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That the value of a work is to be determined by its affect on the uninformed, as opposed to by the reasoned views of experts, is presumably not a claim that Ferreira would wish to hold generally true. For instance, is the value of Shakespeare or Van Gogh's works to be determined by its affect on lay-spectators as opposed to informed experts? If not, we are clearly owned some explanation as to why Kierkegaard's work constitutes a special case. Conversely, if the claim is generalised, it can be used to justify *anything* to be of significance of value; and so will leave us unable to apply any evaluatitive standards at all. Although Ferreira admits that *the reasons why* people care about Kierkegaard's works will have a role to play - in the case of Jim Hernandez one will expect these reasons to be mostly, if not wholly, psychological; in the case of the one thousand Iranian students they will be conditioned by their political situation. Yet Ferreira seems reluctant to allow that such reasons might be extricable from the perspectives of these audiences, and so be capable of evaluation by means of reasoned and scholarly debate. One cannot help but wonder whether this a conclusion that Kierkegaard would have any sympathy with? Might the reluctance to arrive at a substantive and evaluatitive conclusion not be considered the abdication of ethical responsibility? Moreover Ferreira's single readers, or audiences, cannot be said to stand alone (in resisting any encompassing rational and evaluatitive standards) in virtue of being qualified by a transcendent divinity but must rather, I think, run the risk of aestheticism.

The concerns raised in the last six paragraphs will perhaps only be of interested to Kierkegaard scholars and they are not, therefore, to be taken to belie the significance and contribution of *Kierkegaard*: both as a teaching aid, and as the work of one of the finest Kierkegaard scholars of our age.

Alastair Hannay (trans.), *Concluding Unscientific Postscript.*
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
2009, 582 pages, Hb $108.00, Pb $39.99.)

Reviewed by Paul Muench
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Kierkegaard's pseudonym Johannes Climacus contributed two works to the larger authorship, *Philosophical Fragments* [*Philosophiske Smuler*] and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* [*Afsluttende uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*]. Prior to 2009, each of these works had been translated twice into English, with the most recent volume coming out in 1992.[1] Now we are fortunate to have a new translation of *Smuler* by Marilyn Piety and a new translation of the *Efterskrift* by Alastair Hannay.[2] My review here will focus on Hannay's translation.

This translation is part of the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series. In addition to the main text, it includes an introduction, chronology, suggestions for further reading, a discussion of some of the translation choices made by Hannay, and an index. Hannay has also included some explanatory and historical footnotes in the body of the text, but there is nothing comparable to the supplementary material provided by the Hongs in the Princeton edition of the *Postscript*. From a scholarly point of view, the chief limitation of the new Cambridge edition is that unlike all the Hong editions its pagination is not correlated with any Danish edition of Kierkegaard's writings, making it difficult for readers to compare Hannay's translation with other translations or with the Danish original. While this omission can be remedied in a future edition, I think Cambridge missed a real opportunity here to improve on the Hong scholarly apparatus by including page citations of the new fourth critical edition (SKS).[3] Hannay, to his credit, does cite SKS in his notes. Piety's new translation of *Smuler*, by contrast, includes SKS page numbers in the margins (albeit without making use of SKS line numbers). In my view, scholarly communication will be greatly improved if all future translations (and updated editions of older translations) include marginal page citations of SKS, including line numbers.

Typographically, the Swenson and Lowrie translation of the *Postscript* remains the most reader-friendly, especially in the lengthy fourth chapter in the second part of the book. Whereas this older edition provides

readers with eleven distinct headings for this chapter, making it easier to locate different topics, Hannay (like the Hongs) provides a single heading ("The problem of the *Crumbs*") to cover 194 pages. There are two other typographical shortcomings in the new Cambridge edition. The lengthy appendix ("Glance at a contemporary effort in Danish literature") that follows the "subjective truth, inwardness" chapter is not given its own distinct heading (the Hongs have "A Glance at Danish Literature" and Swenson and Lowrie have "A Contemporary Effort"). Nor is the document Kierkegaard attached to the end of the work ("A first and last declaration") given a distinct font and font size and left without page numbers (as in the original Danish). Again, Swenson and Lowrie here are best.

With regard to the translation itself, I should first say that it is a tremendous achievement to translate the *Postscript*. In addition to its sheer size, this book is one of the most philosophically demanding and stylistically complex works in Kierkegaard's corpus. We should all be grateful to Hannay for his efforts. Also, I should confess that I have not had a chance to read through Hannay's entire translation and that my degree of fluency in Danish gives me a limited ability to judge how well he has captured the music of Kierkegaard's prose. I will therefore limit my remarks to highlighting a few instances where Hannay's translation departs from previous English translations while also noting some shortcomings in the text.

In his note on the translation, Hannay draws attention to several terms he has chosen to translate differently than the translators of the two previous English editions. In parallel with Piety, Hannay opts to translate "smuler" as "crumbs" instead of the traditional "fragments" (giving us *Philosophical Crumbs* as the title of Climacus' first book). While this may take some getting used to, it is a more accurate translation and also better captures Climacus' insistence that the *Postscript* and its predecessor are not "a part of the scientific-scholarly endeavor" to which most philosophy of the day is devoted (PF, 5). Another significant change is Hannay's translation of "Meddelelse" as "imparting" rather than the traditional "communication" (as in "indirect communication"). Hannay contends that "imparting" better captures the "one-way relation" characteristic of this concept (xxxix). One change that I do not think is an improvement is Hannay's (and also Piety's) decision to translate "piece" ("pjece" in modern Danish) as "piece"; the Hongs have the more preferable "pamphlet." This term, when referring to written matter, means something like a booklet or leaflet as opposed to a proper book. Climacus repeatedly stresses that his writings are not of the same kind as typical philosophical treatises. Calling a written work in English a "piece" means nothing, and certainly fails to capture the extraordinary nature of Climacus' claim that the *Postscript*, weighing in at over 500 pages, is merely a pamphlet.

Readers will find present in this work the same elegance and naturalness in Hannay's prose style that they have encountered in his earlier translations. If the Hongs have a tendency to elevate Climacus' prose, Hannay helps to bring out the ordinariness and earthiness of some of his remarks. For example, the Hongs regularly translate "dumt" as "obtuse," while Hannay opts for "stupid." Regarding the person who only thinks about the uncertainty of death once a year, we get the following:

(1) Hongs: "If the one who thinks it [the uncertainty of death] in this way also explains world history, what he says about world history can perhaps be splendid, but what he says about death is obtuse" (CUP, vol. 1, 166).
(2) Hannay: "If someone thinking it in this way also explains world history, then what he says about world history may well be glorious, but what he says about death is stupid" (139).

Hannay's apparent commitment to capturing the idiomatic rhythms of Kierkegaard's prose can sometimes obscure the thoughts being expressed. One principle that seems to guide the Hongs in their translations is, as uniformly as possible, to translate a given Danish term with a single English term. While this can result in stylistic awkwardness at times, it does help the reader to track patterns of thought, which is especially helpful in a book like the *Postscript* where topics are frequently revisited and reexamined. For example, as part of his explanation for how he became a writer, Climacus describes the graveyard scene he witnessed, where an old man mourns the loss of his son (someone whose involvement with speculative philosophy may have

undermined his religious faith), and then reports how he himself decided to "find out where the misunderstanding between speculation and Christianity lies" (202). He then characterizes this as "min Beslutning," which Hannay translates "my resolve" and the Hongs render as "my resolution" (CUP, vol. 1, 241). Climacus returns to his "Beslutning" in the appendix to this chapter, where he comically reports how the other pseudonyms have begun publishing books that he had intended to publish (beating him to the punch!) and laments that his solemn "Beslutning" is being carried out by others. In the Hongs' version, it is easy to track the recurrence of this concept, while this is obscured in Hannay's version:

(1) Hannay: "So I resolved [*besluttede*] then to begin….But what happened then I shall tell in an appendix to this chapter. What happens? There I sit and out comes *Either/Or*. It did exactly what I had wanted. The thought of my solemn resolve [*min høitidelige Beslutning*] made me quite wretched. But then I thought again: you haven't promised anyone anything, and seeing it is done anyway, all is well. But matters got worse; step by step, as I was on the point of implementing my plan [*min Beslutning*] (by working [*ved Gjerning*]: not translated in a separate phrase by Hannay), out came a pseudonymous book which did as I had wanted. There was something curiously ironical in it all. It was just as well I had never talked to anyone of my decision [*min Beslutning*], and that not even my landlady had seen any sign of it in me. For otherwise people would have laughed at my comic situation, for it is certainly amusing that the cause I had chosen [*besluttet*] to take up prospered though not through me" (210-211).
(2) Hongs: "So, then, I resolved to begin….But what happened then I shall tell in an appendix to this chapter. What happens? As I go on in this way, *Either/Or* is published. What I aimed to do had been done right here. I became very unhappy at the thought of my solemn resolution, but then I thought once again: After all, you have not promised anyone anything: as long as it is done, that is just fine. But things became worse for me, because step by step, just as I wanted to begin the task of carrying out my resolution by working, there appeared a pseudonymous book that did what I wanted to do. There was something strangely ironic about it all. It was good that I had never spoken to anyone about my resolution, that not even my landlady had detected anything from my behavior, for otherwise people would have laughed at my comic situation, because it is indeed rather droll that the cause I have resolved to take up is advancing, but not through me" (CUP, vol. 1, 251-252).

Inevitably in a project of this scale there will be errors that are not caught. For example, in Climacus' introduction to the *Postscript* he stresses the value of obtaining "dialectical fearlessness" as a protection against the powers of scholarship, oratory, and systematic philosophy (14-15). At the bottom of page 15 (immediately following "and what then?"), Hannay's translation omits two sentences that precede the sentence "He learns to give to Caesar what is Caesar's…": "Then he persists in this way until he finally learns dialectical fearlessness—and what then?" (SKS 7, 23, lines 31-32; cf. CUP, vol. 1, 14). There is also one translation error that is present in the two earlier English editions that unfortunately has not been corrected by Hannay. In all three editions, the "confinium" (boundary) of religiousness A, in which Climacus, a humorist, claims to have his existence—"*Religieusiteten A* (*i hvis Confinium jeg har min Existents*), i.e., the boundary between the ethical and the religious that he has defined as humor—is misleadingly rendered in the plural (as "boundaries"), suggesting falsely in the process that he is here claiming to dwell in the religious sphere (that which is bounded by humor).

(1) Swenson and Lowrie: "My own opinion is that religiousness A (within the boundaries of which I have my existence) is so laborious…" (495).
(2) Hongs: "In my opinion, Religiousness A (within the boundaries of which I have my existence) is so strenuous…" (CUP, vol. 1, 557).
(3) Hannay: "My own opinion is that religiousness A (within whose boundaries I have my existence) is so strenuous…" (466).[4]

Despite the few shortcomings I have noted, the publication of the new Cambridge edition of the *Postscript* is truly an event to be celebrated. Hannay is clearly one of our generation's most important translators of

Kierkegaard. In bringing out this new translation, he has given us all a fine opportunity to approach Climacus' great work with new eyes.

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[1] David Swenson, *Philosophical Fragments* (Princeton University, 1936); Howard Hong and Edna Hong, *Philosophical Fragments* (Princeton University Press, 1985); David Swenson and Walter Lowrie, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Princeton University Press, 1941); Howard Hong and Edna Hong, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Princeton University Press, 1992).
[2] See M. G. Piety, *Repetition* and *Philosophical Crumbs* (Oxford University Press, 2009).
[3] See *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*, vol. 7 (Gads Forlong, 2002).
[4] See SKS 7, 506, lines 31-32. I discuss further how the mistranslation of this passage has misled readers of the *Postscript* in "Understanding Kierkegaard's Johannes Climacus in the *Postscript*," *Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook*, ed. by Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Hermann Deuser and K. Brian Söderquist (de Gruyter, 2007), 433-434 (footnote 30).

Sharon Krishek *Kierkegaard on Faith and Love*

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. xiii + 201 pp.
ISBN 9780521519410 (cloth) $90.00)

Reviewed by Michael Strawser
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It is surely no easy task to offer a significant new interpretation of Kierkegaard's central concepts of faith and love, and yet this is what one finds in Sharon Krishek's bold and stimulating new study. Krishek's work is especially valuable for its insights into Kierkegaard's overall philosophy of love, in particular with her attempt to deal with thorny issues raised from the lack of a univocal conception of love in *Works of Love* by considering *Fear and Trembling* as a corrective. This is both provocative and novel when one considers that it is sometimes the reverse textual relationship that is seen to hold. In other words, *Works of Love* is arguably read as the corrective to the "metaphysics of violence" found in *Fear and Trembling* by writers such as Emmanuel Levinas in his well-known critique and Bruce Chilton in his recent *Abraham's Curse: The Roots of Violence in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*. Perhaps both fortunately and surprisingly, however, Krishek's interpretation is not crucially centered on the story of Abraham in *Fear and Trembling*—thus she doesn't acknowledge the problematic features of this work that would lend themselves to the above critique—but rather on the frequently neglected story of the Merman. This is because her overall concern is "to account for romantic love in terms which demonstrate its essential coherence with, and even similarity to, faith" (16).

In short, Krishek's central thesis is that all love requires faith. It is thus a misconception to think that romantic love lacks this spiritual dimension, and of course Kierkegaard can be faulted for this lack, occasioned primarily by his sharp distinction between *Elskov* (romantic love) and *Kjerlighed* (neighborly love) in *Works of Love*. But instead of turning away from Kierkegaard to deal with this problematic distinction, Krishek finds resources in Kierkegaard's distinctive authorship and terminology to demonstrate soundly that "it takes faith to love" (189)—a thesis that is also aptly illustrated through interesting analyses of Dorit Peleg's novel *On the Way Home*, Almodovar's film *All About My Mother*, Arthur Schnitzler's novella *Dream Story* and its film adaptation in Stanley Kubrick's *Eyes Wide Shut*.

In the first of six chapters, entitled "Lost Loves," Krishek explains three types of lovers to be found in Kierkegaard's writings—the aesthetic, the ethical, and the demonic lover—and how these are related to the sphere of recollection. Of these, it is the demonic lover who "comes closest to representing the essential condition of a human lover," as "he reflects most convincingly the struggle of love" (45). Chapter Two, "The