

THE POST OF POST-TRUTH IN POST-MEDIA. ABOUT SOCIO-SITUATIONAL DYNAMIC INFORMATION.

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Abstract:

Regarding the place of humans in a time of post-media I take into consideration the function of new technology and fictional information on human, embodied, and consequentially emotive forms of evaluating truth and messages conveyed, especially ones sent via the Internet. The main aim of this essay is to argue for the critical role played by post-media understood as digital technology in disseminating and co-creating post-truth conditions mediating human relationships horizontally (peer-to-peer, rather than vertically or from older generations to younger ones) with each other and with information posted online.

Abstrakt:

Uwzględniając miejsce ludzi w czasie post-mediów, biorę pod uwagę funkcje nowych technologii i fikcyjnych informacji na ludzkiego, ucieleśnionego i znacząco emotywnego sposobie oceny prawdy i wiadomości przekazanej, zwłaszcza takich wysłanych poprzez Internet. Celem niniejszego eseju stanowi argumentacja na rzecz istotnej roli odgrywanej przez post-mediów rozumianej jako technologia cyfrowa w rozpowszechnianiu i współtworzeniu warunków post-prawdy zapośredniczającą relacji ludzi poziomowo (p2p zamiast pionowe lub z starszych pokoleń do młodszych) z sobą wzajemnie oraz z informacjami opublikowane online.

Introduction

The title of this essay is intentionally put together in a deconstructionist fashion, playing on the relationships between text and meaning. The word “post” has several meanings, not only “after”. The last two hyphenated with “after than” words are adjectives, which describe the condition of The Post, e.g. as in the form “a long blue post”. Post-medial and Post-Truth are what go into the place of “long” and “blue” respectively. Removing the prefix “post-” leaves us with mediated forms of truth, which I will be analyzing. The word “post” appears in many contextual relationships. First, I will focus on the adjectives. Below are some “definitions”:

According to Andreas Broeckmann, post-media refers to either:

1. Post-mass media;

2. The post-medium condition of contemporary art;
3. The notion of the digital as post-media.

In my interpretation Post-truth can be understood as:

1. The use of appeals to emotions and beliefs as constitutive varieties of circumstances that overshadow traditional notions of “objective facts”.
2. The affective bodily circumstances, social reality, and idea network under which a sentence is subjectively *felt* as true or rejected as false.
3. A statement of circumstances (1)-(2), at times identifies with the meaning of the statement.

With this in mind, the word “Post” is defined

1. as a beam, or firm, fixed foundational support;
2. the act of delivering messages to a home or workplace;
3. the time of day when messages are delivered;
4. a job in a an organization; a place of work; a place of defense or duty;
5. the place where a race finishes and starts; where points are scored
6. a message or picture published on social media;
7. to make something publicly known; an announcement; results
8. to pay for something, especially bail;
9. after or later than something;

I would like to take a look at the majority of ways of interpreting the dynamic set up by the considered definitional criteria. Of course the first two adjectives use the word “post” as in (9); however, I would like to explore this notion in terms that are deconstructive with a special accent placed on non-oppositional analysis such as before versus after. As noticed in the definitions the use of *duration* or temporal aspects of posts are emphasized by a fixed nature of such beams called posts, which *endure* even though they are under great pressure. They are procedural acts, temporally bound, which not only transmit information, but *give meaning to* activities that come with a reward: received pay for work or a job, the giving up of something valuable to earn temporary freedom (post bail), the cross-over *location* designating the place of attributing points to be scored – a challenge, the beginning and end point of races (either circular or linear). The last mechanism is also a geographic distinction, which slices up reality into meaningful places of *getting ahead* or *falling behind*. Post-truth can make some emotive aspect known due to its annunciated characteristic, which through sharing messages or publishing, can be *rhythmically* transmitted. In this interpretation post-truth can be considered as a variety of continuous (progressive and regressive) and temporally bound communication disseminated without a clear place of origin capable of generating arbitrate emotive criteria of attributing meanings by individuals within the notional framework of heuristics.

Luciano Floridi makes the claim that information encapsulates “truthfulness” and should represent or transmit true contents about a referred situation. This means that information, which is not true does not exist. What we call “false information” is nothing other than *semantic junk* or pseudo-information. However, within the ethical context of acting and making decisions both information (true, factual, objective, declarative, semantic) as well as pseudo-information have a great influence, which plays on affect and the effectiveness of cooperation among human agents. Within this context I would like to consider post-medial post-truth (pseudo-information) in a demiurgical spirit through an enquiry of informational activity that makes possible the “construction, conceptualization, semanticisation, and finally the moral stewardship of reality, both natural and artificial” (Floridi, 2003, 465). This aim includes considering the proposal of Fred Truyen in *Towards a Usable Notion of Information*, and *Information in the Structure of Human Interaction* by Keith Devlin and Dunska Roesenberg as well as the notion of intersubjective communication presented by Yuval Noah Harari. How can some-thing be/come-to-be a post-medium of post-truth?

An Attempt at the Characterization of the “Logic” of Post-Truth

Post-Truth is in fact a form of *systemic arationality*. This should not be confused with something done methodically, such as being irrational systematically. Instead, systemic defers and deflects to something that has an influence on the body, as well as the embodied mind, such as mirrors. A basic form of non-rationality experienced by a whole group and not just particular parts or individuals. Something arational, of course, is not governed by logic or reason alone, but neither is it strictly speaking irrational as in contrary to reason, rather it is something that is beyond the domain of rationality alone. I would take into consideration the idea that rationality is itself a part of a systemically arational mechanism, which would include erroneous forms of deduction such as the use of heuristics or short-cuts by the human mind in order to make sense of the sensational world surrounding the body and would include contradictions. Within a systemic arational conception of post-truth the sentence

Snow is white.

would be looked at as a judgement not within the traditional conception of meaning, such as the ice crystals that usually are associated with a Christmas landscape. Rather the situational imagined context of an interpreter would settle the meaning of encountered truth claims based on heuristics such as what first comes to mind. If such an individual has just read or is still within the fairy tale *Snow White*, then they could interpret the sentence as a descriptive claim about the main character. It could be a codified form of communicating the quality of cocaine or heroin. Or it could be a statement on a person nicknamed Snow, who is “white with rage”. Almost anything goes, whereas the only restricting criteria is established by social norms of use, referral, and emotive judgements,

or the systemic elements that go beyond the competences of rationality alone. Traditional logic excludes such elements.

This would be a “logic” that takes into consideration relativity, sensation, touch, smell, balance, and other forms of experiencing *Umwelt*, a term used by Jakob von Uexküll to describe the outer world as perceived by individual organisms. An *organology* or study of the human body and different technical instruments used in conveying information from the outside world to the mind and vice versa should be considered, as Bernard Stiegler proposes. This would not only be limited to the human body, but also technics as an extension of the embodied mind and corporal brain.

The Influencing Machine and Post-Media

Psychoanalyst and student of Sigmund Freud, Victor Tausk (1879-1919) published a work entitled *On the Origin of the “Influencing Machine” in Schizophrenia*, which describes the behaviors of his patients, who have in paranoid delusion attributed their behavior to a remote controlled “diabolical machine”, which they could not completely mentally grasp, and which was operated by a person or people, who were accused by the patients of malignantly persecuting them. What follows is a classic extract from the article:

The schizophrenic influencing machine is a machine of mystical nature. The patients are able to give only vague hints of its construction. It consists of boxes, cranks, levers, wheels, buttons, wires, batteries, and the like. Patients endeavor to discover the construction of the apparatus by means of their technical knowledge, and it appears that with the progressive popularization of the sciences, all the forces known to technology are utilized to explain the functioning of the apparatus. All the discoveries of mankind, however, are regarded as inadequate to explain the marvelous powers of this machine, by which the patients feel themselves persecuted.

The main effects of the influencing machine are the following:

1. It makes the patient see pictures. When this is the case, the machine is generally a magic lantern or cinematograph. The pictures are seen on a single plane, on walls or windowpanes, and unlike typical visual hallucinations are not three-dimensional.
2. It produces, as well as removes, thoughts and feelings by means of waves or rays or mysterious forces which the patient's knowledge of physics is inadequate to explain. In such cases, the machine is often called a "suggestion-apparatus." Its construction cannot be

explained, but its function consists in the transmission or "draining off" of thoughts and feelings by one or several persecutors.

3. It produces motor phenomena in the body, erections and seminal emissions, that are intended to deprive the patient of his male potency and weaken him. This is accomplished either by means of suggestion or by air-currents, electricity, magnetism, or X-rays.
4. It creates sensations that in part cannot be described, because they are strange to the patient himself, and that in part are sensed as electrical, magnetic, or due to air-currents.
5. It is also responsible for other occurrences in the patient's body, such as cutaneous eruptions, abscesses, or other pathological processes (Tausk, 1992, 186).

Excluding those, who suffer from mental illness, the idea of the influencing machine as characterized by Tausk's summary can be metaphorically applied to the perception of mass media and the notion of "fake news". Not the *real* fake news, which are comedy programs that parody news shows, nor the *other real* fake news, which are made-up stories taking the façade of *actually* reporting real events, but with no basis in reality. The notion of "fake news" is most commonly used to refer to *real* news or journalism, which is judged negatively by an individual reviewer to be incoherent with their systemically arrational perception of reality and usually malignant intend is attributed to the mass media. An example of the first fake news are programs such as *The Daily Show*, *Colbert Report*, *The Onion* or *Aszdiennik* (in Polish); the second variety of fake news are genres of conspiracy theories such as "Pizzagate", which accused Hillary Clinton of running a child pedophilia ring from a pizza parlor, or sites such as *Infowars* and Alex Jones' shows or conspiracy theories that have sprouted around the Smoleńsk catastrophe; the final variety of fake news has been made infamous by President of the United States, Donald Trump, who regularly uses Twitter to tweet rebuttals devoid of substantive arguments, such as denying facts already registered and recorded that can be easily verified as "fake news", which is defined by Mariam Webster as: "False news stories, often of a sensational nature, created to be widely shared online for the purpose of generating ad revenue via web traffic or discrediting a public figure, political movement, company, etc."

Fake news, which is a form of post-truth, gives meaning to a community of individuals, who identify with a particular narrative that shapes their emotional reactions and give meaning to events within the world. They shape *imagined hierarchies* of *imagined reality*. They have grounding in physical, objective, material reality, the stuff of physics, chemistry, and the same Umwelt experienced by other animals and species of life. We then deal with a flickering array of *virtual ideas* or networks of notions that are responsible for the way messages are transmitted and understood. Our social reality,

emergent from interactions with each other, is only part of our notional reality, which could be considered forms of *augmented reality*, but without any prostheses other than language and the set of artificial instincts we call culture.

The Post

The post is an announcement delivered cyclically with an enduring temporality (nothing disappears from the Internet, it is all-inclusive) fixing the points of beginning and end of a discourse not only in social media, but also in the protective nature of defense mechanisms of the human mind, which works in such a way so as to receive reward from sensational messages that create feelings of belonging or flexible identity to a disappearing locality in an ever more global culture. Mass media, the digital, and even Nicholas Bourriaud's altermodernity and emphasis on relational aesthetics are encompassed by The Post. "Objective facts" are outdone by bodily and social circumstances, by imagined realities that shape the imagined or virtual hierarchy of relationships, by the ideas conveying feelings through unrestricted methods of communication and meaning. It's continuity belittles temporal or sequential notions of "after" or what was historically "before". The invention of writing already has always been a form of duration, of creating our subjective notions and receptions of time, and in shaping the reality in which humanity resides. Just as "you cannot *really* delete anything from the Internet", writing is simply a disconnected medium, and if any links were to be established, then the place of tying together different texts with meanings would be within the capabilities of brains and minds. Now the tools of the latter are prosthetically given to our devices. Voice is given to Artificial Intelligence, which internalizes The Post and sends a mirror image back at users such as with Twitter bots. Media has been animated and given life.

So, The Post of post-truth in post-media is simply an announcement of the continuously passing-on of "objective facts" and reason's reign, while at the same time giving voice to affect through the ideas that create our ability to identify a communicably agreed upon "universal" human emotion, which is imagined as part of the virtual or imagined medium we call the mind. This concept is much richer than the simple juxtaposition created by before and after dynamics, which hide the present.

Socio-situational dynamics of information

This following section is structured in the following way: It is worth taking note of the way information is transmitted with the aid of the psychoanalytic notion of a transitional object by Donald Woods Winnicott. Such an object should be understood not as the oppositional situation *subject vs. object* but as a technical term that allows for the possibility of bonding and constituting a communicational relationship as an act of information transmission, which I begin with. This is supplemented with the philosophy

of Stiegler. Next, the importance of background knowledge and the pragmatic stance by Truyen is discussed. At that point, information is bracketed with-in the interactive relationship of agents. After that Harari's imagined hierarchies, which are dynamic socio-situational variables capable of making effective cooperation based on information and pseudo-information in mass numbers possible. Finally, how fiction may transmit information beyond truthfulness about other things is discussed as well as how they permit for bracketing reality in a variety of ways.

When an infant is born, this being and shaping mind does not yet have background knowledge or any other information about the outside world except for what is given to it by its genetic code and prenatal experiences. How can such a primitive brain interpret the stimuli that come to it as information about what the world is like? The philosophy of information can be considered biologically and socially, while taking this into consideration. The brain (receiver) is cultivated by qualitatively different channels of information transmission (senses, psychosomatic states of the body, interoception, affect, etc.), which in turn constitute a certain dynamic process of interpreting in a better (more objective truth) or worse (more intersubjective alt-truths) way the data encountered, which are somehow stored. Also, the brain can be a transmitter and in the act of communication, not only can it meet its needs, but it can affect the information that is present in the world. Over time, background knowledge is remembered and knowledge would consist in the ability to forget noise.

It creates what some consider transitional objects (perhaps virtual artifacts of the mind). The term has a technical meaning, because it derives from a psychoanalytic school that emphasizes the importance of relationships, and what has become the axis of the concept of "object." The difference between an object and an ob-ject (*objectus*) lies in the fact that it is not a subject-object situation in which the ob-ject is thrown against or simply put before an observer as an external thing understood in cognitive acts of observation and described after directing attention. The assumptions coming from the theory of child development, which is based on Freud's theory and developed by Melanie Klein and continuators, are of key importance. This direction does not treat the subject as isolated from something that gets the technical name of an "object." The problem in the definition of the "object" of this school is that there are infinitely many of them (partial objects, holistic ones). They can be sucked fingers, the mother's breasts, etc., which are examples of partial objects, and when the child has the level of development of consciousness, that it sees the whole person (eg. mother), the term "holistic object" is used. An object is something that fills the entire mental life, and plays a key role in such a relationship's developmental structure. The schema distinguishes "positions" by developing the evolutionally treated Freudian theory. Developmental mechanisms and an object that is present at all times (e.g. a voice, glance, sucking, touching, imagining, etc.) play a key role in development. The continuator of such thinking was Winnicott, who proposed concepts

of transitional objects (such as a diaper or a toy) and which play a key role in gaining autonomy. It is necessary to separate the mother from the original fusion to recognize itself and her as separate objects or entities.

Bernard Stiegler noticed that the transient object is not an intermediary, but creates and conditions the mother-child relationship and as such does not exist. There is a material medium that allows for the appearance of such an object that is located neither “outside”, in space, nor is it simply an intrinsic feature of a pair in a relationship. It is as a link enabling the passage of compositional information (being, *esse*), but not existing (a finite being, *ens*). The mother's task is to bring the child to a transitional situation and teach the child to separate itself from the transitive objects in order to engage with other transitive situations in which it would establish other relationships. The result is a logic of feelings resistant to formalization and allowing for communication based on fiction, which can be part of the background knowledge of the recipients of information. Then the way information is processed by people is radically different from machines or computers.

In general, information is a good that reduces uncertainty. When a person is informed, then there is a reduction in probability, which may contain a certain amount of surprise. Its value is the probability that a sign or symbol will appear as part of the act of communication. According to Truyen, information is a good that can only be possessed by agents who want to be informed. Then an active selection process takes place on the recipient's side. He noticed that there is an information link between a sent signal and the received signal rather than a causal connector. Information is always the result of a process. It is worth considering information in the way that is actually used. Information is a good that resides in mediums. Then various types of information are intertwined within the information structure as noise, meta-information, contextual information, redundant information, procedural information, information about the user community, relevant (core) information, or side and collateral information. The aspect of the continuous recontextualization of indigenous or relevant information by users using dynamic information systems is important. Of course, information is processed not only by people, but also by other inhumane agents like animals, plants or computers, etc. Truyen says that there is no point in talking about information outside the reality of interaction between agents. Information is created every time it reaches its medium, it appears every time it is used and every time a question is asked to the medium. Let's take for example reading poetry: different (*différance* – difference and deferral of meaning) information is obtained by a child, *différant* by a professor of philology and *différant* by the same person, returning to the same poem in different psychosomatic states. Background knowledge will significantly transform the quality of information extracted, which is stored in memory.

Truyen believes that there is a finite, computable amount of data present at any level of analysis, but nevertheless more information can be extracted from it out of it. We

are not a *tabula rasa* that is waiting to be filled with data, but agents able to in-form (transform) in the process of continuous data exchange with the environment. The internal information network of each agential processes, organizes and integrates information, which enables efficient interaction (and intra-action) and increases survivability. When reading a book, the individual adjusts and changes its internal network to better deal with new possible situations. The better this internal network is capable of communication, the faster and more effective will be the exchange of information with other agents and media (e.g. a book). Information exchange as a transmission criterion takes place in the context of information overload and its effectiveness depends also on the economic manner of management, selection, and response. In sum, different types of information can be received in the communication act depending on the incremental information not transmitted in the transmission. So, information should be considered as input and as a result of an act of processing by intelligent agents, who constantly modify their beliefs (*doxa*) regarding changing situations. Then the agents have information, not only as a commodity, but also as Goodness.

Is pseudo-information (fiction) then just semantic junk? It seems to me that this is an area that can be examined by the apparatus of the philosophy of information in the context of interaction between people, as already done by Keith Devlin and Dunska Rosenberg. This is information subsumed as a social construct and the authors also are suspicious of the existence of information and adopt an *information stance* because of this. In the end, they think that information only exists because of the collective acceptance of this stance. An important element that constitutes something that carries information about something else is the ability to recognize systematic regularities that enable the extraction of information present in physical objects by a human. I think that it is also permissible to include transitional objects and other regularities created by people on the basis of convention, because they do not have to be only natural phenomena. Everything and anything can be used to store information on the basis of a contract that a certain configuration means something. The range differs from a particular individual to entire nations. Examples are natural language, police signals, bells marking the end of school, a door without a handle (information encoded in the design - they should be pushed and not pulled), a telephone connected to a charger in the office can inform colleagues that a person is present in the office on the basis of a joint understanding of how this object is used, etc. It is about how to configure objects within a certain context. The load-bearing capacity of information in everyday artifacts is dynamic, because it arises as a result of action and interaction, and its meaning is understood by a given community. Some "fiction", post-truth, alt-truth or pseudo-information may refer to entities such as money, faith in a nation (e.g. the claim that "Poland exists" and that something belongs to a collection of "Poles" – e.g. dumplings – *pierogi*, and hunter's stew - *bigos*) and religious texts (The Bible, Koran, or a religious one, i.e. the recognition of a supernatural order regulating norms and values like the

Declaration of Human Rights, the Constitution and other similar entities) or *fake news*, misinformation, disinformation, and so on. There is information extracted by interpreters based on fictitious data, which is not purely and simply true from the perspective of nature or materialism. But as a public Good, the seal of authority is often also considered to authenticate the "truthfulness" of pseudo-information.

Devlin and Rosenberg analyze the information contained in the following statements, which I shall re-present:

The baby cried. The mommy picked it up.

Objects in the relationship ontology are all identified (differentiated) by the agents of information and include, among others, **units** (books, chairs, persons, fingers, breasts, designation: $a, b, c \dots$), **relationships** ($P, Q, R \dots$), **places** ($l, l', l'', l_0, l_1, l_2, \dots$), **times** ($t, t', t'', t_0, t_1, t_2 \dots$), **situations** (recognized structural fragments of the world, both real as well as abstract $s, s', s'', s_0, s_1, s_2 \dots$), **higher order types** (S, T, U, V, \dots), and **parameters** (unspecified objects that within their range have different types, which is marked by symbols: $\dot{a}, \dot{o}, \dot{t}, \dots$). The reference to children and mothers is included in types, where \dot{p} is a parameter of a person, and the situation w means "world" as any arbitrarily vast situation containing everything raised in discussion, t means "time". The form $\ll R, a_1, \dots, a_n, 1 \gg$ contains discrete objects named *infons* (σ). R stands for n -argument relations and a_1, \dots, a_n are the objects corresponding to R . The number 1 means that the objects are in relation to R , and the number 0 means that the relation does not occur. For a certain situation s and a certain infon σ , $s \models \sigma$ is used to indicate that an infon is made factual or reified by a given situation. Then the infons themselves are axiologically neutral and cannot be evaluated either as true or as false in themselves. However, a particular informational object can be true or false about a part of the world (situation). The above theorems distinguish types:

- i. "baby" = $T_{baby} = [\dot{p}|w \models \ll baby, \dot{p}, t_{now}, 1 \gg]$
- ii. "mother" = $T_{mother} = [\dot{p}|w \models \ll mother, \dot{p}, t_{now}, 1 \gg]$

However, different aspects concern mothers and babies. One can think about "mother" in relation to a child or to a father (family). A baby can mean an infant (a small child, life stage), or a small animal or something simply small or trivial. These aspects affect the interpretive imagination of senders and recipients, which can be included in the hierarchical frames of types, \dot{e} is a parameter of the type:

- iii. $T_{family} = [\dot{e}|w \models \ll family, \dot{e}, t_{now}, 1 \gg]$
- iv. $T_{life\ stage} = [\dot{e}|w \models \ll life\ stage, \dot{e}, t_{now}, 1 \gg]$

The phrase "The baby cried" may trigger the following interpretation in the recipient as available information is used to interpret further statements. The type "life cycle" for a baby will be different from the "family" type:

$$1. T_{baby} = T_{life\ cycle}$$

The main information contained in "The baby cried" is that in situation s , the baby b was crying at time t_0 , the time of utterance before weeping:

$$v. \quad s \models \langle\langle \text{cried}, b, t_0, 1 \rangle\rangle$$

The recipient does not have additional information about the child and so identifies b as the designator of the word "baby". The recipient of the next two pieces of information can distinguish that b is type T_{baby} or the type of all babies.

$$2. \quad b : T_{baby}$$

3. b is the unique individual of this type in situation s .

The second sentence, "The mother picked it up", evokes T_{family} because it is about mothers and was about babies. It contains further structural elements: the feature of being a mother for x : $M(x)$; the characteristic of being a baby for x : $B(x)$; the relationship x -a in being a mother for y : $M(x, y)$; the type of being a mother: T_{mother} ; the type of being a baby: T_{baby} ; A two-argument type regarding the relationship of mothers to their child(ren): $T_{mother-child(ren)}$. In T_{family} , type $T_{mother-child(ren)}$ is basic and combines the derived types T_{mother} and T_{baby} . This is a certain structural limitation that is most important for the T_{family} category:

$$vi. \quad T_{mother} \Rightarrow \exists y T_{mother-child(ren)}$$

$$vii. \quad T_{baby} \Rightarrow \exists x T_{mother-child(ren)}$$

While being a mother is a two-argument relation of all pairs of units x, y , in which x is the mother of y in the present moment in the world:

$$T_{mother} = [\dot{x}, \dot{y} | w \models \langle\langle \text{mother} - \text{child}(ren), \dot{x}, \dot{y}, t_{now}, 1 \rangle\rangle]$$

Which is important for the implications (4) if p is a mother type T_{mother} then there exists such an individual q that the pair p, q is of the type $T_{mother-child(ren)}$, and (5) If q is a baby type T_{baby} then there exists an individual p such that the pair p, q is of the type $T_{mother-child(ren)}$:

$$4. \quad p : T_{mother} \rightarrow \exists q (p, q : T_{mother-child(ren)})$$

$$5. \quad q : T_{baby} \rightarrow \exists p (p, q : T_{mother-child(ren)})$$

These are not necessarily restrictions, but suggestions that agent A uses to distinguish that if A recognizes p is a mother, it is possible that A will look for a unit q , which is a descendant

of p . In this sentence, the reader may not judge that some *other* mother picked up a crying child. Therefore:

6. $m : T_{mother}$
7. m is a unique unit of this Type in situation s .
8. b is the descendant of m

The recipient has such a cognitive state in the sentence "The baby cried" that all ontological types in the cognitive state of the recipient of the message were equivalent because being a baby is also a type that is subordinated to a typical life stage. The word "mother" changes the meaning of information from a stage of life to thinking about a family:

9. $T_{baby} : T_{family}$
10. $T_{mother} : T_{family}$

The first sentence "the baby cried" will add information based on the implications (5) replacing q with the unit b . In (2) we know that b is the type baby. Therefore:

11. $\exists_m(m, b: T_{mother-child(ren)})$

This analysis published by Devlin and Rosenberg shows that the information structure between the sender and the recipient is used for effective communication. Not only limitations are important, but also so are hierarchical types. Despite the fact that there is a biological relationship between parents and offspring, it seems to me that a thing like "family" is a social construct rather than a natural phenomenon. It is all the more difficult to biologically justify foster families, since culture and legal acts are more decisive than DNA. Other similar types may be fictitious objects, mental order systems (cultural hierarchal types for efficient communication and co-organization). I think that other types can have an analogous structure to the one that has just been explicated.

According to Harari, what distinguishes humans from other animals and agents is "the ability to communicate information about things that do not exist at all" (Harari, 2014, 37). Background knowledge is filled with hypothetical and counterfactual possibilities, and people have the ability to talk about "made-up stories" using fiction-forming language that developed with the cognitive revolution (brain development, a new way of thinking) between 70,000 and 30,000 years ago. Harari claims that this enables collective cooperation with great flexibility, among others, unknown agents. This means that trust in the source of information is assessed on the basis of shared myths rather than truthfulness. However, *Homo Sapiens* **behaves** as if this information was "truthful." On the basis of such stories, there were many "natural lifestyles" of humans, which contributed to the fact that it is the human, which is the animal that conquered the world.

A small group of agents is able to change the way a large group of people operate based on the modification of the background knowledge (or belief) of people, which is based on the creation of imagined orders that have the following features:

- a. They are rooted in the material world (in the medium), which can be modified;
- b. They are responsible for shaping (programming) desire;
- c. They are intersubjectively communicable (combining the subjectivity of many individuals);
- d. In order to change an imagined hierarchy an alternative one is necessary.

Other information media (e.g. writing) arose because human memory is capacitively limited, a human is mortal (loss of information) and "the human brain is adapted to storing and processing only certain types of information" (Harari, 2014, 154). The miracle of bureaucracy, or changes in the way information is stored on external media, as in logographic writing - e.g. Sumerian, changed the way people thought and the way information was processed, which is responsible for the emergence and disappearance of great historical empires and other revolutions (e.g. scientific). In addition Harari notes that "every order created by humans is bristling with internal contradictions. Cultures are constantly trying to reconcile these contradictions, and this process drives change" (Harari, 2014, 202).

Imaginary communities are certain groupings that hierarchize and create as well as modify and delete types that have been refactored by creating objects analogous to transitive objects. On the basis of source data, i.e. the material world as an information carrier, or the acoustic phenomenon of the spoken word, semantics liberated from the strict semiotic framework from a historical perspective is created. However, the shared knowledge of a community introduces a certain limitation as an inferencing mechanism of agents. This way of understanding the information available in a medium depends on the experience of the individual. The knowledge or the opinion of the community allow for a clear way of interpreting the action, such as traditions like setting an empty plate on a table during Christmas Eve. An empty plate is an orderly type, which is interpreted in a religious and mythological context. Nothing in the plate provides data explaining this tradition and situational contexts present for interpreters are required. The same applies to fictions that contain information about the types of a culture, although these types can only exist in the imagination of people.

Without experience, which begins from the beginning of human life, it would be difficult to imagine effective agency between people who can convey intersubjective information about non-material things, which are solely abstract. These abstractions constitute certain interpretative framework ontologies of the world.

Pseudo-information, post-truth and post-media as noise and carriers of The Post can be placed in a certain relation with the hierarchical order of imagination and interpretation of users in such a way that it will become information based on observations of certain regularities in the world that do not necessarily involve physical stimuli. Then such fictions, as narratives about ghosts, gods or secret forces, create a certain framework for the interpretation of information media that are co-created in the mind of the interpreter. Another area in which such information theory can be fruitful is aesthetics. A common language and code is required. I cannot read Hamlet written in a language I do not know. But I do not have to know all the terms. The meanings of words and types are determined by the context of use, and then I expand the vocabulary in my language and the way of conceptualizing types. Other information can be conveyed not in words, but through a channel of empirical experiences acquired through the environment, just as some desires (e.g. from marketing) or imagination about gender. Some parts can be determined biologically, but on the other hand, as a species, a person learns how to organize types for effective co-operation with others. In this mastery of pseudo-information for some specific purposes (e.g. creating "fake news", disinformation, or propaganda). Other examples are the placebo and nocebo effect, some anticipations that can have a significant impact on the shape of reality.

Thus, something can be a carrier of information about another thing based on learning how to regularly interpret certain stimuli in relation to background knowledge and ordered types that give the material world real situational meanings, although they may not actually be *real*. From transitional objects, which are the primary abstractions of the world that condition communication to the interpretation of other media and noise in the sensory channel as meaningful, a person can perform their co-operation with other people based on the socio-situational dynamics of stimulus processing, including both facts and imagined fictions.

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