On Being Guided, Signals & Rules: from Bühler to Wittgenstein[1]

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Abstract. Kevin Mulligan has examined in several papers and a book the conceptual relations between the descriptions of mind, language and colours in the philosophies of Brentano's heirs and the descriptions given later by Wittgenstein. In Chapter 12, he looks at what Bühler and Wittgenstein have to say about the phenomenon of being guided by something and two of their favourite examples – reading and our relations to rules.

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§1   A Guide to Guidance

Appearances, demonstratives, facts, knowledge, name tags, people, perceptions, pictures (misleading or not), quotation marks,

rules, street signs, traffic signals, utterances, written signs, and many, many other things guide, lead, steer, control and influence us. In the writings of Brentano's heirs and Wittgenstein, we find many verbs for such relations:

>trigger/*auslösen*
>follow/*befolgen*
>steer, control/*steuern*
>influence/*beinflussen*
>guide, lead/*führen*
>allow oneself to be led by/*sich leiten lassen*
>indicate/*anzeigen*

The philosophers of guidance are Martinak, Marty and Ahlman, Husserl and Scheler, Bühler and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein and his great predecessor, Bühler, sometimes use the term "signal" (*Signal*) for the first term of the relation of guidance[2]. "Understanding", says Wittgenstein, "is like knowing how to go on, and so it is an ability: but ´I understand`, like ´I can go on`, is an *utterance*, a *signal* (*Signal*).[3] Bühler systematically opposes signals to indicators (*Anzeichen*), sometimes called "utterances" (*Äusserung*) and expressions (*Ausdruck*), and also to symbols (*Symbol*). Signals guide or steer (*leiten, steuern*), symbols represent (*darstellen*) objects and states of affairs and indicators indicate (*anzeigen*) or express mental or psychological states, functions and acts.

One of the more striking illustrations of guidance or steering in Wittgenstein's writings is to be found in the series of simple interactions described at the beginning of *Philosophical Investigations*, for example that of the builder who calls out a word and the assistant who then brings a stone. This is, among other things, an example of a use of language to "influence other people".[4] But, as Bühler had pointed out in 1927, the real variety of guidance only

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[2] Scheler and Bühler also use the expression "Signalement"
[3] Wittgenstein 1980 I §875.
[4] Wittgenstein 1980 §491.

emerges if we consider both non-verbal and verbal interactions and their relations:

> The apprentice who hands something to his master in the course of carrying out some common task, the surgical assistant and the surgeon – here the fact that the activities go hand in hand is brought about by a steering directed towards a goal in a shared perceptual field**…**But if the focus of a desired steering transcends in any way the shared perceptual domain then….a higher-order contact is needed to make steering possible. If we take the case of contact of the highest possible kind, the speaker appeals to the ideas (*Vorstellungen*) and concepts of her listener. But before this there lies a range of intermediate steps and a labyrinth of ways of transcending [the shared perceptual domain] and of possibilities of overcoming this range.[5]

What exactly is it to be guided by something? What are the main forms the phenomenon takes? What are the phenomena which presuppose, which are founded on guidance?

The first question raises many other questions. Does guidance involve any sort of experience or is the notion a non-experiential one? Is it a passive or active phenomenon? Is it sometimes, if we allow ourselves some Husserlian jargon, a matter of passive activity and sometimes a matter of active passivity, and sometimes even a matter of passive passivity? Is the relation a causal relation? An example of association? Of motivation? Are the items which guide us reasons? What is the relation between guidance in the animal world and in the human world? Are expressions such as "guide" "lead" and "steer" family resemblance terms? Is the concept of guidance definable?

One answer to the second question is that what we say and do influences the doxastic, epistemic, affective and conative states of others as well as their behaviour. But we are guided, too, by inanimate

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[5] Bühler 1929 40-41, cf. 90

items - rules, norms, knowledge and by forms, the so called subjective *apriori*. Is this great variety exhibited by guidance a reason for thinking that it has no essence or nature?

What sort of things presuppose, are founded on the phenomenon of guidance? Many if not all forms of social interaction. Consider for example the social category of a community (*Gemeinschaft*). Bühler suggests that there can be no community without reciprocal guidance:

> In human life there are many different accidental gatherings of hermits; we exclude them from the concept of *genuine* community life…It is enough for our purposes if we emphasize one feature, the fact that the meaningful behaviour of the members of a community is subject to *reciprocal steering*…[6]

Indeed psychological contact, knowledge or understanding of the minds or souls of others involves reciprocal steering.[7]

Reciprocal steering of one individual by another is by no means the only type of social cement. Rule-following, in particular our blindly following rules, syntactic, semantic, pragmatic, moral, aesthetic, prudential, culinary, as well as the rules of etiquette and for driving on the left, is also important. We are guided by or, as Husserl puts it, allow ourselves to be guides by rules. Is following the same rules prior to belonging to the same community? Does the priority run in the other direction? Or is there perhaps no such relation of priority? In 1926, Ahlman endorses the first answer:

> We determine whether two individuals belong to the same linguistic community by finding out whether they observe the same norms and not vice versa - the norm system has priority over the linguistic community.[8]

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[6] Bühler 1929 39; in 1931 Charlotte Bühler and Lazarsfeld add: "The fact of reciprocal steering must be the constitutive element of social psychology" (Bühler & Lazarsfeld 1931 335).
[7] Bühler 1929 83-5, 99-101.
[8] Ahlman 1926 15.

A third type of social cement resembles the first in linking only individuals but differs from it in not involving reciprocal guidance. Exemplars or models, such as teachers, heroines and indeed popular musicians, guide or influence us. So, too, do counter-models. ("I don't want to turn into that sort of person!") Models are not leaders, as Scheler points out. Models and counter-models, unlike leaders, may be real or fictive. Leaders lead by telling us what to do, unlike models. Just as following a rule resembles but is not the same thing as obeying an order, so too, following an exemplar or model is like but is not the same thing as obeying the order of a leader.

The philosophy of guidance, then, is inseparable from social philosophy, the philosophy of perception and the philosophy of language. In what follows, I first look at the discussions of reading as an example of being guided (§2) by Bühler and Wittgenstein, the view that "guide" is a family resemblance term and the view that the concept of guidance is what Bühler called a "synchytic concept", a concept which groups objects "according to a *manifold* similarity, that is, one that is not determined on the basis of only one aspect".[9] I then set out the different views of Bühler and Wittgenstein about an analogy between a person's being guided by something and a machine's being controlled by something and between the corresponding possibilities (§3). In the final section, I look at the relations between the views of early Bühler and early Wittgenstein on rule-awareness (§4).

The central aim of the paper is to show that some aspects of the thought of the later Wittgenstein amount to a very radical version of part of the philosophies of some of Brentano's heirs. Brentano's heirs, as is now well-known (perhaps even in the field of the history of

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[9] Bühler 1982 222. Bühler 1982 is referred to henceforth in the text as: ST.

analytic philosophy) moved along two very different paths. Husserl and Meinong, Reinach and Scheler multiplied entities, modalities and essentialisms and set out thoroughly anti-naturalist and anti-pragmatist views. Marty, on the other hand, argued that much of the multiplication was unnecessary. He developed a very thorough account of meaning-nominalism, in which the functions of expressing mental states and modifying the mental states of interlocutors are prominent, an account embedded in an understanding of language and other social phenomena as the product of complicated, unplanned processes of selection. Husserl and many others, on this account, were tempted by linguistic pictures, succumbed to the temptations and from then on misled by just these pictures. This, Marty argues, is particularly true of Husserl's 1900-01 dream of founding the philosophies of language and logic and so of many parts of philosophy on the theory of sense, nonsense and "logical grammar". Marty's philosophy is in some respects a Helvetic compromise between the view of the multipliers and the views of (late) Brentano himself, an uncompromising form of nominalism combined with the conviction that all philosophers of a different mind must be misled by linguistic fictions. Marty's philosophy of language was developed above all by Bühler, Ahlman and Landgrebe and anticipated by Martinak.

In spite of their divergences, Brentano and his most famous heirs all took seriously the idea of philosophy as a theoretical enterprise. From the point of view of the development of Austro-German philosophy, Wittgenstein's most original innovations were two in number. First, the claim that the project of philosophy as a theoretical enterprise is taken seriously only by those who are in the grip of misleading pictures. Second, the suggestion that what look like essential, non-contingent philosophical claims, in particular claims made by Brentano's heirs, are at best reminders about how words ought to be used.

The discussions of guidance by Bühler and Wittgenstein, as we shall now see, illustrate some aspects of this large picture.

§2   Reading & Guidance

Two claims are central in the descriptions of guidance and of reading given by Bühler and then Wittgenstein. First, the extraordinary variety of these phenomena. Second, their independence of particular experiences and sensations.

Husserl often describes and analyses the phenomenon of reading. In his 1900-01 *Logical Investigations* he uses the phenomenon in order to consider the relation between visual perception and "intellectual" acts such as judging, supposing and meaning that *p* and to argue that there is nothing sensory about the latter. His conclusion influenced the Würzburg school of psychology, to which Bühler belonged. In their descriptions of reading as being guided, Bühler and Wittgenstein begin by setting aside what Husserl called intellectual acts:

> [H]ow do things stand in the case of optical linguistic symbols…? In fluent reading, our eyes wander jerkily over the lines taking in one word-image after another. Of course, the thoughts, emotions and interests of the reader do not remain with the black forms which stand on the white background of the paper but with the objects being dealt with…As far as the process (*Geschehen*) [of reading] is concerned, one can say that the sensory impressions intervene (*eingreifen*), triggering and steering. If I read a book out loud, the choice of tempo, whether I read loudly or softly, the right intonation, whether I read phlegmatically or in a lively way, this is up to me....And if we want to characterise briefly the intervention (*Eingreifen*) of optical perceptions in these activities, there are probably no better terms than triggering and steering[10]

And when Wittgenstein invites us to "study the use of the expression ´to be guided` by studying the use of the word ´reading`" he tells us that by the latter he means

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[10] Bühler 1929 75.

the activity of translating script into sounds, also of writing according to dictation or of copying in writing a page of print, and suchlike; reading in this sense does not involve any such thing as understanding what you read.[11]

In the *Blue Book*, we are told that "guided" is used in many different senses.[12] There is, Wittgenstein also says, a "family of cases of deriving" sound from text and

in the same way we also use the word "to read" for a family of cases. And in different circumstances we apply different criteria[13] for a person's reading.[14]

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[11] Wittgenstein 1972 *Brown Book* §66 119.

[12] Wittgenstein 1972 41.

[13] In 1909 Bühler attributes to Paulhan what he takes to be the correct idea of using as "an objective criterion of understanding a correct reaction to perception of language" (Bühler 1909 115). He continues to use the term "criteria", sometimes, like early Wittgenstein, as a synonym of "symptom", sometimes sharply distinguishing the two. Bühler's fullest account of the nature of criteria (Bühler 1930 367-377) identifies criteria with reasons or justifications for that for which the criteria are criteria, for example the certainty of memory. He sharply distinguishes the relation of justification and causal relations. But, like Husserl, he also talks of an experience of the relation of justification, of noticing the relation between certainty and the criteria is based on, an idea Wittgenstein will criticise. Elsewhere Bühler uses "criteria" simply to mean conditions for being F. On criteria and symptoms and related notions in Bühler, Wittgenstein and Husserl, cf Mulligan 1990.

[14] Wittgenstein 1968 §164.

In the following passage, Wittgenstein arrives at the conclusion that no one feature is essential to all cases of reading after mentioning only a handful of the numerous examples of types of reading he gives elsewhere:

> …our eye glides (*gleitet*) over printed lines differently from the way it glides over arbitrary pothooks and flourishes. (I am not speaking here of what can be established by observing the movement of the eyes of a reader.) The eye glides, one would like to say, with particular ease, without being held up; and yet it doesn't *skid* (*rutscht*). And at the same time involuntary speech goes on in the imagination. That is how it is when I read German and other languages, printed or written, and in various styles.— But what in all this is essential to reading as such? Not any one feature that occurs in all cases of reading. (Compare the process (*Vorgang*) in the case of reading ordinary print with reading words which are printed entirely in capital letters, as solutions of puzzles sometimes are. What a different process it is!—Or reading our script from right to left.)[15]

Steering, Bühler asserts in 1929, "can be described without referring to any "mental processes"[16]. But when he asserts that "the entire domain of perception can be dealt with theoretically with the help of…three functions, signals, indicators and symbols" he also asserts that triggering and steering apply not only to "the aspect of behaviour" but also to "the aspect of experience". Steering "describes the process (*Geschehen*) [of perception] from the lowest animals to the most complicated perceptions of symbols".[17] Although Bühler insists on the variety of guidance, he does not describe anything like the variety of cases distinguished and discussed by Wittgenstein. He is particularly interested in the variety of perceptual guidance:

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[15] Wittgenstein 1968 §168, translation modified.

[16] Bühler 1929 42. The concept of "reciprocal steering", according to Charlotte Bühler, is a concept which "in principle already transcends introspection" (Bühler & Lazarsfeld 1931 335).

[17] Bühler 1929 75.

Someone who reads in the ordinary way and remains with the content of his thoughts does not behave with respect to sense-impressions in the same ways as someone who makes an "observation". The visual impressions of the reader are only there in order to excite certain ideas, thoughts and feelings etc.. They are not noticed and considered in order to find out what it is that is seen and how it is. This is always the case when signs and indicators carry out their specific function. In the case of observations, it is quite different…Not all perceptions are observations; this is clearly shown by the example of ordinary reading. It is also shown by other examples: to consider an object within the aesthetic set (*Einstellung*, attitude) is to be oriented towards enjoyment…There are as many kinds of perception as there are specific aims of perception; arriving at a perceptual judgment is only one such aim.[18]

He also distinguishes many different kinds of signals. Indexical expressions (*Zeigwörter*) are both signals and symbols (ST 90, 190). There are reception signals, action signals, position signals and individual signals. "That" and "I" are reception signals when they trigger eye-movements and so a reception and thus differ from action signals, such as imperatives (ST 107). "Here" is a position signal, "I" an individual signal (ST 95). Anaphoric uses of language are a *sui generis* type of guidance (ST 122-3). A speaker's knowledge steers his grasp of utterances (ST 65, 171, 172). Appearances and sense impressions steer behaviour, bodily movements and goals and do this either immediately or immediately[19]. What psychologists call a set (*Einstellung*) is to be understood in terms of possible steerings.[20]

This "wealth" of ways of guiding and and of goals, Bühler says, is often overlooked. The "structural monism" of the Berlin Gestalt

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[18] Bühler 1930 137, my emphasis - KM

[19] Bühler 1929 73-7, 80.
[20] Bühler 1929 121

psychologists, for example, cannot do justice to the variety of guidance[21], unlike the Vienna Gestalt psychologists.

The wealth and variety of signals and guidance corresponds to a variety of different types of understanding. "By nature, understanding comes in *at least* three kinds, in linguistic inquiry" (ST 13, my emphasis - KM). To the difference between symbols, signals and expression there correspond three types of understanding, the understanding of symbols, of signals and of expression, three "keys to understanding", he calls them, expression-keys, signal-keys, symbol-keys (*Ausdrucksschlüssel, Signalschlüssel, Symbolschlüssel* (ST 13)**.** There are, he repeatedly asserts, different levels, strata and depths of understanding.[22]

Already in 1909 Bühler notes that "understand" and "sense of speech (*einer Rede*)", which he calls "corresponding expressions", are "not univocal" and refer to the "ambiguity of the concept of understanding"[23]. One of the reasons why it is so difficult to understand understanding is that "in understanding, we complete a great deal, specify much that is indeterminate".[24]

Yet another type of understanding is pictorial understanding. Bühler agrees with Wittgenstein that "there is understanding and failure to understand" pictures and drawings, "understanding" a picture may mean "various kinds of thing"; one example Wittgenstein gives is:

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[21] Bühler 1926, 1929 121-2.

[22] Bühler 1926 495, 507, cf. 474; Bühler 1929 85, 135, Bühler 1930 225; on understanding, cf. Bühler 1929124, 133, 135; 1930 225, 406.

[23] Bühler 1909 104, 109.
[24] Bühler 1909 119.

A picture is perhaps a still-life; but I don't understand one part of it: I cannot see solid objects there, but only patches of colour (*Farbflecke*) on the canvas[25]

Reading off colour contrasts between colour patches in a physical field or context, says Bühler, is one thing. Taking in the pictorial values in the context of a painting a quite different thing:

> Colour contrast….is a phenomenon that can be read off from the symphysical field of the coloured patches (*Farbflecken*). The case of the 'context' of the pictorial values in a painting as a whole, however, is substantially different. If a painter mixes the same grey on his palette three times and three times places physically the same patch of grey in a developing picture, this patch can three times (or more often) receive a different pictorial value in the context of the painting; for example, it can give the impression of being a shadow or a light reflection or the colour of an object (*Gegenstandsfarbe*) (for example a spot of dirt on a white table cloth) — quite regularly and automatically for the viewer who is in a normal state of readiness to receive**.** The structural law of the pictorial values of a painting is completely different from colour contrast; these pictorial values are in a synsemantic field and receive certain field values in it. The patches of colour (in general: the sense data) must be assigned a sign (ST 165-6).

§3   Misleading Pictures & Pianolas: Machines & Modality, Rules & Rigidity

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[25] Wittgenstein 1968 §526.

For someone to be *actually guided* by something is one thing. For her to be such that she *could be guided* by it is another thing. Similarly, for a machine to be actually guided by something is one thing. For it to be such that it could be guided in this way is another thing. This analogy was of great interest to Bühler and Wittgenstein. Unlike Bühler, Wittgenstein thinks that when philosophers talk about modality in this way they often give in to the temptation to see possibilities, abilities and powers as *states* of the bearers of these possibilities. As we shall see, to see modalities in this way is to be in the grip of a misleading picture, indeed it is to be guided by and misled by a picture. This particular misleading picture of modality had been described in 1908 by Marty, the Swiss philosopher to whom Bühler owes several of the guiding principles of his theory and philosophy of language. From the point of view of Marty and Wittgenstein, what Bühler says about the possibilities open to machines looks like a good candidate for exemplifying the mistake of assimilating modalities to states.

In 1926 Bühler announces that he has borrowed the term *Steuerung* from the vocabulary of physics. There is control and steering not only of "dead systems" but also in "animal and human communities". It is a concept which applies to both behaviour and experience. Properly understood, it promises to help us understand intentionality. Brentano's pathbreaking discovery of intentionality was of "so to speak static", point-like intentionality. But intentionality of this sort is a mere abstraction from dynamic intentionality, in which an individual experience is a control-lever.[26]

Whoever constructs a machine equips it with "degrees of freedom" (*Freiheitsgraden*, *Toleranzen*). Indeed "there is no machine without such degrees of freedom". And "what we find in the domain of technology, we may also assume to be realised and used in the

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[26] Bühler 1926 487, 479.

domain of organic steering".[27] There is "no material machine with only fixed connections, that is without grades of freedom".[28]

Bühler is so pleased with his distinction between the rigid or fixed connections and degrees of freedom of machines and organisms that he applies it to natural language and to a number of different linguistic phenomena. "Intersubjective communication with the signs of natural language is exceptionally imperfect in conforming to the requirement" of

> meaning constancy: the same word - the same meaning, wherever it is used. But the author of this book...finds that the rigidity of a stiff riding boot may well have advantages, for example for the horse rider; for the speakers of the clear language of science are proud riders who insist on rigid, well-defined word-meanings. However, there are other advantages for intersubjective communication that are provided by a certain plasticity of the meaning spheres of our naming words. Modern technology knows that one can and must work with degrees of freedom in mechanical engineering; organisms have known this much longer. As in very complicated modern machines and the organs of organisms, there are safety devices to correct the degrees of freedom of the meaning spheres of our naming words. Supersummativity and subsummativity of attributive complexes increase the productivity of language to a remarkable extent and make possible laconic naming. This presupposes, of course, that a correction of the indeterminateness and equivocity of the complexes formed in this way is available for use (ST 350)

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[27] Bühler 1926 496-7.
[28] Bühler 1926 504-5

It is in his working out of the ideas in this passage[29] that Bühler anticipates contemporary, strongly contextualist accounts of meaning, accounts which Wittgenstein, too, is held to have anticipated.

Are the possibilities open to machines and the abilities of humans states thereof? Wittgenstein notes in *Brown Book* cases where someone is actually guided by something only if she also has certain abilities:

> B is guided by the particular combination of words in one of our three sentences if he *could* also have carried out orders consisting in other combinations of dots and dashes. And if we say this, it seems to us that the '*ability*' to carry out other orders is a particular state of the person carrying out the orders... And at the same time we can't in this case find anything which we should call such a state[30].

What is true of the way we speak about abilities is, Wittgenstein thinks, also true of the way we talk about *de re* possibility in general:

> There are…various reasons which incline us to look at the fact of something being possible,…as the fact that he or it is in a particular state. Roughly speaking, this comes to saying that "A is in the state of being able to do something" is *the form of representation* we are most strongly tempted to adopt;…[31]

This is just the error Marty denounces in 1908,

> the common perpetration of the fiction which consists in bringing what is not real…, in thoughts about it, far too close (*heranrücken*) to the real….Forces,…all possibilities…are

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[29] Cf. Mulligan 2012 ch. VI, Mulligan 1997.
[30] Wittgenstein 1972 117.

[31] Wittgenstein 1972 117. The "form of representation" mentioned here is an example of the phenomenon of the so called subjective apriori, as Scheler calls it, mentioned at the beginning of §1 above.

treated as things, which have effects and are effected….And one proceeds in the same way in a thousand other cases.[32]

As Wittgenstein puts the point,

> We say: "It isn't moving yet, but it already has the possibility of moving"——'so possibility is something very near reality'[33]

He is here referring to a machine:

> We use a machine, or the picture of a machine, as a symbol for the particular action of a machine.… "The machine's action seems to be in it from the start" means: we are inclined to compare the future movements of the machine in their definiteness to objects which are already lying in a drawer and which we then take out[34]

When we consider whether someone is guided by certain signs, there is an inclination

> to say some such thing as that we could only decide this question with certainty if we could look into the actual mechanism connecting seeing the signs with acting according to them. For we have a definite picture of what in a mechanism we should call certain parts being guided by others. In fact, the mechanism which immediately suggests itself… is a mechanism of the type of a pianola. Here, in the working of the pianola we have a clear case of certain actions, those of the hammers of the piano, being guided by the pattern of the holes in the pianola roll.[35]

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[32] Marty 1976 354.

[33] Wittgenstein 1968 §194. On the misleading pictures and associated temptations denounced by Marty and Wittgenstein and their views of such pictures and temptations, cf. Mulligan 2019.

[34] Wittgenstein 1968 §193.

[35] Wittgenstein 1972 118.

Wittgenstein also distinguishes between what Bühler had called rigid or fixed connections and degrees of freedom:

> The machine as symbolizing its action:.. We talk as if these parts could only move in this way, as if they could not do anything else. How is this—do we forget the possibility of their bending, breaking off, melting, and so on? Yes; in many cases we don't think of that at all. We use a machine, or the drawing of a machine, to symbolize a particular action of the machine. For instance, we give someone such a drawing and assume that he will derive the movement of the parts from it…[36]

But "when we are concerned with predicting the actual behaviour of a machine

> we do not in general forget the possibility of a distortion
> of the parts and so on. - We *do* talk like that, however, when
> we are wondering at the way we can use a machine to symbolize
> a given way of moving—since it can also move in quite *different*
> ways.[37]

Hintikka once claimed that Wittgenstein was interested in a problem which is common to both our following rules and to a machine's being guided:

> …Wittgenstein's problem about rules…has nothing to do with intentionality. Wittgenstein could have raised the same problem about machines instead of humans – and, in fact, did so. How is a machine guided by its blueprint? This question is parallel with the question: How does a rule guide my actions when I follow it? …Wittgenstein discusses how the motions of a machine are

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[36] Wittgenstein 1968 §193.
[37] Wittgenstein 1968 §193

"guided" by its blueprint in *Philosophical Investigations* I, secs. 193-194 among other places.[38]

Whatever we should think about Hintikka's account of Wittgenstein's problem about rules, it seems clear that Bühler thought that the understanding of machines and language had much in common:

> My impression is that what is commonly called the "understanding" of a machine is a many-sided and in certain circumstances very complicated matter…The understanding of language is no different.[39]

§4   Early Bühler & Early Wittgenstein on Rule-Awareness

The views about mind, language and colours criticised by "the later" Wittgenstein are often views which are not to be found in the writings of Frege, Russell and Moore or in the philosophical tradition, but rather in the writings of Brentano's heirs.[40] Occasionally, Wittgenstein tells us that a view he is criticising is a view he once held. Thus he says

> [e]arlier I thought at one time that grammatical rules are an explanation of what I experience on one occasion when I use the word. They are as it were consequences or expressions of the properties which I momentarily experience when I understand the word.[41]

Is this view to be found in the Brentanian tradition?

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[38] Hintikka [undated].

[39] Bühler 1929 135.

[40] Cf. Mulligan 2012.

[41] Wittgenstein MS 116, quoted by Hintikka [undated].

In 1908, Bühler put forward the account of thinking he had arrived at as a member of the already mentioned Würzburg School, an account in which certain types of experience are said to be "direct expressions of rules"

> When we want to express a difficult thought we first choose a sentence form for it, we first become internally aware of the operational plan, and it is then this plan that marshals the words. When we understand a complex compound sentence we gain a knowledge of its grammatical structure, we know of the relations between the individual parts of the entire form. That also happens when we speak; when, for example, we begin a parenthesis with 'when' and suddenly break off at the end of the subordinate clause, we become conscious of the fact that we had expected something; what we expect is not only a completion with regard to the topic, but a grammatical completion: we expect a main clause. *What we become specially aware of in all of these cases is what always or almost always <u>mediates</u> between thoughts and words, incidentally and without being particularly noticed: a knowledge of the sentence form and of the relationship of the parts of the sentence to each other, something that must be regarded as a direct expression of the grammatical rules that are active in us.*[42]

Bühler continued to endorse his 1908 account of a type of awareness which is a direct expression of rules active in us. He quotes approvingly the passage from his 1908 article quoted above in 1934 (ST 254)

As already mentioned, some of the claims of the Würzburg psychologists derive from reflection on Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. This is true of Bühler's account of rule-awareness,

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[42] Buhler 1908 84ff., emphasis mine – KM. On the use and understanding of *Darstellung* (representation), *Symbol* and *Zuordnung* (correlation) in early Bühler and early Wittgenstein, cf Mulligan 2012 ch. V.

which he presents as a modification of Husserl's account of so called categorial intuition:

> What is an awareness of rules (*Regelbewusstsein*)? A thought in which something that from a logical point of view we call a rule dawns on us. But this is not an unambiguous description. I can also simply mean (*meinen*) a rule as I can any other object. Awareness of rules is not this thinking of a rule (*an eine Regel denken*) but rather thinking a rule or thinking in a rule (*denken einer Regel oder in einer Regel*). The object of rule- awareness is not the rule but the state of affairs or objective it refers to, is applicable to, from which it is perhaps derived.[43]

Bühler's later views about the place of rules and conventions in his masterly "theory" of language are merely hinted at in various places.[44] A much more thoroughly developed philosophy of linguistic rules is that given by Ahlman who, like Bühler, develops ideas of Marty. Like Marty, Bühler and Wittgenstein, Ahlman thinks of words as essentially tools or implements, a view roundly rejected by such heirs of Brentano as Husserl and Scheler. Like the early Bühler and Wittgenstein, Ahlman thinks there is an intuitive grasp of rules:

> Individuals normally have an intuitive awareness of the rules…More or less distinctly, more or less exactly they have in mind (*vorschweben*) the (ideal) content of these norms, which they try to realise in speaking and understanding; individuals judge each other's linguistic activity and understanding of what is said from the viewpoint of these norms.[45]

But is our most basic grasp of the rules we follow and infringe really to be understood in the ways suggested by Bühler, early Wittgenstein

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[43] Bühler 1907, 335, cf. 339

[44] Cf. for example Bühler1926 494.

[45] Ahlman 1926 9.

and Ahlman? Two philosophers who came to the conclusion that this grasp must be non-cognitive are Scheler and then Wittgenstein[46]

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[46] For the details, cf Mulligan 2006.

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