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NON-MAXIMALISM RECONSIDERED TRUTHMAKING AND THE DEPENDENCE OF TRUTHS ON BEING**

Abstract

Truthmaking non-maximalism usually assumes that some truths do not have truthmakers. I suggest, however, that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically, and that different types of non-maximalism can be distinguished. To do so, I refer to two positions. The first is deflationary truthmaking, some of whose proponents assume that no truths have truthmakers. The second distinguishes between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and moreover do not depend on being. Given the combinations of these positions, I propose a new classification indicating the positions available to a non-maximalist. I argue that one of these positions is particularly worth adopting because of its advantages over the other options.

Keywords: truthmaking, non-maximalism, deflationary truthmaking, dependence of truths on being

Truthmaking maximalism states that:

(Truthmaking Maximalism) Every truth has an entity that makes it true called a truthmaker (Armstrong 2004, Cameron 2008, Dodd 2007, Fox 1987).

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The most prominent theory of truthmaking that recognizes maximalism is that of David Armstrong (2004). He uses a truthmaking principle that ontologically commits to taking distinct entities, called states of affairs, as truthmakers for all truths. In this article, I will refer to Armstrong's maximalist truthmaking principle as the standard truthmaking principle (see Asay and Baron 2020, Tałasiewicz et al. 2013). In recent years, however, one of the leading topics in the discussion of truthmaking has been the issue of truthmaking non-maximalism, which is the negation of the maximalism thesis.¹ Non-maximalism usually states that:

(Truthmaking Non-maximalism) Some truths do not have truthmakers (Barker and Jago 2012, Baron, Miller, and Norton 2014, Baron et al. 2022, Simpson 2014).

Non-maximalism has become a very diverse family of views as the discussion has developed, and simply saying that some truths do not have truthmakers does not seem to capture the full complexity of the debate. I will therefore show the internal differentiation of non-maximalism. In doing so, I will argue that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically on the basis of two premises that are present in the debate: First is the diminishing range of truths that have truthmakers, which can be called a quantitative premise. The second is the diminishing degree of dependence of truths on being, which can be called a qualitative premise.² The first premise is visible, for example, in the position that not only some truths, but no truths, have truthmakers (Rychter 2014). The second premise is visible in the distinction between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and do not depend on being (Baron et al. 2022). A division of non-maximalism that takes into account a combination of these two premises has not yet been proposed in the debate. I argue that these two premises can overlap. As a result, I present a new classification of non-maximalism that extends the existing divisions in the debate. The new classification provides a roadmap of non-maximalism, showing all the options available to the non-maximalist in terms of combinations of the two premises.

I begin with the position that it is possible to account for truth without invoking the standard truthmaking principle, or even the weaker principle of supervenience.

¹In what follows, I am speaking about (non)maximalism, in terms of the (non)maximalism of truthmaking. However, it should be noted that one can also speak of (non)maximalism in relation to other issues (e.g., in relation to maximalism of explanation, see Stamatiadis-Bréhier 2021).

²I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the possibility of using such terminology.

This non-standard position is known as deflationary truthmaking. Deflationary truthmaking can be understood as a kind of non-maximalism, a particular case of which is the position that no truths have truthmakers. Therefore, I outline the development of the debate that led to the emergence of deflationary truthmaking and describe its specific nature (Section 1). I then discuss two former divisions of non-maximalism (Baron et al. 2022, Rami 2009), noting that one of them makes a distinction between degrees of dependence of truths on being (Section 2). I then present a new classification of non-maximalism (Section 3). In the following sections (4–7), I describe the four available positions, using the deflationist positions as an example. I argue for one of the available options, which accepts the dependence of some truths on being and denies it to contentious truths. I argue that it is particularly worth adopting on its merits compared to the other available options.

1. THE EVOLUTION OF NON-MAXIMALISM

In this section, I want to show how deflationary truthmaking emerged from the debate about non-maximalism, and then describe its particular features. I will do this by contrasting it with the first, moderate tendency among non-maximalists that appeals to supervenience. I will also note that a variant of deflationary truthmaking is the view that no truths have truthmakers.

The participants in the truthmaking debate initially had sympathy for maximalism, however they realized that identifying truthmaking entities for some classes of truths seemed to be problematic. For example, which existing truthmaking entity makes the proposition that there are no unicorns true, when it says that something does not exist? Among such contentious truths are:

- *Logically complex truths* (Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984, Rami 2009), like *disjunctive truths* (Barker and Jago 2012, Mellor 2012) or *conjunctive truths* (Mellor 2012),
- *General truths*, such as <every table is extended>³ (Melia 2005, Mellor 2012, Rami 2009),

³I take <p> to mean “the proposition that p,” as is commonly assumed in truthmaking debate.

- *Temporal truths*, such as <Caesar crossed the Rubicon> for presentists, who claim that only what is present exists (Baron et al. 2022, Hornsby 2005, Merricks 2007, Tallant 2009),
- *Modal truths*, such as <it could have rained> (Baron et al. 2022, Rami 2009, Tallant 2009) and their specific cases like *subjunctive conditional truths* (e.g., <if I were a good tennis player, I would not have studied philosophy>, Rami 2009) and *necessary truths* (e.g., the Law of Excluded Middle, Mellor 2012, Rami 2009, Restall 1996) including analytic truths, such as <bachelors are unmarried> (Rami 2009)

and most importantly:

- *Negative existential truths*, such as <there are no unicorns> (Baron et al. 2022, Bigelow 1988, Jago 2012, Melia 2005, Rami 2009),
- *Negative predicative truths*, such as <grass is not black> (Rami 2009) or *simply negative truths* (Barker and Jago 2012, Lewis 1992, 2001, Mellor 2012, Molnar 2000).

Noting the problematic nature of accepting truthmakers for such truths, authors began to present truthmaking principles that weakened the standard one. These allowed them to reject the necessity of accepting truthmakers for contentious truths, and thus avoiding making strange ontological commitments to suspect entities such as reified absences or totality states of affairs. Among the early non-maximalists, the most prominent group of authors used the principle of supervenience (Bigelow 1988, Lewis 1992, 2001, Mellor 2012, Simons 2005, 2010).⁴ The father of the use of supervenience in truthmaking was John Bigelow (1988).⁵

For Bigelow, positive existential truths like <Socrates exists> need truthmakers, while negative existential truths like <unicorns do not exist> do not need truthmakers. It is enough that there is nothing to make them true:

⁴Although even before the theory of truthmaking was seriously articulated, it was already noted within the framework of logical atomism that truthmakers possess only atomic truths and not complex truths (see Rami 2009: 4).

⁵However, already in the foundational text for the concept of truthmaking, i.e., the article by Mulligan, Simons, and Smith there was the suggestion that negative existential truths are true “not in virtue of any truth-maker of their own, but simply in virtue of the fact that the corresponding positive sentences have no truth-maker” (1984: 315).

There are things in the actual world which make it true that there are at least N camels; but there is, I submit, nothing in the actual world whose existence entails that there are no more camels. (Bigelow 1988: 132)

To this effect, he appeals to supervenience, assuming that a truth cannot become false “unless either certain things were to exist which don’t, or else certain things had not existed which do” (1988: 133). In other words, some truths do not have truthmakers, but all truths, whether they have truthmakers or not, depend on being, because according to the principle of supervenience, negative truths require the non-existence of certain entities.

Bigelow was followed by David Lewis. Lewis (1992), like Bigelow, accepts that positive existential truths have truthmakers:

It’s easy to believe that some truths have truth-makers, for instance the existential truth that there are dogs. Dog Harry suffices to make it true. . . . A disjunction has a truth-maker if either disjunct has one. (Lewis 1992: 216)

On the other hand, Lewis (1992) holds that neither negative existential truths (as Bigelow wanted) nor even negative predicative truths do not have truthmakers. In addition, he argues that certain counterfactual truths, certain truths assumed by presentism, and the truth that “the distinction between laws of nature and accidental regularities is primitive” (1992: 210) do not have a truthmaker either. In doing so, Lewis invokes Bigelow’s principle of supervenience, assuming that “no two possibilities can differ about what’s true unless they also differ in what things there are, or in how they are” (Lewis 1992: 218).

The idea of using supervenience in truthmaking was also employed later by Lewis. In (2001) he also adopts the principle of truthmaking, saying that positive existential truths have truthmakers and negative existential truths do not, by referring to Bigelow’s supervenience formulated in terms of possible worlds, that if a certain truth is true in one possible world and false in another, then something exists in one of them but not in the other. However, he goes one step further and elaborates the principle of supervenience by adding the phrase “or else some n -tuple of things stands in some fundamental relation in one of the worlds but not in the other” (Lewis 2001: 612). Thus, without eliminating the possibility of a difference between what exists and what does not exist in the two possible worlds, he also adds possibilities for a difference in the properties and relations of individuals between the worlds. If it is true that a instantiates F , then in the actual world a has the property of F , while in the other possible world a and F exist, but

there is no instantiation relation between them (Lewis 2001: 613). Lewis claims that this is already found in Bigelow, although the latter defends it “somewhat hesitantly.” Thus, Lewis (2001) eliminates the need for truthmakers, not only for hitherto controversial existential and predicative negative truths but also for hitherto uncontroversial positive predicative truths of fundamental properties.

The Lewisian principle of supervenience can be generalized as being predicative truths in general, such as <grass is green>, i.e., *Fa*-type truths attributing properties to individuals. The contribution of Lewis’ supervenience to undermining the standard truthmaking principle is to show that there is no need to accept distinct entities such as states of affairs as truthmakers of predicative truths. However, while Lewis’ supervenience does not commit to the existence of states of affairs that are necessary connections of individuals and relations (or properties), it does require that entities instantiate properties and relations (Lewis 2001: 613–614, Merricks 2007: 68, 96). Non-maximalists who refer to supervenience also include Aaron M. Griffith (2015), D. H. Mellor (2012), and Peter Simons (2000, 2005, 2010).

The group of non-maximalists who appeal to supervenience were the first to challenge the standard truthmaking principle. However, I propose to call this first group of non-maximalists, moderate non-maximalists, since supervenience remains to some extent ontologically committing.⁶

In addition to the moderate non-maximalists, more radical positions that denied the standard truthmaking principle began to emerge from the debate. They posited that the way in which truth is ensured should be further weakened than by the use of supervenience. This radical non-maximalist position can be called deflationary truthmaking (Asay and Baron 2020).

Deflationists about truthmaking often use the slogan “truthmaking without truthmakers” (see Hornsby 2005, Melia 2005, Rychter 2014, Schnieder 2006). For them:

⁶Moderate non-maximalism is associated with the use of supervenience, although there are some other authors who can also be called moderate non-maximalists, such as Asay (2018: 916), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: 31), and Smith and Simon (2007: 81). One can include in this group, among others, those who refer to the concept of truth by default. As Griffith (2022) notes, some propositions such as <there are no Hobbits> do not need truthmakers because they are true by default. In the case of positive existential propositions, however, Griffith still appeals to Armstrongian necessitation (2022: 94). Some proponents of truthmaking by supervenience also refer to the concept of true by default, and so combine the two (Simons 2000: 17, 24–25; 2005: 255–256). Thus, it seems that Griffith’s (2022) view can be understood as a development of supervenience (see 2022: 97, 103–104).

- (1) The notion of truthmaking is philosophically acceptable.
- (2) The notion of truthmaking does not require substantive ontological commitments for its acceptance. (Asay and Baron 2020: 3)

The term “deflationary truthmaking” seems paradoxical. On the one hand, deflationists reject truthmaking. On the other hand, they still use the framework of the acquisition of truth by truthbearers in a certain way. Jamin Asay (2020: 100) even claims that deflationary truthmaking is a “contradiction in terms”! Deflationary truthmaking defines a group of views that emerged, among others, in critical response to Armstrong’s *Truth and Truthmakers* (2004). Numerous truthmaking deflationists reject standard Armstrong-style truthmaking as well as supervenience (which, following Asay and Baron (2020: 7–8), can be collectively referred to as substantive truthmaking). In the twenty years since the appearance of Armstrong’s work, deflationary truthmaking has become much more widespread, and although deflationists reject truthmaking, they still seem to be part of the debate about truthmaking (see Asay and Baron 2020). This is indicated by the fact that the debate distinguishes between a deflationary theory of truth and deflationary truthmaking (see Asay 2020: 99). The question of the relationship between a deflationary theory of truth and truthmaking is treated separately from the question of the relationship of deflationary truthmaking to more substantive concepts of truthmaking (see Asay 2022, Simpson 2021, Vision 2005).

Within the framework of deflationary truthmaking, two approaches can be distinguished regarding the nature of the alternative to substantive truthmaking: one that adopts alternative ontological resources to those traditionally ascribed to truthmaking, and one that appeals to the asymmetrical analog of the T-schema (Tarskian equivalence schema).

The first group maintains that it is enough to reject the substantive truthmaking in its standard formulation and instead use ontological resources available independently of those commonly used in truthmaking theory. Thus, this group of deflationists rejects Armstrong’s states of affairs and tropes (adopted by Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984) as truthmakers, and instead invokes other entities such as individuals or objects and properties that are not connected into states of affairs. Similarly, proponents of this approach argue that it is possible to dispense with the relations traditionally associated with truthmaking theory, such as necessitation and supervenience, and instead use those that we have independently

of truthmaking theory, such as ontological dependence or grounding. This is the line taken by Julian Dodd (2007), Joseph Melia (2005), and Pablo Rychter (2014). However, the status of this approach as a deflationary truthmaking seems controversial. Although they do not adopt the ontological resources traditionally associated with truthmaking (states of affairs, tropes, necessitation), they still refer to some ontological resources. Thus, Asay and Baron (2020: 10) suggest that they are “fellow truthmaker theorists who refuse to acknowledge that they are fellow truthmaker theorists.” In contrast to moderate non-maximalism based on supervenience, they differ in their rejection of truthmakers for a larger class of truths. Namely, they reject truthmakers for positive predicative truths, for which some proponents of supervenience still accept truthmakers. Moreover, some in this group of deflationists believe that no truths have truthmakers, which is also a departure from the scope of moderate non-maximalism.

The second group of deflationists does not use alternative ontological resources. Adherents of this group share the position that all that is needed to ensure truth is an asymmetric analog of the T-schema, which can be called the B-schema (the Because-schema):

(B-schema) $\langle p \rangle$ is true, because p (Asay and Baron 2020: 5).

According to this position, the B-schema is merely a linguistic or sentential device (Asay and Baron 2020: 14). It expresses only a semantic ascent (Asay and Baron 2020: 18) and connects propositional beings. The left side of the schema contains a metalinguistic truth ascription, while the right side contains first-order claims about the world (Asay 2018: 908, Asay and Baron 2020: 8n9, see Hornsby 2005: 33). Proponents of the B-schema want to fulfill the intuition of the asymmetry of truth and being, i.e., accepting that $\langle p \rangle$ is true because p , but not p because $\langle p \rangle$ is true (Perrine 2015: 192), in a way that is not ontologically committing. This position is the most serious weakening of the connection between truth and being compared to the advocates of supervenience and the first group of deflationists. However, Asay and Baron (2020: 12–15) accuse them of accepting that the B-schema is merely an operator of semantic ascent, while at the same time maintaining that truth still depends in some, albeit very weakened, form on being. This group of deflationists includes Robert Audi (2020), Jennifer Hornsby (2005), Fraser MacBride (2014), Matthew McGrath (2003), Trenton Merricks

(2007), Timothy Perrine (2015), Benjamin Schnieder (2006), Jonathan Tallant (2009, 2017), and Timothy Williamson (2013, ch. VIII).⁷

Deflationary truthmaking can be understood as a form of non-maximalism. This is suggested by Mark Jago (2019: 41), who includes Melia (2005) and Schnieder (2006) as opponents of maximalism, while Asay and Baron (2020) treat them as deflationists. In addition, Griffith (2022: 93) lists the deflationists Dodd (2007) and Merricks (2007) as non-maximalists. Deflationists focus on rejecting truthmakers for positive predicative truths (Dodd 2007, Schnieder 2006). However, deflationists also reject truthmakers for negative, modal, or temporal truths (while adopting presentism) (Merricks 2007, Tallant 2009). Moreover, some deflationists argue that no truths have truthmakers (Dodd 2007, Rychter 2014, Tallant 2017). Thus, the strength of deflationism is graded along two dimensions: quantitative (a group that rejects truthmakers for selected classes of truths and a group that rejects truthmakers for all truths) and qualitative (a group that uses alternative ontological resources to substantive truthmaking and a group that uses the B-schema).

Deflationists can be seen as radical non-maximalists, for whom the supervenience used by moderate non-maximalists is insufficient to undermine the standard truthmaking principle. This is supported by Asay and Baron (2020), who, in their list of deflationists, do not mention Bigelow (1988), Lewis (2001), Mellor (2012), or Simons (2005, 2010), who use supervenience as an attempt to undermine the standard truthmaking principle. Similarly, Asay and Baron (2020: 4n5) only mention Lewis (1992) in a footnote, noting that some “find a deflationary spirit” in him, and some do not. This shows that when they write about deflationary truthmaking they have in mind a different tendency among non-maximalists than that represented by moderate non-maximalists.

Supervenience does not radically weaken the standard truthmaking principle, as deflationists proposals do. Many of the proponents of supervenience believe that it does not lead to the rejection of truthmakers for positive predicative truths (Mellor 2012, Simons 2005, 2010, probably Bigelow 1988). Therefore, not every proponent of supervenience takes this step, such as Lewis (2001), who argues that positive predicative truths do not have truthmakers. Deflationists, on the other hand, believe that positive predicative truths do not need truthmakers (and some

⁷Cf. Dodd (2007), who also uses the B-schema, but because of ontological commitments to objects and properties and combining the B-schema with a particular understanding of grounding, he falls more into the first group of deflationists. I take up Dodd’s position further in section 7.

deflationists even believe that no truths have them).⁸ Moreover, supervenience remains somewhat ontologically committing. While it does not commit to the existence of states of affairs as distinct entities, it still commits to the existence of individuals and the properties they instantiate (Lewis 2001: 613–614, see Merricks 2007: 69–70), in contrast to the deflationary B-schema. Therefore, it can be argued that supervenience and the standard truthmaking principle are not substantially different (the standard truthmaking principle is correct if and only if the principle of supervenience is correct). The difference between the two boils down to whether or not one accepts the existence of states of affairs and their having constituents in an essential way (Merricks 2007: 96). In addition, supervenience still provides a basis for rejecting presentism (Merricks 2007: 74, see also Melia 2005: 82). In contrast, some deflationists argue that it is possible to maintain presentism by deflationary means (Tallant 2009).

2. THE EXISTING DIVISIONS OF NON-MAXIMALISM

In the previous section I showed the evolution of non-maximalism. There are two tendencies among non-maximalists: a moderate one and a radical one called deflationary truthmaking. The existence of a position that no truths have truthmakers within deflationary truthmaking shows that non-maximalism cannot be understood merely as *only some truths* do not have truthmakers. In fact, non-maximalism also includes the position that *no truths* have truthmakers.

In this section, I will consider another premise that demonstrates a more specific understanding of non-maximalism. It appeals not to a radical restriction of the scope of truths with truthmakers (quantitative premise) but to a radical restriction of the degree of dependence of truths on being (qualitative premise). In doing so, I will discuss two divisions of non-maximalism that are present in the debate. The first organizes non-maximalism in terms of the classes of truths that non-maximalists deny truthmakers. The second organizes non-maximalism in terms of the dependence of truths on being. It divides non-maximalists into those who reject truthmakers and maintain the dependence of truths on being, and those who reject truthmakers and additionally maintain that some truths do not depend on being. The former division was proposed by Adolf Rami (2009),

⁸Deflationists differ from both moderate non-maximalists, who use supervenience and other moderate non-maximalists in their rejection of truthmakers for positive predicative truths. See footnote 6.

and covers the beginning of the non-maximalism debate, while the latter division was recently proposed by Sam Baron et al. (2022), and thus aspires to cover the entire debate to date. I argue that neither Rami's nor Baron et al.'s division covers all the options available to a non-maximalist.

Rami (2009) divides non-maximalism (which he calls "anti-maximalism") in terms of contentious classes of truths, for which various groups of authors reject truthmakers:

There are three prominent kinds of anti-maximalism that should be mentioned here: (a) logical atomism, which holds that only logically atomic sentences have truth-makers, while logically complex sentences have none; (b) contingent anti-maximalism, which holds that only contingently true propositions have truth-makers, while necessary truths have none . . . ; and (c) synthetic anti-maximalism, which holds that only synthetically true propositions have truth-makers, while analytic truths have none. (Rami 2009: 4)

Thus, the three types of contentious truths that mark the three types of non-maximalism are logically complex truths, necessary truths, and analytic truths. Rami points to Dodd (2002) as a proponent of the second type of non-maximalism, and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005) for the third. On the other hand, as far as the first type of non-maximalism is concerned, Rami does not present the representatives of "pure" logical atomism. He shows that some authors associated with logical atomism nevertheless adopted truthmakers for certain logically complex propositions. For example, Bertrand Russell (1918) adopted truthmakers for general and negative truths, and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922) adopted them for every truth, with only atomic truths *corresponding* to truthmakers. I think that Rami's division is not wrong and adequately captures a particular stage in the development of the non-maximalism position. Nevertheless, it seems that it can be extended according to how the debate develops, based on several factors.

First, Rami's division takes into account only the three classes of contentious truths for which non-maximalists reject truthmakers, and on this basis distinguishes three types of non-maximalism. As he points out, these are the prominent types, so his aim is not to provide an exhaustive division. Nevertheless, his division of non-maximalism can be extended to the other contentious classes of truths. In his text, Rami also refers to general, modal, subjunctive conditional, and negative existential or predicative truths beyond his division of non-maximalism (2009: 15–16). Although Rami mentions some deflationists (Hornsby 2005, Schnieder 2006), he includes only one author who is considered a deflationist in

his division (Dodd 2002, see Asay and Baron 2020: 5). For one thing, it should be noted that some contentious classes of truths, not directly indicated by his division of non-maximalism into three types, can be reduced to the categories listed there (e.g., negative truths are complex truths, and certain modal truths are necessary truths).⁹ Still, his division of non-maximalism can be developed to include the positions of the deflationists, who deny truthmakers for atomic positive predicative truths or truths about the past for the presentists.

Secondly, Rami does not introduce into his division a criterion of the degree of dependence of truths on being (qualitative premise), which is noted by later authors (Baron et al. 2022). It turns out that for some truths one can not only reject truthmakers but also reject their dependence on being.

Third, Rami does not fully acknowledge the criterion for the range of truths for which a non-maximalist denies truthmakers. This is understandable, since Rami's division takes into account the beginning of the debate, when non-maximalists usually denied truthmakers only for some truths. However, the view that no truths have truthmakers has also been proposed (Dodd 2007, Rychter 2014, Tallant 2017).

In addition to the division proposed by Rami, we also find in the debate a second division of non-maximalism. Unlike Rami's division, this division does not list non-maximalist positions in terms of contentious classes of truths that are denied truthmakers, but introduces a criterion based on the nature of the relation of truth to being. This second division, recently proposed by Baron et al. (2022), distinguishes two possible non-maximalist positions. First, the position that some truths do not have truthmakers but depend on being (which Baron and colleagues call weak non-maximalism). Second, the position that some truths do not have truthmakers and are also not depend on being (referred to as strong non-maximalism):

Weak non-maximalists – accept that for some class of propositions, *C*, the propositions in *C* lack truthmakers: but they contend that those propositions nevertheless depend on ontology. More recently, however, there has been a movement in truthmaker theory that maintains that we should accept that some truths do not depend on being at all. We will call this view strong non-maximalism. It is the view that for some class of propositions, *C*, the propositions in *C* lack truthmakers and the truth of those propositions does not depend on ontology. (Baron et al. 2022: 299)

⁹I thank an anonymous referee for this remark.

Among the proponents of weak non-maximalism, Baron et al. (2022) mention Bigelow (1988) and Lewis (1992, 2001), while among the proponents of strong non-maximalism are Merricks (2007) and Tallant (2009).

Baron et al. (2022) aim to show the gradeability of the force of non-maximalism with respect to the dependence on being (qualitative premise). This shows a step forward in the spectrum of understanding of non-maximalism compared to Rami: Non-maximalism is not only described as a list of controversial truths and authors who reject truthmakers for them. It also has a second dimension of the nature of the dependence of controversial truths on being. Baron et al. (2022) grade the dependence of controversial truths on being in a rather straightforward way, distinguishing those that do not have truthmakers but are dependent on being from those that are deprived of even this dependence. For example, negative existential truths, while lacking truthmakers, depend on being, as in Lewis (2001), and temporal truths for the presentist neither have truthmakers nor depend on being, as in Tallant (2009).

By being, Baron et al. (2022) mean a particular ontology, i.e., a list of entities whose existence is accepted by the authors in question, such as states of affairs, tropes, universals, past events, possibilities, etc. This is also indicated by their remark that the so-called “ontology-first” approach is acceptable to strong non-maximalists. Namely, they can first adopt a given ontology (e.g., without past events, as in the case of presentists), and then fit an appropriate truthmaking theory to it (2022: 306–307). This is also the understanding of being that I adopt in this article.

When it comes to their understanding of dependence on being, there is some ambiguity due to their classification of Merricks’ (2007) position as a rejection of dependence on being for some truths. Baron et al. (2022) do not specify that Merricks distinguishes between two types of dependence on being: trivial and substantive.

Merricks’ (2011: 222) notion of trivial dependence on being seems puzzling. Trivial dependence does not bring us into a realm where metaphysical considerations carry weight. Hence, the truth of all propositions trivially depends on being (Merrick 2011: 213). Trivial dependence should not be taken to mean dependence on some irreducible, fundamental, brute, primitive, or basic being (Merricks 2011). Most likely, trivial dependence means only that, for example, “*that hobbits do not exist* is true *because* hobbits do not exist” and not that “hobbits do not exist *because* of the truth of *that hobbits do not exist*.” In other words, the way

non-propositions are does not depend on being true by propositions (see Merricks 2007: 110). Perrine (2015) claims that trivial dependence merely expresses the so-called asymmetry thesis.¹⁰ Merricks (2007) claims that negative existential truths, some subjunctive conditionals, and truths about the past, assuming presentism, depend on being trivially, but not substantively. In turn, truths about the mere existence have truthmakers, and truths about what properties are actually had by actually existing things, supervene on being, so both depend substantively on being (Merricks 2007: 168). Substantive dependence on being, unlike trivial dependence, takes entities (objects, events, etc.) or instantiations of properties as the basis of truths (Merricks 2011: 212). Thus, those truths which are only trivially dependent on being do not commit to the acceptance of certain entities or to the instantiation of certain properties. Not only are they without truthmakers, but even that form of being-dependence which is supervenience cannot be applied to them. It must, therefore, be assumed that when Baron et al. (2022) write that, in Merrick's view, some truths do not depend on ontology, they have in mind not a trivial but a substantive understanding of dependence on being. In other words, Baron et al. (2022) assertion that some truths do not depend on being most plausibly means that some truths do not depend *substantively* on being.

Going further, Baron et al. (2022) seem to understand substantive dependence on being either generally or *simpliciter*, which allows them not to engage in the debate over whether truths depend on being by way of determination, grounding, constitution, supervenience, etc. This allows them to include in their division both positions that appeal to supervenience (Bigelow, Lewis, Merricks) and those that most likely use grounding (Tallant 2009). In addition, Baron et al. (2022: 301) repeatedly use the grounding idiom, which shows that grounding is an acceptable type of dependence that they allow as a model of substantive dependence on being.

¹⁰One can develop an understanding of the somewhat mysterious notation of trivial dependence by referring to the concept of Perrine (2015: 192), for whom the asymmetry thesis means that there are plausible instances of *p* is true because *p*, and no plausible instances of *p* because it is true that *p*. According to him, trivial dependence expresses an asymmetry in thinking about truth. The account of plausibility of the asymmetry is not metaphysical, but is due to the difference between the two kinds of questions: "why is it true that *p*?" "why is it the case that *p*?" and their relevant answers. The schema "*p* is true because *p*" is correct because it correctly answers the first of these questions, while its converse "*p* because *p* is true" does not answer the second question in the best way, since this answer is superseded by more relevant answers (such as the causal story *p*) (Perrine 2015: 196). Unlike Merricks, both sides of the because operator in Perrine's (2015: 192) trivial dependence are propositions.

Merrick's example also provides a good illustration of the difficulty of properly understanding the intentions of the group of deflationists who appeal to the B-schema when it comes to the notion of dependence on being. They want to loosen the connection between truth and being as much as possible for some truths, while leaving their dependence on being in at least some residual form. To maintain this tension, they resort to various solutions, such as distinguishing degrees of dependence on being (like Merricks), or, it seems, distinguishing asymmetry in our thinking about truth from truth's dependence on being (see Hornsby 2005: 33, 42). Perhaps they distinguish between the dependence of truth on being and its ontologically non-committing expression in the B-schema. Deflationists, who appeal to the B-schema should clarify how the B-schema, as not ontologically committing, can be reconciled with truth's dependence on being. Until this is done, they risk ambiguity (as shown by Baron et al.'s (2022) classification of Merricks among those who reject dependence on reality) and criticism (see Asay and Baron 2020: 12–15). A detailed discussion of how to understand the dependence of truth on being in deflationists who appeal to the B-schema is beyond the scope of this section. For now, I take the position, following Baron et al. (2022), that dependence on being means substantive dependence where I do not note otherwise.

Although Baron et al.'s (2022) division of non-maximalism goes a step further than Rami's by introducing the qualitative criterion of the degree of dependence of truths on being, it is possible to develop it further. As I noted in the previous section, there is a view within deflationism that says that no truths have truthmakers (Dodd 2007, Rychter 2014). For one thing, Baron et al.'s (2022) division does not reject the position that no truths have truthmakers (the fact that some truths do not have truthmakers does not invalidate the fact that no truths have truthmakers). However, it is still possible to provide a division that explicitly names two options: "only some truths do not have truthmakers (some do and at the same time some do not have truthmakers)" and "no truths have truthmakers." Adding these two options to the degrees of dependence of truths on being identified by Baron et al. (2022) will show that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically than is usually assumed.

3. THE NEW CLASSIFICATION OF NON-MAXIMALISM

So far, I have shown two ways of weakening the standard maximalist truthmaking principle. The first quantitative tendency has sought to gradually narrow the scope of truthmakers, up to the rejection of truthmakers for all truths. The second qualitative tendency has sought to gradually reduce the degree of dependence of truths on being: from the acceptance of the weaker principle of supervenience, through the more radical proposals of the deflationists, to the acceptance by some of them that some truths do not depend on being.

As a result, non-maximalism is an umbrella term for a complex group of positions that undermine the standard understanding of truthmaking in different ways. The discussion so far has shown that within both the first and the second of these tendencies it is possible to speak of a deepening of the common understanding of non-maximalism. First, the position that no truths have truthmakers is present in the debate. Thus, one can emphasize the fact that non-maximalism, while maintaining that some truths do not have truthmakers, allows for the option that no truths have truthmakers. Second, the mere denial of the existence of truthmakers does not entail that truths do not depend on being. Hence there are actually two possibilities under the term “do not have truthmakers”: the truths in question do or do not depend on being.

The very demonstration of where these two tendencies lead shows that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically than is commonly the case. Nevertheless, I propose to go one step further and combine the two tendencies. Such a combination has not yet been offered in the debate. So, I propose to apply the first tendency of reducing the scope of truthmakers to the second tendency of reducing the dependence of truths on being, and in this way to show the complexity of non-maximalism. In other words, one can apply the distinction between scopes of quantification to the distinction between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and at the same time do not depend on being. This gives us a framework of all the positions available to a non-maximalist (Table 1):

	Some truths do not have truthmakers ⁱ	No truths have truthmakers
All truths depend on being	(A)	(C)
Some truths do not depend on being	(B)	(D)
No truths depend on being	(E)	(F)

ⁱ Here, the existential quantifier “for some” defines the situation in which only some truths do not have truthmakers, while some other truths have truthmakers – analogously in the case of the dependence of truths on being.

Table 1: The New Classification of Truthmaking Non-maximalism

The following positions are available to a non-maximalist when the options are combined:

- (A) Some truths do not have truthmakers and all truths depend on being.
- (B) Some truths do not have truthmakers and some truths do not depend on being.
- (C) No truths have truthmakers and all truths depend on being.
- (D) No truths have truthmakers and some truths do not depend on being.

And positions:

- (E) Some truths do not have truthmakers and no truths depend on being.
- (F) No truths have truthmakers and no truths depend on being.

Although positions (A) to (D) are fully available to the non-maximalist, position (E) should be excluded from the options available to him, while the availability of position (F) is controversial. With regards to position (E), it is not possible that no truths depend on being and at the same time some of them have truthmakers, because having truthmakers already implies dependence on being, so this position is contradictory. Position (F), on the other hand, is at first sight incompatible with the intuition that at least some truths must depend on being. Therefore,

such a position is either highly controversial,¹¹ or requires the introduction of a gradable understanding of dependence on being.¹² Hence, in what follows I will analyze four non-controversial positions available to the non-maximalist.

Of course, a classification of non-maximalism that is an extended list of controversial truths and the authors who deny their truthmakers (i.e., something similar to Rami's 2009 division) would also be valuable. However, a new classification that presents all possible options for a non-maximalist provides more insight into the nature of non-maximalism. Moreover, the new classification is more revealing than the list of controversial truths because it shows the depth of non-maximalism in terms of the degree of dependence of truths on being.

In addition, the new classification of non-maximalism clearly expresses the gradable strength of the non-maximalist positions. Position (A) is the weakest one. It emerged earliest in the debate and is also the most widely shared among authors. The next positions represent more radical options for weakening maximalism. Positions (B) and (C) are of similar strength in weakening the original idea, while position (D) is the most radical option available to the non-maximalist.

4. POSITION (A). SOME TRUTHS DO NOT HAVE TRUTHMAKERS AND ALL TRUTHS DEPEND ON BEING

In this and the following sections, I will present each of the four positions available to the non-maximalist, using examples from participants in the debate. I begin with the more moderate positions, which are the most common in the debate. In presenting the positions, I will focus on deflationary truthmaking to emphasize that it can be understood as a type of non-maximalism. I argue that option (D) is the most beneficial for non-maximalists because it combines the advantages of the other options.

¹¹Trueman (2021: 270) argues that “no truth has a truthmaker, and no fact is grounded.” In my view, however, he cannot accept the position that no truth depends on being, for this would also mean that the position he defends is not grounded. Rather, the purpose of his article is to show that Fitch's paradox, which some authors use to argue that every truth has a truthmaker, can be used to reach the opposite conclusion.

¹²Perrine (2015) points out that although being exists (there are “bits of being” 2015: 191), the asymmetry between it and truth is trivial (except for certain paradoxical cases, which are not even trivially dependent on being), so he rejects both truthmaking and substantive dependence on being for all truths (see also footnote 10).

Position (A) holds that some truths do not have truthmakers, but all truths depend on being. It is chronologically the first and most widespread non-maximalist position in the debate. This is most likely because of its weak character, understood as a relatively minor weakening of the maximalist truthmaking, by denying truthmakers only for selected classes of truths. This is a position often shared both by moderate non-maximalists who appeal to supervenience (including the fathers of non-maximalism, i.e., Bigelow and Lewis) and by some deflationists. I will illustrate this position using the view of the deflationist Benjamin Schnieder (2006) as an example.

Schnieder (2006: 22) suggests that certain essential predicates about objects have truthmakers that are the objects themselves, rather than aspects of objects. In doing so, he invokes Mulligan, Simons, and Smith's (1984) foundational paper for the truthmaker debate, in which they consider whether objects themselves, rather than their aspects (which they call moments), are sufficient as truthmakers for certain classes of truths (predicates in the category of substances, such as <John is a man>, individual existential truths, such as <John exists>, and identities, such as <Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus>). Most likely, Schnieder (2006: 39–42) assumes regular truthmakers for these kinds of truths, and later focuses on another class of truths, namely predicative truths. In connection with these he argues that the entities usually taken as their truthmakers, such as facts, moments, or states of affairs, are not actually truthmakers.

Schnieder gives an example of the predicative truth that Socrates is pale, on the basis of which he presents an argument against truthmakers for such kind of truths. Schnieder shows that the sentence "Socrates is pale because the trope of Socrates' paleness exists" is not a correct explanation, because it explains something more primitive by something more complex. Rather, it would be appropriate to say, in the opposite way, that the trope of paleness exists because Socrates is pale. Only such a statement is appropriate, because in it the complex explanandum is explained by the more primitive explanans, not the other way round. Consequently, the statement "Socrates is pale because the trope of Socrates' paleness exists," which is an expression of truthmaking, should be rejected because it is not a proper explanation. Therefore, tropes cannot be truthmakers. A similar argument can be made against facts as truthmakers.¹³

¹³For a critical discussion of Schnieder's argument, see (Liggins 2012) and (Talasiewicz et al. 2013).

Ultimately, Schnieder rejects truthmakers for predicative truths, opting instead for an explanatory relation (Asay and Baron 2020: 4). In most basic cases, an equivalence schema, i.e., the closest conceptual explanation, is sufficient for truthmaking. For example:

I raise my arm; by (T) it follows that it is true that I do it, because I do it. So, according to my analysis, I render it true that I raise my arm. (Schnieder 2006: 37)

But usually, some further explanation is needed to explain the equivalence schema, which may involve some causal explanations. Nowhere in his paper does Schnieder suggest that the explanatory relation can lead to a rejection of dependence on being. Thus, it should be assumed that all truths depend on being, even if some of them do not have truthmakers.

In addition to Schnieder and the fathers of non-maximalism (Bigelow 1988, Lewis 1992, 2001), position (A) is shared by some moderate non-maximalists: those who appeal to supervenience (Mellor 2012: 104, Simons 2005, 2010: 200–201) and others (Asay 2018: 916, Mulligan, Simons, and Smith 1984: 289, see Dodd 2007: 393n14). In addition, it is an option shared by some deflationists who reject truthmakers only for some truths (Melia 2005: 69 and perhaps Williamson 2013: 397 and Hornsby 2005).¹⁴ Audi (2020: 584) also shares this view, although it is difficult to clearly classify him as a deflationist.¹⁵

5. POSITION (B). SOME TRUTHS DO NOT HAVE TRUTHMAKERS AND SOME TRUTHS DO NOT DEPEND ON BEING

Position (B) goes one step further than position (A). It weakens maximalism by denying some truths not only truthmakers but also the dependence on being. Position (B) is shared by authors described by Baron et al. (2022) as strong non-maximalists, namely Merricks (2007) and Tallant (2009).¹⁶ Advocates of position (B) believe that some truthbearers can be true without having truthmakers and

¹⁴Griffith (2015: 1160n11) notes that Hornsby (2005), Melia (2005), and Schnieder (2006) assume that only some truths do not have truthmakers (while positive existential truths have truthmakers). On the other hand, Asay (2018: 905) claims that Hornsby (2005) rejects truthmakers for all truths. In light of Asay's interpretation and what she writes in some places (Hornsby 2005: 33, 38), her position can be categorized as either (C) or (D).

¹⁵Audi rejects the truthmaking relation, but in some cases writes of truthmakers (2020: 570).

¹⁶Also, by Smith and Simon (2007: 92–95) and most likely by Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: 31, 21n7). For Merricks' position, see section 2, where I discuss it in the context of his understanding of dependence on being. Merricks differs from Tallant in that he accepts a third class of truths that do

without depending on being. On the other hand, these authors still accept that some truths have truthmakers. I will illustrate this position with the example of Jonathan Tallant's (2009) view.

Tallant (2009) argues that negative existential truths, truths about absences, modal truths for the actualist, and temporal truths about the past/future for a presentist do not have truthmakers, nor do they depend on being. Tallant is relying on an even weaker principle than supervenience:

A proposition is true if and only if, either: (a) there exists an entity that makes that proposition true; or, (b) there does not exist an entity and that makes the proposition true; or, (c) there could have existed an entity that would make the proposition true; or, (d) there has existed an entity that makes the proposition true. (Tallant 2009: 426)

His account of ensuring truth has a disjunctive character, which can be extended to other classes of truths. Note that in the first part of Tallant's disjunctive definition of truthmaking there is a statement that there are entities that make some propositions true, which indicates that some truths have regular truthmakers. Regarding the classes of truths that he considers controversial, Tallant defends a position called "no-ground cheating." A cheater accepts truths that do not depend on being, while trying to preserve their truth by modifying his truthmaking principle without properly respecting the grounding intuition. For example, a cheater-presentist may modify his truthmaking principle by adding the phrase "[or] did exist, a fact that makes it [proposition] true" and thus speak of truths about the past while accepting an ontology of only present beings. However, simply modifying truthmaking at the level of principle does not make the presentist extend his ontology to include the relevant beings. Tallant argues that in the case of the presentist, merely considering the past does not commit one to "ontological seriousness" about it. Analogously in the case of modal truths and the actualist (see Tallant 2009: 423–424).

6. POSITION (C). NO TRUTHS HAVE TRUTHMAKERS AND ALL TRUTHS DEPEND ON BEING

Position (C) is an even more radical form of non-maximalism than positions (A) and (B), which assume that at least some truths (usually positive existential truths,

not have truthmakers but depend on being through supervenience, in addition to truths that have truthmakers and truths that neither have truthmakers nor depend on being.

such as <Socrates exists>) have truthmakers. In contrast, position (C) holds that no truth has truthmakers, although on the other hand, all truths depend on being.

Pablo Rychter (2014) can most likely be mentioned as an advocate of position (C). Although he titles his paper similarly to Schnieder (*Truthmaker Theory without Truthmakers*), he assumes, unlike Schnieder, that no truths have truthmakers:

The thesis that there may be truthmaking without truthmakers . . . is familiar. It is the thesis, put forward by several critics of truthmaker theory, that although every true proposition is made true by being, there need not be particular entities (like facts, states of affairs, or tropes) that make these propositions true. . . . But I think we can go further than this: we can also have truthmaker theory without truthmakers. (Rychter 2014: 276–277)

Rychter thus represents a more radical group of deflationists who recognize that no truths have a truthmaker. According to Asay and Baron (2020: 10), Rychter's deflationism "accepts that there are various ontological posits that truths depend on, but maintains that these posits are not of the unsavory kind that are supposedly essential to truthmaker theory." Rychter argues that while the truth of every proposition depends on being, it is not necessary to accept entities called truthmakers, such as facts, states of affairs, or tropes (see 2014: 276). The fact that he assumes maximalism in the theory of truthmaking, which is the starting point of his critique, suggests that he assumes a global dependence of truth on being (see 2014: 277n1).

The substitute for truthmaking in Rychter's view, is some form of dependence on being. Rychter (2014: 279n5) expresses ontological dependence with the term "in virtue of" and claims that it need not be understood as mere supervenience. He argues that the question of how to understand the term "in virtue of" carries over from a form of the standard truthmaking principle (committing to truthmaking entities) to the principle underlying truthmaking without truthmakers. Thus, dependence on being can be understood more strongly than supervenience, for example as grounding, as Rychter suggests elsewhere (2014: 277, 283–284).

For Rychter (2014: 279), there are some entities that do the work of truthmaking, but these are ordinary things that we are already committed to, regardless of whether we accept truthmaking theory. For example, the proposition that Obama is smart is true because Obama exists and is smart. A version of truthmaking without truthmakers, which Rychter (2014: 282) calls proportional and relational, assumes that there are objects, properties, and relations that allow one

to conclude that something is true because the object instantiates the properties and relations.

Rychter presents the concept of proportional–relational truthmaking without truthmakers while countering two objections to his idea. According to the first objection, truthmaking must involve an intuition that each part of being is involved in the truthmaking of different fundamental truths (e.g., snow is involved in the truthmaking of the truth <snow is white> and not the truth <grass is green>). This intuition is difficult to satisfy for someone who rejects truthmakers. To satisfy this intuition, the truthmaker proponent takes the portions of being that are truthmakers as states of affairs. However, Rychter believes that it is possible to satisfy this intuition without committing to additional truthmaker entities. To do so, it is sufficient to adopt an ontology that one has independently of adopting a theory of truthmaking, that is, an ontology of objects, properties, and relations, without going a step further, to invoking entities called truthmakers, such as states of affairs (Rychter 2014: 280–283).

According to the second objection, truthmaking is a grounding relation between truth and features of being. Since grounding is a relation, it requires relata, one of which is a truthmaker. In response, a proponent of proportional–relational truthmaking without truthmakers can assume that grounding is not a binary relation, but a multiple placed relation between truths and features of being. For example, the grounding of the truth <snow is white> is a relation between <snow is white>, snow, and the property of being white, so there is no need to invoke another truthmaker entity as the state of affairs (Rychter 2014: 283–285).

Although Rychter’s conception is formally the (C) position, there is some doubt as to whether his rejection of the standard truthmaking principle is sufficient to identify him as a non-maximalist. Rychter’s theory gives the impression that he is simply trying to accommodate truthmakers (objects, properties, relations) without calling them truthmakers (see Asay and Baron 2020: 10–11). Therefore, one can argue that his proposal only differs in *façon de parler* from the maximalist principle of truthmaking. Nevertheless, in order not to extend the discussion, it can be assumed that the author’s intention is a position which declares that no truths have truthmakers.

7. POSITION (D). NO TRUTHS HAVE TRUTHMAKERS AND SOME TRUTHS DO NOT DEPEND ON BEING

Position (D) is the strongest of the four positions analyzed, radically weakening the relation between truths and being. Julian Dodd (2007), who shares this position, argues that no truths have truthmakers:

By now the moral of the tale should be obvious. Since there cannot be a truthmaker theory that solves the problem of negative truths whilst remaining well motivated, we should give up on truthmaking altogether. (Dodd 2007: 400, see Asay 2018: 908, Audi 2020: 584).

His main argument concerns the problem of negative truths. He argues that they are not dealt with by the theory of truthmaking, which invokes either controversial strategies (exclusion, polarities) or controversial truthmakers (absences, totality states of affairs). He also notes that weakening the principle of truthmaking in favor of limiting it to atomic truths or supervenience (moderate non-maximalism) is not the right solution either (see Dodd 2007: 395–396).

Having rejected truthmakers for all truths, Dodd assumes that truths nevertheless depend on being, as he illustrates with the example of predicative truths. He notes that $\langle a \text{ is } F \rangle$ is true because a instantiates F . According to him, the ontological commitments of this proposition are limited to the object a and the property F , so he concludes that “A truthmaker would not seem to be required” (Dodd 2007: 396). In addition to rejecting the traditional truthmakers (states of affairs, tropes), he also rejects the traditional truthmaking relation (necessitation). For him, the dependence of truth on being, which he articulates in terms of grounding, is expressed in the B-schema ($\langle p \rangle$ is true because p). However, “because” in the B-schema is only an operator, so it does not commit to a full-blooded grounding relation (Dodd 2007: 396–397). For him, grounding truth in being is conceptual rather than metaphysical (Dodd 2007: 400).

As I noted earlier (Sections 1 and 6), the deflationist strategy of replacing traditional truthmaking theory with alternative ontological resources raises some concerns about whether it can really be called a rejection of truthmakers in the strict sense (see Asay and Baron 2020: 10–11). Nevertheless, as in the case of Rychter (2014), I accept that it is the author’s intention to reject truthmakers.

Dodd rejects the truthmakers for all truths and replaces them with the dependence of truths on being. However, he also argues that analytic truths do not depend on being:

The intuition that truth must be ontologically grounded in the sense explicated by (TM) is an intuition concerning (non-analytic) *truth in general*. (Dodd 2007: 394, his italics, see also 2007: 393, 395)

Thus, for Dodd (2007), no truths have truthmakers, and moreover, not all truths depend on being (some depend on and some do not).¹⁷

I argue that position (D), understood as a type of position, is very promising compared to the other options available to the non-maximalist (A), (B), (C). The advantages of position (D) become apparent when considering the full range of options available to the non-maximalist as a result of the new classification. When position (D) is evaluated from this comparative perspective, its advantage over the other options can be determined based on three points.

First, position (D) has a significant advantage over options (A) and (B), which still refer to truthmakers and truthmaking theory for some truths. Position (D) shows that it is possible to talk about becoming true, and in some cases to specify the relevant ontology, without truthmaking. Position (D) is not reliant on the problematic relation of necessitation (see Restall 1996, Schnieder 2006) that Armstrong has proposed mainly in connection with truthmaking theory. Instead, one can use the means at our disposal without truthmaking theory. In particular, position (D) suggests that there is no need to invoke special entities such as states of affairs or tropes that are strongly associated with being a truthmaker. The debate has pointed out significant weaknesses of states of affairs (Betti 2015, Dodd 2007, Rami 2004, Vallicella 2000) and tropes (Schnieder 2006) as truthmakers. The value of position (D) compared to (A) and (B) shows that for truthbearers in all classes of truths, truth can still be ensured without these controversial entities.

Secondly, position (D) has an advantage over positions (A) and (C), which assume that all truths depend on reality. Position (C), on the one hand, takes into account the first point but still assumes that all truths, including controversial classes of truths, depend on reality. Position (D), on the other hand, assumes that some controversial truths do not depend on reality. In this way, it accommodates arguments showing that certain classes of truths require neither truthmakers nor ontological grounds. Thus, position (D) combines two tendencies: the tendency to reject truthmaking for all truths, and the tendency to reject dependence on reality for some contentious truths. In other words, position (D) combines the advantages over position (A) that are expressed separately by position (B) and

¹⁷Most likely, this is also Tallant's position (2017: 166, 206, 193–194). It is also Perrine's (2015) position in terms of trivial dependence on being (see my footnote 12).

position (C). Each of the two tendencies (B) and (C) presents significant arguments that option (D) satisfies.

Third, under position (D), a particular position can be proposed that combines the insights of different groups of participants in the truthmaking debate so far. The proponent of such a position can reject truthmakers by accepting more modest ontological commitments for contingent existential and predicative positive truths (<the rose is red>, <Socrates exists>). For these truths, one can adopt the strategy of the first group of deflationists in the style of Rychter (2014), which is still ontologically committing. Moreover, one can accept the B-schema as ensuring the truth of the other contentious propositions such as negative, modal, and temporal propositions for presentists (<there are no unicorns>, <it could have rained>, <Caesar crossed the Rubicon>). For these truths, one can use the means of the proponents of the second group of deflationists (Hornsby 2005, Merricks 2007, Schnieder 2006). In addition, one can reject any dependence on being for analytic truths (bachelors are unmarried), as some authors do (Dodd 2007: 394, Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005: 21n7, 31, see also Hornsby 2005: 38).

Although negative truths (and other contentious non-analytic truths) do not seem to have truthmakers or ontological grounds in the form of entities alternative to the usual truthmakers, we still have the intuition that they depend to some degree on how the world is. Alternatively, they may depend on truths that depend directly on being. In other words, they are not completely independent of reality in the way that analytic truths are. Applying the conclusions of the first and second groups of deflationists within a single position (D) helps to identify the appropriate task for trivial dependence on being (in the form of the B-schema). This clarifies the issue of differentiating degrees of dependence on being raised in section 2. It seems that within the framework of position (D) there is room for both substantive dependence on being (for existential and predicate truths) and trivial dependence on being (contentious non-analytic truths). In contrast, there is no place for truthmakers.

CONCLUSION

I drew attention to the position of deflationary truthmaking as a form of non-maximalism. I also discussed the divisions of non-maximalism, covering the beginning of the debate (Rami 2009) and the current state of the debate (Baron et al. 2022). It seems that non-maximalism is an umbrella term for a large family

of views, and can be understood more specifically than simply by saying that some truths do not have truthmakers. The weakening of maximalism has many faces and degrees. It is not enough simply to call it non-maximalism, but it is also important to specify what kind of non-maximalism is meant. Thus, after reconsidering the non-maximalism debate, it became clear that a new classification of non-maximalist positions is needed. It emphasizes the possibility of a lack of truthmakers for all truths and Baron et al.'s (2022) criterion of dependence on being. The new classification of non-maximalism that I have proposed (Table 1) provides an effective means of analyzing non-maximalist positions and, in particular, has the following advantages:

- (a) It shows all possible non-maximalist positions in terms of the quantitative criterion of the scope of truthmakers and the qualitative criterion of the degree of dependence of truths on being (provides a classification of non-maximalist positions).
- (b) It emphasizes deflationary truthmaking as a kind of non-maximalism.
- (c) It points out that a distinction must be made between positions which hold that only some truths do not have truthmakers (and some do) and those which hold that no truths have truthmakers.
- (d) It demonstrates the gradeability in the strength of non-maximalist positions.
- (e) It helps to recognize the advantages of position (D), which seems attractive to non-maximalists who want to reject truthmakers for all truths while accepting the dependence of only some of them on being.

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