.

V.

We have seen that Stern is correct to think that the problem of obligation does persist in Hegel’s account of Ethical Life. I have raised some doubts
about whether Hegel’s view of obligation should be seen as a social command account, given that Hegel identifies Ethical Life as a whole with the good. The point I want to press now is why, given that Ethical Life is manifestly social and institutional, we should nonetheless still think of Hegel’s full view of obligation as an individual self-incorporation view rather than as a social command view. I take it that we want to know what the distinctively Hegelian view is, what makes his view worth studying and why he thought it was different than previous views. Hegel encourages us to formulate this question as the question of why we should think of his view as distinctively modern. To answer this question we should examine Hegel’s presentations of his theory as the endpoint of a historical narrative. When we do so we see that the principle of conscience, rather than the social component, is what he took to be the distinctive element of his view.

One major piece of evidence in favor of my view is the account of “Spirit” in the 1807 *Phenomenology of Spirit*. The historical narrative that Hegel unfolds there begins with Greek *Sittlichkeit*, the central conflict of which could, at the risk of some anachronism, be read as the transition from a divine command (Antigone) to a social command (Creon) view of obligation. The account of “Spirit” ends with a section entitled “Morality”, in which Hegel gives a much richer, phenomenological account of the themes in the *Philosophy of Right*’s “Morality” chapter. It has puzzled readers of the *Phenomenology* why Hegel turns to an account of Kantian morality and Fichtean conscience after giving accounts of the actual social and political events of the ancient world and modern France. The short answer is that the modern social order that he hoped would arise in Germany had not yet taken shape. But we can infer that he thought that autonomy-oriented accounts of morality provided the essence of that new world order. He makes various bold statements about how conscience in particular holds together the key moments from the previous dialectic. Conscience is the shape of subjectivity, of individuality, that serves as the principle for the modern ethical order. The modern order is binding in so far as it realizes the good through that principle of subjectivity. We cannot separate this question of legitimacy (which Stern could attempt to put on the side of the right and good) from the question of obligatoriness, since conscience concerns the form of obligatoriness itself. The institutional order is rationally obligating, and obligations express our autonomy, if that order realizes the good through the principle of conscience.

Because the *Phenomenology* is such a tricky text, and its relation to the mature system is subject to so much debate, it is good to draw in other texts for support. My other main piece of evidence comes from the 1830 treatment of world history in *Encyclopedia* §552. Hegel’s theme is the relationship of religion and ethics, with particular focus on the issue of the bindingness of religion and the bindingness of the laws of the State. He argues rather polemically against Catholicism for endorsing the idea of a religious conscience that stands above and apart from the laws. He objects to the idea that one’s
religious conscience (and one’s priest) is the ultimate arbiter of the good, such that the laws are obeyed simply because non-obedience brings punishment, rather than out of an ultimate judgment of their rightness/goodness. One could read the critical claim about Catholic conscience as compatible with a social command view (the Catholic conscience prevents the social sanctions from having proper force). But Hegel goes on to endorse quite strongly the unity of the Protestant religious conscience and the ethical conscience as the basis of the modern State. He writes,

"Only in the principle of the Spirit knowing its essence, in itself absolutely free and having its actuality in the activity of its liberation, does the absolute possibility and necessity exist that State power, religion and the principle of philosophy fall together into one, completing the reconciliation of actuality in general with Spirit, of the State with the religious conscience as well as with philosophical knowing. . . . Thus the principle of the religious and the ethical conscience become one and the same in the Protestant conscience—the free Spirit knowing itself in its rationality and truth. (Encyclopedia, §552)"

This originally religious principle of conscience is centred on the free individual who is valued in her particularity and capable of realizing the universal through her particularity. The universal takes the shape of the laws of the State, but the legitimacy and bindingness come predominantly from conscience. The ethical and reformed religious conscience both aim at the same “rationality and truth”, such that obedience to the law is obedience to conscience’s rational judgment of the good. There is no competing spiritual authority to contravene this judgment, since the religious conscience has the same aim and thus for practical purposes is the same as ethical conscience.

This principle of conscience may still appear rather nebulous, so I would like to give it further definition by comparing it with the identification-with-one’s-social-roles account that Stern considers and rejects. Stern introduces the identification account in tandem with a social role view of the content of obligation: “what explains the obligatoriness that comes with occupying a role is that the individual’s own identity as a person is tied up with that role, such that not performing it is no longer an option for them, but becomes a requirement on them; and if the role involves doing some moral good, then it constitutes a moral requirement” (UMO, p. 162). Based on the PR introduction, there is indeed good reason to expect Hegel to hold such a view. The account of the rational will in §§5–7 certainly suggests that the will’s structured identification with content is what guides the development of right. Hegel uses the example of friendship in §7 as a way of illustrating the full structure of the concept of the rational will as a kind of identification with a role that binds one to other agents. But that structure is so elementary that it
is compatible with a variety of different accounts of Ethical Life, and thus is not conclusive evidence for interpreting Hegel’s position.

Stern’s argument is somewhat hard to assess because it is addressed to Bradley’s text, and extended to Hegel’s dialectic because Hegel was Bradley’s main inspiration. The thrust of the argument is that without the “social organism” in which all the roles are anchored and made determinate, the self-realization and identification of the moral sphere really do not amount to much. The obligation comes not from the inner dynamics of the individual self, but rather from the way in which those inner dynamics are satisfied once the social organism and its legal imperatives come on the scene.

Stern correctly notes that Hegel’s resolution to the problem of obligation turns on the issue of how to stabilize a unity of the particular and universal. The individual certainly cannot come up with, or legislate a solution to, this issue on his own. The content for this stable structure must grow out of “substantial ethical life”, the social practices and customs of a polity. But the proper content can only arise if the form—our mode of attribution, imputation, taking responsibility—is that of conscience. That form is not a discrete act of mere voluntary assent, as would be the case if we bought into the Add-on Thesis. So too the Identification view goes wrong if the identifying self is conceived as a construct always built from scratch. The instability and waywardness of the individual self that Stern draws out through Bradley’s writings (UMO, pp. 166–69) goes together with the notion that identification with a role is more like an act of submission to a social command than like a grounding of the authority of the social role. My self-incorporation view does not deny that the system of value is a substantial edifice ruling over the lives of individuals. But my view incorporates the individual into that system as the leading value, and explains how the individual incorporates the universal into her singular life by acting as a bridge between the particular and universal.

This dynamic comes to light in Hegel’s discussions of how certain social roles become essential to Sittlichkeit only after individuals can stabilize them through the proper form of self-incorporation. A leading example of this is the typical role in “Civil Society”. This is the sphere of particularity and self-interest that has fueled the growth of modern economies. Hegel muses (in PR §185 and elsewhere) on why individuality could not flourish in the ancient world, but rather had to be attacked by philosophers such as Plato for corrupting the ethical substance. It was only with the advent of Protestant conscience that the formal structure of subjectivity could sustain the mercantile practices based on unabashed self-interest. The obligations operative in this sphere are often informed by legal issues, and a legal framework, but there must be extra-legal trust and responsibility for the system to function properly. Individuals are motivated by self-interest, but this self-interest is not degenerative, does not fundamentally undermine the State (as it was beginning to in Plato’s Greece) because of conscience, the holding oneself to universality within one’s attachment to the particular.15
VI.

I will close by offering a very brief defense of Hegel against Kierkegaard’s criticism. The main objection to Hegel that Stern levels in Kierkegaard’s name is that Hegel lets the subject off the moral hook too easily and thereby encourages moral complacency. But this objection only seems plausible because the social command account of obligation leaves little for the subject to do but respond appropriately to the modest demands of the State. Once the self-incorporation of conscience is brought to the fore, it becomes much easier to see how Hegel’s theory can place demands on the individual. There is first of all the demand to think for oneself about each case that calls for moral deliberation. This is often a complex affair, for Hegel does not think that subsumption under a rule at all suffices for determining individual cases. Moreover, Hegel does not think of the agent in primarily a defensive posture—as someone who wants to keep from staining his character. Rather, Hegel advocates the achievement (although not the maximization) of value, and thus has a consequentialist element that valorizes the pursuit of more substantial, universal ends. He also requires that we think through our actions so that they express values recognized by others. This constitutive universality of conscience is not always a matter of conforming to widely accepted norms, but can also require us to adjudicate conflicting norms in a way that can be justified to others.

The Kierkegaardian could respond that since an allowance for particularity is built into the institutional ethical requirements, nothing very demanding is asked of individuals in ethical institutions. It is easy to love your nuclear family, to do your job well and to avoid breaking the law, the argument might go. But this response would neglect the teleological dimension of Hegel’s theory (the demand to exemplify and not just occupy one’s roles) and ignore the difficulties that modernity itself has placed in the way of doing one’s obvious duties for the right reasons. To someone who says that it’s easy to be a good father or husband, I would say, really? Today the challenges of being a good parent are amplified by the unwillingness to let the older generation take over, by an awareness of all the ways that children can be disfigured by parental shortcomings, and by many other aspects of modern life. Hegel was well aware of the dangerous tendencies in modernity. He thought that romantic love as the basis of marriage made the institution more fragile. Today the phenomenon of widespread divorce makes even just staying married seem like a real ethical achievement.

Hegel lamented the modern sickness of thinking that you yourself are the exclusive source of obligation. Hegel’s cure was not to cede the authority to the State, but to argue for co-responsibility of the subject and others. Yet the lure of subjectivism and relativism persists to such an extent that constantly warding it off is for many agents a major demand in its own right. The challenge is not just to remind yourself about the source of ethical norms, but to actually preserve and foster that source by engaging with increasingly fragile
communities. Rather than diverting us to the moral seriousness of the inspired religious life, Hegel’s account calls us to a certain solidarity in defending and nurturing our substance, our values and the conditions of their realization.

Notes

1. This essay was substantially rewritten after the symposium event in the New York German Idealism Workshop. I would like to thank the participants in the symposium for their questions, and Robert Stern for his response to the earlier version.

2. Translations from PR are based on G.W.F. Hegel (1991). When the section number is followed by “A” it refers to the “Additions” compiled from student notes, and when it is followed by an “R” it refers to the “Remarks” written by Hegel himself. All parenthetical citations that being with “§” refer to the Philosophy of Right.

3. See especially UMO (p. 91): “To a significant degree, therefore, I would argue that the basic structure of Kant’s ethics resembles that of his theoretical philosophy, which equally employs a form/content distinction to combine realism with idealism”.

4. In his discussion of Bradley, Stern does raise the emptiness objection to Kant’s moral theory, and he notes that Bradley saw the emptiness point and the dualism point as intimately related.

5. If we move from Kantian self-command to social command, and from the moral law to positive law, then there is the pressure to go constructivist that Pippin exploits. Since Stern does not want to go constructivist, but he does want a command account, he has to find a different way, other than collective self-legislation, to secure the status of content.

6. Kant does accord a prominent place to conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals, but one can still draw a meaningful contrast between the Kantian law-based account and the Fichtean judgment-based account.

7. It is natural to think of conscience as obligating in the sense of giving force to ethical judgments, the inner court or judge holding oneself to one’s judgments and ideals. Hegel does not often discuss bad conscience, a fact which itself indicates that he was not interested in command theories of obligation.

8. This formulation comes at the end of “Spirit” in ¶662. References to the Phenomenology of Spirit are to the section numbers in the A.V. Miller translation (1977).

9. This corresponds to what in Moyar (2011a) I call Hegel’s practical incorporation view of freedom.

10. This comes to a head in ¶641. For a much more detailed account, see Moyar (2011a, Chapter 3).

11. Stern also cites a passage from Mill that is an inspiration for Baier’s view: “[w]e do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience” (UMO, p. 152, citing Mill, 1969, p. 246). Notice that Mill is willing to invoke the internal sanction of conscience as an alternative to the social sanctioning model.

12. Stern discusses the natural law option in Stern (2007, p. 251; UMO, pp. 43–44, 68–72). A fuller account of this issue would deal with the question of how Hegel’s move to thinking of norms in Sittlichkeit as real, as a world of freedom, is compatible with the more constructivist dynamics of the Phenomenology of Spirit. I think there is a way, though I cannot argue for this here, to distinguish the accounts such that the more constructivist phenomenological story and the realism of Sittlichkeit in PR are largely reconciled.


15. For further discussion of this point, see Moyar (2011a, Chapter 6).
16. I have elaborated on this in Moyar (2011a, Chapter 4).
17. See Moyar (2011b).

References


