The Rejection of Consequentializing

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Consequentialists say we may always promote the good. Deontologists object: not if that means killing one to save five. “Consequentializers” reply: this act is wrong, but it isn’t for the best, since killing is worse than letting die. I argue that this reply undercuts the “compellingness” of consequentialism, which comes from an outcome-based view of action that collapses the distinction between killing and letting die.

1. Introduction

Act consequentialists think that acts are right when they have good outcomes, so that it’s never wrong to make things go best. The classic complaint: there seem to be counterexamples. Five lives are better than one, for instance, and yet you may not kill me even if my organs will be used to save five sick people (Foot 1967). Best outcome, wrong act—what does that mean for consequentialism?

Many ethicists, though they accept that killing is wrong, still feel “compelled” to remain consequentialists. So they say that killing really does make things worse, because of something bad about the act itself: five deaths are a worse outcome than one, but not worse than one death plus a killing. Of course, we don’t normally think of an act as part of its own outcome. Our normal concept is that of a narrow outcome: the sum of acts’ downstream effects (Thomson 2003: 8, fn. 2)—it’s “what happens minus the fact that the agent made it happen.” But there is also the kosher notion of a broad outcome (Portmore 2009: 330; cf. Foot 1983: 273), which includes the act itself, and so consequentialists may insist that killing one to save five is wrong because its broad outcome is suboptimal.

This reply—known as “consequentializing”—is now itself a classic. But there is something funny about it. Just ask: how could it be worse by consequentialist lights to kill and save five? The killing’s narrow outcome is the best available: less death. And, given consequentialism, we can’t say that the act is worse because it’s wrong (that gets the explanation backwards), or because it violates a non-consequentialist right to life (there isn’t any). So what could be bad about an act narrowly aimed at
the very best? The consequentializers’ answer must be that the act is bad fundamentally. I argue that, if this were the case, it would undercut their own reason for being consequentialists.

This is a new objection. I am not just wheeling out the intuition that one killing doesn’t seem as bad as four deaths (Scheffler 1994: 109). Nor am I rehashing Nozick’s (1974) point that, if killings are only wrong because they are bad, then we ought to minimize murders, even when that means committing one ourselves—which is intuitively wrong. I’m not here to insist on my intuitions. I want to bring out a tension in the consequentializer’s overall view.

What “compels” the consequentializer is the idea that it can’t be wrong to produce the best outcome. But what makes this idea compelling, I argue, is a conception of action: the view that to act just is to produce an outcome. Consequentialism is only compelling if we are already inclined to see action as production.¹ Now, some philosophers have directly attacked the “compelling idea” and this view of action (Hurley 2017, 2019b). I will not. I grant that action might well be production, and that consequentialism could be genuinely compelling. But for the consequentializer, who draws brute distinctions between acts with the same effects, it makes no sense to insist that outcomes are the only point of action. The consequentializer can’t be compelled towards consequentialism.

After some background (sections 2–4), I argue for my two premises: that consequentialism is only compelling given the view that action is production (section 5), and that consequentializing undercuts that view of action (section 6).

2. Consequentialism

Let’s start by getting clear on the target. Who are the “consequentialists?” I have in mind a thin definition. A consequentialist is anyone who believes that an act’s deontic properties (rightness,
wrongness, etc.) are explained exclusively by the evaluative properties of its outcome (goodness, desirability, etc.). The right is grounded in the good. Reasons for action arise from results.

At the core of consequentialism is the so-called “compelling idea” that it is never wrong to make things go best. At the periphery, consequentialists disagree about which things are good (just pleasure, or something more?); they may also disagree about whether maximizing the good is always required (Yetter Chappell 2019); whether rightness is sensitive to the agent’s imperfect knowledge (Jackson 1991); whether goodness is relative to an agent at a time (Schroeder 2007); and whether the theoretical role played by “goodness” should be played by a close relative (like the reasons to prefer one outcome to another; see Dreier 2011: 101, Portmore 2011, Setiya 2018). Whatever you think about these issues, you can’t be a consequentialist if you see rightness as fundamental, or as grounded in something other than lovely outcomes—responding to rights, expressing respect, etc.

I will abstract away from these and other insider debates when using the label “consequentialist.” But let me emphasize that I use this label just for convenience. My point is that anyone who grounds the right in the good should resist the idea that it’s bad to kill the few to save the many. Nothing turns on whether we use “consequentialist” broadly, as a name for all of these authors, or narrowly to name a special subset.

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2 There is also some debate over how to spell out the compelling idea. The standard formulation is that “it is always permissible to bring about the best outcome” (Schroeder 2017: 1477; cf. Scheffler 1989: 1, Foot 1983: 198, Dreier 1993: 24–5, Portmore 2003: 304, Smith 2003, Schroeder 2007: 279, Hurley 2013, 2017: 30). But in recent work, Portmore (2009: fn.20) puts it differently. Instead of the “best” outcome, he talks about the outcome whose obtaining an agent has “most reason to desire.” He also includes “moral rationalism,” the view that we always have most reason to do what is morally required. These changes are important, but they won’t affect my argument: I will use “good outcome” in a way that is neutral between the normal notion and Portmore’s replacement (“outcome that an agent has reason to prefer”); also, I won’t confine consequentialism to the moral domain. My thanks to Doug Portmore for helpful comments.

3. Consequentializing

In the beginning, consequentialists agreed that acts could have value only extrinsically, as a means to producing the really intrinsic goods. Some thought the sole good was pleasure (Sidgwick 1874); others believed in a plurality of goods including beauty and friendship (Moore 1903). But no one thought of acts as good in themselves.

This would change in the 20th century, as consequentialists partook from the Tree of Counterexamples. Some acts smacked of wrongness despite their wholesome effects—framing the innocent to stop a riot, breaking a promise for expedience, etc. Here is a modern case:

*Footbridge*

A runaway trolley is headed toward five innocent workers. You are on a footbridge over the tracks beside a large man. Push him to his death, and his body will halt the trolley, saving the lives of the five. There is no other way to save them. (Thomson 1985)

The man on the bridge does not consent to being pushed, and his life promises to be just as good as the life that any of the workers would enjoy if saved. Common sense tells us that it would be for the best if the large man happened to fall in front of the trolley, as if blown by the wind—and yet it is intuitively wrong for you to shove him there.

Old-school consequentialists want to resist this intuition. I won’t object. My target is the new school, who try to absorb the intuition of wrongness by consequentializing common sense. To consequentialize a moral view is to cook up a consequentialist counterpart that preserves the original’s claims about which acts are right and which are wrong by changing what the view considers good and bad.4

How does this work? According to Dreier’s “recipe,” the consequentializer says that it is

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4 For recent work in the consequentializing tradition, see Dreier 1993, 2011; Louise 2004; Peterson 2010: 155; Brown 2011; and Portmore 2007, 2011. The classic precursor is Ewing 1939, 1947. On the differences between consequentializers, see Schroeder 2017. (My target, in Schroeder’s terms, is the “intuitive argument” for consequentializing, not the “assimilation” and “pragmatic” arguments.”) For objections, see Sachs 2010; Hurley 2013, 2019b; and Tenenbaum 2014.
intrinsically bad that the act was performed—in this case, the act of killing one to save five (Dreier 2011: 9–99; cf. Brown 2011: 750). Thanks to the badness of the act itself, killing is wrong, after all.

This recipe, to its credit, has a rationale. To account for the wrongness of killing, the consequentializer needs to locate something in the outcome that is unexpectedly bad. But what? Not the narrow outcome. An act’s narrow outcome, as a reminder, consists in its downstream effects. But the effect of pushing the man off of the Footbridge is that he falls and only one dies; the effect of refraining is that the man doesn’t fall and five die. Clearly, less death is better. So there is only one place left to look within the “broad outcome,” and that is the act itself (or in the fact that it was done; this distinction doesn’t matter for us).

So the consequentializer has a recipe, and it seems to handle Footbridge fine, by putting badness in the act of killing. Indeed, Mark Schroeder thinks that the consequentializers can “easily accommodate” cases like Footbridge; the recipe might not lead to “a plausible view about how bad murders and deaths are,” but it nonetheless “shows that consequentialism as such is not directly threatened by such cases” (2007: 266). The real trouble only starts, he thinks, when we bring in more elaborate examples, such as:

*Villainous Footbridge*

You are on the footbridge as before, but this time, the trolley was started up by a villain. Kill the large man, and you will reduce the number of murders on the tracks from five to one.

Here killing seems wrong, but there is no easy way to accommodate this judgment within consequentialism, except by saying that killing is bad from the point of view of the agent—one must reduce one’s own murders. And even that would not help with:

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5 It’s not essential that the choice involves a difference in the number of people harmed. We could also imagine a choice of whether to harm one person to prevent a bigger harm to another.

6 Even if we include the past in an act’s broad outcome, clearly the badness doesn’t belong in the past. For one thing, nothing is particularly bad about the situation in Footbridge until the trolley hits. More importantly, the past is the same no matter what the agent does, so facts about the past can’t make the outcome of pushing worse than the outcome of not pushing.
Redemption Footbridge
Same as Villainous footbridge, but the villain was you. Kill the large man, and you will reduce the number of murders you end up committing from five to one.

To treat this case, we would have to make the badness of killing relative to the time as well as the agent. And so Schroeder thinks that the heart of the debate is here in the realm of relativity. The question is: should we believe in values relativized to times and moments?

That’s a good question. But I think the consequentialist is “directly threatened” well before relativity enters the picture. There is something unstable about a consequentialism on which it’s bad to cause good results, as does the killer in Footbridge. The core problem here isn’t about whether killing is bad in a relative or a neutral way. For consequentialists, the act should not be bad at all.

4. Why Not Consequentialize?

I hope you are feeling puzzled. We all learn in Ethics 101 that consequentialists, who ground the right in the good, are supposed to start with a list of Goods and Bads. Sometimes the list of Bads is as short as simply “pain,” but of course the list might be longer, featuring a variety of things—vice and error, injustice and inequality.

What’s wrong with adding one more thing to the list? Why can’t the consequentializer just say that killing is another fundamental Bad?

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7 See Portmore’s (2011: Chapter 4.3) discussion of Kamm (2007: 252) for an alternative explanation. See also Setiya, (2018) who argues that consequentialists can handle the Footbridge cases without appeal to relative values. It is not clear to me whether he is in the scope of my arguments, since he does not commit to the (more standard) view that the killing is wrong because of the badness of the act itself.

8 As always, I use “good” and “bad” in a way that is neutral between plain old (dis)value and newfangled reductions (or replacements) in terms of reasons to desire. See fn. 2, above.

9 When I say that killing is “fundamentally bad,” I mean to allow that killing might be bad in some particular way. For example, on Portmore’s view, the agent in Footbridge has most reason to desire the outcome of letting die because the outcome of killing involves disrespect to the victim. But this moral distinction is still fundamental, in the relevant sense: there is no further reason, such as a
One answer, mentioned earlier, is that killing one to save five isn’t intuitively so awful—at least not by consequentialist lights. I think there is something to this point. It is worth reminding ourselves that the consequentializer is cramming badness into an act with an unimpeachable narrow outcome: four fewer deaths. This can’t be justified by a prior concern for death-reduction. On the contrary: the act that produces less death has more badness. (Letting the five die is intrinsically better than killing one.) Old-school consequentialists will scratch their heads.

But this isn’t news to the consequentializers. They agree that wrongful killings can have good effects, and they aren’t trying to derive the badness of killing from anything else. Their point is that killing is bad fundamentally. This is not meant to be instantly obvious, but only to recapture, from a consequentialist point of view, our sense that it’s wrong to kill the one.

So why not consequentialize? My answer is that the consequentializer is destabilizing their own view, since there is a tension between their initial motivation—the “compelling idea”—and the claim that killing is fundamentally bad.

The consequentializer’s view has three parts: a theory of what makes things good, a theory of what makes acts right, and an account of what actions are. They are compelled by the idea that it’s never wrong to produce the goods. But this idea is only compelling given Action as Production—the view that to act just is to produce an outcome—and this view flies out the window once we open the door to a distinction between killing and letting die.

This argument has two premises:

\textit{Compelled by Production}
Consequentialism is only “compelling” given Action as Production.

\textit{Undercut by Consequentializing}
If killing is worse than letting die, then Action as Production is false.

nasty narrow outcome, for why the killing is more disrespectful. What makes it disrespectful is simply that it is a (non-consensual) killing rather than a letting-die. Here again I owe thanks to Doug Portmore for his comments.
The conclusion is that, if the consequentializer is right about killing, consequentialism isn’t really compelling. I’ll now defend the premises in turn.

5. Why Consequentialism Compels: Action as Production

“Ever since its inception,” writes Tamar Schapiro (2001: 91), consequentialism has been “reinforced if not entailed by a particular picture of action”—Action as Production. On this picture, the point of action is to make things happen, to change or preserve states of the world.

Action as Production is a view about what actions are: for any act A, there is a state S such that doing A just is to aim at producing S.10 Acts cannot differ unless they aim at producing different outcomes. What is it to “produce” an outcome? In the ordinary sense, producing means causing.11 I produce the death of the big man if I push him off the bridge, but I don’t “produce” five deaths on the tracks when I refuse to push, nor does my refusal “produce” the remainder of the big man’s life.

But consequentializers construe “production” more broadly. An act produces whatever happens when the act is done, no matter whether the act was a direct cause, a constitutive ground, or a failure of prevention. In this broad sense, acts even “produce” themselves. Portmore explains this very nicely:

It is through our actions that we affect the way the world goes…Moreover, whenever we act intentionally, we act with the aim of making the world go a certain way. The aim needn’t be anything having to do with the causal consequences of the act. The aim could be nothing more than to bring it about that one performs the act. For instance, one could intend to run merely for the sake of bringing it about that one runs. The fact remains, though, that for every intentional action there is some end at which the agent aims. (2011: 56; cf. 2014: 246)12

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10 I won’t need to distinguish an action’s aiming at producing S from the agent’s aiming to produce S. But perhaps, in the case of unintentional acts, an action’s “aim” can outstrip those of the agent.

11 Some traditional consequentialists, like the utilitarian Richard Cumberland (1727: 196), explicitly say that action is causation (Schapiro 2001: 94–95).

12 Another common way to put it: an act’s outcome is the world that would be actual if the action were performed (see e.g. Portmore 2009: 330, Brown 2011: 752).
To act is to aim at an end, but the end can include the act itself.

That’s Action as Production. Now, why is it so crucial for the consequentializer? One simple reason is that it directly supports consequentialism. The picture of action nudges us toward the moral theory. Thus Mill slides from action to ethics:

All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are subservient. (1861: 2)

If acts aim at ends, we “naturally” infer to an end-based morality. And here is Portmore:

…since our actions are the means by which we affect the way the world goes, and since our intentional actions necessarily aim at making the world go a certain way, it is only natural to suppose that our reasons for action are a function of our reasons for preferring some of those possible worlds to others, such that what each agent has most reason to do is to bring about the possible world, which of all those that she can actualize through her actions, is the one that she has most reason to want to be actual. (2011: 56)

This is just like Mill, right down to the phrase “natural to suppose.” We even find the same current running through the work of non-consequentialists, such as Judith Jarvis Thomson:

given that for a person to act just is for the world to go in a way that it otherwise would not go, surely the question whether he ought to act had better turn on a comparison between how it will go if he acts and how it will go if he does something else—to repeat, there seems to be nothing else for it to turn on. (2003: 8)

I agree. If action isn’t production, then consequentialism loses an easy source of luster.

But as Thomson hints, there is a deeper rationale for Action as Production: it is part of what makes consequentialism feel inescapable (“nothing else”), part of what makes it so compelling. If action is all about outcomes, it seems that nothing besides a bad outcome could make an action wrong. And this leads us to the compelling idea—namely, that an act can’t be wrong if its outcome is optimal. This idea is what steels the consequentializers’ will as they persevere through hard cases like Footbridge. No wonder. A natural reaction, on first hearing the compelling idea, is to ask how on earth it could be false.

Now, I won’t claim that the compelling idea is false, as the deontologists think, or that it’s
dangerously ambiguous, as Paul Hurley argues. 13 I am happy to grant that the consequentialist’s compelling idea is clear and attractive in the abstract. My claim is that the idea loses its luster if we drop Action as Production. If there is more to acts than outcomes, there is “something else” for wrongness to turn on, something that can make an act wrong even when its results do not. 14

But what else could an action be? Here is one answer: a response to the situation. Some acts—keeping promises, punishing transgressions, respecting rights—seem to be essentially backwards-looking. They aren’t just a means to an end, but a reaction to what is already settled—a promise, a wrong, a right. What an agent is doing is sensitive to what they are responding to. This seems to be part of the intuitive notion of killing. In Footbridge, pushing the man counts as a killing, rather than a letting-die, roughly because he was not under any threat until you got there; the threat was not part of the situation. If you don’t push, by contrast, this counts as letting the five die, because the trolley’s threat to them was already part of the situation; you simply didn’t interfere.

With this distinction in place, we can draw a parallel cut between two kinds of reasons for action. The consequentialist exclusively believes in “telic” reasons based in outcomes—reasons like this would result in five deaths. The deontologist, meanwhile, also believes in “responsive” reasons that spring from the situation—reasons like they have a right or I made a promise. 15

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13 Hurley (2017) argues that the compelling idea can be interpreted either as: (i) it’s always permissible to do the best action, or (ii) it’s always permissible to do the action with the best outcome. The first is compelling but not consequentialist; the second is consequentialist but not compelling. I agree with Hurley’s point, but my argument is meant to have even weaker premises. I grant that the “compelling idea,” even interpreted as (ii), might be compelling if we don’t consequentialize.

14 This claim shouldn’t be too controversial. Some already agree that the compelling idea depends on Action as Production (e.g. Scheffler 1985: 414–15, Hurley 2017: 188–89). But not everyone. Betzler and Schroth (2019: 127–30) say that only agent-neutral consequentialism can be “compelling.” My argument doesn’t need this strong claim. I can grant that agent-relative consequentialists may have coherent, compelling views, too—so long as they don’t consequentialize, and thereby hang on to Action as Production. (Consider, e.g., the egoist view that promoting self-interest is all that matters.)

15 On telic vs. responsive reasons, see Muñoz 2018: 262. See also Broad 1930 and Howard 2019
Clearly, the compelling idea doesn’t compel if there are responsive reasons for action. An agent always has most telic reason to produce the best outcome, but that would nevertheless be wrong if there were a decisive responsive reason against, something like *I promised not to do it, or they have a right that I not do it.* A responsive reason could make it wrong to make things go best.

So how could the consequentialist rule out these reasons? How could we know that, despite the appearance of counterexamples, all reasons must be telic? This is where Action as Production is essential. If action is entirely aimed at producing outcomes, then nothing besides an outcome could be even a candidate reason for action. Responsive reasons, along with any other non-telic reasons, are non-starters—they are “reasons of the wrong kind.”

*But if we give up Action as Production, we are opening our minds to the possibility of non-telic reasons for action, and the compelling idea will no longer be compelling.* Our conception of action determines what things are of the right kind to be reasons for action, and consequentialism compels only if there is exactly one right kind of reason for action—telic reasons.

Someone might object to this line of argument. Why should a view of what action is put any constraints on the kinds of things that can be *reasons* for action?

But there is nothing unusual about the link between a thing’s nature and its norms. Consider the example of norms for attitudes. It is a familiar thought that certain attitudes, like belief and resentment, are not by nature a way of producing states of affairs. Belief is essentially a matter of fitting one’s mind to the truth, and resentment is by nature a response to a felt wronging. Given this, telic reasons for these attitudes are of the wrong kind; they just aren’t relevant. To illustrate: suppose a despot offers me a fortune to believe that $2 + 2 = 5$, or to resent you for the lovely present you

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just gave me. It doesn’t follow that I should believe an obvious falsehood or resent a good deed. At most, as Parfit (2011: 1, 50–1, 420–32) would say, the despot’s bribe means that I should cause myself to have these attitudes, e.g. by hypnosis.

In a domain where telic reasons aren’t supreme, we aren’t compelled towards consequentialism. Consider these underwhelming spins on a familiar claim:

- **Epistemic Idea**: It is always permissible to adopt a belief if doing so would make things go best.
- **Emotive Idea**: It is always permissible to feel resentment if doing so would make things go best.

Suddenly, the idea that producing the goods must be right does not seem irresistible. If a certain attitude isn’t (just) a matter of production, we aren’t compelled to think that holding the attitude must be permissible whenever optimific. My point is simply that the same goes for action.

Now, not everyone will be so skeptical of the Epistemic and Emotive Ideas. Some may even find them compelling, insisting that we should believe and resent in whatever ways produce the goods. This view is worth taking seriously. But I suspect that many consequentializers would share my skepticism, and that they are more compelled by the idea that one may always promote the good when the topic is permissible actions, rather than permissible attitudes. These consequentializers will have special trouble resisting my premise that the compelling idea gets its aura from Action as Production. If the compelling idea is more plausible for action than for belief and resentment, why is that? Presumably, there must be some underlying difference in nature between action and these attitudes. But what could it be, if not that action aims at production, whereas belief fits the truth and

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17 The case of desires is tricky, since they are in a sense directed an at outcome—their content. Still, I don’t think that a despot’s bribe can be a reason to desire something bad for its own sake.
18 See Rinard 2017 on epistemic norms.
19 See e.g. Portmore (2011: 59) on “fittingness reasons” for preference and Parfit (2011: Appendix A) on “object-given reasons” for attitudes. (On Parfit’s sympathies towards consequentializing, see his 2017: Chapter 57).
resentment responds to offenses?

That wraps up my arguments for premise one. The compelling idea depends on Action as Production. If some acts essentially fit the world as is, rather than trying to change it, then it makes perfect sense why optimific changes could be wrong. Unless action is aimed exclusively at production, we shouldn’t be “compelled” to think that producing the goods must be permissible, since there may be other considerations—like responding to rights—that are of the right kind to make a moral difference. If there can be non-telic actions, the compelling idea may turn out to be no more compelling for action than for belief and other attitudes.

6. Why Consequentializing Undercuts

Consequentialism is only compelling given Action as Production. Now I’ll argue for:

\textit{Undercut by Consequentializing}

If killing is worse than letting die, then Action as Production is false.

The claim is that the consequentializer, who takes killing to be worse than letting die, is recapturing intuitions but betraying consequentialism.

But \textit{where} exactly is the betrayal? Why can’t consequentializers embrace Action as Production? Consequentialists come in so many stripes and dots—hedonistic and pluralistic, agent-relative and agent-neutral—and we are granting that all of these varieties can gel with Action as Production, so long as they don’t consequentialize. What makes the consequentializer in particular unable to think of acts in terms of outcomes?

The answer is that the consequentializers are drawing a moral distinction that can’t be traced to any difference in outcomes. There is nothing \textit{about} the act of killing that can \textit{make} it worse than letting die, given Action as Production, so long as the narrow outcomes are the same.

Let me lay out my argument more carefully. Premise one is a principle about value:
Resultance
If killing is worse than letting die, then something about the killing must make it worse.

(I am talking, as usual, just about the case of killing one to save five vs. letting one die to save five.)

This premise should be uncontroversial. Everyone agrees that moral properties are based in other properties; they are “resultant,” in Ross’s phrase (1930: 28). Pain, for example, is worse than pleasure because of a difference in how they feel. But what difference could make killing worse than letting die? Given Action as Production, the only place to look is within the broad outcome. That leaves two possibilities:

Only Two Options
If Action as Production is true, then only two things could make killing worse than letting die: a difference in narrow outcomes or a difference in the acts themselves.

But as the consequentializers themselves seem to assume:

Same Narrow Outcome
Killing and letting die have the same narrow outcome.

Why else introduce the concept of broad outcomes? But if the narrow outcomes are the same, then there is nothing to make the acts themselves any different, and so there can’t be any difference at the level of broad outcomes, either. (I’ll defend this in a moment.)

Narrow Principle
Given Action as Production, if two acts have the same narrow outcome, then they are intrinsically the same.

Thus consequentializing undercuts Action as Production. If killing is worse than letting die, there has to be something about killing besides its outcome that makes it so. And so there must be more to killing than its aiming at an outcome.

I know of two objections to this argument. The first targets the “Narrow Principle.”

Look, you are ignoring the importance of switching to the concept of broad outcomes. Don’t forget: just as the act of running produces the outcome that one runs (Portmore 2011: 56),

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20 I owe thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting both objections, and for pushing me to clarify my argument. (The objections are written in my own words.)
killings produce killings, and lettings-die produce lettings-die. Surely the consequentializer can use this fact to single out killings as worse, while staying true to Action as Production. But this is a mistake. Unless there is already a difference between killing and letting die, you can’t show that two acts are different by pointing out that one produces a killing whereas the other produces a letting die. The “difference” won’t make a difference.

To illustrate, imagine an old-school consequentialist who accepts Action as Production but rejects any metaphysical killing/letting-die distinction. (Perhaps they think the difference is merely verbal or conceptual.) On their view, killing and letting die have the same broad outcomes, because they have the same narrow outcome, and the acts are themselves the same.

Of course, if we do think these acts are different (even when they have the same narrow outcome), then we must also believe that they have different broad outcomes. But the difference in acts would have to be prior, due to some other source. Suppose, for example, that we accept an “expressive” conception of action, on which killing differs from letting die in virtue of what the acts express; killing “says” to the victim that they lack a high moral status (Schapiro 2001: 95–98). On this view, killing and letting die have different broad outcomes (they produce different acts). But that is not, and cannot, be the reason why they are different acts. The broad outcomes are downstream of a more fundamental difference in expressive content. Without that more basic difference, nothing would be there to make the broad outcomes different, and the metaphysical distinction between killing and letting die would collapse. The same goes for responsive views of action. Acts that differ in how they respond to the situation (e.g. revenge vs. mere harm) will have different broad outcomes, even if the narrow outcomes are the same, but only because there is something other than outcomes that makes the difference.

21 To be sure, traditional consequentialists might well accept a real metaphysical distinction between killing and letting die. They could just say that the difference isn’t morally weighty.
What if we are overlooking some hidden difference in the broad outcome, something special about killing? Could this be an opening for the consequentializer to bring in the distinction between killing and letting die? That is the idea behind the final objection:

There is always going to be some metaphysical difference between killing and letting die. When I kill, typically, at a minimum, I have to move my body (as when I push the man off the bridge). When I let die, typically, I don’t have to lift a finger (as when I watch icily as the man is pushed by the wind). Won’t killing and letting die always be distinguished by some such physical difference?  

This is a retreat from the consequentializer’s “recipe,” which takes for granted that she can help herself to opponents’ distinctions. Now we have a consequentializer trying to retrieve the killing/letting die distinction within the limits of Action as Production.

Does it work? I don’t think so, but to explain why, I will need to clarify the objection.

One way to hear the objection is as follows. Killing and letting die have the same narrow outcome, but killing is intrinsically different because it involves some further actions, like the moving of my hand towards the big man as I topple him over the footbridge (there is no such movement involved if I let the wind do the toppling).

But this cannot be quite right. If killing involves moving my hand, then the narrow outcome must include something that is missing from the outcome of letting die—my hand’s moving. This is not something that I do. What I do is move my hand (transitive verb), and as a result, my hand moves (intransitive).  

This latter fact is part of the narrow outcome. And indeed, it seems that for any pair of a killing and a letting die, we can point to some such movement that is in the narrow outcome of killing but not of letting die.

Now we can state the above objection more clearly. The question is: since the killing has

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22 We could spell this out in terms of worlds: the world in which I kill one to save five will be somehow physically different from the world where I let one die and instead save five.

23 See Hornsby 1980 on the distinction between transitive and intransitive uses of “movement.”
extra movements in its narrow outcome, why can’t the consequentializers use this fact to recover the killing/letting die distinction within the Action as Production framework?

My answer is that killings do not essentially have these extra movements. They do in the actual world, but that is only because killing is not actually, for human beings, a *basic action*—something that we do but not by doing something else. Only supervillains have the power to kill “with their mind.” Humans must kill by pulling triggers and pushing men off of bridges. Letting die, even for us, does not require any such means. And so these means contingently allow for Action as Production to distinguish killings from lettings-die.

If we are to find a case where killing and letting die really do have the exact same narrow outcome, we will need some thought experiments. Suppose that a supervillain has the power to kill a certain person basically—disappearing them at will, without lifting a finger. Unless he kills the one, five others will die by being disappeared. He saves them by killing the one. Now contrast this with the case where all six are to be disappeared, and the villain can use his powers either to *save* the five or save the one. He saves the five, letting the one die. These actions have the same narrow outcome. Given Action as Production, there can be no difference between them. But deontologists will say that there is a difference—a metaphysical difference giving rise to a moral one—and so we have a case where we see the limits of the view that makes consequentialism so compelling.

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24 To avoid some complications—won’t the villain’s memory be different, depending on what he does?—we can suppose that the villain disappears the moment he acts.

25 But won’t there be some facts *before* the time of action that distinguish the world where the villain kills from the world where the villain lets die? For example, before the killing, only five were disposed to die, whereas before the letting-die, all six were. Won’t this kind of fact distinguish the broad outcomes of the two actions? (Here we take “broad outcomes” *very* broadly to include the past—see fn. 5, 9, above.) This point calls for a new objection. If the only feature of the “outcome” that makes a difference is a fact about the past, then that fact’s influence can be seen as a responsive reason. If you are comfortable appealing to past “outcomes,” you are in effect admitting that situations can make a direct moral difference, and so you cannot claim to be “compelled” to see responsive reasons *based* in situations as being reasons of the wrong kind.
I conclude that, if killing is worse than letting die even when narrow outcomes are identical, Action as Production must be false. The consequentializer is drawing moral distinctions that can’t be given a metaphysical basis within Action as Production, no matter how broadly we construe “production.” But without Action as Production, consequentialism isn’t compelling; telic reasons needn’t be the only reasons of the right kind. That completes my argument. Consequentializing undercuts consequentialism.

7. Conclusion

We began with a classic problem for consequentialism, which is that killing is intuitively wrong even in some cases where it has the best outcome (such as Footbridge). The standard line is that this problem is shallow. We can “consequentialize,” insisting that the act of killing is surprisingly bad, and recovering the wrongness of murder by trolley. I have argued that the problem runs deeper.

By consequentializing, we are positing a moral difference between acts that can’t be reduced to prior difference in outcomes. Anyone comfortable with this cannot claim to be “compelled” to see outcomes as the only reasons of the right kind for action. The consequentializers should be open, for example, to the possibility of responsive reasons, like the fact that the person on the bridge has a right not to be thrown off (or expressive reasons, like the fact that killing is disrespectful). If these aren’t reasons of the right kind, then the consequentializer must say why—which is no easy take, if they cannot appeal to Action as Production.

How could the consequentializers respond? One option would be to find something other than the act itself to put the badness of killing in—something like the violation of rights. To say this, however, is to admit that the consequentializing “recipe” isn’t a sure thing. It also raises a dilemma. If “the violation of rights” just refers to the violating act, we are back to stuffing badness in actions. But if “violation” is supposed to signify that rights have intrinsic moral oomph, so that they are unfit
to disregard, we are positing responsive reasons to respect people’s rights and giving up the consequentialist game.

Another option is to tweak the consequentializer’s view of action. Again, there is a dilemmatic tight squeeze. Action as Production is too restrictive for the consequentializers, but if we loosen the view to allow for responsive actions, consequentialism will not seem so compelling; responsive reasons will not seem like reasons of the wrong kind. (Mutatis mutandis for expressive reasons, etc.)

And so we are left with a stark choice. We can have the compelling idea of consequentialism, or we can have the intuitive judgements of commonsense deontology—but not both. In the end, consequentialism is at its most compelling when it lets us get away with murder.

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26 I can think of two more options. One is to find a new positive argument for consequentializing (something in the genre of Portmore 2017). Another is to find negative arguments that cast doubt on the deontologist’s concepts, e.g. that of a responsive reason (such arguments might be found in the literature on the “paradox of deontology,” on which, see Scheffler 1994: Chapter 3 and Chappell 2011.)

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Works Cited


